Lords Sitting of 18 April 1944

Preamble
Reassembling after the Easter Recess, the House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers.
  LORD SIMONDS.
  The Right Honourable Sir Gavin Turnbull Simonds, Knight, one of the Judges of the Chancery Division of His Majesty's High Court of justice, having been appointed a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary under the provisions of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, as amended by any subsequent enactment, with the dignity of a Baron for life by the style and title of Baron Simonds of Sparsholt in the County of Southampton—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

  CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE) (Lord Cecil): My Lords, I beg to move that the noble Lord, Lord Denman, take the Chair in Committee of the Whole House this day.
  Moved, That the Lord Denman do take the Chair in Committee of the Whole House this day.—(Viscount Cranborne.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  ARMY AND AIR FORCE (ANNUAL) BILL.
  House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.

  GERMAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY.
  LORD VANSITTART LORD VANSITTART rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether, in view of the paramount necessity of permanently preventing the manufacture of all explosives in Germany after the war, they will appoint a committee of scientists to prepare a practical and efficacious scheme, with particular regard to the control or
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  elimination of Germany's nitrate and hydrogenation plants; and to move for Papers.
  The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall try to speak with becoming brevity on a matter that in part transcends my province and enters the realms of science. I presume that this time we mean business, and that therefore the disarmament of the aggressors will be unilateral, total and permanent. That obviously involves not only the control of German war potential but the total prohibition of some German industries. For example, I take it for granted that there will be inter-Allied control of the German heavy iron and steel industries on the one hand, and that on the other there will be a prohibition of such industries' and manufactures as aviation, machine tools, synthetic petrol and rubber. I think it may be said fairly that a great part of the world's appalling troubles have arisen from the fact that Germany has been greatly over-industrialized, and the measures that I have just touched upon would, I think, be part and parcel of reasonable de-industrialization that Germany must go through after this war for the sake and safety of Europe.
  That, however, leaves untouched possibly the main factor in the problem. The backbone of both Germany's world wars has been the German chemical industry, because it has made all the explosives. Now my simple proposition is that Germany should make no more explosives of any sort or kind hereafter; and that, I think, would cause no pain, even to those tenderest to German interests, because there is obviously no profit in making military explosives. They can only be made at a loss, particularly since from now on, or from peace on, the choice will no longer be open to the Germans between guns and butter. As to the commercial explosives and sporting explosives, those are a minor matter, and they should be only imported into Germany under licence.
  In pursuit of this very simple proposition, we shall no doubt encounter a certain amount of intrigue and opposition, and, as a warning of what we may expect, I would like to remind your Lordships of what happened at the end of the last war in one episode which I think speaks for itself, and which has been I largely forgotten, if indeed it was ever known in this country. Before the last war one of the greatest explosives factories in Germany was at Wolfgang near

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  Hanau, and after the war there appeared before the Allies a deputation which urged that that great explosive factory should be left untouched for fear of causing unemployment. That deputation was composed, not of militarists, not of Junkers, not even of German heavy industrialists, it was composed of German Socialists and trade unionists, headed by the then Minister, Herr Wissell, and they had a considerable effect on M. Jouhaux who was President of the French trade unions and even upon General Nollet himself, who apparently had not heard of a definition of a well-known neutral diplomatist at: Berlin at the time who said: "Don't attach too much importance to the German revolution. All that has happened is that President Ebert has slept one night in the bed of the Kaiser." Anyhow, they attached so much importance to the composition of this delegation that that factory was left untouched, on the undertaking that it should be partially transformed, but that commercial explosives should not be barred. I need hardly say that none of that undertaking was observed. In a very short while that great factory was back in military production, and it went into full military production long before Hitler's time. I may mention in passing that there were no fewer than seven thousand German war production establishments which were listed for closing down, and that in consequence of pleas like that only some twenty of them were thus dealt with, with the consequences that we now know.
  I would mention one more warning as to the future. One day when General Morgan was engaged in drafting the disarmament convention of the Treaty of Versailles, he received a visit from Lord Moulton, our highest authority on explosives, and Lord Moulton said to him that he hoped that the German chemical industry would receive special attention and would be dealt with in a drastic manner because, to use Lord Moulton's words, "Every German chemical factory was a potential arsenal." Unfortunately, that advice was disregarded, and the General went on to explain that in his view Germany was no more to be trusted with an independent chemical industry than with an independent aviation industry. Those of your Lordships who think that perhaps Lord Moulton and the General went too far, will, I venture to think, have no alternative but to agree
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  with the very moderate and reasonable proposal that I am putting forward today. At least I hope so because I believe that no reasonable man could possibly contemplate leaving Germany with an unrestricted chemical industry. It will have to be brought under control, particularly with a view to preventing the manufacture of explosives.
  I hope that the House will follow me in that view because if we took any different view we might strike a chill into the heart of Europe. The one thing that remains open is the best means by which this legitimate and indeed indispensable objective can be attained. On that, so far as I know, we have nothing in our hands. In my Motion I have suggested that part and parcel of this process at least might be the control or elimination of Germany's nitrate and hydrogenation plants. But I hasten to add that I have no pretensions whatever of being an expert or possessing special scientific knowledge as to the best and most practical means by which this may be attained. Therefore I suggest that science should step in and, as I here ask, that the Government should appoint a committee of scientists who will produce in good time a practical and efficacious report. I have reason to believe that several eminent scientists would be quite willing to serve on that committee. I would hope that their recommendations might cover not only the past and the present, but that they would especially safeguard the future. Here again I speak as a layman. I believe that explosives are still only in their infancy and that their powers of destruction will be immeasurably increased during the next generation. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that, by the adoption of new methods, within twenty-five years some quite small bomb might produce infinitely more havoc than that wrought by the heaviest we are now dropping. If that fate comes upon the world, the fault will not be in our stars but in ourselves.
  It may be that some measure of safety can be sought in limiting the surplus technical ability which could be devoted to future German war potential. That obviously would involve the inspection of German education establishments, but that need present no difficulty whatever. Indeed that measure will have to be undertaken on at least a dozen other grounds, and apart from the ground of

