§ Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion, moved by Lord Chatfield yesterday, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to the administration of Imperial and national defence after the war.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRYMy Lords, before I address myself to the adjourned Motion on the Paper, I should like to adopt the formal custom which was 358 followed so adroitly yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Denman, and congratulate Lord Stratheden and Campbell on the maiden speech which he made yesterday. The noble Lord is unable to be present here to-day owing to his duties, but I think I am only expressing what has been indicated already when I say that it is always a pleasure to your Lordships to hear a maiden speech, and that pleasure is enhanced when the maiden speech shows such promise as did that of the noble Lord yesterday. We hope that he will often take part in our debates.
The debate which was adjourned from yesterday will I hope prove to be the forerunner of many debates of the same kind. I should like, if I may, to congratulate my noble and gallant friend Lord Chatfield on having brought this very important matter to your Lordships' notice in this way. In the first part of his Motion he really puts a plain question—I have not the Paper before me so cannot give the terms of it—to which he hopes to receive an answer from the Government. It is on the second part of the Motion I should like to say a few words. I feel that what the noble Lord suggests is something that is really beyond the power of any Government. I am sure your Lordships welcome the noble Lord's desire to bring this matter to your attention at the earliest possible moment. I think we recognize that he is, to use a familiar phrase, striking while the iron is hot. He is bringing his Motion forward at an opportune moment, for while everybody's attention is primarily directed towards the war, it is also directed towards the machinery of defence, and with such earnestness that I am sure we all feel there is ground for hoping that ways will be found to obviate the recurrence in the future of the desperate situations which have faced us in the past. We all have in our minds mistakes which have been made, and the terrible penalties which have been paid in the last five years.
The Motion covers a very wide field, and I am sure we recognize that when the noble and gallant Lord spoke yesterday he was addressing us on matters of which he has had a very long experience, and that he has special knowledge which makes him very well qualified to speak on such a subject. I think that probably I am right in saying that he was not anxious to overload his Motion, and that 359 he only addressed himself to that part of the subject on which he felt he was fully qualified to address your Lordships and to give us the benefit of his experience. I am ashamed to say that I have not read the noble and gallant Lord's pamphlet from which Lord Hankey quoted. I must plead the same reason that many of your Lordships have to plead in such circumstances, that in these fast-moving days we have very little time in which to read all the literature with which we are confronted. I think, however, that in the eloquent speech which the noble and gallant Lord delivered yesterday he told us very clearly and fully what was in his mind.
In dealing with the second part of his Motion, he raised, if I may say so, a very big issue indeed. He hopes and believes that defence will be a non-Party issue in the future. I really consider that that is quite impossible. In the old days there were a great many people who claimed to belong to no Party. In many cases they even went further and said that they were not politicians, and they looked upon the term "politician" as one of opprobrium. They said that they took no interest at all in politics. But in these days when the vote is universal—in fact only your Lordships and a certain section of the community are without it—we feel that nearly everybody from their earliest years must have some regard to politics, and must take an interest in these great questions which come up on such occasions as this. Lord Chatfield and I are old friends. We have had, probably, many controversies in the past. But I am not certain that after I have said what I have to say later on he will not think it will not go far to remove many of those controversies which occurred between the Services, and which I think seem, when we look back on them now, to have been to a very large extent unprofitable.
The machinery of which the noble Lord has spoken, I would go almost as far as to say, is quite unimpeachable. He believes in the rather elaborate machinery that he has outlined to us in the seven points which he enumerated, and he has told us how the desired machinery should take effect. He also mentioned diffidently, and so did Lord Hankey, the question of the Dominions. The noble 360 Earl, Lord Cork, went a great deal further and explained that he fully desired that the Dominions should be associated with us in all the important matters which will confront us in the future. While I do not feel that it would be right in this debate to embark on that particular question, I should like to say that I agree more with Lord Cork's words on that matter than I do perhaps with the manner in which other speakers dealt with it. But I do not think there is any difference of opinion between us at all on the particular point that in future development of policy we must be in close touch, in close agreement, and in close association with our Dominions, and that means must be devised for achieving that.
The speech of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, was followed, as your Lordships know, by one from Lord Hankey. Now Lord Hankey has an unrivalled experience of all these matters. He has been associated with all the machinery connected with military matters and Service matters generally for a long period of time, and anything that he tells us is something which it is our duty—a duty which we shall not neglect if we are wise—to take particular note of. He told us that we are striving now, not for the devising of entirely new methods, but for the perfecting of arrangements which were formerly in force, and he pointed out how trouble came about through our extreme unpreparedness and owing to the policy of disarmament, which occupied an entirely undue place in the national mind. He went further and said that all ordinary safeguards were overridden, and he used a phrase which I think is very applicable to what did happen when he spoke of paralyzed successive Governments. He also spoke of taking defence out of Party politics, but, as I have said before, everyone in this country will have some opinion on this point, and in some cases those opinions may be divergent. There will, for instance, be the question of conscription, and it will be very important that we shall make up our minds on that issue. Another question is that of the employment of women. These are all subsidiary matters into which I cannot go now, but they are all connected with the Motion which the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, has moved.
In relation to the plans suggested by Lord Chatfield, I agree with Lord Hankey that it does appear that they strike at the 361 root of what we look on as our System of Cabinet government in this country. Whatever machinery we provide for regulating and developing our defensive measures, it all comes back to the responsibility of the Government, and in the end to the responsibility of the Prime Minister. We understand that the idea is that a ten-year plan would be established which would be signed by the Prime Minister with the approval of the Cabinet. This is really no innovation; the process has been in being for a considerable number of years. I agree with my noble friend Lord Hankey in preferring the Committee of Imperial Defence, and I am sure that in the Committee of Imperial Defence we have a body which is fully qualified to deal with all those matters which have come before it in the past and which are bound to come before it again.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, widened the area of the discussion and made some very helpful suggestions. He went on to compare the time before this war with the time before the last war. If it was relevant to this debate, I might be prepared to join issue with him on one or two of the things which he said; but I should be out of order if I did so. While I have said all this, and while I agree with the machinery suggested, I would add that that machinery is of no use whatever unless it is handled and controlled by the authority of the Cabinet in the person of the Prime Minister; and I think that the only speech which went to the root of the matter was that delivered by my noble friend Lord Perth. Lord Perth has had a very wide experience, and I think that his career, which has now extended over a great many years, will provide an example for many young men. On more than one occasion in your Lordships' House he has raised the whole question of the Foreign Office, foreign affairs and foreign policy. Although yesterday we were dealing with the machinery of defence, very little was said, except by my noble friend Lord Perth, about the fact that the whole of this machinery and its management depend on our foreign policy.
