NORTH AFRICA.

HL Deb 17 March 1943 vol 126 cc717-42

LORD WEDGWOOD had given Notice that he would call attention to the difficult political and military conditions in North Africa, and move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the situation both politically and from a military point of view in North-West Africa is and has been causing grave anxiety, not only in this country, but in America, and in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We have ample evidence that things are not as we should wish them to be in that country. There are still 3,000 members of the International Brigade in concentration camps in Morocco. There are supposed to be 20,000 survivors of the Spanish Republicans also there. It is true that we have been told that the Russians in the International Brigade have been set at liberty and sent back to Russia, but my information is that still many of them are in these camps. We have been told that Czech nationals have been allowed to leave and to join up with the Czech Forces, but a telegram the day before yesterday contradicted that and said they were still interned. These were the first fighters in the war in which we are engaged. They took their place in the struggle against tremendous odds in the days when their cause was not so popular as it is to-day. If there are people to whom we owe a debt of undying gratitude we owe it to these men, and it is little less than a scandal that in a country in which we hold power they should still be interned, and interned in conditions which beggar description. Anti-Jewish laws which are a disgrace to humanity and to Christianity are still in operation in that country. The latest importation took place only on March 2, when the whole of the Vichy laws were imposed upon North-West Africa, also. The situation has been made worse. We hoped until recently that directly Mr. Harold Macmillan got out there he would put things right. Apparently, the situation meets with his satisfaction. The only communication from him that has been made public is to the effect that things are all right there.

I have said that the situation gives rise to grave anxiety; of course it does, not only for itself but because it is a symbol of very much more. There is certain evidence from America as to what is taking place. I read this in The Times two or three days ago: The National Maritime Union, part of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the famous C.I.O., passed a resolution stating that it would not be a party to carrying vital materials to Franco Spain which can, and will, be utilized to holster the Nazi war machine. That is an outward and visible sign of anxiety on this particular question. There is another—I think it was in yesterday's Times. The report to which I refer reads: Numbers of sailors from the battleship 'Richelieu' which is repairing in America, have quit their ship and made their way to Canada in the hope of getting to England and joining General de Gaulle's forces there. Many of them asserted that their officers were pro-Fascist, and that some of these officers had referred to Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in insulting terms. The "Richelieu" and other ships, as your Lordships will be aware, came from Dakar. The officers are the real difficulty. The French' Army in North-West Africa is mainly, if not entirely, a Colonial Army. That is to say the troops are black, and they serve under white officers. I think that anyone who met these officers after the failure in Norway will realize that they are overwhelmingly Fascist in outlook.

We in this happy island do not know the depths of bitterness that politics have introduced into France. If noble Lords will read Ilya Ehrenburg's Fall of Paris they will get some idea of the hatred existing between the different political sides in France—between the Popular Front and the Right Those who surrendered France hate those they surrendered, and if they are to be the force which is to be rearmed by this country and America and used for fighting Germany, I think that we are likely to meet with serious disappointment at least. The main anxiety here and in America and in Russia is lest we are providing in North-West Africa to-day an Army which will not serve the cause for which we are fighting, but will serve another cause instead, just as Franco's Moors served to destroy the liberties of Spain. That is the danger which everybody must realize. What we suspect is a desire for the preservation in Europe of a great deal that we are fighting to destroy. In the speech of the Lord Chancellor on the Bishop of Chichester's Motion the other day, the noble and learned Viscount made it abundantly clear that in no circumstances whatever would we ever enter into negotiations for peace with Hitler's Government or with any Nazi Government. But he left out—I am afraid he carefully left out—any parallel declaration that in no circumstances whatever would we enter into negotiations with a Fascist Government.

Now we have seen recently in North-West Africa a series of visits. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York has been there; he came from Spain and from Italy. What attitude does our British Foreign Office take towards this question of the preservation of the status quo in Italy, in France, in Spain, in Portugal? Are we going to be a party to restoring democratic Spain, or are we going to be a party to the restoration of Don Jaime? Is the present Fascist rule in France to be preserved after the war? We know perfectly well that there is a fear shared by many people in this country of an overwhelming Soviet victory. There are not many here who would fear a Soviet victory; but elsewhere many.

I have had recently two letters from Algeria. One came from an English business man who is now a Captain in the Transport Corps. He says that they are extremely comfortable out there, but that all movements of troops are made very difficult by the French; that our policy of appeasement, of never compelling action by the French, has not proved successful, and that the trains are full of French troops moving in different directions so that we cannot use them. He does not complain—it is part of the natural results of being too friendly with people who are not our friends. The other letter is from an American university professor who is now a Captain in the American Army. He writes: The Arabs and the rural elements are suspicious of the invaders. City dwellers are probably ripe for de Gaullism, but are vastly puzzled that the very men who helped to get us in here are in gaol. This was written, of course, before they were liberated: The old landholding and official class scarcely bother to conceal their Vichy sympathies, and it is possible that, in the light of Allied reluctance to interfere, they may be planning to tighten their hold on the Army, in order to retain control of the French Empire, in the best Fascist manner, after the war. I think that that fear must be widely spread, not only amongst the Americans in Algeria, but amongst the Americans as a whole. It is certainly very widely felt in this country.

