Lords Sitting of 14 October 1943

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

ITALY.
LORD ADDISON LORD ADDISON rose to ask His Majesty's Government, what undertakings, if any, they have entered into with Marshal Badoglio and those with whom he is associated, and if they have regard to the record of their actions in the past against those who have sought to defend their liberty; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should like to observe first that this Motion is not intended to be in any way critical of His Majesty's Government. My object is to elicit information, if I can. Since the Motion was first placed on the Paper we have had the advantage of the statements made yesterday and we are aware of the declaration of war against Germany by the King of Italy. I welcome those statements with the exception, perhaps, of one statement made by the Minister of State, Mr. Law, with regard to proceedings affecting General Roatta. However, I think that it is altogether useful, in view of the position in which this country stands as the champion of millions of enslaved and tortured people, that, so far as possible, that position should not be open to any misunderstanding.
One has, of course, to recognize the facts of the situation. The sudden surrender of the Italian Government and Army and the collapse of the Fascist system presented all those who were responsible on the spot for carrying on the life of the country with an exceedingly difficult problem. In twenty years the country had been denuded of all self-respecting, free-minded people, and every staff, even of the most modest kind, was composed of followers or supporters of the Fascist system which in its nature and origin was tyrannical and had become, I think there is no doubt, from top to bottom, exceedingly corrupt. It must therefore be a very difficult matter to find in a short time any body of men competent to carry on. In this country we have, happily under our traditions, an abundance of public-spirited and trustworthy
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people, but in a country where such men have been deliberately obliterated over twenty years those responsible are confronted with an exceedingly difficult task, and one has to recognize that. His Majesty's Government and those responsible out there had to make the best of things, and nobody would be critical on that account.
The Italian Fleet, after all, is an asset, a very great asset. What Marshal Badoglio will be able to do with the Italian Army, if there is one, remains to be seen. I am sure we all welcome the studious care with which the United Nations worded the statement made yesterday, that they are prepared to wait and see and be very sparing in their pledges. I think one of the most hopeful things, so far as the internal affairs of Italy are concerned, is the fact that in the north of Italy, before this declaration, there had been a considerable measure of resistance to the Germans in the great towns, in many cases with the assistance of Italian officers and in some cases with the assistance of escaped British prisoners. Anything that can be done to help those people struggling against the Germans, where they are in control, His Majesty's Government will, I am sure, be anxious to do.
But the reasons for the Italian surrender are not obscure. They are that the Army and the Air Force had been defeated, and that the Navy preferred to shelter in its ports. The Army and the people clearly had no stomach for the fight. In addition, there was, as we might have expected, a growing hatred of the Germans, and, let us hope, some growth of a hope that there might soon be discerned in the distance some delivery from twenty years of oppression. When we have allowed for all these things, however, the outstanding reason of the surrender of the Italians was that they had been defeated. One reminds oneself of these matters not in any vengeful or revengeful spirit, or anything of the kind, but because it behoves us to remember them in the interests of those who have fought with us and who will fight with us still. We must remember, too, that what has happened has been brought about by the heroism and sacrifice of thousands of Greeks, Albanians, Yugoslavs and Abyssinians as well as by the loss of thousands of precious lives —of men from Britain, of New

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Zealanders, of South Africans, of Australians, of Indians, and of our Allies from the United States. It behoves us not to forget what these people have fought and suffered for.
In a copy of the Ethiopian News, dated October 9, which I have on the Table here, there is this expression of opinion:
"We are not impressed very much with the King of Italy, Marshal Badoglio and others discovering in their consciences the justice of the Allied cause when they have been defeated on the field of battle."
It is one thing to remember these things and to accept surrender and to behave— as I am sure we shall behave—decently and generously towards the Italian people; but it is quite a different thing to instal people in positions of authority. I am glad that in the other place yesterday we had an explanation of the strange, broad preamble to the broadcast from Bari. I understand that the pomposity of the declaration is attributed to an over-enthusiastic civil servant. Well, that is what might be colloquially described as a little thin, but still there is, so far as I know, no reason why we should not accept it. I was glad to notice that, apparently, there has been an admonition on the subject which will no doubt prevent any recurrence of that kind of thing.
At this time it is right, I think, to remember that during the past twenty years neither the King of Italy nor Marshal Badoglio, so far as I know, protested against Mussolini's exploits, and they stood aside whilst unmentionable cruelties were perpetrated on Italian people. Numbers of the best citizens in the land were sentenced to imprisonment and exile; in some cases they underwent torture. I would recall also what happened in Albania and in France, and the administration of gas to the Abyssinians. Against none of these things, so far as I know, was there any protest by those who have so recently been converted to the cause of liberty. A record of this type, however charitable we may be and are, does not inspire us with confidence in these people as leaders along the path which leads to the restoration of personal liberty, to put it no higher than that. I think that we should also bear in mind the unfortunate repercussions over the acceptance—perhaps at the time the inevitable acceptance—of the assistance of
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Admiral Darlan. It is right that we should be careful that that kind of repercussion is not repeated. I take it from the declarations made on behalf of the Government yesterday, however, that these present leaders in Italy will be judged by what they do. I have no doubt that that will not be forgotten, and I hope that the fact that it is borne in mind will be brought to the attention of all those who have fought with us for so long.
