Lords Sitting of 20 October 1943

Preamble
The House met, The EARL OF ONSLOW on the Woolsack.
TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING (INTERIM DEVELOPMENT) (SCOT LAND) BILL.
Brought from the Commons, and read 1a.

AIR TRANSPORT.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY rose to ask His Majesty's Government for a declaration of policy in relation to postwar air transport with special reference to the vital importance of the earliest possible development of Inter-Commonwealth and Empire air routes; and to move for Papers. The noble Marquess said: My Lords, I feel that I owe your Lordships an apology for bringing before you again almost identically the same Motion as I introduced on July 13. Your Lordships will remember that on that occasion there was some misunderstanding between the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, and myself. He was authorized to reply for the Government, and amongst his remarks he said that I had spent 85 seconds—I think that was the time he gave me—in addressing myself to the Motion which I had on the Paper. The noble Lord was quite correct. I had asked him about research and I can confine any remarks I have to make about research to less than 85 seconds now. I should like to ask what is being done about research. Our own activities in that direction are well known to everyone, but are guarded as a close secret. I hope the noble Lord who is to reply will be able to give us some information about the steps which are being taken in relation to research.
As your Lordships are aware, I have pressed this matter on more than one occasion, and the subject has been brought forward in another place, with the object of eliciting from the Government a reply in relation to policy. That is really what we want. We are always hopeful that the Government will be able to tell us the policy which they are pursuing in relation
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to what is called post-war aviation. I think your Lordships will agree with me when I say that all the replies which we have received—and I should be the last to attach blame to any individual—have been very unsatisfactory indeed. The noble Lord, Lord Sherwood, has replied on more than one occasion, and the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, has discharged that difficult and unenviable task with great eloquence and with that consideration which characterizes the discharge of his duties as Leader of your Lordships' House. Now we have another champion who has come forward to reply to this Motion in the person of the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook. I would venture to welcome Lord Beaverbrook from the bottom of my heart. I am proud to think he is an old friend of mine. We have had a long association and I have always felt that Lord Beaverbrook possesses to a very high degree that quality of drive and determination and that capacity for getting things done which are so important in these days. I most sincerely hope that the sort of gloom which seems to affect Ministers who cross the sacred portals into the hierarchy will not affect my noble friend. We are accustomed to his exuberance when sitting on the other side of the House in a position of less responsibility and greater freedom, and I hope he will continue to show that exuberance now and will also inspire us by that exhilaration which has always characterized his speeches.
The replies which we have received have been by no means satisfactory, and I feel impelled to say—to use an old phrase which I think your Lordships know well, and which I have sometimes used before—"Tell me anything you like, but do not take me for a complete fool." I make a present to the noble Lord of that sentence. He may cast any aspersions he likes on my mental capacity, but I would venture to impress upon him that my friends and those with whom I am associated, some of whom perhaps, wrongly, credit me with greater power than I possess, are by no means fools. Innumerable pamphlets Have been brought out and endless representations have been made, but, so far as I can judge from the contacts I have made, those representations have practically fallen upon deaf ears. Although the last occasion on which I raised this matter was

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as long ago as July 13, I stand before your Lordships now without any further information than I had at that time, except, perhaps, on one particular point which I shall venture to allude to in a few minutes.
Though your Lordships are fully cognizant of the fact, I should like first of all to say that whatever representations we make, whatever words we use, whatever desires we express, they are not intended to interfere—and in my judgment they do not interfere—with our war effort. That effort naturally comes first. Everything must give way to the promotion of it, and nothing must be put forward which will in any way hinder the effort which is being made in support of our cause in so many parts of the world at the present moment. Bombing is invaluable and I would do nothing to hinder the putting into effect of our policy with regard to it. Nor would I suggest the diversion of the manufacture of aircraft from machines which are needed in that connexion. That applies to transport aircraft. We want transport aircraft, but those who are in charge of policy are the right persons to decide how far we can embark on the construction of transport machines, possibly with the effect of diminishing the production of our bombing aircraft. On that point I do not wish to express any opinion. I do, however, regret the necessity for repeatedly bringing up this matter, as I sometimes feel that if in the previous stages of our discussions the representatives of the Government could have given us a little encouragement, or some little idea that there was a concerted policy in their minds, these later debates need never have taken place. But it is incumbent upon us—in fact I feel, myself, that it is my duty—to make representations concerning what we want.
I am bound to say that I believe that one of our many difficulties has been the War Cabinet. I have the greatest regard for those Departmental Ministers who constitute the War Cabinet, but I think we have been made to realize that none of them really has executive authority to state in a definite way what is the Government policy on this question of post-war aviation. I have no personal quarrel with any member of the War Cabinet; far from it. But I have noticed latterly—I do not know whether it is due to
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references which I have made to the War Cabinet—that the Prime Minister in his speeches brings the War Cabinet more into the picture than he did before, and that when he is abroad we hear that every one of his actions is accepted and approved of by the War Cabinet. Perhaps that is done with a view to establishing the War Cabinet on a more important basis than that on which they have been established hitherto in the minds of the people of this country. I have in mind especially the statements which the Prime Minister made from Quebec. I think that I am entitled to say that when the Prime Minister returned from Quebec, Lord Beaverbrook immediately came into the picture. He was given duties to perform, and he will tell us to-day what those duties are. Certainly they are in connexion with this policy which we have been pressing in this House. Another matter which seemed to me very striking was that while the Prime Minister was in Quebec, although the crucial question of the coal shortage was in the minds of everybody here, nothing was done and nothing was said until Mr. Churchill came back and made a very valuable intervention in proceedings in the House of Commons. I would like to strengthen the War Cabinet. I wish that my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook was in the War Cabinet, if that would give him any additional authority. I am inclined to think, however, that the noble Lord, with his accustomed drive and determination, will probably achieve as much in the position which he now occupies whether he is in or out of the War Cabinet.
Since July 13, and even before that, we have heard nothing about post-war aviation. From the B.B.C. we hear nothing, and no messages are given to our people. One might imagine that post-war aviation was something relegated to the far-distant future. I am not aware that in any of the schools anything is done to educate the young idea as to this vast revolution which is taking place due to the developments in aviation. The Air Training Corps, of which I am proud to be a member, is the only effort in a juvenile atmosphere to deal with the matter at all. Those of us who are interested in post-war aviation are all busy men, and it is impossible for us to stand on the steps of Ministries trying to gain some information about what is being

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done. We have, however, the good fortune of being able to come to this House and express our opinion, and again I welcome the change which has occurred whereby, so far as; I am aware, Lord Beaverbrook is given authority to deal with this matter. My noble friend is no respecter of persons, and we well know that he has no patience with dilatory official methods. I do not think that he believes in the phrase "agreement in principle," and I do not think that fair words make any difference to him. I know that he will not give us promises unless he is quite certain that he can fulfil them, and I and my friends feel sure that something will now be done.
I must re-state what we want—and I speak not only for myself but for my friends. We want a statement of policy on Empire aviation. We want to know the policy of the Government in regard to international air lines. We want to know the position which the Government take up with regard to the monopoly, the one instrument chosen by the Government. Last, but by no means least, we want to hear whether the Government have made up their minds that civil aviation will be separated from the Air Ministry. With regard to Empire aviation, we have been gratified to learn that a Dominion Conference has been held here, presided over by my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook. That is indeed encouraging. We are glad that it has taken place. I do not know how far the noble Lord will be able to take us into his confidence to-day, and we fully realize the difficulties, but, as I am aware that he knows the anxieties which exist in our minds, we can only hope for the best. I feel that we should have what I would call an Empire Air Council, which would be in continuous session considering and dealing with all these matters on which so much depends. I should have felt more easy in my mind about the recent Conference over which the noble Lord presided if there had been present some of those who are in direct contact with air operations in the Dominions.
Perhaps the noble Lord can tell us what is the authority which deals with these matters. That is a difficulty which is in all our minds. There is a Committee which is presided over by Lord Brabazon, but we know nothing about the activities of that Committee. Questions in the House of Commons are replied to by the
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Air Ministry, but in this House we have the pleasure of listening to Lord Beaverbrook. That does not convey to the people of this country that there is some special authority for dealing with all these matters. I know that your Lordships will agree with me when I say that it is quite impossible to exaggerate the importance of post-war aviation and the position which this Empire will hold in that respect at the end of the war. This country—I regret to say—is not air-minded, and I do not feel that the proper steps are being taken to bring about a change in the mentality of our people. We know quite well that the whole country reveres and honours the exploits of the Royal Air Force, but I do not think that in the mind of the man in the street there is any connexion between the Royal Air Force and aviation as it may affect him in the future. I feel that if the noble Lord will himself broadcast, or use his authority to have this information spread throughout the country, a great step forward will have been taken.
I now come to the question of monopoly. We all know that the British Overseas Airways Corporation was established by Act of Parliament, and has been in existence since 1939. That represents the policy which has been pursued by the Government, the policy of having one official instrument. That does not seem to me to prevent the Government taking us into their confidence and telling us whether their policy in the future is going to follow the same rigid lines. If the noble Lord could tell us that it was in no way the desire of the Government nor part of their future policy that there should be one chosen instrument, a great deal of good would be done. The lack of any statement creates a feeling of uncertainty in the minds of all those who are very anxious to co-operate in this great work of post-war aviation, and, whether one calls it a direct or an indirect influence, it provides a very damping influence on all our designers in this country.
This raises the question of private enterprise, on which I do not propose to enter to-day. I am alarmed to find that the Government are so anxious not to tread on people's toes and to offend susceptibilities that they do not seem to attach that importance to private enterprise which the vast majority of the people of this country do attach to it, and which makes it one of the prime moving factors

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in America. In relation to the British Overseas Airways Corporation, I do not know whether the noble Lord is aware that Mr. Yarex was over here. He controls the West Indian Airways, and he has interests in Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, Chile and Nicaragua. Those interests have been sold to Mr. Luce and Mr. Kaiser. Our West Indian Airways are associated with the British Overseas Airways Corporation, and yet this tremendous undertaking has gone by the board without many people knowing anything about it at all. Perhaps the noble Lord can give us some information about that.
The next question is the separation of civil aviation from the Air Ministry. I have naturally considered this question very deeply. I have wondered whether in the future civil aviation should come under the Ministry of Transport or under the Board of Trade; and I feel that in view of the vast developments which are going on it will be necessary to have a Minister of Air Transport to whom all these great questions can be referred. I hope that my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook when he replies will realize that we are in contact with a very large number of people, and that these people are waiting for some encouragement from the Government and for a statement which will give some idea of the policy which the Government propose to pursue. I do not know whether the noble Lord has yet had time to study the many plans which are in existence in the minds and in the hands of many independent people who have an idea as to how the future of postwar aviation should be conducted.
I should like to say one short word about the great shipping interests. I have had several meetings and innumerable conversations with their representatives. I do not know whether the Government are in a position to-day to tell us how they view the possible activities of the shipping interests. I am continually asked questions about that. Although I have to say that I really know no more than anybody else about these matters, my reply is always "Go ahead. It has never been the habit of this country, or of any industry in this country, to wait for a lead from the Government. Produce your plan, estimate your capacity and carry on as your fathers carried on." We know quite well that the great shipping
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companies are the foundation of the prosperity of this country and the foundation of the British Empire. It is due to them, their resource and their pioneering instinct that the British flag has been planted all over the world. These great companies have the knowledge and the technique of transport, and it seems to me obvious that when transport and communications are to so great an extent to be turned over to the air, those people who are cognizant of all the difficulties of transport are the people who should take the major part in assisting the Government to carry out the policy which we all have in our minds. As I have said, there are various pamphlets in existence, all of them intensely interesting. I have no doubt your Lordships read the article in the Observer by Mr. Thornton, who is a member of the General Council of British Shipping, which showed very clearly the direction in which the shipping mind is turning.
Now I come to America, and whereas I can speak with a certain freedom, which is not allowed to people who are in more responsible positions, I am naturally not going to say anything of a critical nature. I admire the forceful appreciation by the Americans of the rapidly moving events in the world of aviation. There is bound to be competition. The world without competition would indeed be a sad place; its capacity and efficiency and its striving after perfection would indeed be at a low ebb. But I am not anticipating any trouble in this connexion. I am quite sure that, in accord with the views expressed by that great man, the President of the United States, co-operation can and will be developed between this country and America—and with Russia also—in connexion with all the great air lines throughout the world. In this country we have concentrated on fighters and bombers. We won the Battle of Britain, and I am not ashamed to go on repeating myself about that great feat which was performed in the early stages of the war, when we held the fort by ourselves for a year and more. It is necessary that we should take a foremost position in all the arrangements which will be made as time goes on. America has had the opportunity to build aircraft for post-war aviation requirements, and I think that if we look into the future, we shall see very clearly that a great many of the smaller countries will

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rely on American aircraft for the continuation of their own aviation, which they are not likely to neglect. We shall require American co-operation, and I am optimistic enough to believe that we shall get that co-operation. In view of the manner in which co-operation has been achieved throughout this war, I am quite convinced that when the demands of suffering humanity come to us in their volume and profusion, as they will do at no very distant date, that friendly co-operation between those great countries, which are capable of bringing relief to the millions of suffering people in the world, will continue on a smooth basis.
I would say this in connexion with Empire air transport, that, while we may depend to a very large extent on the assistance which America can give us, and while we shall utilize what we speak of as converted bombers for carrying out a certain part of that transport, still I should like to feel—and I should like the Government to express it as a very definite policy—that in five or six years, or whatever the term may be, Empire aviation will be served by Empire aircraft and Empire personnel. As I have said I am pinning my faith on Lord Beaverbrook. I know, and he knows better than we do, that he has a great task to perform, but what I can guarantee to him is an increasing support in this country for any definite policy which he adopts. The noble Lord may go to America. I do not know what his plans are, but I would venture to advise him that when he goes he should go with a policy and a plan. In his long experience he will have learnt that in whatever business he has had to transact, if he had a policy and a plan he was much more likely to achieve his object. The root of all our troubles in this country has been a lack of policy for a good many years past, and America has suffered from the same failing, as one can read in the very interesting book recently published by Mr. Lippmann. We have been confronted by countries which either because they nourished grievances or were moved by acquisitive characteristics or a spirit of aggression, had a policy and a plan hostile to ourselves, and we should have learnt our lesson because we had to meet their challenge without a policy and without plans. The British Empire can only maintain its world position if we have our policy and our plan and also if our statesmen have the courage and the
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wisdom of their forefathers to carry them out. I beg to move.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: My Lords, I am sure it will be generally agreed that we owe a debt of gratitude to the noble Marquess for raising this question again. What always surprises me now is the interest that is taken in aviation as a whole, be it military or civil. It seems to me only a few years ago that my noble friend Lord Stansgate and myself, in another place, alone in the whole Chamber spoke about aviation, but now I think the whole world realizes what an important part flying is going to play in the future world. In this House my noble friend Lord Londonderry has through his persistence alone introduced quite a new element into the situation: he has shifted Lord Beaverbrook from the Opposition Benches to the Ministerial Beach. That is a very considerable feat, and it will be within the recollection of your Lordships' House that when the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, was sitting here, he at times expressed some anxiety on the situation developing in the world and the Government's attitude to the question of a Second Front. He was very persistent on that subject, and we here thought that perhaps he interrogated the Government a little too closely. I should not like to-day to fall into the same mistake by asking him for any news on that delicate situation, but I should like to know whether, having joined His Majesty's Government, his conscience is quite clear on the matter. I do not know whether the Official Report can report a nod, but I hope your Lordships noticed the nod. I hope that the inclination of his Lordship's head will be reported throughout the world, up and down the Steppes of Russia and in Moscow, and that it will keep Dr. Goebbels awake at night and, when he sleeps, give him nightmares.
The situation wants to be made clear as to what Lord Beaverbrook's position is. He is Lord Privy Seal with, I understand, a special job to do. He is not taking over civil aviation. It would be a very regrettable thing if in future we were not to have those crystal clear windings-up by my noble friend Lord Sherwood on the various points we put to him on aviation in general, nor to have the resounding eloquence of my noble friend Lord Cherwell when he speaks to us on scientific

