GERMANY.

HL Deb 23 October 1945 vol 137 cc412-40

2.55 p.m.

LORD VANSITTART rose to call attention to unsatisfactory features in the conduct of affairs in Germany; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise in no captious spirit. I do not wish to embarrass the Government, because I recognize the magnitude of the tasks ahead of them. I recognize, also, the good work done by the Army of Occupation, the Military Government, and the Commission of Control. I am glad to see in this morning Press that the two latter are in process of merging, but I have thought that some frank comment on the matters uppermost in my mine might be helpful rather than the reverse. For the benefit of the noble Lord who wilt respond on behalf of the Government, I might say at once that I am not so unreasonable as to expect a detailed reply on the spur of the moment to all the points I shall raise, and, while I should be grateful for anything he will be willing to tell me, I shall be quite satisfied with an assurance that the points I am going to raise will receive full consideration.

They fall under six heads. The first is this. At Potsdam the Big Three declared in favour of the decentralization of the political structure of Germany and the development of local responsibility. Those were the exact words. They also said that, for the time being—a rather ambiguous phrase—they would create no central Government, but they did say, at the same time and in the same paragraph, that they would set up a number of central administrative departments under German Secretaries of State. There is room, perhaps, there for some confusion, and there are, indeed, in the body of the Potsdam Agreement, other phrases that lend themselves to a certain amount of misunderstanding. For example, paragraph 12 says that at the earliest possible moment German industry shall be decentralized, whereas paragraph 14 says that for the duration of the occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit.

Of course, much depends on the rate and date at which a central Government is set up, and still more will depend on its powers when it is so established. I think we should all be agreed that, as laid clown at Potsdam, the Germans must learn to govern themselves locally; that, therefore, a central Government should be the last of our creations, and that, even when it does come into being, its powers must be most strictly limited and defined. After the last war we allowed a centralized Government to come into being under a new label, and we know the results. We do not want a strong central Government again. When, in the course of the war, it was given out that after victory the Control Commissions would be set up in Berlin, I protested in this House. I said that should have been the last place to be chosen, and that it might be the prelude to a new centralism. I received from the Government of the day ample reassurance on that point, and I hope it is well-founded. Indeed, I think it would be only reasonable to suppose that the zones can be co-ordinated and relaxed without any premature recourse to centralism. As it is, we understand that the French are protesting against any haste in this matter, and, in the light of experience and on the facts available, I have no doubt that they are right, and that we should support them. My only suggestion would be that a few more of the facts should be made available.

That brings me, very naturally, to my second point: the evils necessarily arising from the zone system. The zone system was a mistake both in principle and in detail. I hope that some of its rigours may now be mitigated, at least in three of the zones. Hitherto, undoubtedly, the zones have been too sharply cut off. Commerce across the lines has been largely by barter; personal and postal communication has been a matter of the utmost difficulty, and often impossible. The Russians have clapped down their curtain so hard that hitherto it has been impossible for us even to send search parties across the line to seek for missing British prisoners of war. We were told on the air only last night that no uniform system of justice is possible in Germany owing to the differences between the zones, and particularly in the Russian zone. I am afraid that most of us have reached a stage when we expect little else, but it is rather a grim little commentary on the hopes of those who, like myself, had in the course of the war really come to hope for all-in co-operation at the end.

Moreover, the zones lead to the enactment of conflicting ordinances in neighbouring regions. They lead also to a different pace in the setting up of trade unions and other democratic bodies. I have no doubt that in a matter of that kind there is a golden mean, but golden means are not easily discovered behind iron curtains. Moreover, so long as curtains exist different policies will be not only pursued but imputed, and some of these suppositions are both unhealthy and dangerous. I do not propose to dwell on them to-day, because I am dealing with facts and not with hypotheses. It will be sufficient to say that some of these hypotheses are greatly nourished by perpetual speculation on the possibility of premature evacuation, first by the Americans and then by ourselves. I wish that the speculators in that realm would desist; these speculations do much harm.

It was like a breath of fresh air when, on October 12, General Clay, of the United States Control Commission, said that the occupation of Germany would have to go on for a generation, because that is exactly what all of us who know our stuff have said. He- added "The Americans will be here for a great many years." I hope he is right, and by the same token I think it would be highly advisable that we ourselves should make some declaration of policy regarding the approximate length of the occupation. It is the only basis on which it is possible to recruit an adequate control service. You have to give the members of such a service some prospects and some security; otherwise the process which is at present in train will continue, the best people will go out, and ultimately you will be left with nobody. That process, in my submission, can be arrested only by a declaration of policy.

Again, the zones militate against reparations; and here I come to my third point, and must touch on economics and industry. Here there is in fact, I think, and not only in prospect, a cleavage of Allied policy. The Russians have swept the country pretty well clean. They have cleared out all the industrial and a great deal of the agricultural machinery; they have driven off all the cattle, and they have deported a great number of skilled workers. That is no policy of loot; it is a perfectly logical, well-calculated policy of depletion and de-industrialization. The figure quoted for production in the Russian zone in September, 1945, is said to be somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent. of the figure for 1944. The Americans have followed a middle course. They have not indulged in the sweeping social and structural changes operated by the Russians in their zone, but they have followed the policy of depletion to a certain extent, as your Lordships will have seen from General Eisenhower's last report, where he put the number of factories working at about 15 per cent., and production at about 5 per cent. Curiously enough, the Russians hardly seem to realize that, because they frequently criticize the Americans in the same breath as ourselves.