I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, in his diffidence, did not wish to overload his Motion, and so dealt with that part of the subject with which he is specially qualified to deal. But Lord Perth has had a very long experience in 362 diplomacy, and from a very close acquaintance is well versed in what we speak of as foreign affairs. It was interesting to hear him speak of the repercussions which he was able to notice from afar of all the different questions which came up in Parliament here, and the effect which they had on those people with whom he was associated at the time. All these questions are going to come up in the House of Commons in the future, and, after all, our main reason for fighting this terrible war is to have the power and the opportunity to raise these matters in Parliament and to discuss them as we wish. The Powers with whom we are battling proclaim an authority which allows no jurisdiction or freedom of action to the individual. I hope, therefore, that my noble friend Lord Chatfield can remove from his Motion the word "non-Party," because I think that that is a wholly impracticable suggestion. We must rely on the Government and on the Party in power to handle foreign policy in a way which will satisfy this country and enable us to put in motion all the machinery for dealing with matters which are really of a subsidiary character.
It is very easy to criticize and to express recrimination, but I have no desire to do that to-day, and recriminations are always unprofitable unless they act as warnings and as guides for the future. There are, however, certain questions which we want to ask. Why are we engaged in the most terrible world-wide conflict that the world has ever seen? Why were we deficient in preparation? Why, with our vast commitments, had we no defences adequate to protect them? Why was Germany, from a state of powerlessness and impotence in 1933, able to challenge the world, although by no means ready at the time, in 1939? Why was every breach of the Treaty of Versailles by Germany condoned and practically ignored? What was the reason for our ignorance of Russia and her vast potentialities and the spirit which actuates that remarkable nation? These are all matters which are raised and should be controlled by the foreign policy of this country.
I go so far as to say that our Foreign Office at this time is not capable of bearing the strain, and of maintaining in this country and abroad the proper position which the Foreign Office should occupy. 363 After all, the Foreign Office is the pivot of the Government, and the Foreign Secretary should be the most dominant personality in the Cabinet after the Prime Minister. I am not sure that the precedents of which we know in the past, when the Prime Minister has been at the same time the Foreign Secretary, have not indicated the best way of dealing with the situation which we can envisage. It may be a harsh thing to say that the Foreign Office has not existed since the days of Sir Edward Grey. Sir Edward Grey carried on a tradition handed on to him by Lord Lansdowne, Lord Salisbury, Palmerston and Castlereagh. All those men were the dominating influences in the Cabinets in which they took part. During the last twenty years, however, for reasons into which I will not enter, the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary have not been able to fulfil the obligations which rest upon them. I understand that the composition of the Foreign Office is to be the subject of certain reforms, and if the Foreign Secretary is to take a dominating part in every question which arises, I believe that my noble friend Lord Perth will agree with me that at the present time the Foreign Office has not the capability of carrying out the duties which will fall upon it.
LORD STRABOLGIIs the noble Marquess excluding a very successful and eminent Foreign Secretary, the late Mr. Arthur Henderson?
§ THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRYI am not naming or excluding anyone, because I can point to the remarkable services which have been rendered by each of our Foreign Secretaries, and I would certainly include Mr. Arthur Henderson; but I do say that at the time when Mr. Arthur Henderson was Foreign Secretary there was an idea all through this country and abroad that the Foreign Secretary was not the most dominating figure in the Cabinet, which he used to be and which I hope he will be in the future. I think your Lordships will agree with me that every point of policy, whether in world affairs, home affairs, Dominion or Colonial affairs, in some form touches our foreign policy, and it is most important that when any changes are made or any policies are pursued, whether financial or other, the Foreign Secretary should have the power and the opportunity of 364 giving his reasons against such a policy if he thought it undesirable; and the machinery which the noble and gallant Lord has so eloquently developed, unless controlled and directed under the influence of the foreign policy enunciated by the Government, might be almost unavailing.
This is where the point about non-Party decisions comes in. I am sure your Lordships will agree that one subject on which we should have a united nation is our foreign policy, and, unless a Government is capable of formulating a foreign policy which receives the support and consent of the nation, it is incapable of governing this country. Probably your Lordships will remember an incident some twenty years ago when an action was taken by a Conservative Government of a very violent character. On that action the whole House of Commons was sharply divided, and yet the action which was taken was one which certainly was capable of involving us in war. If we had had a definite foreign policy with regard to our commitments and what we proposed to do, I doubt if that Motion would ever have been brought forward. If an accepted foreign policy were adopted so many things would fall into their proper place and their proper perspective. The failure of the Disarmament Conference was due to the variations of opinion between the Service Ministers, the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office. If we had followed a concerted course based on British foreign policy there could have been no such variations of opinion. Our foreign policy, such as it was, undertook commitments under the Covenant of the League of Nations which our attenuated armed strength was quite incapable of fulfilling. If your Lordships have read Mr. Lippmann's book you will find he criticizes America for exactly the same reason. All sorts of commitments were undertaken, and yet there was no proper means of fulfilling those obligations.
The noble Lord has suggested certain machinery and if that machinery were actuated by the Government on the basis of foreign policy, I think his ideas are unimpeachable. Take the case of France. The General Staff, for reasons quite obvious to us, were determined on a purely defensive policy. The French Foreign Office followed a foreign policy which demanded what I would call military 365 assertiveness. They made alliances with Czechoslovakia and Poland. But while their General Staff determined to follow a defensive policy, the commitments which France had undertaken demanded forces capable of a military offensive against Germany. The result was that France has fallen. The General Staff went in one direction and the Foreign Office in another. I think, looking back on our own history, we can see that the divergencies between what was looked on as our foreign policy and the opinions recorded by the Service Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff were the main reason why we found ourselves in the position which we did. The Foreign Office had every opportunity. The failure arose through not recognizing that the commitments with the Object of maintaining peace were not stir ported by adequate military strength. While Lord Chatfield's proposal to provide the machinery for defence is excellent, the country must decide the foreign policy which it proposes to adopt, and for this it requires and demands a Foreign Secretary and a Foreign Office capable of fulfilling all our obligations.
§ LORD GEDDESMy Lords, the hour is getting late and this debate, so far as it has gone, has produced some of the most interesting and informative speeches that it has been my lot to listen to in your Lordships' House. But running through the speeches of yesterday there seemed to me to be what I can perhaps best describe as something of a fallacy—namely, that our defence organization could, or should, include within our own bit of machinery cogs derived from the Dominions; because the Dominions now have the right, as free and independent nations, to take their own decisions at any time on any matter of policy, whether it be in connexion with war or peace. So it seemed to me that what we have to discuss here first of all is what our own machine should be, how it should be shaped and fashioned, and then after it had been created the relation with the Dominions could be established. That was a point which I felt had some importance attaching to it, because one knows low easily feelings in the Dominions are aroused to the belief that somebody here is trying in some way to take decisions for them.