If we must supply arms, for heaven's sake let us supply arms to people who will certainly use them and to people who need them at the present time, like the Russians and the Chinese, but not to doubtful starters, not to people who may use them for exactly the purpose against which we are fighting in this war. An American newspaper man told me the other day that he had been to Algeria before the invasion, following up a visit by Mr. Robert Murphy. He wanted to find out what Mr. Robert Murphy was doing with General Weygand, who was there at that time. He said: "By dint of careful inquiries, I found out. I was told that they spent a great deal of time together, and, when I asked what they were doing, I was told that they were praying." That, of course, is not a bad thing in war-time. In fact, I rather like our praying Generals, from Oliver Cromwell down to Montgomery. But what were they praying for? He was told that they were praying that France might be restored to the bosom of the Catholic Church. I want to know whether we have there a duplicate of the late lamented Mr. Joe Kennedy.

The situation has not been made easier by the publication of Mr. Randolph Churchill's letter. If the choice is really between Stalin and the preservation of Salazar and Franco and Mussolini and all those shop-soiled European crowned heads, intelligent people here will prefer Stalin. They are not represented by our Foreign Office or by the American State Department, and the question which I would ask the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, is this: Are our Foreign Office and the United States State Department more anxious to avoid revolution than to avoid Fascism? Undoubtedly French officers are more afraid of revolution. Undoubtedly the Catholic Church is more afraid of revolution. Where we stand should be made clear. It is not that we prefer Bolshevism to Fascism, but that we intend to see that our enemies are smashed, and that Right Wing pseudo-Governments have not armed forces to compel their people to submit to their authority. Let us face the facts. There are some people here who would rather that Russia did the lighting and that we did not expend our strength until the settlement. There are very few of them now in this country, but there are far more of them abroad, where they have not been through the terrible crisis which we have passed through successfully.

Now let me turn to the military side of the North-West Africa question. There too we have people who are anxious to preserve Italy, France and Spain, and who have the fear of revolution strongly in their minds. We have in fact two driving forces compelling these people, whether they be French or Italians or Spaniards, to look at this problem from a different angle from ourselves. Why are the Italian capital ships all preserved and kept in their harbours? I think we know the reason: the Italians, hope that when the Peace Conference comes they will have counters which will amount to something. Exactly the same thing applies to all the minor Governments. They all say: "Give us weapons to use to preserve our order; give us bargaining counters at the Peace Conference." That seems to them a natural aspiration, and a more profitable aspiration than taking an active part in defeating the enemy. "Let us leave the defeat of the enemy to the Russians, the English and the Americans," they say, "but let us preserve our bargaining counters." That must be borne in mind when we are considering to whom we are to give these arms.

Then take our First Army in North-West Africa. We are all agreed that it is an impressive example of successful organization, but an increasing number of people are inclined to think that the organization is overdone. We are told that there is only one man in the front line for every seven who are working behind the line. I do not know, but it strikes me as a remarkably high figure. I am quite certain that neither the Japanese nor the Russians require the enormous number behind the lines that we do. It seems to me that in that First Army we have too much organization and too few fighters. Are all these things really necessary? We hear that they are all doing themselves very well—bread and beer, and canteens and libraries, and welfare and entertainments. The War Office take a pride in doing it thoroughly. But that is not fighting. It is all very well for an army of occupation, it is all very well for trench warfare, such as we had in the greater part of the last war. But it is not much use for a mobile war. In the South African war—and many of your Lordships took part in that—you will remember we did pretty well on biscuits and bully for two years, and we were none the worse for it.

I cannot help thinking that the evolution of civilization has a bit overdone the necessities of an Army. At the time of Marlborough we moved an Army across Europe from the Low Countries to Blenheim without any train at all, living on the country, and it was a successful move. And I am not at all certain that, although now in North-West Africa the Army is able to move with much greater speed, it may not, possibly, be moving with less efficiency. Somebody once wrote to me—I think it was from Cairo, but it would apply equally well to Algiers—saying that Cairo was Capua without the excuse of Cannae, and I think we want to see that there is less Capua and more Cannae. Do your Lordships remember that in the Napoleonic Wars we had one of those failing expeditions, on a smaller scale but rather similar, to the Low Countries? It did not come off. The Earl of Chatham with his sword drawn Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strachan. Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em, Stood waiting for the Earl of Chatham. I think it has its parallel to-day, and that parallel may, I fear, lead not to the failure of those days of course—we are hardly likely to be driven out—but if we go on waiting much longer it will be too late to take Bizerta and in time to invade Europe this year. I want us to invade Europe this year. Every member of your Lordships' House wants to bear a hand in the fighting on land to help the Russians. We cannot let another year go and say it is going to be next year. Self-respect will not allow it. Delay may even be dangerous. It is by no means sure that the German machine is broken yet.

For heaven's sake, if the military have come to the conclusion that they cannot take Bizerta by the 1st June, or whatever it is, then draw stumps and start somewhere else. There are plenty of other places. One of the things I do not like to-day is this exaggeration of the difficulties. We have been told that there are now 250,000 German troops in North-West Africa. I do not believe it for a moment. Why are we told that? We were told before the war started that one air raid on London would cause 200,000 casualties. Why were these stories spread? They were spread in the first place in order to prevent us going to war. Exaggeration is very easy—it is merely an estimate. Now we have been told that Crete is desperately defended by works everywhere along the coast-line of Crete—the coastline of Crete being just about the size of the coast-line of England. That was one of the stories started. In The Times the other day I observed from Crete itself information that nothing had been done at all to defend Crete.