I do want to inquire, however, whether it is necessary, in making the best of the situation, as we have to do, and perhaps accepting Marshal Badoglio and hoping for the best, to accept as his colleagues men who are subject to grave charges by some of our most reliable and faithful Allies. I think that I cannot do better in this connexion than quote a question in the Daily Telegraph of October 8, where there was an inquiry as to whether we needed to include the collaboration, on the path towards liberty, of "men whose names have become a by-word among the liberated people as the authors or even the agents of oppression." I think that that is a very proper question, and one which in the interests of all that we stand for in the world we ought to face. I see that Marshal Badoglio declared in an interview with the Press a short time ago— I quote from the News Chronicle of October 6, which purports to give a quotation of what he said—that his Government would definitely exclude all Fascists; but he added, "I shall keep the Service Ministers I have with me now, General Ambrosio, Chief of the Combined Staff, and General Roatta, Chief of the Army Staff." These two men, Generals Ambrosio and Roatta, are the subject of grave charges by some of our most noble Allies. The Yugoslav Government, we are authoritatively informed, are in possession of documents containing declarations and orders by General Roatta in particular, while he was in command of the troops in Slovenia, Croatia and Dalmatia, which are in fact of an exceptionally ruthless and cruel kind.
There is, for example, an order for the shooting of hostages. There is another for the demolition of villages half a mile on each side of a road, and the extirpation of the inhabitants, if need be, was ordered also. The Bishop of Ljubljana, when 20,000 people had been sent by

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General Roatta to a concentration camp, was told in an interview that, if need be, they would all be exterminated. I have here an extract from an order issued by General Roatta as Chief of the Army Staff on July 25 of this year to the troops in Northern Italy, and quoted in the Libera Stampa of August 8, in which he circularized the Army Corps with instructions for the maintenance of public order. The order is described as being in violent, merciless and even ferocious terms. It contains instructions to fire on the crowd on the slightest pretext in order to prevent disorder. In Turin, in July of this year, the officer in command was praised because he succeeded in inducing his troops to fire on an unarmed crowd and disperse a demonstration with hand grenades; and other barracks were informed of this incident as an example which they should follow.
It is right, of course, that these charges should be investigated. Nobody wants to condemn even General Roatta without giving him a chance to defend himself. We have to remember, however, that charges of this kind have been made for a considerable time against this man by our Allies in Yugoslavia and the adjoining countries, people who have fought and suffered in the cause for which we are fighting. I suggest that the place for a man like this is not in a Cabinet. That is the point. It might be more appropriate if he was in a dock, but at all events he should not be in a Cabinet. This is the criticism that I would make of the statement in another place by Mr. Law yesterday, to the effect that inquiry would be made and that if necessary appropriate action would be taken. I suggest that it may not be long before other men who have been guilty of atrocious cruelties discover that they are on the losing side, and they may suddenly find that they hate the Germans, whom for so long they have aided and abetted. It is no part of our struggle, however, to provide a refuge for tyrants, and it would redound greatly to our hurt if we even seemed to do so. Whilst we recognize that Generals Ambrosio and Roatta are entitled to a fair trial, I say deliberately that men who are accused as they are, by Allies who have been loyal to us all through, of foul cruelty, are not men whom we should provide with any cloak of authority, or to whom we
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should extend any recognition whatever. I beg to move.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships will not disagree with me when I say that my noble friend has performed a great public service today in voicing the true opinions of the people of this country with regard to this whole vexed question of war criminals and the recognition of the rats. I am sure, too, your Lordships are grateful to my noble friend for the high level of his utterances and the stern warning that he gave. Like my noble friend, I also do not wish to be critical, and I will try not to lacerate the feelings of the Leader of the House on this occasion as I fear I did last time. I would seek rather to muster what enthusiasm I can for His Majesty's Government's policy and its results.
The first thing I hope I shall be allowed to say is that this declaration of war on Germany by the Italian Government and the recognition of the Italians as co-belligerents are welcome, but they are rather overdue. They dispose completely of the fiction of unconditional surrender. I found myself, not for the first time, in full agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Hankey—I am sorry the noble Lord is not present this afternoon—when he showed how really absurd it was during our last debate on Italy. A Government that functions at all never surrenders unconditionally. If it ceases to function it is no longer a Government. "Unconditional surrender" is a very proper term to apply to the surrender of a defeated army in the field or of a besieged fortress, and we lost weeks of time and opportunity, I fear, by slavish adherence to this unfortunate Casablanca formula. I realize also the difficulties. Perhaps they are insuperable for the time being, but there docs seem to be an over-centralization at the highest level in the British and American councils and a misunderstanding at this highest level of the political issues involved and their great importance. I think my noble friend's speech in opening this debate this afternoon provides a concrete case. If there had been a better understanding of the great political issues of this war, I do not believe Marshal Badoglio would ever have been permitted to announce the names of these two war criminals as members of the Italian Government, the

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Government of our co-belligerents. But I am very glad to see that Marshal Badoglio also has declared that he is going to widen the basis of his Government, and so long as he leads in the fight against the common enemy he is being supported by the leaders of the democratic movements, or such of them as are left, in Italy. That being the case, like my noble friend I hope the experiment succeeds, and that Marshal Badoglio will give the lead which is so obviously needed in Italy to the armed forces still capable of carrying on the struggle.