What about the British zone? It is possible that the policy there may be somewhat influenced by the talk that I continually hear in this country to the effect that it may not be wise to de-industrialize Germany to the extent foreshadowed at Potsdam. Your Lordships will remember that paragraph 13 of the Potsdam Agreement states that primary emphasis will be laid on the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. The argument which is frequently put forward nowadays is that it would be rather well, on the contrary, to rehabilitate German industry, on the plea of reparations; and, when the plea of reparations does not seem to work, people throw in the argument of the welfare of Europe. I should have thought that Europe had had just about enough "welfare" from German heavy industry. Are not two bloody wars enough "welfare" for any one? At any rate, there you have cleavages, and you can hear continual comments about it on the Russian side. If you want a typical example, you can look at Soviet News of October 11; but you can see it at almost any time in the Press or hear it on the air. Here, too, I should have thought that there was a golden mean, but again the iron curtain is no help.

When people talk of rehabilitating German industry, exactly the same question immediately presents itself as in the case of any reversion to centralism, and that question is, how far? A great deal of misunderstanding arises because people will endeavour to generalize about German industry. I say that you cannot do that; you must be specific and concrete and proceed by categories. For example, we should all agree that the maximum amount of coal should be produced in Germany; but let us look at some of the other categories of industry. I deliberately choose some of those which have not been most prominent in recent discussions. Let us take, for instance, the case of ball-bearings. We were told about six weeks ago that all the plant at one of the headquarters of this industry, at Schweinfürt, had been dismantled. I am not at all sure that that is so; I know that one plant has been dismantled, but I do not know about the others. The question immediately arises of how much ball-bearing capacity is to be left to the Germans. Is there a co-ordinated Allied policy on ball-bearings? I think that the answer would be very difficult to give, seeing that most of the plants lie either in the American zone or in the Russian zone, and only one small roller-bearing plant is in our zone. In any case it is difficult, as usual, to get an answer through the curtain.

Take another case, which we can all see, because it is on this side of the curtain—the watch and clock industry, in the Black Forest, which has beer turned over to the making of fuses. There there is a very curious and remarkable state of affairs; not only is that industry intact, but it has three times the number of machines that it had in 1939—all spanking new machines—and plenty of raw material. I should imagine that the most strenuous advocate of the rehabilitation of German industry would hardly propose that Germany should be left with three times its fuse-making capacity.

Again, take the question of synthetic rubber. This is a matter of which I have often spoken in the past up and clown the country. I always assumed, and I think that most reasonable people assumed, that synthetic rubber, being a definite part of the German war potential, would be prohibited after victory. Is that so? Is I: going to be done? I should be very glad if that question could be studied and an answer given at leisure. For instance, does the disappearance or the disruption of I.G. Farben involve the disappearance of the Buna Industrie? Because Buna was the creation and monopoly of I.G. Farben. Apropos of that, I should like to congratulate all concerned en the destruction of LG. Farben, which was one of the most dangerous monsters which has ever existed in the world. I am very glad to see that it is being destroyed, but I still have a couple of questions to ask about that. What about its roots in the so-called neutral countries? Now Switzerland is full of them, and it is still more essential to grub them up in countries like Spain and the Argentine. Unless they are grubbed up we shall have plenty of trouble in the future.

I would also be glad if it could be laid down as a matter of policy that once the monster is disrupted its production at home will be limited to German requirements. The British and the Americans can well take care of world markets. If you allow the monster to swell up it will become dangerous again. For anybody who wishes to rehabilitate German industry the foundations are all there. In the month of June a distinguished American, Mr. Leo Crowley, published a report of which that was the upshot and substance. He listed a great number of categories, but, for the sake of brevity, I will mention only one. That is the machine tool industry—another very definite part of the German war potential, and also a subject upon which I have spoken frequently up and down the country. On that, he said—and here again I give his exact words—that "with the exception of the United States, Germany is still the great armament machine shop of the world." The substance of that report was recently confirmed by General Clay. Is there, therefore, going to be a machine tools' co-ordinated policy? It is highly desirable that there should be. In that same month of June the Kilgore Sub-Committee of the United States Senate, which has done admirable work, also published a report of which the general effect was that German productive capacity was as to 75 per cent. unaffected and could easily re-expand. That, again, was recently confirmed by General Clay. So we can see that there is every facility for making our old mistakes again if we wish to do so.

I come to my fourth point, which is that of personnel. Again I will be quite specific as to what I have in mind; I do not wish to indulge in any generalizations. Supposing I had here in my hand a list of the directors, say, of the A.E.G., Allgemeine Elektrische Gesellschaft—well, as a matter of fact I have that list at home—I would say that the mass of the people on it are either unreliable or tainted. How far have they been swept away? It might be a sort of rough test case, I suggest. I have no information on the subject, but I would not be too confident of the answer at the present time. I must confess that my heart sank a few months ago when I saw that Hugenberg, who ought to be on the list of war criminals, had been called in for some economic consultation. My spirits went up, though, when I saw that forty industrialists had been arrested in the Ruhr. That, of course, is too little, but it may not be too late. But my spirits went down again the other day when I read—again in the Soviet News—that Dorpmueller, the ex-Nazi Minister of Communications, and a man who, I think, figures on the list of war criminals, had been engaged for some advisory job. Really, I simply cannot believe that, and if it is not true I think that a denial should be published at the earliest possible moment. If it should be true, I suppose the answer would be that the man knows a great deal about railways—and he certainly does.

That brings us, immediately, to another point which has sometimes been called the managerial-counter-revolution, that is the key-men and experts and technicians, the men who know all about the running of banks, factories, railways, public utilities and general administration. In the past, even before Nazi times, a great many people of that type used to give out that they were, oh, so non-political, but in point of fact they nearly always backed power politics, and I would be glad to know if there is any prospect of getting rid of the bulk of these people fairly soon. I quite realize the difficulties in the way, but, as in the case of the big industrialists, I do not believe that we shall get rid of the malpractices until we have got rid of the type.

