Lords Sitting of 17 May 1944

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers.
  Campbell Richard, Lord Bishop of Wakefield—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
  SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932:

    BOROUGH OF BEDDINGTON AND WALLINGTON ORDER.
    The PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE EARL OF MUNSTER): My Lords I beg to move the Motion standing in my name.
    Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department under the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, and laid before the House yesterday, be approved.—(The Earl of Munster.)
    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    CATCHMENT BOARDS' SEA DEFENCE PROBLEMS.
    LORD CRANWORTH LORD CRANWORTH rose to call attention to the impossible situation in which certain catchment boards find themselves with regard to the provision and maintenance of sea walls and sea defences; to ask what steps His Majesty's Government propose to take in remedy; and to move for Papers.
    The noble Lord said: My Lords, I trust I do not have to apologize to your Lordships' House for occupying a few minutes of your time on so dull a subject. I feel not, because in the first place it is open to anybody to take a more generous allowance for lunch than usual, and in the second place because the land drainage of this country is a matter of supreme importance. I do not think it would be too much to say that the war agricultural
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    committees in a great number of cases—possibly in the majority—have found the deficiency in our drainage system to be the main cause of the failure to get maximum food production. To tell the truth I think our land drainage was in a deplorable situation at the outbreak of war and I trust it will never be allowed to sink to that level again. I am going to deal only with one aspect of land drainage, but I believe there will be a strong consensus of opinion that the whole of our drainage legislation is in fact due for another overhaul. I am dealing only with sea walls and sea defences and they, in the same way as the rest of land drainage, are now governed by the Land Drainage Act of 1930, which was the result of a Royal Commission set up in 1927.
    This Act of 1930 was the Act produced by the Labour Government of the day. Prior to that Act sea walls and sea defences, in company with other drainage, were in effect an affair mainly for the landowners themselves and they were supervised, or supervised themselves, by means of a variety of bodies. There were, in fact, no fewer than 361 such bodies which supervised their operations. The number was drastically cut down by this Act and land drainage was placed in the hands of a comparatively small number of catchment boards who operated the greater catchment areas of this country The Act was a great advance upon what had been done before and I think landowners generally ought to be, and I believe are, very grateful to the Party of the noble Lord who sits opposite, Lord Addison, for having introduced that Bill, the more so as sometimes that Party does not seem to be quite so solicitous for the good health, shall we say, of the landowning class.
    LORD ADDISON: Oh!
    LORD CRANWORTH: Perhaps I should not have said "good health." Anyhow, I for one am very grateful for that measure. The Act quite naturally set up machinery for finding the expenses of such boards. The financial arrangements it made to finance the boards were three. The first one was by means of a precept on the county councils and the county borough councils in catchment areas concerned. But there were two provisos to that. The first was that the precept could not exceed a 2d. rate with-

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    out the consent of the majority of the board concerned, and the second was that the same level rate should operate over the whole catchment area. Thus it is impossible to make a precept on the county council for 3d. and on a county borough for 1d.; the rate has to be the same in both cases. The second method of finance was a precept on internal drainage boards. That produces a very small sum in all cases and it is also, I regret to say, sometimes somewhat difficult to collect. The third method of finance was by Government grants towards the loans contracted by the catchment boards for the purposes of their work, the grants varying according to circumstances and times. Again there was a proviso of some importance. The grants towards these loan charges could only be made to new works or works of improvement; they could not be made for maintenance works. The result is that each new work which is undertaken by a catchment board increases its responsibilities and lessens its power of meeting them.
    Now this Act was welcomed by a majority of counties who have no sea walls and no sea defences and was received with nonchalance by counties whose penny rate produces such a sum that they see no immediate danger of collapse. I am going, however, to instance the case of one catchment board, not because it is an extreme case, but because I happen to be a member of it and I know its exact difficulties only too well. The case is that of the Catchment Board of East Suffolk. Now East Suffolk is a small and poor agricultural county. Before the war a penny rate produced approximately £4,000, but I am sorry to say that owing to the incidence of war a penny rate now produces considerably less. This small catchment board has no less than 112 miles of sea defences and sea walls, and these 112 miles protect approximately only an area of 30o acres per mile. That is to say, the defences go back on an average only half a mile. Their income from a 2½d, rate is £16,000, of which £6,200 comes from the county council and £6,800 from the county borough of Ipswich. I would here say a word in commendation of the public spirit of the county borough of Ipswich. Although they contribute a greater sum than the county they do not receive onetenth—considerably less than one-tenth
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    —of the assistance from the catchment board that the county receives. Yet they have consented to go up to a 2½d. rate and indeed in this year they have agreed for one year only to another penny on top of that. The internal drainage board finds £3,000, making in all, as I said, £16,000.
    Our maintenance of internal drainage cost £8,500 and that figure was estimated before the full increase which has taken place in the rate of maintenance, because it is noteworthy that since the war began the cost of work generally, including labour and materials, has increased by approximately 100 per cent. That is to say, what could be done for £16,000 now takes £32,000. Our loan charges on a loan of £173,000 come to £4,500. For our overhead charges and upkeep of these walls we have left —3,000, not a very big sum. This year in the spring tides we had three or four breaks in our walls, flooding large acreages of valuable land. To stop these gaps an immediate expenditure of £8,000 is required and to make the walls in the immediate neighbourhood anything like safe means an expenditure of another £48,000. But we have not got it. These areas still remain flooded. You cannot fill a breach in a wall with an overdraft, nor indeed can you fill it with Government forms, however plentifully they are showered upon you. It has not been done. These breaches are still in existence and big acreages of land, pasturage and arable, remain flooded. But that only touches the fringe of the problem. To make our sea walls even moderately trustworthy requires an immediate expenditure estimated at £375,000, and to make a proper job the estimate is £800,000. These estimates were made before the full rise in cost had occurred.
    It must be obvious to your Lordships that if we were to do it the interest on our loan charges would absorb, and doubly absorb, the whole of the income of the catchment board. It is therefore an undeniable fact that the East Suffolk River Catchment Board is bankrupt and doubly bankrupt. I have taken the case of East Suffolk, but there are others to my knowledge equally had. The Severn I know to be in the greatest difficulties, and in Kent, another county that has suffered from the ravages of war, they are faced with an expenditure of over £2,250,000. They are a much