Well, there are other places to go to. Naturally I have a love for Lemnos, but best of all is the Russian Front itself. Is it quite impossible after two years that we should be able to move troops up through Persia and Iraq to help the Russians at Rostov, in the Taman Peninsula and the Crimea? Your Lordships know that we have at the present time two million troops in India. That road that they talked of two years ago up through Baluchistan ought to have been made ere this, and the railway communications through Tabriz are surely finished by now. If you cannot invade Italy, either because you cannot take Tunis or because you do not want to, there are plenty of other places where we could be of even more use. If I had my choice, I would see the British Army fighting beside the Russian Army, and adding to their battle standards the names of Stalingrad, Kharkov, and Poltava. I would see another Inkerman and the Guards showing that they are better men than the German S.S. troops. This is not a question of North-West Africa, although I have tacked it on to the situation there. This is a question of whether we are going to play a full part in this war, by helping the people who die fighting, by helping them although they are Bolsheviks, and by complete indifference as to the result, so long as we smash Nazi and Fascist power. I beg to move.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

My Lords, I am very glad to get the opportunity of following my noble friend Lord Wedgwood. He is fearless in his criticisms, and he is always warm and generous in his praise. But it is that portion of his speech which he has tacked on that I am hoping to discuss with you rather than the main portion of his very powerful speech. On the North African issues I am glad he has spoken. I think he has got courage in speaking out, and much that he has said finds some response from me, although I may not altogether agree—I do not agree with him at all. I think the conquest of Tunis and Bizerta is not far off and may be achieved in the very near future. But it is a matter of satisfaction to me that he has referred to the Second Front because it is a serious business for a member of the Socialist Party, or a member receiving the Whip of the Socialist Party, to speak of the Second Front. It is almost like using words that are not spoken in your Lordships' House. I am expecting at any moment that the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, will appear here to dissociate his Party from my noble friend's remarks on the Second Front. But it is necessary to discuss the Second Front. It is indeed. It is necessary to discuss it as my noble friend Lord Wedgwood has spoken to-day. The Government should encourage discussion on the subject and should announce their decisions. The Government should tell us now that the Second Front is going to be launched, and they should tell us that preparations are going forward as speedily as possible. It is my belief that it is the intention of the Government to launch a Second Front.

THE EARL OF GLASGOW

Will the noble Lord excuse me for intervening for one moment? What does the noble Lord mean by a Second Front? Surely this country has been a Second Front to Russia ever since Russia came into the war.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

When I discuss the Second Front I mean the same thing as the President of the United States means when he discusses the Second Front. I mean the same thing as the Prime Minister means, the same thing as Stalin means, and that meaning is well known to the noble Earl. I believe that the Government do mean to launch a Second Front. There are 3,000 miles of frontier subject to invasion from Petsamo to Biarritz or, as my noble friend Lord Wedgwood would say, from Dan to Beersheba. Consider the advantage of helping Russia. Consider the advantage to us if we make an invasion of Norway or France. At once we bring the U-boat bases on those shores under our authority. The U-boat bases now being used against us become centres from which we can carry on operations; against the enemy. It is an immense advantage. Therefore it is our duty to let the Russians know we are on the way. You should tell them, you should encourage them by that.

Consider the story of the contribution of the United States of America to Great Britain in the last war. That contribution began with an assurance that the United States would come to our aid in France. More than a year passed before United States troops took part in our battle front, and the only encouragement we got from the Americans during all that interval was the song, "The Yanks are coming." But that song was sufficient to lift up our spirits, to keep us in good cheer. That song carried us through the dark days of Amiens. Can we sing our version of "The Yanks are coming" to the Russians? In the dark days which must come to Russia, the shadows that must come to Russia, in the spring of 1943, can we have another version of the same song, "The Yanks ere coming"? Cannot we let them know, here and now, as soon as possible, as soon as may be, that it is our intention to launch a Second Front, and that they may rely confidently and absolutely on the arrival before long of our British troops to aid them in France by drawing off the Germans from the Eastern Front? We knew in those days that the Americans would arrive. We knew it quite well, and we rejoiced in that song. But some noble Lords on the Socialist Benches will not let us sing our version of "The Yanks are coming" this time. They will not let us have it at all. They will probably dissociate themselves from Lord Wedgwood now. I am waiting for the noble Earl to arrive. I am sorry he is not here. I do not quite understand the composition of the Socialist Party anyway. I understand Lord Addison, but there are three others here on this Bench who, I understand, are elected by four from the Back Benches.

LORD WINSTER

You are keeping us company.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

I am not keeping you company. Naturally those on the Back Benches have selected for the front line the military. You see them here quite frequently and quite properly; it is the right place for the military. Here is my noble friend Lord Southwood, who changes his uniform very often. Lord Southwood made a speech here a day or two ago. His speech was "Hear, hear" when I was being admonished for having discussed the Second Front. I was surprised, doubly surprised, for it was within my recollection that my noble friend's newspaper had advocated the Second Front very warmly; so I looked it up and found that on July 14 my noble friend's newspaper was declaring: Let us now resolve to set up that Second Front as soon as possible after to-morrow. On July 28 it gave a much more serious admonition: If the Government errs because of sluggishness or cowardice we shall criticize. I am now bound to tell you that I repeat Lord Southwood's speech on the last occasion in relation to these sentiments in his newspaper: Hear, hear—hear, hear!