As I listened to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, yesterday I felt that much of the historical review with 366 which he opened was hardly complete or in accordance with my knowledge of that portion of it of which I have really intimate knowledge. After all, at the end of the last war I was one of the Ministers who had to take my share of the responsibility in the decisions as to what was to happen in connexion with our defence forces. But whatever may have happened after I went to America, certainly there was no disordered decision simply to throw away our arms at the end of the last war. The decisions of the Cabinet, which are all on record and which Lord Hankey will remember very well, were based on recommendations from the Naval, Military and Air Staffs. It is true that later there was further cutting down, but the essential fact with regard to the first diminution in our armaments after the last war is that these measures were taken by the Government on the advice and with the assent and consent of the Service Staffs, and the whole matter, unless I am very much mistaken, was reviewed very carefully by the Committee of Imperial Defence.
§ LORD CHATFIELDMay I ask up to what year would the noble Lord allow that to be the case?
§ LORD GEDDESThat was the case until 1920, when I went over to America. Then the next stage of the proceedings, as Lord Chatfield will remember as well as I do, because we were both in Washington at the time, was the limitation of naval armaments. He will remember that that was a definite international scheme in which there were two motives at work. One was to meet the point of view of the United States of America—it was our own point of view too, I think—that it was undesirable that there should be a great disparity between the Fleets of the United States and of the British Empire for reasons of stability in international affairs. At that time the American Fleet, in ships built or building, was actually tending to be greater than the British Fleet. But there was another motive too. That was to make the ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance a well-ordered occasion and so prevent the shock which it might cause to the Japanese having undesirable results.
Several noble Lords in the House took part in those discussions. That limitation of armaments was followed by various 367 other treaties, but we must remember that we were living in a world which was subject to very great stresses and strains. The people of this country were exhausted by the war which had lasted from 1914 to 1918. They were tired of slaughter. The country itself was in considerable financial difficulty. We owed very large sums of money to the United States as the result of the way in which the war supplies had been handled, and altogether there was a stress and a strain on this country which was quite without precedent, certainly in our time. That stress and strain was aggravated by a great deal of mental unrest among the wage-earners. You will recall how popular many of the things that had happened in Russia were in parts of this country at that time, and there were certain people—a small number—who thought it would be a good thing to follow on the same path.
It was necessary for the Government at that time to pay attention to these stresses and strains and to meet, so far as they could, the financial stress and the social strain. All that had the effect of distorting our defence arrangements. Then, later on, there came the full drive of the pacifist movement which received an enormous amount of support throughout the country, partly through a feeling that we, as a nation, ought really to set a good example and that if we did the world would be better. Certainly, we as a nation—not all of us as individuals—shut our eyes to the evil forces that existed in the world. We became idealistic. As I understood Lord Chatfield yesterday, he ascribed our military weakness to the fact that we were supporting the League of Nations. I agree with Lord Perth that it was the pacifist wave that had the effect of making us limit our military power and preparations, much more than the existence of the League of Nations.
§ LORD CHATFIELDI do not want the noble Lord to have a wrong impression on this matter. When I brought in the League of Nations in my speech it was not so much to suggest that it had the effect of weakening our own strength as that the principles on which it was started weakened the world's strength in support of peace.
§ LORD GEDDESI accept that, but if the noble Lord will look at the Official 368 Report he will see that the interpretation I was putting on what he said is at least a possible interpretation.
§ LORD CHATFIELDI am glad that I have corrected that impression now.
§ LORD GEDDESSo I do not think we can say that Party strife was responsible for our military weakness, our naval weakness, and our relative air weakness. There was a definite movement which affected all Parties—some more than others—making for a disinclination to arm and be strong. After the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, had given his view of the historical aspect, he came to the problem. The problem he posed was a very limited one, and he explained why he purposely limited it to the type of machinery which should exist within this country to deal with military problems under Foreign Office guidance. That aspect, he indicated, he left out specially, and it was brought in very clearly and definitely by the noble Earl, Lord Perth. I must say, on the argument so far as it has been presented to us, Lord Hankey's suggestion that the Committee of Imperial Defence should continue to be the central consultative and advisory body appeals to me most strongly. I do not for one moment believe it is possible to get a Council, whatever name you apply to it, formed partly of members of the Government, partly of leaders of I do not know how many Parties—there might be two or three others, perhaps more in years to come—and non-political persons who could take decisions on matters of military policy, using the word "military" in its widest sense. That is entirely out of the question because of the way the Government of this country is worked and must, I believe, continue to be worked.
But I can see no reason, with the Committee of Imperial Defence functioning as it functions, and composed very much as it is composed from time to time, why there should not be added to it, if they are willing to attend, the leaders of the principal Parties who are not concerned with the government of the country. That is a matter of precedent which has been followed time and time again, and it seemed to me at the time a good precedent and one which could be followed in future. But no Opposition leader, it seems to me, could be expected to commit himself and his Party if there were some 369 grave difference of opinion such as existed in this country, for example, during the Spanish Civil War, where you had a great many people supporting one side in ti—.at war and a great many sympathetically supporting the other side. It might be that such a division of sympathy would follow Party lines, and if policy was to be based on some decision taken in connexion with it, I cannot see how it would be possible to get any leader of an Opposition to agree to pledge himself and his Party to support a line of policy with which his whole Party might have instinctive disagreement.
§ LORD CHATFIELDThat is a foreign policy.
§ LORD GEDDESBut the two cannot be separated. If you come to the forces required to support a Party policy, the foreign policy at once comes into the military policy. I do not see that there is any possibility of maintaining a line of demarcation between them. Therefore it would appear to me that Lord Hankey's view is he correct one, the view he expressed yesterday that it should, be the Committee of Imperial Defence with co-opted members from the Opposition, as there have been on many occasions in the past. But it seems to me that the problem may take completely new forms in future. It is by no means outside the bounds of possibility that within a very short time it might be possible for one nation to deliver from afar a devastating and destructive attack upon another without moving many men at all. It might be done by machines moving through the air, and in the hard and stern times that lie ahead of and with the terrific advances that are taking place almost hourly in the application of science to the development of military power, it may well be that the problems with which the Governments of this country in the future will be faced will not only be different in kind but different in degree in every way, and there may well have to be some complete reorganization of the seat of control of our military affairs so that we are not liable to be destroyed in one swift, devastating, unexpected blow. The Pearl Harbour technique must warn us that in future there may be other attempts at Pearl Harbours and they might be even more serious and more disastrous. The solution 370 of the problem on the military side, so it would appear to me, can be looked for through a development of the Committee of Imperial Defence and we must be prepared for sharp and swift events in future in connexion with possible forms of attack which are not yet quite practical politics, or may not yet be quite practical politics.
