SPEED OF MERCHANT SHIPS

HL Deb 02 March 1943 vol 126 cc392-409

LORD WINSTER asked His Majesty's Government what is their policy as regards the speed of merchant ships which they propose to build; and moved for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving the Motion which stands in my name on the Paper, may I say how very grateful I am to the noble Lord, Lord Leathers, for coming down this afternoon to reply to it? We all realize how great must be the pressure of work on the noble Lord's Department, and I have no doubt he feels some regret at having to take time off to reply to this Motion. But if the work of his Ministry is extremely strenuous, it is also extremely successful, and I noticed a very striking tribute paid by the Chamber of Shipping recently, attributing the success in military operations to the complete co-ordination between the Ministry of War Transport and the industry, due to the team-work established under the leadership of Lord Leathers in the management of ships. That is a very striking tribute indeed, and certainly in regard to the remarkable landing operations in North Africa it is a matter of common agreement how much of the success was due to the work of the Ministry of War Transport.

The war has now reached the stage at which we see that the only thing which can possibly beat us is the U-boats, ever-increasing numbers of which are coming to sea. It is idle to tackle that menace by building more tonnage than is sunk. We have got to find a way to destroy the U-boat or to draw its teeth. Speed may be part of the answer to that problem. That building-more-than-is-sunk argument takes no account of the cargoes which are lost, and the cargoes lost are not only cargoes of commodities which are in abundant supply. The position in regard to certain raw materials at the present moment is a very severe handicap to our war effort, and any loss of cargoes containing such materials must be a serious matter. The essential task before us is to get the 1943 figures of losses below the 1942 figures. These sinkings are like a temperature chart. There is a line on the chart where, if the patient reaches it, he is in danger, and there is another line where, if he goes beyond it, nothing can save the patient's life. We were on or near the danger line in 1942, just as we were in 1917, and if we get to the same position in 1943 we shall be reduced to something very like immobility. We have got to effect the same recovery now that we effected in 1917; but the handicaps to surmount are now far greater.

There are more U-boats, faster U-boats, fewer escort ships, and far greater requirements than we had then on our shipping. Our existing position is due to this fact, that when the war broke out the U-boat was very largely discounted. The convoy was thought to be all that was necessary by way of reply to the U-boat. The Admiralty's view on this subject was expressed by Mr. (now Sir) Geoffrey Shakespeare in March, 1939, when he said that the menace of the submarine "will not be as serious as it was in the last war." The fact is that the Admiralty completely over-estimated the possibilities of the convoy. In the same speech he said, "With the Asdic you can locate a submarine nine times out of ten." That happy optimism has not been justified. The convoy was only the great success it was in the last war because the U-boat could not locate the convoy. Now the position is quite different, and the U-boats can locate the convoys. The pre-war measures devised by the Admiralty of convoy and Asdic have been such a failure that only American shipbuilding has got us out of the jam we found ourselves in.

Looking the existing position in the face, rations get steadily a little more exiguous. We have been informed by the Prime Minister that we are eating into our stocks of food. Lord Woolton asks us to eat less bread and more potatoes. Trams, omnibuses; cars, trains—every form of transport is slowing down, with a consequent very serious slowing down of the transaction of business. About one hundred seamen are drowned every week. Thousands of fine ships have gone. Cargoes representing years of labour are at the bottom of the sea, and materials have had to be taken to build millions of tons of shipping which should have been available for the construction of tanks and guns. In the face of all this the Admiralty has been relying upon ships of very slow speed, very conspicuous and very vulnerable to torpedo attack. We have replied to the novel forms of attack with the old type of convoy, less well escorted and with hardly any advance at all in speed over the last war. The U-boats and their supporting aircraft have been devising new methods. We have devised very little that is new to protect shipping since the last war and, above all, we have not seen the advantage of speed in merchant ships. Those responsible have been very conservative about new designs and ideas at the time when the situation was so serious that obviously we should have been open to any form of experimentation.

