Lords Sitting of 23 September 1943

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Lord Grantley—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.
The Lord Burnham—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

REGENCY BILL [H.L.]
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): My Lords, I ask leave to introduce a Bill to amend the law as to the delegation of royal functions to Counsellors of State; and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.— (The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

WAR SITUATION.
LORD ADDISON LORD ADDISON rose to call attention to the statement on the war situation made by the Leader of the House on Tuesday the 21st of September; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, we appreciated very much the statement which the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, made on Tuesday last, and it was fortified, as he himself told us that it would be, by the long statement by the Prime Minister in another place. I am sure that every one of us welcomed those statements, and not least because we were so glad that the Prime Minister was back safely and amongst us again. I think it is right to say that there is in the hearts of millions of people the anxious feeling that stern duty should require his absence from us as little as possible.
If we contrast our situation to-day with the situation of a year ago, it is a transformation. The noble Viscount reminded us that it has been a year of very crowded history, and if we compare, as I expect all of us do, the situation to-day with what it was a year ago with regard to
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the U-boat warfare, the position in the Mediterranean and North Africa, and on the Russian Front, we should not be human if we were not greatly comforted. I am sure your Lordships will agree with me that it is right to-day that we should remember those whose operations are not obvious, but to whom we owe the enormous improvement in the Atlantic and on other shipping routes, and we should remember also what we owe to the sailors and the members of the Merchant Marine and the Air Service, not forgetting the scientists who have contributed to their wonderful success.
There has been a similar transformation in the naval position in the Mediterranean. It would be well, I think, if some person competent to write the history of these events were to take advantage of the occasion to make use of the announcement made by the First Lord of the Admiralty a short time ago about the peril of the naval situation at certain times in the Mediterranean, the magnificent leadership of Admiral Cunningham, and the wonderful change that has been effected by the devotion and heroism of all concerned. The march of the Eighth Army from Alamein to Tunis seems to provide a topic out of which some historian of the future will make a grand story. But the thing that impresses most of us who have inside knowledge of such matters is what that must have meant in the organization of supply, in the organization of the three Services working together, and what it has led to in the improvement and perfecting, so far as it has yet been achieved, of the co-operation of the three Services. That consideration is even more applicable to the successful landings in Italy and to the carrying through of the landing at Salerno. We are bound to remember, or try to remember, when we look at these successes, the infinite patience that has gone before, because we know that every man on these landing craft had to be trained to distinguish between the different signals and trained in the marshalling of the stores on board. A mistake in any one of these matters might be very serious for the landing forces. I am sure we appreciate the splendid Staff work and the infinite training which must have preceded any one of these undertakings. One cannot to-day distinguish between the different Services, but it is fairly obvious that it was by the co-operation of the

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warships and the Air Forces that the perils of the Salerno landing were surmounted.
In this connexion may I observe how glad I was that the Prime Minister said what he did about the Apostles of the Second Front? I was very glad that he dealt at sonic length with the difficulties which must be overcome before any undertaking of that kind can be started, I think some of those who have talked so much about it have either not been aware, or have forgotten, that we lost millions of tons of shipping in the early years of the war, and that the success of many of these enterprises depends first and last upon shipping. I have a lively recollection of what happened in the last war, but with all the big apparatus which goes to furnish an army nowadays the tonnage required then was very much less per division than it must be now. Nevertheless, I remember that in munitions alone we were shipping 53,000 tons a week across the Channel. Therefore, seeing that we have been deprived hitherto to a great extent of the assistance of the French Mercantile Marine, and that we have acted under enormously disadvantageous conditions during this war as compared with the last, I was very glad, speaking entirely for myself, that the Prime Minister reminded Parliament of the difficulties inherent in an enterprise of this kind. The value of a Second Front is, of course, obvious—it always has been obvious—but I was glad that he resisted, and said he would resist, the temptation to undertake it before we knew it would be successful.
In stating one's appreciation of the splendid Staff work shown in the combined operations in the Mediterranean, there is one question in my mind which I should be glad if the Leader of the House would note. I make no comment upon the delays that occurred between the finish of one operation and the beginning of another. It may well have been, as I can fully believe, that not a day was lost in preparing for the next move, but I have been surprised, with the Ninth Army in Syria, that opportunity was not taken to seize the island of Rhodes which is in a very critical place—a governing position—in those seas. So far as one knows from the outside anyhow, a bold adventure might have seized it. I cannot think that the omission to seize the island of Rhodes—an opportunity to do which apparently presented itself—is in any
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way compensated by the occupation of two or three small islands near at hand. I only put that misgiving which is in my mind, and the noble Viscount can answer it or not as he feels wise.
Coincident with these events we have witnessed one of the most remarkable revolutions or resurrections in history— namely, the industrial, military, and I might almost say moral transformation in the Russian State. Some of us cannot fail to remember some of the consultations and some of the character of the Staff work in Russia with which we came into contact in the last war, and the quality of the leadership such as it was. It is a transformation of organization and direction, and industrial and moral competency, in a space of twenty years, that is, so far as I know, quite unexampled in history. It is not for me to discuss the military side of it, but it is quite clear that the triumphs of the Russian Armies and the manifest indication of their immense competency make it all the more necessary that there should be the closest collaboration between Russia, the United States, and ourselves as soon as possible. I am not saying that opportunity has been lost; I make no suggestion of that, because I am not acquainted with the facts. But I do know that there are a number of short-sighted people who have allowed their prejudices to influence their judgment in this matter. It is perhaps natural, but it is unwise, and I hope these short-sighted people who have been afraid of co-operation with the Russian Government will reconsider their attitude, because the governing necessity of the world and the hope of the future, it seems to me, is that there should be the most intimate consultation and co-operation between ourselves, the United States and Russia.
We were all glad when Premier Stalin' announcement was made with regard to the recognition of the Churches, or the permission given to them to become an organized body once more. Your Lordships will agree with me that we are glad that a distinguished member of this House is at present on a mission to Moscow, and I am sure he will do much to promote good will between the two Churches and the two countries. There is no blinking the fact that a considerable amount of the misgiving in many people's minds with regard to an approach to the Russian State was related to their misgiving as to the

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position of the Christian Church in that country. These meetings and this development must be of immense service, and they constitute one of the events of the last twelve months which we should not fail to mention.
While one can only find room for praise and appreciation of the management of the war on the military side, I confess that I am not quite so sure we can be as comfortable with regard to the political side. I rather think the march of war events has been a bit in front of our political preparations. It is natural that the mind of the Prime Minister and the Staffs should, inevitably, be on preparations for the successful prosecution of the war, but the sudden collapse of Mussolini and the events in Sicily have indicated that they were on the military side a little in front of our preparations on the political side. I am not going to make any comments as to the constitution of Amgot. I dare say that that body was all that could be improvised for the time being to carry on in Sicily, but of course it was a military body for military purposes. I am quite sure that the sooner the Mediterranean Committee, which we all welcome, gets to work the better it will be for our progress towards preparations for peace. At all events, we all hope that the Foreign Secretary will meet with great success in his consultations with his colleagues, and that the meeting of the Heads of States, which the Prime Minister has promised us, will take place very soon.
Events in Italy and some events in the French possessions have intensified misgivings which some of us have expressed at different times in your Lordships' House that we may not be as ready to win the peace when we have won the war as we ought to be. It is, I confess, about that side of our efforts that I still feel misgivings. The events of the Mediterranean have precipitated effects in such a way that the need of preparation for dealing with the civil side of affairs has emerged, and I hope no time will be lost in getting ready for the immense tasks which will face this country and its Allies in every country where the war of liberation is successful. We are to have a discussion, I believe, very early after our re-assembly on the steps which were taken some time ago to set up the United Nations' Rehabilitation Commission and that no doubt would be an appropriate time to deal with
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some of these matters, which are amongst the most difficult and tantalizing of the problems with which the Government must be called on to deal. I for one would be the last to be unreasonable in expecting the Leader of the House to state more than he cares to state at the present time.
There is one other event which I think we might call to mind. In the Quebec Conference special attention was given to the Far East and to the affairs of China. A short time ago some of your Lordships paid a visit to China as representing this House and we had a very instructive discussion as a result of the record of their visit. The thing that emerged from it was, I think, that there had grown up in China as the result of its tribulations a sense of national solidarity which probably had never been there before and which may be of immense importance in the future. I know the geographical difficulties; they are obvious; but the more we can do, and the sooner we can do it, to bring help to China and to bring her into our counsels, the better it will be for the future of the world.
I have only suggested a few questions for discussion. There were very many more in the vast review which was placed before us, and your Lordships have in this House a number of members singularly competent to discuss one or other of these matters. I do not propose to do more than just briefly introduce discussion. To sum up, I should say that the year's experience has fortified our confidence to a remarkable degree, but at the same time there is not in the minds of any of us any doubt that we have great difficulties and immense dangers to surmount before we have achieved the victory that we all desire. I beg to move.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, I have very few observations to offer in sequence to the speech made by the noble Lord on the front Opposition Bench which covered, if I may say so, a considerable area of ground in very happy terms. Certainly I could not hope to improve upon the brief review which he gave of the situation in the Mediterranean in the first instance and to some extent in other parts of the world. I merely desire to mention one or two points arising out of the Motion. The Prime Minister in his very wonderful statement showed a grasp of all the necessities of the situation which

