Lords Sitting of 26 May 1944

Preamble
The House met, The LORD DENMAN on the Woolsack.
Prayers.
  NATIONAL EXPENDITURE.
  Message from the Commons for leave for the Lord Rennell to attend to be examined as a witness before the Select Committee of that House. Leave given for his Lordship to attend if he thinks fit, and a Message ordered to be sent to the Commons to acquaint them therewith.

  FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
  Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion, moved yesterday by Viscount Samuel—namely, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government.
  LORD WINSTER: My Lords, I believe that exceptionally bold riders have been known to say that fox-hunting would be a very fine sport if it were not for the hounds; and I dare say that Ministers and Government are inclined to think that politics would be a very tolerable pursuit indeed if it were not for debates, and that perhaps is peculiarly the case with regard to debates upon foreign affairs. Foreign Secretaries raise their seedlings and prick out these tender plants; debate takes place, and they find that unthinking speakers come along and pull up the plants to see how they are growing, which is not a process very conducive to growth, and I have no doubt occasionally causes great distress to those who are conducting our foreign affairs. But I think it would be agreed that in the case of this debate no particular harm of that nature has been done. I listened to the speech of the Prime Minister and, although mine is not a very important voice, I would certainly like to add my tribute to those which have already been paid to that speech. I thought it revealed how very catholic is the genius of our Prime Minis
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  ter. He is playing such a large personal part in the conduct of this tremendous war of operations, which are likely to grow more tremendous still, that it is remarkable indeed that he should have found the time to acquire such mastery of all that is taking place in regard to our relations with other countries.
  As regards the speech, I felt that it was a striking account of our relations with each of the countries with which we are having dealings at this time. I felt that those relations in each individual case are being conducted upon an ad hoc basis, and revealed in many cases a spirit of expediency. But I felt that no very clear general foreign policy emerged from what was said. It may possibly be regarded as unfair to say that, in view of what the Prime Minister had to tell us about the world organization which is contemplated for the regulation of the affairs of the world and the preservation of peace. if I may say so, when I was listening to the Prime Minister on that particular point, I felt what very great pleasure what he had to say would bring to a member of your Lordships' House, Lord Davies, who, I am sorry to see, is unwell at the present moment. Lord Davies has been so long and so prominently associated with the furtherance of the ideas which were outlined in the Prime Minister's remarks concerning this future world organization, that I felt that that part of the speech would indeed bring him very great comfort and encouragement in his illness.
  I thought there were some slight inconsistencies in the speech. I noticed that Turkey was admonished for keeping out of the war, whilst Spain was commended for doing exactly the same thing. I also noticed that we are unable to recognize the French National Committee of Liberation as the Government of France on the grounds that we do not know if it represents the opinions and feelings of the French people or not; but on the other hand we have no difficulty whatever in recognizing the Government of Marshal Badoglio, although there I think we have the most complete and accurate information that it does not represent the opinions and feelings of the people of Italy. I hope that the decision not to recognise the French National Committee of Liberation may be reconsidered by the Allies. I do not say by bur Government only because,

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  of course, it must be an Allied decision; but I hope sincerely it may be reconsidered and that our Government will be able to take steps to effect that reconsideration.
  When I read the admirable statement of foreign policy recently issued by Mr. Cordell Hull, I thought that almost the only weak point in it was that in which he said that when we proceed into France the administration of that country must be carried on, must be supervised, by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. General de Gaulle lost very little time in replying to that, and he replied to it in no uncertain terms. He said France required no lessons from outside countries in these matters. I am quite clear in my own mind, having regard to the character and temperament of the French people, that any attempt to carry on the administration of that country under the supervision and direction of the Allied Commander-in Chief as outlined by Mr. Cordell Hull, will fail. The French people would not agree to such assistance, and it would inevitably make bad blood between the Allies and the French. I am unable to understand why it is impossible to recognize this Council as the Provisional Government of France until such time as the French have had an opportunity of making their wishes known in regard to their Government. To recognize it as the Provisional Government of France would facilitate many matters and tasks which lie ahead. I hope that General de Gaulle may be able to go away from his visit here with some reassurance on that point.
  Public opinion has received with a certain amount of surprise the extremely warm references which were made by the Prime Minister to Spain. I rejoice, as we all do, that relations with Spain are now upon a better and more satisfactory footing, but we have a right to say that a little more time must elapse, matters must continue upon a satisfactory footing a little longer, we must have more tangible proof of good will in the future, before we speak in quite such warm terms. One does not want to dig up the past, but it is impossible entirely to forget the past. The Spanish Government have done very great harm, serious injury, to the Allied cause. Of course General Franco has an entire right to his personal opinion, and no one has a right to criticize him about that, but he has made it abundantly clear
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  that so far as he is personally concerned he would have preferred, and hoped for, an Axis victory. Now when he sees the Axis going down to irretrievable defeat he has taken the wise and statesmanlike course in the interests of his own country. But already his Government have done us great harm. The Prime Minister spoke about obligations we were under to Spain because of a certain "blind eye" which Spain turned on the assembly of our convoys and transports in Spanish waters; but on one occasion I ventured to bring to your Lordships' notice the fact that Italian torpedoes launched from an Italian ship at Algeciras had damaged many thousands of tons of British shipping lying in Gibraltar.
  There is one question on which I hope the noble Earl who is going to reply for the Government will be able to give us information. At the time of the surrender of the Italian Fleet it was reported that some units of that Fleet had taken refuge in the harbours of the Balearic islands. I have not seen any Press reports as to the ultimate disposition of these units—whether they are still lying there or whether they had been disposed of with the remainder of the Fleet. One other small point with regard to Spain. I notice that Mr. Churchill is very anxious to put a stop to certain pictures and caricatures of General Franco appearing in our Press. As an old Liberal I must confess I was pained and surprised the following morning to find that the News Chronicle had taken the opportunity to print his speech in full and to illustrate it with two of these pictures of General Franco to which the Prime Minister took exception.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: One was crossed out.
  LORD WINSTER: Yes, that is so, but crossing it out did not obliterate the caricature. As my noble friend Lord Perth is going to take part in the debate, I have no doubt he will be able to explain this singular lapse on the part of the leading Liberal newspaper in London. Then I was surprised to see in the Evening Standard last night—a paper which is a 100 per cent. supporter of Mr. Churchill —another of these caricatures. I am sorry that Lord Beaverbrook is not here or he might have explained how that took place and it would have been very interesting to hear his remarks.