Might I address a question to the Leader of the House which I took the liberty of informing him about beforehand? I see that Count Sforza, whom your Lordships know all about, has been passing through London, and has had interviews with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in the last day or two. I am very glad to see this. It was reported in the newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic that Count Sforza and other important Italian exiles were being hindered from returning to Italy or Sicily after Mussolini's fall. I hope that is untrue, and I shall be very glad if the noble Viscount can deny the statement.
With regard to the feeling, which I must express, that we lost opportunities in Italy, may I draw your Lordships' attention to the following? The Armistice in Italy was signed on the 3rd September, and kept secret until the 8th. It was on the 10th and nth that the great combined expeditionary force of British, Americans and Canadians landed on the Salerno beaches, and the tremendous and furious battle began in which our men once more added to the good reputation of the British soldier, and the American troops, largely without battle experience, acquitted themselves with such distinction. I have here the account of what was happening at that time in Naples by a very experienced journalist, Mr. Noel Monks, who represents the combined British Press with the Fifth Army. Everything he writes is subject to censorship, and this account was actually issued on October 6 by the Ministry of Information—that is a matter of machinery of course. Mr. Monks says that an Italian naval officer informed him that on September 7 two days before the
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announcement of Italy's surrender and the Allied invasion, the Germans stationed in Naples left in a violent hurry. They did not take any equipment, they just fled in great panic. The officer said, "We were delighted and thought they were gone for good. They did not return to Naples until September 11, the day after the Allied landing in Salerno Bay. On the night the Fifth Army landed Naples was actually wide open. We believe that the Nazis got wind of Italy's surrender and were thrown into a real panic."
If we had been in touch with what was going on in Naples, if we had had an efficient Intelligence Service, we could have sailed into Naples. There might have been obstructions and minefields in the harbour, but these could have been got over by the Royal Navy had they had the opportunity. We could in fact have had that great city and held it against all comers. Even if the Germans were massed outside in the country, once we had a footing in Naples, with its steep and narrow streets and the friendly population, nobody could have turned us out. What an opportunity was lost, and what a lot of brave men died from a lack of appreciation of the situation! I think that is an extraordinary state of affairs. Nevertheless, the Italian resistance in Naples was valuable and it probably deterred Kesselring from making a defence there. But why did not we send arms to these Italians in Naples? Again, lack of contacts and faulty intelligence. It was the almost unarmed mob, with their bottles of petrol and their home-made weapons, who fought the Germans in Naples, some of them with great courage.
Contrast that with what happened in Corsica—what the Prime Minister describes as gathered in "the pick-up." The patriots in Corsica were armed from December onwards—this has been published, so I am not revealing any secrets. Arms were smuggled in to them. It was intended to send an expeditionary force in due course—one of these carefully prepared, elaborately organized amphibian or (if I may use an unfortunate word, which I do not like) triphibian expeditions. When news of the Armistice with Italy was published, the Corsicans rose spontaneously before they were told to. They managed to seize Ajaccio and hold the principal port in the island, and something had to be done from our side. Either they could

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have been told "Go into hiding again, call off your resistance," or we could have sent help. The elaborate expedition, of course, was not ready. But the French acted very promptly—and I think this is another of the great services that General Giraud has rendered to the common cause. They apparently had some Italian destroyers which had surrendered. They put what regular troops they could and American Rangers in them and sent them to Ajaccio. The islanders prevented the Germans from getting to Ajaccio by blocking all the mountain passes, and we know that in spite of the refusal to fight of 80,000 Italian troops in Corsica, the island was cleared of the enemy. Unfortunately, owing to the failure of the Italian troops to fight in Corsica, the Germans to the number of 20,000 managed to get away—they had some losses during the passage—and to reinforce Rommel's Army in the north. There was a case where the French acted swiftly, where there was good political liaison, where the ground had been prepared in advance, where the partisans, the patriots, in Corsica knew what to do. That valuable and important island is now again under the Tricolour.
If that was possible in Corsica, I wish there were other such examples elsewhere. The extraordinary thing is that whereas the city populations in Italy, as my noble friend reminded your Lordships—in Naples, Milan, Turin, and so on—have, at great risk, at the risk of their lives, resisted the Germans, in most cases the Italian soldiers have not fought. The Leader of the House explained what happened at Rhodes, where 30,000 Italian soldiers allowed themselves to be overcome by a German force one-quarter of their size, and we had this case in Corsica of 80,000 Italian soldiers who would not even hold the bridges against the Germans. Why is that? The only explanation I have been given by people who have been out there recently —I do not know Italy so well as many of your Lordships do—is that the bulk of the Italian infantry are peasants, that they refuse to fight anyone now, Germans or Allies, and that all they want to do is to get back to their farms. Yet the city populations have resisted with great courage in certain cases.
What really happened, of course, in the north was that Rommel, with his ten
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or fifteen divisions, thought he had only to hold a line of 300 miles, whereas he had to hold down 600,000 square miles of territory. He had to split up his Army in order to keep down the insurgent population in the cities, and he was not able to send reinforcements to his comrade in crime, Kesselring, so the day at Salerno went in our favour. We must acknowledge that we owe something to these unorganized, unprepared, unarmed people in Italy who, in spite of the terror imposed by the Germans and their known ferocity, did make some resistance.