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  this Motion. The proposition, moreover, would also involve the inspection of German scientific research programmes, and in that also I see no great difficulty. On the contrary, I believe that that part of the proposition would be quite indispensable to the future security of man kind. Again, some measure of safety might be sought in limiting or prohibiting the manufacture in Germany of certain high precision instruments which would only be imported under licence, rather like machine tools. But I do not think we should prejudge in any way the nature of the report for which I am calling.
  I only ask the Government to take the necessary steps to ensure that such a report is available at the right moment and in time, so that we shall not again be caught unprepared, because, let us remember, we did intend to prevent the manufacture of explosives in Germany after the last war, and it was one of the many good intentions that we failed, and failed very signally indeed, to carry out. It was said by Heine once that the German lovedliberty like his grandmother. On the other hand, his affection for explosives has been considerably warmer. I have no hesitation whatever in predicting that any scheme of disarmament which fails not only to prohibit but effectively to prevent the manufacture of explosives in Germany, will begin as another farce but end in another tragedy. I beg to move for Papers.
  LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, when this Motion appeared on the Paper I discussed it with certain of my colleagues and with my noble friend Lord Addison, and they asked me to follow up the very interesting speech of the noble Lord. Lord Addison asked me to apologize to the noble Lord because he could not be here on account of a public engagement. One naturally has a good deal of sympathy with the intentions and speech of the noble Lord. I am surprised, however, that he did not recognize that his Majesty's Government in a matter of this sort is not the only one concerned. We have Allies in this war. Our French Ally, for example, is just as much interested in this matter as we are; the French scientists have a high reputation as chemists. I imagine that the Russian Government and the United States Government must also be consulted. I presume that the noble Lord had that in
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  mind, though he did not mention it. This is an international question, and it may or may not have been discussed at one or other of the interminable series of Conferences which are always taking place and which produce such little results.
  The noble Lord has touched upon a very explosive subject. He is dealing with problems which go far deeper and which are far more complicated than the comparatively simple one of preventing the German chemical industry from manufacturing war explosives. The noble Lord and I will die, and our grandchildren will pay for our mistakes; but will our grandchildren be prepared to prevent scientific tuition in the German universities or, if I understood him aright, will they be prepared in ten, twenty or thirty years' time to prohibit by force, or by an army of occupation if required, the bringing up of a generation of German scientists? He is very optimistic if he thinks memories will be so long, and very pessimistic if he thinks the world in thirty years' time will be so very much like it is to-day. The other comment I wish to make is this. I think we have been rather apt to fall into the habit in our discussions recently of dividing up the tiger's skin before we have killed the tiger. I agree, however, that this is a case where an international programme of action might very well be thought out in advance, and I shall be very astonished if my noble friend Lord Cherwell is not able to assure us that these matters have been very fully explored and discussed, or are about to be explored and discussed, with the Governments of our Allies.
  The problem of the prohibition of the manufacture of explosives is, I suggest, only one part of the whole question of German disarmament. The noble Lord referred to aviation and I was very glad to see that at the recent conference between Mr. Berle and Lord Beaverbrook and others it was apparently agreed that there shall be no German aviation after the war. Having for some years tried to preach that doctrine myself I was very gratified by that, and I was very glad also to hear that Lord Vansittart agrees with it. That is one means, and a tremendously important one, of achieving our object. If you are to disarm a great industrial nation like Germany with her scientific population and her highly trained technicians, then obviously you must also control her chemical industry,

