Lords Sitting of 21 September 1943

Preamble
Reassembling after the Summer Recess, the House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Lord St. Just—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

ENEMY ASSETS IN ITALY.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, may I ask His Majesty's Government whether they have any statement to make regarding the transfer to neutral ownership of enemy assets in Italy?
THE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC WARFARE (THE EARL OF SELBORNE): My Lords, it has come to the notice of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America that certain concerns in neutral countries are, in anticipation of the early occupation of Italy by Allied Forces, contemplating acquiring, or purporting to acquire, enemy-owned shares in Italian companies and other enemy assets in Italy. The two Governments reserve the right to treat as invalid any transfer to neutral ownership of any enemy-owned rights or interests in property in Italy. Nationals or firms in neutral countries, acquiring or purporting to acquire such rights or interests, lay themselves open to all sanctions at the
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disposal of His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom and of the Government of the United States.

THE POSITION IN ROME.
VISCOUNT FITZALAN OF DERWENT: My Lords, I beg to ask leave to put the following question of which I have given private notice—namely, whether the Government can make any statement as to the occupation of Rome by the Germans, and what is the position in the city of Rome and the Vatican State.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE) (Lord Cecil): My Lords, perhaps the noble Viscount will allow me to reply to his question in the course of my forthcoming statement on the war situation.

WAR SITUATION.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, may I ask His Majesty's Government whether they have any statement to make on the war situation?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, nearly two months have passed since the House rose for the Summer Recess. They have been two months packed with stirring events, and it has seemed to the Government, and no doubt to noble Lords, clearly desirable that there should be given to Parliament at the earliest possible moment some account of the recent developments and, so far as possible, some assessment of the conclusions to be drawn

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from them. I once had the temerity, almost the impertinence, to suggest to your Lordships that any great conflict of this kind, once it has ceased to be a Blitzkrieg, once the first flood of aggression has been checked, becomes in the nature of a tug-of-war. It develops into a long drawn-out struggle, with both sides straining every nerve to attain an advantage. For a long time there is no decisive gain to either, and then suddenly one side begins to give. At first it is a matter of inches; the change in the situation is hardly visible; and then the advantage of one party over the other becomes more definitely apparent till, finally, it is clearly only a matter of time before that party wins.
The actual moment when the conflict passes from the first stage to the second and on to the final stage is, of course, seldom easy or even possible to assess at the time. It is only in retrospect that we can say that this or that event marked a crucial moment in the struggle and that then was victory decided. It is probable, if I may be allowed an historical reference, that the exhausted Greek troops on the field of Marathon did not realize, at the end of the day, that they had won one of the decisive battles of the world. It is probable that the British sailors on the morrow of the Armada had no certainty when, if I may use Lord Burleigh's own words, the great Navy of Spain, "with great wrack, passed homeward about Scotland and Ireland, "that the Spanish efforts to destroy England had been finally defeated. They knew that they had won one round in a long struggle and that is all they knew at the time. It was only later that they recognized the extent of the victory which had been gained and that the course of history had been changed. It is very much the same in the present war. Already we can see when the German Blitzkrieg was checked and the war of attrition began. The vital importance of the Battle of Britain and of the entry of Russia into the war are already recognized. They have become historical events. But the moment of transition from the second to the third stage is still a matter of conjecture.
Have we passed yet from the second to the final stage of this great struggle? Have the fortunes of war finally swung in our favour? I think it would be unwise to dogmatize. We have had in recent
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months many successes, one might almost say an unbroken series of successes, but it may be that yet severer trials and difficulties lie before us. At the same time, I think there is real reason to hope that we are at last entering, or at least approaching, the last phase of this war. The tide of enemy aggression is beginning to recede. Everywhere there are signs of this, in the south—in the Mediterranean —in the east—in Russia—in the Far East, on the sea, and perhaps most of all in the new dimension of the air. That favourable change started with the victory of Alamein and the invasion of North Africa, and it has been continuing with increasing momentum ever since.
When I last made a statement on the war situation to your Lordships the invasion of Sicily was approaching completion, the Russian Armies were approaching Orel and our Air Forces were bombing Essen and the Ruhr. Since then, in the European campaign, the Allies have advanced on every front. Italy has been invaded. Further remarkable progress has been made by the Russian Armies. The rubbing out (if I may use an expression which I believe was invented by Herr Hitler) of the City of Hamburg has been largely completed and the intensive bombing of Berlin has begun. In addition, there have been two most important events. There has been the Quebec meeting and the capitulation of Italy. The Italian situation, my Lords, indeed represents a really remarkable change in the position. What the Germans used to call the Fortress of Europe has at last been breached and one of the main bastions has surrendered, though savage and as yet undecided fighting is still going on in the ruins. The Germans used to talk in the years before the war of a wall of steel round Germany and said that it was strangling her. That was not true then. It was a mere travesty of the facts. It was an excuse to justify the expansionist policy of the Nazi Government. But it is becoming true now.
The latest news from the Italian front is certainly encouraging. Your Lordships will have read the epic story of the defence of the bridgehead at Salerno. I do not suppose there is any finer chapter in the whole history of this conflict than that of the British and American soldiers forcing a landing and hanging on under

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every conceivable disadvantage—bombed and blasted by an enemy dominating them from higher ground and yet containing the German forces until the Eighth Army had completed the occupation of Southern Italy and could race to their assistance. That race has been won. The Eighth and Fifth Armies have joined up. We are over the first Italian hurdle, thanks to the courage and endurance of those British and American troops to whom I feel sure your Lordships would wish me this afternoon to pay tribute.
And what of the future course of events? It would certainly be unwise for me to attempt to prophesy what will happen either in the next few weeks or even the next few months. It is even extremely difficult I think at the present stage to attempt to form a balanced view of recent events in Italy. At first, there was perhaps a tendency on the part of many people in this country to overrate the immediate possibilities arising from the Armistice and to assume that the whole of Italy would fall, like a ripe plum, into our lap. That was certainly not true. There is hard and bitter fighting ahead. The Germans know very well what the loss of Italy would mean to them. Not only would it mean the noose drawn closer round their necks, not only would the whole of Germany and Austria come within easy range of our bombing aircraft, but the Allied Forces would lie along the whole flank of the enemy-occupied Balkan countries, where already the Yugoslavs and Greeks are fighting heroically and with ever-increasing success. The position in the Balkans might well become untenable for the Axis and the blow to German prestige would be yet more disastrous. Clearly, Hitler and the German High Command are bound to fight for Italy with all the forces at their command.
There has been a suggestion in certain organs of the Press and in speeches in various quarters, that there was unnecessary delay in completing the arrangements for the Armistice and that that delay gave the Germans an opportunity to prepare for our invasion. I do not intend to deal in detail with this criticism this afternoon. There is, as your Lordships know, to be a debate at a later sitting which will give an opportunity for a full discussion. Indeed, after the
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Prime Minister's devastating reply in another place to-day, I would think that very likely no further answer would be' necessary. But I would say quite briefly that I do not believe such a view will bear examination. There was no avoidable delay in replying to Italian approaches for an Armistice. As soon as possible, they were given the reply—unconditional surrender. It should be remembered by your Lordships that unconditional surrender does not mean that there were no terms. It means that we imposed the terms, and that the enemy accepted them. In the present instance of the Italian Armistice there were in fact numerous terms. They have been published, and your Lordships no doubt have seen them.
But not only did the Italian Government have to accept those terms, they had to take steps to carry them out. They had to send out orders here and there, and if we had acted prematurely they could not have delivered the goods. For instance, under the terms we have gained control of the whole Italian Fleet. It is now in our hands, except for one or two ships which, as your Lordships know, were sunk on the way to Allied ports. These results would not have been possible unless adequate time had been given for the terms to be fulfilled. Nor did the necessary time for putting into effect the terms of the Armistice delay our operations. As the Prime Minister has explained to-day, a preparatory period was in any case necessary to complete our plans for the occupation of Italy. Indeed, as he indicated, so far from the operations being postponed to conform with the Armistice, in fact the Armistice had to be postponed to conform with the operations. I would suggest, my Lords, that these criticisms by certain sections of the Press only betray an utter misunderstanding of the complexity of modern war.
There is one matter in this connexion about which I feel sure your Lordships would like to hear something and that is the situation regarding our prisoners in Italy. From the moment of the fall of Mussolini His Majesty's Government impressed upon the Italian Government in no uncertain terms that the liberation of these prisoners and their return to Allied hands was an indispensable condition of any relationship between us and any Italian Government. There was full pro-

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vision for that in the communications which we made to the Italian Government. Unfortunately, many of these prisoners, especially in the centre and north of Italy, in parts of the country which were dominated by the German Armies, may have fallen into German hands. We have no precise information, in the present confusion, as to the exact position, but I can assure the House that His Majesty's Government have acted and will continue to act with the utmost resolution in this matter. We shall do all that is humanly possible to obtain the release of these prisoners. It is a matter to which we attach the utmost importance, as indeed I am quite certain does every one of your Lordships.
There is another incident also about which your Lordships will, I think, wish to be told. What happened about Mussolini? Why was he allowed to be rescued by the Germans? We have as yet no complete news of what occurred. It seems that the Badoglio Government put him in a place which they regarded as entirely safe. By some means or another—certainly not, I think, by means of the Badoglio Government, they are the last people who would wish to have him handed back—but by some means the Germans discovered his whereabouts and took successful steps to regain control of him. I understand his guard had received orders to shoot him, but they failed to do so. I do not pretend that I personally do not regard the escape of Mussolini as regrettable. I have heard some people say it does not matter at all. I do not personally share that view. At the same time I think it is unnecessary to attach too much importance to it. The rapidity and the completeness of the fall of the Fascist regime shows that it had completely lost hold over the overwhelming mass of Italian people, and if anything was needed to complete their disillusionment I should have thought that the pitiful cry of Mussolini himself, reported on the German wireless when the German troops arrived at his place of captivity—"I never doubted that the Führer would do everything to get me out of here "—would have done the trick. He did not say "My countrymen would do everything to get me out of here. "They had already repudiated him. It was the foreign tyrant. I should have thought that would have exposed him finally as the tool of the hated Germans.
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Where I think his rescue was unfortunate was that it gave the Germans a straw to clutch at just at the moment when they badly needed a straw. Their desperation is shown I think by the frantic use which their propaganda made of his escape. Probably the House will agree with me that the whole business was a pity. But I do not think we should take it too tragically and I believe it will soon be forgotten in the march of events.
Actually, if we try to strike a balance sheet, very, very solid gains have been obtained by this Italian Armistice. First of all, we have the Italian Fleet out of the way once and for all, and that has given us absolute naval control of the Mediterranean. Secondly, the Italian Army is denied to the Axis. It may be argued that the Italian Army was not a first-class fighting force, but at the same time it did represent upwards of 60 field divisions in Italy and overseas—in the Balkans and other places, the Greek Islands and so on—in addition to 30 coastal divisions. That creates a gap which the Germans will have to fill by some means or other. Thirdly, the Germans have been driven out of Sardinia and are reported to be gradually evacuating Corsica. Finally, and this I think is very important, the Germans are no longer fighting in an allied country. There is as yet not much accurate information of the situation in Central and Northern Italy, though there are rumours of strikes in Milan and Turin and clashes between Italian and German troops.
So far as Rome is concerned, about which the noble Viscount, Lord FitzAlan, asked me a question this afternoon, there is no doubt that there are German troops both in and around the city, though we do not know their exact disposition. Our latest information on good authority states that on September 18 the Osservatore Romano, the Vatican paper, published the following paragraph. I quote:
"According to reports published by the Italian Press a patrol of German soldiers has been on guard since September 13 in front of the Piazza San Pietro at the limits of the Vatican City."
I understand that other more fantastic rumours, which have come principally from Swiss sources, are not true. It appears, therefore, that German troops may not actually have violated the territory of the Vatican City though they are certainly in very close proximity to it.