I take next the matter of the police. The police, of course, have been brutal and tyrannical since long before the Nazi period, and I am sure that a great deal of purging and eliminating has gone on. But it remains a fact that there are too many of the old type still in service. That leads to too much snooping and bullying, which is not advantageous from our point of view, because it will make information harder to get and may also increase the risk of collusion with subversive elements. We pass then, perhaps, to the Nazi-ish minded officials. Again, I am-sure that a great deal of purging has been done. The Americans, I think, say that they have weeded out about one in three. I am not sure that that is enough. After the last war we did leave a great many persons of this type in office, and, again, we know the results. In spite of purging and weeding that is going on, some estimates of the percentages still left in office, which I have seen recently, are rather disquieting. Further, I would say that too much emphasis has sometimes been laid upon, and too much confidence has been reposed in, the remnants of the old Catholic Centre Party. Their political party is a power one and they are unreliable. It is not my business to delve into General Patton's troubles, but I think that part of them at least come from that, and that under cover of this organization some real undesirables get in. I fear—in fact I have been told—that the same type of person sometimes enjoys a little too much attention in our zone as well. This is because of very insufficient sifting, or perhaps I had better use the more popular word screening, which applies to coarse material too wide a mesh. For that I am blaming nobody.

I do not think that the personnel which exists is adequate. You need, of course, a good number of good German-speaking sleuths to carry out these inquiries, and I think that their numbers baldy need reinforcement. While they are not reinforced that leads to too much reliance on the signing of pledges and forms which mean very nearly nothing. Again, while it is an absolutely essential test whether a man is a member of the Nazi Party or not, of course, it is not wholly satisfactory because a great many dangerous people managed to keep out of the Party. Another test, such as whether a man was a member of the Party before the year 1933, may very well prove to be entirely fallacious. In other words, I think we need more investigation and more investigators. The investigators should be reinforced. At the present time we are still too likely to be deceived, for that among many other minor reasons, with which I will not weary your Lordships to-day.

I frequently receive from officers serving in Germany indications that they feel that the prestige of conquerors is gradually slipping from us. I do not think I can do better than quote to you two sentences from a letter I got from Germany only the other day. The writer says: The Germans often take us for fools and sometimes show it. Everywhere we are up against the well-meant humility"— I particularly ask your Lordships to dwell on those words because they are a perfect expression in two or three words of what others have tried to say in more words— and decent kindliness of the British. We are performing the material disarmament but the more important: moral disarmament often seems to us to be going the wrong way.

I will now come to my fifth point, which is the control of war criminals. There, I think, progress is painfully slow. Time does matter because we cannot go on for ever trying war criminals. In the course of this war I have made several speeches in this House in which I have pointed out that there would need to be after this war one of the biggest purges in history, that scores of thousands of Germans had forfeited their lives, and that if we were not sensible in dealing with them the roots of the evil would persist and that that would be fatal both to justice and security in Europe. What has happened? Largely what I feared; up to date mighty little has happened. So far nobody has been executed, although we are now six months from VE Day. We can do a little sum in our heads and see the result. It would be quite improper to prejudice the end of these trials—indeed, I do not see why some of them should ever end, especially if, as we heard yesterday, the Americans are going to put in 25,000 documents. To hypothesize, if about forty of the beasts of Belsen were executed by the end of the year and by the end of March twenty of the master criminals had been executed, that would make sixty in six months or ten a month. At that rate we should not be going to get through one quarter of 1 per cent. of the criminals. A great number of cur most gallant airmen broke out of Stalag Luft III and the Germans massacred fifty of them in cold blood, having previously so tortured them that they had to burn the bodies because they were afraid to show them up. The Government of the day was profuse in its assurance that the culprits would be brought to justice. I made a speech in this House in which I said that if certain measures were not taken, the bulk of the criminals would slip through our fingers. Here we are six months from that date and what has happened to the criminals in the Luft III? I fear that the rate at which this problem is being tackled shows some incomprehension of its magnitude.

I am delighted to hear, and I congratulate everybody concerned, that at last the Gestapo, the S.S. and the S.D. are being indicted as criminal organizations, but I should have been all the more glad if that had been done sooner. I myself had a Motion down about that in this House in the early summer. It got delayed and was washed out by the Election. Meanwhile a lot of water has flowed under the bridges and now that at last it has been clone I should be glad to know what it means. Does it mean that the members of these foul organizations are going to be treated as guilty men and dealt with by summary procedure? If it does not mean that, what precisely does it mean?

Again, in the case of Belsen, when we went into that camp there were 10,000 corpses on the ground and 30,000 people who were irremediably moribund. Was that any warrant for mere summary procedure? Is it supposed that we impress the German mind by the rate of our present proceedings? If so, I think it shows considerable incomprehension of the German mind. On the contrary, when I hear counsel for the defence saying that the beasts of Belsen are mere scapegoats, I know that we are putting on record something which will be used against us in the years to come by the very "Germanity" we are trying to eliminate. On March 8 something worse happened. What am I to think, what are we all to think, and what is the whole world to think, when counsel for the defence of these vermin says in extenuation that the German concentration camps were filled with the dregs of the ghettoes of Middle Europe? That is pretty dreadful when you think of the millions who were done to death in those camps. He goes on to say that they were people who had very little idea of behaving themselves in ordinary life and had no idea of obeying orders. In those last words is contained the whole Germany doctrine of force, of the rights of the strong over the weak and not only of the weak individual but the weak State. That spirit is not dead in Europe yet, and you know it. I say that words like that are not only a crime but a mistake; and they are worse than a mistake, they are a shame. We are told that no word tossed into the ether ever dies, but that it rolls eternally and I think it is a pity that words like that should endure. In the fullness of time they may cost more innocent people their lives, and to me the sad and desperate part about it is that I know that man was doing his best according to his lights and according to our lights which have never penetrated this fog.