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nobody else could equal and a power of grappling with the different difficulties that arise. He was able, I think, to dispose of one criticism which was made in various quarters during the Recess, that there appeared to be some unaccountable delay after the occupation of Sicily, and indeed before Sicily was entirely cleared, in proceeding with the assault on the Italian mainland. The Prime Minister, I think, showed clearly that in fact not a moment was wasted and he also was able to point out what a great many of us I think did not appreciate, that if the attack were to be made south of Naples there were very few places possible and only the one place of Salerno where a landing could be achieved. That, of course, gave an immense advantage to the Germans who were holding the position there because they were able, as the event showed, to establish themselves beforehand in positions from which it demanded great skill and the utmost heroism to dislodge them, as they have been dislodged. The future advance of the two Armies on Italian soil seems to be conducted with the skill which we should have expected, and on lines which give ground for the most favourable prognosis of what may happen during the next few days.
One other point on the Italian situation was also touched on by the Prime Minister and some allusion to it was made by Lord Addison towards the close of his remarks—that is to say, on the possible political future of Italy. As I understand it, the Prime Minister's view is—and I have no doubt the noble Viscount the Leader of the House will correct me if I am wrong in what I am saying—that for the time being the Administration or Government of Italy with which we are concerned, without having regard to its intrinsic merits or demerits, is a body which is able to assist us for the time being in carrying on operations of war there. Therefore the Government here have to deal with the situation as it is without further inquiry but, at the same time, leaving the future entirety open for the ultimate settlement of the government of the country on the lines desired by the Italian people, after full examination and discussion and all possible help from the Allied Powers, but with no intention of imposing any special form of government on that country. I hope I am correct in making that statement.
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One other point alluded to by the mover of this Motion was that of a Second Front. The term "Second Front" has been, I think, rather loosely and sometimes inaccurately used. In the past wars have been waged with no Second Front and the term came into especial prominence in the last war when militarist Germany picked a quarrel both with Russia and with France and was prepared to make an attack both from the East and from the West. The present war began with no Second Front. It began by the invasion of its eastern neighbours by Germany, and it was not until the French and we joined in that anything in the nature of a Second Front could be said to exist. That indeed did not last long because the resistance of Poland was obviously and completely overcome. There was one Western Front and, speaking of a front only as that of land armies arrayed against each other, after the defeat and surrender of France in July, 1940, there was no front at all anywhere. It was not indeed until we were able to renew the war in Africa that a front in the technical sense could be said to exist anywhere.
Therefore the explanation which the Prime Minister gave of the extreme difficulties surrounding the formation of a Second Front in that technical sense—that is to say, of an assault on Germany from two sides—seems to me to dispose entirely of the complaints which have been made in some quarters of the absence so far of a Second Front. I cannot help feeling that in Russia, where no doubt some anxiety was felt at the absence of direct assistance on land, a realization has grown up that, whether we like to use the term Second Front or not, we have been rendering very substantial and material assistance to Russia both by sea and in the air. I venture to hope therefore that nothing with regard to this particular question exists to disturb the relations between the Soviet Government and ourselves on which I fully concur with everything that fell from my noble friend Lord Addison about our hopes for the future. I have nothing else to add except to endorse the view that, speaking generally, both in Europe and in the Far East, we are entitled to look forward in a spirit of reasonable confidence.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I hesitate to follow two such political giants

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as my two noble friends who have just addressed your Lordships, and indeed I should shirk the task altogether were it not that fortunately for me the political giants were in conflict on one point with each other. My noble friend Lord Addison expressed the doubts which are very widely felt in the country and in our Party that matters were not adjusted, that our strategy was too inflexible, and that we did not take quick enough advantage of the tremendous change which occurred in Italy by the downfall of the Fascist régime. The noble Marquess who leads the Liberal party did not take that view and supported the Prime Minister. I support my noble friend Lord Addison in that, but as that may appear to be some form of criticism of His Majesty's Government and the conduct of the war, let me begin by reinforcing what my noble friend said about what may be called the bright spots of this war. They are very bright and glittering.
I do not wish it to be thought for a moment by the noble Viscount who will reply for the Government that any of us on this side are not fully appreciative of the excellent Staff work displayed in the great invasion of Sicily and the Salerno beaches, of the success of the Royal Navy and Air Force and of our Allies at sea in the submarine war—all that has been most heartening and encouraging—or of the great fighting qualities displayed by the comparatively newly recruited soldiers of the American Army and the great gallantry of our own troops. May I also with great diffidence reinforce the hope expressed by both my noble friends that the better understanding now unmistakable between the three principal antagonists against Germany—Russia, ourselves and the United States of America—will continue and develop into complete harmony of plans and policy? And lastly I must congratulate everyone concerned, and not least the local patriots, for helping us in what the Prime Minister described as getting islands "in the pick-up." I refer, of course, to the ejection of the Germans from Sardinia and the apparent overthrow of the German power in Corsica. That is a wonderful result.
I also hope that there is truth in the reports, which have received very widespread publicity on the other side of the Atlantic and are now finding their way
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into the British newspapers, that General George Marshall or some other suitable officer is at last to be appointed as Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the European theatre of war. I see that The Times, which has taken up the story, now describes him as "the Marshal Foch of this war." I hope that the report is true. I have had excellent reports of General Marshall. He is described to me as one of the great men of our age, and I hope that he or some other suitable officer will be given this great post. We may then perhaps see greater flexibility and quicker decisions which I am going to try to persuade your Lordships were missing when these great events occurred in the Mediterranean.
The Prime Minister argued, and he is supported by no less a person than the noble Marquess, Lord Crewe, that there was no delay in the invasion of Italy because of the Armistice negotiations. He went on to describe how we were working to a rigid time schedule arranged so long ago as the previous May. Most elaborate preparations, he said, had therefore to be made for an opposed landing with all the intricate modern equipment needed for war. The fact that there were negotiations going on with the new Italian Government did not matter. With great difficulty and immense effort we managed to speed up this complicated schedule by one week. Now that is the whole matter upon which we make complaint. Why were we working with a rigid schedule and trying to carry out these elaborate operations in spite of the "sea change"—if I may use such a term—which had occurred in Italy? The fall of Mussolini and the ruin of the Fascist Party occurred on July 25 and the next few days, and it was a great event in European history. I do not think it is unfair to compare it to the Fall of the Bastille during the French Revolution.
Two years ago the Prime Minister, in one of his memorable broadcasts, referred to the enemy in Italy as "one man— Mussolini." This one man, he said, had dishonoured the name of Italy, and had led the Italians into an unpopular war. This man, the Prime Minister said, must be removed. Well, Mussolini was removed, and not only Mussolini but the whole gang of rascals and gun-men who supported his régime. The Fascists had to tear off their emblems

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and doff their black shirts or be killed by crowds in the streets of Italian cities. A few of them held out in newspaper offices and at Fascist headquarters in northern cities, but they were eventually blown out by the guns of Italian soldiers. The Fascist Party and the whole Fascist system were swept away by an avalanche. This tremendous fact did not seem to ripple the surface in Quebec or in London. The Prime Minister's reaction was: "Well, we will have to see what this new régime will do." He said in the debate yesterday that we knew nothing about this new régime that had taken the place of the Italian Government. What we ought then to do, in his view, apparently, as he said a few week's ago, was to allow the Italian people to "stew in their own juice" for a time. What happened was that we slowed up to allow them to stew in their own juice, and the Germans rushed in and seized the kitchen. They are there still, and they will have to be ejected. Their ejection will require some very hard fighting.
I am now going to refer to one of the Prime Minister's own phrases—that the Government and their associates in this country were below the level of events. The fact seems to be that they were not able to grasp the full significance of this change. They were too taken up, apparently—as Lord Addison suggests in his attempts to excuse them—with the purely military side of the affair and missed the tremendous significance of the political change which had occurred. My right honourable friend Mr. Greenwood, in another place speaking on August 3— that is, very soon after these events and before Parliament rose for the Recess— suggested a policy of appealing to the Italian people. We did appeal to the Italian people. We appealed to them in the name of the President of the United States and of the Prime Minister of Britain. We appealed to them to join us as Allies. We urged them to drive the Nazis from their country and we promised all support to them in doing so. On the 17th September that step was taken, my Lords, and the whole Fascist régime had collapsed in July as a result of increasing unrest and turmoil amongst the Italian population.
Officially, of course, the dismissal of Mussolini was accomplished by the King, but really his downfall and that of the
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Fascist Government were the work of the people. Workers had risen against them all over the country. Rising discontent, strikes in munition factories, refusal to turn out any more arms, refusals by Italian Armies to fight—those were the sort of things which brought about the destruction of Mussolini and the Fascist régime. As my right honourable friend pointed out, we could have had these people as our Allies if we had approached them in the right way at that time. Mr. Greenwood did not know—none of us then knew —of the approaches which had been made to our Government. We did not know that there had been offers, not merely to surrender, but to change sides and to fight with us as Allies. Now at that time, instead of continuing these ponderous preparations, the accumulation of the landing barges in the right order, the loading of them in the right way with supplies and so forth, work which occupied a matter of months, we should have acted with speed. Any lightly equipped landing force sent with our flag and the American flag at its head to anywhere in Italy, whether by sea or air, would have been received with open arms.
If, above all, we had seen some stroke of genius such as that which was delivered on the night the Germans invaded Russia in June, 1941, what an effect that would have had. Your Lordships will recall how, on the very same night that the Germans invaded Russia, we had that great broadcast appeal by the Prime Minister to the British people to treat the Russians now as our Allies in this great war against the common foe. Had an appeal like that been made immediately to the Italian people all Italy would have been ours, without shedding the blood of a British or an American soldier. All Italy would have been ours. The few German divisions in the north were in peril of their lives, and were confined to barracks; they were helpless. The Prime Minister objects to our saying that forty days were lost, but forty days were lost, forty days in which the Germans doubled and trebled their forces and were able to neutralize, disarm and bully the Italian troops and take up positions at the appropriate landing-place at Salerno. We had all this talk about letting the Italians stew in their own juice while we hotted up the fires, and there was a repetition of this parrot cry of unconditional surrender, which, of course, has not been carried out.

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There was talk of "hotting up the fires," but our friends and allies were the industrial populations of the great Italian cities, and we proceeded to bomb them unmercifully. In the days immediately following the downfall of Mussolini, there was tremendous enthusiasm and a great emotional release in the cities of Milan, Turin, Genoa, Naples and Rome, and in the countryside as well. Indeed, the reemergence of the old long-suppressed political parties in Milan particularly alarmed the Badoglio Government representative on the spot, apparently, for he sounded the air-raid sirens to disperse the processions; he pretended that there was an air raid, and the people took refuge in the shelters. A few days later there was an air raid, and hundreds of 4,000 lb. bombs were dropped on Milan.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Does the noble Lord say that bombs were dropped on Turin and Milan after we knew that representatives of the Italian Government were coming to arrange an Armistice?
LORD STRABOLGI: Yes.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Did the noble Lord read the speech made in another place yesterday by the Foreign Secretary?
LORD STRABOLGI: Yes. I am going to deal with that point.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I hope he will, because my right honourable friend said definitely that that was not the case, and it is a useless and wicked misrepresentation to maintain that it was.
LORD STRABOLGI: I am quite seised of the case, and I have read the speech with great care, and also the speech of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister described how, within a few days of the fall of Mussolini, feelers were put out by the Badoglio Government to us, and how subsequently—I think August 15 was the date given by the Prime Minister—we received the first direct approach in Madrid. If the noble Viscount will permit me, I can read the Prime Minister's words to him. After dealing with the events of July 25, and the fall of Mussolini, the Prime Minister said that "feelers were put out by the new Italian Government through various channels, asking for terms," and so on. That was a few days
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afterwards. I believe it was actually in the first week in August that the Italian diplomats in Madrid and Lisbon and other neutral capitals let it be known that the Badoglio Government wished to come to terms. The Prime Minister said that on August 15 an Italian envoy with the rank of General came to Madrid, and negotiations began.
I now turn to the speech of the Foreign Secretary in another place last night, and I quote from column 352 of the Official Report: "… the last occasion we bombed Turin was the night of the 16th-17th." The Prime Minister said that we had these direct official approaches on August 15, but the Prime Minister also said that before that feelers were put out. I do not want to misrepresent the situation at all, and I am quite willing to accept anything that the Foreign Secretary or the noble Viscount may say in explanation; but, apart from the negotiations which had been opened by the Italian diplomats in neutral capitals, we must have known from what happened in Italy that these people were very ready, not only to come out of the war, but to come over to our side. They talked of Rome being made an open city, and there was a great discussion about that. The temper of the people in the northern cities, and indeed all over Italy, was unmistakable. It was not necessary to bomb these cities to induce these people to apply for peace. They were doing it already; they wanted to be out of the war, and that was the logical sequel to the fall of Mussolini.
This is a war, as I have endeavoured to plead before, of right against tyranny. It is also a war of those who oppose Fascism (which amounts to the same thing) against those who uphold it. The moment Mussolini and the Fascist Party were ruined in Italy, there was no question of Italy remaining a neutral in a backwater, like Spain; the Italians became on the side of the Anti-Fascists, of ourselves and the Americans and the Russians who are fighting this foul system of tyranny. If the noble Viscount thinks that our policy was right, in view of all the knowledge that the Foreign Office must have had— and I suppose our Intelligence Service has been improved a little now, and that we do get some news of what is going on in other countries—if he thinks it was right to continue to bomb those northern cities, then I am afraid I must differ from him