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That is the full information we have at the moment and I give it to the House for what it is worth. His Majesty's Government have asked Mr. Macmillan, our Resident Minister in Algiers, for further information on the situation in Rome and no doubt it will come in due course.
At any rate, whatever is the exact position in Northern and Central Italy, it seems certain that the population of that portion of Italy which remains to the Germans is sullen and even hostile to them. I think it will probably get more hostile after the broadcast by Marshal Badoglio which was reported in the Press this morning. The occupation of Italy undoubtedly represents an addition to the commitments of the dwindling German forces. If they are retiring on the Russian Front, as they certainly are, it may add to their need to shorten their line in view of the growing threats from other parts of Europe. At any rate, we have every reason to welcome the conclusion of this Armistice. The task of the invasion of Italy would have been far more formidable without it.
To turn for one very brief moment to another part of the world; in the Far East, too, though events are not so spectacular as they have been in Italy, steady progress has been and is being made. As your Lordships will have seen, Salamaua and Lae, the two Japanese bases in New Guinea, have been captured and that, of course, increases the threat to the great Japanese base of Rabaul. In addition, the surrender of the Italian fleet and the freeing of the Mediterranean makes it possible, or rather will make it possible in the future, to strengthen the Allied naval concentration in the Pacific. This will, no doubt, add to the already serious headaches of the Japanese High Command.
News of the submarine war is also good; very good. The U-boat campaign, to which Hitler attached so much importance, has been, at any rate temporarily, scotched. In the first two weeks of September, as the Prime Minister said to-day, there was not a single Allied ship sunk by U-boat action in any part of the world. That, I think, is a record which was never equalled in any period of the last war. The last two months have indeed been among the best we have had, although there is still need for constant vigilance, and for courage and
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endurance on the part of the Navy and the Merchant Service—courage and endurance of which they have already given us such magnificent examples.
Finally, my Lords, there are the stirring developments on the Russian front. While the British Empire and the United States of America were delivering their blows in Southern Europe, the Russians have been advancing with giant strides on the Eastern Front. Their great offensive, which started with the capture of Orel and Bielgorod, has extended, as your Lordships know, over the whole front from Smolensk to the Sea of Azov. It used to be said by the Germans that the Russians could not conduct a summer offensive. The German High Command undoubtedly looked to the summer as an opportunity to regain ground which they had lost in the winter, and to extend further their gains. That illusion is finally shattered, and I think that the Germans can now expect no relief on the Russian front at any period of the year. One stronghold after another—Kharkov, Stalino, Taganrog, Mariupol, Bryansk, to name only a few—has been freed from the German yoke, and to-day the Russians are approaching Smolensk and Kiev, and threatening the Dnieper bend.
What is the cause of the increasing rapidity of the German retirement? I have suggested earlier in my remarks that it may be, partly, that the Germans are retiring voluntarily to a shorter line in view of threats in other parts of Europe. That would in itself be a confession of defeat; it would show their inability to maintain their gains in the face of growing Allied strength. But there if. no certainty that they retain even that measure of control of the situation. It is equally possible—and many military experts hold this view—that they have been beaten fair and square by the Russian Armies, and that their reserves are not adequate to protect all the danger spots even on the Russian front itself. How long it will be possible for the Russians to advance without a breathing space we do not know yet. In this war many prophecies have been falsified. What is certain is that it will be the aim of His Majesty's Government and of the United States Government to do| all in their power to lighten the burden that is falling on Russia, both with a view to helping a gallant Ally and with a view to bringing nearer the end of the war. The

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British Government, like the British people, are deeply sensible of the fact that Russia has borne the lion's share of the land fighting, and they must, obviously, consider it an obligation of honour to relieve, so far as lies in their power, the weight that lies upon her.
I know that that is the underlying motive for the renewed demand, made by wide sections of the public, for a Second Front. It is a chivalrous impulse which is shared by His Majesty's Government and by others. Clearly if the war is to be won, and won quickly, it is necessary, from every point of view, that we should equalize, so far as possible, the burden falling upon the various Allies. But in our desire to help more, it would, I think, be a mistake for us to under-estimate what we are already doing. That would be of no benefit to Russia or to ourselves. In the strictest sense of the phrase there is, of course, already a Second Front in Italy. This, as I explained earlier, has already eliminated 61 Italian field divisions, and it is bound to draw an ever-increasing number of German troops from other areas in Europe. That is in addition to the 513,000 German and Italian troops already destroyed or captured in North Africa, and not counting 165,000 German and Italian troops destroyed or captured in Sicily. I do not want to over-estimate the part that we have been playing, but surely that is a material contribution to the relief of Russia.
And then there is the bombing offensive against Germany. That is incomparably the heaviest attack that has ever been made from the air upon any nation in the history of the world. We should not under-estimate the contribution that this offensive is making to final victory. If German morale collapses it will be due as much as anything to our bombing; there is no doubt about that. Week after week, month after month, one after another, the great German centres of war production have been pounded into rubble. Let me give your Lordships, very briefly, one or two facts to indicate the extent of this offensive. At Hamburg, which is the greatest port in Germany, the devastation extends throughout the dock area and far out east and west on both sides of the Alster. Fires have spread uninterruptedly, and in large areas every building is left roofless and
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gutted. It is estimated that in this great port and industrial centre 77 per cent, of the houses are destroyed or damaged. Then take Düsseldorf, the leading commercial city of Western Germany. The central area of the town, which contains the chief business and administrative buildings, is two-thirds destroyed, and the damage spreads westward and eastward throughout the main industrial areas. Of Berlin we have not such detailed reports as yet, and the results of the last great raids—the really important raids—are not fully known, but it is already certain that the damage is very widespread, especially to important industrial plants.
These devastating attacks—because they are devastating attacks, in every sense of the word—will be continued and intensified in one industrial centre after another. It is already known that the output of submarines, locomotives and machine tools, to name only a few products, has been seriously delayed, and it is known, too, that the effect upon German morale has been equally great. There is reliable information both as to a state of despondency on the part of the population and as to increased criticism of Hitler and of the Nazi Party. Finally—and this is very important— there has been direct assistance to our Russian Allies by the diversion of large portions of the German Air Force to the Western Front to meet our attacks. To-day, 60 per cent, of the total first-line strength of the German Air Force, and a much larger proportion of fighters, are pinned down on the Western Front and in the Mediterranean; and this in spite of the violent campaign which is being waged on the Eastern Front. I cannot help feeling that that is some measure of the fear which is inspired in Germany by our bombing.
Finally—and this is a subject not so often mentioned—there is the contribution which is being made by the Allied Navies, not only in keeping the seas open for ourselves—that is the side which we hear most about—but even more in denying them to our enemies. Germany to-day is, as your Lordships know, short of many of the most essential materials of war—tin, rubber and so on—and if she is not able to import these from the Japanese-occupied territories, which are the great sources of production of these

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materials, that is because the Allied control of the seas renders it impossible. That is of definite and direct assistance to Russia as well as to ourselves.
Let us, then, do all in our power to help Russia as loyal Allies. But Russia will, I am sure, also recognize the help that is already being given. And do not let us conceal from ourselves or from others that there are limitations to what we can do at any one moment. We are a nation of 46,000,000. With the Dominions, we are a Commonwealth of about 80.000,000 of white people. We are maintaining a vast Air Force and a vast Navy. We have a ruthless and powerful enemy which Russia has not—Japan. We cannot, in the nature of things, concentrate our forces in quite the same way as she can. We and the Dominions are to-day mobilized as perhaps are no other nations in the world. But we must weigh carefully what contribution we can best make to the general war effort, when we can make it and where we can make it; and those are matters which must be finally decided by the Cabinet, on the advice of the Chiefs of Staff.
I think that we have no reason to complain of the advice which they have given us in the past; in the event it has turned out to be very wise. Last year, I remember, there was considerable criticism of the North African "adventure," as it was then called—now we call it the invasion. There was pressure for a Second Front in Western Europe. Would anyone now criticize the strategy of the North African campaign, which has completely transformed the war situation in our favour? If we had yielded to political pressure from uninformed quarters last year, what would our position have been to-day? Would it be anything like as good as it is? It is quite possible that we should have suffered a bloody reverse in Northern France. At any rate Italy would still be in the war; the Mediterranean would still be closed to us, or partially closed to us; North Africa would still be a potential base for new Axis threats to our communications round the Cape, and of direct attack upon Egypt. I think that our strategy has been amply justified by the events of the last month. We may surely trust our advisers, who have served us so well, to build up further plans for the future, and to decide when the invasion of Europe from the West shall take place. An invasion from the West, of course, is not
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ruled out. Far from it. It is merely a matter of timing.
And now, my Lords, I would say—and this is really the last point that I have to make—that what I have said does not mean that there should not be the closest possible co-ordination between the British Empire, the United States and Russia. Obviously that is to the interest of all, and we should seek by all possible means to promote it. It is not easy, in a war so vast and involving great Powers so distant from each other, to obtain personal consultation between those conducting the affairs of State of the three great Western Allies. Even the aeroplane has not entirely abolished space. But such meetings are desirable, and even necessary, from time to time. That was the reason for the Quebec Conference. Certain problems had arisen, notably regarding the conduct of the war in the Pacific and the recognition of the French Committee of Liberation, as well as other questions, on which personal consultation seemed to be desirable, and my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, with his usual energy, decided to go and clear them up. Statements with regard to the Pacific Command and the French Committee of Liberation have already appeared in the Press, and I do not think that I need elaborate them to your Lordships, except to say that I am quite certain that the recognition of the French Committee has been received with the warmest satisfaction in all parts of this country.
It has been suggested that it would have been more satisfactory if Marshal Stalin could have been at Quebec. I think that on this particular occasion it might have been rather an embarrassment to him, for the discussions, as your Lordships know, centred largely on plans for the prosecution of the war against Japan, with whom Russia is not at war; but in general His Majesty's Government would most warmly agree that the more often the heads of the Executives of these three great countries meet, and the closer the consultations between them, the better for all concerned and the better for the world. I do not pretend that such consultations are easy, or that they can take place very frequently. I understand that it is extremely difficult for Marshal Stalin and for the President of the United States to leave their countries; and, frankly, we do not want to see our own Prime Minister out of Britain more