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matters. We may take it that aviation in general is taken over in this House now by the triumvirate which, on the Front Bench at this moment, is interrupted by the Leader of the House. I take it that the special job of Lord Beaverbrook is to deal with the international set-up of aviation as a whole throughout the world. It is obvious that, when you are taking on a vast job like that, it is as well to know what you think yourself, and it is good news to hear that there has been a conference and that a measure of agreement up to a certain point has been got from the constituent members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
My noble friend Lord Londonderry raised some very difficult points on private enterprise, control, and that sort of thing, but these are questions to be answered by the Air Minister or his representative. The problem with which Lord Beaverbrook is charged is somewhat different— it is the broad world situation—and in that connexion certain important questions emerge immediately: "Can we fly over other people's country? Can we fly people into other people's country? And can we fly them out?" Then there is the tiresome question of what in shipping parlance is called cabotage, which refers to flying across somebody else's country—can you take people up or deposit them within it? All these are questions on which you may get agreement within the Empire, but on which other countries may refuse to agree.
I have no doubt some conclusions have already been arrived at, but there is a tremendous amount of talk about the post-war situation—if I may say so, a lot of loose talk. There is a lot of loose talk in America, and "loose" in this case is spelt "Luce". Here we have very grave suspicions that if we were not sending somebody with the astuteness of Lord Beaverbrook we might be tripped up in negotiations in America because one wants a long spoon when supping with Pan-Americans. There are one or two points with regard to world traffic which I hope Lord Beaverbrook will bear in mind in his negotiations. The great route of the world is going to be America—Europe. For at least three or four years it will not be possible to fly New York—London, and the reverse, as a regular route. There must be an aerodrome on the way. I do not say it cannot
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be done, but it cannot be done as a regular thing. Consequently, Newfoundland comes in as one of the most important places in the world because it is on the direct geodesic line. In Newfoundland the British Empire happens to possess the two most important bases in the world. Americans may talk about other places being important up and down the world, but there are no more important bases than Goose Bay and Gander in Newfoundland. I hope that the Government will see that these remain in Newfoundland's hands and are not parted with and given to any other Dominion. That is one of the most important matters on this particular question.
Many people hope and think that we may get into big civil aviation immediately after the war. We have not got the personnel. Americans very wisely put all their civil aviation personnel into uniform, and they have flying all over the world to-day what look like military machines and military personnel, but what are really civil personnel dressed up. Our Government are to be congratulated on doing the reverse—that is starting a Transport Command—but I hope it will be realized that when the war ceases the personnel of the Air Transport Command should be used for running civil air lines throughout the world. I do not think we should run down our own great company, the B.O.A.C. That company has been operating for a few years, but it has not had a chance to get going. It has been operating under considerable difficulties, and with a great lack of equipment. I have myself tremendous faith in General Critchley, who is now in charge. I am sure he will get the spit and polish and look after the general comfort of the passengers and make it, I am perfectly certain, a first-class show.
Now we come to that vexed question of machines. There indeed is the rub. It is true to say we have got one or two types which could be evolved from the bomber of to-day and which are pretty good. I hope they will not become known as converted bombers, because they are not really converted bombers but machines evolved from the bomber. Some of them are quite serviceable, but it is important that new machines and new engines should be thought of now. In that connexion we always say "We must not disturb the war effort" and "How cross America would

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be if we were to build such a machine." Transportation by air is either a war help or it is not. If transportation by air is not of military assistance to the war, why is America building so many transport machines? If it is of assistance to the war, why are we not building any? You cannot have it both ways. It is ridiculous that one country should devote all its resources to one particular type: of machine while another country builds another type which has post-war advantages. There is nothing, as far as I can see, which would not be helping the war if we concentrated a little more on transport machines than we have done in the past. There are Committes of experts to recommend the types of machines that will be wanted, but whatever such Committes may recommend and whatever the wisdom of their recommendations may be they cannot implement their recommendations. That is a matter entirely for the Government. It is the responsibility of the Government to see that there does evolve in time—and the sooner the better—some study and development of these transport machines which we hope one day may be of civil use.
I want to stress the importance of Lord Beaverbrook's work. Everybody is fond of acclaiming the future to-day, but there is a tendency, I think, to forget that if the plans and the efforts of so many are to be of any good the security of the world must be assured. The security of the world is wrapped up with this setup of aviation after the war, and the set-up of civil aviation is just as important as the military one. I hope the noble Lord will not look upon the job that he has taken on and is now doing as being an ad hoc job. It is a job which stretches far into the future and is going to be of vast importance to us all. And I would like to say this to your Lordships: just as his job is one of the most important when he goes to America to negotiate, so ours in this country is important also and that is to give him whole-hearted support so that he realizes he has behind him that united opinion which will strengthen his position. There is an American song which says "Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition." That is the situation to-day. Let us back up the noble Lord who takes on this great responsibility, and let us get going on some good new aircraft.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, we have heard here and in other places about companies, national combines and so forth, to run aviation after the war and I would like to contribute one small voice in favour of international co-operation. We can see passing over our heads day and night an amazing example of magnificent international co-operation in the bombers which are going out on great expeditions in which they get accurately to the places they want to get to on the very second at which they want to get there and arrive home again to an exact schedule. Yet we are talking of smashing all this organization after the war and going in for small companies and national organizations. That seems to me to be a pity. After all, the bomber forces and the air forces of the United Nations have got everything that is necessary to form a big international combine. They have got a chain of air fields that spreads all over the world. They have got very fine bomber and transport planes. These would be very good to found air lines with. I myself know what they are like because I have flown in some of them recently. I am sure they would make very fine air liners while we are waiting for something else to be developed. Then the Air Forces have got masses of well-trained pilots. They have got ground crews who know how to handle the craft. They have got, as we have heard, transport commands which are well experienced by now in running air-line services. All this they have already got organized. English pilots, American pilots and pilots of all the United Nations have been co-operating with each other. They know the ground and the surface of the seas all over the world. Yet many people say "After the war all this must be broken up."
We know the loathing of some of the United Nations to organized Government projects, but surely there is some middle way that has been forgotten. Could not an international company be formed to do this work? We have not got many examples of international companies of that size in the world, but there is one, the Suez Canal Company, which as everybody knows is an international company. Some of its shareholders are Governments and some are private individuals. It is carrying on a job which is particularly vital for a large number of countries, and there has been no complaint as to its

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running nor has there been any squabbling over it. I feel sure the same thing could be done with regard to the air. Alter all, what is the alternative? We have already heard, even this afternoon in this House, about some of the innumerable little squabbles which are going to arise if we choose any other way. We hear about such matters as what nations are allowed to fly over what countries, who may land on what air field, whom the air fields belong to, who may pick up in a country and who may put down'there, and whether one may be allowed to pick up in the same country and re-land in it. This kind of thing is going to get worse and worse. We have only heard the beginning of it. Already in other countries especially in the United States of America, claims are being made to air fields all over the world on the ground that money has been spent on them. As I said, this is only the beginning. It is going to become a grand free fight for all if left as it is. Surely all this can be entirely stopped if one international company is allowed to control the whole thing. There is a lot to be said in favour of a single unit controlling the whole thing.
I am too young to remember the days when the railways in this country were run by hundreds of little companies, but other members of your Lordships' House may do so. If so they will remember the changing of trains, the rights of one company over another company's lines, the mucking about of trains and services and the question of whose was whose and what was what. It was such matters as these that finally induced them all to join together in a few big companies. What happened in this country in the matter of railways is going to happen over the whole surface of the globe in the matter of airways. The result of the railways combining was that train speed increased from about ten miles to some sixty miles an hour, and that long journeys could be made in comfort without the innumerable changes formerly necessary. Airways are very different from the seaways. Your ordinary ten-knot cargo boat takes a considerable time to get about the surface of the water and even big liners are not likely to exceed 30 or 40 knots in any time which we are able to foresee, but already air liners make 300 or 400 knots, and where is it going to stop? The time for combining airways is not far in the
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future, but now. It seems to me that if things are some day obviously going to come under international control we have already gone a long step along the road towards international control in our magnificent fighting forces fighting as one unit. There we have got something which should not be lightly thrown away and which we would do well to make the basis and foundation of the united airways of the world to come.
House adjourned during pleasure, and resumed by the LORD CHANCELLOR.
VISCOUNT ROTHERMERE: My Lords, I should like to congratulate the Government upon having at last held the Imperial Conference. We have had many debates upon this subject in your Lordships' House and we have urged the Government time and time again to call this conference together. Therefore now that it has been held I think the thanks of your Lordships are due to the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, has been charged by the Government at somewhat short notice to look after the matter of civil aviation. For many years Lord Beaverbrook has taken an interest in civil aviation and therefore it is no new subject to him. Of course, it is somewhat strange to see Lord Beaverbrook presiding over what must have been one of the biggest Committees of the last three or four years, after the many speeches which we have heard from him in this House when he has told us he has absolutely no use for Committees at all. On the other hand, he certainly disposed of this Committee in record time. The Conference sat for two and a half days and my only hope is that in disposing of the Conference he did not also dispose of other pressing and difficult problems by the expedient of not discussing them. I do not say for a moment that the length of a Conference is any criterion of the amount of work which has been got through, and it may be that the Conference, if short, has been successfull. It may be that many decisions have been come to. But in a Conference in which over fifty people take part, it certainly would seem that they must have been kept to more or less elementary problems.
It is unfortunate that Lord Beaverbrook is not speaking earlier in this debate because we are really discussing the subject without any public knowledge of what

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the Conference has done. Nevertheless I think it most important that we should state our views without that knowledge. I cannot see that there was any reason for the Conference not studying the whole problem in great detail. I do not believe for one moment that any feeling would be aroused in America if it were known that we were making our own plans, subject of course to their discussion and approval. What do we really want as our plan? I have never heard any member of the Government—we will hope Lord Beaverbrook is going to prove an exception—state what the Government want, but I am not afraid of stating quite frankly what I want, and I am quite sure a great number of your Lordships are not frightened of stating it either. I want to see an efficient, economic, prosperous, splendid air transport service run by this country after the war. I am not going to enter into the question whether it should be run by a certain instrument, whether it should be run by shipping interests or what form it may take. That is a matter to be decided by the Government and communicated to this House when we can discuss it at the proper time. In principle it makes no difference what form the instrument takes. What we want to see is that we have an air transport service, economic, imperial and strategical, running throughout all the routes of the world in which we are interested as an Empire. In saying that we can have no possible objection to America or to Russia having the same notion concerning their spheres of interest. America and Russia will have after the war far and away a majority of their air lines internally. We in this country, if we are to be prominent at all in civil aviation, must have a majority of our air lines externally. The Prime Minister said in one of his famous speeches that we are not land animals. Of course we are not land animals because our history has been built up on the sea, but in the future it must be built up upon the sea and in the air, and if that is not the case then there can be no question that these islands will gradually sink into the position of a second- or third-rate power.
The noble Viscount who has just spoken has put forward a view which has been put forward from these Benches on many occasions, that there should be an international air transport system. I do not
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know why air transport should be picked for this experiment. I perfectly appreciate and welcome the idea which is put forward, that humanity is advancing gradually towards an international authority which will be able to prevent wars from breaking out, but surely it is putting the cart before the horse if you are going to have an international air transport system before you have got the authority to which it must be responsible. You cannot have an international air transport system running throughout the world and responsible to all the Governments in the world. You must first of all create your authority. Why pick on one form of transport? Why not shipping? Why not any other form of communication? Why not the Air Force? Why not the Army and Navy? There are just as good reasons for every one of these as for air transport. If it were possible, one day, to reverse the whole history of the Reformation, to reverse the whole history of the nationalistic tendency of the age, if it were possible for that to be reversed and the world to accept an international authority; if, reversing the refusal to accept an international authority of the Papal power in Rome, the world should come back to another form of international authority to which nations will have to give up their sovereign rights; if that ideal should one day become an accomplished fact well then, of course, air transport will be run by that authority in the same way as practically everything else in the world. But until that time arrives it is, I suggest, playing with the question, and only creating difficulties, to suggest that it should be done at this time.
Some people have the extraordinary idea that transport planes, in the event of war, can be made immediately into bombers. Of course such an idea is perfectly ridiculous. None of the giant passenger planes of the future is going to be easily convertible into a bomber. Many people imagine that the Lufthansa was the germ of the Luftwaffe. The fact is that the germ of the Luftwaffe was to be found in the hundreds of flying clubs that sprang up throughout Germany after the last war. Are you going to control flying clubs over here? After the war, in this country, there will be flying clubs springing up, I hope, everywhere. Are they going to be controlled? They are

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going to be the nurseries of the airmen of the future, though it is not to them that we shall look for the middle-aged pilots who are going to fly the transport planes. The transport service cannot be converted for war uses. I do hope your Lordships will realize, as Mr. Howe said the other day —and I entirely agree with him—that no existing bomber could be made into a successful transport plane. And the reverse is also true.
Of course, as Lord Brabazon has mentioned, it is going to make our situation much more difficult after the war, this fact that no bomber can make a really successful transport plane. Lord Brabazon, incidentally, is the Chairman of several mysterious Committees which report from time to time. Nobody knows to whom they report—certainly the public does not know. The noble Lord makes speeches in this House somewhat critical of the Government, and has various cracks at the Americans, but we know nothing of his real activities as Chairman of these Committees. I think he would be doing much more useful service if he would get up and tell us what his work really is. I deprecate the suggestion that negotiations with America will be as difficult as he has told us they will be. I do not believe it. As a matter of fact those who have read the article written by Mr. Trippe, President of Pan-American Airways, which was published the other day, will have seen that it was an extremely reasonable article. It was perfectly fair, and Mr. Trippe pointed out that America has no desire whatever, should she finish the war with more transport planes than any other country, to take an unfair advantage of the circumstance.
I am quite certain that if Mr. Trippe holds that opinion, it can be said that it is shared amongst all those who really know something of civil aviation and are interested in it. I have no doubt whatever that if the practical experts in civil aviation internationally were to get round a table agreement would follow very quickly indeed. It is not technical difficulties which we have to anticipate, but political difficulties. Conversations with people like Mr. Trippe, who knows his business, are extremely easy. It is when conversations take place between politicians that matters tend to become extremely difficult.
There is a question which I would like to ask Lord Beaverbrook, but I do not
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suppose he can reply on this particular matter as he has only recently been appointed Chairman of the Imperial Conference and can only answer with respect to that. But perhaps Lord Sherwood may be going to say something in this debate. In case he is, or in any case— for if he does speak he probably will not tell me anything—I am going to ask a question. The question relates to a London air port, and I shall be glad if Lord Sherwood would give me his attention for a moment. I want to ask him about a London air port. It is most important for this country that we should have a London air port, that it should be the terminus for the transport lines that will be entering this country, that the passengers arriving here, after the war, should not be forced to travel seven or eight hours by train before they arrive in London, and that the port should be within twelve or fifteen miles from the centre of London so that people can motor straight to their destinations. I wish to ask whether any plans have been made for a London air port, whether any ground has been bought, whether anything at all, in fact, has been done about it. In case, however, it is a matter which does not really arise in his debate, I do not propose to press it too much now. I would take the opportunity, however, of letting my noble friend know that if no reply is given to this question to-day I intend to put down a Motion on the Order Paper for some future date.
I do not wish to keep your Lordships any longer, but I do ask that between this move of the Imperial Conference and the next move—which will, presumably, take place in America—we shall not be obliged to wait so long as we have already had to wait for the Imperial Conference. I expect that Lord Beaverbrook will be able to tell us when the next move is going to take place. I feel certain that, in his hands, matters will move rapidly, and that we shall have conferences in America succeeded by another conference in London. I am sure that it is the desire of your Lordships, as it is of the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, of myself and of others who have taken an interest in civil aviation, that the matter should be decided before the end of the war.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, I desire to express my appreciation of the return of Lord Beaverbrook to the Government,