It is the fashion nowadays to say that Italian Armies will not fight. It is, of course, perfectly true that in most cases they have been only too willing to surrender to the British and later to the American forces, but there have been Italian forces which have fought very well. At the beginning some Italian Armies fought very hard in East Africa, as we know, and in the later stages of the Tunisian campaign the Italians fought better than the Germans; I believe that to be a fact. Italians can fight, and will fight, when they have the right urge to fight. What I suggest is missing in Italy, and what I hope will now be forthcoming, is an ideological urge. I do not mean a revolutionary urge, because there is not a revolution in Italy, but there must be some ideological motive and then the Italian soldiers will fight.
Quite recently, in Spain, during the civil war, the Italian volunteers in the International Brigade—the Garibaldi Regiment—fought extremely well. They were one of the finest regiments fighting on the side of the Government in Spain. We have that direct from my right honourable friend Mr. Attlee, who was in Spain and brought back first-hand evidence of that. Italians will fight when they have the right motive behind them. What I hope the Badoglio Government will proceed to do—and I trust they will be encouraged in this regard—is to bring in a great measure of land reform in Italy, which is what the peasants require, and of social reform for the workers in the Italian industries. If that is done I believe we shall be able to get great help from the Italians and to recruit volunteer divisions, or perhaps the Italian Army can be brought again into the line. The fact that so much of Italy is occupied by the Germans does not mean that there

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are not many Italian soldiers available, because there are still in the Balkans the remnants of a very large Italian Army.
But I go a little further in this respect. The Italian matter is settled for the time being, but there will be other countries where similar problems will arise. I hope I shall not be misunderstood and I hope, once again, I shall not hurt the feelings of the noble Viscount opposite, but we have got to recognize that, as the war proceeds, political warfare becomes of ever-increasing importance. We should be prepared to use it and not to look upon it as a happy accident when, for instance, the Corsican patriots rise against the Germans, but as was done in the case of Corsica, be prepared to take advantage of this feeling of revolt which exists wherever the German jackboot has trodden. The Germans may begin by making a good impression, and win the support of Quislings, but after a few months or years the whole population detests them and only wants to clear them out. That happens everywhere. If we are frightened of this revolutionary spirit and look upon it as something to be discouraged and damped down, we lose a great military asset in the future. That necessitates getting rid of the idea that you can restore the old political and economic system in these occupied countries of Europe, including Italy as well. Of course you cannot. You cannot go back to things as they were. That must be recognized.
The only other thing I feel compelled to remind your Lordships of is this. We have at last got this status of co-belligcrency and the Government under Badoglio which my noble friend hopes will be widened as promised, but this could have been brought about earlier. In those fatal weeks after the fall of Mussolini and the almost complete obliteration of Fascism an Italy, the few German divisions lost control completely, especially in the north. Through a failure to appreciate the real situation, we helped them to restore control—quite innocently, I know, without any intent, but we helped to do Rommel's work for him by bombing the Italian cities especially in the north. I am not going to revert to the discussion we had as to whether the bombing went on after the negotiations for an Armistice had begun or not, but it was continued on a great
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scale in those weeks after the fall of Mussolini, when Fascism had gone, and when Italy was ours for the asking, as we now see. We made this fatal mistake of continuing air warfare against these great insurgent cities in Northern Italy, where the Germans had lost control and were in the greatest danger of their lives. We helped to disperse and disorganize the populations in Lombardy, and unwittingly, innocently, as I say, we did Rommel's work for him. Why do I say this? Not to score points, not to rub it in, if I may use a vulgar expression, but to plead that we should take this political side of the war more seriously, with more understanding, and be prepared to use the political weapon in all these countries which are ripe for invasion, and where the people themselves can do so much to help us to defeat the common enemy.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: My Lords, will your Lordships allow me to add one word on a very narrow point in connexion with what the noble Lord who has just spoken has put before the House? It is clear of course that he has gone a long way beyond the Motion that was moved by my noble friend Lord Addison and has been discussing not the question of the undertakings given, if any, to Marshal Badoglio but the consequent management and conduct of the war since the Armistice was entered into. I do not intend to enter into that topic but, speaking if I may do so in a more or less legal spirit, what I should like to do is to say a word on the use of the term "unconditional surrender." It is perfectly true that on the last occasion my noble friend Lord Hankey also made a comment on unconditional surrender, and I rather think with all respect to him, and with all respect to the noble Lord who has just spoken, that they were forgetting for a moment the meaning which attaches to those words both in histories and as a matter of public International Law. Unconditional surrender does not mean that the conqueror will not impose conditions; it means nothing more nor less than that the surrender takes place without any conditions on behalf of the beleaguered or the conquered forces who are throwing up the sponge. It is that which is without conditions.
The historical feature of it was deeply involved with the siege of cities. It con-

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stantly happened that the besieged found they could resist no longer, generally because they had no more food to eat. The question then, in the Middle Ages very largely, was "Shall we surrender unconditionally, in which case the enemy can march in and do anything they like consistent with the notions of war existing amongst civilized peoples, or shall we insist on a condition?" The usual condition was "Let us march out with the honours of war." That constantly meant that they were allowed to go out with such weapons as they had and join the forces of the Sovereign under whom they were serving. That happened again and again. For my part with all respect to the noble Lord I cannot see that there is ever any difficulty in construing the words "unconditional surrender," nor can I see that the fact that the British Government have now admitted the Italian forces to be co-belligerents in any way interferes with the fact that the Armistice was unconditional so far as regards those who were surrendering because it is something that is done after the surrender.