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  As regards the Polish-Russian dispute, I do feel that that is a most unhappy business not only in itself, not only because of its effect upon Poland, but because of the disillusionment which the matter must cause in Allied ranks. Under the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1942 the two Powers agreed that
  "they will, act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States."
  I say nothing of the bearing of the Atlantic Charter al this matter, because that has already been dealt with by previous speakers; but these are the words of the Anglo-Russia Treaty of 1942. Events in Poland and in the Baltic States are a very sad commentary indeed on that passage, and it is impossible to conceal the uneasiness which those events cause. I often read of much concern about whether we are prepared to go along with Russia after the war. I am most anxious that Russia shall be prepared to go along with us in pursuit of our professed ideas and ideals.
  I do not want to say much more upon this subject, but I should like to add that I agree very much with what Lord Vansittart said yesterday, when he hoped that moderation would yet prevail. He also said that he hoped we should not adhere to the principle of treating our friends worse than our enemies. I am encouraged to think that moderation may yet prevail because Mr. Stalin, speaking in November, 1941, on Russian foreign policy, said:
  "Russia's first aim is to free her own territory and the second aim is to free the enslaved peoples of Europe and allow them to decide their own fate without any outside interference in their internal affairs."
  If there is any enslaved country of Europe which deserves to be freed and to be allowed to decide its own fate without outside interference it certainly is Poland. We went to war for Polish independence; we end it, apparently, by agreeing to take 40 per cent. of her territory away arid to offer her compensation in the shape of German territory.
  I have no tenderness of any sort for Germany, but I am apprehensive about such transfers of national territory for two reasons. First of all, because looking into the future I do not feel at all sure that public opinion will continue to support such transfers of territory; and, secondly, I feel that such transfers always set up irredentist movements. We create one in Poland. Poland will wish to
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  regain the territories which she feels have been taken away from her, and in Germany also there will be a movement to regain territories which have been taken away. Movements to regain lost territory very often appeal to the best people in the countries concerned and they always create sympathy in other countries. Time rolls on and people here say, "I have a great deal of sympathy about that. Supposing someone had taken Suffolk away from us, should not we want to get Suffolk back?" That is the difficulty. You create movements in the countries from which you have taken away territory which evoke sympathy in other countries. The truth of this Polish-Russian dispute is that our Government and the Allies are caught in a conflict between ethics and expediency. The Times of April 20 spoke of such an affair as sheer opportunism which would go far to disillusion opinion at home and abroad. Then it said, referring to these matters, that while we wish to adhere to principle regard must be had to the relative power of conflicting parties. My Lords, that is power politics and nothing else, and we must face the fact.
  The peace and the treatment of Germany have been referred to in this debate. I think a guiding principle must be that it is very difficult to induce public opinion to support a peace led up to by commitments about which public opinion has not been consulted. We remember how quickly opposition arose even to the lenient terms of the Versailles Treaty. Governments must govern. They must take their own decisions, but debates are valuable because Governments should be carried on in the light of expressed opinions. Again I venture to quote to your Lordships from The Times, which said:
  "The structure of peace must not be of such a character that the man in the street fifteen or twenty years hence will not think it worth while to defend it if necessary in arms."
  That I believe should be a guiding and a fundamental principle in these matters. Terms of peace to Germany have been spoken about in this debate and, as the noble Earl who I understand will reply is so intimately concerned with matters of trade and economics, I venture to ask him if the following points have been considered. I feel sure they must have been but I wish to ask him nevertheless.
  It seems to me that if you are thinking about the disarmament of a country,

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  about how you can check her armaments or keep her armaments within bounds, if you know what a country is doing with her steel and if you know what she is doing in transport you must have practically a clear picture of what she is doing in the matter of armaments. It is for that reason that in discussing these matters my mind has turned to the question of whether Germany could be brought into a steel cartel as a partner. As such a partner all the facts about her steel, the amount of steel she was using and for what she was using it, would of course become completely known. Equally I feel if there should be a unified system of transport set up in European idea that has been put in the air very frequently of late—that Germany as a unit in such a system of transport would again have to reveal those facts about transport which indicate so clearly what a country is doing in the matter of armaments. I venture to ask if those points have received the attention of the Government or if they are regarded as worthy of consideration.
  They seem to me to have this very great advantage, that (if I am right in my ideas) they would have the effect of keeping us fully informed on these matters and therefore able to check immediately any German ideas of rearmament. At the same time, they are not in themselves essentially punitive because, on a country entering such systems as a unit in them, she will derive certain valuable trade and economic benefits from them. Therefore you cut the ground very largely from under the feet of the German authorities if they really wish to raise objections on the ground that it is an interference with their right to rearm, because you are able to say to them that this system would confer benefits on them and that if they object it can only be because they are contemplating certain underground and illicit ideas about rearmament.
  There is one other question also that I may perhaps put to the noble Earl and that is to ask about the Black List. It seems to me that the Black List is a most powerful offensive weapon. I know we have had a debate on this subject and I have read Lord Selborne's speech upon it with great interest, but I would ask him if he is satisfied that this weapon of the Black List is really being used to its
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  fullest possible extent. Those who are concerned with trade with enemy countries are frequently men of great wealth, able to be very accommodating and to make themselves very useful. I hope that no tenderness is being shown to those individuals and I hope that the Minister is satisfied that all powers are being used to the fullest possible extent.
  I should like to say one word on the subject of unconditional surrender. I think that is a most unlucky phrase from which we have suffered a good deal. No doubt when Press conferences are held there is always a wish to present the conference with some slogan. This phrase "unconditional surrender" is derived, I think, from an episode in the United States Civil War. I believe that when one General asked another for terms the reply he received was "unconditional surrender". Now we have this phrase hung round our necks to our detriment in many ways. One cause for objection to it is that the conditions of unconditional surrender take such a very long time to arrange. If my information is correct, General Badoglio was quite ready to surrender fourteen days before we actually accepted surrender because we had to work out the terms of this unconditional surrender. That long delay had a very unfortunate effect upon our operations in the Dodecanese and upon the Italian campaign.
  Much of the Prime Minister's speech was concerned with the neutrals. I am quite unable to understand how the principle of neutrality applies in such a struggle as this. This is not a struggle between two Powers contending for a certain object. This is most essentially in every way a struggle between good and evil. I cannot understand how there can be neutrality in such a struggle. Burke said:
  "When bad men combine the good must associate, else they will fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle."
  I remember also that Gladstone, in 1851, speaking about events in Italy, said:
  "This is the negation of God erected into a system of government."
  What else is the Axis régime to-day except "the negation of God erected into a system of Government," and how can there be neutrality in such a struggle?
  What is to be our guide in our foreign policy in the future? Our ideas will be