Let us dedicate ourselves to this purpose of a Second Front. It is not to help Russia. That is not why I seek your approval and your support for the plan I have advocated from this Box now on two or, perhaps, three occasions. It is not to help Russia. It is to beat Germany. That is the main purpose and the principal object of our lives. It is to banish slavery from the world. Is not that the crusade you set out on? Was it not to put an end to slavery, Nazi slavery, that you went to war? What better purpose, what better object, what better opportunity do you want in order to bring slavery to an end than to launch, as soon as may be, that Second Front in support of the Russians who are fighting so gallantly? I am very glad my noble friend Lord Wedgwood gave me the opportunity of saying these few words in support of the Second Front, which I believe is not far off. It is a movement to banish slavery from the world, and that is the whole object of this great figure in public life, Lord Wedgwood.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, apart from the Motion moved by my noble friend Lord Wedgwood, I have been particularly interested in the remarks which have just been made by my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook. He called your Lordships' attention to the fact that three members of my Party sit on the Front Bench who are elected by four members who sit behind them; but your Lordships will have noticed that Lord Beaverbrook sits on our Front Bench without having been elected by anyone but himself.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

I sit here by virtue of my having held office in the Government twice and because I am a Privy Councillor. It is certainly my right, and possibly my duty, to sit on this Bench.

LORD WINSTER

Nobody could welcome my noble friend more than I do. I am glad we have had that explanation, because I understood that Lord Beaverbrook was sitting on our Front Bench by virtue of a lease-lend arrangement between the Daily Herald and the Daily Express. Anything we can do in my Party to assist the noble Lord to show the Daily Express how really to run a Centre of Public Opinion I have no doubt we shall be delighted to do. I join with Lord Beaverbrook in paying a tribute to the warm and generous spirit of my noble friend Lord Wedgwood. I have always noticed his warm championship of the under-dog, but I have also noted that Lord Wedgwood's championship of the under-dog depends upon that dog remaining the under-dog and that at the moment the under-dog shows any signs of becoming the upper-dog nobody attacks him more fiercely than does my noble friend Lord Wedgwood. I gathered from this Motion that Lord Wedgwood objects to the past of certain gentlemen now playing a prominent part in North African affairs. I deplore it too. But my noble friend also has a past. My noble friend once fell so low as to be in charge of the Duchy of Lancaster in a Labour Government.

LORD WEDGWOOD

A very good experience.

LORD WINSTER

A good experience, but one which might possibly justify certain criticisms and comments at the present moment. But, like my noble friend, I also was perturbed and disturbed by certain things which took place after we landed in North Africa. I am content to think that what took place then was very largely a matter of military necessity, and I would not like to join in any criticism of General Eisenhower for the steps that he took in face of a very serious military emergency. But I do feel at this moment, whatever may have been our feelings in the past about events in North Africa, that things look better now, and we have had, in the last day or two, indications that General Giraud and General de Gaulle are prepared to meet and that there are prospects of their coming to terms. If that is the case, if General Giraud and General de Gaulle are coming together and are apparently prepared to negotiate and to appreciate each other's point of view, this surely is the very last moment at which we ought to have a debate about political affairs in North Africa.

LORD WEDGWOOD

May I ask my noble friend Lord Winster whether he thinks that the coming together of General de Gaulle and General Giraud will do much good to the people of the International Brigade or Spanish prisoners interned in that country?

LORD WINSTER

Yes, I gather that those prisoners have now been set free.

LORD WEDGWOOD

No, they have not.

LORD WINSTER

At all events, I think the intention is to set them free. I have great sympathy with those men, I hope there may be no mistake about that. My heart goes out very much indeed to these men of the International Brigade. I have full sympathy with them, but I should think that at the moment the problem is more one of what to do with them after you have set them free.

LORD WEDGWOOD

They can join the Army.

LORD WINSTER

The objection is not so much to setting them free; the real problem is what you are to do with them after you have given them their liberty. At any rate, I cannot feel that these problems will be in any way set back or vitiated by the prospect of General Giraud and General de Gaulle coining to some agreement between themselves, and on that account I feel that perhaps it is unfortunate to be discussing these affairs at this moment. There were two or three words in the speech of my noble friend Lord Wedgwood to which I should like to call attention. I may be under some misapprehension, but I understood that the anti-Jewish laws in North Africa had been abolished. I do not know if I am wrong about that or not. I would gladly submit to correction about it. I was under the impression that I read a little time ago that the laws of racial discrimination in North Africa had been abolished, and I would very much welcome information as to what the position is about these anti-racial laws. As to the arrival of the "Richelieu" in American waters, I have no doubt whatever that French soldiers landing in America and able to go ashore under free conditions gave opportunity for a great deal of talk on the part of those sailors, but we have only Press reports to go on about that. The main fact which I think is of interest, and which is of value to us, is that the "Richelieu" and several other units of the French Navy have arrived in American waters. That I think is a great and significant fact which is of good omen, and not what some sailors may happen to have said when they have got ashore under conditions which I for one hope they are enjoying very much indeed.