Let me take the example I gave of a besieged city. The conquerors insist on unconditional surrender and the General who is in charge of the besieged forces therefore hands over his sword and all the people inside can be ordered to give up their weapons. It does not become less an unconditional surrender because after that date the Commander of the forces who have been beaten asks for something to be done for his people. For instance, he may say, "Look here, I have a lot of wounded, may I send them on to the base? Have you any objection to that?" The other Commander, knowing that they would be a terrible nuisance to him, may reply, "Certainly, I have no objection. I will provide you with transport." That does not make the surrender unconditional. It is a term which is made as a matter of bargain or arrangement after the date when the unconditional surrender has been effected.
LORD STRABOLGI: Will the noble Viscount forgive me? I am most interested in his argument but is not he applying this only to the military case of a besieged city? Has he any case in mind where any Government has ever surrendered unconditionally as a Government of a city? The difference is fundamental.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I am not prepared here and now, because my memory is somewhat defective, to give a series of instances where surrender has been unconditional even by a Government. I suppose the noble Lord would say that when Sedan was surrendered or Metz was surrendered, that was only the General in Charge surrendering. But it always is the General in Charge who is surrendering and so far as the Armistice goes it is a matter for the Generals in the field. Armistices are not as a rule granted by or to a Government. They are granted by and between Generals in the field. I quite agree they may have received instructions from their Government but an Armistice is not like a peace treaty or anything of the sort. It is something which practically results in "Cease fire" over, it may be, a particular area or over a great country involving the whole of one of the belligerent forces. That is quite true, but at the same time I would pledge myself that I could give instances where Governments have surrendered unconditionally. I am not prepared to give the examples now. I rather forget what were the terms of the surrender which the French Government ultimately made after Gambetta's noble efforts on behalf of his country to the Germans in the beginning of the year 1871. As I say I have forgotten them and my memory is not good enough to pledge myself.
LORD GEDDES: The Confederate Government surrendered.
VISCOUNT MAUGHAM: I should imagine the Government of the Confederate States also surrendered unconditionally. There may have been some trifling condition which my memory is not good enough to recall but that is no real distinction. The common thing is for an unconditional surrender to be effected by a General in the field when his men can do nothing. That means he makes no conditions but it does not mean that the conqueror cannot insist on as many conditions as he pleases after that.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, there really is little I can say on behalf of those who sit on these Benches because the mover of this Motion referred to its terms with such moderation that he left us nothing to do except very largely to agree with him. There is indeed very little that we would wish to say in

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challenge of his views. He gave us an account of the history of the last twenty years with which I am not altogether in agreement, but I do not think this would be an appropriate time or place to enter into an argument on that particular point. I do not intend to try to defend the King of Italy or Marshal Badoglio. I would however like to remind your Lordships that the King of Italy is definitely a constitutional King and that therefore he has to adopt the advice of his constitutional advisers. I do not think that perhaps your Lordships quite realize what the political situation in Italy was during the Fascist period, at any rate during the later part of it when Mussolini and his Fascist Party were absolutely dominant. They really ran everything. It may be said that the King of Italy ought to have stopped them. As for Marshal Badoglio, he did not adopt a very dignified attitude. He went and sulked in his tent and would not play. He was rot dignified, but he had a good classical example, which he followed.
That is all I have to say on that point, but I would like to refer to one matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi. He seems to hold that antipathy to Germany, hatred of Germany, dislike of and the desire to abolish Fascism, only existed among the workers in the northern towns of Italy and that it was they who applied the motive force which led ultimately to the overthrow of Fascism. I have a certain knowledge on that point and I can assure him that the feeling against Germany and against Fascism was very widespread. It was not confined to the towns and it is not fair to say that it existed only in the towns and among certain classes. A friend of mine, head of one of the greatest Roman families, never yielded to Fascism. He stood up to it, he was severely punished and later he died. I say that in order to show that objection to Fascism was widespread. I hope the noble Lord will bear that in mind and not accuse everybody outside of not doing their duty.
LORD STRABOLGI: I did not mean to convey that.