But there is a point which was raised by the noble Marquess who spoke before me to-day, Lord Londonderry, to which I wish to refer, and that is the question of the control of our foreign policy by an efficient Foreign Office working under the direction of a powerful Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who will have a grip upon the machine of government, either through his own personality or through his close association with the Prime Minister, that seemed to me at all events in the years before the war to be seriously lacking from time to time. There we pass outside the field of the Motion that is, strictly speaking, before us to-day, for that deals purely with the control of the military machinery. But as I sit down I want to say how strongly I agree with what Lord Londonderry said to-day, and what Lord Perth said yesterday, in connexion with the control of foreign policy and the relation of that policy to the size, weight and scope of our defence preparations.
§ VISCOUNT BENNETTMy Lords, I would not venture to speak at this late hour were it not for the fact that I have one deep and abiding concern and that is the maintenance of the integrity of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The debate to which we have listened has been dealing with matters affecting the future of this Kingdom. The future of this Kingdom as well as of the British Commonwealth of Nations depends not upon the action of this Kingdom or of this Parliament alone, but upon the five separate nations for, rightly or wrongly, this country has renounced its jurisdiction legislatively over every part of the British Empire except that part called Great Britain and its Colonial possessions. You did it in language so clear as to leave no doubt and you created by so doing a new entity called the British Commonwealth of Nations. The very Preamble of the Statute itself says:
And whereas it is meet and proper to set out by way of preamble to this Act that, inasmuch as the Crown is the symbol of the free 371 association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and as they are united by a common allegiance to the Crown—What has happened is that this Kingdom is now the equal of New Zealand and Canada and Australia and South Africa and on no higher level. They all stand on an equality of status. That has been settled. This Kingdom, as I have said, has renounced its jurisdiction over every part of this world Comonwealth except this particular part of it.Now that being so, what we are concerned with is not the question of the defence of this particular community, but the broad question of the defence of the British Commonwealth of Nations. That is what we are concerned with, whether we like it or not and with nothing else. And this Parliament cannot, nor can this House, deal with the question as to how those other communities are going to deal with it. How Canada is to deal with it is the business of Canada. How Australia is to deal with it is Australia's business and so with other members of the Commonwealth. But there must be unity or there will be disaster. What I am concerned with is the maintenance of the integrity of that Comonwealth.
I submit that a new international entity came into being with the passing of the Statute of Westminster because the Preamble states that it was done at the prayer of the countries therein named, including Southern Ireland and Newfoundland and the four great Dominions I have mentioned. That brought into being what is described as the British Commonwealth of Nations. I believe that is the first time these words were used in a Statute, though there is some reference in the Irish Treaty to a Commonwealth. Observe that it contemplates that there shall be unity, and that the States in the Commonwealth are united by a common allegiance to the Crown. There is a tendency in some parts of this Commonwealth to deal with them as though they were separate and not one unity. My point is that there is unity contemplated and that the various nations that comprise the British Commonwealth of Nations must speak with unity or disaster will follow. There must be unity in defence and in foreign policy.
In 1907 Sir Edward Grey, speaking at the Imperial Conference, said in words 372 that were perfectly clear that unless there was a common policy it would be the end of all things. He put it very clearly. He said the first point he wanted to make was that the foreign policy of the Empire should be a common policy. Now there must be unity with respect to foreign policy and defence or, as I say, disaster overtakes us. In the Conference of 1937, the last Imperial Conference we had, this matter was discussed at very considerable length and there were three or four words used which I suggest are important. The delegates spoke of co-operation. They all agreed that we must co-operate and "co-operation" was the magic word, as my noble friend Lord Hankey will tell us, in the minds of all the Prime Ministers when they discussed defence. Then they discussed foreign policy. There was a sharp conflict of opinion because, while some members representing the Dominions said they would have their own foreign policy, others said you could not have separate foreign policies and that there must be one policy. The Prime Minister of Canada made a broadcast in which he referred to the fact that at the Conference the delegates had arrived at certain definite conclusions, and among other things he mentioned was that the delegations at the Conference were unanimous in declaring the complete freedom of action of each Government in foreign affairs and defence. I think that is hardly the fact. My noble friend Lord Hankey was secretary and he took down the observations that were made and that were published—although most of them were not published—dealing with defence and foreign affairs.
When Sir Edward Grey, in 1907, made the statement to which I alluded, Sir Wilfred Laurier, who then represented Canada, made it clear on many occasions—it must occur to every one of us here, as it does to the noble Earl, Lord Perth, who has had so much to do with these matters at Geneva—that there must be a common foreign policy or you would have a situation such as Sir Edward Grey outlined. How can you keep together the Commonwealth of Nations if Australia has one policy and Canada another? The first matter we must deal with is the question how to bring that unity about and the noble Viscount who leads your Lordships' House will have to deal to some extent with that matter at the very near meeting of the Prime Ministers of 373 the oversea Dominions. I submit that the solution is continuous consultation, as pointed out by Sir Robert Borden in 1917. The question of how there should be created a new tribunal to maintain continuity of consultation brought the suggestion that we should have meetings every year. Nothing, however, came of that suggestion. "Continuous consultation" had been the magic words used by Prime Ministers for the purpose of ensuring that the foreign policy of the Commonwealth was a foreign policy approved by everyone of a e constituent parts of the Commonwealth.
It has been asked in Canada, what interest have Canadians in maintaining the integrity of Poland, for instance? What interest had they at the time to induce them to enter this war? It was because they believed a world war was inevitable and a high principle was at stake. But among a very considerable part of the population of Canada there was an idea that Canada should not engage in a European war at all. You will find that reflected in the daily newspapers—in three of them, at least—and at least thirty per cent. of the population think Canada should not be engaged in a European war. There is no conscription in Canada and people from one part of Canada are not coming over in force to join the Army, for the reason that they say Canada has no interest in European quarrels and troubles. If that was the position, then Canada could no longer speak as one of the makers of the foreign policy of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the sooner that gets into the minds of our people the better it will be for the British Commonwealth of Nations.
