HL Deb 23 January 1946 vol 138 cc1071-87

4.53 p.m.

LORD BEAVERBROOK had given Notice that he would call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the dangers to British agricultural prosperity and production inherent in the "Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employment" (Cmd. 6709); and move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords by the Motion which I have put down I am seeking the support of the agricultural Peers-Peers who understand agriculture and take a close interest in it. True, the House has wide interests. There are many bankers in the House—fifty of them altogether. Most of them sit in this side of the House, but when it comes to voting on Bretton Woods they vote with the other side of the House. There are many directors of companies on both sides of the House. They are too numerous to count. Primarily, however, the House is concerned with agriculture and is the guardian of the agricultural interest.

I want to point out that the estimates of the increase of agriculture production during the war period are quite out of proportion with the real facts. It is probably the case that agricultural production during the war has not had the opportunity of increasing by more than 10 per cent., having in view money prices before the war and money prices now, with due regard to the increase in values. The highest estimate that I have heard from any informed quarter is 20 per cent., but for myself I stick to an increase of 10 per cent. The Minister of Agriculture, speaking a short time ago, declared that before the war agricultural production amounted to £290,000,000.He said that at the present time agriculture production was approaching £600,000,000. Very careful estimates have been made of the rise in prices of agricultural commodities, and the estimate that is generally accepted is 104 per cent. If, therefore, you compare the figure of £290,000,000 with something approaching £600,000,000, and hear in mind the increase in prices of 104 per cent. which is generally acknowledged to have taken place, you get no increase in agricultural output at all. I am bound to say that there arc many persons who declare that there has not been any increase in agricultural output during the war. Some say that there has been a great deal put into machinery and much into fertilization; on the other hand, buildings have been allowed to deteriorate in the most shocking way, so that against the increase in agricultural implements and fertilizers you have the decline in the value of buildings. Relating one to the other, many people believe that agricultural production has not increased.

However, whether agricultural production has increased or remained stationary, there is an absolute necessity for more agricultural production at the moment. We must have more men and women on the land. Statistics relating to the war effort show that 100,000 men have left the land during the war. We must bring those men back, and the first step in that direction must be a readjustment of the wages of agricultural workers. Those wages are not high enough at this time. Wages in the United States of America during the war have increased by 170 per cent., whereas in Great Britain they have increased by only 102.9 per cent. You will remember the 104 per cent. increase in agricultural prices to which I referred. It is a fact that agricultural prices have increased more than agricultural wages. We are therefore faced with the need for more agricultural production, for bringing forthwith 100,000 men back to the land, a ad for raising the rate of pay of agricultural workers.

I regret to acknowledge that the new commercial proposals agreed to by the British Govermnent and set out in Cmd. 6709 destroy any prospects of British agriculture in the future. They destroy it utterly. In Chapter III, Section B, paragraph I, provision is made for a "substantial reduction of tariffs." Britain does not send agricultural produce to any foreign country, and therefore Britain is not concerned with the reduction of agricultural tariffs anywhere else in the world. But Britain does import vast quantities of agricultural produce, and, more than that, Britain's agricultural interest is absolutely dependent on those duties for survival. On oats before the war there was a duty of 50 per cent. The oat crops of this country will disappear if that duty goes. On potatoes there was a duty of about 25 per cent. If that duty is removed, the production of potatoes will fall in a most tragic way. Vegetable duties vary' from very little to Too per cent. But all these commodities—oats, potatoes and vegetables—are protected by duties. The Government, under the new commercial proposals, are intending to reduce those duties.

There is, however, something much more serious than duties—the import quotas. We shall hear a great deal about that before long. An import quota is, of course, tile quantitative restriction of an import. It is a system which we have applied to bacon in the past, and the method could be extended to other commodities. The proposals relating to import quotas are to be found in Chapter III, Section C, paragraph I, of this White Paper. But it is stipulated that agricultural quotas shall be imposed in such a way that they do not reduce the proportion of imports from abroad to domestic production. That is stipulated. The basis of import; is fixed by a "previous representative period."

VISCOUNT ADDISON

Where is that? Where are you quoting from?

LORD BEAVERBROOK

I am quoting from Chapter III, Section C. It is on page 6. The relevant words are: Import quotas imposed under (a) of this sub-paragraph should not be such as would reduce imports relatively to domestic production as compared with the proportion prevailing in a previous representative period, account being taken in so far as practicable of any special factors which may have affected or which may be affecting the trade in the product concerned. Have you got the paragraph, Lord Addison?