My last point is that of the treatment of German prisoners of war in our hands. I mention it because it is germane to the subject brought forward to-day, seeing how many of these men will soon be returning to Germany. I feel that a considerable chance is slipping through our fingers but it may not be too late to retrieve it. The German officer sits apart in idleness. He is treated as a member of a privileged class to that extent. He still considers himself a member of a privileged class, but as such he dreams of returning to his own country again. I believe that we should have done better to break up these camps and to mix the officers with the men and make them work alongside the men. They would have learnt more about democracy in that way. I know of course that I shall, be met with the answer "The Convention, the Convention." The men fall into three categories, the good, the bad and the indifferent. It is very difficult to generalize about these matters, but I believe it may be said that the indifferent are somewhat closer to the bad than to the good. In any case here we get a repetition of the same phenomenon that there is not sufficient screening. I admit that it is the devil of a job to screen a quarter of a million men, but the result has been that too many Nazis have slipped through the mesh, with the consequence that intimidation still exists in some of the camps, though, of course, they vary very considerably. The consequence of that in turn is that not enough encouragement and protection is given to the real non-Nazis. I am thinking not only of the professional Nazis but of the dyed-in-the-wool militarists. There again, of course, they vary very considerably but a great many of them are of the smart, slick type, stern disciplinarians who get the best work out of men. That may be very important but it is not necessarily the right test.

What I really have in my mind is that unless we are very careful in our tests we shall soon be shipping back to Germany marked as "good" a great many men who ought to be marked as "bad." That is important, because the man marked "good" is likely to get the job. Conversely, you may find a good many of the good have been marked down as "bad" or "indifferent," and that would be a loss. I think the key to the whole of this resides in the selection as camp leaders at present of senior N.C.Os., Staff sergeants. I should have thought it best to pick the man best suited to our purpose both politically and morally and then back him sternly. In general I fear we shall not settle this very important problem until we level the whole German military caste and, as I have said, mix officers with the men and not hesitate to put an officer under the man when the man may be the better for our purpose. I know that that is ambitious, and it is getting late. I know, as I have said, that the Convention will be quoted against me. I have several answers to that. For me, the German Army is dead; it is dead and buried. Unless we are all insane we shall never allow it to rise again. Therefore the Convention is not applicable. It is defunct. The Convention was torn to shreds during the war by our adversaries. We found it convenient to go on fulfilling it on our side, particularly while so many of our men were in the hands of the Axis, but now it is open to us to remould it nearer to our heart's desire. If that argument is not accepted, I would say that a great many of us would not be prepared to see unilateral adherence to an obsolete Convention—rendered obsolete by our adversaries—turned to promoting the prospects of another war.

Briefly, I feel we shall do little good with this great problem unless we make up our minds that these men shall never see Germany again. By all means let them be sent abroad to labour in countries they have devastated, but when that is finished I think they should be deported to some Devil's Island or its equivalent and there allowed to live out their lives without detriment to their fellow human beings. Unless we are a little more perspicacious and ruthless we shall next year or whenever the time comes be sending back to Germany some shiploads of sheer poison. I have already spoken too long, and I shall not detain your Lordships further. I shall not attempt to make a summary or a peroration to enforce my points. I am content to leave them to speak for themselves, confident that they will receive the consideration which is their modest requirement. I beg to move for Papers.

3.36 p.m.

THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY

My Lords, I speak under the disadvantage of following a very eloquent speaker who discourses always to the delight of your Lordships' House, and I do not wish to try to controvert what he has said on many points. But I do wish to put one point which I have been determined to put to your Lordships at the earliest possible moment. What I want to deal with is the question of officers working under orders. We have read lately the report of a trial of young German officers on a submarine. Some of them, I understand, have been sentenced to death. The one man who should have been tried, if anybody was to be tried, was the man in command. You cannot in a military service have a young officer saying, "I do not think this is a right order." If he did, what would happen to him? If he did that he would be shot or sent to a concentration camp. I think before you condemn anybody you must think of the orders he was working on. The man who gave the order is the man who should be tried. Why an engineer who was down in the engine room should be condemned to death is hard to understand.

May I put this point to your Lordships? Suppose the Admiralty knew that an enemy ship was carrying out attacks under cover of being used as a hospital ship, and the officer in command of a submarine was told to intercept and deal with her. Is that officer to turn round and say, "I am not going to torpedo a hospital ship"? No, he will take it that the Admiralty before giving the order knew what they were about and would take it that the order was justified. Are we going to carry this trial of young officers right through? What about the officer in charge of a battery who shells some place in which there are women and children or people who ought not to be killed? Take the case of an air pilot who took part in an attack on London. Are you going to try him because he dropped bombs in some part of London where there were no military establishments? Of course, when you get to the root of things you find that the trouble is, as the last speaker said, that you have not tried going to the top. In this case of five young men acting under military orders, if they did not obey they would be shot when they got back or by the captain. The noble Lord referred to dyed-in-the-wool militarists. I may be a militarist, but I am perfectly sure that if you are going to try people for war offences the man to be tried must be the commanding officer who gave the orders, and that it is unfair to sentence young officers to death or to sentence the men who carry out their orders. I wish with all the power in my command to urge that we must work from the top down and not take young men and shoot them before making sure that they were not under orders from someone higher up who should be the one to be shot.

3.40 p.m.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD NATHAN)

My Lords, the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, is in a Sense a supplement to the debate in your Lordships' House last week. In the course of that debate my noble friend the Secretary of State for Air foreshadowed a change in the administration of the British element of the Control Commission. I think it may be of interest to your Lordships if I say that, with effect from yesterday, His Majesty's Government have established a separate office to handle the affairs of the British element of the Control Commission both for Germany and Austria. The Minister ultimately responsible to Parliament will remain the Secretary of State for War. But the new office is wholly distinct and wholly separate from the War Office. It is in no sense subordinate to, nor does it enjoy representation on, the Army Council.