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and to say how glad I am, in particular, that he has interested himself in this matter of civil aviation. He has always stood for the rights of the individual and for private initiative, and it is on that ground that I want to say a few words to your Lordships. I also welcome the fact that my noble friend Lord Knollys has taken over the control of British Overseas Airways; but if that is going to be the one monopoly to run the civil aviation of Britain after the war I think that he has taken on a very big job. I do not see how the work can be properly done by a monopoly.
I listened in this House some time ago to the eulogy which Lord Reith gave us of the work of Imperial Airways before the war. I stated then that I had used Imperial Airways to a very large extent and had tried to use them even more, but that in my opinion, as the representatives in the air of the British Empire, they were the laughing-stock of the world. I mentioned one case, I may remind your Lordships, when I tried to book in June three seats to fly to Australia in December, and this monopoly told me that they could not book the seats, because they were likely to have a large amount of Christmas mail in December. They recommended me to go to the Dutch company, which I did, and that company jumped at the opportunity. I feel that the liner companies are really the people who should tackle this business. I have nothing to do with them, however, and they are quite capable of looking after themselves. There are some very able men in control of our shipping lines who, if they want to run air transport, are well able to put their own case. If air transport is not run as a monopoly, however, there is one difficulty, and that is subsidies. In my opinion the subsidies ought to be only the provision of aerodromes and aerodrome facilities and everything possible to help aeroplanes, just as ports are provided for steamships. Over and above this, there should be payment only for work actually done, that is, the mails carried, which should be paid for on the basis of so much an ounce; and the payment should be something like what the public is asked to pay for the carriage of mails by air.
The Mercantile Marine started in a very small way. Many of your Lordships know more about it than I do, but before the introduction of the principle of
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limited liability every ship was bought and sold in sixty-fourths; people put their heads together and drew upon their savings and each bought one sixty-fourth of a ship. Even to-day I believe that if you buy or sell a ship you buy or sell sixty-four sixty-fourths, and then you know that you are dealing with the whole ship. When limited liability came in, small companies were formed, and the origin of the great British Mercantile Marine is these small one-ship companies, companies formed by men who had learnt their business in Cardiff, Newcastle, London and so on, who had often started as office boys, but who had proved their worth and had, by their push and grit, induced others to invest their small savings in the enterprise. In many cases they had a small prospectus and went from door to door collecting the small savings of the people, in that way raising a few hundred pounds. Then they went to a store dealer and promised to buy the ship's stores from him, and he invested £500. They next went to insurance brokers and promised to insure the ship through them, and they invested £1,000. Finally, they went even to the captain and mate whom they were going to employ, and got their savings put into it, so that everybody connected with the ship was interested in it. When they had got together about £5,000, they went to a shipbuilder and asked him whether he would build them a ship if they gave £5,000 in cash and a mortgage for the remainder. Most of the single-ship companies started on that basis; in Cardiff and Newcastle there were any number of them. Those men proved their grit and capacity, they knew their business, and they gradually obtained further financial support and built other ships. In the end, these single-ship companies combined, and that is the origin of most of our big shipping companies to-day.
I am in favour of this private enterprise; it is the only thing which has built up the British Empire, which would not have existed without the Mercantile Marine. I want the Government to do nothing that will stop the private individual who wants to do so from ordering an aeroplane, buying it, and flying it for hire anywhere. The liner companies at sea have always been against the tramp steamer, as taking the plums, and by their deferred rebate system they managed to

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keep these ships out, because the "tramp" was cheaper and could always undercut the others when given the opportunity. However, whenever there was a sudden demand it was the tramp steamer which had to meet it, and it will be the same in the air. This air transport is going to be an immense business. There are thousands of ports in the world, but after the war there will be tens of thousands of aerodromes all over the world, and I do not believe that any monopoly company or any half dozen monopoly companies can possibly serve the public properly. We shall need the tramp company to take the emergency cargoes. If mining machinery has to be sent by air transport to an out-of-the-way place, the monopoly company will not be able to face it. The whole distribution to far-distant places must be done by the smaller men if it is going to be done efficiently. I hope that the noble Lord will be able to assure us that the Government will do nothing which would make it impossible after the war for any Briton to build, buy and fly for hire an aeroplane wherever he wants to, and that they will give him every assistance in the use of aerodromes, the provision of radio facilities and so on, just as steamships can now use the ports and port facilities of the world.
LORD SEMPILL: My Lords, I should like to join with noble Lords who have already spoken in congratulating the noble Marquess on bringing this matter once again to the attention of your Lordships' House. With him, we are all looking forward to a very interesting pronouncement from my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook, not only to-day but from time to time as these important matters with which he is charged develop. In previous debates on air transport, consideration has been given to the international aspect and to methods of co-operation with the United States of America and with other countries; but the noble Marquess's Motion to-day deals with air transport from the Empire and Commonwealth standpoint. I fully support him in this, and am entirely convinced that we should concentrate on setting our own house in order, leaving the particular methods of international co-operation to develop, as they certainly will, while we develop those important world-flung links for the British peoples.
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The names of the important Dominion and Empire representatives attending the recent Conference which was presided over by my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook have been given, but, so far as I can ascertain, I do not think we have been told the names of the representatives of Great Britain. I think that those names should be known, and I hope that when my noble friend comes to deal with this matter he will tell us who the British representatives at this important Conference were. At that Conference no doubt many important and fundamental points with regard to the rights of passage, of landing and of the picking up of passengers and freight were agreed to, and we shall no doubt be told something about that; but I should like to ask what method is proposed for continuing this very useful beginning.
Obviously the Conference over which the noble Lord presided for two and a half days was too large a body to meet frequently, as it should, in different parts of the Empire, so a smaller body of representatives, say one or two from each of the Dominions, the Empire and Great Britain, should be constituted. My noble friend Lord Londonderry has mentioned the necessity of such a body being set up, and on another occasion my noble friend Lord Bennett suggested the name of Empire Air Board, or Council for such a body, which in my view should consist of not more than ten or twelve people. If such a body were set up it would surely function in a somewhat similar fashion to the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States of America. The Board, as I see it, having reached agreement with all the Empire partners on the question of, say, the factor of safety of the aircraft to be used, the size and equipment of the landing grounds, and other kindred matters, would see that these were given effect to by the parties concerned. In addition, the Board's duties would, broadly speaking, be primarily to maintain the freedom of air passage for the various Empire and other services. The approach to the whole question would be one in which our aim surely is to make air transport available for all peoples, without any idea of gaining a national advantage. The facilities to be provided should be equally available to all countries. The various constituent parts of the Empire and Commonwealth would be encouraged to operate services to every part, and it

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would be left to the public, by the amount of accommodation it took up, to determine which of those services were best suited to their particular purpose.
In the development of air transport there lies before the British Empire to-day an opportunity greater than that possessed by any other country of showing in a practical way what we mean to do by making available for the benefit of mankind at large the devices of which the aeroplane and its equipment are in the forefront. It surely would not be inappropriate at this moment to remember that he who is by common consent styled the Father of Aeronautics—Sir George Cayley —in his work in the early years of the last century, the fundamental importance of which is appreciated to-day, spoke of the air as
"an uninterrupted navigable ocean that comes to the threshold of every man's door, which ought not to be neglected as a source of human gratification and advantage."
There words were uttered by Sir George about a century ago, and we have not yet followed his advice. Surely now is the time to do so under the leadership of the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, the average person, when he decides to take a holiday, often has the habit of consulting his friends as to their experiences of a particular hotel in the place to which he wants to go. He may get an answer from one friend, "I went to the Grand Hotel. Of course, it is the last word in modern planning. Every room has a bathroom, and it has just been completed. But I found the service very poor indeed." If he goes to another friend he is told, "Well I went to the Royal Hotel. Of course, it is very old-fashioned and there are very few bathrooms, but the manageress takes the greatest trouble, every single thing you want is done for you, and every attention is given." On those two answers, I should choose the Royal Hotel. And although it is of course of the greatest importance that we should have the finest civil aircraft with the finest engines, it is also important that we should give in any British air line the finest service. That is a thing we should be giving now. We are running a number of air lines, not many, unfortunately, and I feel that every effort should be made to make the service in those air lines a by-word of efficiency. I know that that is mainly the concern of
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the chosen instrument, and I hope that Lord Beaverbrook and all those who have to do with civil aviation will ensure that at least the service given in our lines is above reproach. I do not propose to enter into the large question of what the chosen instrument should be in the post-war world, but I think it should be borne in mind that that service, on the ground as well as in the air, will be needed in remote parts of the world. Therefore the help will be required of people and organizations with local knowledge and established connexions. I do not propose to keep your Lordships any longer. We have listened to a most interesting debate, but I would like to emphasize that one watchword, "Service," on any British air line.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, I listened with particular interest to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Milford, because although we have had many debates on civil aviation in this House, to the best of my recollection this afternoon was the first occasion on which a word has been said concerning the interest which the shipping companies have today in this matter. It is obviously a very considerable one. Most of the big shipping companies at the present moment are taking the necessary powers to enable them not merely to operate aircraft but to build aircraft and construct and maintain aerodromes. I am also under the impression that some undertaking has been given that the Government will come to no final decisions in regard to civil aviation matters without the shipowners being given an opportunity of stating their views. I believe that is the case. For that reason I shall be particularly interested if the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, in his reply, is able to state whether the shipping interests were represented at the Conference over which he has just presided. I have read the accounts which have appeared in the Press concerning that Conference, but I did not notice in them that shipping interests were represented at it.
I listened also with great interest to what Lord Milford said on the subject of subsidies for civil aviation, and on that matter I would certainly agree with him. But I think there are certain cases in post-war civil aviation where the granting of subsidies would be justified. There will be cases where, by the granting of a subsidy, it may be possible to open

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up some new route which would be commercially unremunerative. It may be equally the case that by opening up certain air routes it will be possible to develop certain backward areas of the world. It may also be the case that after the war, until aircraft are available, certain companies may have to operate desirable routes with uneconomic machines. In such cases I would say there is a case to be made out for granting a subsidy, but I suggest that where subsidies are granted for good and sufficient reasons there should be complete publicity regarding costings and the subsidies granted.
One or two subjects in Lord Brabazon's speech also attracted my attention. In regard to the question of cabotage, I understand that the President of the United States has declared himself on this subject to the effect that aircraft of another country may descend at an aerodrome in the United States for the purposes of refuelling or servicing, but may not disembark or embark passengers. I also understand that our Prime Minister has declared himself in agreement with that view. I shall not discuss the rights or wrongs of that this afternoon, but if it is the case it seems to me to do away with another case which is put forward by certain prominent Americans that they should have rights in airfields which they have built in foreign countries. If, according to President Roosevelt, nobody may descend upon American airfields in order to embark or disembark passengers, I cannot see what case is left for retaining anything in the nature of rights over these airfields in other countries.
Lord Brabazon anticipated that after this war our own civil aviation would be in difficulties on the question of personnel. I am not disagreeing with him for one moment, but I wish the noble Lord had elaborated that point. I confess I was very surprised to hear that the noble Lord contemplates that that will be one of our serious difficulties. I was not clear as to which particular category of personnel the noble Lord had in mind, and I hope on some future occasion it may be possible for him to say something further on that point. As regards these Committees of experts who are recommending types of machines, I should like to endorse what other speakers have said. It would be of great interest to know what these Com-
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mittees are and who compose them. There seems to me to be a completely unnecessary mystery and secrecy on this point. If we are dealing with civil aviation, surely it is of no value to the enemy if we are told who are on these Committees.
I am sure your Lordships are all very glad to know that Lord Beaverbrook is going to reply this afternoon. In the many debates we have had on civil aviation the Government have put in one batsman after another, and none of them has played a remarkably good innings. I should say, by general consent, that Lord Sherwood played the worst innings of all. I think we shall have some rather more lively batting this afternoon. The existing position with regard to civil aviation has really become very anomalous in the course of the last week or so. Many speakers have asked in the past that there should be a separate Ministry for civil aviation—I would certainly endorse what the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, said on that score— but these requests have always been refused, and at the present moment the position is that civil aviation is the concern of the Air Ministry. A few weeks ago Lord Beaverbrook joined the Government. There has been no official statement, but Press accounts indicate that civil aviation has now passed into the hands of the noble Lord. We have only got the Press to go on, because to the best of my knowledge no official statement has been made. We have merely heard from the Press that Lord Beaverbrook will concern himself with civil aviation, and we have had Press reports that he presided at the Imperial Conference on civil aviation. In default of an official statement, civil aviation remains the concern of the Air Ministry, and it is the case that the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, in whatever activities he may pursue in regard to civil aviation, is not represented in another place. There is no possibility of pursuing interrogations there into the activities of Lord Beaverbrook—a very happy position for the noble Lord, but one which may give rise to a certain amount of feeling and annoyance in another place.
I have asked whether shipping interests were represented at this Imperial Conference. I should equally like to ask whether the Air Ministry was represented,

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it being the case that the Air Ministry is still charged with responsibility for civil aviation. The Conference was certainly very large, but it was disposed of with a rapidity which is almost a record, I should say, even in transactions with which Lord Beaverbrook has been concerned. I should like to ask how the findings of this Conference will be brought before Parliament. Lord Brabazon said that some agreement had already been reached at this Conference, and he also said that Lord Beaverbrook was going to the United States of America. It is a matter of some interest and importance to know how these decisions and agreements are going to be brought before Parliament, and to what extent we can be committed in regard to civil aviation without Parliament having had an opportunity of discussion. These points which I have brought forward all reinforce the arguments in favour of a separate Ministry for civil aviation.
Quite clearly the Air Ministry, which has the nominal responsibility, is not functioning at the present moment. Its duties and responsibilities have been taken over by Lord Beaverbrook. There is nothing whatever personal to the noble Lord in what I have said. In fact, nobody would rejoice more than myself if a separate Ministry were constituted and the noble Lord turned out to be the head of it. I should rejoice and offer my congratulations. The present position is anomalous. The present status of the noble Lord seems to be a little irregular and, if he were made, so to speak, "an honest woman of" in regard to this matter of civil aviation, there would be great advantage to the country and great advantage to Parliament, because at the present moment the simple fact is that neither we nor the country have the faintest idea of who is actually running civil aviation.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: My Lords, I shall not detain you more than a few moments. I had no intention of speaking in this debate, but when I saw the Motion of the noble Marquess I thought, in view of the statement made by the President of the United States of America, that the debate this afternoon would hinge to a great extent around that statement. I would ask the noble Lord who is to reply if those are the terms of the reference he had
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for his Conference. President Roosevelt said amongst other things on October I in Washington, according to The Times, that "the problem of post-war aviation had been under discussion for six or eight months. The objectives, he thought, were 'rather simple'—freedom of the air which meant freedom to use air ports, with one limitation." The statement goes on:
"The President said he had discussed this question with Mr. Churchill who, he thought, shared his ideas. Briefly, they felt that the apparatus of aviation within the borders of any country should be owned and run by that country …. Mr. Roosevelt added that where routes could be flown at a profit he thought they should be in the hands of private companies and not of the Government. There might, however, be a few exceptions. The United States might desire air communications with a particular point for some reasons, and might find that the route could not be profitably operated. In such a case, probably a Government line or a United Nations line would be established.
"He, was not worried about the matter of bases abroad—it was a question of 'mutuality.' When it was suggested that some Senators believed that the United States ought to have sovereignty over bases which this country was building, he asked how Americans would feel about other nations having sovereignty over bases in United States territory."
That is really all I have to say. That is a statement made by the President of the United States who said that he thought he was more or less in agreement with our Prime Minister. Since that statement there has been a Conference, presided over I understand by Lord Beaverbrook, who was apparently the only British representative on it outside the Dominions. Now we have had this debate. I must say that I thought it would have hinged a great deal on the statement made and published about three weeks ago.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (LORD BEAVERBROOK): My Lords, there have been so many speakers and so much has been said that I am going to devote a large part of my speech to answering various noble Lords who have spoken. But first of all, in speaking from this Front Bench on this subject, I must state that I never spoke from the Bench opposite on this subject. I made many speeches from there on many subjects but not one on this particular subject. The Manchester Guardian calls me a co-belligerent. A co-belligerent I may be on some issues, but certainly not on this issue of civil aviation. However