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    richer county, and I do not suppose they suffer from the same bankruptcy as we do, but I imagine their position is very serious. They sent up a memorandum to the County Councils Association which is well worth study and from which I should like to quote to your Lordships the last two paragraphs. The first is to the effect that the whole cost of the provision and maintenance of sea defence works should be defrayed out of national funds. The second says that a comprehensive system of co-ordination and co-operation in regard to sea defence works throughout the whole country should be established by His Majesty's Government, and that any system of co-ordination should provide that, when sea defence works affect land drainage interests in relation to any catchment area, the catchment board for that area should be the agency to carry out the works.
    I want to make a special point, and it is this. The immediate cost of repairing and maintaining these sea walls is a great deal more than the value of the land to be protected. In some cases it is ten times as much. When the catchment board went to the Ministry to ask what they should do in such a case they were told that it was the duty of the catchment board and no one else to decide whether they would repair these walls or whether they would not, and which walls they would repair and which walls they would leave. I submit to your Lordships that that is a pretty invidious duty to place upon a catchment board. It means that they must say to Mr. A., who is a landowner who has been paying taxes in order that his land should be protected, "My dear Mr. A., we are going to protect your land"; and to say to Mr. B., a man who has done exactly the same thing—and your Lordships will realize that both Mr. A. and Mr. B. are almost certainly known to every member of the catchment board—"We propose to let your lands go into the sea." That would be invidious indeed. This is not a big island, and I do submit that it is wrong and improper that the onus should be or a small, isolated and bankrupt body to decide what portion of this land should be allowed to go into the sea, and what portion should be preserved.
    The noble Duke, who, I understand, is going to answer my question, may say, as ether people have said: "You in Suffolk are very fortunate people, you live
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    in the best climate in England, and among the nicest people. You must take the rough with the smooth." If the noble Duke were to say that I should agree with his premises entirely, although sometimes it does not seem to me that the Ministry in which he takes such an illustrious part is altogether agreed about our niceness. There is extreme difficulty in collecting a large tax which is patently unjust, and it might amount to an impossibility.
    One more point and that, I think, the most important. In my own county of Suffolk during the last century we have seen scores of square miles of valuable country fall into the sea, and we have expended vast sums in order to prevent the trouble becoming even worse. If we look over the seas that face us we see Holland and Denmark who, during that same period, have not only lost nothing but have added to their shores even greater areas than we have lost. What: is more remarkable still is that, whereas in losing our land we have spent vast sums, they have made a profit over the whole transaction. Of course I am well aware that there are conditions in regard to seas, tides, terrain and other matters which are largely responsible for this, but I very much doubt if that is the sole reason. I believe that the skill, co-operation and coordination on the other side of those waters may have something to do with it. I recall that a few years back there was a big inundation in Norfolk at Horsey Mere, and Dutch experts were called in to advise on the reclamation of the area. They expressed themselves as being completely amazed at the ignorance and lack of coordination of those in charge of our sea defences. Probably some of your Lordships are aware that our greatest feat of reclamation in the Bedford fens was the work of a Dutch engineer, Vermuyden.
    What is the remedy? I suggest that there is only one remedy, and that is the remedy put forward by Kent. That is that sea walls and sea defences generally should become a national charge. Your Lordships are probably aware—indeed you cannot but be aware—that very many bodies lately have been putting forward programmes for post-war agriculture—the Royal Agricultural Society of England, the C.L.A., the N.F.U., workers' organizations, the Council of Agriculture, a Committee of your Lordships' House and

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    several more. I really might say that the only authoritative body that has not done so is His Majesty's Ministry of Agriculture. I hope that a programme from that Ministry is now on its way. But every one of those bodies to which I have referred has considered this question, and has said definitely that sea walls and sea defences should be a national charge.
    A more remarkable indication of feeling came about in this way. The Royal Agricultural Society of England, the other day, convened a meeting of those bodies which have produced reports. All the bodies accepted and were represented at the meeting. They endeavoured to find a general consensus of agreement with regard to post-war agriculture, on the main principles, and they did succeed to, I think, a remarkable extent, in getting a consensus of opinion on fourteen main points. One of those points, which was passed unanimously and with acclamation, was that sea walls and sea defences should be a national charge. I submit that that is a vast body of evidence, and very authoritative evidence, too. Such evidence, it seems to me, can hardly be disregarded. You, may say, further, I think, that it is a matter of common sense that the preservation of the land of this country, the decision as to what land shall be preserved and what shall be thrown into the sea, is a matter for the nation, not for small bodies, and should be dealt with nationally.
    Indeed, my Lords, the Government are the only people who can do it. They alone have adequate resources, they alone can put their hands on the experts and men of experience at home and abroad, who can do it, by co-ordination—not by doing what is so often done now, done naturally but very wrongfully, just throwing the sea on to your neighbour. That is what most of these bodies do. If they can, they throw the sea on to their neighbour and then they are quite happy. That sort of thing is not good enough. You want a co-ordinated policy. That can only be brought about by making the whole matter one for the nation to decide, and one in connexion with which the nation must take the necessary action. I do not think that ever in this House or elsewhere I have been a passionate advocate of nationalization, but in this case I am indeed an advocate of nationalization,
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    and that in the quickest possible time. I beg to move.
    THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (THE DUKE OF NORFOLK): My Lords, my noble friend when he raised this question said he trusted he did not have to apologize for keeping the House for a few minutes on this subject, and I shall not make any apologies on my own part because I feel that it is a very important question. With regard to the area of which he has spoken, with the full knowledge he possesses of it, I will not follow him except to say that I also live in a county which is within a catchment area and bounded by the sea, and I leave it for him to decide whether it is more beautiful and better populated than the county from which he comes. The connexion of sea defence with land drainage is quite clear, and it is impossible for them to be separated in the matter of their maintenance. If the land is to be drained, it is not only necessary to have an escape for the water, but for those areas which lie below the tidal level there must be some form of protection to exclude that surplus water. The drainage authorities, therefore, have always been concerned not only with the maintenance of the land but also with the watercourses and drains and the banks, sluices and other defences which prevent water, including sea-water, from coming in. That was fully recognized in the Land Drainage Act, 1930, which actually defines drainage as including defence against sea-water.
    Coastal erosion, of course, does not necessarily have any effect on land drainage. Where cliffs are being eroded, and the land behind them is above the level of high tides, drainage authorities will not usually be concerned. It is only where coast erosion may have an effect on agricultural land that it comes under the Ministry of Agriculture; other Departments are concerned where the land affected is not used for agriculture. I refer to this matter simply because, as many of your Lordships may remember, a Royal Commission on Coast Erosion sat in the early part of this century and reported against any form of State aid towards coast protection works. In making that recommendation they went so far as to exclude grants towards sea

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    defences for land drainage purposes. That part of their Report, however, was superseded by the Report of the Royal Commission on Land Drainage in 1927, to which my noble friend has referred, and it was as a result of that Royal Commission of 1927 that the Land Drainage Act, 1930, came into being. It was under that Act that catchment boards as such were established, not only for drainage works inland but also for sea defence.
    This is the system under which Lord Cranworth suggests that in particular his own catchment area, and possibly others, are in what I think he calls an impossible situation. I will say at once that we fully appreciate the heavy burden which falls on these catchment boards in the maintenance of sea defence work. Whether that burden is in fact too grievous to be borne, even with the very generous State aid which is available by means of grants, is another matter; but I am quite sure that, whatever view you may take of the catchment boards, the Land Drainage Act, 1930, has put matters into a far better state than they were in before. I think it is only right to pay tribute to the great amount of work which has been carried out since these catchment boards were set up, and I would particularly refer to the work which is being done in Norfolk, Essex, Kent and Sussex and on the south side of the Humber.
    In order that your Lordships may understand the enormous advance which has been made in land drainage, I would ask you to look for a moment at the situation which was found to exist when the Royal Commission made their investigations. They found that the existing land drainage authorities were a hotch-potch of bodies with widely differing constitutions and powers. There were Commissions of Sewers issued under the Great Seal by virtue of the Statute of Sewers of 1531, drainage commissions or boards constituted under private and local Acts, elective drainage boards constituted under the Land Drainage Act, 1861, and small bodies acting under in-closure awards or merely by private agreement between landowners. There were two geographical limitations which were common to them all. The breadth of their areas for rating and working purposes never extended beyond the bounds of the lands which derived benefit from their operations; that is, they were
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    relatively narrow lowland strips; whilst lengthwise they were never the full length of the river which was affected. The co-ordinated treatment of drainage problems for a whole river basin was thus, impossible, even if the lowlands had been able, with their own money, to pay all the expenses; the lowlanders had always the grievance that the upland people paid nothing towards the cost and were relying on the lowlanders to provide the whole of the money.
    The Land Drainage Act, 1930, for the first time enabled drainage authorities to be set up which directly controlled the major part of each of the great river systems of England and Wales, whose sources of revenue extended right up to the watersheds of those systems. There are thus to-day two types of statutory drainage district in England and Wales. There is the catchment board of the new type, covering a whole catchment area, and there is the local drainage district or internal drainage district.
    The grant which the Minister is able to give under the 1930 Act to these areas is limited to works of improvement and new construction, and is subject to the approval of the Treasury. In practice the rate of grant is assessed with an eye to the financial resources and commitments of the individual catchment boards. The most convenient guide to the financial position of a catchment board is its precept on the councils in its area, expressed in terms of a penny rate. A poor board, or a board with much work to do, will have a high precept and a correspondingly high rate of grant; a rich board, or a board with not so much work to do, will have a low grant. Thus the Old Haven and Bulverhy the Stream Catchment Board, who have considerable sea defence responsibilities but whose area extends into Eastbourne and Hastings, can obtain £6,300 from a penny rate. They have in fact in the past been able to meet their expenses with a precept of a little over a halfpenny, and have received a 15 per cent. grant. The large River Trent Catchment Board can obtain nearly £116,000 for a penny rate and have in fact precepted at about 1-d.; their £1,000,000 main river improvement scheme receives a 30 per cent. grant. At the other end of the scale the River Ancholme Catchment Board in North Lincolnshire, and