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and from His Majesty's Government. There was a case for bombing communications and airfields which might have been used by the Germans, but I maintain that there was no case for throwing away our bombers and their crews—and we had losses; we lost seven bombers in one attack on Milan—and for plastering those great cities with 4,000 lb. bombs. It had the effect of so disorganizing and terrifying the people there that the Germans were able to step in and work their will and obtain the surrender of a great many units of the Italian Army.
All that, however, is by the way. What I was really attempting to do was to support my noble friend Lord Addison against the noble Marquess on my right in declaring that there was a delay on the political side, that we allowed political events to go ahead of military events and lost forty days, and that the Germans took advantage of those forty days. According to the latest news, they seem to have taken further advantage of them by recapturing Fiume. My noble friend Lord Addison referred to the question of the Dodecanese and the islands in the Aegean, and I should like in two or three minutes to support what he said and add something to it. This business of elaborate amphibian expeditions to meet an entrenched army is not always necessary. An example of that is what happened in Corsica and Sardinia, and I congratulate everyone concerned in the Higher Command on the rapidity with which we have acted there. When the Corsicans were obviously getting the better of the Germans, we sent a French army to help them. It was not arranged in landing barges with tanks in the right order and artillery and medical stores and all that sort of thing. A French army was rapidly sent there, and it is doing splendid work in support of the French patriots in Corsica. Why could not we have done the same thing in the Aegean?
A few days after the full of Mussolini (I think five days afterwards) it was officially reported from Cairo—and everything that comes from Cairo is absolutely true, as we all know—that there was fighting going on in Crete between the Italian and the German portions of the garrison, and a wireless message was sent to the insurgents in Crete—the Greek guerillas— to support the Italians. Why did we not send an expedition ourselves? I do not mean one of these elaborate expeditions
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with landing barges and amphibian lorries and self-propelled guns and all the rest of it, but could we not have sent even a few battalions in warships to support the Italian forces of the garrison of Crete? It would be the moral effect that would matter, not the strength of the artillery or the tanks. We had divisions ready; could not they have been used?
So much for Crete. The case of Rhodes, referred to by my noble friend Lord Addison, is, I think, amazing. Rhodes is the key to the Aegean, or to the Eastern Aegean at any rate. It is the main arsenal of the Italian Forces in the Levant. It has a fine harbour and, I think, three big airfields. It was held by an Italian garrison of 18,000 men. On 3rd September the Badoglio Government signed the Armistice on the dotted line in secret; the terms and 1hc fact of its signature were not disclosed until the 8th. We had a five days' flying start over the Germans. Could not we from Haifa or from Alexandria have sent an expedition to Rhodes in those five days? Had we to wait for the Germans to carry out their smash-and-grab tactics and get hold of the place, thanks apparently to the treachery of the Italian Commander in Rhodes, who was a Fascist? Could not we have done something in those five clays? I should have thought we could have done something after the fall of Mussolini. But allowing for the possibility of treachery, once the Armistice terms had been signed on the 3rd September we had five clear days in which to win the race for Rhodes. As my noble friend said, we are taking Leros and Cos and those other unfortified islands weeks after the event. I am afraid this points once more to inflexibility and over-rigidity. Plans are drawn up at Casablanca, or Quebec, or Washington, or wherever it is, months ahead and cannot be departed from, or only very slightly departed from, and in the meantime great political changes take place and we are not ready to take advantage of them. That is why I hope there will be some overriding commanding authority, British, American or other—I do not care so long as he is given the power to take advantage of a situation which I believe will turn more and more in our favour as the months go on.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, the literature that is produced by debates of

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this kind is so voluminous and comes out with such rapidity that for a man like myself who has a great many official engagements, made beforehand and which have to be kept, it is really impossible to read all that is produced on one day by the next day. I happen to have been very full of engagements the last day or two, and if therefore I have got up my "prep." rather less meticulously than usual, I hope that your Lordships will pardon me. But there are some things which I was anxious to say to-day and I may not have another opportunity to say them. I have over a limited field been a critic of the Government, mostly a little more than a year ago, and I therefore want particularly to congratulate the Government on the very great success of their policy and of their whole conduct of the war. I stress "the conduct of the war" because we had debates on that subject just over a year ago, and though I am not going to claim that it was because certain suggestions were made here and in another place that they were carried out, still I think they had their effect. At any rate, there is not the slightest doubt that there has been a vast improvement in the machinery for the control of the war.
This is not the occasion to go into it in great detail, but I could, if necessary, marshal a large amount of evidence to show that the machine is really working as it was meant to work. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, it is clear, are allowed, on the technical issues, to work without too much interference. It is equally clear that they get guidance and that they get thoroughly good guidance. I believe that the same thing applies precisely to the Joint Staffs at home. In saying that, however, I just want to reserve one point. I am not quite so sure about the civil administration being tuned up to the same extent, though it has been tuned up. But that does not arise to-day, so I leave the point.
The next point on which I was particularly anxious to congratulate the Government is their success in the anti-U-boat warfare. On this I differ a little at one point from my noble friend the Lord Privy Seal, but he will not mind. I think he said the turning point of the war was Alamein. To me the turning point of the war was the Battle of the Atlantic in May —rather later. Perhaps there was more
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than one turning point, one small and one big. But I do think that that Battle of the Atlantic in May was quite a decisive point in ensuring our ultimate victory. Of course we have to maintain all that is being done. When the Government started to tackle the business seriously—as your Lordships know, I think they were very late in doing so—they really tackled it with a will. And the things which some of your Lordships and I desired to see done, such as the bringing of the large aeroplanes into the Coastal Command, the great improvement in the quantity and the quality of the escorts, the provision of a great deal of scientific equipment, which is of prodigious importance (and I really do know something about that), the provision of some aircraft carriers, which are still coming along in increasing quantities— what I think they call Woolworth carriers —the bombing of the U-boat ports and of the industries of Germany—really all the industries of Germany, but those especially affecting the U-boats: the combination of all those things has brought a very great change in the situation.
Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that losses this year have been quite considerable. They must have been in the early part of the year. The Prime Minister said that shipbuilding exceeded losses by 6,000,000 tons. That is a tremendous figure, of course, but still the building is a tremendous figure. We know that the Americans have a target programme of 12,000,000 tons a year—a million tons a month—and that they are ahead of their schedule. We know that our own share is up to date, we know also that the Canadians are making a great contribution. Well, if you add together the American 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 tons, our own— which I do not profess to know exactly, though I could make a shot at it—and the Canadian, and then deduct the 6,000,000, it would not want a Senior Wrangler to deduce that there was quite a considerable figure of losses compared with the early part of this war and the last war. But the great point is that the U-boats are being destroyed and the losses are falling pretty nearly every month. So I think that the Government are to be very warmly congratulated on having tackled, with ups and downs of course, this very terrible menace, as it was a year ago.
Then I would like to say just one word about what is sometimes called the grand

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strategy of the campaign. I myself have always been a convinced believer in what might be called the Mediterranean strategy. Mussolini had in his mind, without question, the intention to recreate something like the old Roman Empire. I always thought that, once you could scotch that idea, Fascism was bound to fall; it was bound up with that conception of the Roman Empire. Therefore, I am sure that the policy of the North African campaign was absolutely sound. I have always felt, too, and I still feel, that since Fascism came first and National Socialism came second, the fall of Fascism was absolutely bound to have a tremendous reaction, and I might go so far as to say to be followed in due course by the fall of National Socialism. The moral effect of the one on the other was bound to be tremendous. So much for the North African campaign.
I was always a convinced believer in the Sicilian campaign, and I always thought that the Sicilian campaign, if it was successful—and it was a hazardous affair on paper—would be followed by an Italian campaign; but never did I venture to think that before the fall of Sicily had taken place, the Italians would be asking for an Armistice. I do not believe anyone could have calculated that, because it. really resulted very largely from the massive operations and successes of our Russian Allies. At any rate, the grand strategy has been a very great success, and I wish in all humility to pay my tribute.
When we come to the political management of the Mediterranean war, I confess that though in many respects it was extremely good, in other respects my enthusiasm is much less pronounced. I am doubtful if we got quite the best out of the situation and, as I shall show in a moment, I think the Allies were rather hampered by the earlier declaration of unconditional surrender. The story really begins earlier than my noble friend the Lord Privy Seal and the Prime Minister in another place began it two days ago. I submit that the story begins with a broadcast that was made from Algiers on July 15 in the name of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. That broadcast made no mention of the term "unconditional surrender." Much less humiliating phraseology was used, and I hope
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your Lordships will allow me to quote from it:
"The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honourable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations."
I felt when I read that very fine document that it was an extraordinarily nice stroke, substituting "honourable capitulation" for "unconditional surrender."
I know the Italians very well, because I have dealt with them both in the last war and at many international conferences. They are an extraordinarily sensitive people. They have got a very fine sense of honour, and they are very much influenced often by what to us rather tough people does not matter very much. There is all the difference, I can assure your Lordships, to the Italians—and I can think of other nations as well—between "unconditional surrender" and "honourable capitulation." That document was, in effect, a powerful but persuasive appeal to the Italian people, first to capitulate, then to get rid of Mussolini and the Fascist régime, and finally to get rid of the Germans. The effect of that appeal, of which I have no criticism to make, combined with the advance in Sicily and the bombing of Italy, was very remarkable. Within ten days the second part of the advice had been taken Mussolini was deposed, Badoglio reigned in his stead, and the Fascist régime was abolished. In a sentence, the second item in the advice had been taken. At the end of July other statements were made on rather similar lines. On July 29 President Roosevelt made a broadcast, and while he did once use the phrase "unconditional surrender," it was rather persuasive, rather holding out hopes to the Italians. He expressed the determination of the Allies to restore these conquered peoples to the dignity of human beings, masters of their own fate, entitled to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.
On the very same day, in a broadcast to the Italians, General Eisenhower spoke in very much the same vein. In urging them to get rid of the Germans, he made it clear that they could have peace immediately "on the honourable conditions that our Governments have laid down." I thought, and still think, that that was a throw-back to the "honourable capitulation" mentioned in the statement of July 15. In his next sentence he struck