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I always have a great deal of sympathy with the Motions that have been brought forward one after the other by my noble friend Lord Londonderry. I have a great deal of sympathy with them. I think the Motions he has brought before this House have really made a very considerable contribution towards the progress of civil aviation in Great Britain.
There are one or two subjects that I want to deal with with some care, but first of all let me make a few observations about air development after the war as I see it. There are many estimates of the extent to which civil aviation will be developed after the war. One estimate is a thousand aeroplanes in Great Britain engaged in civil aviation. Another estimate is 15,000 aeroplanes engaged in civil aviation throughout the world. My own estimate is perhaps 2,000 aeroplanes, and of course it is only an estimate.
LORD STRABOLGI: TWO thousand in Great Britain?
LORD BEAVERBROOK: Two thousand in Great Britain. We must remember that before the war there were less than five hundred aeroplanes in the United States of America engaged in civil aviation, and the United States was the foremost country in the world in the development of civil aviation. I believe that great progress will have taken place during the war and that civil aviation will be engaged in a much bigger way when the war is over. In Canada I have had an opportunity of examining the figures. Air transport there is almost doubled every year in regard to the number of passengers, of express and of mail. From 1941– 42 the growth has not been quite so fast because the number of aeroplanes in operation in Canada has been limited. But civil aviation in Canada should and would double every year if the Canadian Government had the necessary equipment.
Again I believe that newspapers will be carried after the war to an increasing extent by aeroplane. Newspapers were in fact carried before the war to Paris, to Ireland and the West Country by aeroplane. During the war the Times of New York and The Times in Great Britain are both sending copies abroad by means of the aeroplane. It is my belief that in this direction there will be a development in civil aviation and that the carrying of
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mail will exceed even the development in the number of passengers so that plainly civil aviation is likely to grow very fast. But it must be remembered that the figure of two thousand that I have put down—. the figure of one thousand has been given by my cautious noble friend Lord Sherwood and I do not think he takes the responsibility even for that—will not afford a solid basis for the production of aircraft after the war. We have to take into account in dealing with civil aviation the fact that the inherent merits of civil aviation are not something that will enable the civil aeroplane requirements to take up and occupy the slack in manufacturing enterprises when the building of war planes comes to an end.
From these observations I want to pass at once to say what I believe we require here at home. It seems to me that we have the immediate duty to equip ourselves as soon as may be with civil aircraft and here it is our good fortune to benefit from the wisdom of Lord Brabazon's Committee. I am now dealing with Lord Brabazon's Committee, as I have been invited to do by my noble friend Lord Winster and others. We have the good fortune to have the benefit of the wisdom of Lord Brabazon's Committee which deals with engines and aircraft for our post-war requirements—that is our post-war operations. That Committee was set up to deal with that particular issue. It has met regularly and its proceedings are before the Ministries concerned. I may say that Lord Brabazon is the best informed of our technical men and he has a fund of ideas. For my part I mean to follow the views of Lord Brabazon and his Committee so far as I am required to reach decisions in these matters. I hope that is a perfectly plain answer to the question that has been put to me.
Next I come to Empire air development. I have dealt with development as a beginning very briefly because I have a number of remarks made by various noble Lords to deal with and I want to get on as swiftly as possible. In Empire air development we must collaborate with the Dominions and India and the Colonies. In this immense project of Empire air development we will not develop a view which would be exclusive of the interests of others or one that would be directed against them. Not at all. It is our desire that we should go

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forward as an Empire having no differences between ourselves. That has been our policy in relation to the Empire. A Conference has been held in London and that Conference transacted its business in the space of two and a half days, which has displeased some of your Lordships. I will deal with that issue later on. Talks have been conducted with representatives of the Dominions and India and the Colonies. The conversations were necessarily of an exploratory and informal character. They could in no sense commit any of the Governments. The conclusions reached could only be of a provisional nature. But when all these qualifications have been made, the Conference reached a unanimous agreement on every issue presented to it. The issues presented to it were adequate for testing immediate opinion in relation to civil aviation. The Ministers who attended the Conference were Viscount Cranborne, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Lord Leathers, Sir William Jowitt, Lord Cherwell, Mr. Law, Captain Balfour, Mr. Assheton, the Duke of Devonshire and myself. Every issue was dealt with in the space of two and a half days. If that displeases some of your Lordships I must apologize. There are methods of making conferences last longer.
Now I want to deal with the next stage in development. That will be to go forward at once to an international conference. That is our expectation and intention, but it must wait on the United States of America and particularly on Russia, for Russia is engaged on the battle front, and there may be on that account some delay. But we are ready with our plan. If the Dominion Governments approve of what transpired at the two and a half days' conference then we are ready with our plan, an extensive plan and, if I may say so, a complete plan. We are ready. It is all on paper. But you will not be surprised when I say that from planning to achievement is a long leap, a very long leap. It all depends upon whether we can make that leap. Last time we tried we failed completely. In 1930 we began to talk about North Atlantic air services and in 1935 plans were laid for it. Not until 1939 did the passenger service get under way. That means nearly ten wasted years. There was a plan, but there were no passengers and no successful attempt to turn plans into the transport of passengers. That was the last time.
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This time there is something to be said which makes the picture a bit brighter.
In the winter of 1940–41, we did launch a North Atlantic air service. Not only did we launch that service, but we launched it in mid-winter. One of the Ministries— I think it would be wrong to say which— launched a North Atlantic air service and that service began on Armistice Day, 1940. Civil aeroplanes were flown over to Britain. On the first occasion they landed in Ireland and then flew on to Scotland. After that planes flew straight from Newfoundland to Scotland all through the winter. The number of aeroplanes crossing back and forth was very considerable. I will not mention the figure. The direction of that service was under Captain Will Coxon, and the first flight was made by Captain Bennett in mid-winter. We only lost one plane all through the winter, though that, unhappily, had a valuable passenger aboard. The pilots were recruited entirely from civil sources. In the first year, 1940, we recruited one hundred pilots. They were recruited by Mr. MacConnell of Montreal, some from Canada, some from the United States, and some from Great Britain. In the first six months of 1941 we recruited another 200 pilots through the same agency. That service, some time in the summer of 1941, was handed over to the Air Ministry and has been operating most successfully ever since. That is a brighter picture in relation to the North Atlantic traffic, and as the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, said, the North Atlantic traffic is the crux of the position.
As I have said there is a plan. I have tried to outline it in this way, and I hope I have satisfied your Lordships that there is a policy and a plan, a policy which began with the Imperial Conference and will go on to the international conference. There is one noble Lord who cannot quarrel with the plan except in minor details. That noble Lord is my noble friend Lord Londonderry, for the plan to a considerable extent resembles the various projects he has presented from time to time. I may say he nominated me for this post years ago and the Government have even taken heed of him in that respect.
Next let me deal with the question of the chosen instrument. The chosen instrument is for overseas traffic only. It has nothing to do with domestic traffic.

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It is not even a monopoly in one sense, although in effect it is a monopoly. The chosen instrument receives money for the carriage of mails, the only money payment from the Government. In that sense it is a monopoly. It was set up in Parliament in 1939. The Bill came to this House on the first day of August, 1939, and it was debated and passed into law without any dissent at all. There was very little dissent—practically only one or two voices raised in qualifying sentences —in another place, save only from that section which wanted to go further in the direction of Government monopoly. I have been asked what is the policy in relation to this chosen instrument. I have seen no overwhelming demand for a change in policy that has led me to believe that the present is the time to deal with that statutory benefit or advantage or obligation conferred upon the chosen instrument. The chosen instrument is, of course, tied up with the whole question of private enterprise and shipping interests. All this must wait upon the decisions that will be taken at the Imperial Conference, and then, if the chosen instrument is to be abandoned, it will be soon enough to talk of shipping companies and private enterprise in relation to the overseas traffic.
There are other questions of high policy that arose at the Conference of the Dominions and the Empire. One question that arose was the question of an international authority which the noble Viscount, Lord St. Davids, spoke about. The Conference came to a unanimous decision. I point out again that a decision waits upon the approval of the Governments concerned. Those who attended the Conference were not in a position to pledge themselves beyond the right of Governments to revise the decisions of those at the Conference. It was decided unanimously that the international air transport authority should be intimately associated with and responsible to any United Nations security organization which might be established, the air transport authority being, of course, the authority which will be brought into existence if the conference has a happy passage with all the Governments of the Empire, which I believe will be the case.
I will turn now to issues raised by noble Lords in the debate. The noble
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Marquess, Lord Londonderry, asked about research. That is the province of the Brabazon Committee. He referred also to education and I was immensely impressed by what he said. But education is not a subject which I have had the opportunity to consider and to deal with, so far. Apologizing to your Lordships for the delay, I will raise this matter as quickly as may be in the appropriate quarters and will let my noble friend know what can be done. It seems to me that instruction of the young is wrapped up in the question of education.
Then I was asked about civil aviation being separated from the Air Ministry. That, of course, is a matter which I suppose my noble friend expects the Government to consider when the war is over. It would not be expected that we should separate civil aviation from the Ministry while the war is being fought. The Americans have set up a military authority in their country for civil aviation, just as we have one in existence here. I take it that this House is in agreement that civil aviation should remain in the hands of the Air Ministry until the war is over. I take it that there is general and unanimous agreement upon that. My noble friend asked about an Empire Air Conference. That is greatly to be desired, and it may emerge from the international conference that will take place shortly. I have no information concerning Mr. Yarex that would be of any real value. There are two stories but I am not in a position to give any definite assurance one way or another. Lord Brabazon spoke of General Critchley. I would join, if I may, in commending General Critchley to your Lordships. He is a man of remarkable ability; he has great drive, and 1 am confident that he will make a success of the chosen instrument if it is possible to do so.
I have dealt with the speech of Viscount St. Davids and I now come to Viscount Rothermere. He, I thought, referred somewhat sarcastically to the Imperial Conference because it lasted only two and a half days. I hope I gathered rightly what his Lordship meant. I can tell him that he is quite right in saying that he is not afraid to say what he wants with regard to civil aviation. He is quite right. But his Lordship has a tendency to say

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that he wants what he wants when he wants it, and that is the difficulty. Unfortunately for us he did not want it at the right time, and that has been a great tragedy. He was a director of Imperial Airways from 1935 to 1940. Now Imperial Airways had a conference. That conference began in Washington in December, 1935—it was carried on in Ottawa and Washington. It lasted until June 1, 1936. So you see the difference between the conference for which my noble friend Viscount Rothermere was responsible, and the Conference which has been carried through in the last few days.
However, the conference succeeded in hammering out a plan for civil aviation over the North Atlantic for fifteen years, and permits were issued on June 1, 1936. I will tell you what the plan was because it was quite interesting. The round trips, it was laid down, should not exceed two per week—two for Great Britain, that is, and two for the company presided over by the man whom my noble friend admires so very much—Mr. Trippe. Mr. Trippe was conducting negotiations on behalf of his company with the final backing of the United States of America. There was a subsidiary agreement about fares. The number of passengers that could be carried on a British air liner was something short of twenty. On the American Clipper the number was, I think, sixty. The ownership of the British line was to be as to 24½ per cent. Canada, as to 24½ per cent. the Irish Free State, and. as to 51 per cent. Great Britain. The chosen instrument was the Imperial Airways. The agreement is in existence at the present time. It runs till 1951. Then we threw in Bermuda. We made a deal with Mr. Trippe's company by which operations to Bermuda would be divided between Great Britain and the United States. The Cavalier was to carry twenty passengers and it began on June 6, 1937. The Pan-American concern were carrying sixty to seventy passengers every journey when they got their big ships operating on the run. So you will see that if this agreement had operated—which it did not, for reasons which I will give you, though a service was operated over the North Atlantic—Britain and the Empire would have got one-quarter of the North Atlantic traffic and one-third of the Bermuda traffic. That is how Britain would have shared with America.
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By 1939, Pan-American Airways had been insisting on being permitted to make flights over the North Atlantic without waiting for Imperial Airways. Imperial Airways were not ready with their planes; they could not bring them into operation for one reason or another. Pressure was put upon Imperial Airways, or upon the British Government, to such an extent that the Pan-American Company launched their North Atlantic service without waiting for Imperial Airways. In fact, Imperial Airways never carried any passengers who paid their fares. They made two or three experimental flights but never came into operation as passenger carriers on a commercial basis at all. So perhaps I may be forgiven for reminding Viscount Rothermere that it was a pity that he did not put into effect some of the views—
VISCOUNT ROTHERMERE: If I may interrupt the noble Lord since he is referring to me, may I point out that it is well known that the reasons Imperial Airways could not operate over the North Atlantic were that in its charter it was forbidden to buy any aircraft outside this country, and that it was quite impossible to get British aircraft in time having regard to the facilities that existed here then?
LORD BEAVERBROOK: It seems to me that with the drive which he expects in others Viscount Rothermere might have been able to push through a plan for speeding up the production of the necessary aircraft in Great Britain. That is the very thing that we required over everything else. Imperial Airways failed. They failed because they tried to operate with patched-up aircraft instead of going out for new aircraft. Their failure is the reason why almost every plane flying over the North Atlantic to-day is American. I do not think there are any British airplanes flying over the route for Great Britain at all, apart from a British type of aeroplane which is flying for Canada. I do not think there is any type of aeroplane flying for Great Britain, with the possible exception of one experimental type. What is the reason? Why have not we these aeroplanes? Because Imperial Airways, of which my noble friend Lord Rothermere was a director, failed in its duty and responsibility to provide aircraft. The Caledonia and the Canberra were simply strengthened types, and in any case they