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  conditioned by events. I fear that dreadful events will happen in Europe. Dreadful things have happened already, and I feel sure that still more dreadful and terrible things will happen when the leaders of Germany realize that they are going down to utter annihilation. Who can tell what conditions will be raised by the events which may then take place? For that reason who can say what line our foreign policy should take. The Foreign Secretary said in another place:
  "I can only promise the House plenty of plenty of disappointments and much deception in the times that lie ahead."
  If we are to try to seek a guide to our foreign policy we shall find it, I think, only in the application of a principle. We have been told sometimes that the Atlantic Charter is a signpost pointing the way we ought to go or hope to go, and we are told at other times that it indicates the course which we must endeavour to steer during coming events. Bad weather and a bad quartermaster may take you off your course. What I like to think of is a gyroscopic compass deep in the heart of the ship which brings the ship back to her course even if the quartermaster is not a good one or whatever the weather may be. I think we can find that compass if we look to the principle which animated British foreign policy in the past.
  We have made mistakes and we have had our failures. In particular I think the period between the last war and the outbreak of this war was not a glorious phase in the history of our foreign policy. It reduced our status very much and we lost prestige. Still, looking back to history, I think it fair to say that British foreign policy always had a guiding principle of nobility of purpose and conduct. That can fairly he claimed for it. If we think of Mr. Gladstone and the campaign he led against Turkish atrocities, if we think of the abolition of slavery, a completely disinterested act, or of the treatment of the Boer Republics after the close of the South African War, or of the prime object of British foreign policy, enunciated. time after time, to "seek peace and ensue it," we may fairly claim that nobility of purpose has animated our conduct of foreign affairs. Frequently, when listening to the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne's speeches on foreign and Dominion affairs, I seem to catch the echo of that purpose, of that
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  spirit. If we remain true to that principle, if we remain true to that idea, I think we shall get through all right in the days that lie ahead.
  There is one last remark I would make. If we read the history of the last century I think we find there what great status and prestige the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary enjoyed. I feel that in the hierarchy of the Government that status and prestige has been somewhat impaired. It does not seem to me that in recent times the Foreign Secretary has enjoyed that great prestige which British Foreign Secretaries enjoyed in the last century. I feel that one great task of Government must be to make once again the Foreign Secretary the leading figure in the Government after the Prime Minister and to increase the prestige and status of his office. If we do these things, I for one shall have no fear that British policy will not be wisely and well conducted in the making of the peace to the very great benefit of the world and not only of ourselves.
  THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: My Lords, I only intend to follow the noble Lord opposite in his extremely interesting and able speech on one point. He touched on the question of the Provisional Government of the French National Committee of Liberation and I would like to associate myself very strongly with what the noble Lord said. I feel that the only way whereby we can spoil the position in France would be by isolating the French from their own country when invasion begins. I remember it was said by some official source in America that that would be the case, and that a feeling of positive consternation went up in French circles in this country I hope that the noble Earl when he speaks today may be able to tell us something about the policy of His Majesty's Government in that regard.
  I am very glad that we have had these two debates on foreign affairs, for I think they will do a great deal to dispel the illusion about which the noble Viscount spoke yesterday, that His Majesty's Government have no foreign policy at all. I did not hear the speech of the Prime Minister, but I did listen to the really masterly summary which the noble Viscount gave in your Lordships' House and I do not think anybody who listened to that fairly could possibly say