I do not know what is meant by the statement that in North Africa we are struggling to preserve what we are ostensibly fighting to destroy. I know of nothing that is happening which would give weight to that statement. I must say also that I think it is deplorable to introduce the name of the American Roman Catholic Archbishop, who is at present visiting North Africa, into a political controversy of this sort. I think that is particularly an unfortunate thing to have done. What is one to make of those statements to which we have listened, completely hearsay statements, about Mr. Murphy and General Weygand having met and having spent their time praying for the restoration of the Roman Catholic Church in France? Really, I do join issue at the introduction at this moment of completely hearsay statements of that sort into a debate in your Lordships' House. What can be the possible value of it? What can such a statement as that do, except harm? To repeat statements about there being people here who would prefer that Russia should do the fighting, and that we did not expend our strength until the time for settlement has arrived, is deplorable. How is the cause for which we are fighting advanced by statements of that sort? Then I come to a statement which made a particular impression upon my mind. I hope really I am under a misapprehension upon this and I would gladly give way to Lord Wedgwood if he wishes to correct me. I understood him to ask your Lordships, why are Italian ships preserved and kept in harbour unless it is that at the peace settlement Italy may have certain counters in her possession for bargaining at that peace settlement? Is the implications that we, this country—

LORD WEDGWOOD

The implication is that the Italian Government is keeping them there.

LORD WINSTER

It may have served a purpose in clearing up that point, but as the statement was made I feel it was highly ambiguous. We know that statements have been made about refraining from bombing Rome for sinister and nefarious reasons, and the inference-might have been drawn that these ships were left alone for some sinister purpose. Then there was the statement that the First Army are doing themselves well, that they have all the bread and beer they want and generally having a good time, but are not fighting. I wrote the words down—"are having a good time, but not fighting." I do deplore statements of that sort when all of us have rejoiced to see the way the Army after its experience at Dunkirk has fought and trained itself back into the service that it is to-day. I do indeed think it is deplorable that anybody should make a statement of that sort.

LORD WEDGWOOD

I do not know what you wrote down, but I never said it. You seem to have misinterpreted my speech. I said there was too much organization and too little fighting.

LORD WINSTER

It is never my wish to misinterpret anybody at all, and no one would apologize more sincerely for doing so, but certainly the implication was that the First Army was doing itself well but was not fighting. I think that is a deplorable statement to make. I will not refer at length to other points, but I gather that the noble Lord wishes us to have no organization of supplies and thinks that the Army could live upon the country. I think that is rather dangerous ground to get upon. I thought that was the very thing for which we reproached the Germans. They live upon the countries through which they pass. Then there was the reference to Bizerta and the statement that there are plenty of other places to go to. The noble Lord's heart apparently yearns after Lemnos. What military purpose is served by abandoning our attack against Bizerta and suddenly going to Lemnos, I do not know. What is the idea? What is it you do through Lemnos? That was followed by the statement "If you cannot invade Italy, because you cannot take Tunis"—these are the significant words—"or do not want to." What is this insinuation? That our Expeditionary Force in Tunisia is a feint, or that we are pulling our punch "because you cannot take Tunis or do not want to"? What is the suggestion? That the whole Expeditionary Force in Tunisia is engaged in a sham fight and that we really do not want to take Tunis at all?

I feel that perhaps I have kept your Lordships too long with my intervention, but really great as is the respect and in fact the affection which I bear for my noble friend Lord Wedgwood, I cannot see what purpose is served by a speech of that nature which makes insinuation after insinuation and which is based, as to nine-tenths of it, upon hearsay. What purpose can be served at this moment when our Forces are in the position they: are in and when in North Africa there are prospects of arriving at the situation and the understanding which we should like to see reached? I do most deeply deplore the remarks made by my noble friend, and I should be reluctant to feel that such remarks might be taken as in any way representative of myself or some of my friends. In what has been said about the Second Front I join with my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook in hoping that the moment may soon arise when the War Cabinet feel that we are at last able to go to the assistance of Russia. Nobody would join more sincerely than I in hoping with my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook that energy and urgency may be shown in respect of that objective.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE) (Lord Cecil)

My Lords, those of your Lordships who are familiar with the writing of "Beachcomber" in the Daily Express may perhaps remember his model Election address for Parliamentary candidates—"I will lash out in every direction and clear up this mess." That seems to me not an unfair description of the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood's approach to foreign affairs. His practice seems to be to select some problem which appears to be of special delicacy, to say to himself,. "What really provocative thing can I say about it?" and then to shout it in loud and ringing tones in your Lordships' House. From this the noble Lord appears to derive considerable satisfaction. I suspect—though perhaps wrongly—that he regards himself as the lineal descendant of Pym and Hampden. He says: "They always said what was in their minds, and so do I." It all depends on what is in your mind, and I am not sure that Pym and Hampden would approve everything said by the noble Lord this afternoon.

At any rate, that seems to be the procedure he has adopted on this occasion. He has said to himself: "What is the most delicate problem at the moment? What is the one that needs the most caution, the most patience and the most wisdom?" And he has come to the absolutely correct conclusion that it is the difficult political and military situation in North Africa. Having decided on his theme, he has sat down and composed the speech to which your Lordships have listened this afternoon. Indeed, he has not contented himself merely with North Africa. He has thrown his net even wider. He has managed to sandwich into his remarks references to the constitutional future of Spain and Portugal, some rather offensive remarks about the American President's personal representative in North Africa, Mr. Murphy, references to a Second Front, and a violent attack on the Catholic Church. In its way I think that the speech was one of the noble Lord's masterpieces. It was calculated to cause the maximum of irritation in France, the United States, Spain, Portugal and Russia. That is no mean performance for a speech that lasted very little more than 25 minutes.