THE EARL OF PERTH: I am glad to hear that. The last point I want to make concerns the two Generals whose names have been mentioned, General Ambrosio and General Roatta. I would ask your
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Lordships to reserve judgment about them. I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, who said, before any trial, that they were war criminals. To say that seems to me to go beyond our idea that no man should be deemed guilty until he has been formally tried and condemned. I have no knowledge, and I do not think His Majesty's Government have any, as to whether the charges against these Generals—very grave charges of terrible breaches of International Law, the taking and shooting of hostages—are justified or not. I see that in another place His Majesty's Government promised to make inquiries and take appropriate action if they were found to be true. I do not know whether your Lordships noticed in the Press the other day the report of a very curious German broadcast about General Roatta. They accused him of being violently anti-German, of having laid traps for German troops and having supplied arms and ammunition to Yugoslav patriots. I do not know whether that is true, but it is a matter we have to bear in mind. In Scotland we have a verdict of "Not proven." I only ask that we shall keep an open mind. I think what we all want is that justice shall be ultimately done, but it must be justice and must not be inspired by prejudice.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, I only want to say one word about Generals Roatta and Ambrosio. The noble Earl said that Lord Strabolgi had called them war criminals and that at this stage they were not war criminals because it had not been proved that they were war criminals. Very serious charges, however, have been brought against these two men. Those charges, as I understand, are to be tried in due course. As described by the noble Lord, Lord Addison, those charges have very great substance behind them, and if these men are going to be tried I would suggest to His Majesty's Government that, if they are not to be discharged from office, at least they might be suspended from office until these charges have been tried and they have been proved guilty or otherwise.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS (VISCOUNT CRAN-BORNE) (Lord Cecil): My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Addison, has asked the Government "what undertakings, if any, they

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have entered into with Marshal Badoglio and those with whom he is associated, and if they have regard to the records of their actions in the past against those who have sought to defend their liberty." I understand from the speech that the noble Lord has delivered that his purpose has been in no way critical of His Majesty's Government and I should like to thank him for the great spirit of moderation and wisdom with which he spoke. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, for his comparative restraint and I am glad to assure him that my feelings have not been lacerated on this occasion.
Lord Addison said in his speech that he was really merely desirous of elicting information about what was admittedly a difficult and tangled situation. He said, as I understood him—I paraphrase his words—that this situation was causing a good deal of bewilderment and some anxiety among wide sections of the people here, and he thought that His Majesty's Government should take the earliest opportunity of allaying those anxieties. I am fully aware of the preoccupations to which the noble Lord is referring in his speech. I have, like I expect a good many of your Lordships, had a certain amount of correspondence on this subject and I think nobody can complain of the intense interest which is being shown here with regard to progressive developments in Italy. It is a very welcome sign of the vitality of the public conscience and of determination that there should be no weakening in the principles for which we are fighting this war. But, as I hope I shall be able to show this afternoon, there really is no shadow of foundation for apprehensions which seem to have been aroused in some quarters.
I am very glad to have the opportunity of exposing the full facts of the position, so far as they can be given at the present stage. I do not intend, if the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, will forgive me, to trouble your Lordships at any length with a further discussion of the circumstances surrounding the invasion of Italy. We have had a great deal of debate about that, both in this House and in another place. But I would just like to say this. The Prime Minister in the speech which he delivered in another place made it absolutely clear why that invasion was
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not made earlier, and I would recommend the noble Lord to look at that speech again. It had nothing whatever to do with the date of the Armistice. The reason it did not take place sooner was that General Eisenhower, who was in charge of the operations, and General Montgomery and General Alexander said it was impracticable at an earlier date. That was their opinion given to the Governments. I must say without wishing to be offensive to the noble Lord that this is a matter on which most of us will wish to take their judgment even before his. They are men of acknowledged military skill and they were in possession of all the facts on the spot. Even in the event, we took very grave risks. We went as early as we possibly could and as far north as we could. The noble Lord spoke of going further north to Naples. If we had done that, we should have had no air support and our troops would have been in a hopeless position. I do not think it is any use reopening controversy on that matter. It is one on which this House and the country have made up their minds. I therefore propose, if I may, to confine myself to the present position, the position which exists to-day.
I should like to make it clear in the first place that our relations with the Italian Government are based on the Armistice terms. No obligations have been entered into and no promises have been given. The most that we have told the Italian Government is that the extent to which the surrender terms will be modified in their application will depend on the degree of assistance which Italy renders us in the further prosecution of the war against Germany. We have also promised, as was stated by the Prime Minister on September 21, that if at any time, anywhere, in any circumstances any Italian forces or people are found by our troops to be fighting the Germans, we shall immediately give them all possible aid.
Yesterday at four o'clock, as Lord Addison said, there was a new and most important development which I think will have been helpful in clearing up, in the minds of people in this country, the question as to what is the exact position. The King of Italy declared war on Germany, and following that announcement the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint declaration which noble

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Lords will have seen in the Press. I think that, perhaps, they will forgive me if I read it again. It is not long and it is very important. It reads:
"The Governments of Great Britain, the United Slates and the Soviet Union acknowledge the position of the Royal Italian Government as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept the active co-operation of the Italian nation and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since 8th September and the brutal maltreatment by the Germans of the Italian population, culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany, have in fact made Italy a co-belligerent and the American, British and Soviet Governments will continue to work with the Italian Government on that basis. The three Governments acknowledge the Italian Government's pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can detract from the absolute and untrammelled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of Government they will eventually have.
The relationship of co-belligerency between the Governments of Italy and the United Nations Governments cannot of itself affect the terms recently signed, which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied Governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian Government may be able to afford to the United Nations' cause."
That is not only a clearly drafted document, but it is evidently a most important declaration. I believe I am right in saying that it is the first time that a document of this character has been issued jointly by the three great Powers. I think it is very satisfactory evidence of the identity of view and of the closeness of collaboration between this country, the United States and the Soviet Union on this question. As is clear from this document, the position under the Armistice is in no way altered by the King of Italy's declaration of war against Germany. I would especially bring this to the notice of Lord Strabolgi, who said, I think, that the fiction of unconditional surrender had been finally destroyed, or words to that effect.