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    the Rother and Jury's Gut Catchment Board in East Sussex and South Kent can obtain only £550 and £1,450 from a penny rate, and have had to precept at 6d. and 7d. They have been grant-aided at 75 per cent.
    The House will note that in making these grants we have not so far differentiated between sea defence work and ordinary inland drainage work, but for the future, in deference to the representations which have been made by the catchment boards, we are going to make a distinction in favour of sea defence works. Before I come to that, however, let me review the enormous advance which has been made in arterial drainage, including sea defence, under the catchment board system. Thirteen years, during which we have had an economic depression and a war, have been much too short a time in which to make up the neglect into which main river drainage has fallen, and which was obvious when this Act came into force. But in that time no less than £16,000,000 worth of main river schemes, including sea defence work, has been submitted by catchment boards and approved for grant. Although much of the work came to a standstill when this war broke out, we have been able to spend £4,500,000 on main river work, which has had a direct bearing on food production.
    If I may turn to sea defences and the main problem which is confronting my noble friend at this moment, I would just refer to the deputation which the Minister of Agriculture received last January from the Catchment Boards' Association. They put forward proposals, first that the whole cost of providing and maintaining sea defence works should be defrayed out of national funds, and secondly, that a comprehensive system of co-ordination and co-operation in regard to these works should be established by the Government. They suggested that such a system should provide that where sea defence works affect drainage interests in relation to catchment areas, the catchment board should be the agency to carry out the works. The case put forward in support of these proposals was that some catchment boards have to undertake sea defence works which are beyond the scope of true drainage works, that the catchment boards, operating singly, have not
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    enough jurisdiction properly to undertake these works, and that the enormous cost is a burden which the peculiarly limited basis of catchment boards was never designed to carry. The Association argued more particularly that sea defences protected many interests other than land drainage, that their effects may extend far beyond the catchment area in which they are carried out, and that they therefore required co-ordination throughout the country.
    It will be clear from my opening remarks that land drainage cannot be divorced from such sea defence works as affect it. It is equally clear that ordinary drainage works, like sea defence works, also benefit many other interests and are a matter of national concern. This national concern is, recognized in both cases by Government grants, but it hardly justifies a demand that the whole cost should be borne by the State. So far as greater co-ordination is concerned, this will be heartily welcomed, particularly in the Humber Estuary, but it is open to catchment boards to come together themselves without asking for a 100 per cent. grant from the State, as has already been done in the Thames Estuary. In short, the Minister thought that the Catchment Boards' Association had put forward a very reasonable case, and as a result, he was able to tell them that the Treasury would consider generous financial treat-merit for sea defence works. I am now able to inform the House that we are prepared to go further and to agree to a maximum grant of 80 per cent. to meet those cases where the financial difficulties of catchment boards are most acute. I must emphasize, however, that this is a maximum grant and by no means all the cases which will come forward will be justified in receiving it.
    In the meantime the Minister asked for certain information from the Catchment Boards' Association, which they have submitted to him, and they ask in particular that the maintenance of sea defences, as well as the improvement of existing and the construction of new works should be considered. These matters will be considered, but I must make it clear that under the present legislation, the 1930 Act, the Minister has no right to extend his powers beyond improvement, and if maintenance is to be included new legislation would have to be brought in. Before that step could be taken very careful con-

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    sideration would have to be given to this matter. I know that my noble friend has had certain trouble in his own catchment area, but I hope that he has now taken steps, both there and here, to try to bring this to an end. Possibly the small concession which I have been able to announce this afternoon will satisfy him, and I hope make him feel that his journey was worth while.
    LORD CRANWORTH: My Lords, I must thank the noble Duke for his sympathetic reply and for the element of hope that he put before us at the end of his speech. I am afraid that he would be the first to admit that his speech and the promise that he holds out will not close the overdraft of my catchment board, nor yet the breaches which exist in our walls, still less remove the water off the flooded area. I quite appreciate that it was not in his power to do that, and I can only thank him for the sympathy of his reply and trust that the hope that he expressed at the end of his speech may be more completely fulfilled than I myself anticipate. I ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
    Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

    SEGREGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR.
    LORD VANSITTART LORD VANSITTART has given Notice that he would ask His Majesty's Govern-men what steps have been taken to segregate Austrian and so-called Sudeten, that is German-Bohemian, prisoners of war from the ordinary Teuto-Prussians; and whether any such salutory measures are being applied to the German-speaking prisoners of war taken by the Armed Forces of this country and merely held for convenience in the United States or Canada.
    The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to ask the question that stands in my name, and before considering any further comments on the matter it would be only reasonable to hear the reply I am about to receive. I say this with the greater alacrity in that I understand that, anyhow, I should be out of order in making a speech at this point.
    THE EARL OF HUNTINGDON: My Lords—
    SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
    LORD STRABOLGI: I understand my noble friend beside me is quite in order in discussing this matter.
    THE EARL OF HUNTINGDON: I do not wish to do anything out of order.
    THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD CROFT): My Lords, the noble Earl is quite in order in speaking, although there is no Motion.
    THE EARL OF HUNTINGDON: I just want to add a word or two on this question of the segregation of prisoners of war into racial groups. I should like to suggest to the Minister who will answer the question that, instead of the racial division which is proposed in the question, it should rather be a political division, because in practice we must all recognize that this is a war of ideologies rather than a war of races. In fact we see among the Austrians that Adolf Hitler is a great exponent of the Nazi ideal. In any prison camp, as in any community, there must be a large proportion of followers, led and ruled by a small minority of leaders. I think you must find in any prison camp a small percentage of Nazis dominating the other prisoners and forcing Nazi ideals down their throats, and in my view you should segregate these unfortunate or misled Germans. If not, they may become more confirmed Nazis than perhaps they were when they were captured. I want to emphasize that it should be a political division—not a segregation of the Anti-Nazis from the Nazis, but rather a segregation of the violent Nazis from the mass of prisoners.
    Perhaps also it would be possible for the noble Lord to say what proportion of members of the Nazi Party there is roughly among these prisoners, and what has happened, for instance, to the 999 Division captured in Tunisia who were all Anti-Nazis detailed for most dangerous and unpleasant work. I do not want to continue further, but I would like to suggest that perhaps some Commission of inquiry might be appointed to go into this subject of the prison camps because there have been unpleasant stories in the papers. Particularly I refer to what happened in Canada where two unfortunate Anti-Nazis were bullied and then murdered. One would be greatly relieved in one's mind if some Commission, taking evidence in camera, investigated this matter.
    LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, as the noble Earl's speech entirely misrepresents the question that is on the Paper, I should like to reply to it right away. There is nothing racial whatever about my proposal. The plain fact is that Austria and the so-called German Sudetenland are going to be taken away from Germany, and it is on that basis that I wish the prisoners to be segregated. I differ entirely, as a matter of fact, from the last speaker in considering this an ideological war, in that I consider it a war to defeat the German lust for world domination. I do not think that is ideological at all. In the case of Austria, her destiny has been settled by the Moscow Declaration. It is on that basis that I ask that the prisoners be segregated. As regards the so-called Sudeten German, there is, as a matter of fact, "no such person." The so-called Sudeten Germans are merely German Bohemians who have invited themselves to live in Bohemia. Your Lordships may remember that in the 'nineties there was a bit of a campaign by the Hohenzollerns to detach these areas from their Hapsburg allies. There was nothing racial about that. It was ambitious and nothing else. The campaign was a flop, but that does not matter. It is well known that these Sudeten Germans or, as I prefer to call them, German Bohemians, have given a great deal of trouble, and this time they have either to behave themselves or go home. That is well recognized by the Party to which the noble Earl belongs. In the Report of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party it is said that all Germans living outside the postwar German frontiers, unless they are willing to be loyal subjects of the States in which they find themselves, without claiming any special privileges, should go back to Germany. There is nothing racial about that, and that is the basis on which I ask that segregation should take place.
    LORD CROFT: My Lords, as I indicated when I was invited to express my opinion, it was competent for any noble Lord to offer some remarks on this question. My noble friend was probably aware in asking his question that he was entitled, as usual, to make a speech on the question. Perhaps I should say it is unusual, after deciding not to make a
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    speech in asking the question, to make a speech later. I only mention that with great deference because I believe that is the custom in your Lordship's House. My noble friend will forgive me if, first of all, I try briefly to answer the points made by the noble Earl opposite. He suggested that prisoners should be segregated into political divisions. That is not a subject that I have been able to take counsel about. It is not included in the question. I would only say, as on reflection my noble friend will probably agree, that there might have to be a very great many stages to be gone through if we attempted to practise segregation in this form. But I am sure the noble Earl's view will be taken note of when the debate is read. Then he asked a question as to what proportion of the prisoners are Nazis. I cannot answer that question at present, but I should be very glad to ascertain the information if possible.
    With regard to the question on the Paper by my noble friend Lord Vansittart, the Joint Declaration issued at the Moscow Conference made it clear that it was the desire of the three signatory Governments to see re-established a free and independent Austria. His Majesty's Government have considered it a logical consequence of the Declaration to segregate Austrian from German prisoners of war. Hitherto Sudeten Germans have not been treated in this way. His Majesty's Government are, however, prepared to consider the question of the segregation of Sudeten German prisoners with a view to deciding whether it is either desirable or practicable. I should like to make it clear, however, that it is at present by no means certain that it is either desirable or practicable. As regards the Austrians, the policy I mentioned has been carried out as far as it is administratively practicable to do so. In North Africa and in the Middle East, where considerable numbers of the German prisoners are held, the segregation is complete: that is Austrians and Germans have no contact with one another. In other respects the Austrians are treated in the same way as other prisoners of war. The number of German prisoners held in this country, as my noble friend will be aware, is relatively small and the number of Austrians is of course much smaller still. It is therefore not in all cases administratively practicable to make the arrange-