I do not intend to follow the noble Lord in his Cook's tour of Southern Europe, and I had not intended to pursue him still further to Russia, though in view of the noble Lord's speech I shall be obliged to say a few words on that subject. The affairs of Spain are a matter for the Spanish people, and they will not thank us for meddling with them. The same applies to the visit of Archbishop Spellman to Rome. I should have thought it very natural that a Catholic Archbishop visiting Europe and North Africa should take the opportunity of paying his respects to the Vatican, and I should have thought it both unnecessary and unfortunate to read into the visit the sinister implications which the noble Lord did this afternoon. Nor do I think it very helpful to make the suggestion that the Catholic Church is an implacable enemy of the cause for which we are fighting at a time when hundreds of thousands of Catholics are fighting in the Allied ranks.

However, my Lords, I do not intend to follow my noble friend Lord Wedgwood further into these rather regrettable topics. I propose to devote myself so far as I can—for the discussion has ranged somewhat widely—to the main subject of the debate, the political and military situation in North Africa. I do not think it is either necessary or desirable from the operational point of view to say very much about the military situation. The noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, has, in his remarks, contrived to draw what I thought was a very surprising analogy between Generals Alexander and Montgomery and Lord Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan. To those of us who have watched the recent achievements of these brilliant officers, it is an analogy which does not seem to make very much sense. The noble Lord has sought to prove, as I understood him, that the Eighth Army and the First Army are moving too slowly. He said, I believe, that they had too much organization and too little fighting.

LORD WEDGWOOD

I did not say anything about the Eighth Army.

VISCOUNT CRAN BORNE

I am obliged. It would certainly have been a very queer observation. So far as the First Army is concerned, I think that the noble Lord has already been answered by Lord Winster and that it is not necessary for me to say any more. The explanation for the present delay—because there is undoubtedly rather more delay than some of us possibly would wish—is a very much simpler one than that which the noble Lord has put forward. Perhaps the main lesson we should have learnt in this war is that there is nothing so dangerous as premature attack. We have had examples of it more than once in Libya where attacks have been delivered before complete preparations had been made. And we have had one famous example to the contrary—the battle of El Alamein. Those in command in North Africa know this just as well as anyone else, and they are steadily and methodically making their preparations. To urge them to strike before they are ready is really to do no service to this country or to Russia or to anyone else. I recognize the impatience of the noble Lord, which is perhaps shared by other people in this country. That impatience was equally evident before the battle of El Alamein. I remember evidences of it even in your Lordships' House. I do hope that it will not be suggested from here that the Eighth Army or the First Army or General Alexander or General Montgomery are dillying and dallying. The House should remember that this North African campaign fulfils—as Lord Beaverbrook I think has said to-day—a very important purpose. The Prime Minister himself has described it as a springboard, and the completion of this springboard is a vital precursor to further operations, which we all hope are coming. Do not let us, by anything we say here, encourage the premature opening of an attack which might be a failure because it was made too soon. If that happens, instead of gaining time we should lose time.

The noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, in his speech, reverted to the topic of a Second Front in Europe. He finds opportunity for raising this question on a Motion on almost any subject. I confidently expect to find him raising it tomorrow in dealing with his Motion on agricultural cottages.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

Not tomorrow.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

And I may say, my Lords, that I am arranging for the Government spokesman to be suitably briefed for the occasion.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

I promise a holiday.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

I do assure the noble Lord that I recognize how strong his feelings are on this subject, but I suggest that it is not wise on his part so constantly to revert to it. No doubt the expression "Second Front" is in itself harmless, and, perhaps, convenient. But if the impression is given in Russia, however unintentionally, that Britain and the United States are doing nothing while Russia is doing everything—and that is the impression which was created at any rate in my mind by the noble Lord's speech to-day—the result would be most unfortunate. Such an impression, moreover, would not be fair to our own fighting men. Everybody, I think, agrees that the main burden of the land fighting is at present being borne by Russia, and we have seen with admiration the magnificent display of endurance which the Russian Armies have put up during recent months. But equally, I think, everybody should agree that the lion's share of the war on the sea and in the air is being shouldered by us and by the United States.

Our air offensive against Germany, which reached its peak last week, inaugurated a new era in aerial attack, and the direct damage which was done to German production was terrific. Tanks and aeroplanes were destroyed by those attacks just as surely as though they had been destroyed by the Russian Armies on the Eastern Front. I should have liked to have seen—or rather I should not have liked to have seen—the length of the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook's face, when he was Minister of Production, if the Germans had launched against us an air attack on the scale of that which we have launched against them in this last month. What I have said about the war in the air is equally true with regard to the war at sea. Unless we had command of the sea, which we have to-day, Germany would be able to import from the Far East and elsewhere essential materials of which she is at present short, and the situation in Russia would be very much more difficult than it is at the present time. Yet there was nothing about this in the noble Lord's speech to-day. We know what will happen in regard to that speech. It will be reprinted in a paper with which, I understand, the noble Lord has no longer any direct connexion.