LORD STRABOLGI: Marshal Badoglio also said that.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Said what?
LORD STRABOLGI: Exactly what the noble Viscount has said. In his broadcast a fortnight ago Marshal Badoglio said that unconditional surrender does not exist any more.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, I am not responsible for what Marshal Badoglio says. All that I am responsible for is what His Majesty's Government say. The Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union see eye to eye in this. In fact, the declaration of war makes no difference to the position as it existed before. It is true that we welcome the King of Italy's declaration of war as an earnest of his intention to exert all the force in his power against what has become a common enemy. But that does not involve the United Nations or any members in any further obligation to him. There are no secret or implied commitments of any kind. I would, in saying that, emphasize once more that every step that has been taken has been taken as the result of full collaboration between, and with the approval of, His Majesty's Government, the President of the United States and Marshal Stalin, who have kept in the closest consultation throughout. If any noble Lord here, or anyone outside for that matter, feels anxious lest by supporting the King of Italy and the present Italian Government we may prejudice the rights of the Italian people to decide for themselves the form of the régime under which they will be governed, let me reassure them. Any such fear is completely unfounded. The avowed aim of Marshal Badoglio's Government is to mobilize all the forces of Italy against the Germans, and it is our hope that in this task they will receive the support of all patriotic Italians.
Until the Germans have been expelled from the country, there is clearly no means of ascertaining the will of the Italian people, but in the meantime it is our intention that the present Government should be broadened by the inclusion of representatives of all Anti-Fascist elements. Both the King of Italy and Marshal Badoglio have said that they intend to build up such a Government. But whatever Government may be necessitated in Italy under the existing abnormal circumstances—and indeed, my Lords, they are extremely abnormal—we intend that the Italian people shall be enabled, after the war, to choose freely both the form and the composition of their future Government. Meanwhile, we shall be glad to see the arrival of any of the democratic leaders in Italy. Lord Strabolgi I think

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made an inquiry concerning our attitude towards Count Sforza. The noble Lord asked whether we were opposed to Count Sforza's return to Italy. We are not, and I am glad that the noble Lord has given me the opportunity of clearing that up. So far from being opposed to his return we have, on the contrary, given every facility for it. I am delighted to have the chance of making that statement.
LORD STRABOLGI: That was not my question. I wanted to have the position cleared up because reports have been widely circulated—reports which I believe to be false—to the effect that Count Sforza was hindered from returning to Italy for a time after the fall of Mussolini.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I do not think that is so. I certainly do not know of anything of that kind. All I can say is that Count Sforza came over here and was welcomed. He has seen the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary and he is now being speeded on his way to Italy. I do not think therefore that it could be said with justice that any violent hindrance has been put in his way.
It has been suggested that in view of their past records we should have refused to have any dealings either with the King of Italy or with Marshal Badoglio. It has not been suggested here, but it has been suggested in the country, and I have myself received letters to that effect. I have no intention—and in this I am in agreement with Lord Addison—of defending all the actions of either the King of Italy or Marshal Badoglio. I think there are many things which they have done in the past of which none of us would approve. But I would remind the House that after the overthrow of Fascism it was necessary to find some authority with whom we could deal so as to bring about the unconditional surrender of Italy in the shortest possible time, and—I would emphasize this—with the least possible cost in the lives of our soldiers. It appeared to us—and when I say "us" I mean all the Governments concerned, not merely His Majesty's Government—that the King of Italy and the Badoglio Government did constitute such an authority, and when we received overtures from them we felt fully justified in dealing with them. Both before and since the signature of the Armistice they have acted towards us with good faith and they have done
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their utmost to comply loyally with the Armistice conditions. Their present aim, which is to destroy or drive out the German forces which are now occupying very large parts of Italy, coincides exactly with our own, and so long as they devote themselves to this task we shall assist them in its accomplishment.
I come now to the last main point that I want to make about the debate, and it is the point which has, I think, inspired the debate. Strong views have been expressed, both here and outside the House, about some of the members of the Badoglio Government, and notably Generals Ambrosio and Roatta. As your Lordships know, Lord Winster, who is, I am sorry to say, not able to be here today, drew attention, both in the letter which he wrote to The Times and in the question which he put on the Paper yesterday (and which he was good enough to postpone in order that a reply might be given to the debate this afternoon), to the past record of General Roatta in particular; and my noble friend Lord Addison painted a dark and horrible picture of General Roatta's record in Yugoslavia during the earlier part of this war, a picture which must greatly have shocked your Lordships.
LORD ADDISON: Not only in the earlier part of the war, but up to the autumn of 1942.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I accept that correction. It is certainly not my intention to try to whitewash these two men. It is clearly essential that the grave charges against them should be the subject of the fullest inquiry. That inquiry, as was said in another place yesterday, has already been instituted; and, if these charges are discovered to be well-founded, then, as my right honourable friend Mr. Law said in another place, appropriate action will be taken. I can assure your Lordships that His Majesty's Government, for their part, certainly do not desire the inclusion in the Italian Government of any man who is proved to have been responsible for acts of barbarity against any of the United Nations during the course of this war. If I do not say more, the reason is that this is not a matter which affects His Majesty's Government alone; it affects all the other Governments concerned. Your Lordships may be assured, however, that inquiries have been instituted, and I

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hope that noble Lords will be patient pending the result of the investigations which are taking place.