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  as Lord Vansittart has said, and her heavy industries too. You must control them in some way or see that they are controlled. To destroy them would, I suggest, be a retrograde step for they can be very useful in the reconstruction of Europe—that is to say, what is left of them after the Royal Air Force and American aviation have finished with them.
  I hope that most of the German hydrogenation plants will have been destroyed by bombing before this summer is out. A great many of the heavy industries have already suffered severely and some of them have been destroyed. The Germans now rely more and more on the heavy industries in occupied Europe for their armaments. But what you cannot destroy completely is the German technical experience and technical knowledge and efficiency They are very fine chemists, overrated, I admit, but still very fine and efficient chemists, and if you only confine yourselves, as Lord Vansittart has suggested we did after the last war, to destroying the already obsolescent armaments which Germany will have left when the war is over and do not prevent her scientists from secretly preparing these new chemical weapons, then you will not have completely disarmed Germany. But it would be a pity nevertheless not to be able to use, for example, the production of nitrates, as my noble friend Lord Faringdon reminds me, because they will be very badly needed as fertilizers to help in the production of foodstuffs from the impoverished soil of Europe.
  Therefore, what will you do? You can either internationalize these heavy war industries, including the chemical industry, or you can encourage the German people themselves to nationalize them. Mere control by itself is apt to be insufficient and transitory. It is not the existence of these heavy industries in the past which has caused war. It has been the people controlling them who have been warlike, the great German industrialists, and especially the leaders of heavy industry, who were amongst the worst and most aggressive German imperialists. They were over-producing capital goods and they had to have markets for them. They therefore encouraged the process of Drang nach Osten and other aggressive policies which led to last war and also to this war. In alliance with the other
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  bad influences in Germany, the Junker aristocracy and the military aristocracy of Germany, they it was who really made Hitler and the Nazi revolution, they it was who made this war possible. I suggest that to disarm Germany and prevent a future war you will have amongst other things to destroy the political and the economic power of this evil alliance between the landowning aristocracy of Germany, with their control of the Army for generations and their great political influence, and their allies the German leaders of heavy industry.
  The latter are comparatively few. The German heavy industry has been extensively cartelized and trustified, and I have seen authoritative figures showing that before the present war half the total share capital in the whole of Germany was in the hands of only 89 companies. The amalgamations and the rationalizations and trusts that have been formed were very extensive in Germany, much more so than in this country. A comparatively few men therefore controlled the economic and financial policy of German industry, particularly German heavy industry. It was these men who were aggressive and imperialistic and who, in conjunction with the Junkers, caused the mischief which we are now experiencing in this war. How are you to destroy the power of these people? If you destroy the power of these people then you will enable new generations of Germans to grow up and become decent Europeans. All my noble friends on these Benches want to see new German generations growing up who will be good Europeans, who will collaborate with Europe and who will, I hope, be peaceful, prosperous and contented. If that should happen then we shall not have wars.
  The economic and therefore the political power of the Junkers, the military aristocracy, rests on the possession of the great landed estates, and I should hope that it will be generally agreed that these great estates must now be broken up and divided, as happened with the great estates of the former landlords in Ireland and as has happened in other European countries. Then with regard to the Army—and here I hope I have Lord Vansittart with me and also Lord Cherwell—do not let us make the mistake again of agreeing to a long-service professional Army, a small professional corps d'élite, as we had after the last war, because that will only

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  be again a preserve for the Junker military aristocracy. Let us rather aim at having a militia or something of that kind with short service.
  With regard to the heavy industries and the necessity of destroying the economic and therefore the political power of the men who control them, how are you to go about that? One suggestion I see canvassed is that the German heavy industries should be put under international control, and something of that sort was implied in the argument of Lord Vansittart. But who is going to do that? That is easily arranged. The leaders of the British and American monopolies with their cartels will be very happy to rearrange their cartel treaties with the German heavy industries and the chemical industry. Would that satisfy Lord Vansittart? I hope it would not satisfy the Government. It would certainly be against public interest if we allow private monopoly in Britain and America to control the German heavy industries and the chemical industry. You would be making a further cartelization of industry in the world and therefore you would make the international policy of expansion and reconstruction very difficult. I hope therefore that that idea will be rejected. The only alternative I can see is that these German heavy industries and also the chemical industry should be nationalized, and made into national services in Germany under political control of the new German Government. That does not prevent you having a system of inspection, as my noble friend Lord Vansittart suggests, to see that your rules about producing explosives and war materials are observed. But it does break the power of the German heavy industrialists who have caused so much mischief to the German people and the rest of the world. Break their economic power and you destroy their political power. Destroy their political power and the coming generation of Germans will have a chance of rehabilitation and of becoming good neighbours of the rest of Europe.
  THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I gather that the aim that the noble Lord who moved this motion has in view is that Germany, after the war, must not be allowed to establish such a military potential as will allow her even to contemplate the possibility of successful
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  aggression. I think that we should all agree with him on this point. But surely it is the object which is of "paramount" importance—to use the word contained in the Motion—rather than the means which should be adopted to secure and maintain the desired, end. There may well be other methods which may be equally efficacious; indeed, I think that a combination of various methods will probably be required. Therefore, to single out one method as superior to all others seems to me to be a mistake. For instance, there should be—and I think that both the noble Lords who have spoken agree on this—a total prohibition of the construction of aircraft in Germany. This would cause no hardship to German industry because Germany does not need to build aircraft in order to become and to be prosperous, and she could import such aircraft as she wanted for her internal needs under licence. That is one method.
  The second possible method, with which I think everybody will agree, is that Germany should be deprived of the right—if it is a right—to build battleships, submarines, tanks and guns beyond certain fixed calibre, and so on. Such a measure should not be difficult to enforce since engines of war of that character, happily, cannot be constructed in secret. Again, from the economic point of view, a deprivation of that kind is not likely to do harm to Germany's economic life. Indeed it is likely to have the reverse effect since the man-power and raw materials required for such construction could be devoted to productive instead of non-productive purposes. Now there is another method. You might deprive Germany—and I hope that she will be so deprived—of the liberty of acquiring freely certain metals and minerals which are essential for war purposes according to present scientific knowledge. These minerals and metals should certainly include manganese, wolfram, tungsten and nickel. Those are only examples; I do not claim to give at all an exhaustive list. But a country meditating aggression will require large amounts of those minerals and metals in order to build up its armament resources.
  On the other hand, we all know, or no doubt we shall be told, that Germany will need considerable quantities of such things for peace-time purposes and she should