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possibly an even better note. He said, "we are coming as liberators." The relentless bombing of the armies in Sicily and the bombing of the mainland had strongly disinclined the Italians towards continuing the war. In that respect I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Strabolgi. They were disinclined, especially when the bombing was combined with the sweeping advances of the Allied Armies through Sicily and with the series of statements which I have just quoted, admirably supported by the kindliness of our soldiers and airmen, who are really our best diplomats. All these things were showing the Italians that an honourable capitulation was within reach. It was not therefore very unexpected when, in the first week of August, the feelers were put out by the Italian Government.
That seems to me to have been a particularly decisive moment. A great opportunity was opened up. After all, the main object of our policy was, and is, to defeat the Germans, and here was an occasion which might, with luck, be used not only to eliminate our enemy's principal ally, Italy, but even to get them on our side, to get the wholehearted good will of the whole nation before Germany had time to increase to strangling point her growing grip on the country. At that moment, too, we were dealing with Marshal Badoglio, a soldier who is notoriously anti-German, a good colleague in the last war, a man who had already taken all risks in upsetting Mussolini and the Fascist regime, a man who had already carried out at great risk the second advice of July 15 by making his approach with a view to honourable capitulation and with a view to opposing the Germans. We had not the slightest reason to doubt his good faith. Of course it is easy to be wise after the event and I know I am exposing myself to that being said, but it does seem to me that there was an opportunity to reply in rather a different way. I am not sure we replied at all, I do not think we did, but there was an opportunity to reply to the feelers.
I think we might have let it be known that our policy was one of honourable capitulation and that we were coming as liberators. We had said that already. It was an opportunity to suggest that
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Marshal Badoglio should get in touch with General Eisenhower. This was a matter of an Armistice and an Armistice is a military matter. According to my recollection, in the case of the Bulgarian Armistice in the last war the approaches were made across the lines and the whole business was settled in a single night. Of course it had been prepared. I suggest that if we had been able to get in touch with General Eisenhower in Sicily, if we had asked the Marshal or his agents to do that, it would not then have been so very difficult because the war was very mixed up in Sicily. There were men surrendering every day and it would have been a relatively easy matter to arrange for the surrender of the right people to carry on the negotiations. Contact would have been possible, and the whole matter could have been arranged probably without leakage and plans arranged at that very early date for Italy's co-operation. That, of course, was not done. I dare say it was impossible.
As I have said, it is easy to be wise after the event, but as we now know a very different course was adopted. We abandonded for a time the idea of honourable capitulation and coming as liberators and reverted to the humiliating and rather insulting phrase "unconditional surrender." A lot of time was inevitably lost and enough leaked out to warn the Germans that something was afoot. We do not know whether at Madrid Marshal Badoglio's representative was told that it was a policy of unconditional surrender.
LORD STRABOLGI: The Prime Minister says yes.
LORD HANKEY: I did not know that. All I knew was that in that aproach it was made clear that Italy wanted to join the Allies. We do know that at Lisbon four days later the Italian emissary received from the hastily-assembled Allied representatives, who included Staff officers from General Eisenhower's headquarters, the reply that we would only accept unconditional surrender. So far as we can judge, there was no discussion on the Italian proposal that they should join the Allies. We know also that the Italian emissary said he could not give a reply without consulting his Government, because his purpose was to discuss how Italy could join the United Nations in the

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war against Germany. Then he had to go homo by a roundabout route. It was not till the 23rd August that he left. I am not sure of the day on which he arrived at Rome. He took back with him the military terms. We know also that there had been a certain reaction in Italy against unconditional surrender.
There was a broadcast from Rome on August 11 which stated that the Allied peace conditions were such that there was no Italian who would not go on with the war rather than accept such dishonour. Then the friendly journal Free Italy described the term as un errore di vocabulario. In fact it was an error of vocabulary, because at the very meeting at which the emissary was informed of the policy of unconditional surrender he was handed a document which was in effect "preliminary peace conditions," and he said he must take it home and he did take it home. So far as one can see, no opportunity was taken at that interview to discuss closer co-operation by Italy.
Meanwhile, in spite of all these precautions, it is quite clear the Germans must have been placed on the alert. There was a very peculiar announcement in the Press on August 17. I only saw it in an obscure column, but there it was. A news agency reported that an Italian mission had arrived in Lisbon led by General "Tobacco" and Signor "Speranza." That must have set the whole German diplomatic and secret service machine agog From that time we began to read stories in the Press that German troops were pouring into Italy and seizing one key point after another. I shall not pursue the story because I think for the rest it was conducted, so far as I can judge, with the same success as it was in the very first stages. It was in the middle stage where I think things went wrong. I am not contending, and I never have thought, that we could have anticipated our landing in Italy if the Armistice negotiations had been concluded earlier. I think that the Government's case on that was one hundred per cent. foolproof and I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Strabolgi on that point, if I understood him correctly.
All that I am suggesting is that by acting earlier at the time of the original feelers, by transferring Armistice negotia-
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tions at once into military channels—and of course the Generals act under instructions from their respective Governments and our Governments were together at Quebec—by sticking to our previous attitude of honourable capitulation and coming as liberators instead of reverting to unconditional surrender, by responding rather more cordially to Marshal Badoglio's desire to join the United Nations we might perhaps, I will not put it higher than that, have fixed up better arrangements for Italian co-operation. In addition, we might have kept the thing rather more secret than can have been possible in the conditions, first, of a visit to Madrid, and then to Lisbon, and then the arrival of the other General and so forth. But I am quite certain we should have secured a better spirit of co-operation by a more generous acceptance of Marshal Badoglio's overture, by treating Italy in the spirit of the prodigal son and making it a bit easier for the Italian people. That seems to me to be proved by a passage in the very virile statement issued by Marshal Badoglio to the Italian people on September 20:
"Do not forget that all talk of unconditional surrender is out of date and irrelevant to the changed conditions of to-day."
That seems to me to show that the Marshal feels that he must get that into the minds of his people if he is going to get their whole-hearted co-operation.
I am very glad to observe a good many signs that we are now getting back to the principle of a war of liberation. The moral of the tale seems to be that perhaps it is a mistake to make declarations of this kind the effect of which, on the military situation, we cannot judge beforehand. I felt that at the first moment when I read the adoption of unconditional surrender. It is a harsh term. It is a rather meaningless term, because there always have to be conditions, and these can always be imposed if the military situation permits and cannot be imposed unless the military situation permits. My own view, therefore, for what it is worth, is that I hope the term will gradually fall into disuse so as not to hamper us in dealing with other capitulations, which will certainly be coming along in due course, unless the circumstances make it necessary, as I would be the first to agree would be almost certain, in the case of Germany.
LORD KEYES: My Lords, we listened two days ago to a most heartening statement by the noble Viscount the Leader of the House, and most of your Lordships will either have listened to or have read that wonderful, comprehensive survey of the war situation made by the Prime Minister in another place. I am sure that statement will be regarded all over the world as a prelude to victory. No one knows better than I do what a great debt we owe to the Prime Minister for what my noble friend Lord Hankey calls "the Mediterranean strategy," because I know from personal experience that from the time that Italy came into the war the Prime Minister has most insistently and faithfully pursued the policy of gaining control of the Mediterranean. In order to do so great amphibious operations were obviously necessary and combined operations are terribly difficult to mount when not only three Services are involved, as must necessarily be the case now, but Allied forces also. My noble friend and the Prime Minister left us under no illusions as to the great difficulties we have to face and the price we may have to pay in blood and treasure before the war can be brought to a victorious issue by reason of these operations which must be conducted by the three Services as combined operations.
I remember the time—it was about seven years ago I think—when the Prime Minister was leading in the House of Commons a small band, of which I am proud to have been one, who were fighting all the time for the restoration of our defences, and I remember his incessant warnings that if we did not put our defences in order, and particularly our Air Force, we should be courting disaster. I remember his saying on one occasion when he had been attacked by somebody for saying the same thing two or three times, that the object of recriminating about the past was to enforce effective action in the future. I do not intend to recriminate about the past because I feel very strongly that most, if not all, of the lessons which were taught in previous combined operations in past generations and even in our own generation, have been learnt afresh and taken to heart. I would include the temporary setback at Salerno, for which I think there was a very good explanation. I hope no one will be unduly discouraged by that setback. I have in mind particularly one
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thing which the Prime Minister said on Tuesday. I believe one is not allowed to quote exact statements made in another place, but paraphrased what the Prime Minister said was that there were no certainties in war, that we had a precipice on either side, a precipice of caution and a precipice of over-daring: the difficult thing was to steer the middle course.
When that great amphibious operation described as the greatest in the history of the world was launched in North Africa, the Prime Minister said in another place that it was regarded by his expert advisers as one of great hazards. Yet we only had a token resistance to expect. There might be bitter resistance perhaps in certain localities, but we had no Italian Army and no German Army nor any properly equipped army to fight. The war machine evidently regarded it as too great a hazard, although we sprang a great surprise in North Africa, to carry out amphibious operations to seize Bizerta and Tunis, and we allowed the Germans to forestall us. The hazards, we were told, were too great. When we wanted to capture Pantellaria it was considered necessary to bomb that island into submission for about twenty days. I think that recent events have shown that probably a landing might have been effected on the second or third day. A great deal of time was lost.
The next operation was against Sicily, Knowing the Italians very well—I was for three years Naval Attaché in Italy and three years Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, and I kept up my contact with Italy until the war began—I always felt that when we had a proper crack at the Italians they would collapse. We were greatly advantaged, to use the Prime Minister's phrase, in our landings in Sicily because the Italians did not put up much of a fight. Still it was described as an operation of great complexity and hazard. When the next great combined operation was carried out the enemy's fleet was about to enter our harbours, we knew that it was not going to attack us, and we had a friendly country to invade. This, as the Prime Minister told us, was a most hazardous operation. And yet there are people clamouring in this country, for a Second Front, a Second Front across the Channel. To carry out what they suggest would entail a far more hazardous operation than anything we have undertaken yet.