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  that the Government have not got a foreign policy. Furthermore, they have pursued that policy with very great courage and persistence in a perfectly abnormal situation. So much was said yesterday and the whole question was so well thrashed out that I only wish to touch very briefly upon one aspect of our foreign policy. That is the relations of this country with the nations of Western Europe. So far as our relations and Russian relations with Poland and the other contiguous countries in the East go, I think it is far better to observe that discretion which I noticed was observed by noble lords yesterday on this point. The whole matter, after all, is sub judice at the present time. I think I can say, with all your Lordships, that we hope that the Government will soon be able to tell us that this most dangerous Pointe neuralgique has been removed.
  When we come to Western Europe it appears clear to me, at any rate, that the old concept of the neutrality of small Powers has been shattered into a thousand pieces by the events of this war. Holland, Belgium, and the rest of them, are necessary to our security, but we are vital to theirs, and I feel that the time is now surely past when they can propose, and we acquiesce in, their taking refuge in unilateral and exemplary neutrality. It has been officially stated with regard to Western Europe, that this country is going to play a greater part than ever after the war. It is also true, I presume, that she will emerge from this war still capable of great efforts but, none the less, diminished in strength. If that is correct I feel that the holding of the recent Imperial Conference, about which the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, spoke yesterday, is extremely timely at this present moment. I do not quite understand why the noble Viscount apologized for mentioning this in a debate on foreign affairs, for surely a coherent Commonwealth is the very first and only sane prerequisite to a balanced British foreign policy. We may, I trust, assume that a Commonwealth partnership was forged at this recent Conference of such strength that its links will not easily be snapped. That will be a very great achievement.
  So far as Western Europe is concerned, I am convinced that this country now
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  has an opportunity for leading, inspiring and binding to us the Western European countries such as has never occurred before and will never recur. I am also sure that such a policy would in no way incur the hostility of Soviet Russia. After all the appalling sufferings which that country has gone through in this war—and, in passing, may I say that I think it is not sufficiently known how the Germans in their advance destroyed literally everything on the face of the earth, every village, every installation, everything that could possibly be destroyed—their main theme for many years must be security. I believe they will recognize security in a union of Western States who are no longer pursuing the will-o'-the-wisp of individual neutrality but are strongly organized under our leadership in policies which, naturally, will be entirely friendly to Russia.
  I repeat that the opportunity is ripe and that it is unique in the most literal sense of the word. England need no longer indulge in that maddening self-distrust and self-depreciation which has had such a lamentable effect upon our policies in the past, for the eyes of all Western Europe are fixed on us in expectation and even in longing. Whatever the effect on Europe may have been of our weakness and vacillations in the past—to which the noble Lord, Lord Winster, has very rightly referred—that is all gone now. It is submerged in a savage hatred of the Germans, and a burning desire for revenge which will burst out on that day of wrath which in France is called the Jour J. It is submerged also—let us face the facts honestly for once—in a profound admiration for this country. All those nations know where they would be now if we had not made the stand we did in 1940. They will not forget it.
  This resistance in occupied Europe has been a fantastic and terrible story, and I sometimes feel that too little is known of it in this and some other countries which have not been occupied. It started, in many cases, from the most unstable beginnings and it emerged sometimes from treachery and decadence. Then it grew stronger through one ghastly winter after another, through repeated and heartbreaking postponements of the hope of liberty and indeed of life itself. In how many thousands of families in all those countries is there a son, a husband or a brother who perhaps, after four years, is

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  still rotting in the Stalags of the Reich, or who has been caught in the inhuman slave deportation which adds to the unspeakable humiliation and dejection of occupied Europe. Yet, none the less, thousands of young men have stubbornly resisted deportation in France and elsewhere. Others have hidden themselves in the woods or taken to the fields. Some have joined the Maquis or have attempted that perilous escape across the Pyrennes. There is barely a subsistence level of food in those countries. There are no clothes, no boots or shoes to protect the people against the winter weather. Those countries have been literally sucked dry by scientific pillage prepared years ahead by German economic experts who think of evcrything. There have been incessant examinations of papers, spying and curfew.And, throughout all this, there is a steady outflow of what the Prime Minister has called "the cold blood of the execution yard."
  It is in these terrible and abnormal circumstances that I would wish to read to your Lordships a few sentences from a letter received from an English officer who has just escaped from France, where he has been for many months. It will tell your Lordships far more eloquently than I can what these people are expecting born England and how they feel about us. He writes:
  … I have one more thing to say. I would beg you to pay the most particular attention to it. It concerns the attitude of the French towards ourselves. On the whole they have been slow to understand. The shock of the defeat dazed them for quite a long time … they know better now, and in the light of this new understanding … they are bitterly conscious of their own failure. We cannot judge them more severely than they judge themselves. They look to us for their deliverance from the oppression under which they writhe. They look with a hope which, dimmed by disappointment as the season for a débarquement drew to a close in the autumn of 1943, shines brighter now then ever in the spring of 1944. Some have hoped since June, 1940, almost all are hoping now. Their admiration for our resistance in those early days is unbounded. The traditional dislike of us has been dissolved in hatred of the Germans… This confidence which already exists is very real. It suffices to be British and people will trust you, believe what you say and follow your instructions. That the French, once so proud and distrustful of us, should now feel this way about us is. I feel, almost pathetic. It is a situation which cannot last and will never recur."
  I am sure we all hope and believe that the Government will take full advantage
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  of this situation. After listening to the noble Viscount yesterday, I have little doubt that that is so. I hope it will be remembered that British and American troops, when they enter any of these places, must not go as troops of occupation but as troops of passage, bringing security and good will to these people who so sorely need them. I am sure that the noble Earl will be able to tell us that the Government realize the immense opportunity for the future which has been presented to us by the brutality of the Germans, and that they are prepared to seize it before hope and admiration are replaced, once and for all, to our mutual disaster, by a long period of cynicism and disillusionment.
  THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Winster, put to me a definite question about an illustrated article which appeared yesterday in the News Chronicle. I feel that have no responsibility, nor has the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, for what appears in the News Chronicle, and I have not been in touch with the editor, but I might perhaps make this suggestion to the noble Lord. There were two pictures side by side. One seemed to me to be a picture which had been imagined by my noble friend Lord Latham; it was a picture of General Franco which Lord Latham might have drawn. The other was the picture painted by the Prime Minister. I would point out that in the News Chronicle the picture by Lord Latham was crossed out, and the picture by the Prime Minister held the field. I hope that the same process is going on in the noble Lord's mind.
  There were two points in the speech made by the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, yesterday with which I should like briefly to deal. They concern France and Turkey. I want to express my full agreement with what fell from the noble Lord, Lord Winster, and from the noble Earl' who has just sat down, and who made such a moving speech, about the Provisional Government of France. Surely as France is being freed there must be a Provisional Government to take charge of civil matters; and, if there has to be a Provisional Government what Provisional Government can there be except the French National Committee? It is the only Government available. Of course, the basis of that