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  not be prevented from acquiring them if they are really for legitimate ends. I think that this is right because I believe that the ultimate economic prosperity of Germany is likely to be of high importance, not only to this country but to Europe as a whole. Probably what would be required would be a system of rationing by licence. The granting of licences could be entrusted to an international body to which Germany and certain offer countries, indeed, perhaps, finally, all countries who desire to import such metals, would have to apply. The specifies requirements would be carefully checked by this international organization and licences issued accordingly. It would be desirable, clearly, that countries which produce these special metals should sit on, or form part of, the international organization in order that they might be certain that their interests would be properly safeguarded. A very good analogy of the successful operation of such a system of rationing and licensing is to be found in the proceedings of the Opium Board which was set up under the ægis of the League of Nations a longish time ago. Each Government submitted to that Board a statement of the legitimate requirements of their country, and after examination—and discussion if necessary—the Board authorized the importation of the agreed amount. Any country importing an amount in excess of that figure became immediately suspect, and the importing country was called upon to justify the extra amount. I think that affords a very good example of what might be done as regards these special metals.
  Nitrates fall into an entirely different category from the materials which I have mentioned because they are manufactured largely in Germany itself. My fear is that the "control or ehmination"—those are the words of the Motion—of the making of nitrates inside Germany may necessitate a close and continuing supervision and inspection of every part and of the whole of Germany's industry. Now our experience shows that this may very well in the long run become wearisome. It might have to be extended by the United Nations over generations and then might become extremely difficult to enforce. Nevertheless, I am fully agree with the noble Lord in asking that a serious study of the problem should be made. But I do hope that the economic and political aspects of the issue will not be lost sight of. Therefore,
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  while I support the noble Lord in his request for study of the problem, I am a little anxious when he talks of a committee composed solely of scientists, since it does seem to me that a problem of this kind involving so many factors falls outside the range of pure science.
  LORD HORDER: My Lords, I find myself in entire sympathy with the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, and I should like to support my adherence by a few remarks. We are all animated by a passionate desire to prevent a recurrence of this terrible conflict, but we must be realists if we want to see that desire fulfilled. The noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, spoke of several ways in which Germany might be hamstrung in regard to waging war, and in this connexion there are two 'things which stand out as being of vital importance. The first, which has been referred to during this debate, is that Germany shall not be allowed to manufacture aeroplanes of any description at the end of the war. There is wisdom, however, in not confining our preventive measures to this alone. As a second string I infer that the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, attaches great importance to the prevention of the manufacture of explosives. Although, like the noble Lord, I can claim no scientific knowledge about the manufacture of explosives, I am not ignorant of what that manufacture means in the way of synthetic chemical industry. The removal of the nitrogen-fixation plant—a very large and conspicuous plant—in Germany, together with the prevention of the manufacture of any form of aircraft, would, in my humble judgment, prevent Germany from making war so long as the instruments of war are as we know them at present; and that is surely a long enough time for which reasonably to budget.
  As a doctor, however, I am interested in what I may call a collateral aspect of this synthetic chemical industry, and I wish to draw attention to the fact that it is clear that the Nazis' long and devilish preparation for an all-out war included more things than killing human beings by explosives. It included preventing the cure of human beings who fell sick of disease. For a long time before the war the Nazis deliberately cut down to starvation point the manufacture by other countries of chemical substances vital to the pursuit of medical science and treatment. There are two essential drugs