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And who are the people who are asking for this Second Front? British Communists, Left-Wing Socialists—those are the people who are clamouring for a Second Front. Well, I wonder what the relations and friends of the men who were fighting during that anxious week on the beaches of Salerno—facing disaster, as some thought, although I personally never had a doubt—felt when they read in their newspapers that fourteen thousand miners were out on strike because one boy had been punished for refusing to go down a mine? Now these people who are asking for a Second Front are asking for it on behalf of the Russians. I wonder what the Russians think. What must they have thought if they listened, as I did, the other night to a broadcast which told of strikes here and strikes there, strikes at Vickers' works at Barrow, strikes at the Liverpool Docks and so on. We have heard, too, of much absenteeism. I say that these things are monstrous. These are the things that those who are agitating for a Second Front ought to tackle. They ought to use their best endeavours to influence their people so that an end is brought to strikes and absenteeism. The workpeople concerned can be influenced if they are led properly.
During the last year or two I have spent a good deal of time going about the country and visiting factories. I have been enormously impressed by the work that is being done in them, work which to a great extent is being carried out by young women and old men. Most of the young men, of course, are serving with the Forces but a certain number of them are in reserved occupations. Now I have said this in another place—I said it across the floor of the House to the Socialist Party several years ago—for God's sake let us have some equality of sacrifice. Let men in the appropriate age categories be conscripted for work just as men of similar age are conscripted for the Services. Why should men be conscripted to fight when men in the same categories are left free to strike and to absent themselves from their places of employment? I said all this with reference to some very bad cases in shipyards which came to my knowledge nearly two years ago. As a result, I was asked by the shop stewards to go down to these shipyards and to repeat the insults which I was said to have hurled against the working classes. Alto-
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gether I received three such invitations. I went down to the first shipyard on the list and I said there what I thought. I got a vote of thanks for having the guts to go down and talk to the men straight.
Later I went to a second shipyard. There I listened to a man making an impassioned speech demanding a. vote of censure on the Admiral for having insulted the British working people. The vote he got was unanimous but it was rather half-hearted. After the voting, someone at the back of the crowd got up and said: "I beg to propose a vote of thanks to the Admiral for having the guts to come down here and talk to us so straight." That vote was carried with enthusiasm. Subsequently the man who made the speech demanding the vote of censure wrote me a letter which I greatly value. He said, in effect: "I had to do it, but now what can I do to help?" I replied to him: ''You are a very eloquent fellow. Go about among your people and use your influence for good." I do not believe that there has been any trouble in those two places to which I have referred since that time. I am absolutely certain that if the Prime Minister went to what is called the microphone, and, using that great gift of oratory of his, pointed out to our workmen, ninety-nine per cent. of whom are loyal and devoted people, that all this nonsense has got to stop, that there must be no more strikes and no more absenteeism, for we have great battles before us, and that, as he said the other day, much blood must yet be spilt, the whole country would rise as one man to respond to his appeal.
LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE: My Lords, I cannot help on an occasion like this saying just a word or two with reference to the amazing statements that were made first of all by the Prime Minister in another place and after that by my noble friend who leads this House so well. Reports of those speeches are extraordinary documents to read. The immense distances of time which they cover, and the changing events which they review, are I think, unprecedented in any period through which we have passed. It has been shown how we have swung over from a desperate situation into the beginning of a continuous building-up of success after success. I often wonder whether the people of this country realize what it means in effort, in Staff work, in building-

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up of material, in bringing things from far-distant shores to the theatre of war, before a successful operation can be carried out. I think that we in this country, especially the people who have some knowledge of military matters—and I may here say that I am sure the noble Admiral who has just spoken has well voiced the point of view of the Navy—must stand amazed when we consider the marvellous standard of co-operation and co-ordination which has to be achieved, and which has been achieved, between the Army, the Navy and the Royal Air Force before such an operation can be carried out as a landing on these rocky beaches in Italy. It is an accomplishment which is almost beyond our conception. We owe the officers and others concerned in this tremendous effort a great debt of gratitude for the wonderful success of these operations.
A point which strikes me is that anyone who knows these Italian shores must realize what a desperate undertaking it is to land on such beaches as those of Salerno, with a hinterland rising so rapidly and affording such splendid concealment both for mortars and howitzers. The fight on the Salerno beaches was a most amazing operation. The way in which our men stuck it out and held on after once getting a grip is beyond all praise. As for the incomparable Eighth Army, which will always live in our memories, I can only say of those who belong to it that they are perfectly wonderful. I only hope that the Government will see to it that after all these battles and campaigns in which they have been used, it will not be long before a good many of the old soldiers at any rate will be able to get some well-earned leave. I hope indeed that it may be possible for them to get some this winter.
There is another point which I think is overlooked; I have not seen any notice of it in the way of thanks. I refer to the fact that the bulk of the troops brought from the United States and from Canada were carried in ships of the British Mercantile Marine. The hardships and trials which the merchant seamen who man the ships had to undergo in bringing these men to the Mediterranean—in some cases bringing them first to this country—must not be forgotten, and we owe them a great debt of gratitude for their wonderful work. It was a marvellous performance to bring these men so many miles in
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safety. The third point to which I would refer is the lesson which has been brought home to us that we are confined in these operations to the distance at which air cover can be provided. That is a lesson which has been learnt during this war. In the landings at Salerno, where we were stretched to the uttermost to give that cover, the performance of the Air Force was wonderful, and the way which it protected our men after they had got ashore and could not quite reach the upper heights was beyond praise.
Another point which strikes one in the review of the situation by the Prime Minister is why more use was not made of the collapse of Italy, or, as I should prefer to put it, why certain arrangements were not made in advance before the Germans had a chance to interfere. I think that our prisoners of war in Italy ought to have been the first thought in the minds of our negotiators, and that in the early stages of the negotiations with the Italians we should have insisted on our prisoners of war being moved out of the range of harm from the German troops. I cannot think why that was not done. I believe a great many of our men who were held prisoner in Italy are now roving about the country, and I hope that large numbers of them will be able to get through to our lines; but I think that something might have been done to safeguard them against being dragged off to Germany.
I wonder whether we are thoroughly prepared to meet the eventuality of a sudden collapse of Germany. In the last war, Germany collapsed very suddenly. I wonder whether we should be in a position to take advantage of that if it occurred now. It is quite within the range of possibility that the Germans might say that with all this pressure from Russia and from the direction of Italy, and with the further pressure which may develop at some time from another direction, they could not go on. They might say: "Italy has left us. What have we to fight for? Are we going to fight for Hitler, to save his skin? What outlook have we? We have no chances of winning the war." Do not you think that it might enter the minds of the German people that at least they could not be any worse off than they are at present by running up the white flag? That is quite possible. Therefore I wonder whether we are prepared to act and to take advantage of any sudden movement in that direction.

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All kinds of things are involved. It means not only occupation by British and American troops, but also the sending in of people with experience to deal with administration and to handle the reconstruction of industry. I wonder whether we have the necessary people trained and ready to go into Germany and do that work. I am convinced that for many years after we have overcome Germany we shall have to control directly a great many German industries and ports, as well as various Government offices, and we shall have to go on doing so for much longer than we thought of doing alter the last war. It seems to me that at least we ought to have people earmarked who would be ready to take up that very important function, if anything should happen.
The last point to which I want to draw attention is that obviously there is a good deal of concern to-day in the minds of the Japanese. I think that the Prime Minister brought that out very well. They are becoming very concerned about their position, and it may easily be that after, or even before, we have finally dealt with Germany, we may have to go ahead with the task of defeating and crushing those barbarous people. What we have done at Lae and other places has been wonderful. Before the final attack on Japan can be delivered, however, a great deal of work will have to be done. We as a people must look forward not only to finishing the war with Germany but to a continuation of the war until we have beaten the Japanese to their knees.
We must all admire the wonderful fortitude with which the Prime Minister has faced many dangers—not only physical dangers, but dangers to health—to make personal contacts with President Roosevelt and Mr. Mackenzie King. I hope that at some future time, not too long delayed, he will have the opportunity of including Marshal Stalin in one of his conferences. I was disturbed at what the Foreign Secretary said in another place yesterday. There have evidently been misunderstandings with the Russians. If the Leader of the House, when he replies, could elucidate the position and explain what those misunderstandings are, I think it would ease the minds of many of us. I hope that whatever misunderstandings do exist will be removed as speedily as possible, because it is only in complete trust one with
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another that the Allies can win this dreadful war.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, this debate on the war situation has enabled comments to be made on certain aspects of the Italian operations which have not, perhaps, gone quite so well as they might have done, and I think that many of the criticisms which have been made have been well-founded. It seems to me, however, that one has to take a very broad view of events during war. One must take them rather by and large. Things which are very well planned and which deserve complete success often turn out badly owing to bad luck, and very often good results are achieved very fortunately indeed, and not as a result of any great planning or foresight. It seems to me that what we have to do is to judge by the results; and the results to-day are certainly good. I feel, therefore, that the opportunity can be taken of this debate on the war situation to pass what is known as a hearty vote of thanks to the management. I would certainly hold up my hand in support of that. I personally feel very grateful to many members of the Government who have brought us through great dangers, who have raised enormous armed forces and equipped them, and who have brought our affairs to the favourable situation in which they are to-day.
Reference has been made to the Prime Minister's speech on Tuesday last. I think that the passage in which he said that it is generally felt that our plans are well made, and that those at the centre of the direction of the war have appointed competent men to carry them out, was very well justified by the results which we see to-day. In referring to that speech of the Prime Minister, I would say that it is a fortunate instance of Lend-Lease in reverse that we are from time to time, thanks to the Prime Minister's shuttle service across the Atlantic, enabled to see the war through American and Canadian eyes, while those on the other side of the Atlantic are enabled to see the war through our eyes.
There was a passage in his speech which particularly aroused my attention, because before your Lordships rose for the Recess I made a short speech in which I ventured to say that I thought the Allies were not so well in step politically as they were militarily. And indeed, if I may, I would like to support what my noble