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    ments which are necessary in order to separate Germans and Austrians.
    As the noble Lord indicates in his question German prisoners are held by the United States of America and in the Dominions. But the terms of the noble Lord's question are perhaps somewhat misleading in this connexion. All Allied Governments, and this includes the Dominions, share the burden of providing accommodation for prisoners of war captured by the Allied Forces. Each Government is separately and independently responsible under the Geneva Convention for these prisoners of war it holds as Detaining Power. It has been suggested to the Canadian and Australian Governments that they might consider taking measures similar to those taken by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. I should emphasize, however, that this is entirely a matter for those Governments.
    LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I do not want to take advantage of the fact that I have a right to speak and the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, has exhausted his right, so I will not reply to his provocative remarks to my noble friend beside me. But I would like to express my sympathy with my noble friend the Under-Secretary of State for War, because, although quite rightly as I consider, my noble friend beside me raised the real crux of the matter, that was not in the printed question and naturally the noble Lord, Lord Croft, did not have notice of it and could not make the inquiries.
    I should, however, like if I may to put this argument to him. The information which reaches my noble friends on these Benches is rather disturbing. Quite apart from the question of the Austrians—and I personally agree with the segregation and with the arguments put forward by Lord Vansittart for segregating the Austrians—I believe the administration of the camps on the political plane does require more attention. The camp commandants are mostly retired officers, men with very distinguished careers but of a certain age, who, to put it quite plainly, do not want trouble. They look after the health and other interests of the men, but if they can arrange for the prisoners in the camps to run themselves they allow that to happen. The same thing of course takes place in Germany. In the prison camps there, at any rate where the British and American
    810
    prisoners are, you have the same state of affairs. Prisoners will look after themselves and keep order and peace. The elderly German commandants are only too glad for that to be done.
    The same thing occurs here; it is only human nature. But what happens in the case of the German prisoners? In practice it means that the ardent Nazis rule the roost. They keep order and take very good care to suppress, and in sane cases oppress, their fellow-countrymen who have seen the error of their ways. My noble friend quoted the cases of murder in Canada, and I am sorry to say I hear of bullying in this country of Anti-Nazis carried out by these Nazi thugs. The suggestion we wish to make from these Benches—and my noble friend is not alone in this matter—is that great care should be taken to separate these dyed-in-the-wool Nazis, these strong party men who are probably incorrigible, from the others. We think they should be put in separate camps so that the others may have some chance, by discussion, reading, listening to the wireless and other experiences, of seeing the evils of the régime which they have hitherto served.
    In this connexion I must say I think the United Nations and our country in particular, have been unenterprising in using prisoners who are favourable to our cause. If the Germans can get any recalcitrant Poles, Czechs or Indians, they promptly put them into fighting units and make the greatest use of them both for propaganda and military purposes. If we can find prisoners who are willing to help, prisoners who have seen the evils of Nazism, I think we ought to use them. That is the suggestion we wish to make to my noble friend. I am sorry he was not given notice of it but I am sure he will be sympathetic. I assure him there has been a lot of uneasiness at the policy of drift with regard to these German prisoners of war camps, with perhaps evil results, and it has been suggested that at the end of the war the only convinced Nazis left will be prisoners of war.

    MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
    VISCOUNT ELIBANK VISCOUNT ELIBANK had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His Majesty's Government whether, in view of the unsatisfactory nature of the replies

    811
    given by the Minister of Economic Warfare in the House of Lords debate on the 9th of May to certain questions put to him regarding the future arrangements outlined by him for closing down the Department of Economic Warfare after the war with Germany is terminated, they will cause a White Paper to be issued at an early date setting out the proposals in detail in order that Parliament may have full opportunity to discuss them before they are brought into force; and to move for Papers.
    The noble Viscount said: My Lords, last week there was a debate in your Lordships' House on the operations of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Although the Motion introducing that debate had not a single reference to the future of the Department, the Minister in charge, my noble friend Lord Selborne, at the end of his reply, made a statement regarding that future. Why he chose that particular moment to make this disclosure I cannot say, but he certainly surprised some of your Lordships, certainly myself, by doing so, and not only by the act of doing so but by some of the facts which he disclosed. He further made what I regarded as an astonishing statement, that the proposals that he laid before us had been agreed between the Foreign Secretary and himself as Minister for Economic Warfare, and he made no mention as to whether His Majesty's Government had agreed to them or not.
    After very careful study of his speech in Hansard and of his reply, I have summed up his statement regarding the future of his Department as follows. First, I wish to say to my noble friend that in doing so I have tried to be as accurate as possible, and in order to make it more convenient I propose to make certain comments on the details of that statement as I proceed with my speech. As a preliminary he informed us that the Ministry of Economic Warfare is divided into two parts, first of all the administration of the blockade, and secondly the Economic Intelligence Branch, which is known as the Enemy Branch. He then went on to tell us that as soon as the war with Germany is terminated, steps will be taken to close down the Ministry so far as the blockade is concerned, and that so far as the blockade with Japan is concerned a separate Department in England
    812
    was not necessary for the purpose as our American Allies are the greatest authorities on the economic situation as it exists in those waters.
    In my speech I questioned him closely on this point. With our immense trade interests in the Far East I cannot see that we can afford to leave the blockade entirely in the hands of the Americans without proper representation. Indeed I feel that the blockade in the Far East should be a joint operation between the Ministry of Economic Warfare and whatever department exists for that purpose in the United States of America. For that purpose alone I should have thought it was necessary to retain the Ministry of Economic Warfare until the war with Japan was concluded. I could get no satisfactory reply on that question.
    Now I should like to pass to that section of the Department known as the Enemy Branch or the Economic Intelligence Branch. So far as this branch is concerned, that is the Economic Intelligence Branch, it is to be handed over to the Foreign Office and to become the Economic Intelligence Branch of the Foreign Office. This, my noble friend stated, had been agreed to already by the Foreign Secretary, and indeed he went on to say that the Economic Intelligence Branch had already been handed over to the Foreign Office partially and that it was now known as the Enemy Branch of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare—not the Enemy Branch of the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Foreign Office. The transference had gone so far that it had already gone to the Foreign Office—partially, as he himself explained. Nevertheless, the fact remains that this branch has crossed the threshold of the Foreign Office, evidently to stay. In fact, the break-up of the Department has already started apparently by the ipse dixit of the two Ministers concerned. Unless the Government have agreed to this—and we know nothing about that, my noble friend did not advise us at all on that side of the question—then it seems to me that my noble friend and the Foreign Secretary have acted ultra vires.
    What will be the effect of handing over the Economic Intelligence Branch to the Foreign Office? The noble Lord, Lord Rennell, in his speech, let the cat out of the bag. He evidently knew what had