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than is necessary. As the Prime Minister said to-day in another place, however, His Majesty's Government have a confident hope that a joint meeting between him, the President and Marshal Stalin will take place before the end of the year. Such a meeting would be of the utmost importance not only for the conduct of the war but for the planning of the post-war world. Certainly there is nothing that His Majesty's Government would welcome more wholeheartedly.
In the meantime, there is something which can be done. As your Lordships probably already know arrangements have been made for the calling of a Conference of the Foreign Secretaries of the three countries, or their representatives, and that Conference will take place at an early date. This country will be represented by Mr. Eden. In addition, Marshal Stalin recently proposed that an Inter-Allied Commission should be set up in the Mediterranean to deal with the Italian situation and with other similar problems. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government, I need hardly say, warmly welcome this proposal, and it will be put into effect as soon as possible. I would, in connexion with this Commission, quote some words spoken by the Prime Minister to-day, because they define its functions and the inevitable limitations of its functions:
"The Commission of course cannot supersede authority or diminish the responsibilities of Governments, but its members will be kept fully informed of all that passes and will have the power of individual or collective representation to their Governments."
France will also, I am glad to say, be represented on this Commission. The British representative will be Mr. Harold Macmillan, the Resident Minister at Algiers. Such are the practical steps which are being taken to promote closer co-ordination between the Allies, and I am quite certain that, both in this House and outside, they will be very warmly welcomed.
I have kept you, my Lords, an unconscionable time, but, as I have said, it is nearly two months since we met, and they have been months of tremendous import. At a later date we shall have an opportunity further to discuss these events. To-day I have merely tried to sketch in the broad picture. There are clearly no
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grounds for complacency—indeed there are never, in this world, grounds for complacency—but there are, I believe, grounds both for confidence and for pride. Certainly the war is not yet won. But in the giant tug-of-war between the forces of liberty and the forces of brutal tyranny, in which we have all been engaged these last four years, there is definite reason for thinking, as I said earlier, that the enemy's feet are beginning to slide. This is the crucial moment. Were we to slacken off now, we might well lose the fruits of all our labours. We must set our feet and tense our muscles. If we do, I firmly believe that it is not inconceivable—I do not put it higher than that —that in this, the fifth year of the war, Hitler and all he stands for may yet be swept away into the limbo of the past.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I am sure we all thank the noble Viscount for his statement, and I do not think there is anyone who would support his suggestion that it has been too long. In view of the magnitude of the world-wide operations with which he has had to deal it would have been almost impossible to make his remarks shorter. The noble Viscount consulted me as to procedure and expressed the view, in which I concurred, that in view of the length of the statement of the Prime Minister and of the fact that this House contains a very large number of exceedingly well-informed members, who would wish no doubt to consider a statement of this kind before speaking on it, it would be more convenient if we had a discussion at a later date. It was on those grounds that I concurred with the suggestion of the Leader of the House that there should be a special discussion on the subject later.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, in view of what has been said on both sides of the Table and of the forthcoming Motion, all I desire to do now is to congratulate the noble Viscount on having been able to make so full a statement— but by no means too full or too long— uniformly favourable in tone, with no tinge of complacency but with a high degree of confidence, and leaving us to look forward to a full discussion later on, which I am sure will be friendly in tone, and certainly not captious or too critical in manner or substance.
VISCOUNT FITZALAN OF DERWENT:My Lords, I should like to be allowed to thank my noble friend for the kind reply he has made to my question. At the same time, while I am not attaching any blame whatever to our Government—I do not know that any blame can be attached to them—the fact that the Germans got into Rome in the way they did was a very smart stroke of business on their part, and they fairly jockeyed us in so doing. However, I do not suppose they are very happy there, because the length of their communications is considerable and they may not be able to maintain their position. All the same, they have got the best of us, and we have to admit a certain amount of humiliation on account of it.

BRITISH CHILDREN IN CANADA AND THE U.S.A.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY rose to ask whether the attention of His Majesty's Government has been called to the position of British children who were evacuated to Canada and the United States in 1940 and who ever since have been entirely dependent upon the charity of their hosts in those countries; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, my object in bringing this Motion before your Lordships is to draw attention to a state of affairs which exists at the present time and which, as I shall venture to try to persuade your Lordships, should be ended at the earliest possible moment. In July last I received a letter from a friend of mine, who enclosed a copy of the Daily Sketch in which was an article by that well known and well informed writer "Candidus," headed "Forgotten Children," and the article alluded to those children who were evacuated to Canada and the United States of America in the summer of 1940. It was pointed out that after this long lapse of time those children are still living on the charity of the kind people who took them into their homes when things were looking somewhat black in this country.
It will be remembered that in June, 1940, the Government announced that they had accepted as their official policy a plan, prepared by a Departmental Committee, for the evacuation of children overseas, and that this plan had been endorsed
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by the War Cabinet. In making the announcement advantage was very properly taken of the opportunity of thanking, in the name of the people of this country, those kind persons overseas for the extremely generous offers for the reception and maintenance of British children which had been made by people in the Dominions and in the United States of America. Although accepted, the scheme was not put into immediate operation, for the situation at sea in June, 1940, was a very difficult one, and the Lord Privy Seal, when announcing a temporary postponement, said it was to allow time to enable the Government to provide naval escort to the ships which would be employed for the purpose. It was made perfectly clear at that time that, owing to the necessity of conserving our dollar resources to meet other essential demands, it was impossible to allow the sending of funds in any form for the maintenance of those children. Subsequently, after the scheme had been abandoned, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that in practically all cases before the children left this country their parents or guardians had signed an under-taking that they would not make an application to be allowed to remit overseas.
I have mentioned these facts to show that I know of them, and I can quite appreciate that the action taken was necessary at that time. I have not the slightest intention of attributing any bad faith in this case to the Government. What I am going to do is to ask whether, in view of the altered circumstances, that decision cannot be either abolished or at least eased to a considerable extent. The circumstances which prevail now are very different from what they were when the Government framed these regulations. In June, 1940, it was contemplated that many thousands of children would be evacuated overseas. In the House of Commons mention was made of a figure as high as a quarter of a million. The Government spokesman said he already had 100,000 vacancies, and no doubt he could get more. The scheme was put in operation at the end of July, 1940, and at the beginning of August it was officially stated that the parents and guardians of 19,365 children had already been notified that their applications were approved. The children to be sent, we were told, would be "a cross-section of the children

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of this country." Early in September, however, the scheme came to an abrupt end owing to the torpedoing of two ships with children on board and, as your Lordships will remember, in one case, the "City of Benares," several young lives were lost. In January, 1941, the scheme was finally abandoned, "owing to the danger to which passenger vessels were exposed making it obviously undesirable to resume the evacuation of children overseas." Subsequently it was announced that, under the Government scheme, 1532 children had gone to Canada, and 835 to the United States. Other children were sent privately and some were sent to other Dominions. If we take the number of 3,000, it certainly covers the total that went to North America.
Your Lordships will agree that these figures—3,000 instead of 100,000—represent a very different state of affairs from what the Government originally contemplated. At the end of 1941 this was recognized, and the regulations were to some extent eased up. The children, when they left these shores, were provided with the few pounds which it was then permitted to export with each child. Beyond that they had no money, and for the first eighteen months of their stay in America no money could be sent to them. At the end of 1941—that is, after eighteen months—parents were allowed to send £3 per child per month, and £10 worth of clothes were allowed to be sent per annum, but as the clothes had to be sent from this country, doubtless a certain proportion of the parcels failed to reach their destination. Three pounds a month is little enough to keep a child on in this country, and it does not go very far across the Atlantic. This justifies the statement that has been made that these children are still living on the charity of those kind people who received them at a time when things were very black over here, and when we were glad to get rid of them for their own sakes.
Your Lordships will recall that these children were referred to as "young ambassadors of Britain." This was done in the Press, on the platform, and in Parliament, but if they were young ambassadors I can only fear that we have to register another mission that has failed, for their position to-day certainly does no credit to this country. I am sure the
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children are playing their part as well as they can in the difficult circumstances in which they are placed, but they and their parents are in a most invidious position. However hospitable and good-natured their hosts may be, it must be irksome— particularly for those who are not well-off—to be called upon to arrange, and perhaps pay, for housing, feeding, schooling, dentists, and doctors for children who are not their own, and who are billeted upon them for an indefinite period. Every year a child becomes more expensive. There is a great difference between a boy of seven and one of ten, and in both Canada and the United States the conditions of living are becoming more difficult as the war proceeds. Here at home in this country many of the arrangements made between relations and friends whereby people went to stay with one another have gone by the board because circumstances have changed. People do like having their homes to themselves!
Surely it would be easy to arrange, under one or other of the financial schemes now in operation, for payment on an adequate scale to those who house these children. There are, at the outside, 3,000 of these boys and girls to be considered, and in many cases the parents are only too anxious to provide for their own children. This, I am informed, they are not even allowed to do in the few cases where the homes to which their children were sent have proved unsatisfactory. I submit that our young countrymen should not be allowed to continue in their present humiliating position, that those kind people who have befriended them should no longer suffer financially, and that the Government should arrange to pay a proper sum for each child, collecting the amount from those parents who are able to pay and making up the amount in cases where they are not. The alternative would be for the Government to facilitate the passage home of our discredited "ambassadors." Some children have been allowed to return, so why not all? It would, from the nature of things, have to be a gradual return, and would make little demand on shipping space. I hope that the noble Lord who will reply for the Government will be able to tell your Lordships that arrangements have been or are about to be made which will put an end to this unsatisfactory state of affairs. We owe a great debt of gratitude to those

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who, when our cities were being bombed, hastened to offer hospitality to our children. The least we can do is to repatriate these children as soon as we can, and if we cannot do that, at least provide an adequate allowance for their support. I beg to move for Papers.
LORD MARCHWOOD: My Lords, I should like to support the plea put forward by the noble and gallant Earl because recently, when in Canada, I met several of these unfortunate people who were in a very sad plight. I promised that I would put down a question when I returned to this country. It is for that reason that I have not withdrawn the question in my name on the Order Paper to-day, because at the time I sent it in I was unaware that this Motion was coming forward. I spoke to our High Commissioner, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, when in Ottawa, and pointed out the hardships that were being suffered by these unfortunate people. He was most sympathetic, and said that the Treasury in many instances had eased the lot of these people by relaxing the conditions. I sincerely hope the conditions will be relaxed still further, for many hard cases came to my personal knowledge. I know that relatives are keen and eager to help in the matter of finance if it is permitted. I feel quite sure that it is not the wish of the Government that they should be placed in this unfortunate eleemosynary position, where people have taken them and their children into their homes without realizing the cost or how long the war would last.
When I came into the House a letter was put into my hand which touches on this point and, if I may, I should like to read two paragraphs from it. The writer says:
"My wife is American-born, and she and our two children have now been in the States for three years. They are fortunate in that they have been able to live with my wife's parents or relations, but this has not made the financial situation any easier. My 'inlaws' are both elderly and by no means well-off, and consequently my family's living expenses and the education of the children have had to be paid for by a whip-round amongst all the members of the family circle. It is true that I am allowed to send £16 per month, but this does not go very far towards school fees even though, with traditional American kindness, these have been greatly reduced for us. It is a humiliating situation for both of us, but you are already fully aware of the position.
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There is, however, another aspect which fortunately does not apply in our own case although I submit that it is a serious one. I quote from a recent letter from my wife: — The question of the British children in this country is becoming a major problem. I hope the powers that be appreciate this fact. With all the tremendous problems connected with the running of the war this must seem trivial, but I do not think it is. I know of so many cases where the conditions in households that have taken British children are harrowing—tremendous increases in the cost of living, the impossibility of getting help of any kind, the food situation, certainly not as difficult as in England, but just one added thing. I am so afraid of our all outstaying our welcome. A lot of people do not want the children to go back, and wish to keep them for the duration. But I think the matter should be carefully considered, and in houses where the conditions are difficult, weeding out should take place. I know ships are scarce and every inch of space is needed for vital supplies but I think it would indeed be wise for one or two ships to be set aside and for many mothers and children to be sent home as quickly as possible. It would do a great deal towards maintaining a happy relationship that shows signs of becoming strained.'"…
It may not be wise to consider yet the wholesale return of the children, but I suggest that the older ones at least should be permitted to return. The Government could, I think, if they consider the situation generously, give much help. I sincerely hope it may be possible for many of these people to be brought home. It is for that reason that I to-day support the Motion so well put by the noble Earl, Lord Cork, and ask the Government to give it their most sympathetic and generous consideration.
THE EARL OF RADNOR: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Cork, for bringing forward this Motion. It is one that interests me personally very much because I have two children still in America and I get information of the situation from them and others relating not only to the United States but also to Canada. I am perhaps fortunate that the sponsors of my children are sufficiently well off to be able to look after them perfectly well and to look after other children also. Like all parents in a similar situation to myself, I am extremely grateful for all that has been done by those people who have taken these children in, but I do not think either of the two noble Lords who have spoken have, so far as my knowledge goes, in the least exaggerated the situation that now obtains in the case of a great many of the children. I have had letters from America which