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  to which I should like to refer. The first is suramin, which the Nazis—surely with their tongue in their cheek—called Germanin. They prevented other countries than their own from using it. It was made by Bayer as the result of a secret process, and was of great use in the treatment of sleeping sickness. Still more important was the synthetic drug called atebrin, the equivalent of quinine. This also was a Bayer product. Both the constitution and the mode of preparation of atebrin were kept secret for a long time, and the supplies outside Germany were very strictly limited.
  At the outbreak of war, of course, these supplies ceased. No doubt we relied upon the natural product, quinine, obtainable in quite large amounts at that time from the Netherlands East Indies. When this supply failed us, as it did, we were caught out very badly. To what degree we were caught out only those responsible for the health of the Armed Forces and of our people in the Dominions, and particularly in India, and for the treatment of hundreds of thousands of cases of malaria, really know, and this in spite of the quite valiant efforts which our own big chemical industries have made to try to help us. All this, as I have said, was part of a long-term policy in preparation for war. It is clear to me, therefore, that a full inquiry by expert chemists—and, with due respect to my noble friend Lord Perth, it is only by chemists that an inquiry of this sort can be undertaken—should be undertaken, an inquiry into the whole field of synthetic chemical industry in Germany. Then, in conjunction with our Allies and with political experts, some plan should be devised by which the manufacture of explosives in Germany is entirely prevented, and a strict lien over and control of essential drugs by Germany ended.
  The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, referred to the possibility of our stultifying the genius of Germany in chemical research. There is no doubt that Germany does excel in chemical research, but I fail to see how the prevention of the manufacture of explosives and the breaking up of strict control over essential drugs need interfere with the pursuit of chemical research. Whatever we do to induce or to force Germany to behave herself will be met by some charge against us of a somewhat
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  similar nature, if not the charge that we are curbing research. Every criminal makes the same sort of charge against the police, but every criminal has the remedy in his own hands. I do hope, therefore, that the Government will see their way to make the expert inquiry for which this Motion asks.
  LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I should like to say a word as one who was conversant with these arguments at the close of the last world war. Lord Vansittart has made a proposal which in broad outline commends itself to every one of your Lordships, but the particular point which he makes in asking for an expert committee to be appointed now—and presumably he would agree to include our Allies in its membership, so far as they would be in agreement with it—is one on which different opinions have been expressed. The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, believes, I gather, that the nationalization of everything would solve more problems than this method, and my noble friend Lord Perth, whose expert knowledge, through his connexion with the League of Nations for so many years, will commend itself to your Lordships, also disagrees. But I think the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, is right and I will tell your Lordships why I think it is right that such a committee should be appointed.
  It is all very well to say we will do this and that and the other to Germany when we have beaten her, and it is a great mistake to try to carve up the pelt before you get the beast, but in this case it would be well to do it because you have to get the consent of the Allies to certain specific things. At the end of the last war great scientists who advised me—one or two of whom only, alas, are left to advise Lord Cherwell—pointed out that there were certain definite things which would enable us, to quote the very vivid phrase used by the noble Lord, Lord Horder, today in the speech to which we listened with so much interest, to hamstring the aggressors' effort in the chemical field. Certain definite things can be done. Most of them are of a confidential nature today, but one which is of particular importance is to consider how far it may be possible to prohibit the making of nitrates from the air by Germany. It is probable that even if we decided to do that now, something will happen in the not very

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  distant future as happened after the last war. At that time as now we said: "Let us see that these wicked Germans do not start to murder us all again." But at the Peace Conference, which it was my duty to attend, other nations very swiftly said: "Come, come, people have got to be fed, not only in Germany but in countries around Germany. If you do not let Germany do this that and the other Germany cannot recover and Europe cannot recover." As a consequence nearly all the things which we said the Germans should not do they set to work to do.
  I submit to your Lordships that Lord Vansittart has raised a vitally important point. If the scientists get together now before the excitements of the final stage of the war, and if they can get the Government to agree on certain things, which we do not ask them to reveal but which scientists know to be essential to the production of explosives and other things vital to the conduct of war, we can put it, I believe, to people in this way. "Let Germany do all sorts of things we really do not want her to do, but not that and not that and not that and not that and not that." Deliberately I say "not that" five times because I remember I was told five things which if they were denied to any country would make it impossible for that country to make war. For that reason I cordially support the proposal of Lord Vansittart for this expert committee and I venture respectfully to hope that the Government may agree to its appointment.
  LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, I desire to intervene in this debate for a moment only to enter, if I may, a caveat and also to make a suggestion. It does seem to me that in any measures we may take after the war to prevent Germany re-equipping herself in such a way as to make a repetition of the present war possible, we must be very careful. My noble friend Lord Strabolgi mentioned that nitrates are used as fertilizers. Before the war, as your Lordships are aware, the League of Nations set up a committee to examine the question of nutrition and the report of that committee came, I think, as a very considerable shock to nearly everybody who read it, because even in those countries which prided themselves on their standard of living it was shown that a very large amount of malnutrition existed. Those of
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  your Lordships who have read the copious literature which has since been produced, such as Professor Marrack's book and Dr. Legros Clark's pamphlet dealing with the subject, will be aware of the enormous difficulty which will confront many countries after the war, not only in feeding their people sufficiently at once, but in giving them in future an adequate diet and adequate nutrition. I suggest that in this matter of nutrition we must watch very carefully so that we do not, by preventing German production of this invaluable fertilizer, hamper ourselves in the urgent work of re-establishing the world and the world's health.
  Hydrogenation seems to be in an entirely different category. That is a war industry. The hydrogenation industry is developed because of the threat of war and the desire of nations to make themselves independent of oil supplies outside their own countries. Therefore to the control of the hydrogenation industry there is not the same objection that there might be to the elimination of the making of nitrates. I find myself incidentally very much attracted by the suggestion of the noble Earl, Lord Perth, that there should be methods of control which do not entail inspection. Like him I feel doubtful whether in the long run any system of inspection can be successful, and like my noble friend Lord Strabolgi I do not believe that our children will take the same view that we take now.
  I said that I would make a suggestion. This is my suggestion. In my view it might be helpful to forbid to Germany an industry, which although it has nothing to do with explosives, is purely a war industry. I refer to the industry of growing beet for the manufacture of sugar. That is a purely war industry. There can be no Government which would encourage the growing of sugar beet if it were not for the desire to make a country independent of the natural supplies of sugar. I suggest that it would be crippling to the Germans to have no sugar beet industry. That is the caveat and that is the suggestion I have to make. Personally I believe in the long run that, although these measures of control may be necessary immediately, what peace will depend upon is not these measures but the terms of peace, and whether those terms provide a framework within which all the peoples