    813
    been arranged because he spoke before my noble friend had an opportunity of saying anything. What Lord Rennell said was that the handing over of the Economic Intelligence Branch to the Foreign afice—and he advocated it very strongly and, if I may say so, very ably—would give back to the Foreign Office what was taken away from it after the last war—namely, presumably, the control of overseas trade which was after the last war vested in the Overseas Trade Department by Parliamentary decree and statutory action.
    In a very few words I should like to describe exactly what happened at that time. The Department of Overseas Trade was established somewhere towards the end of the war for the purpose of administering and controlling overseas trade with Europe and other foreign Powers. I am riot talking about the Dominions or the Colonies. When the Geddes Committee was sitting in 1923 or 1924 that Committee recommended for the sake of economy that the Department of Overseas Trade should be abolished. That aroused great objection, publicly voiced, on the part of the commercial bodies in this country, and so the Government appointed a Committee under the chairmanship of the late Lord Chancellor, Lord Cave, to advise them upon it. I cannot remember the exact date but about 1925 or 1926 that Committee reported. They advised that the Foreign Office should not be commercialized and strongly recommended that the Department of Overseas Trade should be retained in its existing form. Upon that there were further debates. I have been looking up those debates and I find—it is only of personal interest to me—that I actually made my maiden speech in your Lordships' House upon that subject. I feel that I was one of those who helped to retain that Department in the State and I shall do my best, having some knowledge of the advantages it has given, to see that in the future its powers are not whittled away. Under these present proposals therefore a decision deliberately taken by Parliament is to be reversed solely by Ministerial action without Parliament being given the opportunity to consider the wisdom or the non-wisdom of the steps proposed. I submit that that is a subversion of our Parliamentary procedure and of our Constitution.
    But there is a still further arrangement between the two Ministries which will require great force of argument to make me believe that it can be right. What is proposed in the Foreign Office when Germany is defeated is that through the Economic Intelligence Branch which is to be attached, and which has already been partially attached to the Foreign Office; the Foreign Office shall have responsibility for planning and controlling presumably the many economic operations that will follow the defeat of Germany. My noble friend summed up that part of his proposals in a paragraph which I should like to read to your Lordships. It is in col. 647 of the Official Report. My noble friend said:
    "Quite apart from the manifold uses of economic intelligence for fighting the war, economic intelligence is of vital importance for the planning of many operations which will follow the defeat of Germany. In the first place, there is intelligence for the Far Eastern war,"—
    I have already referred to that—
    "economic disarmament and economic control of Germany, reparations, the economic effects of frontier rectification, the rehabilitation of occupied territories, the development of economic sources of supply to allow Europe to recuperate. These are matters on which the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers will need expert advice in the months immediately succeeding the Armistice."
    That paragraph alone is sufficient to show that these proposals require very careful consideration by Parliament before they are put into force.
    The importance and magnitude of the operations involved seem to require a Department with a special Minister to administer them, not a sub-department of the Foreign Office which is already overworked and will be even more overworked when this war ends, and work on all these particular matters begins. I ask your Lordships to say whether you believe that the Foreign Office is the appropriate Department to control such functions. Personally, I do not think so. Surely these proposed functions are not compatible with the proper and usual functions of the Foreign Office. On the one hand you have smooth diplomacy, on the other hand ruthless repression, because that is the only sort of treatment that can be applied to Germany with success until the points mentioned by the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, have been settled, or until Germany has paid the

    815
    penalty for her misdeeds. Both these functions, smooth diplomacy and ruthless repression, are to be supplied by the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office is to become a sort of Jekyll and Hyde Department, a role which, I submit, will fit ill that most dignified Department of the State, and it might very well spell the ruin of our foreign policy after the war.
    I am not going to suggest to-day who should take on this thankless and gigantic task, but of one thing I am certain—it is necessary that the whole question as to what organization it should be, and the form it should take, should receive the very closest consideration and deliberation in Parliament, and that for that purpose alone the present proposals should be submitted in a White Paper in more detailed form for the consideration of Parliament. All these proposals require close scrutiny and discussion in Parliament. It was emphasized only yesterday in this House by the Minister of Reconstruction that what will matter most after the war will be our export trade, upon which we shall have to rely to rehabilitate our economic system. All these proposals are bound up with that vital question. It is all wrong that they should be forced through Parliament in this hole-and-corner fashion. I resent it, and there are other members of your Lordships' House who resent it. Many members of the House of Commons resent it, too. Those members have, in the past few months, shown in no silent manner what they feel about the proposals being brought forward and placed before the House by a Minister without any real notice that these things were going to be done or any indication of what the proposals are.
    I can assure your Lordships that a great deal of time, a great many differences, and a great amount of heat and argument will be saved by laying these proposals before Parliament in the form of a White Paper so that we may know what they are about. It will be of great assistance to my noble friend and to the Foreign Secretary in getting their proposals through. I do not suggest, for a moment, that I am necessarily right over this, or that others must be right. I may be wrong. But I do say, at least let us have a full discussion with all the details in front of us set out in such a form that we can understand them, and not misunderstand
    816
    them. Let us have these things in a White Paper. It is for that reason that I bring forward this Motion to-day and I urge my noble friend to accept it. My Lords, I beg to move.
    THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I listened with great attention to the case made by the noble Viscount who has introduced this Motion, but it does seem to me, with great respect, that it is based on a fundamental error. In that Motion the noble Viscount maintains that the replies given by the Minister of Economic Warfare in the debate on May 9 were unsatisfactory. Now I venture to assert that those replies were considered satisfactory, not only by myself but by the great majority of your Lordships' House. In support of my belief, may I remind your Lordships of the debate which took place in this House on March 25 and continued on March 30 last year? That debate was about the reform of the Foreign Service. It had as its subject, its main subject, the White Paper in which His Majesty's Government proposed the amalgamation of the Diplomatic Service with the Consular Service and with the Diplomatic Commercial Service. The proposals were later approved by both Houses. Now the White Paper stated that economics and finance had become inextricably interwoven with politics, and speaker after speaker—speakers of such eminence as Lord Cecil, Lord Tyrrell and Lord Hankey—insisted on the necessity of a strong economic branch in the Foreign Office. Lord Addison, speaking for the Labour Party, expressed the fear that the reforms relating to the recruitment for the Foreign Service would be too late, and he said that there should be set up—I do not think I shall be misinterpreting him in saying this—at the earliest possible moment, a diplomatic staff at the centre of affairs consisting of persons who shall be competent to advise on all matters affecting trade, industry, social conditions and so on. That was Lord Addison's view.
    After the last war, the Commercial Department of the Foreign Office was suppressed, and the Department of Overseas Trade was created. I will revert to the latter in a short time. The result, however, was that there was a wide gap in the organization of the Foreign Office, and although the Economic Relations Department was established, it was not