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give some indication of the very serious and real difficulties that are being caused by the continuance of these children in America. If I might quote from those letters, one statement is that in very many cases the sponsors of these children are absolutely at the end of their tether financially. Taxation has risen seven times in the past year, and the cost of living has doubled, and finally those people are beginning to say that the British Government are ungrateful and stingy.
The noble Earl, Lord Cork, told the House how much money was being sent out. I understand that it amounts to 40 dollars for an adult and 12 dollars for a child per month. I am informed that the very least a woman and a child can live on is 200 dollars a month. My arithmetic is not very good but I think 200 dollars a month amounts to something like £600 a year or thereabouts, which is a great deal more than the amount that we are now allowed to send out to them. It is true that a number of these English mothers are now able to do a certain amount of work, but the very fact of their being there to look after the children precludes them from working whole-time and they can only take part-time jobs. One must also remember that out there they are aliens and it is not so easy for them to get good jobs. Still they are, as I understand it, doing their best to help themselves, though it does not go as far as is necessary. Another fact which I think must be borne in mind in considering this problem is that in many cases the parents in this country of children out there, even if they were allowed to send out the money necessary for the keep of their children, would not be able to afford to do so. The standard of living and the cost of living on the other side of the Atlantic are so much higher than in this country that the incomes of many of the parents would not be able to stand it. I hope, therefore, that His Majesty's Government will very seriously consider taking the necessary steps to enable these children to come home at the earliest possible moment.
I understand that it is a matter now of something like 4,000 or 5,000. I know perfectly well that the argument can be used that if 4,000 or 5,000 women and children are sent back from America, it will mean 4,000 or 5,000 less troops being
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sent to this country. I do not know that on examination that particular argument holds a great deal of water. I do not suppose for a moment that all the troops that come over here are fully trained, and it would only mean that their arrival in this country would be delayed for the necessary period for a boat to come across and back again. The troops would have three weeks or a month in which to take extra training on the other side instead of on this side of the Atlantic. It is an important and a growing question because it is very necessary for the future of the world that we and the United States of America and the Dominions should remain on the friendliest and the best possible terms. It is not enough for the Governments of the countries concerned to remain friendly. We want the ordinary people of these countries to remain friendly. To have a running sore based on difficulties arising from money and from the cost of living, is something that will do a great deal of harm between the two countries, and it will become worse the longer the difficulties remain.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I greatly hope the Government may be able to give favourable consideration to this matter. I am well aware, through my connexion with the Treasury, that there are all kinds of considerations which make it much more difficult than it would appear at first sight to be. Naturally we would appeal to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and one cannot say that without expressing, as I am sure everyone who is in this House would wish to do, our deep sense of the loss that the country has sustained by the untimely death of the holder of that great office. Having come in contact with him so often I can speak with knowledge when I say that if ever a man really gave his life for his country by his persistent devotion and hard work when he had been warned that he was really carrying this too far, that man was Sir Kingsley Wood. I am sure we all deplore his loss and sympathize with his relatives. I had to mention that because I was asking that the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the time should give favourable consideration to this appeal. As I have said, there are various considerations which make it extremely difficult to solve the problem. It is much more difficult indeed, if I may say so, than perhaps the noble Earl, Lord Cork, appreciates. Nevertheless, I do hope the

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Government will do something to cure the undoubtedly unfortunate position that arises now, which may do harm to our relations with that great friendly country across the Atlantic.
LORD MORRIS: My Lords, I just want to say a very brief word about this very dirty public scandal which has now gone on for three years. My first word must be one of thanks and gratitude to the noble and gallant Earl who has raised the subject here with all the prestige and authority which his name and the position he has held in this country carry. I have held my peace on the subject for three years. Like the noble Earl, Lord Radnor, I too have a personal interest in this matter and it is very difficult for me to speak on it with restraint. Now, however, that the matter has been brought up I will be quite frank with your Lordships and say that I have a wife and children over there and while Lord Radnor has two children I have four children there and unfortunately my sponsors have fallen down altogether.
The matter has a very important Imperial aspect which has been touched on a little by several speakers but which I am sure noble Lords like Viscount Bennett and Lord Beaverbrook, from their experience, will recognize as vitally important. I am sure the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will also appreciate that this Government consciously, unconsciously or subconsciously have perhaps been blind to it; perhaps they have not been able to help themselves, but I hope this state of affairs will not be allowed to continue. Are we sure that our Government have not explored the fact that the women and children over there are being supported to our immense gain, direct and indirect, by Canadians and. Americans to all intents and purposes, free of charge? If these women and children—and I am told there are many thousands of them— had remained in this country they would have had to be looked after by fire rescue squads and air raid wardens and so on. We have gained enormously. Do not let us delude ourselves into thinking that Americans and Canadians are blind to that. They know that we have gained enormously by this removal of women and children. What do they say? I do not claim the same knowledge of the United States as the two noble Lords I have mentioned, but I was born on the other side of the Atlantic and I have crossed the
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Atlantic many times and have lived on the other side. There are a great many who regard us as a nation of pikers who do not pay our debts and who have not paid our debts incurred in the last war. Do not imagine that Americans are blind to the fact that we have gained. And we have gained enormously.
I suggest to His Majesty's Government that for the reasons that have been mentioned, and not for any personal reasons, they should attempt at once to put this matter right, and pay something towards the keep of these women and children of ours who are being entertained over there. As has been pointed out already, the picture has changed very considerably since they went. No one could have foreseen that the war would last so long, and certainly it was not foreseen by their hosts. I do not know which particular dolt in Whitehall thought of the crazy sum of ten pounds for an adult and three pounds for a child, but anyone who knows conditions over on the other side of the Atlantic will tell you that it is perfectly useless. It means that these women and children are practically dependent upon charity for the necessities of life. That allowance given by the British Government may possibly enable them to subsist but no more. It takes no account of growing children, no account of clothing, no account of doctor's or dentist's bills. The responsible Press in this country have taken a very kind and helpful attitude about this and I hope we can count still on their help.
It must be remembered that for three years—a very long time—these homeless people on the other side of the Atlantic have been looking into other people's mirrors; trying to find a corner of their own to live in, and a window of their own to look through. No doubt it will be said that these people knew what they were doing. They knew that sterling could not be sent across the Atlantic. I have not sent and would not try to send sterling from this country in excess of the amount permitted, but I did send money from the Middle East and the Government in Whitehall clamped down on that. If I had not seen it myself I would not have believed it and would not tell your Lordships of a cable sent from the Secretary of State to the High Commissioner of Palestine. That cable was to this effect: "Understand you

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have permitted Flight Lieutenant Lord Morris"—a very junior and insignificant member of the Royal Air Force—"to remit money for the support of his wife and children. Please stop this." That to me seems incredible. That was in 1941 when, your Lordships will remember, we were about to launch an offensive in Libya, when the German hordes were at the gates of Moscow, and an hourly conflagration was expected in the Far East. Is it not amazing that a Secretary of State could not find something more important to claim his attention and that of his minions than the financial affairs of a very junior Air Force officer?
That gives some idea of the length to which the Government are prepared to go, I do not say deliberately to prevent a man supporting his wife and children —that would be absurd—in the sacred name of the war effort and what must be done to help it. Your Lordships have heard what has been said by others on this subject and will not think it is some idea that has just occurred to me. It is a matter on which a considerable body of public opinion is deeply exercised and if the Government think it a small or trivial matter they are quite mistaken. I beg the Government to remember that, although the war effort is very important and although almost everything must be subsidiary to it, we have a reputation for looking after women and children and a reputation for decency which to some of us is more important than dollars.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, there can be no doubt that there is very great feeling about this matter in the country and therefore it is well that members of your Lordships' House who have strong opinions on it should speak their minds. I have no personal grounds for being interested, but I have paid several visits to Canada and the United States since the war began and have had occasion to see at close quarters how this matter works. I am sure many people in this country will feel gratitude to the noble Earl for having raised the question. In my opinion it should have been discussed in your Lordships' House long ago. Last year, when I returned from Canada and United States, I felt so strongly about it that I took some trouble to get corroboration of some facts which had been given me. I went to the Treasury. There the
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officials offered what they considered were very good reasons for what had been done hitherto, and gave me to understand that the matter was then under review.
I do not want to deal with the two main grounds suggested for the inadequacy of the money allowance—one the question of international relations and the other personal hardship. I approach the matter on the ground that there must be one of two reasons, either a question of exchange or a question of deterrent influence. After all, the amount involved in actual sterling is small. If it were a question of exchange I should have thought it would be more easy to criticize the action of other Departments than that of the Treasury. There is, for instance, the policy of the Board of Trade with regard to exports. A very little latitude in present policy would easily contribute the exchange necessary to make possible the correction of this matter. The position, it seems to me, is more likely to be explained by some deliberate purpose of deterrent influence. The suggestion has been made that the children should be brought back. It so happens that, on two occasions when I was crossing the Atlantic children were among the passengers. The feeling I had was that to send children as passengers across the Atlantic then meant doing a disservice to the nation, because in the event of a ship foundering where was the burden of danger going to fall? It was going to fall on the shoulders of the Mercantile Marine personnel who would have the duty of saving the children at the risk of their own lives. On these grounds I profoundly disagree with the proposal that facilities should be given to these children to come back. Knowing the strength of feeling that there is amongst the personnel of the. Mercantile Marine I think it only right that their views should be voiced here to-day.
My last word is this: that while realizing that the Treasury may well be faced with difficulties, I hope that the noble and learned Viscount who is going to reply on behalf of His Majesty's Government will give some information to the House to the effect that these amounts have already been reviewed and liberally increased. If this is not done I hope that my noble and gallant friend who has moved this Motion will press most strongly for further reconsideration of the matter.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): My Lords, this is a difficult subject. On the one hand it arouses in every one of us a deep feeling of gratitude to generous people in Canada and in the United States; and not merely a feeling of gratitude, it arouses also a feeling of obligation. Certainly everyone may be sure that that feeling will be nowhere more deeply appreciated than here in your Lordships' House. On the other hand, your Lordships will, I hope, allow me to say that it would be doing very little justice to the difficulty of this subject to suppose that this was merely the edict of some crazy—I think "crazy" was the word used—and curmudgeonly person in the Treasury; in this instance the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is known to every well-instructed man, of course, that the difficulty here arises out of the overwhelming necessity of dollar exchange. At the very beginning of the war, the Treasury made regulations restricting in every sort of way the transmission of sterling from this country—or from the Near East by British people, which is exactly the same thing. The Treasury made most careful regulations about it. Those regulations were not made in panic; they were the subject of long discussion by those who make it their life's work to understand such questions. Those regulations have had this very remarkable result—which is certainly in striking contrast to what has happened in other wars, or in other countries—that we have been able to so large an extent to maintain the value of the pound. We have been able to limit our call for dollar exchange, and nobody can estimate to what extent that has contributed, and is still contributing, both to our own victory and to the general success of the Allies.
That half of the matter is very difficult. The Treasury have to some extent made me acquainted with the subject but I am far from professing to speak as an expert upon it. It would be regrettable if we should have a debate in this House on the basis that these considerations were not of the very gravest importance. Of course they are. That was the reason why, at the time when this country was threatened with the danger, it might be, of immediate invasion, and when Germany was letting loose her Blitzkrieg over our cities, in spite of the strong natural prompting of so many parents that they would like to get their children away, and
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of the feelings of so many husbands that they would like to get their wives out of the way to some place of safety, the Treasury had to say: "We will help you all we can but we cannot consent to your making arrangements for sending your family away with the result that there will be a transmission of sterling and damage will be done to our dollar exchange." I hope that by this time it is appreciated by every student of currency questions that the Treasury were rendering an immense service to the country by the insistence which they put upon that proposition.
Speaking broadly, these children now on the other side of the Atlantic, were either sent over under the auspices of the Children's Overseas Reception Board—in which case it meant the acceptance of an offer to receive them, an offer of magnificent generosity for which we cannot be too grateful, an offer made by the Canadian Government which they have never sought to go back upon—or else these children were sent in the circumstances mentioned by one of your Lordships today. In the latter case an undertaking was required before they sailed that the child evacuee would be maintained on the other side of the Atlantic without any call being made in this country for sterling. Definite arrangements were made with definite hosts and hostesses. I need not use many words here in expressing what everybody feels towards those people. We are indeed under a very deep debt of gratitude to them. As I was saying, to treat this as though it were merely a piece of curmudgeonly, hard-hearted ignorant folly on the part of Whitehall is not a method of discussion which will appeal to any of your Lordships who are at all well-informed on this subject. Your Lordships will understand very well the importance of maintaining our ability to finance the war overseas. This does call for constant and regular watchfulness in all directions where you get transmissions from this country or transmissions by British subjects from other points which, of course, involves the use of British banks.
I quite agree that the situation has changed, as my noble friend has said; it certainly has changed, and there has been a change in the treatment of the matter on this side; because, as my noble friend Lord Barnby indicated just now, when the original arrangements were made and