The Prime Minister has recently spoken about the situation at sea. On his return from Casablanca he told us that during the last six months British, Canadian and United States shipbuilding has exceeded all Allied losses by 1,250,000 tons, that we were more than holding our own against the U-boats, and that the rate of sinking the U-boats had steadily improved. He said we should be definitely better off by the end of 1943; but the Prime Minister ascribed that fact to the American shipbuilding programme and not to our own. He also told us that a very large number of escort ships are now building in Great Britain and the United States. On the subject of faster ships the Prime Minister said this: "It is much better to have fast than slow, but speed is a costly luxury." He said that the careful calculations were constantly revised as between fewer fast and more slow ships, and he advised us to leave the matter in the hands of the very capable men who are dealing with the question. But these are the same capable men who, six months ago, scoffed at and discounted any suggestion that we ought to build more escort ships, although in the same speech the Prime Minister said we were now laying the emphasis upon building more escort ships. When I am asked to leave this question in the hands of these capable men, looking at the record I feel a certain amount of apprehension.

Broadly speaking, I would say that these statements of the Prime Minister were really far too optimistic. I have taken the opportunity to read the views held in shipping circles as voiced in their technical and completely non-political journals. I would say that this jubilation is not shared by those, either ashore or afloat, who have to run the ships. They are more apt to dwell on the statement that our losses are very heavy, and that they prolong the war by delaying our operations. The gain in six months has been only 1,250,000 tons. If the "Tirpitz" got out on the Atlantic traffic lanes that gain might be wiped out in one foray. I remember that last autumn we were warned from America that our shipping resources were 12,000,000 tons short of our military requirements alone. Thus, if we have only gained 1,250,000 tons, we are still 10,750,000 tons short of our military requirements, although our military requirements have vastly increased since that estimate came to us from America. These statements, as I say, were very optimistic. But Colonel Knox, Secretary to the American Navy, has had something to say about the matter since the Prime Minister spoke. Colonel Knox said that there is nothing in the situation justifying any sanguine hope of an early end of the U-boat menace, which is still emphatically very grave. Admiral Stark says: You ask me, have we broken the back of the U-boat campaign? The answer is No. I notice that the Chief of the Canadian Naval Staff estimates there is a net gain of ten U-boats per month, while Admiral Land estimates that Germany is building one U-boat per day. In a very famous statement made by an Admiralty representative, we were told that we could safely reckon two U-boats lost for every U-boat claimed as sunk. As we are not told what the claims are it seems a meaningless statement, but, accepting it at its face value, it would be safer to claim two built to every one claimed as lost.

What answer can greater speed make to this serious situation with which we are confronted? A radical change of programme could not show results before the end of 1944. Our problem is in the next six months during which the enemy will probably be making his maximum U-boat effort. Whatever orders we give to-day for any type of ship will hardly affect the situation before the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944. It is the old story of warnings neglected—the way of the Sibylline Books. Everything becomes more expensive and less possible if you neglect the warnings. As it seems to me, this matter of speed is particularly governed by the imperative need for reliable engines which will function without failure. Engines dominate this and every other war situation, as my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook has pointed out upon more than one occasion. I have lots of good ideas sent to me about submarines and tanks and merchant ships and so on, but the people who send them have nearly always forgotten about the engine situation, and when you say "Where are your engines coming from?" they very rarely can tell you. But engines dominate this situation. One other thing that is certain is that the increased speed of the U-boats makes it impossible indeed for us to build any ships fast enough to sail independently. We may be able to do something with ships of fifteen knots, but I do not believe we can embark upon a large programme of eighteen or twenty-knot ships. I very much doubt that. Unless you can have ships of eighteen or twenty knots I think you are running very great risks if you sail them out of convoy. The most it seems to me that we can hope for is fifteen-knot ships, which will have to sail in convoy it is true but which would permit of faster convoys. The essential thing would be to have enough of them to enable them to form a convoy by themselves. Having given them more speed they should not be pulled down by the company of slower ships, otherwise the great effort made in building these faster ships would be lost.