    817
    of sufficient strength and authority to advise tile Secretary of State on the possible effect of economic and financial measures on our foreign policy, and also to digest and adapt to the best national use the economic information which flows to the Foreign Office from abroad. The Foreign Office was compelled in economic and commercial matters to act very largely as a post office, and I am sorry to say that there was a serious lack of coordination in economic and political factors in our Foreign Office as a result of what happened. If you compare the Economic Relations Department of the Foreign Office with the economic branches which were maintained by the greater number of European Foreign Offices, you will find that these latter attached far greater importance than we did to what may be called politico-economic subjects.
    However this may be—and I now come to the particular point raised by the noble Viscount—on the outbreak of war the Economic Relations Branch of the Foreign Office lapsed, and its staff was lent to the Ministry of Economic Warfare. I presume that the noble Lord is not opposed to restitution. That staff, according to the statement made by the noble Lord, is to be returned to the Foreign Office, and I hope that its numbers will be largely increased in the meantime, so that the Secretary of State will have ultimately at his disposal a really first-class competent authority, who will be competent to advise him of the effect on political relations not only of economic measures taken by foreign countries but also of economic proposals which we ourselves make. Such a staff, if it is to be effective, must clearly be under the authority of the Foreign Secretary himself, and I hope very much that it will be found possible to house it in the same building. That may not sound a very important point, but this question of what I may call physical propinquity is really very important from the point of view of efficiency.
    The noble Viscount mentioned the excellent work done by the Department of Overseas Trade, and I entirely agree with him. When I was in Rome I had on my staff a very able member of that Department; I do not think anybody could have wished for a better adviser, and he was my Commercial Counseller.
    818
    I can speak very highly of his work. That Department, however, has one very great disadvantage: it has to serve, as Lord Tyrrell put it the other day, two masters, the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade. I do not know whether it loves the one and hates the other, or to which, if so, its love and hatred may be devoted; but I do know that that is not a satisfactory position. More important still, its central organization in London is not such that it can really tender to the Foreign Office the kind of advice on politico-economic questions which is essential if the Foreign Secretary is adequately to perform his very onerous task.
    I suggest, therefore, that the statements made by the noble Earl in the debate on March 9 last were not only satisfactory but in accordance with the desires already expressed by your Lordships and also, as far as I can gauge, not in opposition to any views expressed in another place. I yield to none in the view that these questions of Government organization should be fully discussed and controlled by Parliament; but in this case it does not seem to me, in view of the debates which have taken place both here and in another place, that such a procedure as the issue of a White Paper is really called for or required.
    LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, I was unfortunately unable to be present at the debate in which the noble Earl announced that he and his Department might possibly be the first casualties after the last shot. I read of that with very great regret, because the noble Earl has always treated us to statements of such clarity and forthrightness that I would rather see him amongst the last than the first to disappear. If I had been present at that debate, I should presumably have spoken before the noble Earl; and in that case, speaking under an evident misapprehension, I should have been anticipating a long and useful life for him and for his Department. I should have anticipated that on a number of grounds, on which I shall detain your Lordships to-day only for a few minutes, but on which I should like to speak frankly.
    We may be within measurable time of the moment when all the worst criminals in the Axis countries will be seeking temporary addresses where their loot has already been deposited, there to recuperate and ultimately to filter back and

    819
    organize Germany's third war. Your Lordships may remember that after the last war Ludendorff made a bee-line for Sweden in blue spectacles; and this time there will be thousands of such cases. I very much hope that they will receive hospitality nowhere; but the records of some of the neutral countries are not such as to give us any absolute guarantee. If these people do filter into neutral countries, I hope that the "vile bodies" will be handed over immediately. If, however, they filter into neutral countries and succeed in staying there, some of us will be in deadly earnest in "winkling them out" again, because we regard this as a matter of European security. For that purpose it may be that we shall need measures of economic suasion or enforcement. I shall certainly be amongst those who will require them.
    I come now to an even more important matter, although it may not be so swift in operation. In the former case we shall have to act quickly, because the cause of justice cannot be protracted. After the last war it was notorious that a number of countries assisted the ex-aggressors to evade the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. That would be another matter of first-class importance, in which many of us again would be in deadly earnest, because this time we do mean disarmament to be a reality. Again we might need the machinery of economic suasion or enforcement, this time in a slightly deferred form, because personally I do not think that such measures of evasion would be attempted until several years after the cessation of hostilities, whereas the matter of the war criminals would be one of a few months. There is a distinction between those categories, but on both of them I should be prepared to take a strong line, and I think that millions of people will take the same view.
    Even if that method is contested by any of your Lordships, there is another very important consideration which I hope will be contested by no one. In a debate on a Motion which I brought before this House in regard to the chemical industry of Germany, the noble Earl, Lord Perth, mentioned something which I have long advocated—namely, that it will be necessary to ration the Axis countries very strictly after this war in all imported and important war materials; not only chrome
    820
    and wolfram of evil memory, but a list of things as long as one's arm. That will be necessary because we must at all costs prevent the aggressor countries from laying up war stocks. It is obvious that that policy—and it must be an essential part of our peace policy—would be defeated unless we were also going to ration the satellites and the sympathizers; and that will be an enormous operation, and very complicated and protracted. I should very much like to know exactly how it is contemplated that that should be carried out before I could possibly make up my mind on the subject. It is a very difficult matter indeed and any other thing that we have ever attempted in peace-time—the enforcement of sanctions against Italy, for example—would be a drop in the ocean compared to it.
    Therefore this measure, I think, requires a good deal more consideration than it has received at present. Is it suggested that the Foreign Office should be in charge of the execution of these measures of economic suasion or enforcement? Hitherto the Foreign Office has not been an administrative Department, and I do not think that you turn it into an administrative Department by attaching to it an Economic Section detached from the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Surely an Intelligence Department can advise you, say, as to what the ration should be. It could also advise you as to how the rationing might be enforced, and it could also inform you as to who was breaking the ration. Is it supposed that it should be the enforcing Department, the executive Department as well? If not, what exactly is proposed? For all those reasons I would like to suggest that before parting with the actual machinery we should be given a good look-see at what is going to take its place, and that that should be in the nature of an offer, and not of a decision.
    LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, you have just had the edifying spectacle of two eminent members of the Foreign Service completely differing from each other. The noble Earl on my right considers that the Ministry of Economic Warfare and all its work should be turned over to the Foreign Office and that the Foreign Office should rule the economic world in future. The noble Lord who has just spoken takes the opposite point of view, and he makes no secret of the