I am sorry to say I have found among a great many people a completely improper conception of what happened when the Statute of Westminster was passed. When the Statute of Westminster was agreed to the people of this country dispossessed themselves of any power to make foreign policy for the Commonwealth of Nations. You cannot make in The complaint of Sir Robert Borden until his dying day was that there was an endeavour on the part of this Kingdom to make a foreign policy and then give the people in the Dominions an odd opportunity to say "Yes" or "No" quickly by cable. They said "Yes." 374 They never said "No" because of their realization that more was known here than in other parts of the Commonwealth, and that made it difficult for them to do otherwise than agree. If we get into our minds here that we are first among equals, if we believe ourselves to be on an absolute equality of status with all the four Dominions I have mentioned, we shall realize that large issues of defence and foreign policy must be agreed upon by the British Commonwealth and not by the Parties in the United Kingdom. What the Liberal Party or Labour Party may think, or what the Conservative Party may think, is no longer an issue so far as the larger interests of the Commonwealth are concerned. It is not a question of what the Parties think. It is what these overseas nations, now speaking with a voice that is equal to that of this country, think of in foreign policy that really matters.
That in my view is one of the most sobering thoughts that ever entered the mind of any British subject. We have said that questions of foreign policy in the British Commonwealth shall be determined by the Governments of seven countries, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, Newfoundland and Southern Ireland. Those were the names given in the Preamble of the Statute of Westminster. There is, as Lord Balfour pointed out, a difference in function, but the problem is how continuous consultation can be maintained on foreign policy and defence to ensure the continuance of the Commonwealth. Having created a Commonwealth we must defend it. No one knows better than Lord Hankey what took place in connextion with the appeals which were made from time to time for the creation of this Commonwealth. When Sir Robert Borden and General Smuts spent the time they did here working out the details of it in 1917, they had it in mind that we would have a conference, a constitutional conference, with respect to the whole Commonwealth. But when at the Peace Conference, and later at the League of Nations, the views they put forward were agreed to, it no longer was necessary to have a conference.
But there has been going on in some parts of the Commonwealth a steady demand that we shall be regarded as separate nations rather than as units in a Com- 375 monwealth. There has been circulated to the troops a pamphlet in winch it is stated that Canadians did not owe allegiance to the King of the United Kingdom but to the King of Canada, and in which reference was made to the fact that the King had personally assented to legislation in Canada. If giving a Power of Attorney to a Governor-General—which is what his Commission is—means anything at all it is that the principal, the King, can do what he has authorized his Attorney, the Governor-General, to do. That was all that happened. The King personally gave assent in Canada to legislation passed in his name by the Parliament of Canada. But he is not described as King of Canada, or King of Australia or King of any of the Dominions specifically. At the Coronation, the different countries are mentioned by name, but the correct description of the Sovereign—we have heard it read here to-day—ends with the words "and of the British Dominions beyond the seas." When I pointed that out and expressed the alarm that I felt that the theory suggested in the pamphlet could be accepted, I believe that the pamphlet was withdrawn. But it is a terrible thing to have that idea get abroad, and if we are going to maintain our lives we must see to it that our foreign policy is the policy of all these Dominions as well as of this country which is a Dominion. Sir Robert Borden's complaint regarding the Foreign Office may be recalled in this connexion. He said how difficult it was for a Foreign Office in this kingdom to accommodate itself to the thought that somebody else had a finger in the pie of making the foreign policy of this vast Commonwealth.
I have ventured to express my views as rapidly as possible. There is much that I should still like to say to relate the story in detail, but I shall not do so. I shall content myself by thanking the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, for having brought this matter up and so affording an opportunity for discussion of it in its larger and wider aspects, and by expressing my gratitude for what was said by Lord Hankey, who knows perfectly well that the Committee of Imperial Defence does not touch the overseas Dominions unless they are willing to agree to its doing so. Furthermore, he knows, and could tell your Lordships if 376 he desired so to inform you, that in some parts of the King's Dominions they did not believe in having a representative even attend the meetings of the Imperial Defence Committee, so strong was their feeling for autonomy and against the idea of our being united in what was described in those days, with a sneer, as "Imperial matters."
I think at times that there is a lack of appreciation and understanding in this country of the extent to which you have shorn yourselves of any jurisdiction with respect to these matters. In passing, I would point out to my noble friend that it was not Delilah who cut off the hair of Samson, she did not do the cutting herself. If the noble Lord will look up his Bible he will see that that is so. But you at any rate have shorn yourselves of jurisdiction and have left to these Dominions the rights and powers of independent nations. Their future relations to this country and to one another depend upon a common defence policy and a common foreign policy with respect to the defence policy. The war has done a great deal to co-relate their activities and bring about that measure of co-ordination and co-operation necessary to ensure a common defence policy. But you see evidence to the contrary if you desire to examine the question closely in more places than one, and it is to that difficulty that I shall never cease to direct attention, as long as I may have voice, until such time as we find a way by which to bring about a measure of consultation that will ensure the certainty of our policy being the policy of the united Commonwealth, as was contemplated by the Conference of 1937, in which there is a recognition of these facts. If you look at the report of the proceedings you will find that there is an appreciation of the fact that aviation would play a large part in making possible that continuous consultation which is so essential to the maintenance of the life of this Commonwealth.
§ LORD DENHAMMy Lords, I have not ventured to address your Lordships' House since May, 1940, at which time I used to answer here for the Ministry of Agriculture. If I may have three or four minutes of your Lordships' time in which to put forward a completely separate point of view, I shall be very grateful. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chat- 377 field, in his speech yesterday made use of a most striking sentence. He said:
How few in Parliament, or outside it, can look back on those peace years, as regards the matter of defence, with anything but humility"Humility" indeed! I have the melancholy record of having been in another place from December, 1918, until I joined your Lordships' House in 1937. That is to say, I was in another place during practically the whole of the years between the wars. It is a melancholy record, and if anybody is guilty for what may, or may not, have been done in another place, l am certainly one of those concerned and I see two noble Lords sitting in this Chamber who have very much the same record as I have, having entered the House of Commons at about that same time. Most of your Lordships have dealt with this great matter of defence and foreign policy from an "outside Parliament" point of view, but what I want to draw your Lordships' attention to is the appalling ignorance, the abysmal ignorance, especially among members of another place, as to what is happening from tine to time in matters of defence and foreign policy.I was eighteen and a half years in the House of Commons, and I spent over ten years in the Whips' Office which gave one a sufficient chance of knowing what was going on in the House. Whereas the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, talked about the necessity of having political unity on matters of defence, I would stress the necessity of having more political knowledge. I wonder if I could emphasize what I am trying to bring home by telling your Lordships of something that happened in another place, it must have been at the end of 1936 or at the beginning of 1937. The present Prime Minister sat in his place below the gangway, the then Secretary of Stale for Air was on the Front Bench, and Mr. Churchill challenged the Front Bench to deny that the Air Force of Germany was stronger in that year than the combined Air Forces of France and Britain.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRYThen he was incorrect.