LORD QUIBELL

Is this a private conference, or have you no objection to some of us joining in this conversation?

LORD BEAVERBROOK

I am not making any objection. I stand for all interruptions. Some people say that I interrupt too much myself, but it is not true.

VISCOUNT ADDISON

I hope the noble Lord will not think me discourteous. I have only been trying to find the passage to which you are referring.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

Of course, I do not. If I have seemed to show any resentment, it was certainly not intended.

LORD QUIBELL

I did not suggest that you were showing resentment. I was only asking if it was a private conference.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

Oh! I am not speaking loud enough. Well, I will try to remedy that. Have you now got the reference, Lord Addison?

VISCOUNT ADDISON

Yes, thank you.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

I am getting a little bit wary, I have all my references with me to-day. Now to continue. This phrase "previous representative period" plainly refers to the pre-war production. There can be no other representative period. There cannot be a representative period during the war. The section means that the import of a commodity into Britain can be reduced only if the home production is reduced by the same proportion. And the home production can be increased over the pre-war figure only if the import from abroad is increased by the same relative amount. In bad times, therefore, we could not deal with unemployment and depression by seeking to enlarge our domestic output of a commodity. For, in such conditions, our total consumption would be stationary—it might even be falling. If the import went down, we would be required to cut down the home production. Cut it down! In such conditions! And in good times, with rising consumption, importing countries would be guaranteed their existing proportion of our expanding market. Home production could only advance hand in hand with the import from abroad.

These proposals, if accepted—as they will be, no doubt—would confer upon foreign countries what they have never possessed hitherto—a statutory right to a market in Great Britain. There has been nothing like it since we had a statutory right to a market in China. It is a new, strange, and alarming project. The effect of it on our farm workers will be immense. If a farmer decides to employ one more pig man—that is to say one more pig man for the service of Britain —then overseas farmers must employ three more pig men for the service of Britain. That is the meaning of the proportion—it is three to one. Every time a pig man is engaged in Great Britain, three must be engaged for our service overseas. Then, again, if, in future, you engage a dairymaid, in Great Britain, to make butter, there have got to be ten dairymaids engaged for our account overseas. If you catch a swarm of bees, a British swarm of bees, then three foreign or overseas swarms have got to be caught. When these commercial proposals are carried through, Lord-Keynes's chickens will come home to roost. But not our hens—under the law a hen for a hen, one in Britain and one overseas.

Why do you give this statutory right to the farmer abroad? Why do you give him a statutory right to come into our market and take his proportion of our market? Because you desire to borrow £1,000,000,000 from U.S.A. That is why you give it. The United States unfortunately has such hundreds of thousands of millions of pounds that it is prepared to lend us this £1,000,000,000 at a rate of interest of 1.65 per cent.—quite a trifling sum and quite a reasonable rate of interest. But 'they say: "Sign here now. Sign here for Bretton Woods. Sign there for the commercial proposals." And then becomes apparent the full meaning of this loan from the United States — this borrowing of £1,000,000,000 at 1.65 or 2 per cent. interest. We agree in consideration of the loan (1) that duties will be reduced; (2) that Imperial preferences will be wiped out; and (3) that agriculture—that is agriculture? in Britain—shall be limited to a production comparable, in all probability, to the pre-war output or at most to 10 per cent. in excess of the pre-war production.

There is no need for such a loan. There really is not. It is quite wrong to suppose that we need that money. It is not necessary to cripple agriculture now in this way. There is no compulsion upon us to send employment abroad in this vast and startling manner —no necessity at all. You may have your dairymaids and also your pig men. £500,000,000 will buy all that we need from America for the next two years. That is the highest estimate ever put on our needs in America for the next two years. It was stated by Lord Keynes when he spoke in the debate a little while ago. I say that we could provide for such a deficit—a deficit of £500,000,000. Contemplate the strength and resources of Great Britain. We have vast stores of raw materials. Our supplies of rubber I have no doubt are sufficient for one year or more. Wheat, sugar, copper and aluminium we have in such quantities as to provide us with what we need to meet our requirements. We have wool on hand sufficient for thirteen and a-half years, and large stocks of cotton and scrap. The Secretary of State for the Dominions was under the impression that I spoke of scrap and the vast store of scrap we have in Britain as machinery. Scrap is most valuable; it is essential to the manufacturing process of Britain. But these are not the only resources we ' possess. We have got enough solid balances in hand to pay the deficit for the next two years. But it is my purpose to appeal to the agricultural elements. I know the bankers on the other side are convinced and determined that there is something in all this business that may be good for them, but we cannot believe it will be anything but horror and disaster to us.