Finally, I should perhaps say a word about "co-belligerency," the new political term which has come to the fore during the last few days. In the literal sense, of course, many Italians have for some weeks already been co-belligerents, since they are assisting us and have been fighting with us against the Germans. Now, although the Italian Government have declared war on Germany, technically—until a peace treaty is signed between Britain and Italy—the two countries are still at war with each other; yet the practical situation is that both Great Britain and Italy are fighting a common enemy. That seems an absurdly anomalous situation, and the easiest way which has been found of defining it has been to describe the Italians as "co-belligercnts," a term which might almost be said to have been coined for that purpose. I can assure your Lordships that the term has no further significance, nor docs it in any way impair the validity of the Armistice terms which we have signed with the Italian Government; but it is certainly our hope that the Italian people, freed from the servitude imposed upon them by Fascism and from the German oppression from which many of them are still suffering, will be able in due course to regain their rightful place among the free democracies of the modern world.
I hope that what I have said has clarified the position. I have taken very great pains to try to put a very difficult situation as clearly as I can to your Lordships. I do recognize that some of those who are of necessity imperfectly informed as to the day-to-day progress of events harbour dark suspicions as to the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government, and feel that it sometimes strays from the straight and narrow path which leads to our declared goal, and that it diverges sometimes in one direction and sometimes in another. That, as I think your Lordships know, is not the case. What these people should remember—I refer to people not in this House but in the country, and I do not complain of their anxieties at all—is that the action which it is possible to take at any one moment must inevitably be governed by the pressure of events. If I may give your Lordships a very simple analogy, a vehicle going through heavy traffic in the piping
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days of peace, say from Hyde Park Corner to Piccadilly Circus, might be proceeding as rapidly as possible towards its destination, yet it might be compelled by the sheer jostling of the traffic to veer sometimes to the right and sometimes to the left; sometimes it might be brought to a standstill, and sometimes it might even be compelled to make a detour and comeback higher up the street. The passengers inside, who could not see the obstacles ahead—and that is the position in which most of us are at present—might easily imagine that that progress was vacillating, uncertain, and even devious, and at moments they might even wonder whether they were not going in the wrong direction; but in fact the skilled driver would be taking them as rapidly as possible towards their goal. What is really important is that the passengers should be able and willing to trust the driver.
The same thing is true in international affairs in times like these; we too must be able to trust those who conduct the affairs of the United Nations. And I think that we have every reason to trust them. If we were to ask Hitler or Mussolini who were their greatest enemies, they would not give us the names of any of these excellent people—I make no reflection on them—who write letters to the newspapers expressing their anxiety about the policy of His Majesty's Government. They would say that their greatest enemies were Roosevelt, Stalin and, perhaps most of all, our own Prime Minister, who has never wavered in his relentless opposition to the Nazi movement ever since Hitler came into power. Those are their three great foes, who have already destroyed the Fascist régime and who have brought Nazi Germany to the very brink of defeat. On these three men rests the main terrible responsibility for the conduct of the war, for seeing that the loss of life in the Allied Armies is reduced to the minimum, and for ensuring that the unhappy people in the occupied territories are released as soon as possible from their bondage. From that aim we may be sure that they will not deviate. One and all they have approved the policy which is being pursued in Italy. We must trust them and, if we do, we may be sure that they will bring us through to final victory.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I am sure that it will be agreed throughout the House that we have had the advantage of

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a very important and authoritative statement from the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, at a very opportune moment. I think that it has been well worth while to have provided the occasion for it. As he said, there was no suspicion, concealed or unconcealed, in my mind of any sort of hostility, but I was exceedingly anxious that an opportunity should be provided for the kind of statement which we have had.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I was making no reflection on the noble Lord.
LORD ADDISON: I am quite sure of that. I have one comment to make, arising partly out of the observations of the noble Earl, Lord Perth, and partly relating to the two Italian Generals who have been mentioned. I deliberately went out of my way to insist that these two men should not be deemed guilty until they had been tried.
THE EARL OF PERTH: The noble Lord, Lord Addison, did insist on that, but Lord Strabolgi definitely styled General Roatta a war criminal.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, Lord Addison spoke for me. I cannot allow that for a moment.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, the point about which I am not satisfied is this. I take the view that men subject to these charges, whether well founded or not, brought against them by an Ally, a long-suffering Ally, Yugoslavia, are not persons, to use my own words again, to whom we ought to extend the cloak of authority or to afford any form of recognition. I quite recognize that any action that must be
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taken with regard to Marshal Badoglio's Government is a matter for the three Governments concerned. I know that any action in matters of this kind necessitates time and many interchanges of messages. But I am quite sure that politically, in the interests of those who have fought with us and for whom we are still fighting, we should be exceedingly careful that we avoid bringing into council, or giving any authority to, men who are suspected, or who have the reputation, of being guilty of breaches of the code of war and of the kind of cruelties against which we are fighting. I hope that the inquiries that are now being made, if they show that these accusations are at all events sufficiently well-founded, will be followed by appropriate action in the form of the disappearance of these men from the Badoglio Government. Anyhow, I am very grateful to the noble Viscount for his statement, and I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.