I will not say that speed is an entire solution. Speed will certainly help, but even then your difficulties are not at an end. Convoys would still have to be large for a very long time because of the paucity of escort ships, and the U-boat has an answer in a higher speed and the remarkable system of communication between the U-boat packs and their supporting aircraft and home bases. These things enable the U-boat, having located the convoy, to cut corners, get ahead and lie in wait for the convoy, so that speed may not be the entire solution. Nevertheless, any increase in speed above the present 7½knot convoy will handicap the U-boat. With the 7½knot convoys we have seen the same U-boat, or a U-boat of the same pack, come back suddenly during the passage half across the Atlantic. We had a recent account of thirty-five attacks made by U-boat on a convoy in four days and we only destroyed two of those attacking U-boats. The speed of the escort ships is a very vital factor. The average sloop at the present moment is one of the first ships that gets left behind if a convoy meets with bad weather. This bad weather factor is all-important because so few merchant ships can make their speed if they meet with bad weather. They have to go all out to try to maintain the speed of the convoy, so that they are not manœuvrable and they have nothing in hand.

If we are considering this question it seems to me that it is necessary to ask where does the responsibility lie for deciding types and speeds under the merchant shipbuilding programme? The first thing one finds is that the shipping industry, as such, has never been asked for its views. I have no doubt it has proffered advice, but it has never been asked for its views. That seems to me a ridiculous state of affairs. The ultimate responsibility lies with the Admiralty. I have no doubt the Ministry of War Transport can and does influence the policy, but the responsibility is with the Admiralty. There is a Merchant Shipbuilding Advisory Committee which considers applications for licences to build, but the Admiralty-is the licensing authority. The Committee may advise on what it thinks is possible, or as to the type of ship to be built, but the Admiralty is the licensing authority. On the question whether you are to build fast or slow ships it seems to me the responsibility is beyond even that of the Admiralty, and lies with the War Cabinet. It is essentially the War Cabinet which must decide whether you are to commit yourself to a programme of fast or slow ships. It is a War Cabinet decision because of the priorities which are involved.

The arguments for the fast ships are mainly these. Those who believe in these arguments say that 20 per cent. fewer fast ships than slower are required to transport a given cargo; they say that smaller crews are required, which would lessen the loss of life; that the number of ships and engines to be built would be less; and that the ships would be for shorter periods in the danger zones. They say, too, that if, as is said, the carrying capacity of the faster ship is less, she is more likely to get home safely, and it is better to get a smaller cargo home than to lose a large one. But there is another very important consideration also—namely, that zig-zagging on the part of a slow convoy going 5½ or 6½ knots not only wastes a great deal of time and fuel, but it is very doubtful if it is any protection at all. The fast zig-zagging on the part of the faster ship certainly does afford protection and of course the fast ship is able to keep her speed much better in bad weather—an all-important consideration. Among the arguments against fast ships is this one—that 6o per cent. more labour would be required for building engines and that would be to the detriment of the requirements of the War Office and the Air Ministry. I notice that Admiral Craig-Waller, who has been a great apostle of fast ships, agrees that his proposals for faster ships would, for a time at least, delay output. That is a very grave consideration. Even, supposing other things being equal, we decide that we would like fast ships, can we, in view of the urgent ship situation, afford that delay in order eventually to obtain something better? A fast ship would certainly take longer to build, and would make a much greater call on the marine engineering industry, which is already very heavily strained, because our marine engine position is poor. And not only would there be this cargo space to fill, but fuel consumption would be higher. The President of the North-East Coast Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders has published some very interesting figures on this argument of fast versus slow. I would summarize that in this way. He illustrates his argument by the effect on the engine position. He says that the same firm could build twenty-four engines for 11½-knot ships or ten engines for 15-knot ships, so that in three years you would get fifty-eight slow ships as against twenty-three fast ships.