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were only 50,000 lb., as against the 86,000 lb. of the comparable aircraft which were being built by the Americans at that time. Our engines were an adapted R.A.F. type. Instead of having types specially built for civil aircraft, they were modified to suit civil aircraft. I do not want to press the point; I make it only because of the necessity for explaining the difficulties which will arise at this conference in America, which my noble friend Lord Rothermere thinks should be an easy triumph for us, and to which we should have to go confessing that we have not any aircraft suitable for passenger traffic across the Atlantic at the present time. That is not at all a pleasant situation for a man who is going to conduct negotiations.
My noble friend Lord Sempill asked for the names of the British members of the Empire Conference, and I have told him the names. Lord Gifford spoke of service, and I agree with him completely. In reply to Lord Winster, there were no shipowners at the Conference, which was one of Governments only. There was no room for shipowners, or for representatives of business interests, or for representatives of operating air lines; the Conference was strictly limited to Governments. It was a discussion between Governments. Possibly one Government will make its chosen instrument a Government company, while another will encourage private enterprise, another combine the two, and another do as Britain did, and choose an instrument which is owned by shareholders but under the control of the Government. The Conference, however, was a Government Conference only.
LORD STRABOLGI: There were no business men there at all?
LORD BEAVERBROOK: No business men at all, as long as you exclude Lord Leathers, and perhaps I should add myself.
LORD STRABOLGI: There were none there as business men?
LORD BEAVERBROOK: No. The rest did not look to me like business men ! When Lord Winster asked me whether there were any shipowners present, I nodded my head, but that nod meant I would answer; it was not indicating assent. My nods must not be taken as assent until
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I can express myself in exact terms. My noble friend also spoke of cabotage. This was also referred to by my noble friend Lord Brabazon, and by it I under-stand him to refer to internal traffic. I have already told you that we came to complete agreement over the issues raised at the Imperial Conference, but next time I will think of some way of satisfying the natural desire of my noble friends for a longer meeting ! The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, spoke of the international conference in relation to a statement which is attributed to President Roosevelt. I could not say that the President made that statement, but what is certain is that our Prime Minister and the President had conversations on civil aviation, that they came to a considerable measure of agreement, and that the policy which I am laying before your Lordships to-day is consistent with that measure of agreement.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: Then is the statement about the "freedoms of the air" true?
LORD BEAVERBROOK: Freedoms of the air, subject to certain conditions which I am not free to go into. It is impossible to go to an international conference and discuss at all publicly the issues, but, if the noble Viscount will allow me to do so, I will tell him privately about these freedoms. I now come to my conclusion. I am conscious of the immense duty and enormous responsibility which rests upon any person who undertakes international negotiations, particularly in relation to this complicated issue. I think it a thankless task, for any bargain which is brought home is sure to be unsatisfactory to some portion of the community. But for my part I go forth to the duty with the determination and resolution to do what I can to put the civil aviation of Great Britain on the highest possible plane.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for the speech which he has just delivered, and also to congratulate him. He will not expect me to agree with everything he says, but certainly on the major issues I feel myself in agreement with the noble Lord. He has told us very definitely that complete agreement was reached on every issue at the Dominion Conference. He has also told us—and it is very gratifying to hear it—that the plans and the policy are ready to be put forward when

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he goes for his next visit to America. Those are two very satisfactory statements, and I think that I and my friends can congratulate ourselves on having, by the pressure we have brought forward, had a Minister definitely appointed to deal with this matter. Up to now we have had different Ministers, who have done their best, and I should be the last person to criticize them; but they have not been in the position which the noble Lord is in to-day, of being able to give us answers to our questions and to give us hope for the future.
I do not want at this stage to go into any of the matters to which the noble Lord has replied except one, and that is the monopoly. I would urge the Government to consider this matter from their own point of view. It is quite true that there is an Act of Parliament which has established a company, but there are many individuals, operating companies, constructors and their designers in this country who would like to know what will probably happen in the future. I hope that the Government will consider that point and make up their minds what should be done. I think that we can say that the noble Lord has had a very good exercise gallop in your Lordships' House, and I am sure that when he appears on the racecourse he will prove a winner. I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

FOOD SITUATION IN INDIA.
THE EARL OF HUNTINGDON THE EARL OF HUNTINGDON had given Notice that he would ask His Majesty's Government whether they have any further statement to make with regard to the famine conditions prevailing in certain Provinces in India, and what steps are to be taken to relieve the situation; and also move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, in the week ended September 30 the mortality figures in Calcutta were 1,492 persons, as against 581 for the same week a year ago. Last week the figure is quoted as 2,154. The special correspondent of The Times on September 24 stated that in the Calcutta hospitals approximately 50 persons a clay were dying of starvation. In the five weeks from August 16 to September 24 the same authority reports that 4,400 victims of starvation had been removed to the Calcutta hospitals, of whom 972 died. Apart
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from these, from August I to September 24,2,500 corpses of starved men, women and children have been picked up in the Calcutta streets. In the first week of September the Calcutta hospitals received 849 starvation cases, of which 202 died. In the country districts the mortality figures are harder to get, but famine is acute there, and in fact the struggling of starving people into the cities is, I understand, one of the greatest complications to be faced by the authorities.
I have no wish to give more of these harrowing figures. Those I have given are enough, I think, to confirm the dreadful stories of starvation and misery which are coming from India to-day—especially in the Deccan, and the States of Cochin and Travancore, and even more so in Bengal. Rice has risen over 950 per cent. above pre-war prices and in some places even more. Not only is there a shortage of grain and rice, but there is also a great shortage of milk and milk products, and in fact foodstuffs of all kinds seem to be in great scarcity and at exorbitant prices. And whenever food is short cholera makes its appearance. In the Malabar districts 3,000 cases have been reported. Grim stories have come of patients not wishing to be cured of cholera, as the only alternative would be a slower death from starvation. There are also worse stories of parents deserting dying children, and children deserting parents, and even of children being sold for the price of food. But we do not need to stress these stories; I think the figures are enough to stir our imagination and to show how appalling the conditions in India must be.
When we are confronted with such a situation, the major concern of all of us must be, I feel in the first place, to express our deepest sympathy with the Indian people, and particularly with the sufferers from the terrible conditions in Bengal and in the rest of India. Our second concern must be to ask what can be done to relieve this terrible suffering, and how quickly can the measures of relief be applied. It was with great thankfulness that I, and I think many others among us, heard that food ships were on their way to India, but I am sure that everyone in this House must feel that more drastic measures are essential if we are going to deal with this acute crisis. I should like to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give us any fresh news of the situation there, and also

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whether they can let us know what steps are being taken now, and can be taken, to deal with the crisis. I should also like to ask them whether more grain could not be shipped from Australia, or even from the United States of America, and even whether some of the Army reserves could not be released to feed the civilian population; they could later be replenished on the arrival of future supplies of grain. Obviously the greatest need and the greatest difficulty must be that of shipping, and I should like to urge on His Majesty's Government that the shipping of food to India to-day is a vital war need. If we are going to keep up the morale of the Indian population and of the Indian Army, India must at least have food.
If for a few moments I ask your Lordships to examine the causes of this disaster, it is with the object in view of finding out in our discussion further remedies and, if possible, preventing the recurrence of such a major disaster. There has been a Committee set up in India under the Chairmanship of Sir Theodore Gregory, Economic Adviser to the Government of India—the Food Grains Policy Committee. Its Report takes the view that there is no one cause of the famine, but that many causes, working together, have all contributed to the final result. I personally very much agree, from what I have heard, with that view. For instance, the Report suggests that the loss of the Burma rice was obviously a very strong contributory cause; but we should remember that the rice imported from Burma is about 1,500,000 tons, of which under 100,000 tons normally went to Bengal. So we cannot completely attribute the famine to the loss of the Burma rice, though it was a contributory factor. The cyclone in Bengal in 1942 was another contributory cause, and so was the failure of the monsoon in Madras. On the other hand, these losses were largely made good by the exceptional crop in Northern India in the spring of 1943. Grain, bought for the Army and for Army reserves, must also have been a contributory cause—not so much the amount probably shipped out of the country as the fact that the Indian as a soldier eats very much more than the Indian as a civilian can ever afford to do. But, looking at the whole situation, it would seem to be not so much a question of absolute shortage of foodstuffs
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as of a complete breakdown in distribution. A few Provinces seem even to have had a surplus but to have been unwilling to export it to the deficit Provinces in case they should go short themselves. Sometimes Provinces had shortages in one foodstuff and a surplus in another. But everywhere rising prices and uncertainty about future supplies tempted both merchant and farmer to hold up their stocks, thus increasing the shortage and again raising prices.
The terrible poverty of the Indian peasant allows only a very small margin between subsistence and starvation. His methods of agriculture are extremely primitive, and the good of the soil is being constantly used up without anything being put back to replace what is being taken out. It stands to reason that an agricultural people that is so reduced in poverty as to have to burn cow dung as fuel instead of using it as manure is on the way to committing race suicide. About 55,000,000 small farmers produce a surplus of about 14,000,000 tons of grain and rice, which feeds the cities, and if even a small amount is kept back by each farmer, who may be frightened of future conditions, this surplus to feed the cities diminishes and almost disappears. This is especially so in a case where consumer goods are scarce—and especially iron to repair agricultural instruments—as there is little to give the farmer in exchange for his produce.
But I think the most important part of this Report is not so much the aspect which deals with the causes—though that is important enough—as that which deals with the steps which it advises the Central Government of India to take at once to relieve the situation. The main steps are price control; the establishment of a food grains reserve; control of distribution, transport and supplies; extension of rationing in the cities; the creation of a Central Food Board with wide powers, and especially the stopping of all food exports and, instead, the importing of large stocks to meet the emergency. This is a very good Report, and I agree with most of these recommendations, but what is puzzling many people—and I hope the Minister who will reply will clear up this point— is this. If the situation was foreseen a long time ago, and has been developing for many months, why did not the Central Government of India take adequate preventive measures before the famine

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reached the terrible disastrous dimensions and before the situation became completely out of hand?
The Secretary of State for India, speaking at Birmingham only last week, said:
"The dangerous possibilities of the situation were fully realized by the Central Government of India as soon as the loss of Singapore and the invasion of Burma showed that India could no longer rely upon her customary rice imports, or easily secure wheat cargoes from Australia."
The loss of Singapore happened some time ago, so why were none of the measures now advocated in the Gregory Report put into operation—price control, rationing in the cities, establishment of food grains reserve, control of supplies, establishment of a Food Board, and so on? The problem is obviously an All-India one affecting all the Provinces, and as such it could only have been dealt with by the Central Government. The Secretary of State in the same speech seemed to suggest that the reason for this not being done was that the Central Government was reluctant to encroach on the functions of the Provincial Governments. Again I quote his words from a newspaper report:
"It is a very serious thing, when you have entrusted wide powers and responsibilities to a democratic Government, to brush these powers aside."
In British India, as we all know, whether the States are being ruled by a British Governor through his appointed nominee, or whether a popularly-elected Government functions and is still functioning, in every case the ultimate power rests with the British Governor, just as the final and ultimate power in the Central Government rests with the Viceroy. As we all know, these powers are immense. We have seen the powers of the Central Government exercised in a drastic and sweeping way, brushing aside everything, very recently, and why in this case, when the whole welfare of hundreds of thousands depended on these measures being taken, were not drastic reforms instituted by the Central Government? I particularly raise this point because I feel sure there must be some other reason beside scrupulous regard for red tape which has influenced the Government in its action. We must remember that all questions of control or rationing of foodstuffs in India are immensely complicated by the vast-ness of the country, the complete illiteracy
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of the peasantry, and the absence of sympathy and co-operation on the part of the Indian people with any schemes originating from the British Government. The noble Lord, Lord Woolton, has successfully introduced most drastic measures here to keep us from being hungry, but I feel that his task has been made easier by the whole-hearted support of the people of this country.
It is for that reason, if we are to cope successfully with this dreadful famine, that I suggest, and earnestly press, that the problem of the future of India should be brought out of cold storage and another attempt made to thaw Indian distrust by sympathy and generous understanding in this crisis. Once we have won the confidence and friendship of the Indian people half the problems connected with this famine would be solved. Public opinion in India could be brought to support any scheme or regulations, the leaders of the different Parties, if given a chance, could induce the farmers and merchants to release their stocks, the public would be prepared to make any sacrifices demanded of them. Mistrust is so great that this confidence would be difficult to win, but a sincere gesture to prove the integrity of our aim in regard to India's future might succeed, and it is this gesture which I should like to see made. I am going to suggest that the British Government should, as it were, declare India to be in a state of trust or wardship—might, in short, declare her to be what I should call, for want of a better expression, a "ward in democracy." By that I mean we should ask our great Allies to join hands with us in guaranteeing India's future freedom. Inter-Allied co-operation now envisaged in high places as the basis for world peace is so vast and thorough that I do not think it would be impossible for us to ask the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China to act with Great Britain as guardians, who would be jointly responsible for India's present welfare and guarantee her future freedom, perhaps to be realized a year after the end of hostilities.
With India established as what I have called a "ward in democracy," and with her future freedom thus guaranteed, the mistrust of Indians of all Parties might be dispelled. The leaders would surely be only too glad to co-operate in even the

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most drastic schemes for fighting this terrible famine, and it is not too optimistic to suppose, given such a basis of mutual co-operation and confidence, that the Indian leaders would be prepared to work under the Viceroy for the fullest prosecution of the war as well as for an immediate offensive against this famine. Such a beginning might be the first step towards Indians working together to find a basis for the future Constitution and government of their own country. Whether His Majesty's Government should consider such a gesture or not, the most immediate and important step to be taken is the sending of more food as speedily as possible to relieve the present situation. I realize the strategic necessity of shipping in other war areas, but for the security of the Pacific Front, and above all in the interests of humanity, the Indian people must be saved from the disaster which is threatening to engulf them. I beg to move for Papers.
LORD CATTO: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just sat down has wandered away somewhat from the terms of his Motion into certain political aspects of this question. I do not propose to follow him in that because, quite candidly, I do not know what is meant by a "ward in democracy," and I doubt very much if many of my Indian friends would understand such an expression. We are not discussing this afternoon the merits or demerits of constitutional arrangements in India. We are not discussing even how or why this calamity has fallen upon these poor people. We are discussing how best to relieve and bring succour to these distressed people in the quickest possible time. I hope that my noble friend the Under-Secretary of State, who will be replying for the Government, will be able to give us some reassurance in regard to these matters. This is not the time to ask how or why this has happened. I hope that at a later date we shall be given an opportunity of going into these matters, and I can assure your Lordships that I shall not be backward in asking how and why this calamity has come about. But that is for the future. Heresy hunting at this time will not fill the bellies of the Indian people. It is a tragedy we all deplore that in a world of plenty there should be such suffering in an important part of His Majesty's Dominions.
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It so happens that the part of India chiefly concerned is one that I know well and I cannot speak on this matter without strong feelings. But I would speak with equal vehemence if these events were happening in any other part of His Majesty's Dominions or even in any other part of the world, for famine is a preventible thing. India from the very dawn of her history suffered cruelly from this terrible scourge, but in modern times it has been comparatively free from such calamities, not because the causes of famine have changed, such as failure of the monsoon, floods and other catastrophies, but because the Central Government had perfected famine relief organizations of the greatest efficiency combined with transportation facilities which made it possible to bring relief quickly to afflicted districts. Indeed these arrangements had become so perfected that the horrors of famine in India had become almost a thing of the past.
The present conditions in Bengal and the surrounding districts have been brought about by very special causes. One of the most vital has been that this part of India normally imported from Burma, as the noble Lord has already told us, something in the neighbourhood of 1,500,000 tons of rice annually, and of course that source of supply was immediately cut off when Burma was overrun by the enemy. It may be that this shortage should have been well understood and that foresight might have been shown in arranging supplies from other sources. Certain efforts were made. Increased sowings were enforced and it was hoped that these, with some help from the Provinces which have some surplus of food grains, would be sufficient to make up the deficiency. But in the event these efforts have proved sadly inadequate, largely I think because there was not sufficiently taken into account the manifold difficulties of war-time transportation, both internal and external. Moreover, the districts of India where there are food surpluses are mainly on the other side of that Continent, vast distances away from Bengal. War congested railways have undoubtedly increased the difficulties of war transportation. War has brought about another serious problem which is not confined alone to India and that is the problem of hoarding, for in an uncertain world such as we are now living in primitive people are