The Baldwin Mission went to the United States some years ago and brought us back the disaster of the gold standard and unemployment. The Keynes journey has brought us a great deal more. It has brought us the disaster of the gold standard, unemployment, the ruin of any prospect of increase in agricultural product I, and the destruction of the economic Empire. Lord Keynes said in this House: "I wish that Lord Woolton had led the Mission." So do I, and so do most other persons. Lord Keynes has inflicted on us the biggest diplomatic muddle we have sustained in a long time. Most of our people think, as a result of Lord Keynes's Mission to the United States, that we are being squeezed, many Americans think that they are being "gyped," and that is the sum total of the Keynes Mission to America. Back he comes to this country, and most of our people are dissatisfied and many o the Americans are dissatisfied too. We may recover from the evil effects of Lord Keynes's diplomatic Mission in time, but horn Lord Keynes's bargain I know no way cut. British agriculture began to prosper when we laid down the very sound principles that our own market here, the producers here, should rely first of all upon the home producer, secondly, upon toe Dominions producer, and, lastly, upon the foreigner. That is all over now.

But I do deplore and regret bitterly the steady deterioration of our Empire economy. Lord Keynes has brought this grief upon all of us. His Mission to the United States in the autumn of 1945 destroys that future prospects of Britain's basic industry, agricultural production, and fastens upon us the outward sign and the final stigma of the liquidation of the British Empire. I beg to move.

5.13 p.m.

VISCOUNT ADDISON

My Lords, I think no member of your Lordships' House would complain of the frankness and sincerity of the noble Lord's speech. The only thing I am quite satisfied with is that he is completely wrong from start to finish. I can assure him that if any one member of this Government thought for a moment that what was being agreed to in Washington, or what may be negotiated under the proposals set out in this Paper, was likely to damage the British Empire in any way whatever, or to damage British agriculture in any way whatever, we should never have consented to it. We are quite clear about that. But I go further and say I think I shall be able to show without much difficulty that the noble Lord has not done us justice by giving the proposals the examination which they merit. However, I know he will give us credit for an equal sincerity and enthusiasm for the British Empire which he himself entertains. There is no difference between us on that at all.

I noted that as an aside the noble Lord made animadversions upon Lord Keynes's Mission to United States and on the question of the loan, but to be quite frank in thinking over what I should say I did confine myself to the Motion that is on the Paper. I might perhaps remind the House of it: To call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the dangers to British agricultural prosperity and production inherent in the ' Proposals for consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employment ' … I deplore, as much as the noble Lord does, the decline in British agriculture which has characterized the last two generations of our time. No one is more sincere than I am in seeing what ways we can devise to put an end to it and to put agriculture on to a sound basis, and I challenge the noble Lord in this way. The Government policy announced on November 17, has, I believe it is true to say, been received with unanimous relief and with much satisfaction by every section of the agricultural community, and I am quite sure it would not have been so received had the dismal prognostications of the noble Lord had the justification which he suggests. What is it that underlies the policy that the Government have announced? It is that we seek to deal with what has been the essential weakness of British agriculture—namely, uncertainty of prices and certainly uncertainty in regard to prices which would give a competent farmer confidence in planning his cultivation. If you are going to have prosperous agriculture you must be able to rely on decent prices. That I regard as absolutely essential. Our policy has been successfully constructed in order to give effect to that. It is because we want to provide that foundation for British agriculture that our policy has taken the form it has.

I am quite sure that if what the noble Lord had said about the effect of tariffs on certain commodities had had the beneficent result which he anticipated, we should not have been confronted with the dismal condition of agriculture which prevailed in this country before the war. That would have been quite evident. Agriculture would have been remedied, but agriculture was not remedied. It got progressively worse and the essential weaknesses of the situation were not dealt with. It is to remove that uncertainty that our policy is designed.