Assuming a round voyage of 10,000 miles in three years these slow ships would carry over 6,000,000 tons cargo whereas the fast ships would carry over 2,000,000 tons. These figures are remarkable and at first sight would seem to be a very strong argument in favour of the slow ships. But an opposing argument has been put forward which I think is valid. It says that if ten 15-knot ships can be built for sixteen 11-knot ships and if 15-knot convoys only lose ten ships for every sixteen which are lost in 11-knot convoys then the 15-knot standard offers an advantage. That I think is an argument which at any rate requires an answer, because I think we must agree that the possibilities of loss in the fast convoys are less than in the slow convoys.

I agree that the matter is not a simple one, and the balance is very difficult to strike, but no preconceived ideas ought to stand in the way. We want impartial consideration of the problem because the successful prosecution of the war is all that matters. I notice that the Chamber of Shipping are in accord with the demand for the provision of faster cargo ships to the fullest extent that practical considerations permit. The seamen's trade unions hold the same opinion, and Admirals with practical experience of convoys are on the side of faster ships. The first question which emerges is whether the Admiralty are in fact using our shipbuilding resources to give our ships all the speed possible. Are new ideas in engine design and ship construction being utilized? I know that two years ago the Admiralty claimed that equipment and conditions in the shipping industry made it impossible to lay down a fast ship programme, but that was two years ago. What has been done in the interval to adapt the industry to the need? We have had an Admiralty statement on the subject as recently as January this year. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty said that the policy of the Government had been and would be to build the ships which, with the labour and resources available, would give the best results having regard to the needs of providing the requisite number of escort ships. He claimed that the policy of the Admiralty had been consistent since the beginning of the war. That statement may seem very fine on reading it, but if analysed it means nothing. It is simply Dr. Pangloss saying everything is for the best in the best of all possible Admiralties. Your Lordships may remember that in The Heir-at-Law a character remarks, "I have henceforth the privilege of adding to my name the honourable title of A.S.S." The policy may have been consistent, but it may have been consistently wrong.

Everything on land and in the air has had to be speeded up during the war. Has every opportunity been taken to speed up the merchant ship also? America has had the same problem to face and she has improved the hulls and engines of her liberty ships and raised them to a speed of 15 knots. It seems to me our merchant shipping industry has not progressed quite so fast as the aeroplane and motor car industry. I must say that I sympathize with the editor of Siren and Shipping who says: Recent argument seems to have about as much effect on certain Ministries and the Government as a jar of vanishing cream on a wart-hog. A large body of experts advocate larger and faster ships. If these views are right what has been done about it? The First Lord has stated that a large percentage of present shipbuilding consists of fast ships. That is welcome news, but if that is so I cannot quite understand the First Lord's statement about the percentage of losses of fast and slow ships being the same, because if indeed they are the same what is the point of building these fast ships? Why not build slow ships if you lose just as many fast ships as slow ships?

On the argument about losing as many fast ships as slow ships I would point out that you must compare like things with like things. It is no good putting an argument in the form which enables you to answer it to your own satisfaction but to no one else's satisfaction. The question to be considered is, how fast were the fast ships at the time they were sunk? As between fast convoys and slow convoys we know that the balance of safety is much in favour of the fast ships. Again, some ocean routes are far more dangerous than others. Before we accept the statement about losses of fast and slow ships being equal we should know on which routes these shins were being employed, because some routes are far more dangerous than others. There was another statement made on behalf of the Admiralty that to put four knots on to eleven knots would require doubling the size of the engine capacity. There would also be required sixty per cent. more skilled labour in producing the engines if we did replace all the slow ships with fast ships, and it was also said that we should not gain in net imports because it would take longer to build the ships, supplies would be required for larger engines and for increased fuel, and there would be smaller cargo space. Even allowing for a quicker turn round it was said there would be actual loss in relation to the war effort.