§ LORD DENHAMPerhaps I may be allowed to continue with my story. The Front Bench was silent. Twenty minutes afterwards I happened to go along the passage to the Smoking Room with the 378 present Prime Minister and we met the Secretary of State for Air. Mr. Churchill said to him, "Why did not you answer my question?" The Secretary of State for Air replied: "I could not; what you said was true." All I am saying is that there ought to be more knowledge amongst members of both Houses—and especially in the House of Commons, of which I can speak with more knowledge than I can of your Lordships' House—of what is going on and what the true state of affairs is from time to time, so that anybody after this war who will be in the House of Commons for the next twenty years shall not feel himself, if another war takes place, as guilty as I felt when this war broke out.
How is that to be done? In the House of Commons there are Party Committees such as the Army Committee, the Navy Committee and the Air Committee, but these are Party Committees. If there could be an All-Party Committee called the Defence Committee, to which from time to time knowledge could be brought by the Prime Minister or by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—but the lead ought to be given by the Prime Minister—then I think there would be no doubt that the members of another place would be themselves seised of the necessary information from time to time and would, through their constituencies, see that the country possessed the right information. That would enable the Government to bring in unpopular votes for more armaments, and so avoid the mistakes of the past.
There is only one other remark that I want to make. During those years I used to comfort myself from time to time by saying: "If things go wrong, surely the Service Chiefs of the three Fighting Services will resign; surely they will resign if they do not get what they want for their Services." Probably there were good reasons why the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the First Sea Lord did not resign; but, whatever may have been the efficiency of a resignation of that kind in the period between the wars, after this war, when combined operations will be essential for true defence, it will be no good only one Service Chief resigning. But, be the panacea what it may, it is most important that the members of another place, and indeed the members of your Lordships' House also, should from 379 time to time be given far more knowledge of what is going on than ever they have had in the past.
§ THE PAYMASTER-GENERAL (LORD CHERWELL)My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, has brought forward a Motion which raises a number of very important questions. Lord Hankey said that they do not involve serious changes in our constitutional procedure, but I do not really think that this can be maintained. The noble Lord has already ventilated his views, and indeed propounded a cure, in a Sunday newspaper, and we shall, I am sure, all agree that it has been useful for him to bring those views forward here, so that the pros and cons can be examined. Nobody will dispute Lord Chatfield's knowledge of these questions. From 1933 to 1938 he was First Sea Lord, and from January, 1939, until March, 1940, he was Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. Indeed, I think it would be fair to say that he probably knows as much as any single man about the condition of our armaments at the outbreak of war, and indeed bears a certain responsibility for them.
The noble and gallant Lord enumerated a series of difficulties which had arisen in the inter-war years in maintaining our Defence Services at a level consistent with our safety. Many of these difficulties are real, and we are bound to sympathize with much that has been said; but, when he says that our rearmament proceeded only in a half-hearted manner when he was First Sea Lord, he, as I understand it, suggests that this was owing to fear of Party complications. I really do not think that it is very plausible to suggest that the reason which prevented a Government, which had a majority of over 400 until 1935 and nearly 30o thereafter, from assenting to the defence requirements necessary, was merely fear of Party disagreement.
I could not help feeling, as I listened to the noble Lord's speech and to some of the speeches which followed, that there was a hint of what the psychologists call "rationalization" about some of the arguments. Rationalization, in psychological jargon, does not mean quite the same as it does in ordinary economic language; it is the process by which an individual with some past action on his mind, which he heartily deplores, finds 380 what seems to him an adequate rational explanation or excuse which relieves him of the responsibility. It is very natural for anyone who has failed to make the machine give the right result to take the view that it is the fault of the machine and not of the people working it.
§ LORD CHATFIELDMy Lords, would the noble Lord more clearly explain that point? It seems to be one where he wishes to reflect on my own conduct, and I should like him to be more definite in what he says.
§ LORD CHERWELLMy Lords, I do not wish to reflect on the noble Lord's conduct in any sense. I am only trying to explain why he takes the very strong view he does about the impossibility of obtaining the right results with the existing machine. After all, he was one of the leading members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, he was First Sea Lord, and he was thereafter Minister for the Coordination of Defence and had every opportunity of bringing pressure to bear. We all know that there has been no occasion—at least, I cannot recollect one—when the Admiralty put forward a strong view and were refused by the Government the requirements for which they had asked. I cannot help thinking that it is a natural psychological reaction on the part of the noble Lord to think that the machine must have been at fault rather than, perhaps, some of the people who were working it.
The noble Lord's Motion falls into two parts. In the first he asks whether His Majesty's Government are planning to improve the administration of Imperial and national defence after the war. Obviously every Government hopes and intends to do all it can to improve the administration of Imperial and national defence, but the words of the Motion clearly mean more than that—namely, to ask whether we are actually making plans. Most if not all noble Lords will realize that it would be premature to answer such a question publicly at this moment, and the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, showed why. It is hoped to hold a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Mother Country and of the Dominions in the early summer, and I am sure that we should do well to await the result of their discussions.
The noble Lord's more particular proposal, that we should consider the prac- 381 ticability of obtaining the agreement of all Parties that national defence policy should in future be a non-Party matter, was put forward with his accustomed eloquence and force. If I may say so, it is the sort of proposal which is more apt to attract officials than politicians. One man's fundamental convictions often seem to another mere party bias. I may perhaps recall to the noble Lord the pregnant saying from Burke which he himself quoted in one of his articles: "All virtue that is impracticable is spurious." Naturally nobody wants defence to be a Party matter. Nor do we want the treatment of industry, or the social amelioration of the population or, for that matter, foreign policy to be a Party matter. The trouble is that once you go beyond some general statement of aim—such as that you want the thing done well—and come down to the measures required to implement that aim, differences of view as to how it should be done are bound to emerge and do emerge in any educated democracy. Some think that tariffs are the best way to help industry; others, free trade. Some people believe in collective security; others, in the balance of power. So it must be with defence. Everybody wants to protect the country against aggression; it is when we try to settle what is required for this and how best to do it that differences, of view are bound to arise.
These divergencies not only arise between Parties. They are quite as likely to occur between the Services. Everybody remembers the controversy as to whether the battleship could beat the aircraft or vice versa. Even within one Service I seem to recall instances of falling away from complete unanimity of opinion. Was there not an Admiral some years ago who was so much impressed by the submarine that he used to ask in season and out of season "What is the use of a battleship?" and answer it with the succinct, if inelegant, phrase "No damn use at all"? As Lord Perth and Lord Strabolgi emphasized, the view we take of national defence policy must depend entirely upon our view of what is likely to happen abroad. It would be splendid if everybody agreed about this. But is it ever likely to happen? The 11,000,000 people who voted for the Peace Ballot in 1936 were not members of any particular Party. But they were united in the belief that we could trust in collective security.
THE EARL OF PERTHI think the question was "Are you prepared to go to war on behalf of the League of Nations?"—not for a national policy.
§ LORD CHERWELLI have no doubt that was the question, but I think most of the people who answered it did believe in collective security. Others felt violently that we were running into fatal danger and that at all costs we must improve and extend our defences. They were usually pilloried as war-mongers. I do not know how Lord Chatfield proposes to reconcile such differences of opinion or even to collect and analyse them. We cannot merely brush aside these people as "wrong-headed groups" and confine ourselves to the official Parties represented in Parliament. How are they to be dealt with? We cannot take away their votes. And if they persist in being "wrong-headed" what does the noble Lord propose to do about it?
At first sight Lord Chatfield's proposal for a Defence Council sounds very attractive but the matter is not quite so simple as it seems. Take the personnel. The most influential members are to be the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Service Ministers. But Governments do not endure for ever, and the holders of particular offices change even during the lifetime of a Government. I am sure it is not in the noble Lord's mind to give permanent seats to the men who happen to hold these offices to-day.
§ LORD CHATFIELDI never made any such suggestion.
§ LORD CHERWELLI said I was sure it was not in the noble Lord's mind. What then is to happen when a new set of men who may well hold diametrically opposite views replace them? No doubt he will say that the Opposition Leaders who have been invited to join will tend to be the men occupying these key posts in the new Government. To a certain extent this may be so but we should be rash to rely upon it. But even so could we expect them to maintain without modification a policy which might very likely have been pushed through the Defence Council against their most cherished views and convictions? His plan surely can only work if everybody agrees. Well of course we all agree that unity in these great matters is desirable. But I have 383 noticed that most people's ideas of securing unity imply that the other people should accept their view. And on that basis what hope is there of getting agreement? Is the noble Lord not falling into the logical error, well known, I believe to lawyers, that "one cannot agree to agree?" It is much easier "to agree to disagree" as I believe a Government did once.
I will not dwell upon the pertinent question whether he expects each Party, however small, whether Communist or Common Wealth, to be called into Council or only the largest Opposition Party.
§ LORD CHATFIELDThe principal Parties.
§ LORD CHERWELLThen we shall again have disagreement and the small Parties will stump the country and raise opposition to the policy. Nor do I wish to labour the point that agreement concerning defence must pre-suppose agreement concerning foreign policy. In all our history, so far as I recollect, this has only been reached in the throes of actual struggle when we were fighting Philip II or Louis XIV, or Napoleon, or William II, or even Hitler. And right up to the last moment there have been the most contrary views taken by the best informed people. On October 5, 1938, the present Prime Minister, in another place, said:
Never will you have friendship with the German Government. You must have diplomatic and correct relations, but there can never be friendship between the British democracy and the Nazi power, that power which spurns Christian ethics, which cheers its onward course by a barbarous paganism, which vaunts the spirit of aggression and conquest, which derives strength and perverted pleasure from persecution, and uses, as we have seen, with pitiless brutality the threat of murderous force. That power cannot ever be the trusted friend of the British democracy. … We do not want to be led upon the high road to becoming a satellite of the German Nazi system of European domination.Only the previous day in his maiden speech in this House the noble and gallant Admiral had said:I suggest that we should accept with both hands the new spirit which the German people and their leader have offered us. We should not cast doubt upon their good word. To do so is the best way to justify a departure from that good word. Let us rather proclaim from the housetops that we believe in it, that we trust the German people, and that we believe that the new spirit engendered at the present time is one on which much can be built in Europe for peace in future.384 Here we have two distinguished men holding views fundamentally contradictory on the proper policy to pursue. Yet how can we form a defence policy until we have made up our minds? In matters of defence technical and political considerations are inevitably intermingled. Consider a concrete example—the cession of the Irish ports. Their value as bases against U-boats operating in the North Atlantic is indisputable. Many hundreds of lives might have been saved if we could have used them. It seems clear therefore that other than military reasons—political arguments—must have influenced the decision to hand them over to Eire. But how are we to draw a line between political reasons and Party reasons. A man tends to join a Party because he holds certain views. It is rare nowadays for anyone to adopt particular views because they belong to the Party dogma. If he comes to a certain conclusion anent political matters, how can anyone say whether his judgment was warped by the fact that he belonged to a particular Party? And if this is so what meaning is there in demanding that national defence policy should be a non-Party matter when all agree that its formulation must have regard to political considerations?So far as I have understood him, Lord Chatfield wishes to work out a ten-year plan for Imperial Defence, which, once it is agreed, cannot be altered by Parliament and to do it now. But how can anyone predict ten years ahead what pattern will be displayed in the kaleidoscope of external affairs?
§ LORD CHATFIELDI really must interrupt the noble Lord, but I never said that.
§ LORD CHERWELLThe noble and gallant Lord published it in his pamphlet, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, supported the view that it should be done now.
§ LORD CHATFIELDI never said so.
§ LORD CHERWELLWhat?—that it should be done now?
§ LORD CHATFIELDThat it can only be altered by Parliament.
§ LORD CHERWELLThe noble and gallant Lord said it can only be altered if 385 all the various Parties agreed. He said Parliament was not to interfere with it once the plan was laid down.
§ LORD CHATFIELDNo !
§ LORD CHERWELLI must refer the noble Lord to his own pamphlet.
§ LORD HANKEYHas not the noble Lord overlooked that there is to be an annual report which could alter it?
§ LORD CHERWELLIf the plan is to be altered, there is no difference between the plan and our present annual Estimates and annual Votes for the Defence Services? What do we know to-day about the position in the next ten years? We do not know whether there will be any organization intended to secure international peace and justice, nor who will be a member of it, nor to what degree the members will consent to be bound. We do not know how many States there will be in Europe, nor what their frontiers will be, still less how they will align themselves, least of all what their military ambitions and resources will be. Yet we are to form now a tea-year plan for Imperial defence.
We cannot possibly predict, as was pointed out by Lord Geddes, what changes in weapons and armament will be brought about by the accelerating rate of scientific invention. Anyone who had said forty years ago that aircraft might endanger battleships, would have been laughted out of court. Thirty years ago a most distinguished general, who had just been shown the latest aircraft, was reported to have declared that they would never be a serious weapon of war. Right up to 1939 the view was widely held, even in Service circles, as the noble Lord knows, that the battleship had nothing to fear from the airplane and for that matter that the U-boat was obsolete. Is there any reason to suppose scientific invention has come to an end? If not, how can we make a ten-year plan for Imperial defence? Surely we must deprecate anything tending to stereotype our methods. Flexibility is essential in all these matters. We do not want to face the future with large armaments all out of date, as happened to the French in 1939. Yet how can the complicated machinery described by the noble Lord cope with all the shifting aspects imposed by changes of policy abroad or new inventions at home?
386 The plan would have to be agreed as the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, pointed out, by the Legislatures of this country and the Dominions. Each time it has to be varied—and as Lord Hankey agreed it will have to be varied in the light of events—all of them must be persuaded to agree the changes however their compositions may have altered or their Parties been realigned. Much as we all sympathize with the noble Lord's desire to make national defence policy a non-Party matter, I have grave doubts as to whether his proposals are practicable. We shall, of course, study the possibilities of improving the organization of Imperial defence in peace, in the intervals of trying our best to conduct it in war. Everybody is anxious to secure a fair, just, impartial evaluation of needs and methods on what 41, might call scientific lines. Anything that can be done will be done to avoid bias on Party or any other grounds and to ensure that continuity on which Lord Stratheden, in his admirable maiden speech, laid so much stress.
As has been said by the noble Earl, Lord Perth, it has often been found convenient to inform and consult Opposition leaders on matters of moment in the past, and the Government will consider whether this practice could usefully be extended and perhaps even systematized. But whatever is done at any time, whatever measures have to be taken, the final word must be with the Government of the day. No Government can unload its responsibility in the vital matter of defence on to a body unknown to the Constitution. The essence of democracy is that the people have the right, and must be trusted, to elect the kind of Parliament they wish to govern them. Until it is dissolved Parliament is supreme. And the Government is responsible to Parliament. The Government in power must be responsible for its acts, and we must continue to trust the good sense of the British people to see that they get a Government they can trust to govern them.
§ LORD CHATFIELDMy Lords, I must not keep you long at this hour. I am much obliged to those members of your Lordships' House who supported the principle of unity in defence for which I am fighting. They came yesterday from all sides of your Lordships' House, and those who could not be here to-day because of the change of plan, which was very un- 387 fortunate, would also, I know, have supported my principle. The noble Lord who replied for the Government is apparently unable to understand that my Motion is put forward not to cover up my tracks, but in honest endeavour to improve the safety of the country. I have nothing to look back on which I regret, and I know of nothing I have done which I should not do exactly the same if I were in similar circumstances. I think that was an unnecessary suggestion. The noble Lord has a strong case in answer to mine. He should stick to it, and not try to weaken my arguments by suggestions that I made them from unworthy motives.
§ LORD CHERWELLI made no such suggestion.
§ LORD CHATFIELDUnfortunately, in all the arguments which have been used by those who have not been able to support my plan, the speakers have ignored one vital fact. They want to stick to the present machinery, but they ignore the fact that it is the present machinery that nearly brought us to ruin. How then can you stand up here and say it is impossible to improve it—let us stick to the good old weapon that we have wielded for so long, but wielded, unfortunately, so completely ineffectively that we were very nearly destroyed as a race? Can you ignore this fact? You cannot do so. You have got to improve your machinery, and, if you do not, posterity will condemn you and condemn this Government.
There are only two points I have to meet in the debate we have had. One is the suggestion by my noble friend Lord Hankey, who most kindly supported my Motion, that it would be much better to stick to the machinery of Imperial Defence and to use that machinery to implement the principles of unity which he approved of. I do not mind what machinery is used. Parliament can invent its own machinery so long as the principle is accepted which I know, from my experience, is vital. There was method in my plan that you will never get the big decisions on defence policy made by a body which consists both of Ministers and experts. If you put in your leaders of the other Parties, if they come into the Committee of Imperial Defence, then you will find exactly the same thing—namely, that when difficulties arise, the Ministers will withdraw to make their own decisions 388 on big policy. That is why I suggested it would be better, straight away, to set up a Defence Council which will be Ministerial in basis.
The other point I would like to mention is that in relation to foreign policy which the noble Earl, Lord Perth, raised. He asked me if I would include the words "foreign policy" in the Motion. May I say that I did not do so because I think it would lead us off the line which I am anxious to steer—namely, that of defence? It is quite true to say that foreign policy and defence go hand in hand. They must do so but they are governed by quite different administrative rules. Foreign policy may involve you in immediate decisions. For instance, a revolution breaks out in some country and you have to decide whether you will recognize the revolutionaries or not. It is a matter perhaps of your own ideologies and it may be very difficult to get national agreement upon it. But if you have to make an immediate decision I think it is very difficult to do that if it has to be an All-Party decision. But in defence it is different. Your defence must be long range. You cannot arm yourself in a moment. Your decisions on defence have got to be made in good time and have to cover a period of years. The noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, says that you cannot have a ten years policy in defence. That statement in my opinion is absolutely without foundation. It is only raising bogies and difficulties against a policy which you do not like. You must have a long-range policy. Why did we in 1922 agree at the Washington Conference to have a fifteen-year programme of naval defence with America and Japan? We could see fifteen years ahead then. Ministers who are now in the Government were responsible for that policy. Why does the noble Lord now suggest that you cannot have a ten-year plan for defence?
§ LORD CHERWELLCan the noble Lord see ten years ahead to-day?
§ LORD CHATFIELDI am not talking about to-day but of the end of the war. You must see as far ahead as you can. Ten years is merely a figure put out at a venture. You can make it five years if you like. What I want to have myself is a plan by means of which you will look far ahead, as far ahead as you can. If you cannot see everything about your 389 defence for ten years ahead my plan is so arranged that you could reconsider it every year, that the Defence Council should consider the plan annually and put before Parliament each year before the Estimates their summary of the situation with such alterations as they wish to make. I submit it is quite possible to do that, but I cannot press the Government to do what they do not want to do. I am glad the noble Lord is even willing to say that he is prepared to consider whether it is possible to do anything at all to improve the existing machinery. I shall not of course press the matter to-day but ask your Lordships' permission to withdraw my Motion. But I shall return to the matter because I know that it is vital.
I do not think that anything will save this country from final destruction except to change the present machinery and the political way in which it is handled. That is my honest conviction. The arguments which I have put forward and the seven 390 proposals which I made yesterday the noble Lord has not answered. He has only answered the one about the Defence Council. Nevertheless those seven proposals in my view are proposals of sound judgment and I believe that your Lordships, if you reflect on them, as I know you will, will in time come to think that they are correct. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.