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these children left this country in 1940, the rule had to be imposed quite strictly that no provision of any sort or kind could be made from this country. That is a very hard thing for parents who are able and would like to contribute. It is a very hard thing, I quite agree, as between the friendly people on the other side and the people of this country. I thoroughly appreciate the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Radnor, when he said that it is good feeling between the peoples, and not merely between the Treasuries and the Governments, which we have to think of here. That, I think, is quite true, and that is the reason why, at a later stage, in 1942, the Chancellor of the Exchequer made the announcement which he then did make, and with a copy of which I have been provided by the Treasury so that I may read it to the House.
Here I must for a moment follow the example of my noble friend Lord Mottistone. I cannot mention the name of the Chancellor of the Exchequer without saying quite simply how shocking to all his friends is the tragic and wholly unexpected news of his death this morning. I saw him, and spent some time pleasantly chatting with him, on a railway platform last Sunday evening, waiting for the arrival of a great man, and nobody appeared to be in higher spirits or in better health. Like others of your Lordships, I have had constant dealings with him over a long series of years. It would be quite out of place to attempt now any elaborate estimate of his qualities, but perhaps I may be allowed to say this one sentence. The public owe a great deal to the calm judgment, to the staunch resolution and to the unwearied industry of the late Sir Kingsley Wood. His sudden passing from the scene is a grave loss not only to his colleagues but to the country.
What my friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer did—and I was in touch with him at the time, because I was interested in the subject, and I know the pains he took about it—was to discuss this matter, as his duty was, with the Canadian Government. He considered what could be done in view of his own responsibilities at the Treasury, and he made the provision which has been referred to. Your Lordships will allow me to observe that it would be quite wrong to treat the very moderate allowances then announced as
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though they were an attempt by the Treasury or by anybody else to measure how much was needed to maintain people in Canada or in the United States. That had absolutely nothing to do with it. No wonder one noble Lord used strong language about it; he seemed to think that the figures fixed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer were estimated to be the equivalent of necessary maintenance. That is not so at all, as the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, has pointed out. This was, however, a provision which was at any rate of some value in itself, and a token of our desire to break the iron stringency of this rule. It was accordingly arranged that permission would be given for the remittance from this country of sums not exceeding £3 a month for any child under sixteen at the time of departure, and in addition of sums not exceeding £10 per month for any adult who left this country in charge of children and who was still shown to be responsible for them.
It is not that this country or that this nation is not willing that more than that should be provided, if it could be done. This is an adjustment, in respect of a very difficult technical matter, in the light of all the claims made on our resources in connexion with the dollar exchange. It is important to add, moreover, that there is another provision which has operated very freely, and which is of a very much more generous character— namely, that the special circumstances of a particular case have always been taken into account, and applications for additional remittances on grounds of hardship or for medical or surgical help in a particular case have always been given favourable consideration. I was very glad to hear from my noble friend Lord Marchwood that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald had explained that side of the matter to him, because your Lordships may be assured that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, who in Canada is in the closest touch with the Canadian Government, has also been in the closest touch with the Government at home; and I know that on the last occasion when he was here, only a few weeks ago, this was one of the matters which he brought prominently forward, in the general interest and in the interest both of Canada and of ourselves. That, then, is the policy—a very limited allowance in the ordinary case,

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but with full and effective consideration given to meet exceptional circumstances which call for it.
I quite appreciate that that does not remove the sense of grievance and frustration on the part, it may be, of the husband who, of course, wants to send sufficient over to maintain his wife and children—a most natural feeling—but the fact must be faced that these evacuees were permitted to be sent only on the distinct and written promise that nothing of the sort would be done, and it therefore had to be left to the Government to decide how far they could go in view of the developments which might take place.
I do not think that the Motion by my noble friend Lord Cork and Orrery, or the question by my noble friend Lord Marchwood, raises the other matter— namely, the question of getting the children back here. That is quite a different matter and does not affect any issue relating to the dollar exchange, as far as I can see; but, as one or two of your Lordships have said, there are other considerations which are involved. I am not prepared to deal with that alternative aspect of the matter to-day, but I am quite willing to see that attention is called to it again, if that is what the House desires. I am very sorry that I am not able, in answering the Motion to-day, to make any further announcement. Nothing would have given me greater personal satisfaction than to be able to do so, but any announcement on this subject must be made with the authority of the Treasury, and I have no right to use language which goes beyond that which Sir Kingsley Wood authorized me to use in the paper which I hold in my hand.
In conclusion, however, let me assure your Lordships of this. This is certainly not a matter which is treated by the Government as trivial. It is not a matter which is regarded as decided once and for all, and as incapable of revision. The fact is that it is being carefully considered whenever occasion offers. I am not able to say, and it would not be right to say, more than that to-day; but I do hope that your Lordships will appreciate that it is not out of stinginess or muddle-headedness but out of a bounden duty to protect our resources for the purposes of maintaining the main struggle that it has been necessary for the Treasury in con-
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nexion with this matter, as indeed in connexion with a great many others, to impose so strict a regulation, which, as I thoroughly understand, presses so hardly upon the consciences and the wishes of individuals whose children have gone overseas.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble and learned Viscount whether there would be any indiscretion in asking for a disclosure of the amount involved in this matter?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I have not the figures here.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: My Lords, I must thank the noble and learned Viscount for his answer, though I confess I feel that to some extent I have been lectured in a way which I did not deserve. I stated quite clearly, when moving my Motion, that I entirely appreciated the necessity for having these regulations at the time, and I tried to point out that it was because we were talking then of 100,000 more children going. The amount that is now involved, however, is so small that, with all due respect to the noble and learned Lord Chancellor, I cannot believe that it is going to have much effect upon our national finances. There are so many financial arrangements which must be made that a sort of book-keeping entry is surely all that is necessary. I do not often go and have a chat with the Treasury, but I try to understand these things as far as I am able to do so. I can quite appreciate the necessity of carefully nursing the dollar exchange. I would point out, too, that while parents may have given an undertaking about not asking questions or sending remittances, that does not bind other people who have not made that declaration and who may consider it their duty to bring these matters up. I do not wish to go any further. I see a gleam of hope in what the Lord Chancellor said. I trust that before long he may be able to enlarge that bridgehead. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

AGRICULTURAL POLICY.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD THE EARL OF MANSFIELD had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are aware that the food-production pro-

35
gramme of this country, in the years immediately following the conclusion of hostilities, must be affected by the anticipated conditions of semi-starvation throughout a large part of Europe, as well as by considerations of national security; whether they will bear this in mind when framing their long-term agricultural policy, in order to avoid the premature adoption of schemes that may not be immediately feasible; and to move for Papers.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, when some two months ago I put my Motion on the Paper, in common I think with the great majority of those throughout the country who are directly interested in agriculture, I expected that before the Motion was discussed some announcement of Government agricultural policy would be made. This hope has, however, not materialized, and it is unfortunately a fact, whether realized or not by His Majesty's Government, that a feeling of considerable uneasiness is beginning to spread throughout the agricultural community. Although they are in no way relaxing the very great efforts that they have made ever since the war began, and are still making, they do feel an ever growing anxiety as to the future of their industry and of themselves.
It is, of course, a truism to say that it is a very difficult matter to frame a satisfactory agricultural policy for this country, even in peace, let alone in war, or for the uneasy years that must follow the cessation of hostilities. We are a small country, with a very dense population, of which only some 7 per cent. are directly engaged in agriculture, and if one takes into account all those who are indirectly engaged, such as auctioneers, veterinary surgeons, manufacturers of agricultural machinery, seedsmen and the like, it does not exceed 10 per cent., and one has to realize that an agricultural policy must receive the support of at least the majority of the urban population if it is to be put into practical effect. Furthermore, in framing such a policy one has to consider not only home politics but also our relationship with our Dominions and Colonies and with other countries overseas, and also the question of balancing exports of manufactured goods by imports of foodstuffs; although in the past there can be no doubt that the last question has been given a consideration quite unduly weighted in favour
36
of the exporting manufacturer. But even when all these considerations are given the attention they deserve it surely cannot be impossible for the Government in power to produce at least an assurance, if not a policy, which will go some way to allay the justifiable anxiety now felt.
To come more directly to the terms of my Motion, as I see it the period after the war will have to be divided into three sections. The first of the sections comprises the few years that must elapse when our prime consideration must be to supply foodstuffs and live stock to the devastated countries of Europe in order to prevent wholesale starvation and outbreaks of disease in those countries. This question, although one of vital importance to many countries, has not received publicly by any means the attention that it deserves, and I hope to ask your Lordships to consider this specialized aspect of our agricultural problem at an early date in the new Session. Once that period has come to an end there will begin another period, the duration of which is very difficult to prophesy, during which Europe and the world will alike, we hope, be settling down into some form of political stability. It is during this period that considerations of national security must be weighed along with political and economic factors. It may be said that surely after this war we shall be able to ensure that there will be no further danger of subsequent wars, at least within the lifetime of all now in a position to sit in your Lordships' House, but that perhaps would be taking an unduly optimistic view. Who at the end of the last war could have believed that in considerably less than a generation Germany again would have plunged all mankind into an enormous international conflict? While one must hope that Germany and Japan—I do not think we need worry about Italy—will so be dealt with as to render them permanently impotent for harm, one cannot be certain that this will be the case. We must therefore ensure that the agriculture of this country is kept in such a position that it can be expanded rapidly in case of emergency should the need arise.
There is one other possibility on which one can only touch very lightly. The experience of history shows only too clearly that many coalitions of various countries face their greatest difficulties