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  will have guaranteed the four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter.
  THE PAYMASTER-GENERAL (LORD CHERWELL): My Lords, I am sure We shall be very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, for bringing these important matters before the House. He has reminded us of what happened at the end of the last war when various measures of this sort were considered and when attempts were made to introduce them. As the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, said, these questions of course have not escaped the attention of His Majesty's Government, and as has been pointed out in the course of the debate the Motion on the Paper deals with only one aspect of very much wider matters. I must say that I agree with my noble friend Lord Vansittart in putting nitrogenation, if not first, at any rate somewhere near the top of the list. After all, what distinguishes modern from medieval war is that we are now able to store large quantities of latent chemical energy and release them as kinetic energy. This may be used either to project bullets or to cause fragments to fly about and kill people, or again, through the medium of the surrounding air, to cause damage in the neighbourhood by blast.
  The energy of these explosives is not very large. It is only about one-sixth of the energy that can be got by burning an equivalent weight of coal. But the fact that really makes them dangerous is that these reactions can be made to take place extremely fast. We have oxygen in intimate contact with some other atom, carbon or hydrogen, with which the oxygen tends to combine with the evolution of a great amount of heat. Of course, the fact that we can mix oxgyen with these atoms despite their high affinity for one another without causing an immediate detonation is due to the very low reaction velocity at ordinary temperatures. Since the reaction velocity rises sharply with temperature we have only got to initiate reaction at one point in our explosives and the heat produced raises the temperature throughout the immediate neighbourhood. This causes a further reaction and in that way we get a sort of compound interest rate of increase in the production of heat. If the heat is transmitted from place to place by a process of conduction we get burning; if
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  the heat is transmitted by the adiabatic pressure wave we get what is called detonation.
  In the case of propellants we do not want detonation, but rapid burning to produce a controlled amount of pressure on the base of the projectile. In the case of high explosives it is arranged that the pressure wave is sufficiently strong to produce adiabatic heating which sets off the neighbouring particles causing detonation. Of course the simplest explosive on this basis is ordinary carbon and liquid oxygen, and it is a very effective one. A large part of the Simplon tunnel was blasted by this means. It is rediscovered periodically by people who want to make our flesh creep by talk about secret weapons but it has been going for about thirty years and is not very much more efficient than ordinary explosive. But the main reason why it is not used is that it is inconvenient. If liquid oxygen is to be kept for any length of time it has to be insulated against heat and this would make it an extremely awkward propellant or explosive to use. We have to look about, therefore, for some way of holding the oxygen at reasonably high density in contact with the carbon and the hydrogen, and the simplest and best way that has been found so far has been to make it form an unstable compound with nitrogen.
  There are other elements, but nitrogen is the lightest and also the most convenient, and of course everywhere accessible. I will not weary the House with reasons why nitrogen is the most suitable in this way. It can all be explained, but it is a fact that nitrogen can be made at the right temperature to combine with oxygen to form a sort of mariage de convenance and it holds as long as there is no more attractive partner in view. Even then, as I have said, even with the attractive partner present, nothing happens until there is some shock which initiates a rearrangement. It is precisely loose chemical compounds of this sort which form the basis of practically every modern explosive.
  They contain the nitrogen mixed or compounded with hydrogen or carbon. There are one or two others like the azides, for instance, where no rearrangement of partners occurs, and where the mere divorce creates sufficient exuberance to produce an effect: but they are only