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liable quickly to take fright and to hoard food supplies in excess of what they really need. I regret to say, too, that there have often been speculators in food grains. But we cannot point the finger of scorn at India in that respect, for India is not the only country in the East where there are speculators. Indeed, we have some in this country, though I hope not very many. The noble Lord interrupted me when I was going to call these speculators by a much stronger name. I was going to refer to them as "these vermin."
But, my Lords, if Bengal is remote from those districts in India where there may be food surpluses, it has one great advantage in that it is on the seaboard and normally relief could, with forethought, have been quickly brought from overseas. Again, war conditions have interfered with this and, as the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State for India said in the speech at Birmingham last week to which the noble Earl, Lord Huntingdon, referred, the problem of external help was and indeed is, to use his own words, "essentially and entirely one of shipping." I trust that the noble Earl who is replying in this debate will have some reassuring words for us on this point. For there can be little doubt that the problem of help for these stricken districts cannot be completely dealt with without substantial assistance from overseas. In a vast country like India, and in war conditions, and with comparatively small surpluses even in the more fortunate Provinces, the most stringent Government regulations as to holding cannot quickly bring about substantially changed conditions. It may be that these regulations were not instituted quickly enough; it may be that the magnitude of the problem was underestimated; it may be that the Central Government relied too much on the Provincial Governments and that the latter found the problem too much for them. These and many other questions quickly come to our minds and they will have to be answered at the right time.
I do not need to tell your Lordships that famine is a terrible thing, nor do I need to tell you that it falls very heavily upon the poor, because there is always some food which those with money can buy. Unfortunately, therefore, it is always the poor that suffer most and that applies with special severity in the districts upon which this calamity has fallen,
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for even in normal times these people live with hardly any margin for emergencies. The result is that as soon as food prices begin to rise they very quickly reach limits beyond the means of these poor people. There is another and a very terrible aspect of this problem and it is one of great importance. In time of war famine is not only a calamity, it is a menace. Millions of these poor people live in districts behind the lines of the Allied Armies on the Indo-Burma frontier. Already the Japanese are using these famine conditions as propaganda and it is no wonder that insidious lies are quickly absorbed by a people with empty stomachs.
And there is a further menace. Famine conditions breed disease and disease is no respecter of persons. Various diseases are always endemic in these parts of India and there is a grave danger, due to famine conditions, of these diseases becoming epidemic. Cholera, which is always there to a small extent, even in the great city of Calcutta, is increasing and the spectre of that dread disease is stalking through those districts and in that great city, the second largest in point of population in the British Empire. And history teaches us that epidemics, if not checked in their early stages, often become more dreaded than the enemy, and that is especially so in the East. In conclusion, I would make this final point. We are not discussing the matter only because of its humanitarian aspects; we are discussing it because we have a direct responsibility. Let me remind your Lordships that by the constitutional arrangements, as they still exist in India to-day, in the final analysis the British Parliament is responsible for the welfare and good government of that country and we are part of that Parliament and we share that responsibility.
LORD HAILEY: My Lords, I think one could well wish that this question had been confined both here and elsewhere to the simple issue of what steps are being taken to put an end to this distressing and harrowing situation in Bengal and what guarantee we have against its recurrence. But, unfortunately, discussion has taken a very much wider range. I do not refer merely to the somewhat wide range Lord Huntingdon gave to it in his introduction of this Motion. I am referring to the fact that events in India have been

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followed by a very wide reaction both in this country and outside this country. It has given to those outside this country who are critical of us a handle for impugning once more the character of British rule. It has given to others an opportunity of pointing out that we ourselves have been conniving at a state of things which must impair the position in India as one of the central factors in our campaign in the East.
Quite apart from that very wide sympathy of which both the Earl of Huntingdon and Lord Catto spoke, and which certainly most of us feel, apart from all those feelings of humanity to which it has given rise here, there is the question of the competence of the authorities in India and the position of His Majesty's Government. Let me add that I suppose there are few who have been connected with the administration of India in the past who did not feel this very deeply indeed. Many of us remember the famines at the end of the last century—we have good personal reasons to remember —but we had hoped that that chapter had closed, and we were in the habit of taking pride, legitimate pride, that in the last forty years there has been no famine in India. Now it appears that once again the dread spectre of scarcity and starvation is stalking, not indeed throughout India, but in an important part of it.
Since these widespread issues have been raised your Lordships will perhaps permit me, as one who has had to deal with some of these matters in the past, to try and distinguish between the different questions that have been raised. There is, of course, first the outstanding question which must override in importance all others. How far in fact can we be satisfied that all essential steps are being taken to remedy the immediate situation, so far as it can be remedied? Secondly, looking beyond the immediate present, what means exist for preventing the recurrence of a situation like this? Many of the factors which have produced it will persist and as far as can be seen will produce somewhat similar results. Thirdly (and this is a point in which I think many people are interested), does the very obvious administrative and constitutional difficulty which has been experienced in dealing with this situation convey lessons which must be borne in
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mind—we must hope by Indians, but certainly by ourselves—in considering the constitutional position of the country?
But to appreciate the bearing of these questions, one has to look at the facts in due perspective. Normally India can be said to be almost self-sufficient in the production of foodstuff. I am not speaking of course in the sense that she produces enough to give her people all the nutrition which modern standards demand, but judged by the rough test—the only test we ought to apply in the circumstances— of imports and exports she is reasonably self-sufficient. True, she has normally an import of some 1,250,000 tons of rice from Burma to which some noble Lords have already referred, but the significance of this may be seen from the fact that it amounted to only about six per cent. of her own total production of rice. Apart from that, it is significant that only 100,000 tons of the Burma rice went to the Bengal area, the area now mostly affected. Though, therefore, the cessation of Burma imports was an important fact it did not have the same significance, or perhaps the same results, as a cessation of imports of food grains would a few years ago at all events have had on the nutritional position in this country.
There are also those who point to the great increase in Indian population during the last few decades and see in it one of the factors which must have helped to produce the present situation. They point out that the population has increased by 50,000,000 in the last decade, and they say that every month India has 300,000 or 400,000 more mouths to feed. I am anxious to mention this point because I think that, though this great increase in the population of India is a very important factor, which will have to be taken into consideration in any effort we make to raise her standard of life, it is not a factor which we need necessarily import into the present discussion. It is the general conclusion of economists that hitherto the increase in India's production has preserved some reasonable ratio to her increase in population. The increase of population—again, of course, I am applying previous standards of consumption, not ideal standards—has left a very narrow margin in the event of emergencies such as crop failure, but not any state of normal deficiency.

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It is clear that the situation which has arisen on this occasion, unlike previous famines, has not been due to crop failure. The harvest in 1942 was reasonably good. Such crop shortages as occurred were only local—for example, in Bombay and Madras—and should normally have been adjustable by drawing grain from the surplus areas in the north and centre. It has been calculated that any loss suffered by crop failures and the loss of imports combined only amounted to a total reduction of 4 per cent. in food supplies. India had in the last ten years been able to deal on at least four occasions with larger shortages—on one occasion up to 14 per cent. Clearly, therefore, the cause has been internal maladjustment, as the noble Lord, Lord Catto, said—the difficulty of transport, profiteering, and what is known as hoarding. That was the kind of situation for which a civil power has to attempt to find a remedy within the range of the administrative measures open to it. But that there was going to be a very considerable inflation of price was obvious. It occurred, from much the same causes, in the last war; but it was bound to occur with increased force now, for the war hardly touched India in 1914–18 in the sense in which it has come home to her to-day. Every force which operated then operates in double strength now.
It would be unprofitable to ask ourselves whether it was feasible to prevent some inflation in the price of foodstuffs, for that was clearly impossible. It must be realized that 80 per cent. of the producers are also consumers. It is natural to them at any time to reserve a certain part of their production for their own subsistence. When, as on the present occasion, there are threatenings of war or trouble clouding their economic future with uncertainty, this tendency must become all the stronger. But this is not all. It is inevitable that when there are signs of a rising market they should keep back as much as possible of their marketable food crops, such as wheat and rice, in order to take advantage of it. They were on this occasion, particularly in Northern India, better able to do so, because the high price of cotton and other non-edible crops enabled them to meet their ordinary expenditure, in the nature of rent or land revenue, and India has always shown herself able to reduce expenditure on consumption goods, such as clothing and the like, when occasion de-
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manded it. Hoarding had therefore a somewhat different meaning from that which we attach to it here. The Governments had not merely to deal with profiteering in a wholesale market or with a recalcitrance of dealers; they had to deal with a vast mass of producer-consumers, actuated by motives which could hardly appear to them either unreasonable or illegitimate, and which in any case reflected a traditional practice on their part. To judge of the size of this problem, let me recall again that, as Lord Huntingdon has said, there are between 55,000,000 and 60,000,000 cultivated holdings in India.
We must admit all these difficulties; but still the question remains whether it was not possible to prevent a price inflation so extreme as that which has actually occurred. The normal price of rice in Bengal is about 5 rupees a maund of 82 lbs. It rose to 35 rupees; it is said that at Dacca it even rose to 80 rupees. The Government of India stated in March that the rise in the price of a certain essential range of foodstuffs had amounted to 950 per cent. Now we may well imagine what this meant to the urban or industrial population, or to the section of the people who were not themselves producers of foodstuffs; what it meant to vast numbers of people in India, who, as Lord Catto has said, are always living a little above or a little below the margin of starvation. And there is a second question. How is it that the result was felt with such severity mainly in Bengal? There was scarcity in certain parts of Bombay owing to local crop failure, and in certain parts of Madras due to a similar cause. But it is only in Bengal, and notably in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, that we hear of actual starvation. Yet Bengal has always been considered to be self-sufficient in the supply of foodstuffs. She produces normally some 8,500,000 tons of rice. As I have pointed out to your Lordships out of the total of 1,250,000 tons of rice imported from Burma or Siam only some 100,000 tons normally went to Bengal.
What were the steps taken by the Government of India or the Provincial Governments to anticipate or prevent inflation of this type? In 1941 there was set on foot a campaign for growing more 100d, and we are told that this actually resulted in adding about 4,000,000 acres to the

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area under food crops, notably rice and millets. True, this had the effect of reducing the area under cotton and certain other cash crops, and thereby increasing their price to an extent which gave a large body of producers of mixed crops an increased ability to keep their food crops off the market. But in general the effect of the campaign could not have been otherwise than beneficial. The Government of India began to exercise control over inter-provincial exports in order to reduce competition between the different areas suffering from shortage, and attempted to fix a ceiling price for wheat. But the Punjab and Sind—among the principal producers of wheat—had already begun to show themselves unwilling to co-operate. For one thing, the ceiling price fixed for wheat was five rupees a maund, whereas the market price had already risen to ten rupees. The Punjabi peasant, naturally, resented the suggestion that the price of his own product, wheat, should be controlled, and very strictly controlled, while producers of other crops elsewhere were able to take full advantage of the rising prices for their production.
At the beginning of 1943, when the general rise in prices began to cause anxiety, Bombay began to make preparations to ration the population of the city; a measure which was brought into full effect in the following May. Bengal had not, apparently, at that stage, taken alarm at the situation. The Government of India now withdrew the ceiling price on wheat, and as a result somewhat larger supplies came forward. But the measure did not have full effect, for the Punjab and Sind Governments still showed themselves unwilling to co-operate. The Punjab in particular was able to point out that while they were sending wheat to Bengal at ten rupees a maund, free on rail, the Bengal Government was selling it to the mills at 15½ rupees, and earning a considerable profit for itself from the transaction. That was an unfortunate incident, and it undoubtedly added to the difficulties of the situation. It does not appear, however, that the situation became really severe in Bengal until about August. By that time, if my figures are correct, some 450,000 tons of rice and a considerable quantity of wheat had been sent to Bengal by Government agencies alone. Meanwhile,
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however, the population of Calcutta had been swollen by large numbers of destitute people coming from outside. Their numbers have been put at from 80,000 to 100,000, and it is they who have furnished the largest number of sufferers from actual starvation. The needs of the industrial labour have been largely met by purchases made by mill companies, and sold to employees at a normal price. And I think that it may well be said here that we owe some tribute to a number of these companies for what they have done for their labour in this situation.
Judging from what information is available to us at this distance, it would seem that there are actually now, or shortly will be, sufficient supplies of foodstuffs for Calcutta. I emphasize the word "supplies." Nearly a million people are actually being fed by the Government. But the real source of trouble still remains; the pitch of prices continues entirely beyond the capacity of the ordinary consumer to pay. And this remains a standing cause for anxiety. It will not, so far as one can foresee, be remedied by natural means—such as the arrival of a new harvest, however good this may be. Unless they are removed the forces which have produced this present situation will persist.
Now there can, normally, be only one solution for this. There must be some drastic measure to control all prices of foodstuffs and to force them on to the market. The Government of India has now taken such powers under its recent ordinance; but I have already pointed out some of the difficulties, and they have been increased by the fact that the present distinction between "surplus" and "deficiency" Provinces, and the wide range of prices which prevail between areas of abundance and areas of dearth, has persisted long enough to create a network of vested interests which it will be very difficult to break down. Clearly also, inter-provincial difficulties still exist; the Punjab in particular, to judge by the speech of one of its Ministers, Sir Chhotu Ram, is still far from being in a mood to cooperate. One does not desire to be unduly pessimistic; but it is clear that a situation has been allowed to grow up which, though it may be bettered by vigorous administrative measures, will continue to present grave difficulty until the seas are open again, and prices brought back nearer to normal by importations of rice

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from Burma, and the free importation—or possibility of free importation—of wheat from Australia and Canada.
Looking back, I think we may fairly say that the Bengal Government certainly did not show itself sufficiently far-seeing or sufficiently active at an earlier stage of this situation. This attitude seems to us who have been to the best of our powers watching the situation to compare unfavourably with that of Bombay and Madras in circumstances that were not entirely dissimilar. If any criticism of the Central Government can be justified, it is, I think, on the ground that it showed undue hesitation in putting sufficient pressure on the non-co-operating Provinces. It is true that the Provinces are autonomous, but the Central Government had in reserve powers which could have been and now have been invoked to exercise a certain measure of control over them. One can appreciate the reason for its hesitation. The political situation was, to say the least, uneasy. Autonomy is a very real thing to the Provinces, and the noble Earl, Lord Huntingdon, to my mind tended to overlook the reality of autonomy and independence which the Provinces have in a constitutional sense achieved, which is the most solid achievement of the Act of 1935. Again, the Punjab— to take one particular instance of a non-co-operating Province—had in other respects, and particularly in regard to the war, been very fully co-operative.
The use of any special power by the Central Government had been strenuously opposed by political circles in India, although, characteristically enough, the Congress is now strongly critical of this very lack of control exercised by the Central Government in the present situation. But the issue was grave, and, if the hesitation shown by the Government of India is understandable, and may on political grounds have even had some justification, its results have certainly been unfortunate. It is difficult to see in what respect the action of the Home authorities can be impugned. There is as yet no evidence that they refused to the Government of India any powers or denied it any assistance for which it asked. In circumstances such as these, which involve matters of purely internal control, the initiative must inevitably lie in India itself.
Let me conclude by asking whether these events have for us any lesson which
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bears on future constitutional developments in India. I will say here, if I may, that I join with Lord Catto in deprecating any suggestion that we should make a gesture to India such as the noble Earl, Lord Huntingdon, proposed. India has only one objective and one ambition, and that is independence. Already the word "trusteeship" as used by us is in very little favour in Indian political circles, and I doubt whether the association of our Allies or of the United Nations in the form of guarantee suggested, or the joint assumption by them of trusteeship for India, would be any more satisfactory to India than it would be flattering to us. But, looking to the future, there is certainly one lesson that stands out. There could be no stronger argument than that provided by these events to prove the inadvisability of the fragmentation of India, which would inevitably result from such schemes as that for the creation o separate Dominion consisting of the Moslem Provinces. Again, though it may well be that the future, so far as we can foresee it, will demand that the Centre should no longer occupy a predominating position as a political and legislative factor, yet there must somewhere remain a strong reserve of executive action, capable of dealing with emergencies of this nature, and it must be placed in hands which will have both the initiative and the resolution to override the individualistic policies of Provinces. More and more does it become clear that whatever the benefit to India of the growth of her political institutions, and whatever the benefit of a broad-based form of popular government, she cannot dispense in the future, any more than she has been able to in the past, with the necessity for a strong, a competent and a reliable form of executive.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I think that I can congratulate the noble Earl who is to reply for the Government in this debate on the masterly defence of his Government which has been made by the noble Lord who has just addressed the House. Most respectfully and with great humility I should also like to congratulate Lord Hailey himself. Never before do I remember hearing so masterly a defence of inaction and indecision, or a more competent finding of reasons why nothing