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friend Lord Addison said to-day on that particular score. I felt that in the speech of the Prime Minister there were signs that the international political aspect of the war is now fully engaging his attention, and that in particular the setting up of the Mediterranean Committee is a solid augury for the future in that respect. I would only say in regard to the future in these matters that I was much struck by what my noble friend Lord Hankey said to-day on the subject. I think indeed that the watchword for the future is, as the noble Lord said, that whatever countries we may penetrate, we should go as liberators. The American Liberator aircraft will pave the way, but after they have done that let us also go as liberators into these countries.
In regard to what has been said about the Italian operations and loss of time, I think there has been loss of time on one or two occasions. But of course combined operations are bound, I think, to involve loss of time. We had to proceed by means of combined operations first in North Africa, then into Sicily, then into Italy; and combined operations in the very nature of things are bound to take up a great deal of time in the plans. At the same time I would not disagree for a moment with what my noble friend Lord Strabolgi said this afternoon, that there are occasions when you may take advantage of the tide and a great deal of that planning can be dispensed with. But in the nature of things combined operations, of which we are bound to hear much in the future of the war, must absorb time, and sometimes must involve a certain loss of time. In regard to those operations, there is one matter that my noble friend Lord Keyes suggested to me that I should mention and I do with very great pleasure. That is that we might to-day think for one moment of the admirable gunnery of the Mediterranean Fleet —the remarkable bombardments which were carried out by the Fleet, the remarkable precision of the shooting—bombardments which undoubtedly played a very great part indeed in restoring and improving the situation at Salerno.
Reference has been made to the rescue of Mussolini by the Führer. I agree with the noble Viscount that perhaps too much has been made of that episode. It seems to me that while the Führer has got the shadow of the Duce, we still have the
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substance of the campaign. And really if we were to add it up, we have got Sicily, we have got a very large part of Italy, we have got Sardinia and we have got the Italian Fleet. I suggest that if we were to say to Hitler, "Would you swap those for Mussolini?" we should have Mussolini the same day. And while the Duce may be very grateful to the Führer for rescuing him, perhaps the thought will penetrate his mind that the Führer will be slow about releasing him, and there may be difficulties ahead for him in that respect. Indeed I can feel a certain amount of sympathy with Mussolini. A man who, during his confinement, is condemned to read the works of Nietzsche can excite a certain sympathy in our minds. Nietzsche, to the best of my information, died in a lunatic asylum, and it seems to me very suitable that one maniac should send to another the works of a third for his recreation during his imprisonment.
But there is another and more serious matter to which I should like to make reference, and that is in regard to the Italian Fleet. Certain points about the surrender of the Italian Fleet rather attracted my attention. I see some reference was made in another place to the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Fleet upon arriving at Malta to surrender it inspected a naval guard of honour. Well, I would not make too much of that. I rather like the Nelson tradition in such cases. I think it was after the Battle of the Nile that Nelson, speaking of those whom he had captured, said: "When they became my prisoners they became my guests." I think matters of that sort may very safely be left in the hands of Sir Andrew Cunningham who, if I may remind your Lordships, after Dunkirk, showed himself extraordinarily well able to handle the situation in regard to the French at his end of the Mediterranean at Alexandria, when he made an agreement with Admiral Godefroy of the French Fleet there, which to the best of my knowledge was honoured right up to the time when the French ships came over to us the other day. I regret that he did not have the handling of things at the other end of the Mediterranean, at Oran. If he had done so, we might have been spared events at Oran, about which I would say that the folly of their inception was only equalled by the ineptitude of their execution.

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But in regard to this surrender of the Italian Fleet I think at some suitable time in the near future it would be valuable and of interest to have a statement as to what exactly is involved. The German Fleet at the end of the last war did not surrender but was interned. It came across the North Sea to Rosyth and was interned—not surrendered. Lord Wemyss —he was then Admiral Wemyss, and was First Sea Lord—was very anxious that it should be surrendered, but he was overborne by the Government and the German Fleet was interned. But when that Fleet came into Rosyth Admiral Beatty made a signal: "The German colours will be hauled down at sunset and will not be rehoisted." The Italian Fleet has come to Malta after Italy has done its best to wipe Malta off the map and it has surrendered, but, according to the Press reports, the ships of the Italian Fleet are still wearing their colours in Malta harbour, the ships have not been immobilized, oil fuel has not been pumped out, and essential parts of the mechanism of the guns have not been removed. This seems to me somewhat remarkable. I am sure there are good reasons for it. I am not speaking in a spirit of criticism, but I think the whole of the conditions under which the Italian Fleet is lying at Malta at the present moment are really rather remarkable. I hope that at some early date it may be possible to elucidate the position. Many interesting points arise. For instance, who is paying the officers and men of the Italian Fleet at the present time, or who is going to pay them in future? I hope very much that my noble friend may be able to indicate that it will be possible in the near future to make some statement in regard to the position of the Italian Fleet.
One other matter regarding the war at sea to which I wish to refer is the U-boat campaign which is going so successfully at the present time. I have been one of those mentioned by ray noble friend Lord Hankey who have been critical in this respect in the past. Nobody rejoices more sincerely than I do that events are now going so well, and nobody would wish to congratulate more warmly all concerned on the happy turn which events have taken; but equally I have no word of criticism to retract in this matter. The criticisms were thoroughly well justified, and I have always felt that a particular
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debt of gratitude is due to the Press for the part it took in the U-boat warfare when it showed itself a real bastion of our system of political government. If I had any doubts in my mind as to whether I should apologize for any criticisms I may have uttered on this subject, they were removed when I listened to Mr. Bevin, a member of the War Cabinet, speaking at the Trade Union Congress at Southport recently. Mr. Bevin stated that it was in November last that the Government really made up their mind that something had got to be done about the U-boat, and decided to concentrate their efforts on it. I am sure that these are the words—I was sitting on the platform— which I heard Mr. Bevin use. If it were only last November that the Government really decided that something must be done about the U-boat, then we can congratulate ourselves that it only took six months to get the more favourable results that began to come along in May. If there ever was justification for the criticisms, it was to be found in the remarks of Mr. Bevin.
There was something else which Mr. Bevin said on that occasion. I understood him to say that last November the Government decided to give certain priorities to the Admiralty in this matter, but I also understood him to say that the time was now coming when some of these priorities would be switched back again to aircraft production. We really are getting on rather dangerous ground here. I do urge most strongly that there should be no playing fast and loose with any of the priorities which the Admiralty enjoys at the present moment with regard to the U-boat campaign. I am certain that if we begin to play fast and loose with these priorities, it will not be long before we find ourselves confronted with some of the difficulties which we have had to face in the past. In particular, where the scientists are concerned, where apparatus, instruments, radiolocation, and so on are concerned, there must be no playing about with these priorities because in this matter it is a day-to-day affair. What was effective yesterday, the enemy have found an answer to to-day, and you must find something new to-morrow. I therefore urge most strongly that there should be no playing fast and loose with any Admiralty priorities in this matter. We still need all our vigilance and activity

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because, while the results are good—the results from the Atlantic are very good indeed—if we were only losing five ships a month, that would still be five ships too many. One of these ships might be carrying a cargo vital to the success of a certain operation.
All I wish to say in conclusion is this. There was another passage in the Prime Minister's speech to which I hope the whole country will pay the deepest attention as well as to the good news he gave us. The Prime Minister said that the bloodiest time yet lies ahead for America and ourselves. These words point a very serious moral for us at this moment. My noble friend Lord Keyes has referred to the matter of strikes. I hope my noble friend will not mind my saying to him that a Communist is not a Left-Wing Socialist. That is a confusion in terms; there is no connexion between the two. I see it stated in the Press that there is a certain slackening of the war effort in certain spheres of production owing to a belief that the war will soon be over. There is a certain amount of foolish talk about the war being soon over, but I do not believe that any slackening in the war effort is due entirely to that. What, perhaps, does cause a certain amount of unrest, perhaps occasional strikes, and may be at the bottom of some of these troubles, is a profound uncertainty on the part of our working men and women as to what shape it is intended this country shall take when the war is over. They will do everything they can to beat Fascism into the dust, but more and more the question is on their lips: "What sort of a country is this going to be afterwards?" There, I believe, is the cause of any slackening there may be.
Now when the war is going so much better, when the Prime Minister is reaping the fruits of his tremendous labours, when the situation is so much better militarily, surely one may venture to hope that the Prime Minister, with his incomparable prestige, will begin to devote his attention to that phase of our domestic affairs, and will use his great influence and powers to inspire the people, to make them believe that after this war the result of their labours will be something for which each one of them in the future will be personally thankful.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, on Tuesday I inflicted an extremely long speech on the House, and to-day we have already had a further full, interesting, and on the whole harmonious debate. I therefore, in winding-up, do not propose to speak to your Lordships for a very long time, but rather intend briefly to answer the points that have been made. Indeed, I do not think there has been a very great deal that I need answer. It seemed to me, as I listened, that the House as a whole shared the feeling of warm if sober satisfaction which was voiced by Lord Addison and the noble Marquess, Lord Crewe, in the speeches with which they opened the debate. There are, however, certain points of inquiry and some of mild criticism which I ought to answer, and I propose to devote myself to them immediately.
First, let me deal with the Italian situation, around which a great part of the debate has centred. The noble Lord, Lord Addison, generally speaking, had nothing but praise for the Italian situation. He said, as we all recognize, that things have gone much more quickly and better than we could possibly have expected a year ago. But he had a certain anxiety, as I understood him, lest the political preparations which the Allied Government were making for changes and developments in the situation were behind our military preparations. I do not really feel that these misgivings are justified. He will realize that the situation has been difficult and complex, but, as I say, I do not think his misgivings are justified. We are in fact looking forward the whole time. Lord Strabolgi, who spoke after him, seemed to think we should have done a great deal better if, instead of confining ourselves to dealings with the Badoglio Government, we had promoted a popular rising by appealing to the Italian people above the heads of their Government. That was the gist of his remarks, as I understood them.
LORD STRABOLGI: I think that might have been a good thing to do, but I did not suggest it to-day. What I wanted was the same appeal as was made to the Italian people on September 17 to have been ante-dated. The same appeal made by the President of the United States and our Prime Minister in almost the same words made at the time of the fall of Mussolini would have been admirable.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: That is exactly, I think, what I suggested—that we should have appealed to the Italian people to rise immediately in the early stages, before our offensive began.
LORD STRABOLGI: The important thing was to appeal to them to turn out the Germans.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to go on. I quite realize that was the important thing. All of us are entirely in favour of rallying the widest measure of resistance to the Germans. That is common ground. I honestly feel that we should have made a mistake had we neglected those means which we did use and just made a general appeal and pushed ahead—this was the main point the noble Lord made—with a sort of half-baked invasion before the date when we were really ready. That would not' have been of the slightest use. On the contrary, it would have been a disastrous course of action to take. In the first place, if we had sent forces before we were ready and before Marshal Badoglio was ready, we should not have got hold of the Italian Navy. It would not have fallen into our hands. The necessary preparations could not have been made.
Perhaps, while speaking about the Navy, I might say one word in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Winster. He asked what the position of the Italian Navy is now. I cannot give him full information; but I will say this. The Italian Fleet did not surrender; it moved to designated points under the terms of the Armistice. The future of the Italian Fleet is at present under consideration and much depends on the extent to which the Italian Navy co-operates against the enemy. I cannot go any further for the moment, but I think it may be of value to the House to know this. I repeat therefore that we should not have got control of the Navy and the Army would not have received orders to cease fighting againstus—and certainly not to co-operate with us. Also, I think we should not have got that result if we had sent the type of light expedition which the noble Lord indicated. The noble Lord spoke of an expedition not too heavily weighted down. If we had sent that sort of expedition it would have met with complete and absolute disaster, so far as our own troops are concerned. That would have only meant
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useless slaughter, and no one would have been angrier if that had happened than the noble Lord himself. We should not have had the protection of the necessary land-based aircraft for our troops: we would have been sending an inadequately prepared force to meet a fully armed German Army on the mainland. That is, in fact, exactly what the Germans wanted us to do, and the result would have been utterly disastrous to us. We should have been cut to bits and the Italians would never have trusted us again.
I think most of your Lordships know that the success of the Sicilian expedition depended upon very careful preparations—preparations that went on for weeks and months before the expedition took place. That is why it was so successful and that is why our losses were so small. The same thing applies exactly to a full dress attack on the Italian mainland. When it is necessary we are not averse from making an attack with light forces. We have moved such forces into Sardinia. We did not send forces with heavy impedimenta because it was not necessary. As a result, with very little loss, we have got control of a valuable territory. But because that was the right thing to do in Sardinia, it does not mean it is always the right thing to do. To try and tackle the enemy's main armies with inadequate forces would have been reckless and indefensible, and if the Government had done that they would rightly have been censured for agreeing to such a plan.
To return to what I was saying earlier with regard to Lord Strabolgi's remarks, he wanted, as I understood it and I think the House so understood it, to call upon the Italians to rise. He said that we gave the Germans time to prepare, and so on. If we had called upon the Italians to rise and if they had answered our call it is indeed conceivable that we might have produced a situation of absolute chaos in Italy. That is conceivable. But I cannot really believe that such a course would have helped the Italian people, who are suffering enough already. Moreover, the noble Lord's picture of the Italian people panting to fight the Germans was singularly unconvincing. I think the noble Lord will remember that before the fall of Mussolini when riots occurred in Milan and Turin, the cry was always for "Peace." It was not a cry of "Help the Allies" or "Down with the Germans," it was just "Peace,