That is the Admiralty answer to the argument in favour of the fast ship. It is an argument which should be analysed and answered. One shipping journal observes: The statement as it stands is incorrect and misleading and we are surprised that the expert advisers should have allowed it to be made. We could introduce alternative forms of propulsion which would give an extra four knots with less than double the horse power and with practically no reduction in cargo space or increase in fuel consumption. I have one point to make in passing about this statement made by representatives of the Admiralty concerning the problem of fast ships. These are very intricate and involved questions, very difficult for the layman to handle. This statement made on behalf of the Admiralty should have been very carefully checked by the naval side. I would suggest that it would be far better if such statements were made in the House of Commons rather than on the public platform, because in the House of Commons expert and knowledgeable opinion exists which would be able to analyse them and check them.

In conclusion I would like to say that I feel that the questions to be answered in connexion with this problem are something like these. What speeds do Commodores of convoys report to be desirable, and for how long have they been asking for these speeds? What is the difference in time, from keel-laying to entry into service between the building of 11-knot and 15-knot ships? How much more labour and materials are required for the building of a fast ship than for the building of a slow ship? What are the percentages of fast and slow ships being constructed to-day? We are told that we are building some more fast ships; what are the percentages? It may not be desirable to answer that question here, but at the same time it is an important one. And I will further ask: Can that percentage be increased? The Chairman of the General Council of British Shipping says that he thinks the faster ship is to be preferred, and hopes that it will be possible to make the proportion of faster ships higher still. These are some of the questions that have to be answered.

But what are the factors with which we are confronted when we look at the existing situation? As in the last war up to 1917, the Admiralty have not entirely succeeded in their prime responsibility of protecting our shipping trade in war. In fact, I would say that the U-boat has done far better than it should have been allowed to do. As I have mentioned in my speech, only American shipbuilding got us out of the jam that we have been in because the Admiralty thought in terms of the last war, underrating the U-boat and discounting the air menace. So much was this the case that the Admiralty told shipowners that the slow cargo ship sailing in convoy would get us through the war. That was their attitude at the outbreak of the war. I think that the view of the Admiralty on the air menace was reflected by an inspired article which has been published. In this article it was stated that the question of air attack on shipping at sea did not arise because it would be contrary to the Laws of Prize. Anyone who, after four years' experience of Hitler, thought the Laws of Prize would stop him doing anything to our shipping that he felt inclined to do, must indeed have been living in a fool's paradise.

The Admiralty did not believe in fast ships. They have concentrated on a slow type, of poor internal construction, which has been sunk by hundreds. They have been resistant to new ideas and very resentful of criticism and advice. The very dangerous experiment of sailing 15-knot and 13-knot ships out of convoy has been tried with unfortunate results, and there was a very useless withdrawal, on the outbreak of war, of fast ships for use as armed merchant cruisers. I do not believe they have ever shown any dividends whatever for their use as armed merchant cruisers. They were fast ships of the type we shall require for troop movements. Whatever may be said about our building programme, I very much doubt if any troopships are being built at the present time, although we may be greatly requiring that very fast ship which alone can give 100 per cent. safety to troops. Looking at the record of the last four years, I am compelled to feel that decisions on shipbuilding should not be left entirely in the hands of the Admiralty, but should be entrusted to a body with wider views and more specialized knowledge in various directions. Above all, as I have said, it is absurd not to consult the shipowners. I think that the facts which I have brought forward all strengthen the arguments of those who, like myself, feel that it is necessary to unify the command of the anti-U-boat campaign and to constitute a staff experienced in aspects of the anti-U-boat campaign which obviously are outside the province of the Admiralty or which the Admiralty have not fully considered. I beg to move for Papers.

THE MINISTER OF WAR TRANSPORT (LORD LEATHERS)

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Winster has been very kind to me. He has promised to be very much briefer than he originally intended to be, and in other ways he has been most helpful and lucid. He traversed a good deal of ground which, I think, is somewhat removed from the question on the Paper. While I am very much tempted to answer many of the points he has raised, I feel that I really should not do so in Open Session, and I must accordingly refrain. I must say that I cannot possibly accept a number of the statements made by the noble Lord. But as against that I must say that he has put forward many which have been most helpful. I must, however, confine myself more nearly to the question which forms the Motion.

The noble Lord has raised this point about the speed of merchant ships most opportunely. There have recently been many public statements from one quarter or another which have shown that some of the major factors which govern war-time shipbuilding policy are not fully understood. Furthermore, there was a broadcast from Berlin some ten days ago, which I am glad to have this opportunity of contradicting. This enemy broadcast stated that new construction of merchant ships had practically ceased because British yards were so occupied with repairing damaged vessels. It was also suggested that the discussions in Press and Parliament about the speed of merchant ships were simply put up as a smoke-screen to cover the practical cessation of merchant shipbuilding. The German Intelligence knows as well as I do that these statements are wholly untrue. The real object of the broadcast was to try to sting us into making an official announcement as to the present output of merchant ships, which the Germans would very much like to know, not only for its own sake but because it would give them a very useful indication of the volume of warship construction that was going forward in this country. I am not going to oblige the enemy by giving any figures.

The sole aim of our ship construction policy is to build as quickly as possible those ships which can carry the maximum quantity of cargo with the greatest measure of safety. To reach this end, we have to assess a very nice balance between conflicting considerations to make the best possible use of the shipbuilding and marine engineering capacity of this country for meeting the needs of the war. Within this framework our aim is to produce as many fast vessels as we can without misusing any capacity which is available to us. The decision must always depend on a balance of factors. We must match, not only exactly but according to an exact time-table, our production of hulls and of machinery. Noble Lords will be aware that to increase the speed of a vessel by, say, twenty per cent., involves increasing the cost in man hours of the machinery in a very much greater proportion. We have not got unlimited man-power or unlimited facilities for producing marine engines. This means that to the extent we build faster ships we are bound, also, to build fewer ships. Taking for example the speeds to which the noble Lord has referred, I may say that the period required for building a 15-knot ship is about half as long again as the time needed to build an 11-knot ship of the same cargo-carrying capacity. The faster ship also needs about 5o per cent. more in labour and materials. I might perhaps at this stage answer another of the noble Lord's questions—that which related to the displacement of a 15-knot ship carrying, say, 10,000 tons. Such a ship would have a displacement of about 17,000 tons. High speed is generally necessary, and always desirable, in ship ping for operational moves. For these reasons we build as many fast ships as we can without upsetting the balance of production. Even if we had the engine capacity and built only fast ships, we should waste a great part of our shipbuilding resources.

With the development of the quite extraordinarily impressive shipbuilding effort of the United States, we have been able to agree with them on a joint policy of ship production, whereby in each country the best use is made of the facilities which are available and which can be provided. Our basic policy has been the same since the outbreak of war, but new developments, both in our supply situation and in the enemy's method of attack, have caused this policy steadily to develop from the outset, and the emphasis has gradually changed in favour of an increasing proportion of fast vessels. Ships of high speed are very much harder for the U-boat to torpedo, mainly owing, probably, to the short time which the U-boat has to position herself, so they are able to proceed independently of convoy in many parts of the oceans. On the other hand, when the speed of a ship is below a certain critical figure it becomes safer for her to sail in convoy. This means that there is no advantage in build-Mg faster ships than convoy speeds allow, unless their speed is so great as to enable them, to run independently. The output of ships of the latter type is limited, as I have said, by the extent of our marine engineering capacity, and it is also limited by the size of the shipbuilding berths available. We have now greatly developed our marine engineering establishments, and supplemented them by engineering capacity normally devoted to other purposes—for example, the manufacture of turbo-electric machinery. Of the oceangoing vessels now on order and under construction in this country, about one-third are in the high-speed category. These faster vessels are mainly of the large cargo-liner type, though an increasing number in the future will be tankers.