The noble Lord made some statements —and I cannot say I differ from them very much—about the actual increase in agricultural production during the war. It is difficult to ascertain. With regard to liquid milk, although there has been a great consumption of liquid milk, owing to the very proper nutritional programme, the total production of milk has not increased because less milk has gone into processing, less milk has gone into cheese, butter and other things, and more milk has gone down people's throats. The aggregate amount, I agree, has not increased, and it ought to increase. That is what we are aiming at. The same applies to several other products, so that I think there is considerable justification for the misgiving that the total food production of the country did not actually increase as much as some people thought, although the value of it increased in terms of money. The reason for that, of course, is that several of our products such as poultry, the production of poultry, and the production of pigs had to be diminished during the war. They had to give way because we could not get the feeding stuffs, and, therefore, the production of that kind of food diminished. Others, however increased. We increased our cereals because we released more cereals for bread-making and so on. But that is not the point. The point we are aiming at is to develop a system of British agriculture on a sound foundation which will make—not what happened in the war—progressively better use of our land.

Now I want to examine our proposals quite briefly in the light of the Paper to which the noble Lord has referred. Now this Paper contains Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference. The basis of the policy which His Majesty's Government announce is this. We propose to establish a system which will give reliability of price. Those prices, standard prices, will be determined more or less by the arrangements agreed upon in February of each year; they will be determined so long in advance for some commodities, longer in advance for others, because it takes longer to produce certain commodities than it does to produce others. Therefore, the prospective price period fixed in any particular February adjustment will be longer in the case of some commodities than in others, according to the length of time it takes to produce them, and how they relate to agricultural planning. But we do propose to establish a price, which the farmers will know some considerable time in advance, and to maintain that price by the system which it is proposed should be established. There is nothing in this Paper from start to finish which prevents our giving effect to that policy. Let us he quite clear on that.

I may say I myself was very much concerned with the meeting which dealt at this end with those proposals so far as they affect home production of food, and the one thing which we made a condition from start to finish was that we should be enabled to carry out our scheme of agricultural policy. There is nothing in the Paper to prevent our doing that. Now, on what is that price stabilization mainly dependent? It depends on a combined system, if you like so to describe it, of State trading combined with the fixation of a price which may contain within it, as for instance the present cost of living prices do, something in the nature of a subsidy. Now, if noble Lords will refer to the Paper, they will find at the bottom of page 8 a paragraph dealing with State trading and one dealing with subsidies at the top. It is well known that by the control which the Ministry of Food can exercise over the bulk—the whole—of commodities and the releasing of them on to the market, we can control, and do control, the price. I need not go into the technicalities of the machinery. We propose to continue that system for stable adjustments.

In the case of wheat, under the original Wheat Act all the wheat was, let us say. pooled by the purchasing commission, and the price of flour was prescribed so as to provide for the sale-price of the flour and give a price for the home producer of the wheat. That is how it was arranged, and it has been working quite smoothly for several years. Well, you can do it that way. There are various ways of doing it, either by State purchase or by working—as we often shall, I am quite sure—through trade organizations on an agreed plan. At all events, there is nothing in this Paper either in the para- graph dealing with State trading or that dealing with subsidies which prevents our carrying on on that basis.

Take a simple illustration: take State trading. We have been accustomed to buy, and I am sure shall continue to buy, large quantities of New Zealand butter. There is nothing here to prevent our continuing to purchase New Zealand butter in bulk, which we propose to do. That particular illustration, I may tell you, was sent to Washington and tested out in full, on my own particular suggestion that we should have nothing in it which would, for example, prevent our buying in bulk New Zealand butter. There is no doubt at all them is nothing in this document which prevents our continuing to do it, and. we propose to continue to do it. Of course, as your Lordships will see at the top of page 9, you have to be directed by commercial considerations of an ordinary, sensible kind, but, subject to them, we can buy New Zealand butter without any restriction or difficulty. We are old customers. We arc their customers. it is the kind of preference in which I rejoice. I cannot imagine any better kind of preference than our being willing to buy their goods. That is a very effective form of preference. Other things being equal, unless here is something uncommercial in the transaction, I am 'quite sure that this country will prefer to buy Dominion products, and there is no reason why we should not. In this Paper there is nothing to prevent our doing so.

Therefore I can say, without elaborating the details—of which I have many in front of me provided by the Department—that there is nothing in this Paper which prevents our giving effect to the agricultural policy which we have propounded and which, I suggest, will lay the foundation of a prosperous and stable agriculture n this country. And I am not there expressing a Party view. I see that that has been supported by men of all Parties as well as by the leaders of the National Farmers' Union. I can confidently claim that so far as that is concerned, the noble Lord need have no misgiving.

As to increase in production, I agree that we must aim for a greatly increased production. We can produce more, and we ought to do so. The noble Lord drew some fancy picture about there being one dairymaid here and so many in the Dominions. Now take the case of milk: what is the Government policy? I do not even claim it as the Government policy —what is the national policy? It is that on health account people should drink more milk. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Llewellin) took a very active part in encouraging people to drink more milk and to get better milk, and all honour to him for it. It is not a Party matter at all; we all agree that it should be done. What does it mean? It means that we should encourage our live stock, our milking herds, and I hope that not only will there be more of them but that they will be of better quality. What is wanted is that we should get more milk per cow per day, and that is what the scheme for the improvement of live-stock production will aim at, so far as that part of the matter is concerned. We want better cows, better treatment, better feeding, and better yields. I say that the day is not foreseeable, not even if we have a very large increase in our milking herds, when we shall produce much more liquid milk than the people ought to drink, and I think that is a moderate statement. People ought to drink very much more than they are doing—children, mothers, and everybody—and it will require an immense increase in our milking herds to produce it.

What does that mean? It means that there will be less milk for butter and cheese. Is that going to diminish our imports from the Dominions? Is it going to damage any Dominion? If our livestock and nutritional policy is persisted in, we shall have to buy more from abroad, because we want our milk to go straight down people's throats, and not so large a proportion of it to be turned into butter. Some day, when the milking herds have sufficiently increased, we shall produce more cheese and more butter; but in the immediate future, if our nutritional policy is to be sound, we want a great increase in milk consumption, and that will mean that a smaller proportion will be available for other milk products. It will also mean that we shall have to continue to import milk, and, for my part, I would rather get it from our Dominions, so far as we can, than from anybody else. We are just as sincere as any noble Lord in that desire. And there is nothing in this policy to prevent us doing it. We propose to do it, and I have no doubt we shall do it.

So far as other increases in farming are concerned, they are all urgently required 'in many directions, particularly in that of live-stock production and ancillary products. Nothing is more urgent than to increase our production of bacon if we can do so, because the pig produces more food more quickly than any other animal. But we have not the feeding stuffs for them now, and I am afraid that, with the present prospective shortage of wheat, I do not see that we shall have those feeding stuffs in the near future. I wish we could have them. At all events, there is an immense room for expansion without any interference at all.

The only point the noble Lord made in that regard was in connexion with the quantitative regulations mentioned on page 6. If you read the first two lines of the paragraph, you will see that these quotas to which the noble Lord refers relate to "agricultural products imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of Government measures which operate (a) to restrict," etc. In other wards, the whole machinery of this paragraph relates only to those cases where import quotas are imposed for the purposes there set out. Does anybody imagine that import quotas for that purpose will be imposed on our main agricultural products? It is practically unthinkable. Where any product is dealt with under the State organization and imported freely for feeding the people, that paragraph does not apply at all. I asked this morning for a case where it did apply, and in which it would be likely to apply in the future, and the only illustration thought of was that of raspberries. They said that it was conceivable that we could have a terrific crop of raspberries, and therefore should say, "We are not going to take any more raspberries." We would put a quantitative regulation on raspberries going on to the market because we had a glut. But as to the staple foods of the people, they will not come into this matter at all. They will be dealt with under the price regulation machinery, which will be operated by the Government. This exceptional procedure does not apply to them. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, he is conjuring up a bogy which remains a bogy and does not apply at all.

I have been through the rest of this Paper, and, frankly, I anticipated quite a number of challenges on other points, and I am grateful to the noble Lord for confining his challenge to so narrow a limit. I have dealt with the power to have a concealed subsidy, as we have now, and as I think we must continue to have. Take, for example, the operations of the Ministry of Food. That Ministry has acted on the principle that certain prices will be given to the producer, but the consumer will be charged only so much. That implies a subsidy in fact, because it is done to prevent a rise in the cost of living. The State has spent its money in that way, and let us hope that very substantial reductions will be possible. But that has been a great public end, and I think, on the whole, notwithstanding the great cost it has involved, it has been abundantly justified. It has prevented the starting of that rising spiral of prices which would lead to inflation—at any rate, it has put the brake on. Just imagine, for a moment, what would happen to prices if we were to release all these controls. I am quite sure the prices on the market would be vastly more in many cases than those which have been paid to the producers. They would soar to a very shocking figure, if it were not for those controls. We have paid for the restriction on the rising of the cost of living in this way, and I believe myself that our expenditure is well justified. That. however, is a war expedient; it does not relate to the long-term policy which, I hope, we shall gradually develop.