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peace." That was what the Italian people wanted. They did not want to fight anyone, they were absolutely down and out. Therefore I cannot believe that this call of the noble Lord's would have had the effect he said. And if indeed the Italian people had risen at that juncture and we had been unable to assist them—and we should have been unable to assist them—then there would only have been a horrible and bloody massacre. A population rising unsupported by regular troops may have been all very well in the good old days but it is absolutely futile in these days against aeroplanes, machine guns and tanks. The Italian people would not have been fortunate if His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States had adopted the advice of Lord Strabolgi. If we were lucky enough to find a Government in Italy functioning, which was ready to treat with us on a basis of unconditional surrender, why should we not take full advantage of such a situation? Marshal Badoglio has himself already appealed to the Italians to resist the Germans. I really do not know what more the noble Lord and those who agree with him want than that.
Before I go on to reply to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, I should like just to say one word with regard to Lord Strabolgi's remarks about bombing Turin and Milan. I interrupted the noble Lord when he was speaking about that and I am afraid I spoke with considerable heat. But I did think it was the most base insinuation I have ever heard that we, a democratic country, should go and bomb Milan and Turin longer than we need, because there were only Italian workmen in those cities. I think that is a most disgusting suggestion and I hope the House will think the same. In fact, there really is no foundation for that suggestion at all. I can only repeat what was said by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary in another place the other day. The crucial dates are these. The first Italian envoy arrived in Madrid on August 15. We (that is the Government) first received a telegram about it on August 16. The envoy arrived in Lisbon on August 17, and our negotiations began on the 18th and 19th. The last occasion on which we bombed Milan was on the night of the I5th-16th and the last occasion
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that we bombed Turin was on the night of the 16th-17th. It will be seen, therefore, that from the day when the envoy arrived in Lisbon there was no more bombing of either of those two cities. I am very glad to make that clear. The noble Lord spoke of earlier feelers. It is true there were feelers, but they were feelers to which no Government could properly pay any attention. They were a few words spoken in neutral capitals by comparatively unimportant Italian diplomats and things of that kind. They did not carry any weight. But directly accredited envoys arrived, the bombing stopped. I think I have made that clear, and that I have scotched this, as I think it, most monstrous suggestion, once and for all.
LORD STRABOLGI: May I interrupt the noble Viscount? He is very courteous and I hope he will not mind. He speaks of just a few words here and there being said in neutral countries. He has overlooked what the Prime Minister himself said, printed in column 80 of Tuesday's OFFICIAL REPORT. He said:
"Presently feelers were put out … through various channels asking for terms, and explaining the deadly character of the difficulties in which they were involved."
Those are not a few words by unimportant diplomats; and that is what the Prime Minister himself said about these approaches.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I know all about these feelers. It is quite true they were put out informally in a neutral country by diplomats, but they were not official approaches on behalf of the Italian Government. I cannot put it more clearly than that. A feeler put out by such a person is not the same thing as an official approach.
I would like to address myself for a moment to a question asked by the noble Marquess, Lord Crewe. He asked what of the future of Italy? I paraphrase his words: Do the Allied Governments intend to deal with the Badoglio Government without prejudice to the future? That really is the position. The noble Marquess stated it quite correctly. It is the hope of His Majesty's Government that Marshal Badoglio will set up as soon as possible a Government including representatives of all sections of opinion, except Fascist opinion, and of course it is also their hope that ultimately, when circumstances permit, the Italian people should

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choose that Government which suits them when more normal times arrive. I hope that what I have said is an adequate answer to the noble Marquess.
Now I turn for a moment to the speech of my noble friend Lord Hankey. Anything that comes from the noble Lord of course will be listened to in this House with the greatest interest and considered with the greatest care. But I really do not find myself, if he will forgive my saying so, in entire agreement with him this afternoon. He objected to the term "unconditional surrender" and preferred the term "honourable capitulation." I had to deal with this difference of terms once before, in July, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Winster. I explained at that time that I thought there was really no difference in substance between the two. Capitulation and surrender, as the noble Lord will see if he looks up the words in the dictionary, mean exactly the same thing. They mean that we impose terms and the enemy accept them. That is what both words mean.
LORD HANKEY: May I be allowed to interrupt to say that I think there is a very great difference in the psychological effect that the words may have on different nations. I think the effect on Germans, a hard, tough people, would be very different from the effect on the Italians, who, as I explained, are extremely sensitive people.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: The question whether the terms imposed are dishonourable or not depends upon the terms themselves. It was never the intention of the Allies to impose intolerable terms upon the people of Italy and they have not in fact done so. The fact that, as the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, himself said, General Eisenhower used the words "honourable capitulation" shows I think that in his view the words mean the same thing. There is no doubt that Marshal Badoglio himself realizes this because at present he is doing all he can to assist the Allies to drive out the Germans. The purpose of asking for unconditional surrender or for honourable capitulation, whichever term is preferred, was of course to ensure that all facilities should be made available to the Allies to defeat Germany. "Unconditional surrender" was the phrase used, as the noble Lord knows, at Casablanca.
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That is where the phrase was first brought before the public, and to have altered it would, I think, only have led very naturally to unfounded suspicions. I repeat that the phrase "unconditional surrender "does not mean "dishonourable capitulation." The two phrases "unconditional surrender" and "honourable capitulation" may very likely and do often mean exactly the same thing.
There was another point raised by the noble Lord as to whether negotiations were best conducted in the early stages at Lisbon or whether it would not have been better to have handed them over entirely to General Eisenhower. I cannot see how the matter could have been left entirely to General Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief, because the question whether Marshal Bagdolio was to be allowed to negotiate an Armistice to take Italy out of the war was essentially a political decision and the Governments concerned must take responsibility for it. The noble Lord suggested, or at any rate I understood him to suggest, that we ought to have accepted Italy immediately as an Ally, that that would have saved time and that it would have been also better because it would not have hurt Italian feelings. I do not believe that it would have been possible for the Allies to have gone further than they did. After all, the Italians had been fighting for three years against us. It is easy for the noble Lord to say that they were ready to swing over immediately and to fight on the other side, but it is by no means certain that at that time the Italians were ready to do that, nor is it certain that Marshal Bagdolio, even if that was his intention, was in a position to deliver the goods.
All that we knew was that these envoys had arrived from Italy. These envoys were told first that if the Italian people and the Italian troops fought the Germans they would receive every assistance from the Allies, and the second thing they were told was that the terms might be modified in accordance with the help which the Italians gave. Therefore it was perfectly clear to them that if they were willing to turn from the Germans and assist in the expulsion of the Germans from their country, that would be taken into consideration by the Allies. I do not believe it would have been possi-