LORD BEAVERBROOK

I own it.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

The noble Lord owns it. Well, anyway, it may be expected to have a kindly feeling for him. His speech will also be printed in extenso in the Russian Press and a very wrong impression may be derived from it. I beg the noble Lord to allow me to reassure him. Do not let him be under any misapprehension; this question of a Second Front or campaign, or whatever you like to call it, in Europe, is equally in the minds of the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt and all those distinguished officers responsible for our strategy. Our policy in this respect was made perfectly clear after the Casablanca Conference. I beg the noble Lord, therefore, to leave these matters to those whose responsibility they are, both at home and on the spot, and not to raise unfounded suspicions in the minds of the Russian people. To do that I think could only tend to impair the good relations between the two countries, to which I know he is so deeply and sincerely attached.

Now, having, I am afraid, rather digressed from the main subject of the debate, I should like to return to the political situation in North Africa. The noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, takes a very gloomy view of the situation in that area. He sees a Fascist behind every bush. But, really, his suspicions are unfounded. All recent evidence, both in the hands of His Majesty's Government and of the public, goes to indicate that the régime in North Africa is moving in exactly the opposite direction. The House will have seen—and the noble Lord himself no doubt will have seen—reports of a remarkable broadcast delivered by General Giraud on March 14 and reprinted in the newspapers here on March 15, in which, among other things, he repudiated the authority of Vichy, reconstituted the democratically-elected Conseils Generaux (municipal councils), and abrogated the anti-Jewish laws. I understood the noble Lord to-day to give the impression that nothing had been done about these anti-Jewish laws.

LORD WEDGWOOD

Yes. I thought that he had only said that he would abrogate them; I did not understand that he had done so.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

A number have been abrogated already, and a number of decrees are being issued almost at once abolishing the rest. I hope that that will relieve the mind of the noble Lord. I understand that he remains unconvinced by General Giraud's words; I am afraid that he is not very amenable to facts. But I am certain that the British people as a whole will take a different view, and will recognize that these decisions which have been taken by General Giraud, and which were so warmly welcomed in another place to-day by the Prime Minister, and which have, I understand, the approval of the United States of America, are not those of a Fascist leader.

It may be suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, or by others, that there has been undue delay in the taking of these measures by General Giraud. But we should make a great mistake if we underestimated his difficulties. It is not easy to conduct a house-cleaning when a war is going on on the doorstep. His first aim—quite rightly—was to ensure that no political situation should be created which might prejudice military operations; and that object he achieved. Communications, on which the supplies of the First Army depend, have at no time been interrupted by civil strife, nor has there been at any time the necessity to divert troops to quell internal disturbances in North Africa The second task before General Giraud was to widen the basis of his Government. His Majesty's Government desire to see this, as I think Lord Wedgwood recognizes, just as much as he does. North Africa is not, however, an area which is under our control. The relationship of the British and United States Commanders is not that of an occupying Power towards the local authority of an occupied region. North Africa is French territory, and to attempt to do General Giraud's work for him must only too probably have led to disaster. What we could do, and what the United States, in whose strategic sphere North Africa is, could also do, is to assist the development of events by the exertion of influence. This is one of the main functions of the Resident Minister, Mr. Macmillan, against whom the noble Lord made an entirely unprovoked and unjustified attack this afternoon.

LORD WEDGWOOD

Not unprovoked.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

As I understand it, from the information in my possession, Mr. Macmillan has, during the short time he has been there, achieved an outstanding success. He has established admirable relations with the Americans and with the French, and he has lost no opportunity of impressing upon the French authorities the interest with which the British people are watching the development of events in North Africa. I am glad to say that, as your Lordships have probably noted, there are already definite signs of improvement, and I will give the "unbelieving Thomas" of your Lordships' House—the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood—some examples. Three of the men who were arrested after the murder of Admiral Darlan, although they had helped the Allies both before and after the landing, have now been appointed to important positions in the administration of Algeria. One of them, M. Bringard, is Director-General of Security Services. The Information Services, formerly under the control of M. Rigaud, have been taken over by General Chambe, against whom, as far as I know, there has been no objection raised in any quarter. A former strong supporter of Vichy, the Prefect of Oran, has given place to a man of more solid views, and I understand that the Police Chief of Casablanca has also been replaced. To-day there is news that the resignation of General Bergeret and M. Rigaud has been accepted. These are just examples of the steady transformation which has been going on all the time, although the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, does not appear to see what has been going on before his eyes.

I recognize that there has been a great deal of understandable anxiety, which was voiced by the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, this afternoon, as to the position of political internees; and indeed until these people are generally released none of us can accept the situation as satisfactory. According to figures which have been supplied by the French authorities, and which are believed to be accurate, about 1,300 of these people have been released out of a total, on November 8, of about 7,000. I quote those figures because I think that the noble Lord himself gave a figure of 20,000 International Brigadiers still in internment.

