HL Deb 21 March 1946 vol 140 cc318-27

5.2 p.m.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK rose to ask His Majesty's Government what steps they have taken to implement the general policy outlined in the speech of the Secretary of State for Air in the House of Lords on January 24, 1946, regarding the Ruhr and the Rhineland in accordance with which he staled that those two territories will never again be utilized by Germany in preparation for and as the spearhead of any aggressive attack against the adjacent western nations; and to move for Papers. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, it is now two months since I raised this question in your Lordships' House, and upon that occasion I was informed by the Government that never again would the Ruhr or the Rhineland be used as a jumping-off ground by Germany for aggression against her western neighbours. No explanation or information was forthcoming as to how this was to be ensured, and therefore I do not apologize to your Lordships to-day for having once more brought forward this subject. I do not wish to weary your Lordships with a repetition of the various arguments I used on the last occasion, but I have to refer again to one point. That is, that at Potsdam, where the "Big Three" decided there should be a central administration of Germany, France was not represented. Shortly after the close of that meeting, France submitted that she ought to have been represented, and she stated strong objections to a central administration in Germany being set up before the question of the western boundary of Germany, and especially of the Rhineland, Ruhr and Saar, was determined. The French also claimed that any central administrative and economic machinery would necessarily overlap into the Ruhr and the Rhineland and that this machinery could not readily be disentangled if the Ruhr and the Rhineland ultimately were separated from Germany, as France wished should be done.

Since then, I think it is true to say, France has modified her attitude towards a central administration, but she has maintained her stand very determinedly that nothing of that kind should take place until the question of the western boundary has been settled. That is the position which we have reached to-day. I submit to your Lordships that France is absolutely right and that His Majesty's Government should support France in her attitude and direct all their energies to obtaining a settlement which will merge France's views on this matter with our own. We cannot afford to leave this vital issue in a state of uncertainty, and I am supported in that view by no less an authority than The Times. I con fess that I have not seen eye to eye always with the attitude of The Times in this matter, and I do not quite know what The Times really wishes should be done, but at any rate in a leading article on Germany The Times said: Great Britain has as acute an interest as France in security on the Rhine; indeed the interest of the two nations is one, and is inseparably bound up with that of Germany's other western neighbours. It is well within our memory that after the first world war a form of settlement of Germany's western boundaries was decided at Versailles against the views of General Foch, and a settlement against which, if I may so put it, M. Clemenceau thundered in vain. This so-called settlement finally led us to the devastating second world war, from the tragic effects of which we are still suffering and seem likely to suffer for a long time.

We cannot leave out of account that there may be another German war of revenge on her western neighbours in the future if she gets the chance, and so we must make ourselves so secure on our western side as to obviate any chance of a war of revenge against us. Russia has made herself secure. She has made herself secure by setting the boundary of Ger many at the River Oder. She has handed East Germany, as far as the River Oder, including Silesia, to Poland. She has taken one half of East Poland for herself, she has taken half of East Prussia, and she has taken ideological control of other territories within that area. In short, she has made perfectly sure, as far as she can, that she is secure. What does she say about it? On March 12—that is only a very few days ago—this was said in a broadcast from Moscow: The Soviet Union is determined to guard all her conquests, and she will go the path she has set herself, without worrying about others. Then again, Professor Tarles, the Soviet historian, declared in Izvestia (and Izvestia, as I understand it, is an official organ of the Moscow Government) the following day that: The Soviet Union will not be moved by any threats. It will firmly safeguard all its frontiers. The word "all" was printed in heavy type. That is Russia's outlook on the matter; that is what Russia has done. But we have just as vital an interest on the western side as Russia has on the eastern side. I contend that we must not pay too much attention to what Russia may think about what we shall do on the western side in view of the fact that Russia, I am quite sure, will brook no interference from us in connexion with the security boundaries which she has established on her western side.