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ble for the Allied Governments at that moment to go further. If we had done what the noble Lord suggested, public opinion in this country and in the United States would have been utterly bewildered. I do not believe that the man in the street would in the least have understood it.
Moreover, there is another point regarding this aspect of the matter. Time was the essence of the matter, as I think several noble Lords have already pointed out. There was always the danger of a leak. Indeed, some noble Lords seemed to think that a leak did take place. It was necessary that the terms should be transmitted to Italy as quickly as possible and the easiest way was to tell the envoy to take them back immediately to Rome. The further stages of the negotiation were, in fact, entrusted to General Eisenhower. I do not believe that any time was lost by the method adopted. Indeed, quite the opposite. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, said that the Allies ought to come as liberators, not in the aerial sense but in the terrene sense. In fact, I think we have been received as such. Everybody has seen photographs of the Italians pelting our soldiers with fruit and flowers. I did not get the sinister impression which Lord Hankey seems to have got. The Italians seem to have been delighted to see us.
LORD HANKEY: I do not think I suggested anything sinister. I merely suggested that it might have been better, especially for the future, when you get out of those territories which have always welcomed every liberator.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I think the whole of Italy has always welcomed every liberator, for a long period of centuries. In passing, I may say that I was very grateful to Lord Hankey for what he said about the general conduct of the war and the U-boat campaign. The noble Lord was formerly one of the most formidable critics of the Government, because he spoke from enormous knowledge and long experience. It is extremely satisfactory to know that he is now more happy about the machinery and the conduct of operations. The Government appreciate the generous tributes he has paid this afternoon. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, raised a question about the U-boat campaign. I hope he will forgive me if I do
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not answer that this afternoon. It seems rather wide of the scope of this debate, but I can assure him that I will consider very carefully what he has said.
Now I should like to say a word or two about the question of prisoners which was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Hutchison. I am sorry he is not in the House at the moment, but I feel sure he would wish me to answer the point. The noble Lord is under a misapprehension. He seemed to think that the Government have not paid enough attention in negotiating an Armistice to the question of the release of prisoners. In fact, as I think I explained to your Lordships on Tuesday, this is a matter to which the Government have devoted the utmost concern. Stipulations regarding these prisoners, as your Lordships know, were included in the original terms of Armistice. But evidently there was one serious difficulty in that the Italian Government, themselves, could not take very extensive steps to release our prisoners without letting the cat out of the bag to the Germans, and that would have been a disastrous thing from our point of view. It was inevitable, I am afraid, that many of these prisoners could not be released until it was too late for them to escape. As I explained the other day we have not very full information as to their present whereabouts, but His Majesty's Government are doing, and will do, everything in their power to assist them.
I would like now to say one word— I think it can be very brief—about Amgot. I rather expected a large number of questions about Amgot, which seems to be a subject of great public interest. I believe, however, that the only person who has referred to it in this debate has been Lord Addison, and he did so rather indirectly. I really am not able to understand why there is this agitation about Amgot. I do not think that the noble Lord really shares in the agitation, but it is undoubtedly prevalent in some quarters. Quite simply, the object of this organization is that when the Allies take over enemy territory the unhappy inhabitants should be made as free and as happy as possible, that they should be provided with food and the necessities of life, with transport, with medical supplies, and with all those things that, obviously, they require. So far as I know—judging by what can be learnt from official sources

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and from two extremely interesting articles which have appeared in The Times—that object is being attained. The Fascist administration has been superseded, and the Italian people are as well and as happy as is possible in the back areas of a war. I do not think, therefore, that this agitation, which comes, so far as I can see, entirely from outside the occupied countries, has any very deep foundation or any great substance. I believe that as further reports come in it will gradually die away. At any rate, the Government have found no reason to fear this agitation because it appears to them not to be founded upon fact.
Now I would like to pass to the position in the Aegean, to which reference has been made by Lord Strabolgi and by Lord Addison. The position is this. We are at present in possession of the islands of Samos, Cos, Leros, Stamphalia and Castelrosso. We are not in possession of Crete and Rhodes. It was suggested, by Lord Strabolgi, and I think also by Lord Addison, that if we had moved to Rhodes earlier we might have captured it. I think that that suggestion arises from a mistaken impression—which has been shared, I gather, by some organs of the Press—that at Rhodes there was no German garrison before September 8. Lord Strabolgi mentioned September 3 to September 8 as the critical days. It was not, in fact, the case that there was no German garrison there. There was a garrison of seven thousand Germans in Rhodes long before these events occurred at all. After the Armistice, these Germans were confronted by an Italian garrison which was four times as large. We were in touch with these Italians, and they had shown to us every intention of dealing with the Germans, as, of course, they were perfectly strong enough to do if they showed determination. But when the time came, unfortunately, the Italian commander threw in his hand, and the troops surrendered. Certainly, it was a misfortune of war. But I really do not see how we could have anticipated that with that preponderance of four to one in strength the Italians would not have been able to deal with the situation as they had very definitely indicated that they would do.
The position in Crete is rather different. There are 30,000 Germans—a very large force—and to achieve anything it would have been necessary to mount a very large expedition, not one of those light
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forces which Lord Strabolgi throws about so casually but a really big and fully armed expedition. It would have been out of the question for us to do this when the whole of our amphibious and air resources were concentrated on the main battle in the Mediterranean, If we had begun diverting large quantities of our resources to these minor enterprises we might very easily have lost the battle of Salerno.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, may I ask if the noble Viscount is replying to me?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: No, I was replying to Lord Strabolgi.
LORD ADDISON: I understand. I, of course, referred only to Rhodes.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I think Lord Strabolgi referred both to Rhodes and to Crete. Obviously it was a case of first things first. It would have been as foolish to divert shipping to Crete as it would have been to divert shipping to Sardinia, which, in fact, has already fallen into our hands without cur having to go to any great lengths to obtain it. I hope that, in due course, the same thing will happen in other parts of the Mediterranean. The House will no doubt understand how it is that I cannot say anything more about the Aegean to-day. I have gone as far as I possibly can to give information on a matter which is quite evidently of an operational nature, and I hope that noble Lords will not press me any further upon it to-day.
There is one other question, which I think has been touched on this afternoon but only very briefly. That is the question of Russia and a Second Front. When I mentioned this subject on Tuesday I felt a little bit like a man lighting the fuse of a time bomb which was due to explode in two days time. I have felt during the last two days that I have been waiting for the explosion, but, in fact, it has not occurred. Indeed, it seemed to me, listening to-day to the debate on this question, that there is really not very much, if anything, between other members of the House and the Government. We both want the same things in regard to Russia. We both want to help her as much as is practically possible, and we all of us realize the difficulties and the complexities which are involved.

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The timing and the form of the operations, and their co-ordination with other operations—all those things are ultimately, as I think Lord Addison himself emphasized, matters for the Chiefs of Staff, the expert advisers of the Government, and they can be depended on to advise action whenever the opportunity is favourable. I cannot help feeling glad, when I look at the position to-day, that His Majesty's Government did not take the advice which was so freely proffered to them last year, however well meant it may have been, to start a Second Front' in France at that time. I believe that if we had done so the unbroken series of successes which we are now celebrating would have been impossible; and, what is more important for the future of the war, I do not believe that we should have diverted so large a number of German troops from the Russian Front as we are able to do by the present Italian campaign.
I have come to the end of the remarks which I wish to make to your Lordships. In conclusion, I should like to say this to critics of the Government, both inside and outside Parliament, and particularly, if he will forgive me for saying so, to the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, who, I feel, is the only noble Lord this afternoon who has been guilty of the error to which I propose to draw attention. No Government should resent constructive criticism. It is obviously the right of Parliament to make inquiries, and it is obviously their duty to spur Ministers on to further efforts. That is one of the functions of Parliament. But what I do deprecate is any suggestion that this country is not playing the full part which it ought to play in the war. When we look back on the last four years, I think we may well feel that for both the people of these islands and those of the Commonwealth and Empire as a whole this has been one of the great periods of our history.
It is one of our national characteristics to belittle our achievements. But do not let us understate our record in this war or do anything which is calculated to diminish any influence which we can exert for good in the world. I believe that the name of the British Empire stands very high to-day. Some people like us and some dislike us, but they all respect us. The deeds of our sailors and our airmen, and of the men of the Eighth and other Armies, have won an imperishable name
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all over the world. It is really no reflection on the other great nations of the world to say that we like ourselves best. Our long tradition of ordered liberty seems to all of us better than any other. It is for that that we have fought, and it is for that that we shall fight to the end. As a nation, I think we are old and wise with the wisdom of experience, yet always susceptible to change and improvement; and it is that which has enabled us, under the unparalleled stress of this great war, to evolve a system which combines a wide measure of public control with the maintenance of that free speech and individual liberty which is, I believe, the envy of the world.
Our example, I believe, will be of inestimable benefit to many other nations in the difficult days after the war. We may not notice it ourselves, but I have had it mentioned to me by foreigners staying in this country; it is what strikes them most forcibly when they come here. Many great countries have fallen by the way in these last four years because they have lost their pride in their institutions and with it their unity. I hope that none of us here will ever fall into that error. Nearly a hundred years ago a very famous American, Emerson, wrote of this country:
"So I feel in regard to this aged England. I see her not dispirited, not weak, but well remembering that she has seen dark days before; indeed, with a kind of instinct that she sees a little better on a cloudy day, and that in storm of battle and calamity she has a secret vigour and a pulse like a cannon."
That is the spirit which we have always shown in the great periods of our history, and it is the spirit which we are showing now. Let those of us whose lot it is to counsel the nation do nothing to weaken that spirit, for on it will depend, in the unknown and uncharted future, our greatness and, indeed, our very existence.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I have only to say how much I admire and how glad I was to hear the concluding portion of the noble Viscount's speech, in which he praised the spirit of the British people. I remember the story of a dispute which ended by one of those taking part saying to the other: "I do not agree with anything you say, but I would fight to the death for your right to say it." That is the embodiment of the British spirit. As for the only point to which the noble Viscount did not reply, with regard to

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operations in the island of Rhodes, I shall not ask any more questions. When I made my comments I said that I should be quite content if he felt that it was not desirable to reply and, having said that, I have nothing to add with regard to that event. We have had, I think, a discussion worthy of this House, and I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

ADJOURNMENT: STATEMENT BY LORD STRABOLGI.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn.
Moved, That the House do now adjourn.—(Viscount Cranborne.)
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, on the Motion for the Adjournment I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I take the opportunity for a moment only of making one comment about the question which we have been discussing of the island of Rhodes. I am not saying this in any critical sense, and, like my noble friend Lord Addison, I am very grateful for the very full account which we have been given—I am sure the fullest possible—of the operations in this vital area. The account which I have here, however, is that the fighting went on for a long time before the Italians were overcome, and that what finally decided it was that the Governor, who seems to have been a one hundred per cent. Fascist, was won over
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by the Germans, who told him that Mussolini had been released and that the Fascist Government had been restored in Italy.
The point that I was trying to make—I have consulted my noble friend Lord Addison about this, and I think that he agrees with me—is this: What counts is not the size of the force which is sent on an occasion of this kind. A hundred British Marines under the White Ensign on the spot would have stiffened the morale of the 20,000 Italian troops—four times as numerous as the Germans—and shown that we were ready to help them. If we could have sent a few fighter aeroplanes to keep off the Stuka dive bombers, so much the better. That is what I meant by the use of a light force and its value when everything is in the balance and nobody knows quite what master to obey. I do not want to risk the lives of British soldiers, but I do want to make that point clear. Like my noble friend, I am most grateful for the very interesting explanation which we have had.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said, and I am also grateful to him for giving notice that he intended to raise this point. I did make most careful inquiries and obtained the fullest and most accurate information available at the time. I cannot add to it now, but no doubt with the progress of events we shall know more.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned.