Lords Sitting of 17 March 1943

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Lord Allerton—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

TIDAL WATERS AND ELECTRIC POWER.
LORD BRABAZOX OF TARA LORD BRABAZOX OF TARA rose to call attention to the possibility of tidal harnessing for the generation of electric power, and in particular to the recommendations of the Report of the Brabazon Committee on the Severn Barrage of 1933; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I am taking the opportunity to-day of moving the Motion standing in my name calling attention to the Report of a Committee of which I happened to be Chairman some years ago. I was then a junior Minister, and I suppose that that was the reason I was made Chairman. The Prime Minister at that time asked us to report upon the practicability of the Severn Barrage, and I want your Lordships to understand that this was an entirety new conception of harnessing power. It was not like the damming of a river, storing up water and using it when you wanted it. This was a matter of intermittent power by virtue of tidal forces. That Committee was set up in 1925 and it had an immense work to do. It reported in 1933. That fact, I think, indicates what an immense investigation of a physical type had to be carried out. Many problems which had never been faced before were introduced and had to be explored, such as the harnessing of water power of very low heads.
I think that just one word on tides, I which constitute the basis of the whole barrage scheme, would not be out of place. We associate tides always, of course, with the attraction of the sun and the moon, and it is interesting, I think, to remember that the actual pull of the sun and moon upon the Atlantic Ocean raises that ocean four feet in the middle. If the coast were, so to speak, normal to the line of approach of that hump the tides everywhere would be four feet high. But what happens is that that hump rolls
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up against varying shapes of coasts, and the most convenient shape of coast on which to get a high tide is a V-shaped estuary. The Bristol Channel, therefore, is an ideal shape for getting an accumulation of this hump, and consequently at the English Stones, a few miles above Bristol, where it was contemplated that the barrage should be put, there is a rise of 23 feet at spring tides. There is a mean tide of 18 feet, and the neap tides figure is 12 feet. At every tide of the spring type there flows past the English Stones no less than 24,000,000,000 gallons twice a day. That is the power which is going to waste in that particular locality. This investigation was one of very great technical scope, and a sub-committee was formed, consisting of Sir John Snell, Admiral Douglas, Professor Gibson and Sir Basil Mott. Although little praise or thanks has been given to them, we do owe them an immense debt of gratitude for the work they did in this very pioneering piece of investigation.
One of the first things that had to be decided was whether such a barrage, stopping such an immense flow of water, would have a deleterious effect on navigation on the lower part of the river. Professor Gibson, of Manchester, took the solution of that problem in hand, and at Manchester he built a model of the whole of the Severn estuary. That model was based on soundings made by the Admiralty in 1849. He built that model, and he then proceeded to flood it with tides—ordinary water with a certain amount of silt in it. He imitated the tides, every tide taking about 30 seconds to come in on the model, and, so to speak, he brought 1849 up to the present day. If he had got his silt right, and all the other factors correct, then the soundings after that time should correspond with present-day soundings. At the first attempt he got his silt slightly wrong, but at his second attempt, on bringing the position up from 1849 to the present day, the model corresponded exactly with the present-day position. So extraordinary was the model that at the particular times of spring tides we did get, even on the model, the bore in the upper regions of the Severn. That showed how remarkable the model was. The barrage was then put in place in the model, and we went on from the present day to a hundred years in the future, swilling the tides out and working the barrage to see

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whether it would have an effect on the ports of Bristol and Avonmouth. The results were quite satisfactory and no trouble arose, which meant that one of the difficulties had been cleared away. It is of interest to remark, in passing, that models of this sort have been extremely accurate. After this one, a model was made to show the effect of putting a dam across the River Dee in Cheshire, and that showed that, if this was done, it would silt up the whole estuary of the Dee in six months.
Having dealt with the question from the navigational point of view, we then turned to the electrical side of the matter. This is quite a complicated business. I am always very meek when I speak about electricity; I take the view of Stephen Leacock who, in his Manual of Education on Natural Science, tells us that electricity is of two kinds, positive and negative. The difference, he says, is that the positive is more durable but more expensive, whereas the negative is cheaper but liable to get the moth in it. I always think that one should go back to that definition when exploring electricity, because one is liable to end with formulae only which mean nothing at all when related to reality. This electrical plant was of a pioneer type, harnessing water of a very low head. It was proposed to put in 72 turbines, each of 17,000 horse-power and that plant would have delivered no less than 2,200,000,000 units a year and, when working on spring tides, with all the generators going, the station would have developed over 1,000,000 horse-power. It was therefore an extensive scheme. After paying compound interest while the plant was being installed and all charges, and wiping the capital off, the cost of current came out at 18d. per unit.
If it had been an ordinary dam the scheme would have been too attractive for words, but the trouble with the tides is that they are intermittent, and in the generation of electricity there is one disadvantage: it is not possible to store alternating current electricity, and therefore, whatever the peak load is going to be, there must be plant available to reach that peak should it be wanted. It was obvious that at many times when the maximum peak load was required the tide would not be working, and it would not be possible to get the current, so that
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the scheme would not save the capital cost of steam-generating plant, which would have to be put down to meet the maximum load at peak hours. That was a grave disadvantage, and consequently an auxiliary and ancillary scheme was introduced by which the surplus power at the peak tides was used to pump water up into the hills near by and fill a reservoir there, from which power could be derived at any time desired. Doing that reduced the number of units available per year from 2,200,000,000 to 1,600,000,000, and the extra capital cost raised the price of electricity to .237d. per unit, but the advantage of it is that you can take current when you want it to supplement the Grid at the peak load hours.
In the investigation of the scheme the price of electricity ruling at the most efficient thermal stations at the time was put at .375d. per unit, and as the scheme produced current at .237d. you will see that there is a very big difference in favour of this scheme, and it showed a saving per year of £1,250,000. They did say in the Report that current would become cheaper as time went on. I have been at pains to find out exactly whether their prophesy would come right, and it has not come right, for the reason of course that the price of coal has gone up enormously, and instead of the price of current being .3d. per unit as was expected, the price of current to-day at the most efficient thermal stations and at the same load factor is .39d., so that there is an even bigger reason for making this barrage than there was at that time.
The capital figures are big—I would not like to disguise that from your Lordships, The barrage power machinery would cost £25,000,000, the extra reservoir into which Severn water would be pumped £11,000,000, transmission lines, £1,500,000; and then it was proposed to take advantage of the barrage to put a road across the Severn at this very convenient point and also to make a railway across it too, which would supplement the Severn Tunnel. The scheme would have taken fifteen years to complete, and the capital arrangements were based upon 4 per cent. interest. But, as I say, the scheme showed a net gain of £1,250,000 a year. That Report was published in 1933, and I hoped, and I envisaged, that it would be accepted with acclamation because it was a time when we were very

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short of work; but, to adapt the words of the Jackdaw of Rheims,
"What gave rise to no little surprise
Nobody seemed one penny the better."
Nobody took any notice of it at all. I think the reason was that the building of such an imaginative and expensive scheme to make electricity saved the consumption of over a million tons of coal a year and from an area like South Wales, where there was a tremendous amount of unemployment at that time; so it had no friends at all. And, although it is some time ago, it has passed into a sort of oblivion which I do not think it in any way deserves.
But I raise this question because new factors have come in and these factors are things which bear very considerably upon the whole economic structure of this vast, imaginative enterprise. At that time the cost of coal varied from us. to 18s. per ton. The cost of coal to-day varies from 30s. to 40s. And there is this point to be remembered, that after the war there may be a very great disinclination among the young men to go down and devote their lives to mining. That is already being shown. People would rather indulge in other forms of activity than in mining. Consequently it would appear that the high price of coal will still remain. Then there is the prestige of British engineering. Tides exist all over the world. There are no examples of tidal harnessing anywhere in the world, and if we in this country could show a successful scheme for the harnessing of tides, it would be copied throughout the world, and, I hope, orders would be given to English firms. There is yet another point, which is that the civil engineering works which bulk so largely in this scheme have now been improved out of all knowledge, and there are many new ways of dealing with this vast earthwork which were not known at that time. The experts tell me that the long time required in the original plan—fifteen years—could now be reduced to eleven years. That would, of course, save a lot of capital cost, because over those fifteen years the loan was carrying compound interest at the rate of 4 per cent.
I base the plea for re-examination of this subject, not of course as a thing that can be proceeded with to-morrow, but as something that must not be forgotten, and which must be fitted into our reorganization after the war. What a dreadful waste it would be to think that in a part of
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England one million horse-power is available for the good of our country people and for our towns and our industries, and yet we are going to throw that away and compel the youth of the country to work in mines instead. I do not hope that the Minister who is going to reply can say anything very definite to-day, except to give a vague promise of how perhaps this scheme may be fitted into the future. But I would like to tell him that there are one or two technical matters which still want investigation. I hope he will be able to say in reply that he will give an assurance that these technical investigations will be proceeded with even now in order that we may be ready with this pioneer and imaginative effort. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT BLEDISLOE: My Lords, I make no apology for intervening in this debate, although I do not profess to have any technical knowledge whatever of this extremely interesting but somewhat abstruse problem. But I live in the neighbourhood where this immense engineering scheme was contemplated and within twelve miles of what is known as the English Stones from which the barrage would cross the estuary of the Severn, (I am not quite sure whether it is estuary or Bristol Channel at that point, but I think it is estuary), reaching across to that part of Gloucestershire that is situate in the neighbourhood of Avonmouth. I may say that for many years past we, in that area, comprising a large part of Gloucestershire, Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire, not to mention what I may call the hinterland counties, have been talking about the possibility of something in the nature of a Severn Barrage for the generation of electric power, coupled, as we have always hoped, with a more effective means of crossing the estuary by road and rail than exists at the present time.
I think I am right in saying that a Private Bill was brought forward some seven or eight years ago in another place with a view at any rate to carrying out that part of this scheme which would improve the road and rail transport across the estuary, enabling those who live and work and are industrially interested in South Wales to have easier access both to the Midlands and to London. I for my part cannot help thinking that, whatever impediment there may have been to the carrying out of this gigantic scheme in days gone by—and I believe it was due

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very largely to what I may call vested interests so far as colliery undertakings are concerned in particular—taking the long view, even if vast millions had to be extended upon this scheme, it would be undoubtedly in the national interest, and incidentally would enable a large number of lucrative industries to be established in that part of the country for which there is a serious need, and which cannot be established to-day largely owing to the cost of power. My noble friend Lord Brabazon has with great lucidity and with a good deal of picturesque illustration adumbrated a scheme, the practicability and economic justification of which, according to him, were beyond doubt. That, of course, I know nothing about; but at the end of his speech he did indicate that there were certain technical problems which would have to be solved before it would be wise, prudent, or safe to embark upon so vast an undertaking.
I do not know what these technical troubles are, but what I do want to say is that I cannot help thinking that this Old Country is a little short-sighted, somewhat myopic, in embarking with confidence—always assuming that practicability can be proved and justified in the minds of experts—upon really big schemes of industrial development. The late Joseph Chamberlain perpetually reminded us that we ought to "think imperially." I am not at all convinced whether, in relation to our Colonial administration and to our home agriculture and other problems, we have shown ourselves in the past to be "thinking imperially," that we have taken a sufficiently long view, indicating both vision and convinced judgment Surely if we claim, as we do, to be predominant in industrial matters, we ought to "think imperially" in regard to the future of British industry. In the district whence I come I see one coalfield gradually disappearing. The Forest of Dean coalfield, upon the borders of which I live, will, as far as we can estimate, in the course of the next twenty years cease to exist in any sense as a paying proposition. Over all the Welsh valleys not very far away we have seen, prior to the war, very serious unemployment, and we have seen the appalling effect of adverse conditions on a large proportion of our industrial population.
Your Lordships will forgive me if, comparing large things with small, I refer to New Zealand. Members of this House
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rather smile when I mention New Zealand, but I will say this, that nothing surprised me more in New Zealand than the fact, first of all, that 93 per cent. of the milking of cows was done by machinery and not by hand, and that the greater part of it was due entirely to the availability of cheap electric current. I use electric current on my own farm in Gloucestershire, but I have to pay something like four times as much per unit as any farmer in New Zealand has to pay, through the harnessing, not of tides, but of river water in the generation of electricity with the help of turbines. In spite of the sparse population and consequently of the relatively high transport costs in the matter of conveying electric current, it is quite easy for any farmer over the greater part of the agricultural areas of New Zealand, both in the South Island and in the North Island, to obtain current at rather less than one penny per unit. The average cost was about one halfpenny per unit. The same thing I found years ago in Czechoslovakia. The waters of the Elbe had been harnessed in a similar way, and in certain villages in Bohemia to-day you will find every sort of activity, both domestic and industrial, carried on thanks to the fact that current is available at something between one farthing and one half-penny per unit.
What occurs to me is that this problem is worth much more exploration than has so far been given to it, and careful consideration as to whether it would not be, in all human probability, a perfectly sound proposition to embark on a scheme involving many millions of money if, in the long run, you are going to establish far more industries with far lower cost of working and overhead costs, thereby rendering them much more prospectively profitable than they would appear to be to-day. In my own county we have a very effective county planning committee, and already we are contemplating establishing in this very area, within twelve miles of the English Stones, from which the barrage was expected to be constructed, something like fifteen or twenty new industries in order to provide some outlet for the labour now employed in the Forest of Dean which, ere long, will find itself idle owing to the disappearance of that coalfield as a working proposition.
I have not enough knowledge to develop this theme further, but there is one idea that has struck me, and it is

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this. If a country like Russia can spend an enormous amount of money and labour upon that vast hydro-electric scheme in Southern Russia, at a place with a quite unpronounceable name, which has been so ruthlessly destroyed, surely this rich industrial country of ours can, with confidence, embark on a similar scheme, always assuming that intermittent tidal power can be dealt with in the manner in which my noble friend Lord Brabazon assures us it can. I hope that, if the Minister cannot tell us anything else, he will be able to tell us that the matter has not been lost sight of. Speaking for the neighbourhood from which I come, where we are badly in need of new industries—that is the County of Gloucester—I assure him we shall give this scheme a very warm welcome, especially if it involves the crossing of the river by road or rail which Lord Brabazon assures us. will be a concomitant of it.
LORD SEMPILL: My Lords, I would like to support the noble Viscount who has just spoken and add a few words to his recommendation. It is to be hoped that your Lordships will give strong support to the Motion of my noble friend Lord Brabazon. Lord Brabazon told us a little of the work of his Committee, work that was extremely valuable and stretched over; a number of years. But I think your Lordships will remember that this question of harnessing the tides goes back to the end of the last century when one or two engineers from this country went over to France to Fécamp to see the small tidal harnessing scheme that was working there. While that was a small scheme, none the less it was working well in the development of electrical energy. That inspired them to think of the possibility of harnessing tidal power in these islands, and one or two thought of possibilities in relation to the River Severn. It was not, however, until, I think, the year 1920 that the late Sir Eric Geddes, whose brother is so very active to-day in your Lordships' deliberations, set up a Committee to go into this matter in the first instance. He employed Sir Alexander Gibb to get out a scheme for a Severn Barrage in the year 1920. That scheme was, as my noble friend Lord Brabazon has mentioned, to provide electrical energy, to provide also a further railway into Wales, and, as the noble Viscount
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has just said, a bridge for road traffic. The whole scheme without the cost of the rail and the road was to cost some £29,500,000; but nothing was done.
Then my noble friend Lord Brabazon in 1925 was made Chairman of a Committee. He has told us a little but not as much as he might have done about the work of that Committee, which was exceedingly valuable and stretched over many years, until 1933. The scheme got out by the noble Lord's Committee was to cost, I think, something like another £20,000,000 over that originally proposed, but no doubt it had advantages over the first scheme. In that connexion and following up Lord Brabazon's plea, would it not be very suitable for His Majesty's Government to ask Sir Alexander Gibb, who is very active in these affairs, to go into the matter afresh, taking into view the technical developments in the generation of electricity and the distribution of electricity, and to get out a fresh scheme along the lines of present-day requirements to give effect to the noble Lord's suggestion? The noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, talked in terms of horse-power, but I submit the matter to you in terms of man-power. The potential man-power that this scheme when implemented would bring to the country would be equivalent to the addition of 7,000,000 men. Therefore that is a very big factor indeed in our plans for the future, and I hope most sincerely that full support will be given to the suggestions submitted by my noble friend Lord Brabazon.
LORD TEMPLEMORE: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Brabazon has made a very interesting and excellent speech, as he is so well able to do on this and kindred subjects, and I have to say at the outset that His Majesty's Government welcome the opportunity which the noble Lord's Motion affords for discussion on a matter of the greatest interest to the country as a whole in relation to the problem of postwar development. Your Lordships may remember—I do not know that it is very well known to some of your Lordships—that the terms of reference of the Committee of which the noble Lord who has moved this Motion was Chairman, were simply "to inquire into, and report upon, the practicability of a Severn Barrage." My noble friend has given your Lordships a short account of the proceedings of the Committee, but I think I would do well

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perhaps to go into a few details about the matter.
The Committee was appointed in October, 1925, and made its Report in January, 1933. During the course of its work the Committee reviewed a number of tentative schemes for a barrage across the River Severn. Under the Committee's supervision a hydrographic survey was carried out by the Admiralty of the English Stones, the point on the River Severn which appeared to offer the best site for a barrage. In addition to this, as my noble friend has described in a very interesting part of his speech, Professor Gibson, who was a member of the Committee, constructed a model of the Severn estuary at the Victoria University, Manchester, and conducted a series of experimental investigations on it. As a result of these investigations the Committee recommended the preparation of a complete tidal power scheme with estimates of cost and of the total amount of electricity that might be expected to be generated, together with the approximate cost of such electricity. This investigation was carried out by consulting engineers and was extremely thorough. It will be seen, therefore, that the Committee's Report and recommendations were the result of a very long period of careful and expert inquiry. In fact the whole thing took over seven years.
During the ten years that have elapsed since the Committee's Report, and particularly during the war years, there have been certain fundamental changes in the bases upon which the Committee's estimates were founded. Indeed, it is not possible at the present time to estimate exactly what the adjusted figures would be under present conditions, and much less what they would be under post-war conditions, but I have a few figures which I think may be interesting to your Lordships. Among the most important of these basic changes are, first, the rise in the price of coal which in 1938 was 33 per cent. and in 1942 had risen to 112 per cent. above the price of 1932. Secondly, the approximate cost of coal per unit of electricity which was 15d. in 1932 rose to 16d. in 1938, but jumped to 26d. in 1942. It will be seen, therefore, that up to 1938 the reduction in heat consumption per unit had practically cancelled out the increased cost of coal, but since that date there has been a very
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material rise in the cost of coal per unit. I am afraid my advisers are not able at present to say at what level coal prices may be stabilized after the war, which is natural, but it does not seem likely—and indeed my noble friend Lord Brabazon said the same I think—that there will be a return to pre-war standards. Another important field in which there have been great changes is that of electrical equipment and engineering constructional work. It is quite impossible at the present time to say what advance in price would be necessary to cover the civil engineering work under post-war conditions. On the one hand, of course, great improvements in methods of construction have taken place in recent years and there has been also simplification in the design of electrical plant. On the other hand, there have been large rises in costs of wages and of raw materials.
Another important factor in the problem is the possibility of absorbing the maximum output from the barrage at times of spring tides which is, I am informed, nearly 800,000 kilowatts. To absorb the full amount of this output. under all conditions would involve closing down most of the existing stations in the southern part of England at some period. If the barrage scheme were to be supplemented by a storage scheme, so as to enable electricity to be produced whenever it was required, and at a price which would compare favourably with the overall cost in steam stations, this would involve, on the Committee's estimates, an additional capital expenditure of £11,500,000. A further change which has taken place since the Committee's Report, and which operates in favour of the scheme, is the reduction in the interest rate. The Committee based their estimates on an average rate of 4 per cent. per annum, but it is probable that the necessary capital could now or after the war be raised at a lower rate. Here again therefore there is a considerable field for conjecture.
As I have said, the Government welcome the opportunity for discussion of this most important matter. In view, however, of the reasons I have given, and generally of the difficulties attendant upon making any precise declaration of policy on matters of such importance as this during the war conditions, I think that your Lordships will agree that the Government

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cannot be expected to do more at the present time than to give an undertaking that the recommendations of the Committee of which my noble friend was chairman will receive the most careful consideration in connexion with the postwar reconstruction schemes as a whole. The scheme is of immense magnitude and would require so much capital resources for such a long period of time that it must inevitably compete with other claims upon national resources. As it is very much a long-term project, it would be unwise to embark upon it until there were much clearer indications of what was likely to be the level of post-war prices At this point I should like to comment upon a suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Sempill. I understood him to say that he thought it would be a good thing if the Government invited Sir Alexander Gibb to be chairman of a fresh Committee to inquire into the matter. I have not been instructed upon that point and I do not know how such an idea as that would commend itself to my noble friend opposite, Lord Beaverbrook. I think he said recently that there were far too many Committees in existence during this war. I do not think this attempt to set up a fresh Committee would commend itself to everyone.
LORD SEMPILL: May I interpose one remark? I did not suggest that a fresh Committee should be appointed, but that Sir Alexander Gibb, who was the technician previously employed, should be asked to look into the matter again.
LORD TEMPLEMORE: That suggestion will certainly be conveyed, with other suggestions made in this debate, to my right honourable friend. Here also I would like to refer to the very interesting speech made by my noble friend Viscount Bledisloe who delighted us, as he always does when he speaks. I think he has said that mention by him of New Zealand sometimes raises a smile. It does not make me smile, because I think it is extraordinarily interesting to hear of his experiences out there. I often say, and I have said in public, that I think it would be a very good thing for our Dominions if we had a few more Governors like my noble friend Lord Bledisloe. I was interested to hear from him that the County of Gloucester would welcome the scheme, though I am not quite sure that the people
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of that County would welcome it only because of the good the barrage would do. I rather think they would welcome it also because it might improve the communications between Gloucestershire and other parts of England. But whether or not I am right about that, the scheme turns not only upon general questions of national policy, such as the level of prices and the use of the country's fuel resources as a whole, but also on detailed technical considerations which must be treated as part of the general question of electricity supply for the country as a whole after the war.
I think we are all agreed that a cheap and abundant supply of electricity is one of the most important essentials to national reconstruction and post-war prosperity. Whether, having regard to all the circumstances, this electricity can be most economically and efficiently generated from coal, or whether, and if so to what extent, it can be produced from water power, is one of the most important and complicated problems which we shall have to face. It is often said that Reports such as those of the Committee presided over by my noble friend, when once they get into Government offices, are put away into pigeon holes and forgotten. That may be so, and I dare say it is so in many cases, but it is not so in this case. I can assure my noble friend—and I have the authority of my right honourable friend the Minister for saying this—that the Report of his Committee, and the mass of valuable information which was acquired during the course of that investigation holds an unchallenged place as a classic in the field of hydro-electric literature in this country, and will be constantly in the minds of the Government in relation to all major problems of fuel and power production and utilization in the post-war years. My noble friend asked me if I could give an undertaking that all technical matters in connexion with this scheme would be considered by the Government along with other matters. I can most certainly give that undertaking. I think I have dealt with all the points that have been raised and I hope that, even if my noble friend is not entirely satisfied, he will be sufficiently satisfied with my answer to withdraw his Motion for Papers.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: My Lords, it is very stimulating to find a Minister not taking the role of an inverted

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Micawber end waiting for things to turn down. I shall be satisfied as long as the Government, although the scheme may be pigeon-holed for the moment, do regard it as a scheme which may be gone on with at some time. I do not ask that it should be done now. As long as it is kept in mind together with other schemes after the war, I shall be happy. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

NORTH AFRICA.
LORD WEDGWOOD LORD WEDGWOOD had given Notice that he would call attention to the difficult political and military conditions in North Africa, and move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the situation both politically and from a military point of view in North-West Africa is and has been causing grave anxiety, not only in this country, but in America, and in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We have ample evidence that things are not as we should wish them to be in that country. There are still 3,000 members of the International Brigade in concentration camps in Morocco. There are supposed to be 20,000 survivors of the Spanish Republicans also there. It is true that we have been told that the Russians in the International Brigade have been set at liberty and sent back to Russia, but my information is that still many of them are in these camps. We have been told that Czech nationals have been allowed to leave and to join up with the Czech Forces, but a telegram the day before yesterday contradicted that and said they were still interned. These were the first fighters in the war in which we are engaged. They took their place in the struggle against tremendous odds in the days when their cause was not so popular as it is to-day. If there are people to whom we owe a debt of undying gratitude we owe it to these men, and it is little less than a scandal that in a country in which we hold power they should still be interned, and interned in conditions which beggar description. Anti-Jewish laws which are a disgrace to humanity and to Christianity are still in operation in that country. The latest importation took place only on March 2, when the whole of the Vichy laws were
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imposed upon North-West Africa, also. The situation has been made worse. We hoped until recently that directly Mr. Harold Macmillan got out there he would put things right. Apparently, the situation meets with his satisfaction. The only communication from him that has been made public is to the effect that things are all right there.
I have said that the situation gives rise to grave anxiety; of course it does, not only for itself but because it is a symbol of very much more. There is certain evidence from America as to what is taking place. I read this in The Times two or three days ago:
"The National Maritime Union, part of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the famous C.I.O., passed a resolution stating that it would not be a party to carrying vital materials to Franco Spain which can, and will, be utilized to holster the Nazi war machine."
That is an outward and visible sign of anxiety on this particular question. There is another—I think it was in yesterday's Times. The report to which I refer reads:
"Numbers of sailors from the battleship 'Richelieu' which is repairing in America, have quit their ship and made their way to Canada in the hope of getting to England and joining General de Gaulle's forces there. Many of them asserted that their officers were pro-Fascist, and that some of these officers had referred to Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in insulting terms."
The "Richelieu" and other ships, as your Lordships will be aware, came from Dakar. The officers are the real difficulty. The French' Army in North-West Africa is mainly, if not entirely, a Colonial Army. That is to say the troops are black, and they serve under white officers. I think that anyone who met these officers after the failure in Norway will realize that they are overwhelmingly Fascist in outlook.
We in this happy island do not know the depths of bitterness that politics have introduced into France. If noble Lords will read Ilya Ehrenburg's Fall of Paris they will get some idea of the hatred existing between the different political sides in France—between the Popular Front and the Right Those who surrendered France hate those they surrendered, and if they are to be the force which is to be rearmed by this country and America and used for fighting Germany, I think that we are likely to meet with serious disappointment at least. The

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main anxiety here and in America and in Russia is lest we are providing in North-West Africa to-day an Army which will not serve the cause for which we are fighting, but will serve another cause instead, just as Franco's Moors served to destroy the liberties of Spain. That is the danger which everybody must realize. What we suspect is a desire for the preservation in Europe of a great deal that we are fighting to destroy. In the speech of the Lord Chancellor on the Bishop of Chichester's Motion the other day, the noble and learned Viscount made it abundantly clear that in no circumstances whatever would we ever enter into negotiations for peace with Hitler's Government or with any Nazi Government. But he left out—I am afraid he carefully left out—any parallel declaration that in no circumstances whatever would we enter into negotiations with a Fascist Government.
Now we have seen recently in North-West Africa a series of visits. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York has been there; he came from Spain and from Italy. What attitude does our British Foreign Office take towards this question of the preservation of the status quo in Italy, in France, in Spain, in Portugal? Are we going to be a party to restoring democratic Spain, or are we going to be a party to the restoration of Don Jaime? Is the present Fascist rule in France to be preserved after the war? We know perfectly well that there is a fear shared by many people in this country of an overwhelming Soviet victory. There are not many here who would fear a Soviet victory; but elsewhere many.
I have had recently two letters from Algeria. One came from an English business man who is now a Captain in the Transport Corps. He says that they are extremely comfortable out there, but that all movements of troops are made very difficult by the French; that our policy of appeasement, of never compelling action by the French, has not proved successful, and that the trains are full of French troops moving in different directions so that we cannot use them. He does not complain—it is part of the natural results of being too friendly with people who are not our friends. The other letter is from an American university professor who is now a Captain in the American Army. He writes:
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"The Arabs and the rural elements are suspicious of the invaders. City dwellers are probably ripe for de Gaullism, but are vastly puzzled that the very men who helped to get us in here are in gaol."
This was written, of course, before they were liberated:
"The old landholding and official class scarcely bother to conceal their Vichy sympathies, and it is possible that, in the light of Allied reluctance to interfere, they may be planning to tighten their hold on the Army, in order to retain control of the French Empire, in the best Fascist manner, after the war."
I think that that fear must be widely spread, not only amongst the Americans in Algeria, but amongst the Americans as a whole. It is certainly very widely felt in this country.
If we must supply arms, for heaven's sake let us supply arms to people who will certainly use them and to people who need them at the present time, like the Russians and the Chinese, but not to doubtful starters, not to people who may use them for exactly the purpose against which we are fighting in this war. An American newspaper man told me the other day that he had been to Algeria before the invasion, following up a visit by Mr. Robert Murphy. He wanted to find out what Mr. Robert Murphy was doing with General Weygand, who was there at that time. He said: "By dint of careful inquiries, I found out. I was told that they spent a great deal of time together, and, when I asked what they were doing, I was told that they were praying." That, of course, is not a bad thing in war-time. In fact, I rather like our praying Generals, from Oliver Cromwell down to Montgomery. But what were they praying for? He was told that they were praying that France might be restored to the bosom of the Catholic Church. I want to know whether we have there a duplicate of the late lamented Mr. Joe Kennedy.
The situation has not been made easier by the publication of Mr. Randolph Churchill's letter. If the choice is really between Stalin and the preservation of Salazar and Franco and Mussolini and all those shop-soiled European crowned heads, intelligent people here will prefer Stalin. They are not represented by our Foreign Office or by the American State Department, and the question which I would ask the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, is this: Are our Foreign Office and the United States State Department more anxious to avoid revolution

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than to avoid Fascism? Undoubtedly French officers are more afraid of revolution. Undoubtedly the Catholic Church is more afraid of revolution. Where we stand should be made clear. It is not that we prefer Bolshevism to Fascism, but that we intend to see that our enemies are smashed, and that Right Wing pseudo-Governments have not armed forces to compel their people to submit to their authority. Let us face the facts. There are some people here who would rather that Russia did the lighting and that we did not expend our strength until the settlement. There are very few of them now in this country, but there are far more of them abroad, where they have not been through the terrible crisis which we have passed through successfully.
Now let me turn to the military side of the North-West Africa question. There too we have people who are anxious to preserve Italy, France and Spain, and who have the fear of revolution strongly in their minds. We have in fact two driving forces compelling these people, whether they be French or Italians or Spaniards, to look at this problem from a different angle from ourselves. Why are the Italian capital ships all preserved and kept in their harbours? I think we know the reason: the Italians, hope that when the Peace Conference comes they will have counters which will amount to something. Exactly the same thing applies to all the minor Governments. They all say: "Give us weapons to use to preserve our order; give us bargaining counters at the Peace Conference." That seems to them a natural aspiration, and a more profitable aspiration than taking an active part in defeating the enemy. "Let us leave the defeat of the enemy to the Russians, the English and the Americans," they say, "but let us preserve our bargaining counters." That must be borne in mind when we are considering to whom we are to give these arms.
Then take our First Army in North-West Africa. We are all agreed that it is an impressive example of successful organization, but an increasing number of people are inclined to think that the organization is overdone. We are told that there is only one man in the front line for every seven who are working behind the line. I do not know, but it strikes me as a remarkably high figure. I am quite certain that neither the Japanese
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nor the Russians require the enormous number behind the lines that we do. It seems to me that in that First Army we have too much organization and too few fighters. Are all these things really necessary? We hear that they are all doing themselves very well—bread and beer, and canteens and libraries, and welfare and entertainments. The War Office take a pride in doing it thoroughly. But that is not fighting. It is all very well for an army of occupation, it is all very well for trench warfare, such as we had in the greater part of the last war. But it is not much use for a mobile war. In the South African war—and many of your Lordships took part in that—you will remember we did pretty well on biscuits and bully for two years, and we were none the worse for it.
I cannot help thinking that the evolution of civilization has a bit overdone the necessities of an Army. At the time of Marlborough we moved an Army across Europe from the Low Countries to Blenheim without any train at all, living on the country, and it was a successful move. And I am not at all certain that, although now in North-West Africa the Army is able to move with much greater speed, it may not, possibly, be moving with less efficiency. Somebody once wrote to me—I think it was from Cairo, but it would apply equally well to Algiers—saying that Cairo was Capua without the excuse of Cannae, and I think we want to see that there is less Capua and more Cannae. Do your Lordships remember that in the Napoleonic Wars we had one of those failing expeditions, on a smaller scale but rather similar, to the Low Countries? It did not come off.
"The Earl of Chatham with his sword drawn
Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strachan.
Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em,
Stood waiting for the Earl of Chatham."
I think it has its parallel to-day, and that parallel may, I fear, lead not to the failure of those days of course—we are hardly likely to be driven out—but if we go on waiting much longer it will be too late to take Bizerta and in time to invade Europe this year. I want us to invade Europe this year. Every member of your Lordships' House wants to bear a hand in the fighting on land to help the Russians. We cannot let another year go and say it is going to be next year. Self-respect will not allow it. Delay may even be dangerous.

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It is by no means sure that the German machine is broken yet.
For heaven's sake, if the military have come to the conclusion that they cannot take Bizerta by the 1st June, or whatever it is, then draw stumps and start somewhere else. There are plenty of other places. One of the things I do not like to-day is this exaggeration of the difficulties. We have been told that there are now 250,000 German troops in North-West Africa. I do not believe it for a moment. Why are we told that? We were told before the war started that one air raid on London would cause 200,000 casualties. Why were these stories spread? They were spread in the first place in order to prevent us going to war. Exaggeration is very easy—it is merely an estimate. Now we have been told that Crete is desperately defended by works everywhere along the coast-line of Crete—the coastline of Crete being just about the size of the coast-line of England. That was one of the stories started. In The Times the other day I observed from Crete itself information that nothing had been done at all to defend Crete.
Well, there are other places to go to. Naturally I have a love for Lemnos, but best of all is the Russian Front itself. Is it quite impossible after two years that we should be able to move troops up through Persia and Iraq to help the Russians at Rostov, in the Taman Peninsula and the Crimea? Your Lordships know that we have at the present time two million troops in India. That road that they talked of two years ago up through Baluchistan ought to have been made ere this, and the railway communications through Tabriz are surely finished by now. If you cannot invade Italy, either because you cannot take Tunis or because you do not want to, there are plenty of other places where we could be of even more use. If I had my choice, I would see the British Army fighting beside the Russian Army, and adding to their battle standards the names of Stalingrad, Kharkov, and Poltava. I would see another Inkerman and the Guards showing that they are better men than the German S.S. troops. This is not a question of North-West Africa, although I have tacked it on to the situation there. This is a question of whether we are going to play a full part in this war, by helping the people who die fighting, by helping
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them although they are Bolsheviks, and by complete indifference as to the result, so long as we smash Nazi and Fascist power. I beg to move.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: My Lords, I am very glad to get the opportunity of following my noble friend Lord Wedgwood. He is fearless in his criticisms, and he is always warm and generous in his praise. But it is that portion of his speech which he has tacked on that I am hoping to discuss with you rather than the main portion of his very powerful speech. On the North African issues I am glad he has spoken. I think he has got courage in speaking out, and much that he has said finds some response from me, although I may not altogether agree—I do not agree with him at all. I think the conquest of Tunis and Bizerta is not far off and may be achieved in the very near future. But it is a matter of satisfaction to me that he has referred to the Second Front because it is a serious business for a member of the Socialist Party, or a member receiving the Whip of the Socialist Party, to speak of the Second Front. It is almost like using words that are not spoken in your Lordships' House. I am expecting at any moment that the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, will appear here to dissociate his Party from my noble friend's remarks on the Second Front. But it is necessary to discuss the Second Front. It is indeed. It is necessary to discuss it as my noble friend Lord Wedgwood has spoken to-day. The Government should encourage discussion on the subject and should announce their decisions. The Government should tell us now that the Second Front is going to be launched, and they should tell us that preparations are going forward as speedily as possible. It is my belief that it is the intention of the Government to launch a Second Front.
THE EARL OF GLASGOW: Will the noble Lord excuse me for intervening for one moment? What does the noble Lord mean by a Second Front? Surely this country has been a Second Front to Russia ever since Russia came into the war.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: When I discuss the Second Front I mean the same thing as the President of the United States means when he discusses the Second Front.

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I mean the same thing as the Prime Minister means, the same thing as Stalin means, and that meaning is well known to the noble Earl. I believe that the Government do mean to launch a Second Front. There are 3,000 miles of frontier subject to invasion from Petsamo to Biarritz or, as my noble friend Lord Wedgwood would say, from Dan to Beersheba. Consider the advantage of helping Russia. Consider the advantage to us if we make an invasion of Norway or France. At once we bring the U-boat bases on those shores under our authority. The U-boat bases now being used against us become centres from which we can carry on operations; against the enemy. It is an immense advantage. Therefore it is our duty to let the Russians know we are on the way. You should tell them, you should encourage them by that.
Consider the story of the contribution of the United States of America to Great Britain in the last war. That contribution began with an assurance that the United States would come to our aid in France. More than a year passed before United States troops took part in our battle front, and the only encouragement we got from the Americans during all that interval was the song, "The Yanks are coming." But that song was sufficient to lift up our spirits, to keep us in good cheer. That song carried us through the dark days of Amiens. Can we sing our version of "The Yanks are coming" to the Russians? In the dark days which must come to Russia, the shadows that must come to Russia, in the spring of 1943, can we have another version of the same song, "The Yanks ere coming"? Cannot we let them know, here and now, as soon as possible, as soon as may be, that it is our intention to launch a Second Front, and that they may rely confidently and absolutely on the arrival before long of our British troops to aid them in France by drawing off the Germans from the Eastern Front? We knew in those days that the Americans would arrive. We knew it quite well, and we rejoiced in that song. But some noble Lords on the Socialist Benches will not let us sing our version of "The Yanks are coming" this time. They will not let us have it at all. They will probably dissociate themselves from Lord Wedgwood now. I am waiting for the noble Earl to arrive. I am sorry he is not here. I do not quite understand the composition of the Socialist
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Party anyway. I understand Lord Addison, but there are three others here on this Bench who, I understand, are elected by four from the Back Benches.
LORD WINSTER: You are keeping us company.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: I am not keeping you company. Naturally those on the Back Benches have selected for the front line the military. You see them here quite frequently and quite properly; it is the right place for the military. Here is my noble friend Lord Southwood, who changes his uniform very often. Lord Southwood made a speech here a day or two ago. His speech was "Hear, hear" when I was being admonished for having discussed the Second Front. I was surprised, doubly surprised, for it was within my recollection that my noble friend's newspaper had advocated the Second Front very warmly; so I looked it up and found that on July 14 my noble friend's newspaper was declaring:
"Let us now resolve to set up that Second Front as soon as possible after to-morrow."
On July 28 it gave a much more serious admonition:
"If the Government errs because of sluggishness or cowardice we shall criticize."
I am now bound to tell you that I repeat Lord Southwood's speech on the last occasion in relation to these sentiments in his newspaper: Hear, hear—hear, hear!
Let us dedicate ourselves to this purpose of a Second Front. It is not to help Russia. That is not why I seek your approval and your support for the plan I have advocated from this Box now on two or, perhaps, three occasions. It is not to help Russia. It is to beat Germany. That is the main purpose and the principal object of our lives. It is to banish slavery from the world. Is not that the crusade you set out on? Was it not to put an end to slavery, Nazi slavery, that you went to war? What better purpose, what better object, what better opportunity do you want in order to bring slavery to an end than to launch, as soon as may be, that Second Front in support of the Russians who are fighting so gallantly? I am very glad my noble friend Lord Wedgwood gave me the opportunity of saying these few words in support of the Second Front, which I believe is not far off. It is a movement to banish slavery from the world, and that is

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the whole object of this great figure in public life, Lord Wedgwood.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, apart from the Motion moved by my noble friend Lord Wedgwood, I have been particularly interested in the remarks which have just been made by my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook. He called your Lordships' attention to the fact that three members of my Party sit on the Front Bench who are elected by four members who sit behind them; but your Lordships will have noticed that Lord Beaverbrook sits on our Front Bench without having been elected by anyone but himself.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: I sit here by virtue of my having held office in the Government twice and because I am a Privy Councillor. It is certainly my right, and possibly my duty, to sit on this Bench.
LORD WINSTER: Nobody could welcome my noble friend more than I do. I am glad we have had that explanation, because I understood that Lord Beaverbrook was sitting on our Front Bench by virtue of a lease-lend arrangement between the Daily Herald and the Daily Express. Anything we can do in my Party to assist the noble Lord to show the Daily Express how really to run a Centre of Public Opinion I have no doubt we shall be delighted to do. I join with Lord Beaverbrook in paying a tribute to the warm and generous spirit of my noble friend Lord Wedgwood. I have always noticed his warm championship of the under-dog, but I have also noted that Lord Wedgwood's championship of the under-dog depends upon that dog remaining the under-dog and that at the moment the under-dog shows any signs of becoming the upper-dog nobody attacks him more fiercely than does my noble friend Lord Wedgwood. I gathered from this Motion that Lord Wedgwood objects to the past of certain gentlemen now playing a prominent part in North African affairs. I deplore it too. But my noble friend also has a past. My noble friend once fell so low as to be in charge of the Duchy of Lancaster in a Labour Government.
LORD WEDGWOOD: A very good experience.
LORD WINSTER: A good experience, but one which might possibly justify certain
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criticisms and comments at the present moment. But, like my noble friend, I also was perturbed and disturbed by certain things which took place after we landed in North Africa. I am content to think that what took place then was very largely a matter of military necessity, and I would not like to join in any criticism of General Eisenhower for the steps that he took in face of a very serious military emergency. But I do feel at this moment, whatever may have been our feelings in the past about events in North Africa, that things look better now, and we have had, in the last day or two, indications that General Giraud and General de Gaulle are prepared to meet and that there are prospects of their coming to terms. If that is the case, if General Giraud and General de Gaulle are coming together and are apparently prepared to negotiate and to appreciate each other's point of view, this surely is the very last moment at which we ought to have a debate about political affairs in North Africa.
LORD WEDGWOOD: May I ask my noble friend Lord Winster whether he thinks that the coming together of General de Gaulle and General Giraud will do much good to the people of the International Brigade or Spanish prisoners interned in that country?
LORD WINSTER: Yes, I gather that those prisoners have now been set free.
LORD WEDGWOOD: No, they have not.
LORD WINSTER: At all events, I think the intention is to set them free. I have great sympathy with those men, I hope there may be no mistake about that. My heart goes out very much indeed to these men of the International Brigade. I have full sympathy with them, but I should think that at the moment the problem is more one of what to do with them after you have set them free.
LORD WEDGWOOD: They can join the Army.
LORD WINSTER: The objection is not so much to setting them free; the real problem is what you are to do with them after you have given them their liberty. At any rate, I cannot feel that these problems will be in any way set back or vitiated by the prospect of General Giraud

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and General de Gaulle coining to some agreement between themselves, and on that account I feel that perhaps it is unfortunate to be discussing these affairs at this moment. There were two or three words in the speech of my noble friend Lord Wedgwood to which I should like to call attention. I may be under some misapprehension, but I understood that the anti-Jewish laws in North Africa had been abolished. I do not know if I am wrong about that or not. I would gladly submit to correction about it. I was under the impression that I read a little time ago that the laws of racial discrimination in North Africa had been abolished, and I would very much welcome information as to what the position is about these anti-racial laws. As to the arrival of the "Richelieu" in American waters, I have no doubt whatever that French soldiers landing in America and able to go ashore under free conditions gave opportunity for a great deal of talk on the part of those sailors, but we have only Press reports to go on about that. The main fact which I think is of interest, and which is of value to us, is that the "Richelieu" and several other units of the French Navy have arrived in American waters. That I think is a great and significant fact which is of good omen, and not what some sailors may happen to have said when they have got ashore under conditions which I for one hope they are enjoying very much indeed.
I do not know what is meant by the statement that in North Africa we are struggling to preserve what we are ostensibly fighting to destroy. I know of nothing that is happening which would give weight to that statement. I must say also that I think it is deplorable to introduce the name of the American Roman Catholic Archbishop, who is at present visiting North Africa, into a political controversy of this sort. I think that is particularly an unfortunate thing to have done. What is one to make of those statements to which we have listened, completely hearsay statements, about Mr. Murphy and General Weygand having met and having spent their time praying for the restoration of the Roman Catholic Church in France? Really, I do join issue at the introduction at this moment of completely hearsay statements of that sort into a debate in your Lordships' House. What can be the possible value of it? What can such a statement as that do,
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except harm? To repeat statements about there being people here who would prefer that Russia should do the fighting, and that we did not expend our strength until the time for settlement has arrived, is deplorable. How is the cause for which we are fighting advanced by statements of that sort? Then I come to a statement which made a particular impression upon my mind. I hope really I am under a misapprehension upon this and I would gladly give way to Lord Wedgwood if he wishes to correct me. I understood him to ask your Lordships, why are Italian ships preserved and kept in harbour unless it is that at the peace settlement Italy may have certain counters in her possession for bargaining at that peace settlement? Is the implications that we, this country—
LORD WEDGWOOD: The implication is that the Italian Government is keeping them there.
LORD WINSTER: It may have served a purpose in clearing up that point, but as the statement was made I feel it was highly ambiguous. We know that statements have been made about refraining from bombing Rome for sinister and nefarious reasons, and the inference-might have been drawn that these ships were left alone for some sinister purpose. Then there was the statement that the First Army are doing themselves well, that they have all the bread and beer they want and generally having a good time, but are not fighting. I wrote the words down—"are having a good time, but not fighting." I do deplore statements of that sort when all of us have rejoiced to see the way the Army after its experience at Dunkirk has fought and trained itself back into the service that it is to-day. I do indeed think it is deplorable that anybody should make a statement of that sort.
LORD WEDGWOOD: I do not know what you wrote down, but I never said it. You seem to have misinterpreted my speech. I said there was too much organization and too little fighting.
LORD WINSTER: It is never my wish to misinterpret anybody at all, and no one would apologize more sincerely for doing so, but certainly the implication was that the First Army was doing itself well but was not fighting. I think that is a deplorable statement to make. I will not refer at length to other points, but I

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gather that the noble Lord wishes us to have no organization of supplies and thinks that the Army could live upon the country. I think that is rather dangerous ground to get upon. I thought that was the very thing for which we reproached the Germans. They live upon the countries through which they pass. Then there was the reference to Bizerta and the statement that there are plenty of other places to go to. The noble Lord's heart apparently yearns after Lemnos. What military purpose is served by abandoning our attack against Bizerta and suddenly going to Lemnos, I do not know. What is the idea? What is it you do through Lemnos? That was followed by the statement "If you cannot invade Italy, because you cannot take Tunis"—these are the significant words—"or do not want to." What is this insinuation? That our Expeditionary Force in Tunisia is a feint, or that we are pulling our punch "because you cannot take Tunis or do not want to"? What is the suggestion? That the whole Expeditionary Force in Tunisia is engaged in a sham fight and that we really do not want to take Tunis at all?
I feel that perhaps I have kept your Lordships too long with my intervention, but really great as is the respect and in fact the affection which I bear for my noble friend Lord Wedgwood, I cannot see what purpose is served by a speech of that nature which makes insinuation after insinuation and which is based, as to nine-tenths of it, upon hearsay. What purpose can be served at this moment when our Forces are in the position they: are in and when in North Africa there are prospects of arriving at the situation and the understanding which we should like to see reached? I do most deeply deplore the remarks made by my noble friend, and I should be reluctant to feel that such remarks might be taken as in any way representative of myself or some of my friends. In what has been said about the Second Front I join with my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook in hoping that the moment may soon arise when the War Cabinet feel that we are at last able to go to the assistance of Russia. Nobody would join more sincerely than I in hoping with my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook that energy and urgency may be shown in respect of that objective.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE): My Lords, those of your Lordships who are familiar with the writing of "Beachcomber" in the Daily Express may perhaps remember his model Election address for Parliamentary candidates—"I will lash out in every direction and clear up this mess." That seems to me not an unfair description of the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood's approach to foreign affairs. His practice seems to be to select some problem which appears to be of special delicacy, to say to himself,. "What really provocative thing can I say about it?" and then to shout it in loud and ringing tones in your Lordships' House. From this the noble Lord appears to derive considerable satisfaction. I suspect—though perhaps wrongly—that he regards himself as the lineal descendant of Pym and Hampden. He says: "They always said what was in their minds, and so do I." It all depends on what is in your mind, and I am not sure that Pym and Hampden would approve everything said by the noble Lord this afternoon.
At any rate, that seems to be the procedure he has adopted on this occasion. He has said to himself: "What is the most delicate problem at the moment? What is the one that needs the most caution, the most patience and the most wisdom?" And he has come to the absolutely correct conclusion that it is the difficult political and military situation in North Africa. Having decided on his theme, he has sat down and composed the speech to which your Lordships have listened this afternoon. Indeed, he has not contented himself merely with North Africa. He has thrown his net even wider. He has managed to sandwich into his remarks references to the constitutional future of Spain and Portugal, some rather offensive remarks about the American President's personal representative in North Africa, Mr. Murphy, references to a Second Front, and a violent attack on the Catholic Church. In its way I think that the speech was one of the noble Lord's masterpieces. It was calculated to cause the maximum of irritation in France, the United States, Spain, Portugal and Russia. That is no mean performance for a speech that lasted very little more than 25 minutes.
I do not intend to follow the noble Lord in his Cook's tour of Southern

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Europe, and I had not intended to pursue him still further to Russia, though in view of the noble Lord's speech I shall be obliged to say a few words on that subject. The affairs of Spain are a matter for the Spanish people, and they will not thank us for meddling with them. The same applies to the visit of Archbishop Spellman to Rome. I should have thought it very natural that a Catholic Archbishop visiting Europe and North Africa should take the opportunity of paying his respects to the Vatican, and I should have thought it both unnecessary and unfortunate to read into the visit the sinister implications which the noble Lord did this afternoon. Nor do I think it very helpful to make the suggestion that the Catholic Church is an implacable enemy of the cause for which we are fighting at a time when hundreds of thousands of Catholics are fighting in the Allied ranks.
However, my Lords, I do not intend to follow my noble friend Lord Wedgwood further into these rather regrettable topics. I propose to devote myself so far as I can—for the discussion has ranged somewhat widely—to the main subject of the debate, the political and military situation in North Africa. I do not think it is either necessary or desirable from the operational point of view to say very much about the military situation. The noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, has, in his remarks, contrived to draw what I thought was a very surprising analogy between Generals Alexander and Montgomery and Lord Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan. To those of us who have watched the recent achievements of these brilliant officers, it is an analogy which does not seem to make very much sense. The noble Lord has sought to prove, as I understood him, that the Eighth Army and the First Army are moving too slowly. He said, I believe, that they had too much organization and too little fighting.
LORD WEDGWOOD: I did not say anything about the Eighth Army.
VISCOUNT CRAN BORNE: I am obliged. It would certainly have been a very queer observation. So far as the First Army is concerned, I think that the noble Lord has already been answered by Lord Winster and that it is not necessary for me to say any more. The explanation for the present delay—because there is
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undoubtedly rather more delay than some of us possibly would wish—is a very much simpler one than that which the noble Lord has put forward. Perhaps the main lesson we should have learnt in this war is that there is nothing so dangerous as premature attack. We have had examples of it more than once in Libya where attacks have been delivered before complete preparations had been made. And we have had one famous example to the contrary—the battle of El Alamein. Those in command in North Africa know this just as well as anyone else, and they are steadily and methodically making their preparations. To urge them to strike before they are ready is really to do no service to this country or to Russia or to anyone else. I recognize the impatience of the noble Lord, which is perhaps shared by other people in this country. That impatience was equally evident before the battle of El Alamein. I remember evidences of it even in your Lordships' House. I do hope that it will not be suggested from here that the Eighth Army or the First Army or General Alexander or General Montgomery are dillying and dallying. The House should remember that this North African campaign fulfils—as Lord Beaverbrook I think has said to-day—a very important purpose. The Prime Minister himself has described it as a springboard, and the completion of this springboard is a vital precursor to further operations, which we all hope are coming. Do not let us, by anything we say here, encourage the premature opening of an attack which might be a failure because it was made too soon. If that happens, instead of gaining time we should lose time.
The noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, in his speech, reverted to the topic of a Second Front in Europe. He finds opportunity for raising this question on a Motion on almost any subject. I confidently expect to find him raising it tomorrow in dealing with his Motion on agricultural cottages.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: Not tomorrow.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: And I may say, my Lords, that I am arranging for the Government spokesman to be suitably briefed for the occasion.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: I promise a holiday.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I do assure the noble Lord that I recognize how strong his feelings are on this subject, but I suggest that it is not wise on his part so constantly to revert to it. No doubt the expression "Second Front" is in itself harmless, and, perhaps, convenient. But if the impression is given in Russia, however unintentionally, that Britain and the United States are doing nothing while Russia is doing everything—and that is the impression which was created at any rate in my mind by the noble Lord's speech to-day—the result would be most unfortunate. Such an impression, moreover, would not be fair to our own fighting men. Everybody, I think, agrees that the main burden of the land fighting is at present being borne by Russia, and we have seen with admiration the magnificent display of endurance which the Russian Armies have put up during recent months. But equally, I think, everybody should agree that the lion's share of the war on the sea and in the air is being shouldered by us and by the United States.
Our air offensive against Germany, which reached its peak last week, inaugurated a new era in aerial attack, and the direct damage which was done to German production was terrific. Tanks and aeroplanes were destroyed by those attacks just as surely as though they had been destroyed by the Russian Armies on the Eastern Front. I should have liked to have seen—or rather I should not have liked to have seen—the length of the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook's face, when he was Minister of Production, if the Germans had launched against us an air attack on the scale of that which we have launched against them in this last month. What I have said about the war in the air is equally true with regard to the war at sea. Unless we had command of the sea, which we have to-day, Germany would be able to import from the Far East and elsewhere essential materials of which she is at present short, and the situation in Russia would be very much more difficult than it is at the present time. Yet there was nothing about this in the noble Lord's speech to-day. We know what will happen in regard to that speech. It will be reprinted in a paper with which, I understand, the noble Lord has no longer any direct connexion.
LORD BEAVERBROOK: I own it.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: The noble Lord owns it. Well, anyway, it may be expected to have a kindly feeling for him. His speech will also be printed in extenso in the Russian Press and a very wrong impression may be derived from it. I beg the noble Lord to allow me to reassure him. Do not let him be under any misapprehension; this question of a Second Front or campaign, or whatever you like to call it, in Europe, is equally in the minds of the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt and all those distinguished officers responsible for our strategy. Our policy in this respect was made perfectly clear after the Casablanca Conference. I beg the noble Lord, therefore, to leave these matters to those whose responsibility they are, both at home and on the spot, and not to raise unfounded suspicions in the minds of the Russian people. To do that I think could only tend to impair the good relations between the two countries, to which I know he is so deeply and sincerely attached.
Now, having, I am afraid, rather digressed from the main subject of the debate, I should like to return to the political situation in North Africa. The noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, takes a very gloomy view of the situation in that area. He sees a Fascist behind every bush. But, really, his suspicions are unfounded. All recent evidence, both in the hands of His Majesty's Government and of the public, goes to indicate that the régime in North Africa is moving in exactly the opposite direction. The House will have seen—and the noble Lord himself no doubt will have seen—reports of a remarkable broadcast delivered by General Giraud on March 14 and reprinted in the newspapers here on March 15, in which, among other things, he repudiated the authority of Vichy, reconstituted the democratically-elected Conseils Generaux (municipal councils), and abrogated the anti-Jewish laws. I understood the noble Lord to-day to give the impression that nothing had been done about these anti-Jewish laws.
LORD WEDGWOOD: Yes. I thought that he had only said that he would abrogate them; I did not understand that he had done so.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: A number have been abrogated already, and a number of decrees are being issued almost at once abolishing the rest. I hope that that will relieve the mind of the noble Lord.

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I understand that he remains unconvinced by General Giraud's words; I am afraid that he is not very amenable to facts. But I am certain that the British people as a whole will take a different view, and will recognize that these decisions which have been taken by General Giraud, and which were so warmly welcomed in another place to-day by the Prime Minister, and which have, I understand, the approval of the United States of America, are not those of a Fascist leader.
It may be suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, or by others, that there has been undue delay in the taking of these measures by General Giraud. But we should make a great mistake if we underestimated his difficulties. It is not easy to conduct a house-cleaning when a war is going on on the doorstep. His first aim—quite rightly—was to ensure that no political situation should be created which might prejudice military operations; and that object he achieved. Communications, on which the supplies of the First Army depend, have at no time been interrupted by civil strife, nor has there been at any time the necessity to divert troops to quell internal disturbances in North Africa The second task before General Giraud was to widen the basis of his Government. His Majesty's Government desire to see this, as I think Lord Wedgwood recognizes, just as much as he does. North Africa is not, however, an area which is under our control. The relationship of the British and United States Commanders is not that of an occupying Power towards the local authority of an occupied region. North Africa is French territory, and to attempt to do General Giraud's work for him must only too probably have led to disaster. What we could do, and what the United States, in whose strategic sphere North Africa is, could also do, is to assist the development of events by the exertion of influence. This is one of the main functions of the Resident Minister, Mr. Macmillan, against whom the noble Lord made an entirely unprovoked and unjustified attack this afternoon.
LORD WEDGWOOD: Not unprovoked.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: As I understand it, from the information in my possession, Mr. Macmillan has, during the short time he has been there, achieved an outstanding success. He has established
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admirable relations with the Americans and with the French, and he has lost no opportunity of impressing upon the French authorities the interest with which the British people are watching the development of events in North Africa. I am glad to say that, as your Lordships have probably noted, there are already definite signs of improvement, and I will give the "unbelieving Thomas" of your Lordships' House—the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood—some examples. Three of the men who were arrested after the murder of Admiral Darlan, although they had helped the Allies both before and after the landing, have now been appointed to important positions in the administration of Algeria. One of them, M. Bringard, is Director-General of Security Services. The Information Services, formerly under the control of M. Rigaud, have been taken over by General Chambe, against whom, as far as I know, there has been no objection raised in any quarter. A former strong supporter of Vichy, the Prefect of Oran, has given place to a man of more solid views, and I understand that the Police Chief of Casablanca has also been replaced. To-day there is news that the resignation of General Bergeret and M. Rigaud has been accepted. These are just examples of the steady transformation which has been going on all the time, although the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, does not appear to see what has been going on before his eyes.
I recognize that there has been a great deal of understandable anxiety, which was voiced by the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, this afternoon, as to the position of political internees; and indeed until these people are generally released none of us can accept the situation as satisfactory. According to figures which have been supplied by the French authorities, and which are believed to be accurate, about 1,300 of these people have been released out of a total, on November 8, of about 7,000. I quote those figures because I think that the noble Lord himself gave a figure of 20,000 International Brigadiers still in internment.
LORD WEDGWOOD: I think it was 3,000 members of the International Brigade and 20,000 Spanish Republicans.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I understand that the total number was 7,000, and that of those 1,300 have now been

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released. The French authorities have told us that the number who were imprisoned for their Allied sympathies was at no time large, and that all of these have now been released. We are told that the remainder consist of Spanish Republican refugees and men of other nationalities, the great majority of whom were members of the International Brigade. It is to these, as I understand it, that the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, has specially directed the attention of your Lordships. I fully appreciate his preoccupation with their situation, and all of us would wish to see them released; but, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Winster, pointed out, we must realize that they present a practical problem of some difficulty. What is to be done with them? It is a real problem. The French authorities are unwilling to release them on a large scale until places are found for them to go to, or there is work for them to do; and indeed merely to throw them on the streets of Algiers or elsewhere would be a very poor solution even from their own point of view.
The Governments immediately concerned are examining urgently this thorny problem. It is not one which affects His Majesty's Government alone, though they are doing their very best to help. It would be idle to ignore the difficulties, but I understand—and I have been making careful inquiries into this—that it is now hoped that it will not be long before the difficulties are settled and these unfortunate people released. I would add one word. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, referred to conditions in the camps. It may be useful if I give him some information about this. Representatives of the Joint Commission on Political Internees have recently completed a tour of visits which took them to four of the most important camps, where over 1,200 of the internees are living. They have reported favourably on the conditions in these four camps. I should add that they intend to visit, at the earliest opportunity, all the other camps. The Commission also reported that the medical examination of about 300 internees who expressed themselves willing to join the British Pioneer Corps was proceeding, and that it was hoped that those who had passed the examination would join the Corps within a few days. It will be seen, therefore, that with regard to this intractable
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problem also some advance is being made.
Perhaps I may be allowed, in conclusion, to return from these matters of comparative detail to the general situation. No doubt there are among the supporters of General Giraud, as among the supporters of General de Gaulle, some men of strong Right Wing views, but there are also men of the Centre and of the Left. The admirable thing in both cases is that Frenchmen of widely differing political complexions are finding it possible to work together in close collaboration for the defeat of the common enemy. As I said just now, your Lordships should make no mistake. The task of General Giraud is not an easy one, and it has never been an easy one since he arrived in North Africa. He came to a territory which was rent with violent divisions of opinion and contained all the elements of a civil war. He found an administrative machine formed by people in many cases of very different views from himself, and that is the machine which he had to work. He has shown patience, he has shown wisdom, and to-day at last there are evident signs that he feels strong enough to widen the basis of his Government and to weed out untrustworthy elements.
The noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, asked, What is the aim of His Majesty's Government and of the United States Government in North Africa? Are they more anxious to avoid Fascism or revolution? The answer is that they are anxious to avoid both. The policy of His Majesty's Government and of the United States administration in North Africa has been stated again and again: it is to unite all groups of Frenchmen in opposition to the common enemy, so as to enable France at the end of the war to choose her own Government. That aim has unfortunately not yet been achieved, though this week's news surely brings it somewhat nearer. One thing is certain. Nothing is more likely to hinder this most desirable process than constant meddling interference from our side, and especially such insulting reflections on the integrity and patriotism of Frenchmen as the noble Lord made in his speech this afternoon. That can only tend to infuriate all sections alike. If Frenchmen want to fight Hitler, for heaven's sake let us help them do so and not jeer and gibe at them the whole time. No great nation of modern times has suffered more cruel wounds to her proudest

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feelings than France has suffered in this war. Her Armies have been defeated, her territories have been occupied. It is not for us who have had a happier fate to keep those wounds open. On the contrary, we should do everything we can to heal them. At Bir Hakeim, in the deserts of the Sahara and now in Tunisia, a notable start has been made. Let us not now hinder the development of this process; let us assist it, in order that when the war is over, France may again take her rightful place in the councils of the world.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, your Lordships all like wit, but may I say with Canning, "Save, oh! save me from a candid friend." I do not know whether Lord Winster came down here intending to make that speech, but if he did I wish that he had learnt shorthand so as to take down my words with something like accuracy. Now I turn to the speech of the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, which I thought admirable. I think the apologia pro vita mea which I must make is this, that I make such an invaluable whipping boy. Of course my speeches do not do any harm because they are reported, I hope, in the Left Press of this country, with the immense approval of the Left people. They are reported, I hope, in Russia, where they will meet with unanimous approval, and they are reported, I expect in this case, in America also, where they may do a lot of good. They cannot do any harm because they are always replied to by the Government. Think what a useful man I am. Take Harold Macmillan. Harold Macmillan stood beside me to sing "Rule Britannia" on a famous occasion when Chamberlain walked out. He will do much better work in future for knowing he has been criticized, and possibly he may even be induced to visit one of these camps and see these people for himself. He ought to have done it long ago.
Then as to the indignation of the French population at hearing themselves criticized for having French Fascist leaders, it may have a very good effect
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upon them. It may even induce them to get into their Administration some members of the Popular Front. The Administration at present has shown the greatest reluctance. If they had not known this debate was coming on, do you think they would have made those changes? Not a bit of it. The invaluable work done by publicity in this country for Left Wing propaganda has been the saving of the situation over and over again, and, far from regretting my speech to-day, and far from the noble Viscount regretting it, he should congratulate himself that these suspicions, based on hearsay, have been stated in public in your Lordships' House, because it is much better that they should be stated in public and replied to in public—if they can be—than that they should continue to go sotto voce through all circles and do infinitely more harm. I can assure your Lordships I shall continue to be an enfant terrible. Far from my speech having been the latest example of Wedgwoodiana, it may be a faint prelude to future improvement. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (GOV ERNORS ALLOWANCES AND PRIVILEGES) (AMENDMENT) ORDER, 1943.
Report from the India and Burma Orders Committee, That they have examined the Draft Order as required by the Standing Orders of the House; that in their opinion the Order raises important questions of policy and principle; that the Order is founded on precedent; that in the opinion of the Committee the Order can be passed by the House without special attention; and that no further inquiry is necessary before the House proceeds to a decision on the Resolution to approve the said Order.
Read, and ordered to lie on the Table.
House adjourned.