LORD WEDGWOOD

I think it was 3,000 members of the International Brigade and 20,000 Spanish Republicans.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

I understand that the total number was 7,000, and that of those 1,300 have now been released. The French authorities have told us that the number who were imprisoned for their Allied sympathies was at no time large, and that all of these have now been released. We are told that the remainder consist of Spanish Republican refugees and men of other nationalities, the great majority of whom were members of the International Brigade. It is to these, as I understand it, that the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, has specially directed the attention of your Lordships. I fully appreciate his preoccupation with their situation, and all of us would wish to see them released; but, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Winster, pointed out, we must realize that they present a practical problem of some difficulty. What is to be done with them? It is a real problem. The French authorities are unwilling to release them on a large scale until places are found for them to go to, or there is work for them to do; and indeed merely to throw them on the streets of Algiers or elsewhere would be a very poor solution even from their own point of view.

The Governments immediately concerned are examining urgently this thorny problem. It is not one which affects His Majesty's Government alone, though they are doing their very best to help. It would be idle to ignore the difficulties, but I understand—and I have been making careful inquiries into this—that it is now hoped that it will not be long before the difficulties are settled and these unfortunate people released. I would add one word. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, referred to conditions in the camps. It may be useful if I give him some information about this. Representatives of the Joint Commission on Political Internees have recently completed a tour of visits which took them to four of the most important camps, where over 1,200 of the internees are living. They have reported favourably on the conditions in these four camps. I should add that they intend to visit, at the earliest opportunity, all the other camps. The Commission also reported that the medical examination of about 300 internees who expressed themselves willing to join the British Pioneer Corps was proceeding, and that it was hoped that those who had passed the examination would join the Corps within a few days. It will be seen, therefore, that with regard to this intractable problem also some advance is being made.

Perhaps I may be allowed, in conclusion, to return from these matters of comparative detail to the general situation. No doubt there are among the supporters of General Giraud, as among the supporters of General de Gaulle, some men of strong Right Wing views, but there are also men of the Centre and of the Left. The admirable thing in both cases is that Frenchmen of widely differing political complexions are finding it possible to work together in close collaboration for the defeat of the common enemy. As I said just now, your Lordships should make no mistake. The task of General Giraud is not an easy one, and it has never been an easy one since he arrived in North Africa. He came to a territory which was rent with violent divisions of opinion and contained all the elements of a civil war. He found an administrative machine formed by people in many cases of very different views from himself, and that is the machine which he had to work. He has shown patience, he has shown wisdom, and to-day at last there are evident signs that he feels strong enough to widen the basis of his Government and to weed out untrustworthy elements.

The noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, asked, What is the aim of His Majesty's Government and of the United States Government in North Africa? Are they more anxious to avoid Fascism or revolution? The answer is that they are anxious to avoid both. The policy of His Majesty's Government and of the United States administration in North Africa has been stated again and again: it is to unite all groups of Frenchmen in opposition to the common enemy, so as to enable France at the end of the war to choose her own Government. That aim has unfortunately not yet been achieved, though this week's news surely brings it somewhat nearer. One thing is certain. Nothing is more likely to hinder this most desirable process than constant meddling interference from our side, and especially such insulting reflections on the integrity and patriotism of Frenchmen as the noble Lord made in his speech this afternoon. That can only tend to infuriate all sections alike. If Frenchmen want to fight Hitler, for heaven's sake let us help them do so and not jeer and gibe at them the whole time. No great nation of modern times has suffered more cruel wounds to her proudest feelings than France has suffered in this war. Her Armies have been defeated, her territories have been occupied. It is not for us who have had a happier fate to keep those wounds open. On the contrary, we should do everything we can to heal them. At Bir Hakeim, in the deserts of the Sahara and now in Tunisia, a notable start has been made. Let us not now hinder the development of this process; let us assist it, in order that when the war is over, France may again take her rightful place in the councils of the world.

LORD WEDGWOOD

My Lords, your Lordships all like wit, but may I say with Canning, "Save, oh! save me from a candid friend." I do not know whether Lord Winster came down here intending to make that speech, but if he did I wish that he had learnt shorthand so as to take down my words with something like accuracy. Now I turn to the speech of the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, which I thought admirable. I think the apologia pro vita mea which I must make is this, that I make such an invaluable whipping boy. Of course my speeches do not do any harm because they are reported, I hope, in the Left Press of this country, with the immense approval of the Left people. They are reported, I hope, in Russia, where they will meet with unanimous approval, and they are reported, I expect in this case, in America also, where they may do a lot of good. They cannot do any harm because they are always replied to by the Government. Think what a useful man I am. Take Harold Macmillan. Harold Macmillan stood beside me to sing "Rule Britannia" on a famous occasion when Chamberlain walked out. He will do much better work in future for knowing he has been criticized, and possibly he may even be induced to visit one of these camps and see these people for himself. He ought to have done it long ago.

Then as to the indignation of the French population at hearing themselves criticized for having French Fascist leaders, it may have a very good effect upon them. It may even induce them to get into their Administration some members of the Popular Front. The Administration at present has shown the greatest reluctance. If they had not known this debate was coming on, do you think they would have made those changes? Not a bit of it. The invaluable work done by publicity in this country for Left Wing propaganda has been the saving of the situation over and over again, and, far from regretting my speech to-day, and far from the noble Viscount regretting it, he should congratulate himself that these suspicions, based on hearsay, have been stated in public in your Lordships' House, because it is much better that they should be stated in public and replied to in public—if they can be—than that they should continue to go sotto voce through all circles and do infinitely more harm. I can assure your Lordships I shall continue to be an enfant terrible. Far from my speech having been the latest example of Wedgwoodiana, it may be a faint prelude to future improvement. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.