From the terms of the reply I received from the Government on January 24, I have very little doubt—and I give credit to the Government for this—that His Majesty's Government wish likewise to ensure security on the western side of Germany; but, owing to the fundamental differences in our methods and those of Russia, and after our experience in con nexion with the Versailles Treaty after the last war, I have no faith that our Government will accomplish this. I feel that I am entitled, therefore, to ask the Government how they propose to ensure security.

A few weeks ago, in another place, in the course of a debate on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Anthony Eden, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs why he did not internationalize the Ruhr as part of the settlement of Germany. Mr. Ernest Bevin, in the course of his reply, evinced considerable sympathy with this proposal, describing the Ruhr as the "heart of Germany" but he refused to be led into any declaration on the subject, on the ground that the whole question was, at the moment, being closely studied, and that he—not his Majesty's Government, but he—had not yet come to a conclusion as to what was to be done.

Since then we have learnt through the Press—not through Parliament—that a Cabinet Committee has been set up to consider this matter. To my astonishment, in that very well known paper the Scotsman, last week, I saw a communication from its London correspondent, who is a very trustworthy and eminently reputable journalist, to the effect that the Foreign Office now viewed with favour the separation of the Ruhr and the Rhineland, but that there were certain difficulties, connected with the political conditions in Germany, which made it uncertain as to what would be done in the matter. This little communication, appearing in the course of the London Letter, which probably most members of your Lordships' House have seen and read, went on to say that a Cabinet Committee had been set up to consider all these questions.

Surely, it is not right that we should get our information through the Press on these matters! Is Parliament not to be told what is intended? Is Parliament not to be taken into consultation about questions of this kind? Two months ago, here in this House, I asked the Government about this question and I have received no information. Yet we see communications of this sort appearing in the Press. Therefore I would like to know—and I ask the noble Viscount, who is going to reply to this debate, categorically: What is our British policy in this matter? I also ask him: Have our over seas Dominions been consulted about it, and, if so, what are their views? They are most vitally interested in this, just as we are, for on each occasion when Germany has overstepped these boundaries they have come out and fought splendidly side by side with us. They have made supreme sacrifices in the same way that we ourselves have done.

I should also like to ask the noble Viscount whether we are supporting France in this matter or whether we are taking an independent line, because I submit that we ought to have the closest possible collaboration with France over this whole question. What really is our policy? I hope that the noble Viscount will be able to enlighten us. In these days of so-called "open diplomacy," as evidenced at the recent gathering of the United Nations Organization, Parliament ought surely not to be kept in the dark, so long about what our policy really is upon this vital issue. It is a matter of vital importance to the British public, and I venture to suggest to the Government that they have the right to know what is proposed for them so that they may be able to discuss and form a judgment upon our policy before it is finally determined. Time drags on, and we hear nothing and know nothing. Indeed, I can conceive, by the way things are going, that finally this country will be confronted with a fait accompli, which Parliament will be forced to accept whether she likes it or not, as happened after the first world war when the Versailles Treaty came before Parliament for ratification. I myself was then a member of another place like the noble Viscount, and I often found myself—I wonder if he did too—having to vote for proposals with some of which I did not agree, including proposals with regard to the Ruhr and the Rhineland as a result of which we found ourselves engaged in another disastrous world, war.

Before I sit down, your Lordships may consider that in view of my remarks it would not be out of place if I made a few suggestions as to what I think Germany's future western boundaries should be. In fact, I think it would be only fair, in the light of what I have said, that I should do so. Whilst I do not for a moment deny that there are difficulties in coming to the right conclusion about these things, I do suggest that there are certain principles which should, or at any rate might, govern this settlement. My suggestions as to these principles—and I am going to put them as shortly and as concisely as I can for the benefit of the noble Viscount and of the House—are: Firstly, that the Ruhr should be separated from Germany and created into a separate State; secondly, that the Ruhr should be placed under the trustee control, responsible to the United Nations Organization, of the neighbouring countries of France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and Great Britain, and, if they will agree, of the United States. As an alternative to this, I suggest that an International Commission responsible to the United Nations Organization, and drawn from the same countries, should be set up to administer the Ruhr.