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  Government will have to be enlarged as more and more territories are freed; but the very name "Provisional Government" does show that when that happy day comes, when there are a sufficient number of Frenchmen liberated to choose how their great country shall be governed, then a truly representative organ will be set up, and clearly the Provisional Government will be dissolved. Until then I do think that a Provisional Government is necessary.
  We have the example of the Government set up by Marshal Badoglio. I do not altogether agree with what my noble friend Lord Winster said, because I think he would acknowledge that that Government has now a far broader basis, and does represent a very considerable amount of opinion in Italy. I quite realize that questions of personality are, unfortunately, playing a certain part in rendering these negotiations with the French National Committee difficult, but I do trust that when General De Gaulle comes over here —a visit which I am sure we shall all welcome—a solution may be found for this rather difficult problem, and a solution on the lines which so many of your Lordships have indicated.
  I now turn to Turkey. I share the regret expressed by the Prime Minister and by the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, that Turkey has not seen fit to associate herself still more closely with the United Nations and to take an active part in the operations destined finally to defeat our enemies. I do not think, however, that we ought to forget that during very black days Turkey was constant and faithful to the alliance she had made with us. They were black days not only for us but for our great Russian Ally, and Turkey, in spite of great pressure by the enemy, remained unmoved. I feel that, if Turkey had played a different part, our task and that of Russia would have been far more difficult. Let us give Turkey full credit for that. Let us also hope that the new fears from which she is suffering may be dispelled, and that that courage which she showed previously will lead her to join the United Nations, to the mutual advantage of both.
  So much for those two special points. I now want to say a few words on the subject of the Atlantic Charter, although
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  the noble Viscount told us that we were there approaching rather delicate ground. The Prime Minister talked about the Atlantic Charter, and various noble Lords in this debate have also mentioned it. Before I come to the Charter, however, I feel that I must challenge a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, who I am sorry is not in his place. He was talking about the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, and he stated that they had almost no effect on the last war. These points were set out in a message to Congress on January 8, 1918. It is, of course, true that as long as Germany was winning victories and, as she thought, the war, the German Government and people paid very little attention to the programme contained in those points. Nevertheless there was a leaven working, and as soon as victory became doubtful the operation of the leaven was certainly activated. I am sure that the disintegration of the civil front in Germany was hastened, and therefore the war was shortened, because the programme contained in the Fourteen Points had been placed before the German people.
  At the same time, I am very glad that the Prime Minister made it quite clear that the Atlantic Charter is in no way a contract between the United Nations and Germany, and that the German people have not obtained any rights under it. The Charter is a declaration of common principles to guide the United Nations themselves. But, although it confers no rights on the German people, we have published it urbi et orbi, and it is quite right and proper that the German people should take note of what it contains. I hope that they will take abundant note. After all, it is a very fine document, and I cannot see that the United Nations have to be ashamed of any single point in it. I was frankly rather surprised when I heard the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, declare that the only point in the Charter which affected the vanquished nations was Article 4, concerning access to raw materials. Incidentally, I fully agree with him that under that Article Germany cannot be allowed to acquire sufficient raw materials to enable her to build up again her war potential. That must be prevented, and I feel that any such establishment of a new war potential would be contrary to the spirit of the Charter taken as a whole. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, spoke of the possi-

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  bility of Germany joining a steel cartel. Frankly, I was a little astonished at the word "cartel" falling from his lips. I think there are other methods of checking the importation of minerals generally, and certain key metals in particular, which would to my mind give better results; but I do not want to develop that at the present moment.
  To return to my main thesis about the Atlantic Charter. I find that Article 5 speaks about "the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field. Article 6 speaks of a peace which, after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and in Article 8 again there is mention of "the nations of the world." I therefore feel that the analysis given by the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, of the Articles of the Atlantic Charter was, to say the least of it, inadequate because the greater part of that Charter applies to the world as a whole. I want to say one word about the famous Article 2 of the Charter, about self-determination. There I should like to support the argument of my noble friend Lord Samuel. It is clear that the principle of self-determination is itself sound and should be applied when it does not clash with other equally important principles. Article 6 of the Charter does contain such other principles: freedom from fear, which to my mind implies national security; and freedom from want implies adequate economic organization. It is when those different principles clash that the trouble arises for the peacemakers. Each case, to my mind, must be taken on its merits: sometimes one principle will receive priority and sometimes another; sometimes, perhaps there may be a happy combination of two or three principles.
  There were many of these cases after the last war. We had them quite continuously during the Peace Conference. My own view is that perhaps at that Conference we over-emphasized the principle of self-determination. Incidentally, may I say that I very much hope that if and when the principle of self-determination is to be applied, the system of plebiscites will be avoided? I do not think that you can get a real representation of the genuine opinion of the inhabitants immediately after a big war, or even for a long
  1018
  time afterwards. You get extraneous in-fluences, and all kinds of outside factors entering into the voting; and in any event, great unrest and conflict arise in the territories themselves. I would infinitely prefer to trust to the knowledge of people who happen to know territories well and to follow their advice. I fully agree with my noble friend Lord Samuel that it would be a great mistake for His Majesty's Government to commit themselves at the present time to any territorial changes. They should have their hands completely free from all pledges, so that they can consult in these matters not only with the United States and with Russia, but also with those States who will be bound, for geographical reasons, to live as neighbours with Germany. I take France, Poland, Holland and Belgium as examples. The views of these States would be of high value, and I think they should be given great weight.
  The question of East Prussia has been raised in the debate and in conclusion I should like to make a few observations about it, and perhaps say one word on Upper Silesia. I will take Upper Silesia first because it seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Buxton, appeared to forget that a large part of Upper Silesia belonged to Poland before this war, and in the German part there is a very large number of Polish inhabitants. As to East Prussia, I was in general agreement with what fell from the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart. Apart from the strategic and economic reasons which the noble Lord gave for detaching East Prussia from Germany, a very strong case can be made out on quite different grounds. First of all there are in East Prussia the landowners, who are German. They are those Junkers who have given so mach trouble in the past, and whom the world would be well rid of. Then there are numerous German officials in East Prussia, and a large intelligentsia based on the University of Königsberg. But quite apart from these three categories, there still remain a large mass of peasants. From the researches I have been able to make, I believe these peasants belong to Polish stock, and not to German stock. I use the word "stock" because scientists tell us we should not use the word "race." I would like to give proof of my argument. When, after the last war, the Polish Corridor was established it was found that the majority of the inhabitants were,