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after they have achieved success, and the unity that has characterized their efforts during a conflict does not always last very long alter the end of that conflict. Few people would have thought twenty, or even ten, years ago that we should find ourselves engaged in direct battle with our former Allies Italy and Japan. It is possible, although we must indeed trust that such a thing will not take place, that some of our Allies will not always remain Allies, and until such time as all nations of the world show some definite inclination to beat their tanks into tractors agricultural production in this country must always be considered, partially at least, with a view to its being rapidly expanded if the occasion should ever arise, however much we may pray that it does not.
When this second period is ended only then can a really stable agricultural programme come into being, and it would of course at such a distance of time be vain even to sketch the outline of one. All the same, one must hope that whatever Government may then control the destinies of this country will rather tend to encourage production on those lines which have been shown to be the most suited to the natural genius of our agriculturists and the characteristics of our soil and climate. That is to say, we hope there will be a concentration upon the production of live stock, milk, etc., rather than upon crops which have had up to date, for various reasons, to receive artificial support.
Now, in framing any policy, there are certain considerations which must be paramount. The first of these is the welfare of those who are engaged in the agricultural industry. Of these let us first consider the agricultural worker. Surely any policy adopted in future must have as its bedrock an intention that the agricultural worker shall enjoy, at all future times, a standard of living no less high as far as real wages are concerned than he has at present. In the past, as everyone knows, the standard of living of the farm worker, consequent upon his meagre wages, has been deplorably low. Although perhaps the hardest working man in the whole country, his remuneration has been at a painfully inadequate level, and very little attention has been paid to the fact outside those organs which take a direct interest in agriculture. Next we have the position
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of the farmer himself. For generations back, with very few periods of prosperity, the farmer's lot has been one of acute anxiety and great difficulty in making, if not even both ends meet as has sometimes happened, at least a reasonable profit. Any policy which is to be permanent and to do permanent good must ensure that the farmer receives a reasonable profit and a reasonable return for the energy and skill he shows. The third partner in the industry is the landowner. He in the past, and even up to the present time, has been subjected to much ill-considered abuse. He has been represented as a mere blood-sucking parasite living on the rents he derives from his downtrodden tenants. Those of your Lordships who are agricultural landlords know how utterly false is that picture, but it is one that has unfortunately been "put over" on a large section of the electorate for political reasons, and its ill effects have still to be dissipated.
Surely to-day is a time when an agreed agricultural policy is probably less difficult of attainment than at any other period, because so many groups and branches of people, often with views extremely diverse in every other direction, have produced brochures and manifestos on agricultural policy which are remarkable more for their similarity than for their differences. There is, in particular, the policy which has been brought forward by a group of Peers who, I think, would be unlikely to agree entirely on many other subjects, but have found such common ground in agriculture that they have produced a policy which, if adopted in general outline by all the political Parties, would take agriculture out of Party politics, which is one of the most beneficent things that could possibly happen. In regard to the future of administration of remedies, it is not my intention to go into these at all to-day. Whether assistance to agriculture be direct in the form of subsidies, or more indirectly in the form of levy subsidies, by quota, or whatever it may be, is not a matter which I am prepared to discuss to-day. For one thing, only the Government have the knowledge and the figures at the present time which would make such a discussion valuable, and as long as the war lasts these figures must be kept secret in the interests of national security. There is one thing that is quite certain, and that is that if

39
agriculture in this country is to prosper the individual enterprise of farmer and landowner alike must not merely continue but be encouraged.
Agriculture depends, owing to its extremely diverse nature, so much on individual effort and individual intelligence that no attempt to dragoon it into dull uniformity can meet with anything but disaster. There is little doubt that agriculture in particular is suffering at the present time from a spate of "controls" which are doing a great deal more harm than good. Illustrations of this have appeared in that great mirror of British life and thought, Punch, which very well show up what is happening. May I remind your Lordships of two cartoons that have recently appeared? In one of them there were two officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, and one was saying to the other, rather sadly, "Have you noticed a veiled hostility to the Department on the part of farmers?" at the same time gazing at a scarecrow in a field very accurately got up to portray the said officials. Another and even more biting one showed a farmer in a field in which there were two large haystacks, and one of these, the farmer was saying, was provided by the Ministry. Close investigation showed that the haystack in question was exclusively composed of Ministerial forms. That is a picture which is not very far from the truth, and to-day I read in one of the organs belonging to the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, that an unfortunate farmer has committed suicide simply because he could no longer cope with this appalling torrent of forms which require a lawyer to interpret and a chartered accountant to fill up. If our agriculture is again to be on a really satisfactory basis it has got to be freed to some extent from this dreadful multiplicity of officials, instructions, forms, and the like.
If the industry is to receive any form of Governmental assistance, it is an unfortunate corollary that that must mean, to some extent, Governmental control. I am, myself, not unprepared to see the continuance of war agricultural committees, because obviously when public money in one shape or another is to be provided for the assistance of agriculture, some adequate supervision of its distribution and expenditure is required; but these committees should, quite definitely, be as far
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as possible of an advisory character. If they are to continue to have the power to eject tenants from their farms on the ground of bad farming, and if they are to acquire the added power, as some suggest, of being able to deprive of his property the landlord who is unable or unwilling to keep up that property properly, then it is essential that no such steps should be taken without an appeal to some independent tribunal. There are at the moment two great blots on the Government's escutcheon. One is this, the other is the administration of the notorious I8B Regulation. In both cases the regulations themselves are admirable; it is their administration which is extremely questionable. Those of us who are members of war agricultural committees are informed that we are ourselves really part of the Ministry of Agriculture, or in Scotland of the Department of Agriculture for Scotland. An appeal, therefore, to the Minister concerned is really an appeal, not to any independent tribunal, but an appeal from the right hand to the left. If we are to continue to have this control, which may well be necessary, then there has got to be some tribunal where independent judgment can be given. It is no longer going to be enough to have an appeal from Robert to Hudson, or from Pontius to Pilate.
At this hour I do not wish to detain your Lordships longer than possible, but I do hope that some consideration will be given to the views which I have put forward to-day. As I have said, anxiety continues to grow and unless some definite statement is made in the near future it may well be that agricultural production will be affected before very long. It must be remembered that from the very beginning of the war onwards the agriculturist has been working at a pressure seldom equalled and certainly not surpassed in the industrial field. He has been compelled to alter his methods, to adopt new ones which in many cases are suitable only for war conditions and are not economically sound. He has been compelled often to spend money which he does not own in buying fresh machinery for the development of ground hitherto under grass, and he has had to borrow money to do it because this counts as a capital expenditure and cannot be done out of profits, all of which over a certain by no means high figure are liable to be taken by the Excess Profits Tax.
At the present time landlord, farmer and farm worker lack definite guidance and it is much to be hoped this anxiety can be relieved by a Government pronouncement at an early date Such a pronouncement is very much needed and it should be upon sound lines. After all, agriculture is our greatest single industry even if it be a group of various industries in some cases competing to a certain extent one with another. If in the future agriculture is made really prosperous, then even if we had industrial depression in various directions our general economy would go on. If, however, agriculture is allowed to sink again into a condition of permanent or semi-permanent depression, then no matter how fair the industrial situation may appear outwardly it is bound to bear within it the seeds of its own and of national decay. For that reason I trust the noble Duke may be able to give me some assurance along the lines I have indicated. I beg to move.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships will be grateful to the noble Earl for calling attention to the programme of food production in his very interesting and persuasive speech. I wish to underline the importance of the subject from the point of view of the reference in his Motion to the anticipated conditions of semi-starvation throughout large parts of Europe. Your Lordships will have noticed the reference to certain of the conditions made by the British Ambassador to Madrid in his speech reported in the Press this morning. I do not think it is as yet sufficiently realized how grave the food position is, and how grave and much graver it will be for a good while after the war throughout large tracts of Europe.
Take Europe immediately before the war began so as to compare the food situation now. There are always of course differences in food conditions between town dwellers and those living in the country. The only nations which had enough food for their population before the war were Denmark and Germany. No other country could afford a fall in the consumption level. Some other countries would have benefited by a rise in the consumption level, particularly the town populations of France, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia, and in many countries, particularly in Belgium and in
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countries in Central Europe, a rise in the nutritional standards was, essential. Now if we turn to Europe in its present war-stricken condition what do we find? We find that still Denmark and Germany are sufficiently supplied with food and they are the only countries in that situation. We have to bear in mind the fact that Germany, having long prepared for this war, had reserve stocks before the war of 7,000,000 tons of broad grain, 400,000 tons of vegetable oil and large reserve stores of sugar and soya beans. No doubt those stocks are very considerably depleted if not nearly all gone after four years. We have to remember, too, that one substantial motive behind the occupation of a large part of Europe by the Nazis was Germany's need of food and labour.
I will give your Lordships one or two illustrations because, as the Motion brings the point out so clearly, the matter is relevant. There is roughly a population of 200,000,000 in the occupied countries of Europe. Half of these are in rural territories and half in 1owns. On the whole those dwelling in rural territories are sufficiently near a pre-war level though there are exceptions in certain countries where the position is very serious for all classes. But it is the population in the urban areas which is so very much worse off, the 100,000,000 people living in towns. The well-to-do very often can obtain their food from the black markets. It is the working classes, the vast majority of these 100,000,000, who are very badly affected. But I would give one or two instances. In Poland, which is a country that suffers most hardly and I think may be fairly said to complain least, whether one thinks of incorporate Poland or General Government Poland which contains Warsaw, there is a process of slow starvation. That is not too harsh a phrase to use. In Yugoslavia, apart from the fact that the peasants are no longer co-operating with regard to the stabilization and the maintenance of agriculture because of the occupying forces, in the towns milk and meat are extremely rare and in Belgrade it is mouldy bread that is more often handed to the customer than not. Everybody knows how desperate is the condition in Greece to which assistance has been given by the Canadian Government through the offices of our own Government. The situation there is very bad still. Most people know that the situa-