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  used as detonators and are not really satisfactory as high explosive fillings. Therefore as I have said, nitrates in some form or another are practically essential to modem war.
  Formerly, all nitrates came from decomposition of organic matter—such as proteins—and as they are all highly soluble, they are only found where there is a very low rainfall, as in the deserts of Chile. About forty years ago it was discovered in Germany that under suitable conditions of pressure and temperature oxygen could be made to combine synthetically with nitrogen. Under rigorous conditions—two or three hundred atmospheres' pressure and the temperature from five to six hundred degrees Centigrade—the reaction proceeds at a controlled rate, but this implies special steel. Anyhow, all these difficulties have been overcome, and it is now a perfectly good proposition to make synthetic nitrates. I think any chemical engineer would agree that the Germans could not have carried on the 1914–1918 war without these means of making synthetic nitrates. Therefore I agree with my noble friend Lord Vansittart that if we could prevent his synthesis we could prevent the Germans making war—in the present state of knowledge. There are, of course, other things that might be developed in the future, but at the moment that would be enough.
  But, as has been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, and other noble Lords, this is only part of a wider question. It is wider in two ways. As I have said, nitrogen is the essential element in protein. Proteins are necessary for food. Every ton of wheat we take out of the ground carries with it about 50 lb. or so of nitrogen in the form of protein, and somehow or other that nitrogen has to be put back into the ground if food is to be grown in successive years. In the old days we relied on the bacteria in the roots of certain plants, which are capable of fixing nitrogen—taking it the atmospheric nitrogen and making a compound out of it themselves; that is, of course, one of the reasons for the rotation of crops. But in the modern world we have replaced this very largely by putting the nitrogen back into the ground in the form of synthetic fertilizer. Two hundred and fifty pounds or so of ammonium sulphate contain the necessary
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  nitrates to make up for that taken out by a ton of wheat. If we go back to the old-fashioned method we shall certainly reduce the amount of proteins that can be produced per acre of ground. Germany depends very largely on these synthetic fertilizers, and a good many of her neighbours depend upon German supplies.
  There is the difficulty that if we stop Germany making synthetic nitrate or ammonia—which comes to the same thing in the end—there will be difficulty about getting fertilizers in Central Europe. It may, of course, be said: "We will supply the fertilizers, and Germany need not make them." If we supply them, how are they to be paid for? If Germany is to pay us for them, it means she will have an exportable surplus, and if she has an exportable surplus I would rather it came to us on reparations' account! It is also questionable whether we could supply enough.
  I only mention these difficulties because they are real difficulties, though I do not say they are insoluble. Every effort should be made and is being made to find out whether there is any way of circumventing them. The same applies to the question of hydrogenation. I would not be so afraid of hydrogenation as of nitrogenation plants were it not for the fact that the one process can be converted into the other. Once the compressors and retorts are available they can be used for either purpose. It is a matter of comparatively small adjustment.
  The other approach to this subject—it has been mentioned by several noble Lords—is that there are several key substances whose prohibition might be extremely effective in reducing the German war potential. Synthetic rubber has been mentioned—a perfectly good example—and there are tungsten and the various alloy metals to which Lord Perth referred. If we are prepared to face the prohibition of larger quantities, there are common metals like nickel and copper which are suitable for control. It used to be said, before 1914, that when a country introduced nickel coinage one had to look out, and suspect the worst, as this accumulation of nickel might be useful in war-time. Lord Horder brought up a point which is really the reverse of this one. He said that the Germans had got exclusive control of certain drugs, and

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  when these supplies were cut off we were left in a bad way. That is perfectly true, but it is the reverse side of the medal. What it really implies is that we ought to make sure that we have sources of these drugs rather than stop the Germans making them. These questions, I entirely agree, require study and consultation. Various committees have been considering all these matters, including those raised by the noble Earl, Lord Perth, and as a matter of fact they have recommended that more scientists should be invited to join in the investigation of these very problems.
  LORD STRABOLGI: Are these international committees?
  LORD CHERWELL: No; the committees to which I am referring are mainly British. But, as Lord Strabolgi mentioned, we cannot decide these matters alone. We have first to form some views of our own, and then discuss them with our Allies. We clearly cannot say what we are going to do with regard to German industry without considering what the Russians, the French, and the Americans intend to do. The Government definitely agree that the time has come to extend the participation of scientists in these questions, and they are going to invite a greater number of professional scientists and experts to take part in the deliberations. Whether they should form a separate committee or subcommittee, or should come on to the main committee, is a matter of organization. In the main, I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, that they will, be called in in greater numbers. They will not only be brought in but they will be invited to initiate ideas and to express their opinions, and great attention will be paid to these opinions. I may say that the terms of reference will be somewhat wider than those relating merely to nitrogenation. I can assure Lord Vansittart that we are grateful to him for calling attention to these matters, and I hope he will be satisfied that we have not only accepted the proposal on the Paper but are already on the way to going somewhat beyond it. The other part, dealing with the more questionable proposal of supervising German research, will not be forgotten.
  The House will forgive me if I do not endeavour to examine first causes, such
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  as Lord Strabolgi raised, as to whether the nationalization of German industry or the break up of great estates there will prevent Germany going to war. All these matters are rather beyond the scope of the Motion on the Paper. Even more definitely I must forgo the pleasure of anticipating what the noble Lord's grandchildren will do in given circumstances! But I can assure the House and the noble Lord who raised this question that the Government are determined that nothing shall stand in the way of our curbing, so far as is humanly possible, Germany's war potential. Twice in one generation the strange but very formidable compound of docility and ferocity which makes up the German mentality has brought disaster on the world, and His Majesty's Government are prepared to take every step, and will take every step possible, however inconvenient it may be, to prevent a recurrence. No tenderness to the enemy or trouble it may involve to him will be allowed to stand in the way.
  LORD VANSITTART: My Lords, perhaps as we are agreed that we have been discussing this afternoon a subject of considerable importance, I might be allowed to say a few words in summing up. The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, detected a certain prematurity in my approach to the tiger that took a very ladylike young lady for a ride in the inter-war period. He would perhaps agree that there is no point in waiting for the natural demise of the tiger. While I quite agree with him that this is a matter for international consideration, I have always found it best, before going into such consultations, to know exactly what one intends oneself. He mentioned the remedy of nationalization. I also am anxious that these German magnates should be expropriated, but that is not a real remedy. I gave the instance of this great factory which the German Socialists and trade unionists persuaded us to leave intact after the last war. The whole point of that example was that this was a State factory. That shows that nationalization is no remedy by itself, particularly as something else has become nationalized in Germany, and that is militarism. In the days of my youth the German non-commissioned officer had a bad name in Germany, and there was a great crop of suicides in the intake of recruits every year. Most of that type of man have risen from the

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  ranks. Indeed we have it on the authority of Hitler that 60 per cent. of the German officers have risen from the ranks. What has been the result? There has been an increase in atrocities and militarism has been nationalized. It is not a remedy by itself to nationalize anything unless you maintain Allied supervision; and while the noble Viscount and some who spoke after him indicated that we might well weary of welldoing, I can only reply to that by saying that you will have to maintain this form of supervision until you are sure you have got a new Germany, and that may very likely take a generation. If we fail by the way, we shall fail in many other ways as well.
  In regard to what the noble Earl, Lord Perth, said, I would like to make it plain to his Lordship and to other speakers also that I mentioned hydrogenation and nitrate plants merely as one suggestion on my part. It is only part of a much greater whole. I gladly recognize that. This is a buck I am only too anxious to pass into more competent hands. That was the whole purpose of my raising this debate. I agree also with the noble Lord that the committee which I had in mind need not be exclusively composed of scientists. I had in mind that it should indeed have a far greater representation of scientists on it but exactly at what period they should be brought in is perhaps not my concern. In conclusion I would say that I am entirely reassured by the most interesting and informative speech of the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, who replied for the Government, and I can only add that what he has already told the House gives me very full satisfaction—in other words scientists are going to have a larger say in this matter and will receive their full mead of attention. That is exactly what I wanted to hear and I thought that was what the House would wish to hear. I therefore have pleasure in asking leave to withdraw my Motion fully satisfied with the Government's reply.
  Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

  INDIA.
  THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE EARL OF MUNSTER): My Lords, the House will have read the Resolutions standing in my name on the
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  Paper to-day concerning the continuance in force for a further period of twelve months of Government rules in those Provinces of India specifically mentioned. From inquiries I have recently made I understand that noble Lords do not press for a discussion of these Resolutions to-day. However, noble Lords opposite have intimated to me that while they are prepared to let these Resolutions pass now without debate, they will do it on the understanding that if a debate is called for during the summer months on Indian matters His Majesty's Government will be prepared for such a discussion. I need hardly say that we are prepared to fall in with the views which have been expressed to me privately and in those circumstances I will formally move the first Resolution.
  Moved, That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of Madras on October 30, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on February 15, 1943, copies of which were presented to this House on November 28, 1939, and March 16, 1943, respectively.—(The Earl of Munster).
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I now beg to move the Second Resolution standing in my name.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): Would it not be convenient to put the remaining Resolutions together?
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: If that is your Lordships' wish, I will move that the remaining Motions on the Paper in my name be approved.
  Moved, That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of Bombay on November 4, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on February 15, 1943, copies of which were presented to this House on November 28, 1939, and March 16, 1943, respectively.
  That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of the United Provinces on November 3, 1939,

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  and of his Proclamations varying the same issued on December 1, 1939, and February 12, 1943, copies of which were presented to this House on November 28, 1939, January 16, 1940, and March 10, 1943, respectively.
  That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of the Central Provinces and Berar on November 10, 1939, and of his Proclamation varying the same issued on December 2, 1939, copies of which were presented to this House on November 28, 1939, and January 16, 1940, respectively.
  That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor of Bihar on November 3, 1939, and of his Proclamations varying the same issued on December 3, 1939, and February 13, 1943, copies of which were presented to this House on November 28, 1939, January 16, 1940, and March 10, 1943, respectively.
  That this House approves the continuance in force of the Proclamation issued under Section 139 of the Government of Burma Act, 1935, by the Governor of Burma on December 10, 1942, a copy of which was presented to this House on February 9, 1943.—(The Earl of Munster.)
  On Question, Motions agreed to.

  HERTS AND ESSEX WATER BILL. [H.L.]
  The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES informed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn. The Orders made on March 1 and April 4 last discharged and the Bill committed.

  PONTYPOOL GAS ORDER, 1944.
  Special Order proposed to be made by the Minister of Fuel and Power, on the application of the Pontypool Gas and Water Company:
  Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) for affirmative Resolution and referred to the Special Orders Committee.

  SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932.
  Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department extending Section 1 of the Act to the
  Urban District of Coalville:
  Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) for Affirmative Resolution and ordered to lie on the Table.