  1019
  in fact, of Polish stock. Therefore, provided our Allies are of the same opinion, I see no difficulty at all, and indeed very great advantage, in depriving Germany of East Prussia and in ridding that part of Europe once for all of the Junker influence. Incidentally, I would hope that when that happens there would be a large measure of land reform and of education, because under the Junker domination the peasants have really been treated very much as serfs, and if they were liberated in the proper sense of the word I feel that they would be very good citizens of their new country.
  The noble Lord, Lord Buxton, made an appeal to history. He said that depriving countries of their land leads usually to war. I should have been very much more impressed if he could have given a single concrete instance when that had happened. Certainly it was not the cause of the Napoleonic wars. It was not the cause of the war between Austria and Prussia; it was not the cause of the Franco-German war; it was not the cause of the war of 1914, and it was not the cause of this war. Therefore I do not think that history bears the noble Lord out in that particular test. I do not feel, in advocating this territorial change, that I am in any way running contrary to the establishment of a lasting peace which must be the aim and object of us all, and to which I believe the establishment of an international authority, as outlined by the Prime Minister and confirmed by the Foreign Secretary yesterday, will be a very valuable and great contribution.
  LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I am not going to attempt to range over the wide ground covered by my noble friend the Leader of the House yesterday and extended in the course of the debate, to which I have listened with so much interest, both yesterday and to-day. I was moved to intervene in this debate by a passage in Lord Cranborne's speech, in which, replying to my noble friend Lord Noel-Buxton, he deprecated the making of certain statements in time of war bearing on the war itself and on the post-war settlement. Without any prejudice to the subject of Lord Noel-Buxton's speech, which I unfortunately did not hear, I should like to say how warmly I agree in general principle as to the danger of political manifestos and
  1020
  statements in time of war. They are apt to bring great difficulties in their train. We saw that in the declarations which were made at various times in the last war, which bore so heavily on the Palestine settlement.
  Two statements have been mentioned in this debate that seem to fall into this category. I refer, firstly, to "unconditional surrender" and secondly, in spite of its merits, to the Atlantic Charter. Unconditional surrender has been discussed before in your Lordships' House. I made part of the case against it myself on September 23 last, and I shall not repeat it. The object of the phrase, as f understand it, is to nail the grotesque German He that they were not beaten in the last war. But that lie has already been disposed of by the fact that it was the German Generals themselves who first insisted on peace negotiations and who signed the humiliating Armistice terms. It could be disposed of by propaganda based on German sources. There is no need for such a vastly important development as the unconditional surrender declaration. The German answer, of course, was that they were let down by their Generals. If the Nazis concede unconditional surrender it will only be said afterwards that the Nazis let them down, that it was their nerve that failed this time.
  It is becoming constantly clearer that the formula caused delay, embarrassment, and leakage in the extraordinary story of the Italian surrender, with its strange migrations to Madrid and Lisbon and so forth. As my noble friend Lord Winster pointed out earlier, the conditions of unconditional surrender took a very long time to arrange, and these conditions, I would add, differed in no way from what we could have got without it. It was just another added complication and delay. On September 23 I suggested to your Lordships that the phrase should gradually fall into disuse so as not to hamper us in subsequent capitulations, referring of course to the satellite nations. That, up to a day or two ago, seemed to be happening. The Russians did not use the term in their conditions for Finland, and that was stated to have had a good effect on the other satellite nations. Also it was not used in the recent warning to the Balkan satellites. Moreover, it looks as if the term has been dropped in the case of the satellites, for the Prime