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could be done, and why what has happened could not be helped, and was inevitable, and would have happened in any case. I cannot withhold my admiration for this feat.
LORD HAILEY: I am very grateful to your Lordship !
LORD STRABOLGI: I have heard better Governments defended with far less ability than the noble Lord has shown. That is not to say, however, that we do not all recognize that he feels as deeply as any of us the implications of this terrible tragedy in India, and is not as conscious of the sufferings of these people as any one in your Lordships' House. The noble Lord informed us that India was self-supporting in food. I understand that the statisticians have been rather nervous for a number of years on this point, and have been alarmed for a long period at the shrinking margin of foodstuffs available in India. Indeed, I believe it is correct to say that quite apart from this present emergency of war, if the war had not taken place India could have been self-supporting in foodstuffs at the present time only if we had set an inadequate standard of diet for a very large proportion of the Indian population, below the needs of normal life and health.
If I may trouble your Lordships with a few figures, I should like to do so. My noble friend Lord Huntingdon put the case a little differently, and spoke of the countryside providing foodstuffs for the big cities. I should like to deal with the whole peninsula. On the supposition that a pound of grain food a day is needed per person—and that is very low, when we remember that grain and vegetable foods are the only diet of vast numbers of her people—India needs every year 50,500,000 tons. If we add to that 4,500,000 tons for seed, we have a total requirement of 55,000,000 tons of grain a year. The production in a normal year, however, is of the order of 50,000,000 to 51,000,000 tons. If the supposition of a pound of grain food a day is correct, there would have been by this year, even If the war had not intervened, a deficit in India which would be quite different from the deficits with which Lord Hailey and his colleagues had to deal in the famine years, and of which we have heard something in the very able speech of my noble friend Lord Catto.
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I think there has been general agreement in this debate that the conditions which we now have to face are not to be compared with the ordinary catastrophes due to failure of the monsoon and other climatic difficulties in the past. Indeed, I believe that it is right to say that the present trouble in India has been foreseen for years, but it was coming on very gradually, and has been accentuated by causes attributable to the war. My noble friend Lord Huntingdon referred to the very large Army in India, and to the great amount of food required for the active soldier, and that has accentuated it. But if these danger signals have been, or should have been, noted by the Central Government and by the Provincial Governments, the unfortunate fact is —this was not dealt with either by Lord Hailey or by any other of your Lordships who have spoken—that considerable quantities of food continued to be exported from India for war purposes to the Middle East. It went on because it was the normal thing to do, and unless there is some strong hand at the centre—which, as Lord Hailey said, will always be needed in India—to take command of the situation and to insist on the Forces in the Middle East getting their foodstuffs elsewhere, you are bound to have this trouble.
I have here a telegram received yesterday morning in answer to a cable sent by a friend of mine to a gentleman whom Lord Hailey knows very well, Mr. Martin Herlihy, the special correspondent of Reuter in New Delhi. He was asked about this question of exports, and the warning that the Central Government had daily received of the trouble that is now come upon these unfortunate millions of people. Perhaps I may trouble your Lordships with the telegram, and particularly commend it to the attention of Lord Hailey. This, after all, is an independent source; Reuter's correspondent is impartial and he knows the facts. The cable reads:
"In the earlier part of this year the Indian Government, realizing the possibilities of the food shortage, pressed for large imports of food to India, and received 150,000 tons. This was only part of the amount asked for. With operations in North Africa and U-boat sinkings, the position became acute, and in view of these facts, coupled with bumper harvest in Punjab, the Government decided not to press for further imports. It is now admitted that this was a serious mistake. Government's

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next step in July was; to appoint a Committee to work out long-term food grains policy."
Note, long-term policy; but the need, of course, was for emergency measures. The correspondent adds:
"Report of Committee was presented to Government at end of September. Recommendations can be summed up as (1), import of food; (2) rationing; (3), drastic tightening up of machinery for acquisition of food; (4), drastic revision of relation between Provinces; (5), statutory price control."
That is the news received only yesterday morning, and it brings the whole history of this unfortunate affair up to date.
I am afraid that it discloses—what indeed was implicit in the defence of the noble Lord who has just addressed the House—once more in the greatest, the most hidebound, indeed ironbound, bureaucracy in the world, that of the Government of India, that fatal disease of bureaucracy, procrastination. They consider too long, they set up too many Committees, they talk too long about what they are going to do, and in the meantime this terrible famine was galloping towards them. To show how dilatory was not only the Bengal Government but the Central Government in dealing with this matter, between January 1 this year and March 15, from Bengal alone, despite the loss of the Burma rice which Lord Hailey and other speakers have mentioned, 300,000 tons of rice were exported.
LORD HAILEY:That has been denied.
LORD STRABOLGI: It was stated in the Bengal Legislature by the Minister responsible. If it is denied I am very glad to hear it. But I think the export of food was stopped far too late. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, can find good bureaucratic reasons for defending the Government, but he cannot deny the fact.
LORD HAILEY: May I give the facts?
LORD STRABOLGI: I shall be very glad to hear them.
LORD HAILEY: And I speak, not as one interested in bureaucracy, but as one interested in facts. The actual facts with regard to export are that in the first seven months of 1943 only 21,000 tons of wheat and 70,000 tons of rice were exported to Ceylon, the Persian Gulf or the Arabian ports. Of course, those are comparatively small figures. And it was
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officially denied on behalf of the Government of India that there had been this alleged export of 300,000 tons of rice from Bengal to other parts.
LORD STRABOLGI: Of course I accept that at once, and I am very glad to hear it. It is apparently a conflict once more of evidence between the Provinces and the Central Government. In addition to the large numbers of soldiers to be fed, Indian and European, referred to by my noble friend Lord Huntingdon, there is another cause as well, and that is the abnormal number of Indian labourers working for the Government on various schemes, who also have to be fed, the immense roads across the Burmese mountains in the Shan Province and so on. And not only have the military authorities to feed their own vast Army but, looking ahead, they have hoarded food, they have bought up foodstuffs on a short market. Also the Government Departments concerned with feeding these vast armies of labourers, directly or indirectly concerned with the war effort, have bought up, and indeed hoarded, foodstuffs so as not to be caught short. That cause has not been mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Hailey and Lord Catto.
Another matter that affects the whole situation adversely is that there is inflation in India, or if there is not inflation, the effects of inflation are there because there is wide distrust of the paper rupee. With the fear of inflation you at once get hoarding and withholding of goods from the market. That has obviously happened here, as has been admitted in this debate. It is said, "Don't look for scapegoats. What is the good of looking for scapegoats? What is wanted is to deal with the emergency." I do not want to look for scapegoats, but thank heaven Lord Wavell has now arrived in Delhi, a man who is used to dealing with realities, a man of great organizing power, and I hope he will take the most drastic steps to deal with this terrible disaster. Your Lordships are agreed that the first need is shipping. Mr. Curtin says there is enough wheat in Australia to relieve the Indian famine, it is only a matter of ships. But I do not think any of your Lordships have suggested the release of some Army food stocks for feeding these starving people, and the using of the Army to administer the distribution of the foodstuffs, as well as to provide the trans-

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port. As for all the difficulties, described to us by Lord Hailey, of the friction between the Central Government and the Provincial Governments, surely we are not going to tolerate any more of that, and the Provincial Government Services will be compelled to relieve the deficit Provinces.
I want to deal with one other matter. The noble Lord, Lord Catto, referred to Japanese propaganda. The Japanese are taking advantage of this terrible state of affairs in Bengal and elsewhere, and are using it against us. Of course they are doing that, and the Germans as well. Part of the Japanese propaganda by wireless—and the Japanese wireless stations in Rangoon and elsewhere are sending their programmes in five or six of the principal Indian languages during the whole 24 hours—is to the effect that they would feed Bengal, and would release rice from Burma for the poverty-stricken population, if the British would allow it. It is probably nonsense, because I understand that in Burma their own maladministration has so upset the cultivators that there is now a deficit of rice in Burma. At any rate there is great difficulty there. But they are using this against us as a weapon of propaganda, and saying that they have rice which they would be prepared to send to Bengal.
Very seriously I ask my noble friend Lord Munster to consider this suggestion. Their bluff ought to be called. It will not do, when you have at least 10,000,000 people in danger of starvation, to allow this story to pass from mouth to mouth through India that the Japanese would send rice if the British Raj were removed. You cannot permit that. Therefore call that bluff. If the Japanese are prepared to send rice in, take the rice. It would be something to make up for the devastation and damage they have caused to Asia by plunging Asia into war. If they have not got the rice, you will expose the cruel and horrible lie for what it is. In any case do not sit down and do nothing in the face of this propaganda. The whole trouble has been a lack of grip and a lack of action on the part of the Central Government. We have a new Viceroy now and we can all wish him well. I believe myself that if he is properly supported by the India Office here he will accomplish great things.
House adjourned during pleasure, and resumed by Viscount MERSEY.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE EARL OF MUNSTER): My Lords, at this comparatively late hour I must ask your Lordships' indulgence if I make a somewhat lengthy reply to the Motion which has been moved by the noble Earl. I have no wish to be drawn into discussion of the future constitutional problems which may concern India, and therefore I shall confine my remarks entirely to this very highly complicated question raised by the Notice on the Paper. I wish at the outset to follow the noble Earl who proposed this Motion and record my deep and sincere sympathy with the Indian people in this dire misfortune that has come upon them. As there are considerable doubts existing in the minds of many people concerning the present constitutional position in India, I have thought it advisable, after consideration, to draw up my remarks under five headings:—Firstly, the fundamentals of the food problem in India; secondly, the responsibilities of His Majesty's Government, the Government of India, and the Provincial Administrations, of which the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, rather seemed to be unaware; thirdly, the action taken by the Central Government; fourthly, the reason for the shortage of foodstuffs in Bengal; and, lastly, what action has been taken to relieve that shortage.
There are certain fundamentals in the economy of Indian agriculture peculiar to that country, and which are perhaps not found in any other great country in the world with the possible exception of China. The task of supplying and maintaining the daily needs and wants of one-fifth of the human race—a population which has increased incidentally by some 60,000,000 in the last dozen years— devolves upon 55,000,000 subsistence fanners who, from time immemorial, have followed the practice of retaining a portion of their products for their own consumption and that of their families and dependants, and of selling or marketing the surplus to pay their taxes and their debts and buy those things which they most require. It will be realized that, when all the families are counted in, the 55,000,000 farmers probably represent some 300,000,000 peasant consumers. Consequently, at times when low agricul-

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tural prices prevail, the farmer may be compelled to sell an unduly large quantity of his products which he would normally wish to reserve in order to pay his debts and to buy things he particularly requires. When high prices for foodstuffs prevail he Is able, by disposing of only a smaller quantity, to meet his current liabilities, and it consequently happens, when prices are high, that he tends to eat more, to save more, and probably market less.
Your Lordships will see how narrow and precarious—and indeed how narrow and precarious has always been—the margin of supply for the urban population. Despite the increased acreage which is now under cultivation, the amount of foodstuffs available per head has, in spite of the vast increase of population, remained practically stationary from year to year. The bulk of the production goes direct from the producer to the consumer, and therefore the steady distribution of home-grown products must always play a very important role in the feeding of the people.
There are other additional factors which affect the even distribution of foodstuffs, the most important of which are the fixed diet habits of the people and the difficulty which is experienced in persuading them to vary their customary foodstuffs if any shortage should occur in the particular food grains to which they have become accustomed. I have met this same difficulty in another part: of the Empire, and although it can usually be overcome by the spoken or written word, it is far more difficult in India where we are faced with a very large illiterate population who, in times of famine, as has been said to-day, are the very people who suffer the greatest tribulation and need. Your Lordships will realize that, should anything occur to disturb that normal flow of trade between the small subsistence farmer and the great urban population, a man-made artificial famine is at once created, a famine which is quite distinct from that caused by the failure of crops due to reasons over which mankind has little or no control. At the moment Bengal is unfortunately enduring both forms of disaster—man-made and natural—and they react on and exaggerate, as they must do, one another. From the districts on which Calcutta relied for rice, and which are themselves faced with starvation, there have flocked into the cities thousands and thousands
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of destitute villagers looking for charitable relief and swelling the proportion of the city population which is already destitute. That point was made very effectively by my noble friend Lord Catto this afternoon.
I leave the fundamentals of the Indian food problem, and go on to the responsibilities of His Majesty's Government, the Government of India, and the Provincial Governments, which are in fact the three authorities concerned in the government of the Indian Empire. I shall try to explain to the House—for it is a most substantial point—the duties which fall on each of these authorities under Act of Parliament. Any of your Lordships who know India will not forget that, under the existing Constitution, and leaving aside for the moment the Indian States of great and varying sizes and wealth, the Indian Empire is made up of eleven Provinces, some as great and as big as the principal European countries, to which certain responsibilities have been allotted to enable them to function as autonomous units in many respects practically self-governing. The Provincial Governments under the Government of India Act, 1935, are responsible for agriculture, agricultural development and the production and distribution of foodstuffs. In fact, the House will see that they are primarily responsible for the well-being of their community in their respective districts. There is no other administrative organization in existence for the execution and carrying out of any common food policy in India other than that which is provided by the administrative organizations of the Provinces and States, it is, 01 course, true to say that the Central Government has certain powers of co-ordination and it has used them from time to time to give advice, assistance and help to the autonomous Provinces, but for the functions of government which have been developed in the Provinces it has no administrative agency of its own and it must therefore depend on the machinery which, as I have said, is already in existence and only in existence in the Provinces.
That then is the position at the present time in all Provinces and in the States as well. Let me pass to the Central Government and explain to your Lordships the position which it occupies. It is quite true that the Government of India has special war-time powers which enable it to override the Provincial Governments if