The tasks of administering and directing the administration of Germany and Austria are, of course, of immense scope. They cover every activity of government. It was natural and proper that at the opening stages of the conquest and occupation the War Office should have been responsible for the administration of the civil population of those countries, but it will be clear to your Lordships that the War Office, as such, is designed for other purposes and could not be expected to continue this duty indefinitely. Under the system which has obtained hitherto, the British element of the Control Commission was answerable to the Army Council and worked through the procedure of the War Office, through which all its contacts with other Departments of State were effected. Under the new constitution, the British element of the Con- trol Commission becomes in effect a Department of State, with access to all other Departments on an equal footing. Subject to the ultimate responsibility to Parliament of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War, my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has assumed responsibility for the new office. The new office will have a Permanent Secretary, who will also be accounting officer for the expenditure of the Commission.

I may usefully add perhaps that in assigning this dual responsibility to the Secretary of State for War, His Majesty's Government bear in mind that the activities of the Control Commission in the field are closely bound up with the activities of the British Army of the Rhine in Germany and of the military forces in Austria, and that for the time being the Army acts, to a large extent, as the instrument of the Commission's authority. I should add, too, that the Permanent Secretary of the office now established will be, as my noble friend mentioned the other day, Sir Arthur Street. Its title, while not yet officially determined, is likely to be the Control Department for Germany and Austria, and it will operate from Norfolk House, St. James's Square.

The fact that these new arrangements have been made in no way detracts from the magnificent and immensely valuable work performed hitherto by Military Government staffs in Germany, and by the War Office in laying the foundations and also in carrying on with their task in the face of immense difficulties. As regards the Military Government staffs and the work they have been performing, public recognition is long overdue. I welcome this opportunity of paying them a tribute and of stating that it is the view of His Majesty's Government that the British staff of the Control Commission have clone magnificent work in circumstances of the utmost complexity. Nor should a tribute be omitted to the staff concerned at the War Office. Planning for the administration of Germany at the conclusion of hostilities began, of course, while hostilities were still in progress. Warm praise is due to those who prepared the plans, ready at the appropriate moment to be carried into effect. I have in mind in particular the Director and members of the staff of the Civil Affairs Directorate, but it would be ungracious not to mention the then Permanent Secretary, Sir Frederick Bovenschen, who, at the official level, had the greatest responsibility, both in the timely preparation of the plans and in their execution. Ten days ago, after nearly forty years in the Civil Service—indeed after nearly forty years at the War Office—Sir Frederick Bovenschen retired from the War Office, and I am sure I shall carry with me your Lordships in every part of the House in offering warm good wishes on his retirement to this great public servant. It may be of interest that I should state that the Joint Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Eric Speed, by the operation of a sort of jus accrescendi, now becomes the sole occupant of that high office.

The noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, has covered a very wide field. He has raised a number of questions both of principle and of detail. I appreciate what he said at the outset of his remarks, that he had no desire to embarrass the Government, and also I appreciate his saying that he scarcely expected that I should be able to answer the great mass of questions that he put, or deal with the large number of points that he raised, in detail to-clay. That anticipation was well-founded. He raised the question as to the central administration of Germany. Discussions are at present taking place in Berlin with regard to that matter and I should not wish to say anything which might prove an embarrassment to the trusted advisers and spokesmen of His Majesty's Government who are actually taking part in those discussions. But I may say this: that steps are being taken to implement the terms of the Potsdam Agreement. The discussions are, of course, quadrupartite, and their aim is to reach an agreement within the framework of the Potsdam Agreement which will be mutually satisfactory, convenient and workable. As regards the zonal arrangements, very much the same observation applies as to the limitation on what I can usefully say. Provincial Councils and local councils have been set up, some of them executive, others advisory, but these arrangements are to be regarded as temporary expedients, designed to be merged into the central administrations as soon as they may be formed.

The noble Lord raised questions on, and dealt at some length with, matters of restitution, reparation and de-industriali- zation. Upon those, let me say that the instructions given by His Majesty's Government are in no wise restrictive. They are designed to enable Military Government to go ahead and to ensure that the undertakings we have given are honoured as fully and as speedily as may be. The noble Lord proceeded to address to your Lordships certain observations with regard to war crimes. I thought that he did rather less than justice to the difficulties of the situation and the complexities confronting those who have been concerned in those grave matters. The noble Lord will be aware that the court has met—it met last week. Your Lordships will have seen published in the Press, at great length, the indictment presented to that Court, an indictment which differs widely from what we in this country normally know in the processes of our criminal law and which might be likened to the olden time Bill of Attainder. The indictment has been presented, and has been served on the accused. They now have an opportunity for preparing their defence. The trial is fixed to open at Nuremberg four weeks hence from this day, and I would quote to the noble Lord the words used the other day at the Mansion House by my noble and learned friend sitting on the Woolsack that, despite the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, time is relatively unimportant compared with justice.

I turn to another trial on a lower level—also referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart. It so happens that a young officer of my acquaintance came to see me the other day from Germany, and he told me that he was stationed at Belsen. He told me, indeed, that it was his daily duty to attend the proceedings of the court. I thought it would be interesting to know something of this trial, and I asked him, not about the proceedings, but of the effect of these proceedings upon the Germans. It would appear, from what I was told, that, in the beginning, quite small numbers of Germans attended those proceedings. They came as to a spectacle, some to gloat, some, perhaps, to commiserate. They looked upon the panoply of the trial as if it were a stage-setting for the declaration of a sentence on a verdict predetermined. But, as the trial proceeded, as the gradual process of the law unfolded, a new spirit came upon them, and they took a new interest in the proceedings. They attended in ever-increasing numbers, and with a new seriousness. They marked with wonder, may be with admiration, and observed one thing differing notably from their own experience, that, in the view of our democracy, no man is found guilty until he is proved guilty, and that in the British conception, Justice, though she carries a sword, carries also a balance. The noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, suggested that in Germany our prestige was gradually wasting away. But such information as I have, arising out of the Belsen trial alone, is that it has observably enhanced our prestige, and the Belsen trial is a definite factor in the reeducation of Germany.

The noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, referred to the question of denazification. I understand by "denazification" what is stated in the Potsdam protocol in that respect: All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activity and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public offices and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. The problem of denazification is as complex as it is necessary. I will strike, if I may, one word of warning. It has become, in certain quarters, too much the case to think and to speak as if all those who occupied positions of responsibility in any respect in Germany are Nazis. The word "Nazi" has become a term of abuse, used very much in the same sense as "Fascist" and "Communist" are often used, for one reason or another, of those whom one does not like. I must speak that word of warning because the voice of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, would seem to be raised almost in favour of the elimination from German Government and industry of all those associated with it before in any position of responsibility. But I will say, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that we are working loyally in pursuing a policy of denazification, and, in doing so, are working hand in hand, and going forward step by step, with our Allies. As a matter of practical administration—

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

All our Allies?

LORD NATHAN

With our Allies. As a matter of practical administration, it is necessary that denazification should be phased. There is in the first place, a list of those Nazis who come within the category of those who are to be the subject of automatic arrest, and, in the British zone, some 50,000 have been arrested, falling within that category. Leading Nazis have been expelled from administrative posts in provincial and local government and are being eliminated, also, from industry. At present, an investigation is taking place into the individual cases, both in public administration and in industry. There is offered to each of those who come within the sphere of this investigation a questionnaire, Fragebogen, of which I shall be glad to show any noble Lord a copy, should he wish to see one. There are, at the present time, in the British zone, some 700,000 cases based upon these Fragebogen, awaiting investigation and in course of investigation.

There is great pressure being brought upon the administration to pursue denazification. There is the push to get rid of the Nazis. On the other hand, there is the pull to ensure production. But, in the conflict between ideology, on the one hand, and efficiency, on the other, our policy is to proceed vigorously with denazification, even though that may involve a loss of efficiency. We must, however, be careful at all times to safeguard against the possibility of a complete breakdown, both in administration and in industry. I wish to make it entirely clear that we are determined to eliminate from any position of responsibility those who are Nazis by past record or by present inclination. Closely linked with this whole question of denazification, which, I suppose, may best be described as of a negative nature, is re-education. Denazification is the purge of persons; re-education the purge of minds.

On the whole, according to such information as has been placed at my disposal, it appears, somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, that Nazism has not taken such deep roots as had been expected, or as might have been anticipated. It is more difficult to eradicate Nazism among the younger generation than among the older and, perhaps, curiously enough, among the women than among the men. There is a widespread mood of disillusion. The re-education which is being undertaken in the British zone is partly of a formal nature, education of the children in the schools and of youth in the universities. Schools have been opened throughout the British zone, but I am bound to tell your Lordships that great difficulties have been and are being experienced in the way of obtaining buildings, teachers, equipment and books. I have figures for three provinces only, which may perhaps be of interest to your Lordships—Hamburg, Hanover, and one other province, the name of which escapes my memory. In those three provinces, 4,500 schools have been opened, and there are 17,000 teachers, 270,000 whole-time pupils and 490,000 part-time pupils.

The great difficulty, of course, has been in the provision of text-hooks. It has been difficult to provide text-books differing in their text and quality and purpose from those which prevailed during the Nazi régime. Even the arithmetic books have had to be changed. When I was a boy, I was told of the apple-woman with a basket of apples, and was asked how many would be left if a certain number were taken from the basket. The Nazi youngster is told that there is a munition dump with so many shells in it, and he is asked, if a gun fires so many shells, how many will be left. The militaristic taint is found even in the arithmetic books, and is most disquieting. New books, of course, are being provided which are not open to those objections—either newly-written, or those which prevailed before the Nazi regime. It is not only that arithmetic books are tainted, though they may seem an unlikely source of propaganda, but also that we find the same thing in fairy tales for the young. Little Red Riding Hood, under the Nazi regime, has been a fine, Nordic girl, and the wolf has been a democratic plutocrat. I have before me a quotation from a fairy tale intended for eight-year olds and entitled "The Wild Squire of Polmanstein." This is the quotation: The squire said to his henchman that he had killed a man a few days ago, not with the intention of robbing him, but merely out of a desire to murder; he had wanted to see blood. That fairy story has been withdrawn from circulation!

Much more difficulty than in dealing with children has naturally been found in dealing with the youngsters who would in the ordinary way attend the universities. They were hot-beds of Nazism. It has been necessary to find reliable pre-Nazi liberal professors, who are not too numerous now and are rather ageing. Göttingen University has been opened, however and there are as many as 30,000 applicants, and 4,800 students admitted. The naval base at Kiel is about to become the University of Kiel, a seat of learning and not of warfare. Youth groups are being encouraged, subject, of course, to strict control. They are being formed on a voluntary basis, and for religious, cultural and recreational purposes only. The Potsdam Declaration provided that: All clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military trend in Germany shall be completely and finally abolished in such a manner as pre-eminently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism. These new clubs and youth organizations will fulfil a purpose entirely different from the old; their object is, in the words of Field Marshal Montgomery, to encourage an independently-minded and genuinely democratic leadership, such as will instil accepted ideals of chivalry, honesty and magnanimity. If formal education is being extended now to the children and youth of Germany, different methods are being and must be applied to the adult population in general. There are at the present time in operation under the British element of the Control Commission sixteen newspapers, of four pages each, rather smaller than the pages of the Evening Standard. There are great difficulties in obtaining paper and great technical difficulties in securing both printing presses and those able reliably to use them. Four million copies of these newspapers circulate in the British zone, twice weekly. Facts and comment are kept separate; the ideal which C. P. Scott, of the Manchester Guardian, set himself is being firmly and rigidly observed in the British zone in regard to these newspapers. It is something new to the Germans to receive statements of fact which have been tested as far as possible and are not controversial, and that comment and opinion should be kept entirely separate. A new feature of these newspapers is the introduction of a correspondence column, and letters are now being contributed by the local German population.

The editor and assistant editor are British; the remainder of the staff is German. Efforts are being made to train a body of German journalists who may be trusted with the publication of newspapers when the time has come to permit freedom of the Press. The present position is that complete control is exercised over the contents of these newspapers, but we are moving towards freedom of speech, and the next step should be the handing over of the papers, subjecting them to post-publication censorship only. No journals of opinion yet exist in the sense of the Economist or Spectator or New Statesman and Nation, but there is a Readers' Digest which gives translations into German of what are considered to be suitable articles from the world's Press.

One of the greatest difficulties has been with regard to books, both existing books and new books. So far as the books found there were concerned, there has been a purge of Nazi books. Your Lordships may perhaps be interested to know that in the university library there has been set apart a special division where the books of the Nazi régime are kept as museum-pieces for study by future historians. Great difficulties have arisen in regard to books partly because of lack of paper and difficulties of printing, but also on account of copyright. It is hoped, however, to overcome those difficulties. Public libraries and booksellers are kept under a severe control. There are 740 cinemas open in the British zone, and a news-reel under Anglo-American auspices is being shown there.

The British Control Commission is anxious to encourage a healthy interest in politics and to encourage the growth of political Parties, but I am bound to tell your Lordships that there is very great apathy. All thought is concentrated on food, clothing, and warmth; very little thought is being given to politics. Three Parties are now coming before the public of Germany: the Social Democratic Party, which is the most numerous; the Communists, who are the most active; and the Catholic Centre, who are extending their boundaries to include the Lutherans and other portions of the Christian Church, by which I do not mean, of course, the German Christian Church, which has been abolished. No new leaders of any great consequence are yet perceptible, and very little enthusiasm is shown. Meetings are not very fully attended, and I think it is right to say that, on the whole, the political Parties which have disclosed themselves so far have made no great impression upon the general public mind. It is proposed—and let us hope it may encourage political Parties—to allow space in the newspapers to which I have referred to each of the political Parties, or to apportion a certain newspaper to each of those Parties.

What I have, said about apathy in relation to political Parties applies also to trade unions. As my noble friend the Secretary of State for Air said last week, there are no very noticeable signs of trade unions coming into existence on the model that we know here. But the Trades Union Congress has been invited to send a delegation to Germany, and it is hoped that, assisted by their advice, the British element in the Control Commission may be able to effect something in the direction of bringing trade unions into existence. They are prepared, if the signs are favourable, to allocate to them a special trade union newspaper. But I am bound to say to your Lordships that the sole obsession of the German people would seem to be now the battle of the winter.

I am able to say that there are observable effects of the process of re-education in the desired direction, and that the ideas of democracy are making headway. Yet, my Lords, when full credit has been given to all the methods of re-education, and to the men who have contrived and operated them, the most potent factor in re-education is, perhaps, to be found elsewhere; it is to be found in the—what shall I call them?—the mysterious, God-given qualities of humour, kindliness and decency, possessed by thousands and tens of thousands of men, strangers in a foreign country, few of whom have any conscious thought at all of this problem of reeducation. When all is said and done the best re-educator of them all is the British private soldier.

I apologize if I have dealt somewhat summarily with a number of matters that have been raised to-day, and have omitted reference to others. But I would ask both the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, and the noble Earl, Lord Cork, to believe that each of the matters which they raised will be regarded as a contribution to thought and knowledge on this subject, and will be studied with an earnest attention. Let me finish by saying this. I saw in a place where I was, perhaps, surprised to see it, the other day, a board upon which were emblazoned two sentences. That board was over the fireplace in the room, at the War Office, of one of our most distinguished Generals. I should, perhaps, have known these sentences before, but I did not. Possibly they may be known to some of your Lordships. They are: The difficult takes a little more time than the simple. The impossible takes a little more time than the difficult. The British element on the Control Commission have been confronted, and will be confronted, with circumstances that are difficult and that may seem impossible, but the sentences which I have quoted show the spirit which will inform the activities of His Majesty's Government and of those who represent them in the areas of Germany and Austria which are in our occupation.

4.15 p.m.

LORD MOTTISTONE

My Lords, before the noble Lord replies, permit me to say a word which I have long wished to say. We have all listened with great interest to what the noble Lord has just said. He said, as I feared he would, that efforts are being made to teach the Germans something about the growth of Parties by various means. Space is to be found in the newspapers so that the Germans may be assisted in going back to Parties. I do protest that that is a most extraordinary proceeding. It may be that what we call Party politics is necessary in this country—if so, I say that it is a necessary evil. If we should say to the Germans: "We will not allow your Nazi Party to continue; it has resulted in utter disaster to mankind; but we will give space in your newspapers for the growth of regular Parties," that seems to me to be a very unwise thing to do. I believe that the growth of Parties is almost fatal—and, indeed, will be fatal very soon owing to the way in which things have developed—to any form of democratic government. I believe that the Party to which noble Lords on both Front Benches belonged only the other day was the ideal Party. Why go back to Party politics in Germany? Why tell them that it is a good thing to do? It is not. It is a necessary evil—if it is necessary. Having made my protest I will not delay the House further, but I do implore the noble Lord not to allow it to be said for a moment that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, Coalitions are bad and Parties are good.