  1021
  Minister, in reaffirming it on Wednesday, said that
  "the principle of unconditional surrender, which has also been promulgated, will be adhered to so far as Nazi Germany and Japan are concerned"
  without mention of the satellites. I myself have no desire to be weak to Germany. I expressed the view on September 23 that I thought unconditional surrender would al most certainly be necessary in the case of Germany.
  It is not the infliction of unconditional surrender when the moment comes, and if the circumstances are appropriate, that is to be deprecated. It is the announcement and reiteration of the policy long beforehand. It has been a gift to Nazi propaganda, and it has been used in grossly exaggerated form, without any explanation of its real intentions and meanings, to inculcate the idea that there is no hope for Germany except resistance to the last, so as to give the Germans the courage of despair. Despair gives courage to a coward, according to a German proverb. Despair doubles strength, according to a French one. Therefore I venture to express the hope that, even now, this particular formula will be rather kept in reserve.
  In that connexion I would remind your Lordships that unconditional surrender was kept in reserve in 1918, and was used at the final stages with decisive effect. In his third Note of October 23, 1918, President Wilson, in insisting on the impossibility of dealing with "the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany"—that was his language—in the international obligations of Germany, said that in that case the American Government must demand not peace negotiations but surrender. That produced a tremendous effect. Hindenburg and Ludendorff reacted violently. Throwing over their earlier demands for peace negotiations, they drafted and signed a telegram headed "For the Information of all Troops," in which they described President Wilson's Note as a demand for unconditional surrender. "it is thus unacceptable to us soldiers." The draft telegram concluded with an appeal "to continue our resistance with all our strength." But they were too late. The German Government was irrevocably committed to peace and the telegram was never sent Before I leave that subject I would just like to say that so far as
  1022
  my recollection goes it supports what Lord Perth said and not what Lord Vansittart said, that the Fourteen Points did have a value in softening Germany.
  I come now to the Atlantic Charter. Like the Fourteen Points I had thought that it was intended for its propaganda value, but that seems to have been rather lost by recent statements. It also does seem to me to contain certain seeds of danger. As has been already pointed out, there are signs of some incompatability between certain provisions of the Atlantic Charter and the security requirements of the Russians in the settlement of their frontiers, but I have no intention of intruding into that delicate question. I would however express the conviction that the Atlantic Charter is bound to crop up again and again and sometimes to increase difficulties as in the case of the settlement of the thirty and more intractable problems which baffled the Paris Peace Conference and which will assuredly baffle us again. For these reasons I suggest that the Allies ought to be as sparing as they possibly can in making solemn declarations. But sometimes they have to be made, sometimes they cannot be avoided and in those cases very great precautions should be taken in their drafting. Even in the case of the Atlantic Charter the drafting is not, I think, impeccable. I am not here criticizing the material of the Charter but some of the drafting. The various clauses are made to apply to the peoples concerned, all peoples, all States great or small, victor or vanquished (which sometimes seems to be forgotten), all nations, all men in all lands, all men and all the nations of the world. Then (a more material point that raises no difficulty I think), the abandonment of the use of force in the Eighth Clause would appear to be a very remote and almost visionary aspiration in the light of present intentions for world organization. This does show the difficulty of looking ahead very far in these matters.
  My specific suggestion is that solemn declarations of this kind, and others which may have to come, should, before adoption in their final form, be submitted to the same careful technical procedure as occurs in the case of international treaties—that is to say, to scrutiny and final drafting by trained international lawyers accustomed to work together.

  1023
  They exist in every foreign office. Sir Cecil Hurst, Sir William Malkin and M. Fromageot, the great French jurist, and others from other countries whom I could name, built up a great tradition. They were cool, wise, unobtrusive, detached, objective and, above all, worked as a team. With their vast knowledge and experience they tided over many difficult situations, warning their chiefs betimes, usually individually but sometimes collectively, asking for precise instructions on every point of doubt as to the meaning intended. I therefore suggest to the noble Earl who is to reply that he should put it to the Foreign Secretary that a small team of Allied jurists should be built up now, that they should attend future war conferences and be used for the final drafting of all political manifestoes or agreements, so as to build up a new team ready to work together at peace settlements. We have to remember that every political commitment and every document will be subjected to minute scrutiny and will require approval by all the Legislatures concerned, including in the United States of America the Senates Foreign Affairs Committee which I think decides by a statutory majority. You cannot be too careful and the sooner an efficient body is established the sooner will it become like its predecessor a band of brothers.
  THE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC WARFARE (THE EARL OF SELBORNE): My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Winster, in that solicitude for the Front Bench that graces his speeches commiserated with me and my colleagues on the necessity of having to submit the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government to the scrutiny of Parliament, but I can assure the noble Lord that we do not require commiseration in that respect however much we may need it in others. Debates such as have taken place in your Lordships' House and in another place are the strength of British foreign policy, and as the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, pointed out in his most eloquent speech, the Imperial Conference is another immense strength to that foreign policy. The British Prime Minister, in setting forth the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government, has been able to present it to the world with the knowledge that it has the authority and general support of the Empire
  1024
  behind it, and of both Houses of Parliament as well. Therefore we are under one more debt of gratitude to the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, for having introduced this debate and for having at once raised it to the high level to which we are accustomed from him.
  Lord Winster also suggested that there was no guiding principle in the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government. I do not think that is at all a just criticism and I agree with what the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, said in that respect. Surely the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government at the present moment can be summed up in the words that we are out to help those who are prepared to help us in the defeat of Germany, and that everything must be subordinate to that. What other immediate foreign policy do you require or should you have in a life and death struggle such as this war? Our attitude to all countries must be determined by that touchstone.
  Our second objective is, of course, to achieve a durable peace, and a peace settlement to be durable must take into consideration the facts of ethnology, geography and history which have been referred to by your Lordships in this debate. A durable peace must also be based on the right of all homogeneous nations to lead their own life in their own way, free from fear of attack from their neighbours. That is the policy set forth in the Atlantic Charter, and in regard to what fell from the noble Lord, Lord Winster, and other noble Lords to-day I would remind them that Russia is an adherent of the Atlantic Charter as much as is America and the British Empire. The Atlantic Charter is, as the Prime Minister has described it, a great signpost pointing towards the post-war world that the Allies intend to make. It is not a bargaining instrument with our enemies. That I feel is one great justification for the declaration in regard to unconditional surrender. It is very easy, if I may say so with great respect, to point to the disadvantages that may be attached to the formula of unconditional surrender, though I think the statement made by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, that peace with Italy was hung up by that formula is entirely incorrect. The reason why peace was not concluded earlier with Italy was that our Generals and Admirals were not