43
tion in Belgium is grave, especially so far as the children are concerned, with their scurvy and their rickets, their disease and their inadequate nutrition. In the Netherlands the position is also bad for lack of food. I have seen statistics which show that as a result of the lack of food there is a great increase in diphtheria, in poliomyelitis, and in dysentery. The situation is bad, though not as bad as in the other countries mentioned, in Norway particularly, on account of the deficiencies of diet which affect the health of the Norwegians.
I should like to quote, because it is the most crucial instance of the policy of the Nazi Government with regard to occupied territory, an order issued in June, 1941, from Berlin described as "an instruction for directing the economy of newly occupied eastern regions" and I should like to apply it to Russia. This is the text of the instruction:
"In accordance with the orders of the Führer it is necessary to take all measures for immediate and full utilization of the occupied regions in the interests of Germany. To obtain for Germany as much food and oil as possible —this is the main economic purpose of the campaign. Along with this German industry must be supplied also with other raw materials from the occupied regions. The first task is to ensure in the shortest possible time the complete supply of the German troops with food at the expense of the occupied regions."
That has been ruthlessly enforced in occupied Russia, which is at the present moment, though being gradually liberated, suffering from semi-starvation or starvation.
I think that it is a fair inference from the facts that I have given your Lordships —a very hasty summary of a very large field—that every country is much worse off than it was when the war began, except Denmark. Winter is coming and, as is well known, the position by Christmas in these countries will be very serious indeed. If there is, as one hopes there will be, a military invasion with a Second Front, the military conditions will at first at any rate make the situation difficult, though no doubt the supply of concentrated food to stop starvation will begin as soon as is compatible with military safety. When the war is over, and the veil is lifted far more than it can be lifted now,. we shall see the spectre of famine stalking over large areas of Europe. Nobody can praise too highly
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the resourcefulness, the determination and the triumphal success with which the Minister of Food has organized the distribution of food in this country. The Minister of Economic Warfare and other members of the Government at an earlier stage in the war, and from time to time since, have spoken of the great stocks of food which are held in reserve in some portions of the Allied countries, notably our own country, ready to be rushed in to feed the starving countries as soon as the war is over. I wonder whether these great stocks of food are in existence now in the quantities which will be necessary when the need has to be met. I make no apology for pointing out and emphasizing that there is every indication that the food situation in Europe is going to be very serious indeed. Therefore one cannot emphasize too deliberately or too seriously the urgent need of food supplies from all sources.
That is why I have ventured to intervene to say how warmly I welcome the insistence in the noble Earl's Motion on the way in which our own food production programme ought to be affected by the conditions of semi-starvation over large portions of Europe. We owe it to the land and to those who work upon the land to see to it that our own land produces to the fullest possible capacity. We owe it to our national security, various features of which the noble Earl at the conclusion of his speech quite properly pointed out. We owe it also to our duty to consider the needs of Europe and the necessity of doing what we can do to act on the principle that those nations who are better off and those empires who are better off should help those who are worse off.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: My Lords, I was very glad indeed to hear the noble Earl who raised this Motion speak of the necessity for increased production or at any rate for sustained production at the present level. The right reverend Prelate spoke movingly of the need for food supplies in Europe after the war. That is another incentive to the farmer to sustain or increase food production. But there are weaknesses in the situation that should be straightened out in the interests of production, particularly the production of live stock and milk to which the noble Earl referred. The weaknesses are to be found in the very improper price levels

45
which now exist favouring the big man at the expense of the little trader.
The Ministry of Food is really now a Ministry of many margins. It is a Ministry of margins and nothing else. It has three separate milk prices for various classes of milk suppliers. There is first the big man who gets three margins of profit on the milk he buys from the Ministry; the next man in size gets two margins; and then comes the little man with only one margin. As long as that inequitable position exists there must be impediments in the way of production, and very serious impediments. Why not wipe them out? The whole story of the three margins is like the story of the three bears and I hope the noble Duke when he replies for the Government: will give some explanation of these three margins. I hope we shall hear some response from the Ministry before long because the matter has been put before the Government again and again. It is time something was done. It is leading to such dissatisfaction as really to interfere with the production of milk. Distribution is also a subject that is giving cause for the greatest concern. Distribution was cheaper before the Ministry began to interfere—actually cheaper. Mr. Sidney Foster, an authority on the subject, says the cost of distribution before rationalization was 11½d. a gallon. The cost now is 11Üd. when the distribution is less than 750 gallons, rising to 14¼d. to the main supply depots, an average cost of distribution of 12¾d. as against 11½d. It is estimated that distribution since 1939 has cost the country £15,000,000 additional money. That is an abuse that has got to be dealt with.
There is another abuse crying out for the attention of Ministers, the Minister of Agriculture as well as the Minister of Food. It is the abuse in regard to bacon prices, which is directly concerned with the question of live stock raised by the noble Earl. There are also three separate bacon prices. There is one price for the multiple concern with ten shops. Such a concern gets a rebate on the Ministry's prices of 4s. per cwt. But if the undertaking happens to comprise more than ten shops in its multiple system, if there happen to be as many as twenty shops, another 1s. per cwt. is allowed for invoicing to themselves, that is to say for sending out invoices to their own sections. Then there is a third price for multiple
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concerns of fifty shops and over. In their case the rebate is 9s. per cwt. Now the price of bacon is about 150s., and here we have the three bears again. They are called on this occasion: "First and second buyers," but there are really first and second buyers, and then third buyers who are not given a name as yet. These last are really the mugs; they are paying 150s., say, for bacon of a type which the firm of Sainsbury is buying at 142s. That is a difference of about 1d. a pound.
I think that is enough for to-day. I will speak again on another occasion about butchers and margarine manufacturers, and I hope that noblemen who are interested in meat and margarine will come down to this House to help in the defence of their price scales, which are also in favour of the big concerns and damaging to the little man.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (THE DUKE OF NORFOLK): My Lords, I have at the outset of my reply to tell the noble Earl who moved this Motion that I took the terms of the Motion to be much more in conformity with the lines of the speech of the right reverend Prelate than with those of his own speech or with those of the speech which has just been made by my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook. I will, therefore, if I may, give an answer to, or rather explain my reason for not answering, Lord Beaverbrook before I come to deal specifically with the Motion. It would not, I think, be unreasonable for me to suggest to Lord Beaverbrook that in view of the terms of the Motion on the Paper he really could not expect an answer dealing with the situation regarding prices charged for various commodities which he has mentioned to-day.
Taking the Motion as it stands I have no quarrel at all with the noble Earl for he has only asked that when the appropriate time comes we should consider what the situation regarding the food shortage in Europe, and particularly in the occupied countries, will be, and that we should consider it when we formulate our long-term policy. I can at this moment give the assurance that these matters are not being overlooked. In fact, the records show that my right honourable friend the Minister of Agriculture was already thinking several

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months ago of the help that would have to be given to these countries, help which will be gladly given by the United Nations to the peoples living on the Continent of Europe. In May of this year, when addressing a meeting at the Caxton Hall, the Minister used these words:
"Even the end of the war will not mean the end of our farming effort, for starving Europe will have to be fed."
A few weeks later he made the same point to that representative body known as the Council of Agriculture for England.
The European peoples to-day are very seriously underfed, there is no doubt about that; and in some countries the position is certainly worse than in others. That means that as these countries are liberated so they will have to be fed, and we shall have to assist not only in producing food but also in restoring the production of the soil of those countries, countries which to a large extent are still agriculturally inclined. That will not help merely to put them on their feet again. The quicker we can make these countries produce some of the food which they will need the more we shall assist in saving shipping, which may quite easily be much needed for wars which may still be continuing in other parts of the world. To-day, as the result of the occupation by the Germans of these countries, many European lands have lost a large number of their draught animals; they have lost or have not been able to replace a large amount of their machinery. Their seeds, too, are likely to be inadequate. They have been short of fertilizers for some time past, and now their supplies of phosphates from North Africa have been lost to them in this last year.
All these matters are under active consideration at this moment by the United Nations. The problem before us is to help in supplying Europe's essential needs in the matter of food and production requirements whilst at the same time maintaining in this country our agricultural resources and our output of food at home. How is this to be done? I think that the answer to that question has really been given in the Minister's reference at the Caxton Hall to starving Europe. Following upon that statement, he went on to say that he was trying at that time to work out a four-year cropping plan for agriculture, which would
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include the harvest of 1947. This programme has since been given greater definition. Its essence is that we shall continue to take the plough round the farms of this country; we shall extend the ley farming, and we shall consider the improvement of live-stock husbandry through better breeding and other means. The aim of these measures is the provision of the maximum crops possible for both human and animal consumption.
Here I may say that one of the most remarkable features of this season is the extraordinary production which we are getting from the young grazing leys established on land which has been reseeded after some three or four white straw crops. This reseeding, using special mixtures of grasses and clovers, and where necessary phosphates, is a new technique to many of the fanners, but they are practising it with such success now that the grazings on these new leys far outstrip, both in quality and in quantity, the amount of food produced from the older herbage. On the dairy farms the criterion is milk yield, and the cows are certainly milking well on these young pastures. Under the four-year cropping plan, it is hoped that we shall extend these pastures, which automatically are now feeding a greater head of live stock than before, and that we shall put the plough into the whole of the pastures, so that they may produce, from the fertility stored in them, the great crops of wheat and potatoes which will be needed in the years about which I have been talking.
This policy is one which also accords with the recommendations of the Hot Springs Conference, the members of which obviously foresaw the period of critical shortage of food in the aftermath of war. It is also considered that this policy is the best way in which we can help our European Allies, whose needs were not forgotten at that Conference. I will, with your Lordships' permission, quote Resolution XII (3) from the Final Act of that Conference:
"That, pursuant to the above purpose, countries which have been producing more than normal output because of freedom from enemy action should—

(a) In the short run maintain such production;

(b) Whenever possible, increase production further, provided transport and the means of production, etc., are available, to assist in meeting abnormal demands."

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This policy which I have outlined is undeniably consonant with the maintenance of our national security. Finally, I suggest that the four-year plan is the best preparation for the long-term agricultural policy that must be devised at the appropriate time in the interests both of the safety and welfare of this country and of co-operation with the world overseas.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, while thanking the noble Duke for his reply, which I recognize is satisfactory as far as it goes, I should like to say that there are still a good many more detailed aspects of this problem on which he has not touched, and which I think do require further elucidation. I shall therefore be compelled at a later date to request the noble Duke to enter into these considerations more fully. I should like to thank the right reverend Prelate for the support that he has given to me. Admittedly his speech was considerably more relevant to the Motion than was my own, but I departed from the terms of the Motion largely because this is going to be the only opportunity available for the next few weeks for expressing the grave anxieties felt by the agricultural community that nothing more than the four-year cropping plan has up to date been produced. Four years is only a small part of the average lease, only a small part of the normal tenure of a farm, and indeed of a rotation; and, if confidence is to be really restored, something of a more long-term nature will have to be produced at a fairly early date. The phrase "appropriate time," used by the noble Duke, while itself unexceptionable, is still capable of being extended to such a remote period that it would hardly suffice to subdue all the anxieties at present felt.
I fear that I cannot criticize or enter into a discussion of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, as I have not his intimate knowledge of the matters concerned; but his remarks will doubtless receive the attention of His Majesty's Government. Meanwhile, I assure the noble Duke that I am satisfied with his reply as far as it goes, and I therefore beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

BREAD FOR FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
LORD HANKEY LORD HANKEY had given Notice that he would ask His Majesty's Government whether national bread is supplied to His Majesty's Forces serving in the Mediterranean theatres of war, and, if not, why not; and move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I raise this question in a spirit of inquiry, in order to elucidate the facts. My attention was first drawn to the subject by private letters from the Mediterranean, stating that after units arrived there they were served only with white bread, to the detriment of their digestive arrangements— though it was put in more forcible language than that. When oar Armies arrived in Tunis, and bread was served out by them to the civilian population, it was stated by newspaper correspondents that that was the first time that the people there had had white bread for many years. Then the late Mr. John Hilton, in what must, I think, have been his last broadcast, referred to the whiteness of the bread supplied to the Forces. Finally, when Sicily was occupied, the newspaper correspondents reported that the population said that it was the first time for eight years that they had tasted white bread. There seemed to be not much doubt, therefore, that white bread was supplied to the Forces, and accordingly I put down this Motion.
I do not raise the subject from the shipping point of view, because I hold that the Army must have the best, and that the shipping must be found for it. I raise it solely from the point of view of the health of the Forces, which I submit is of critical importance in view of the present and coining campaigns on the Continent. Why do I say that white bread is not the best for the health and physique of the troops? On March 11, 1942, that epoch-making day when my noble friend the Minister of Food announced the introduction of the national bread, Lord Horder, in welcoming the innovation, gave this assurance to your Lordships. He said:
"My colleagues and I are uniformly of opinion that no single step which the Government could have taken in respect of the nation's food is so calculated as this one to raise the level of the nation's nutrition."
That forecast, I submit, has proved correct. The Minister of Health and Sir John Orr and others have told us that