    821
    fact that he would not trust the Foreign Office a yard. I rise to support very briefly the proposition of the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank. I was present at the debar e and played a small part in it, and I was a little disturbed at what fell from the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, but Lord. Elibank was quicker in the uptake than I was, and saw the full implications of what was said sooner than I did. The noble Earl, Lord Selborne, told us in effect that when there is an Armistice with Germany terminating hostilities the whole of the Pacific side of economic warfare will be handed over to the Americans holus-bolus. That is in effect what he said. I will quote it if necessary. In fact, he went so far as to suggest that it was the American Navy which was fighting the war in the Pacific, assisted by the British Navy. Never did I expect such words to be used in your Lordships' House.
    THE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC WARFARE (THE EARL OF SELBORNE): No, I did not say so.
    LORD STRABOLGI: Yes, I have got it here. The noble Earl said:
    "In the case of Japan it is the American Fleet, now assisted by the British Fleet, that is enforcing the blockade and the complication of negotiations with neutrals really does not come in."
    As the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, has pointed out, we have immense interests in Asia and the Pacific. Are we really proposing to abandon the conduct of the whole of our economic warfare against Japan to our American Allies because the American Fleet happens at the moment to be predominant in the Pacific? That is an extraordinary statement to make, and it is unfortunate in this respect. Our ill-wishers in the United States are continually harping on the theme that when the war in Europe is over we shall not be 100 per cent. in the war in the Pacific. We shall have to be, and we shall be, 100 per cent. in the war in the Pacific. Statements like this from the noble Earl will be seized upon by the Anti-British Press in the United States, which will say, "There you are. The Americans are again to be left holding the baby. Just what we told you." Those statements should not be made in your Lordships' House, and if it is the suggestion that the economic side of the war in the Pacific should be handed over to the
    822
    Americans, with a little assistance from our War Intelligence Department and a little assistance from the Royal Navy, then I think that should be corrected at once. It is a very dangerous statement indeed.
    I had the great pleasure of spending many happy years in another place with the noble Earl, and again and again, both as Minister and as private member, his lovable impetuosity led him into making rash statements. To my great delight he used occasionally to bring down on him the wrath of his own political leader and Prime Minister. I feared that when he was elevated to your Lordships' House that impetuosity had been curbed. Personally I am delighted it has not. We had an example of it in the debate last Tuesday, and I think we are greatly indebted to the noble Viscount for drawing attention to the implications of what was said. In that debate I was speaking for my noble friends here, and both Lord Nathan and myself felt that the suggestion that the Ministry of Economic Warfare should be wound up at the earliest possible moment and a part of it handed over to the Foreign Office was dangerous, and when I spoke I entered a caveat. The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, has reinforced that to-day.
    Speaking for my noble friends on these Benches, I have to say we consider that, far from winding up the Ministry of Economic Warfare, we should strengthen it after the Armistice with Germany, and that it will have a most useful part to play in the post-war settlement. You have a machinery in operation that has been successful, and to destroy it now merely for the purpose of saying that you were winding up superfluous Ministries, and getting the plaudits of those who complain about the growth of bureaucracy, would be a mistake. For these reasons I think we ought to have a White Paper and know where we are, and if the noble Viscount goes to a Division I shall go with him.
    THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I welcome the debate that the noble Viscount has inaugurated, because it is undesirable that there should be misapprehension on this point, and the speech of the noble Viscount and this debate give me an opportunity of clarifying matters which appear to be obscure. I am afraid the noble Viscount has read

    823
    a great deal more into my speech than is there, and the scope of my announcement was not so portentous as he appears to infer. The noble Viscount made some complaint that I had alluded to the subject at all, but I do not think I should have been treating your Lordships' House with candour if I had not, because the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, who inaugurated the debate, had pressed me on the subject of the future of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Therefore, I felt it was only right and proper that I should inform your Lordships of the attitude of the Government in the matter. Then the noble Viscount seemed to assume that a great constitutional change had been brought about by the Foreign Secretary and myself in what he calls a hole-and-corner manner, without any Cabinet sanction. I can assure him that is not the case, and in fact on looking at my speech I found that in my reply I pointed out that this had not only been very carefully considered in the Departments concerned but also by an Inter-Departmental Committee as well. A change of this sort, of course, would not be made without the consent of the Government as a whole.
    The change is not nearly so important and far-reaching as the noble Viscount seems to think. In my speech of which he made complaint I was addressing myself to two points. The first one was, should the Ministry of Economic Warfare continue in whole or in part after the war; and, if the view of the Government is that it should not continue as a whole, the second question which arose was, with what Government Department should what is left be associated. The noble Viscount who moved this Motion, and Lord Vansittart in a characteristically interesting speech, argued that the Ministry of Economic Warfare should continue as a whole after the war, and that was also the view of Lord Strabolgi.
    Lord Vansittart gave three reasons why the Ministry should continue. The first was in order to "winkle out" the German criminals from neutral countries to which they had fled; the second was to prevent evasion of the rearmament clauses of the Peace Treaty by Germany; and the third was in order to ration ex-enemy countries in all commodities important in war-time, and not only them but
    824
    also their satellites and sympathizers. I do not know exactly what countries he includes in that list, but I gather that the noble Lord contemplates continuing something very much in the nature of a blockade indefinitely—until, at any rate, human nature is so reformed that the danger of war has been removed. When it comes to "winkling out" German criminals, I can assure the noble Lord that no one will be keener to support his attitude than myself, and I think the great majority of your Lordship's House, if not all, would take the same view. The same is true of any evasion of rearmament clauses; but I do not think it is necessary to maintain a Ministry specially for these two purposes.
    When I expressed the view that the Ministry of Economic Warfare should disappear after the Armistice with Germany, I did not mean that several months might not elapse. The actual date no one can foresee. I would certainly agree that, as long as there was any useful work that the Ministry as a whole could properly do, it ought to be continued. It is impossible at this juncture to say when the precise moment of the change should be. Subject to that reservation, I do not sec how either of these two operations would necessitate the continuance of the Ministry in its present form. With regard to the perpetual rationing of ex-enemy countries, that is a very big question, but again I do not think that would necessitate a separate Government Department to supervise, if indeed it formed part of the peace policy; I am not prejudicing that question at all. If it did form part of the peace policy, if the noble Lord's views were accepted, it would not require a separate Government Department or the machinery of the blockade to carry it into effect, if indeed it could be carried into effect.
    Then the noble Viscount who moved and the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, both urged that the Ministry of Economic Warfare would be required to enforce the blockade against Japan. I feel that both these noble Lords have rather misconceived the problem, and it is no doubt my fault if I did not make it plain on the last occasion. As I told your Lordships, the Ministry has two halves—one concerned with the administration of the blockade, and the other, the Enemy Branch, with all this

    825
    economic intelligence. The administration of the blockade in Europe is a very different matter from the administration of the blockade against Japan—primarily for this reason, and I apologize to noble Lords if I did not make this clear: that Japan is an island and Germany is not.
    What are the principal tasks of the Ministry of Economic Warfare in administering the blockade against Germany? Negotiations with Spain and Portugal about wolfram, negotiations with Turkey about chrome, negotiations with Sweden about baa-bearings, and with Switzerland about precision tools; the endless negotiations about a hundred and one different materials and commodities which neutral countries contiguous to Germany are in a position to supply to Germany and which we, as Germany's enemies, have got by the means open to us to induce these neutral countries not to supply to Germany. That is the blockade problem in Europe in a nutshell. That problem really dose not arise, or hardly arises, in the case of Japan. It is an infinitely simpler problem. It is the Fleet that is blockading Japan. Lord Strabolgi took exception to the reference I made to the American Fleet, bur that was merely a reference to the fact that the great bulk of the American Fleet throughout this war has been in the Pacific, and that the American Fleet in the Pacific is at the present time stronger than the British Fleet in the Pacific. I was merely alluding to that fact, of which everybody is well aware. Everybody knows, of course, that the moment the war in Europe is over the entire British Fleet will be alongside the American Fleet in continuing the war against Japan. I am sure the noble Lord would not like to suggest I had said anything to the contrary. Therefore the question is simply, is the continuance—and that was the only point I was discussing last week—of a separate Ministry necessary to conduct the blockade against Japan? In my view it is not. I do not think there is work for a Minister and a Parliamentary Secretary and a separate Ministry for that.
    Here I venture to differ from the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, who, being a good Socialist, would no doubt like to see more Ministries controlling the whole population of these islands from the cradle to the grave and seeing that they behave themselves every moment of their lives.
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    I am one of those people who believe in the liberty of the subject and I think the number of Government Departments should be the minimum compatible with efficiency. You do not necessarily get greater efficiency by having more Government Departments. It is quite easy to manufacture work and if you put enough able people to do it, they can keep themselves well occupied, and a great many other people also, by writing letters to each other. That is a danger which, I suggest, it is incumbent on all Governments to guard against, and if the work can be done efficiently by a smaller number of Departments then that change should be made. That is my view and that is the view I submit with great respect to your Lordships' House. I do not think we should be justified in spending the taxpayers' money on maintaining a Ministry that was not absolutely necessary.
    If, then, the Ministry of Economic Warfare has to be shut down, the question arises whether it should all be shut down. I said to your Lordships last week that indeed it ought not, because of the Enemy Branch which is concerned in the collection, classification, arrangement and appraisement of economic information. That work in my view would be of permanent value to the governmental machine. I announced therefore that it had been arranged that control of that branch should be transferred to the Foreign Office. The noble Viscount who moved this Motion very strongly disagreed with two features of that decision. In the first place he took exception to the statement which he quoted from my speech that matters which this branch deals with should be the business of the Foreign Office—economic disarmament and economic control of Germany; reparations, the economic effects of frontier rectification, the rehabilitation of occupied territories, the development of economic sources of supply to allow Europe to recuperate. I said those were matters on which the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers will need expert advice in the months immediately succeeding the Armistice. Does the noble Viscount think that the Peace Treaty can be well drafted if these considerations are not borne in mind and if the people who draft the treaties have not good advice on these subjects?

    827
    The reason why the Enemy Branch of the Ministry of Economic Warfare has now become the Enemy Branch of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare is that the Foreign Secretary is, quite rightly, even now considering the lines on which the various Peace Treaties that we shall have to make after the defeat of our enemies, will have to be drawn up, and in considering those matters these questions all have to be regarded. I never said that the Foreign Office was going to administer any particular one of those subjects. What I said was that the Foreign Secretary would need expert advice upon them, and he will need expert advice upon them because it falls to the Foreign Secretary, with our Allies, to negotiate the treaties of peace and to dictate them to the enemy.
    VISCOUNT ELIBANK: May I interrupt my noble friend just for a moment? Who will administer them? If the Foreign Office is only to be advised upon them, who are to be administrators of those very important matters?
    THE EARL OF SELBORNE: There my noble friend is considerably widening the scope of the debate. I was endeavouring last week to deal with the future of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and I explained to your Lordships some reasons why the Enemy Branch was being transferred to the Foreign Office. One reason is that the Foreign Secretary has decided that he requires expert advice on these economic matters and we have heard from the noble Earl, Lord Perth, very strong support for that view. The second point to which my noble friend Lord Elibank takes great exception is what he has conceived to be an attack on the Department of Overseas Trade. I never mentioned the Department of Overseas Trade and nothing I have said has had any reference to the Department of Overseas Trade. If I may say so, I should like to endorse what he said in regard to the splendid work that has been done by the Department of Overseas Trade. But the announcement that I was authorized to make last week had nothing to do with the Department of Overseas Trade and nothing that has been decided in any way affects the responsibilities of the Board of Trade or the Department of Overseas Trade. All that has been decided
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    is that certain functions of the Ministry of Economic Warfare which are likely to survive the Ministry shall be allocated to the Foreign Secretary.
    The noble Viscount pressed for publication of a White Paper. As the noble Earl, Lord Perth, pointed out, a White Paper already has been published in regard to future developments of the Foreign Office and has been discussed by your Lordships' House. The change that I announced last week is really in conformity with the policy there approved. I cannot answer the noble Viscount's question about the Department of Overseas Trade. I have no official knowledge on that subject at all. If he wishes to raise the question that should be raised as a separate matter. I cannot say whether any re-arrangement of Government offices is going to he proposed after the war other than that which I have already mentioned concerning my own Department. That is a separate matter which the noble Viscount can raise as a separate issue. All that I have endeavoured to inform your Lordships is that in the view of His Majesty's Government the continuance of the Ministry of Economic Warfare for long after the Armistice with Germany will be unnecessary and directly its continuance is found to be unnecessary it will be wound up. The Enemy Branch will continue to serve the Foreign Office.
    The noble Viscount said these things should not be done without Parliamentary authority. I entirely agree with him and it is for that reason that the matter has been brought before Parliament in your Lordships' House at the earliest possible opportunity. If either House of Parliament strongly dissented from the policy then no doubt that would cause His Majesty's Government to reconsider the subject, but I do not think that is likely. I hope your Lordships will be satisfied with the explanation I have given. I do not think there is really in this particular point material for a further White Paper. If larger issues become ripe for discussion or decision that is beyond anything I mentioned the other day.
    VISCOUNT ELIBANK: What are the larger issues to which the noble Earl refers?
    THE EARL OF SELBORNE: For instance, whether the Department of Over-

    829
    seas Trade should be continued or not. I have no knowledge on that—it is not my Department—but the noble Viscount spoke about lit. I say that is a different issue and if he wants any information on that subject I suggest that he should put down a question about it at the appropriate time. I was concerned to point out that the decision I announced was really very limited in scope' and I think my noble friend has read a good deal more into it than really exists.
    VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, whilst I agree that my noble friend in his reply has tried to make the best case possible I remain very dissatisfied. In this debate four noble Lords have spoken. One of them, the noble Earl, Lord Perth, supported the Minister and the other three, Lord Vansittart, Lord Strabolgi and myself, spoke in favour of the desire expressed in the Motion that a White Paper should be published in order that we should have full opportunity to consider these matters and have a full debate upon them. I do not think that anything the noble Earl has said to-day has in any way altered the position with regard to the necessity for a White Paper. He has not answered a number of questions which were put to him. He said it would widen the scope of the debate to say who should control all these matters with regard to Germany about which he spoke in his former speech. But widening the scope of the debate was the noble Earl's own first action. The Motion upon which this whole question arose, placed on the Paper by the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, contained nothing whatever about the future of the noble Earl's Department. I came to listen to the debate, which I expected would show great praise of the noble Earl's Department and of the way he conducted its operations. I had no intention of speaking until suddenly out of the blue the noble Earl made a disclosure about the future closing down of his Department. If that is not a broadening of the debate I cannot think what is. Therefore I do not think it is fair to ask your Lordships to accept a sort of semi-explanation of what these proposals involve.
    My noble friend Lord Vansittart talked about the maintenance of the Department of Economic Warfare for certain objects which he described and which were really similar objects to those mentioned by my noble friend. He did not mean—obviously
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    he could not have meant—that the blockade should continue when the war was over. What he had in view was obviously the maintenance of the pressure that would be necessary on Germany and other countries in order to carry out these objects. Yet we are told that the Ministry of Economic Warfare which has done all these things through its Economic Intelligence Branch is to be closed and the branch handed over to the Foreign Office only as expert advisers to the Foreign Office. In my experience expert advisers to a Department assume that that Department is going to carry out the functions, but the noble Earl suggested by implication that the Department would not carry out the functions. If that is so, why hand *over a very expert section of the Ministry of Economic Warfare to a Department which is not going to carry out the functions instead of to a Department which should carry out the functions?
    The noble Earl suggested that I was quite wrong in my assumption that the Government had not approved of these proposals, because he said—and he re—ferred to a passage which I had nut noticed particularly because I thought it was not worth noticing very much—that an Inter-Departmental Committee had considered these proposals, and they were being adopted. Here we come to a point which raises a great issue. It has been suggested only recently, by a member of the War Cabinet, that the day may come when we may be governed by Orders in Council, because of the congestion of business in another place. This afternoon we are told—and in view of my knowledge of the noble Earl's political record and actions, I am surprised that he should have suggested this—that because an Inter-Departmental Committee has approved of these things we here in this House, and presumably those in the House of Commons, must adhere to them too. I object very strongly to that theory, and I feel so dissatisfied with the reply that we have received this afternoon that I will not withdraw my Motion.
    THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): Do I understand that the noble Lord is ready to agree that his Motion should be negatived by voices?
    VISCOUNT EUBANK: Oh, certainly. I am not withdrawing my Motion.
    On Question, Motion negatived.

  DERWENT VALLEY WATER BILL [H.L.]
    PETITION FOR ADDITIONAL PROVISION
    Examiners' Certificate of non-compliance with the Standing Orders referred to the Standing Orders Committee.
    LONDON MIDLAND AND SCOTTISH RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]
    Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
    LONDON MIDLAND AND SCOTTISH (CANALS) BILL. [H.L.]
    Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
    HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICES.
    Second Report by the Select Committee made, and to be printed.