  1025
  ready to take advantage of the peace immediately, and that strategy required further delay before we could marshal our forces to enter Italy. If peace had been completed before we had done that, it would have given the Germans greater opportunity to oppose our invasion of Italy.
  The noble Lord, Lord Hankey, if I understood him correctly, argued that this problem was handled more adroitly in the last war when President Wilson in his Fourteen Points gave an indication of the type of peace for which America was coal ending, but when it came to the German breakdown then something very similar to unconditional surrender was demanded of Germany. Are we not entitled to say against that that the principle of unconditional surrender, however much it might have been accepted by the. German Generals—as indeed it was—was not as fully realized by the German people as it has been driven into them to-day? That is surely an important consideration when we are thinking of the durability of the peace, because the problem of a durable peace involves making the German people have a will to peace as opposed to the will to war with which our generation and previous generations have had to contend. Surely, my Lords, the underlying cause of the terrible wars that have ravaged Europe during the last three quarters of a century has been the ambition of the German people to dominate Europe by force. We shall not have achieved an enduring peace until the German people have renounced that ambition.
  The ultimate problem, therefore, is to give the German people a will to peace. We shall not have achieved that until we have convinced them as a matter of national conviction, that war does not pay. Therefore it is abundantly necessary to make them realize that they have lost this war in a way which the common people of Gennany did not realize on the last occasion. I confess that in 1919 it never entered my head—I wondered if it entered any of your Lordships' heads—that the German people did not realize they were beaten. Yet undoubtedly the Nazi Party twenty years later was able to spread the myth that Germany was not really defeated in the last war, that she was tricked into an Armistice by the Fourteen Points and stabbed in the back by Jews and left-wing leaders in her hour of difficulty. Anyone who in 1919 had
  1026
  prophesied that happening would have aroused derision, I think, in any informed quarter in this country. Yet something very much like that did happen, and therefore if we are to make it clear that the Atlantic Charter is a signpost representing the ambition of the United Nations in regard to the post-war world and nothing more, it is surely necessary to convince the German people beyond any possibility of misunderstanding that the Atlantic Charter is not a bargain with them, that they have been beaten and that they will have to accept the terms of peace which the Allies lay down.
  There is also another condition necessary to a durable peace. We must put it utterly beyond the power of the German people to attack Europe again, so that they no longer have the temptation to do so. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, asked me some questions as to whether technical problems in regard to the possible rearmament of Germany were receiving adequate consideration. I can assure him that that is so. It is only when the rest of the world is convinced that the German people have renounced the ambition to dominate Europe that they will be prepared to regard the German people as good citizens of the world. In the light of our experience in the last hundred years the peoples of the world will require some convincing. It will therefore have to be a feature of the postwar world that the most powerful of the peace-loving nations constitute themselves the guardians of world peace. If we have learnt nothing else from the experience of the past twenty-five years, we have learnt that peace is one and indivisible, and that the maintenance of peace will be the foremost problem that will confront the present and the next generations. Surely, that problem can only be solved by effective collaboration between the peace-loving peoples of the world. As the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, said yesterday, Great Britain and the British Empire are not in a position to dictate the structure of the peace to our Allies, and we have no ambition to do so. We believe, however, that we can make a very effective contribution towards that settlement, and that with our traditional ties with Europe and our newer but even stronger ties with the Dominions, we shall be intimately concerned with the maintenance of peace in other parts of the world.

  1027
  In that connexion I would like to echo what the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, said so eloquently. I do agree with him that this country enjoys a measure of respect and trust in Europe which she richly deserves, and it is greater now, possibly, than at any previous time. That gives our statesmen a great opportunity; it also imposes upon them a great responsibility. It is not merely the respect that this country enjoys among our Allies in Europe and in many neutral countries that is such an important factor. The conditions of the resistance movements and the underground warfare that has raged in Europe these last four years must also be taken into account. I would like again to echo what fell from the lips of the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, in that respect. When the story of that underground warfare in Poland, in France, in Norway, in Holland, in Belgium and in the Balkans comes to be written, it will prove to be a story of heroism as great as any we have seen. It will be a story of brave deeds comparable with the bravest deeds performed on the battlefield. From all those countries will come stories of heroism than which nothing finer has ever been recorded in all the annals of human courage. These stories will show how true is the metal of the nations of Europe. Many of them were overrun suddenly, but their spirit has never been broken. And there is another fact that will also emerge, and that is that throughout the progress of those resistance movements it has been the privilege of this country to lend them very considerable aid. British officers have been constantly passing to and fro, and munitions of war in very considerable quantities have been supplied to the resistance movements. The assistance that this country has been able to give to the heroes of the underground armies will, I think, be recognized and remembered in all the freed nations of Europe.
  I must apologize for having trespassed longer on your Lordships' time than I had intended doing. There are, however, one or two questions which I was asked to-day, and to which I feel I should give an answer. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, and other noble Lords, criticized the Government with regard to the degree of recognition that has been accorded to the French Provisional Government. I
  1028
  think your Lordships will agree that it would be inadvisable to say anything about that matter now in view of the forthcoming visit of General de Gaulle to this country, but I would like to remove one misconception which the noble Lord, Lord Winster, appears to entertain. He said that it was inconsistent for His Majesty's Government to have recognized the Badoglio Government in Italy because, in his view, it had less authority than the French Provisional Government. The cases are not really parallel. The Badoglio Government was constituted in accordance with the recognized law of Italy. The King of Italy appointed General Badoglio his Prime Minister and entrusted the formation of the Government to him. That is a recognized legal Government in exactly the same way as the Governments of Holland and Norway are, and the difference between that and the French Provisional Government was explained by the Prime Minister in another place on Wednesday.
  The noble Lord also asked me whether I could assure him that the Black List was being employed as an instrument of war. I can give him the most unqualified assurance on that point. When the question of putting a firm or an individual on the Black List arises, all the relevant circumstances are borne in mind, and whenever we are satisfied that a firm or an individual is acting contrary to the interests of the United Nations, and that it would be of assistance to stop his trade, that instrument is put into force without hesitation. There is now a very large number of names upon that Black List. We have ample evidence to show us what a terrible penalty it is for the individuals and the firms concerned, and how the threat of using that penalty has been most potent in restricting trade with Germany. I have endeavoured to answer the various points which were raised in this debate. It only remains for me to thank your Lordships for the indulgence which you have shown in commenting on His Majesty's foreign policy.
  VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Earl for his speech, with the purport and terms of which I find myself in full agreement, and would ask leave to withdraw the Motion which stands in my name.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  House adjourned.