My third suggestion is that the coal, iron and steel products of the Ruhr should be used for the recovery and general good of Europe, and in assisting Germany to recover her economy, but on a basis strictly divorced from the manufacture of munitions or armaments. My fourth suggestion is that the Rhineland, inclusive of the Saar, should also be created into a separate State, and this separate State should, similarly to the Ruhr, be placed under trustee control or under an Inter national Commission of the same five or six western Powers responsible to the United Nations Organization. Her surplus products should, I suggest, be used in a similar manner to those of the Ruhr—that is, for the recovery and general good of Europe and in assisting Germany to recover her economy. My fifth suggestion is that strategical boundaries should be fixed to ensure the sanctity of those two separate territories. I am not pre pared to say what these strategical boundaries should be. That is a matter which will require expert military consideration. At the same time it is probable that the Rhine, if and where it becomes the boundary, would have to be militarily secured and occupied on both the eastern and western banks and not only on its western bank. My sixth and final suggestion is that any additional population required from time to time for both the Ruhr and the Rhineland, including the Saar, should not be of German origin, but should be drawn from people of other European races. There are many "displaced persons" who are trying to find settled homes, and have been placed in this unfortunate position owing to Ger many's terrible treatment of them. This would be a way of making the population of these two territories, the Ruhr and the Rhineland, more international than it is to-day.

Those are the principles which I believe should govern the settlement of this Ruhr and Rhineland question, but whatever is done should, I believe, be done quickly and firmly and so give Europe a chance to settle down with the nightmare of German aggression once more removed from her doors. The position in Germany is becoming more and more chaotic, politically and otherwise, and some objec- tive and defined policy for dealing with Germany is now a necessity. The longer we wait the more difficult it will be to apply any German policy at all. There is one final point I wish to make. It was suggested in The Times in the recent article from which I have already quoted, that: the international control of the industry of the Ruhr is also perfectly compatible with a policy of leaving the Ruhr under German sovereignty. I do not know what exactly is implied by the words "German sovereignty" but I feel very strongly that if Allied control of the Ruhr is only to be economic and on the other hand Germany is to control politically both the Ruhr and the Rhineland, it will not be long before a centralized Germany has once more seized economic control as well as political control over these two territories. I feel very strongly about that. I cannot believe that it is possible to hand any territory over to Germany and give her political control and expect her in the long run not to take economic control of these territories again. As I have already indicated, it was the indeterminateness of the arrangements with Germany over her western boundary which finally gave her again after the last war full possession and control over both the Ruhr and the Rhineland and enabled her to wage a second world war with such disastrous results. Do not let us repeat this terrible error. If we do, knowing now what we do and having suffered as we have, we should be even more criminally blameworthy than those who let us down after the first world war in 1919. I beg to move for Papers.

5.25 p.m.

THE EARL OF PERTH

My Lords, I understand that the noble Viscount is urging His Majesty's Government to declare the policy which they intend to adopt with regard to the future of the Rhineland and the Ruhr. The same plea was put forward in another place in a recent debate, but I submit that that really is not a practical proposition. In my view you cannot deal with the future of the Ruhr and the Rhineland until you have definitely settled the future of Germany as a whole. With very great diffidence I should like to put forward a proposal which has come into my mind. I say "with very great diffidence" because it is quite clear that in matters of high policy the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs must be far better in formed than anyone who is not in close touch with the Foreign Office machine. But having studied the question it seems to me that it might be possible to set up an economic central body for the whole of Germany, excluding for the time being the Ruhr and the Rhineland. I cannot help thinking that the French might quite well agree to the constitution of a body of that kind and it has been the object of the other Powers concerned to centralize the economic life of Germany. I only ask that the Government will give the point consideration because I think it is one which might be of value. If that happens we could wait for the future developments as regards Germany which will, as time goes on—and we need not be in such haste as the noble Viscount suggests—become clearer.