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the health of the nation has very greatly improved. I do not think there is any doubt that the change in the bread has played a considerable part in the improvement. In the same debate I expressed the hope that this rule would be extended to the Fighting Services, whose health and staying power would soon respond to this improvement in their diet. The Minister of Food nodded assent, and in fact the national bread was extended to the Fighting Services at home, and I do not think that anybody can help seeing—I live in the middle of troops myself—how much their health has improved.
That seems to me to make it all the more remarkable that our fighting men in the Mediterranean, of whose heroic deeds we are all so proud, are not given the same advantage. The nation and the Army have suffered dreadful things in the past from the deceptively attractive but pernicious white bread of the last fifty years. I could quote reams from international reports, and if it were not so late I should quote from the massive history of "The Englishman's Food" by Professor J. C. Drummond and Anne Wilbraham—Professor Drummond being the very eminent scientific adviser to the Ministry of Food. He and his collaborator lay great stress on the terrible evils that we suffered in our teeth and in our bones by the introduction of white roller-milled flour in the last part of the last century. I will make only one very brief quotation:
"Bad teeth were certainly one of the chief causes of the high proportion of rejections (40 per cent.) which so alarmed the Army authorities when recruits presented themselves for service in the South African war."
That state of affairs continued right down to just before the war, when the rejections for bad teeth continued to be so heavy that the Army authorities had to accept men with that defect, and in many cases to provide them with dentures when necessary. I have been told on very high authority within the last few weeks that even to-day not more than 5 per cent. of the recruits for the Army have a good set of teeth. It sounds simply terrible, but my authority is unimpeachable. That is a frightful admission for an Imperial race.
But I shall be told we really are tackling the matter—milk for children, improved bread and so forth. I agree that a good deal has been done. Those are
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advances, but apparently only at home so far as the Forces are concerned. Why then do not the men who are doing the fighting get the same benefit? We shall be told, I am sure, that the national flour will not keep in the Mediterranean. That was the explanation given to one of the newspaper men in Tunisia. I particularly ask the noble Lord who is going to reply that your Lordships may be told whether any attempt, even on a small scale for experimental purposes, has been made to store it there and, if so, with what result. The reason why I ask such an elementary question is that I really have heard such tarradiddles about the store-keeping qualities of flour which I have controverted by the experience of twenty years in my own household with wholemeal bread, which is of higher extraction. But, even if the storage explanation is correct, it is hard to believe that the difficulty is insurmountable. For thousands of years a score of nations have been fighting all over the Mediterranean, in Spain, Italy, Greece, Macedonia, Turkey, Palestine, the deserts of Syria and Libya, and the whole of North Africa. Wellington's Armies fought all over the Spanish peninsula from 1808 to 1814, Abercromby's Army in Egypt in 1801, and we occupied Sicily from 1806 to 1815. All that happened long before white bread was discovered.
Somehow or other the administrative difficulties of milling the com have always been overcome. Is it seriously contended that if the modern "poverty" white bread had never been introduced, or if it had been discarded, as it ought to have been when the frightful havoc it was creating was established, we could not have supplied armies of the size employed in North Africa, Sicily and Italy with bread? Obviously that is inconceivable. There is no difficulty in storing the grain in these climates. Joseph, as recorded in Genesis 41, stored it in Egypt for seven years, more than three thousand years ago, and Egypt was later for centuries the granary of Rome though the voyage often took a month. I do not think it it contended that there is any difficulty in storing the grain. It is a milling problem, and I would here ask some questions. Would it not be practicable now that we are committed to extensive campaigns in the Mediterranean, to utilize and, if need be, to supplement the considerable milling facilities which must exist in North Africa and Sicily and Southern Italy, so as to

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supply a more satisfactory Hour? The second question is, has any scientific investigation been made of the possibility of improving the storage facilities for national flour, or for improving its keeping qualities in these climates, or both? Thirdly, if neither of these expedients is practicable, cannot some advance be made on the very unsatisfactory starvation white flour—something between white flour and national flour, which will still keep? Lastly, can we get no enlightenment from South Africa, where, as Lord Horder told us on March 11, 1942, the national wholemeal is of 90 per cent. extraction, as compared with 85 per cent. for the British national wholemeal, and I think 75 per cent. for the ordinary white flour? I ask these questions, and I submit that the matter really is of vital importance.
Our Forces have to be able to stand up to the rigours of the climate of the Mediterranean, particularly malaria and dysentery, and ought to 'be fortified with the very best nutritional advantages. It must be wrong to feed our men on bread from which has been extracted all the vitamin A, nearly all the vitamin B1, and a large proportion of the calcium, phosphorus and iron. I submit that every effort should be made to avoid it. If I am told that I am misinformed, that the Fighting Forces are receiving national bread, no one will be more delighted than I. If we can be told that reform is coming as soon as existing large stocks of white flour are used up, that would be a very good second best. At the least I hope that we shall be told that our Forces receive some compensation in their diets for the loss of these vitamins, and that the possibilities of improving on the present white flour are being intensively explored. I beg to move.
LORD SEMPILL: My Lords, before my noble friend replies, I hope your Lordships will allow me to make a few remarks in support of Lord Hankey's Motion. Firstly, my noble friend Lord Horder wishes me to say how very sorry he is not to be here as he feels very keenly on this question. The plea that has been advanced to your Lordships by my noble friend Lord Hankey for wholemeal bread for His Majesty's Forces, and also for all His Majesty's subjects, is a very vital one indeed. We have, as your Lordshops know, struggled for a long time to get the present 85 per cent. extraction flour,
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and it is to be hoped there will never be any sliding back from that; but it has taken, as I say, a long time to achieve that present standard of excellence in our bread.
My noble friend mentioned the fact that only five per cent. of the Army recruits had good teeth. That is a very serious figure indeed. A few days ago I had the pleasure of spending the day with the medical authorities of the Royal Air Force, and I asked the leading officer what the main difficulties were in regard to the recruits at present coming into that splendid Service. He said "In one word, teeth." I asked, "Why?" He said "The white bread of the past and too much sugar." That shows how very real is the plea that Lord Hankey has advanced. When we consider that in the British Empire there is only one spot in which teeth are perfect—that is in Tristan da Cunha—it shows it is possible to achieve in this island something akin to that. I hope your Lordships will give strong support to the plea that my noble friend Lord Hankey has made to retain wholemeal bread for all His Majesty's subjects, whether they are serving in the Forces or in civil life.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD CROFT): My Lords, the noble Lord who raised this very proper inquiry into a subject so near his heart has given us an interesting account of his views. I should like to preface my remarks by saying that though I cannot give him great satisfaction in my answer to his Motion, I hope he will rest assured that I am not in conflict with him on the merits of national bread, as to which I am quite incompetent to judge, but which I hope to show does not really enter into this matter from the Army point of view owing to difficulties which I must explain. I must confirm the noble Lord's information that national bread is not, in fact, being supplied to His Majesty's Forces in the Mediterranean theatres of war. The reason for this is a very simple one. In order to cut out all unnecessary transport, flour is not shipped to these theatres from this country, but from the areas where the wheat is grown, namely, Canada and Australia. Your Lordships will no doubt recall that the decision to make this flour in this country was based primarily on the necessity to make the fullest possible use of home-

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grown and imported wheat in order to cut down the quantities of wheat which had to be shipped here. These considerations, as the noble Lord will be the first to realize, do not apply to countries such as Canada and Australia, which do not import wheat. These countries do not, in fact, make national flour, and no shipping to the Mediterranean would therefore be saved if they did.
Even if national flour could conveniently be shipped from Canada and Australia, it would, I submit, be inadvisable to do so. Large reserves of flour must be kept for considerable periods for the use of the three Services in theatres of war. Owing to the climate, and for other reasons, the storage conditions in the Mediterranean theatres are not usually as good as those which are available in this country, and it has been found that white flour keeps better and longer than national flour in a hot climate and in unfavourable storage conditions. I would mention that the scientific evidence on this subject is, we believe, most emphatic. The noble Lord asked whether any experiments had actually been made in North Africa. The answer to that is, not so far as I am aware, at any rate upon any large scale, because there is no national flour in that area upon which to experiment. But I understand that tests have been made under similar conditions, and we naturally would be only too anxious to see, if the flour was on the spot, what steps could be taken still further to preserve the flour supply.
The noble Lord suggested that the milling facilities in the Mediterranean area should be supplemented, but he will appreciate, I am sure, that the existing facilities were built to supply the needs of the local inhabitants, and there is no useful surplus capacity available for the use of our Forces. There are two main reasons against building new mills which might be considered. First of all, adequate mills already exist in Australia and Canada, and the duplication of these facilities would use up skilled labour, expensive manufactured materials, and shipping space. Secondly, the grain ships would be compelled to unload at the ports where the mills had been constructed and not, as at present, at whichever ports are at the moment most conveniently situated for supplying the troops. Finally, I can
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assure the noble Lord that the health of our sailors, soldiers and airmen is not suffering as a result of this policy. They have in the Middle East stood up to the strain in a very remarkable manner, and it is generally conceded that all the way through that wonderful campaign in the Desert they were extremely tough and fit. The rations on which their daily diets are based are, my noble friend will be pleased to know, scientifically built up to give them the quantities and the types of food which they need in order to remain fit to carry out their duties. The food provided for them contains a full measure of those constituents of national flour which were not present, or only present in small quantities, in the white flour previously used in this country. I am glad to be able to assure your Lordships that, from the scientific point of view, that is so.
My noble friend asked whether we could not get any lessons on this subject from the Union of South Africa. I was only aware yesterday that he was going to raise this matter, and I am afraid I have not got the information yet from the Union. But most certainly I will cause inquiry to be made. I realize that the noble Lord has raised this question primarily on health grounds. I for one am sure that the virtues of national bread are great. Our country has certainly not suffered but has benefited since the change. I can find no lack of benefit myself in the new diet. But the main point appears to us to be that there is no prospect of getting wheat meal flour to the Mediterranean unless we build mills there. That, for reasons which I have attempted to give, is not possible and for those same reasons I think your Lordships will agree that at the present time it is undesirable.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for the tone of his reply and for the full information he has given. He did not give me entire satisfaction, I am afraid. In the last of my three points at the end I suggested that at least perhaps we could be assured that the deficiencies were met in some form and on that point the noble Lord's answer was satisfactory. But that was rather the last resort, and I cannot help feeling that more should be done to get over these difficulties. For our machines, for our lorries, for our guns, we would not put up with anything but the best oil, the best fuel, the best lubricants and the best

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explosives. The human machine is infinitely more important even than the mechanical apparatus with which our men have to fight, and I feel that no effort ought to be spared to bring their food up to the highest point of nutritional value. But as I have said, my Motion was one of exploration, a reconnaissance, and I ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw it.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

DIOCESAN EDUCATION COMMITTEES MEASURE, 1943.
Text of the Measure laid before the House (pursuant to Act) and to be printed.
Eighty-ninth Report of the Ecclesiastical Committee, being the Report of the Committee upon the Diocesan Education Committees Measure, 1943, laid before the House (pursuant to Act) and to be printed.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932.
Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department extending Section 1 of the Act to the

County Borough of Darlington,

Borough of Sale:

Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) for affirmative Resolution and ordered to lie on the Table.
House adjourned.