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necessary, in order to secure that provincial action conforms to All-Indian requirements. These powers were, I venture to think, not granted by Parliament for the purpose of coercing these Provincial Administrations, who possibly in the performance of their proper provincial functions seemed perhaps overanxious to protect the interests of their own populations or failed to move at that speed which might have been expected of them. They were granted, as I understand it, for use in a time of emergency and when the security of India is threatened by war. That, as I see it, is the governing situation, but it would be an extreme measure to use these powers to deal, even in war-time, with a problem of famine. It may be said that the granting of provincial autonomy has resulted in a lessening efficiency as viewed from an All-Indian standpoint. But, so far as I can see, there is no reason whatever why the Central Government should encroach on provincial responsibility except in the most exceptional circumstances. If it should prove that the Provinces failed to co-operate in handling the food problem to such an extent that the war effort was seriously affected, then the Central Government would be justified in using these powers.
I think that it would be an unhappy development if the Government of India were to exert these powers and, to use words which have been used to-day, brush aside the responsible democratically-based Governments whenever an ugly situation develops or threatens in any particular Province. I think it is quite true, as was said by my noble friend Lord Hailey, that the noble Earl, Lord Huntingdon, did overlook that point in the speech he delivered to your Lordships. I ask myself this question, what is the first act of any democratic Government? Surely it is to look after and safeguard the well-being and interests of all the people in its district, both the majority and the minorities, and most elected Governments are usually deeply sensible of this responsibility. I should have thought myself that it is quite clear that the Central Government has adopted the only possible course short of the extreme measures which I have mentioned, for it has continually and earnestly sought to obtain the loyal co-operation of the Provinces. It would be contrary to all the facts in this very com-
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plicated story to assume that the Government of India was content to do absolutely nothing until the situation had developed into the serious dimensions that we see to-day.
I shall have to return again in a moment to give the House further facts which will show what action has been taken by the Central Government from the first day of the war, now more than four years ago, but let me for a moment try to elucidate the position of ourselves at home—that is to say of His Majesty's Government. Quite apart from the statutory and constitutional responsibilities which we retain for securing the safety of the peoples of India, it would be our natural wish at all times to render every conceivable form of assistance and help to all our partners within the Empire whatever their precise constitutional relations to this country, and wherever they may be situated, and indeed whatever the cost might be. That wish of course is magnified in times of grave tribulation and of great need. As I understand it, loyalty to the Empire implies an obligation on the part of all of us, a mutual safeguard of common interests and a recognition of a duty of mutual assistance to each other. The problem, then, so far as we are concerned at home, in what is essentially a matter of internal administration in order to secure effective distribution within India, is limited entirely to the provision of shipping for the carrying of food supplies that India requires from outside sources. It is hardly necessary, I think, for me to remind the House of the many calls that are made upon us in this matter of shipping. We have to judge in the light of all relevant factors, we have to judge in the light of all the other urgent demands of the United Nations, and allot shipping as and where it can be of most use and assistance to the war effort. I am happy to think that these efforts we have made have not been without some considerable degree of success and large quantities of food grains are now arriving in ships which have been diverted to meet the present needs of the food shortage in certain districts of India.
Perhaps I may revert for a moment in order to give your Lordships some account of the action which has been taken by the Central Government, action with which, I venture to suggest, the

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noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, is completely unfamiliar, otherwise he would not have given us the speech to-day which contains so many magnificent examples of gross inaccuracies. From the earliest days of the war the Government of India realized that it would inevitably be confronted with some of the consequences of war conditions and the commodity supply position was taken in hand at that time. Every development was carefully and closely watched and the co-ordination of policy was achieved by price control conferences convened by the Central Government of Provincial and State representatives. Powers under the Defence of India Rules were taken to authorize Provincial Governments to control prices of certain essential commodities. I do not propose to worry your Lordships with the many details of events which occurred from that time to the beginning of 1942 when the position did undergo a radical change. The loss of Burma deprived India of rice normally imported from that country. In December, 1942, the Central Government set up a food department of its own with regional food controllers whose duty it was to advise and assist and to convey instructions, At the same time a basic plan was evolved which arranged for the purchase and distribution of food grains from the surplus areas to the deficit areas, and agencies were established under the authority of Government for that very purpose.
At that time the Central Government experienced many unforeseen difficulties when they came to consult the Provinces as to the quantity of food grains available by way of surplus and of the dimensions of the deficiencies to be met. In spite of an excellent wheat harvest in North-West India, it became obvious in the middle of this year that the basic plan was not in fact providing sufficient remedy for meeting the difficulties of the more hardly pressed areas and therefore amendment was found necessary to this plan, which, as I have said, was formulated at the beginning of the year. In normal peace time the imports of foodstuffs into India spread through the period of twelve months amount to about 2½ per cent, of the total consumption. The situation, therefore, differs fundamentally from the position in this country where by far the greater part of our foodstuffs is imported and the State can easily
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institute a price control of vital commodities without a great deal of difficulty. The basic plan did not deal with price control, but it was believed its effective operation would bring food grains on to the market at reasonable prices. Fixed prices for wheat were actually in operation in India for a time, but when a shortage was apparent dealers were unwilling and reluctant to sell at the controlled price and it was accordingly removed. This naturally resulted in a large quantity of wheat coming on to the market, but of course at higher prices. It should also be remembered that, with the exception of wheat, there is no organized system of marketing food grains in India, and there is now no general price control on food grains, though practically all the Provinces have taken steps to control prices either directly or indirectly. There is further a ceiling price on rice which has been imposed throughout Bengal.
The Central Government also instituted, during the early months of last year, a grow-more-food campaign which brought an additional 8,000,000 acres of food crops under cultivation and will probably bring a total of 12,000,000 acres this year. This should normally have met the deficiencies which have resulted from the fall of Burma alone. The Government is also providing financial assistance to the Bengal Government to meet the heavy increased cost of relief. From time to time an All-India food Conference has been held when all matters pertaining to food supplies have been exhaustively examined. I think your Lordships will quite easily see that the Central Government has been and is continually and energetically devoting its efforts to the food problem.
Last July the Government of India appointed a Committee of Provincial and other representatives to make recommendations on what was described as the long-term food policy. That I think was referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Huntingdon, and by my noble friend Lord Strabolgi. That Committee reported at the end of last month and the Government of India called a conference last week to consider it. The full text of the report and of the discussion has not yet reached us, but a telegram was received at a late hour last night explaining that the decisions include a new and revised edition

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of the basic plan for the marrying of provincial surpluses and deficits and the continuance of present methods of procurement by the Provinces under central advice and direction pending the Government of India's consideration of the possibility of a central food grains monopoly. As regards prices, statutory price control both for food grains and other commodities is to be established ultimately, being built up from a provincial and regional basis. Provincial control of prices meanwhile is to be subject to central approval. Lastly, full urban rationing of towns over 100,000 population, is accepted as fundamental. I wish I had further information, but I thought the House would probably desire the earliest information that could be given to it. I think that if this scheme works well it will prevent a recurrence of this man-made famine which has given so much anxiety to us.
May I go on now to explain some of the reasons for the shortage of foodstuffs in Bengal? The present unhappy situation which has developed there is due to a variety of reasons. The loss of Burma had repercussions upon Bengal and upon other districts of India, but the Provincial Governments were not seriously alarmed at that time for there were reserves of stocks which had been obtained from an excellent crop and which had come on the market at the beginning of the year. That reserve was in the hands of a number of traders and cultivators. Unfortunately, cyclones and floods occurred in parts of the rice growing areas of Bengal and not only destroyed a portion of the coming season's crop, but also resulted in the loss by floods of some of the reserve stocks which, as I have just mentioned, were in the hands of the traders and cultivators. As a result of this the rice harvest was poor, with probably a 25 per cent, reduction in quantity on former years. The distribution of foodstuffs within the Province was also hampered by the lack of small craft which had been removed by the boat denial policy instituted at the time of the threatened invasion of Burma. Furthermore, as your Lordships must know quite well, the railways in Eastern India were carrying immense quantities of military personnel and equipment.
The cumulative effect of these causes aggravated the food problem and caused
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a shortage in the production and the distribution of foodstuffs. The traders in all crops tended to hoard in the hope of obtaining a substantial rise in prices, and the cultivator was reluctant to dispose of any surplus which he held for fear of having to buy back at a higher price if famine conditions spread or the next harvest failed. Thus your Lordships will see that the position as a whole was accentuated by the loss of Burma, by the adverse supply position, by the fear of invasion which at that time was very much alive, by the lack of any marketable surplus through hoarding, and by the withholding of stocks for speculative reasons.
Your Lordships will naturally wish to hear what action is being or has been taken to relieve the food shortage in Bengal. In August, instructions were issued for the immediate establishment of an elaborate relief organization based on very similar lines to those indicated in the famine code. Emphasis was laid on the importance of affording relief in kind through free kitchens and cheap grain shops, in addition to the more usual forms of Government assistance and relief. As a result of these remedial measures, 4,000 free kitchens have been established or have been subsidized by the Government, and nearly 1,500,000 people are being fed daily in this manner. As the House already knows—it has been announced in another place—the problem of the destitutes in Calcutta and elsewhere is being tackled by the opening of relief camps. The Government of Bengal, with the aid of the Government of India's adviser— and incidentally I may mention that he is an expert who was recommended by my noble friend the Minister of Food to meet the request of the Government of India—is working out a system of individual rationing for Calcutta, and this should be in full operation before the end of November.
In addition to these methods of relief, the Central Government has treated this question the whole time as a matter of first-class importance, and has taken a number of steps to assist the Bengal Government. Arrangements have been made for the running of special food trains each day to carry food grains from North-West India to Calcutta and beyond. Deliveries of food grains to Bengal since the beginning of April on Government account have amounted to 181,000 tons of rice

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and 194,000 tons of other food grains. During the month of September deliveries amounted to 72,000 tons.
My Lords, I have endeavoured, at, I am afraid, far too great a length at this time of the day, to put before your Lordships an examination of all the relevant factors which have led up over a period of time to the present very unhappy condition which is prevailing chiefly in Bengal, though it exists in other parts of India as well. We are, as I have endeavoured to show, making every effort to remedy the situation as quickly as it is humanly possible to do so, for it is vital, not only for the war effort but for the civil life of the community at large, that they should return to normal conditions without any undue delay. The Aus crop has already been harvested, and, subject to adequate distribution and to assistance rendered from outside sources, it is hoped that this will carry Bengal to the New Year when the Aman, or winter rice crop—which is the main crop for Bengal—will be coming on to the market.
I hope that I have dealt with all the questions which were asked me in the speeches which have been delivered to-day. But may I be so bold as to conclude my remarks by referring to a matter which does concern this House and indeed the country at large? I refer, of course, to the appointment of the nob|e and gallant Field Marshal Lord Wavell as Viceroy and Governor-General of India. I feel sure that your Lordships would naturally wish to express your best wishes to the noble Viscount in the gigantic task which he has undertaken. It is, I think, only one further indication of his willingness to serve his country in whatever position he can render the most useful service. This, perhaps, is not the time to refer to the work performed for seven and a half long and arduous years—four years of which have been years of war—by the noble Marquess, Lord Linlithgow, who will shortly be amongst us again. But I must quite frankly say that fortune has not been kind to Lord Linlithgow during the last few remaining months of his Viceroyalty, for the hideous spectre of famine has raised its ugly head in spite of the many remedial measures which he took and which he has undertaken to relieve it. But, nevertheless, we are grateful to the noble Marquess for the loyal, long and very distinguished service which he has
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given to us and to our great Indian Empire.
THE EARL OF HUNTINGDON: My Lords, I do not wish to keep you long at this late stage of the day, but I should like to thank the noble Earl for the very full and pithy reply which he has given to the question which I have raised, and to the questions which have been asked by other noble Lords. I think that we have had an exceptionally interesting debate, with valuable contributions from Lord Catto and, particularly, from Lord Hailey. There are just one or two points which I should like to mention before we cease dealing with this matter. One is this. I cannot quite agree with the remarks of the noble Earl about the emergency powers. I understood that those powers were given to the Central Government of India for use in any war-time emergency. Surely this famine is about as great an emergency as we could possibly come up against. I should like to express my agreement with Lord Hailey in what he said about the importance of price control. Although there are some other topics on which we may not altogether agree, I do agree very strongly with what he said in this connexion. I should like, finally, to express the gratitude which I think all members of this House must have felt at hearing the news that grain ships and other forms of relief are now going to India. I hope that His Majesty's Government will continue to make every effort to fight this dreadful famine. I beg to ask leave of the House to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER DOCUMENTS.
LORD DAVIES: My Lords, I beg to ask the question standing in my name on the Paper.
[The question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government, when it is proposed to publish the full text of the various memoranda, reports and other official documents relating to the events and developments in the field of international relationships which 'preceded the outbreak of the war.]
LORD SNELL: My Lords, documents dealing with the period from the 15th

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March to the 3rd September, 1939, have already been published in Command Paper 6106. The publication of further documents is under consideration but I am not yet in a position to make any statement.
LORD DAVIES: My Lords, arising out of that reply I am sure that my noble friend will realize that in the absence of these documents, we have nothing to fall back on but the distorted version put out by enemy sources. I therefore venture to plead with him that these documents should be released as soon as possible.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, I will see that the noble Lord's suggestion is carried out if possible.

CLEARING OFFICE (ITALY) AMEND MENT ORDER, 1943.
VISCOUNT CLIFDEN: My Lords, on behalf of the noble and learned Lord Chancellor, who is unavoidably absent on urgent Government business, I beg to move the Motion standing in his name. An Anglo-Italian Clearing Office was set up in 1936, with a view to ensuring that the sterling derived from Italian exports to the United Kingdom should be used to meet Italian liabilities to the United Kingdom. The Clearing Office (Italy) Order, 1936, made by the Treasury on July 10, 1936, provided that the sterling received by the Clearing Office should be placed to a reserve account pending the conclusion of negotiations with the Italian Government. Subsequently, on November 6, 1936, a Clearing Agreement was concluded with Italy providing for the distribution of the sterling received by the Clearing Office. This agreement was put into force by the Clearing Office (Italy) Amendment Order, 1936, made by the Treasury on November 11, 1936. An amending agreement was signed on March 18, 1938, and was brought into effect by the Clearing Office (Italy) Amendment Order, 1938, which was made by the Treasury on March 28, 1938.
On the outbreak of war with Italy, the agreements automatically lapsed, and no further distribution of the sterling in the Clearing was made to creditors in this country. However, the provisions of the Orders under which debts due by United Kingdom creditors for goods of Italian origin must be paid to the Anglo-Italian
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Clearing Office remained in force; but, under the specific provisions of Section 8 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 1939, the sterling amounts standing in the Anglo-Italian Clearing at the outbreak of war, and subsequent additions thereto arising from the payment of pre-war debts by British residents, have been paid over to the Custodian of Enemy Property with a view to their preservation in contemplation of arrangements to be made at the conclusion of peace.
The Clearing Office (Italy) Amendment Order, 1943, of which confirmation is now proposed, provides that the previous Orders shall not apply to debts in respect of Italian goods imported into this country after the coming into force of this Order. They will not, therefore, be paid to the Clearing Office. The purpose of the Order is to establish a clear distinction between pre-war and post-war debts. Pre-war debts to Italy—both those payable through the Clearing and those payable outside the Clearing—will be held in suspense, in the hands of the Custodian, until such time as a general settlement can be made, a time which is clearly not the present. At the same time, payment for current imports from Italy, which we may shortly expect to receive, will not have to be made in accordance with pre-war machinery.
For the time being any exports to, or imports from, Italy which may take place will be on Government account, and it would clearly be unsuitable that sums due by Government Departments for purchases made in Italy should be paid into a Clearing Account set up to carry out an agreement which no longer exists, and then handed over to the Custodian of Enemy Property. These sums should be available against the current claims which we may have on Italy, and not least against the cost of the supplies which this country will have to send into Italy for the relief of the civilian population. When private trade with Italy can be resumed, it will be necessary to make further arrangements with the Italian Government for payment machinery, but it is impossible in the present unsettled stage to foresee what arrangements will be necessary. In accordance with Section 4 of the Debts (Clearing Offices and Import Restrictions) Act, 1934, the present Order must be approved by each House of Parliament within 28 days of the making of

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the Order, excluding any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or both Houses of Parliament are adjourned for more than four days. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Special Order, as reported from the Special Orders Committee yesterday, be approved.—(Viscount Clifden.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.