4.18 p.m.

THE EARL OF PERTH

My Lords, the noble Lord who replied on behalf of His Majesty's Government told us one extremely interesting fact, and I wonder if I might put a question to him about it. He said that there was a Commission being formed for Berlin to bring about the centralization of German affairs. I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, said, that most of these evils, to which reference has been made, have come into existence because Germany has been divided into four different zones, and there has been no adequate coordination either of policy generally, or of food supplies, or of industry. Each occupying Power has treated its zone as it wished, and it is very largely owing to that fact that the unhappy situation to which Lord Vansittart called attention has arisen. We all know that one of the great difficulties is due to the completely divergent policy which has been followed in the zone of the Soviet occupation as corn-pared with the policy followed in the zones of British and American occupation. I would venture to ask the noble Lord and His Majesty's Government whether they could not make an adequate appeal to the Soviet Government for closer co-operation.

I would rely, in making that appeal, on the definite alliance which we have with the Soviet Government, and which, I feel convinced, ought to be one of the linch-pins of our foreign policy. I firmly believe that, as M. Molotov said the other day, it is the intention of the Soviet Government strictly to carry out the obligations which they have undertaken. I should very much like to remind the House of two Articles in the Anglo-Soviet Alliance. In the first Article, the High Contracting Parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and to resist aggression during the post-war period. Then there is Article V which is really very important. That says: The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of the security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take Alto account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. It may be argued, and I think perhaps that the question might be put, that we have not yet established peace and that, if I was trying to read my Treaty very carefully, one might say that the time had not yet arrived. That answer would not, however, be valid because accompanying this Treaty is a letter from M. Molotov, in which he says: The present Treaty also determines the common line of action of the Soviet Union and Great Britain after the war. I understand that whatever that war was, it has now come to an end. I think the United States, the Soviet Union and ourselves have all come to that conclusion.

I suggest that we should utilize this Treaty to try to persuade the Soviet Government that we should act together—we may have to give way of course—but at any rate that there should be a co-ordinating policy throughout Germany both as regards industry and as regards food, and for other difficult questions. I could say a great deal on this subject but I will not now detain the House. I entirely support the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, when he says that there has been far too much delay about these trials. They are going on far too long and I cannot see why speed should not be combined with justice. That is what is really desirable and we should not simply let this thing drag on. It is quite true, and it has been pointed out over and over again, that the result of allowing it to drag is that people will become tired and justice will not be done.

4.22 p.m.

LORD VANSITTART

My Lords, in regard to the short speech of the noble Earl, Lord Cork, I find myself in complete disagreement. After the last war we placed on our war criminals' list a few of the beasts who had been doing this kind of thing, shooting people in open boats, on rafts and so on, and we were all very angry when they slipped through our fingers. Now that we have got them, someone gets up and says that they really ought to be let off. I take a totally different view, because if you adopt the reasoning of the noble Earl, there would be only two guilty people, Himmler and Hitler. He said that we should start at the top but we know that the top has gone. I only hope that the culprits will be executed as soon as possible; I am only sorry that they are going to be shot and not hung.

In regard to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, he said very truly that I had said I should not expect too much from him and that my anticipations were well founded. I did not expect to be overfed exactly and my anticipations have been equally well founded. On matters like centralism and the zoning question the noble Lord was exceedingly diplomatic. As I said, until I ceased to be diplomatic myself I never knew how diplomatic Governments could be. It was a complete revelation and I feel that in the future I may have to press more strongly on those matters. As to what he said about the value of time, I venture to stress what the noble Earl, Lord Perth, has said, that time does matter. If we have only got through a limited number of people at the end of the year, we cannot go on trying war criminals for ever. I should like a very drastic purge to be made, the maximum possible. It is no good blinking the fact that we are not getting on with it. I therefore feel that time and justice are compatible. At present far too much time is elapsing.

Then, if I understood him rightly, he said that he understood me to have reasoned against the employment of any pro-Nazi elements. I did not say that. I reasoned against the re-employment of anybody who has been a pro-Nazi failure. For example, last month I saw a list of prominent Social Democrats who may be expected to come to the fore again and indeed were doing so. Among them were former members of the Reichstag who had voted for Hitler's foreign policy in May, 1933. I do not think that they are exactly a good bet. I should like to see that bet scratched. The noble Lord also said that he found the roots of Nazism less deep than he expected. I venture to point out that Nazism is not a thing in itself. Its roots go deep under the surface and are mainly nationalism and militarism. It would be impossible to exaggerate the holds those roots have in the German soil. Another small point which he mentioned was that Nazi publications were being used as museum pieces. I would far rather have sent them to be used for other purposes; I think that pulping would have been more effective. I understood the noble Lord to say that certain books were being used as museum pieces.

I will not detain the House longer than I need. I thank the noble Lord very much for all the questions he answered that I did not ask, and I hope that in due course I may receive some kind of an answer to those that I did ask. In particular, I think it would be in the Government's own interest to take us a little more into their confidence than was the case in the Coalition Government of war-time, when we were all satisfied to be the House of short commons—very short commons. That time, however, is over and we shall require a little more pabulum. I certainly mean to ask for it. I feel very deeply, for instance, on this matter of centralism. The noble Lord was very careful not to tell me anything about that, but I wish to give notice that if there is anything like a reversal to centralism in the air I think we are all entitled to a full debate before our future is irretrievably committed, and I personally would take a sarong line of resistance to anything of the kind. I am deeply grateful for the opportunity of ventilating these questions. I hope that they will be considered in due course, and on that understanding I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.