We may find that Germany is likely to develop into a federated State and the fact that to-day Germany is divided into four zones is likely to be helpful towards a solution of that kind, a solution which I think would be far the best. If Germany really becomes a federated State I believe that the Ruhr and the Rhineland might form one of the federated States but—and here I agree entirely with the noble Viscount—the production of the Ruhr must be inter nationalized and under international control so that it can be used for the benefit of Europe as a whole and not to strengthen Germany. If, on the other hand, we find that Germany is likely to develop into a centralized State the Ruhr and the Rhineland ought to be under international control both from an economic point of view and from a political point of view. Then they ought to be administered and governed by some such international body as that set up under the Treaty of Versailles for the Saar territory. It was called the Saar International Commission and it worked extremely well, considering everything. It would have worked even better if it had not unfortunately been laid down in the Treaty that there should be a plebiscite after fifteen years. The fact that there was to be such a plebiscite kept political passions alive, made the economic position more difficult and rendered the work of the Commission much harder. Therefore if Germany does be- come centralized you ought to set up an International Commission—probably the best form would be something like the Saar Commission—responsible in this case, of course, to the United Nations which would administer and govern the territory. The important thing would be that in that case there should be no definite period laid down. Otherwise I fear that you would come up against the difficulties which were encountered by the Saar Commission.

5.29 p.m.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR (VISCOUNT STANSGATE)

My Lords, I think this debate, as of many in your Lordships' House, has been of great value if only because it is evidence of the very sincere feeling of the noble Viscount in this matter and because of the very interesting suggestions which the noble Earl has contributed out of his experience. I can say nothing with regard to what he said, but naturally it will be read with the very greatest interest in Government circles. With regard to the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, I do not think that, beyond emphasizing his strong feeling in the matter, he added very much to-day to what we already knew of his opinions, except that I think he suggested a transfer of population. I do not remember that being one of the suggestions in his earlier speech, with which I am very familiar because I have read it many times. I do not think he added very much to our knowledge of his views, but merely emphasized them again. I need not tell the noble Viscount that the Dominions are vastly interested in this matter. You cannot deal with the frontiers of Germany without consulting your faithful Allies who responded when the call came. Naturally, that will be one of the subjects for discussion when we have the advantage of having with us the Dominion Prime Ministers in a few weeks' time.

The noble Viscount was good enough to state my case as well as his own, for which I am greatly obliged. First of all, he mentioned that his Majesty's Government are determined that this enormous potential arsenal shall never again fall into evil German hands. Then he went over much of the ground which I intended myself to cover by referring to the speech of the Foreign Secretary in which he explained where he stood, what sugges- tions he had, how far he had gone, and what the present situation was. The Foreign Secretary himself has indicated that an internationalized industrial control of this area would be desirable. He emphasized that the statesmen are always torn between the consideration of security and the obvious need of Europe for the sort of products which the Ruhr can give. He gave a hint that it might be possible to have products partly manufactured in the Ruhr and exported in this unfinished state to other parts of Europe, where they could help to satisfy consumer needs. But of course there always remains the coal and the immense potentiality of steel manufacture there which could be a positive danger. Beyond that, I have nothing to say. We know the French proposals. M. Alphand took them to Washington, where they are being studied very closely. They go far beyond the suggestion of industrial internationalization. It is political amputation and internationalization. On that subject the Government have not yet come to a decision. When they do come to a decision, I have not the least doubt that your Lord ships' House, and in particular the noble Viscount who is particularly interested in this subject, will be informed of the results of their deliberations.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

May I ask the noble Viscount before he sits down: Is the Government, as I asked in my speech, working closely with the French in this matter, or independently?

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

Well, I do not know; there are so many Foreign Office experts here, and I have never been in the Foreign Office. I should imagine they are working closely with what we might call "all and sundry."

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

My Lords, I do not thank the noble Viscount for his answer, because I do not think he has told us anything.

VISCOUNT STANSGATE

No, that is quite true.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

Therefore I do not propose to waste the time of the House in discussing nothing! Before withdrawing my Motion I may say that I propose to bring it up again after the Easter Recess.

Motion for Papers, by leave, with drawn.