I would like to say, so far as this commercial conference is concerned, notwithstanding what the noble Lord has said, that it had no relation whatever to the negotiations for the loan. The loan was not agreed to or discussed with this as a condition. That is an entirely truthful, honest statement. This was not a price for the loan; it had no relation to it. As a matter of fact, if one studies this document, what is it? It means that the parties concerned will enter into a conference and they will agree, if they do agree, to reductions in tariffs—or, it may be, preferences—provided they get what is to them a satisfactory equivalent. We ourselves and each individual Dominion will go to this conference with completely free hands. I have said this before; the statement which we prepared with great care and which was issued at the time made it plain. Everybody will go to this conference, with these excellent objectives in front of them, with a free hand. If they feel they can make a bargain which it is in their interests to accept, I am sure everybody would rejoice if they succeed in doing so. The main purpose of this conference is to abate artificial barriers to world trade, to do what it can to make food and other commodities flow more freely in the world. Every nation entering into the conference will do so freely and will give no undertakings or enter into no bargains except those which they themselves are satisfied are good bargains. Nothing could be freer than that. I an quite sure there is everything to be gained and nothing to be lost by bringing the nations of the world together to see if they cannot between thorn agree upon a better system.

So far as our own agricultural policy is concerned. I have complete confidence in assuring tine House that there is nothing in this which prevents our giving full effect to the policy for the stabilization of agricultural prices, for the providing a firm foundation for the development of agriculture, which was announced by the Government and which has been welcomed by the farmers and by men of all political Parties.

5.44 P.m.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Viscount it for the manner in which he has dealt with my question. I do not accept his interpretation of the clause under discussion at all. There are only three methods by which we can deal with imports—duty, quota and State purchase. State purchase is subject to severe restrictions. In Section E on page 8, it is said: Members engaging in State trading in any form should accord equality of treatment to all other members. To this end, members should undertake that the foreign purchases aid sales of their State-trading enterprises shall be influenced solely by commercial considerations, such as price, quality, marketability, transportation and terms of purchase or sale. That confines State purchase to the market where the goods may be purchased at the lowest price,

VISCOUNT ADDISON

No.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

At the lowest price subject to certain other qualifications; and price is one of the qualifications upon which the purchase say be made. That agreement strictly limits and confines State trading, so that State trading comes within the orbit of tariffs and of quotas. That is the intention of it.

I have listened to the noble Viscount, and I have learnt from a long experience of him to depend absolutely on what he says, but unfortunately he is giving an entirely different statement in relation to these commercial proposals from that given by the President of the United States only yesterday. The President of the United States, in sending his message to Congress, associated these commercial proposals with a plea for the loan. The two march together, and in fact everybody knows all three are marching together. I accept absolutely the honesty of the statement of the Secretary of State. I accept the honesty of the statement of Lord Keynes when he says that what we are shortly to embark upon is not the gold standard; while I find the Economist, for instance, saying it is the gold standard. Here we have the case of the Americans saying the commercial proposals are tied to the loan and the Secretary of State saying the commercial proposals are not tied to the loan.

State purchase cannot buy more than a certain quantity of a commodity in relation to the amount of that quantity imported before the war. The noble Lord speaks of milk. Of course we can increase milk output by increasing the output of the beasts. Of course we can increase milk output, and we shall undoubtedly do so as our herds are raised in quantity, but the moment we raise milk output beyond certain levels which have relation to this period preceding the war we must give way in agricultural production in other products to make allowance for the increase in production of milk. It is the desire of myself and of men like me that we should not only produce the milk to the greatest extent but likewise the butter and the cheese. It is, of course, the real meaning of the whole transaction that in future the foreigner and others overseas shall have the statutory right to participate in our market subject only to certain agreed percentages in excess of the prewar production. If the noble Viscount will look deeply enough and closely enough into it he will find that that spirit has animated the whole of the negotiations from the very beginning. It is my inten- tion to follow the procedure of this House and to ask leave to withdraw my Motion. It seems a very odd process but none the less I conform to it, with some reluctance. I thank the Secretary of State for all the trouble he has taken to prepare an answer.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.