In order to achieve maximum output by saving time, labour and materials in every possible respect, we have dispensed with many peace-time accessories which, though desirable in normal times, could now be regarded only as luxuries. We are developing welding and other technical improvements, and there is no doubt at all as to the very high all-round efficiency of our shipyards. While we have cut out many items, we have had to add a number of other items which are not usually required for peaceful trading. We are now fitting our ships, for example, with much more powerful cranes and derricks to enable them to handle abnormal lifts, such as tanks. We are allowing more water-ballast capacity, and fitting more elaborate life-saving appliances; and, on top of this, there is, of course, always the ship's defensive equipment.

As your Lordships are aware, the construction of merchant ships is the responsibility of the Admiralty, but the types of merchant ships to be built are settled by my Department, in the light of the Admiralty's advice as to defensive needs and the availability of suitable capacity for building the hulls and machinery. The two Departments work very closely together, with much give and take of ideas and most satisfactory pooling of experience. The noble Lord has referred to the shipping industry and said that it ought to be consulted in the matter of deciding what types and speeds of ships should be built. I should point out that the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee, which does this very job, is composed of many leading and experienced shipowners, men who are completely representative of the shipping industry.

LORD WINSTER

The industry as an industry has not put its views forward, or been invited to put its views forward. I agree that its representatives serve on this Committee, but as an industry it has not been consulted.

LORD LEATHERS

Perhaps I should just say there that my Ministry has supporting it, as members of the Ministry in positions of all kinds, a very large number of members of the shipping community. Perhaps that is not so in any other Ministry. We are surrounded, therefore, by the practical shipowners of this country, and they are all making their contribution. We have also the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee, and representatives of the shipping industry are permanent members of that Committee.

I am fully satisfied, and I hope that your Lordships will also be satisfied, that we are utilizing the shipbuilding berths and marine engineering capacity of this country to the very utmost, and are building the ships which are most urgently required for war purposes. It has been said in the Press and elsewhere that we at times, at any rate, have been led by the industry to build ships which have in view not so much war-time needs as the post-war position. I can assure your Lordships that, although members of the shipping community contribute so much to the advice given on the Advisory Committee regarding the building of ships, not one of them has sought, and not one of them would be permitted, to decide on the construction of a ship which had regard to post-war conditions and did not fulfil war-time needs.

Low) STRABOLGI

My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves this subject altogether, there is one point which I should like him to make clear. Did I understand him to say that he was not prepared to give the output of merchant shipbuilding? If so, I venture to remind your Lordships that that is rather a new departure. We have had statements in this war, and certainly we had them in the last war, about the global output from the shipyards, and our American Allies are giving full details, quarter by quarter, about the output of their shipyards. What is the objection to giving that information?

LORD LEATHERS

My Lords, I do not think I said that in so many words, but it is obvious from the broadcasts from Germany that they would like to know more than we have yet told them about our merchant shipbuilding, not perhaps in order to know more about our merchant shipbuilding, but in order to be able to make deductions from that information as to what the warship construction in this country is. They could do that quite well, I think, if they had detailed information about our shipbuilding programmes; and, since they have endeavoured to draw us on this subject by making the foolish statement that all our shipbuilding yards are engaged on nothing but the repair of damaged ships, I do not propose to give further details now of the shipbuilding position.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, I am very grateful indeed to the noble Lord for the reply which he has been kind enough to make. It is, of course, a very closely-packed, factual reply, which one will have to read and consider before being able to answer all the points made. I gather from the noble Lord's remarks that we shall continue to build the 11¼knot "Liberty" type ship. If that is so, the speed of the convoys in which those ships sail will be some 7½ knots, and in bad weather will probably fall considerably below that. If that is so, and if we continue to build that type of ship, we shall be condemned to have these very slow convoys, which have met with considerable misfortune from time to time.

LORD LEATHERS

My Lords, the "Liberty" type ship is not built in this country at all; it is the "Empire" type which is built here. While I do not think that it is wise to give precisely the speeds, they would be in the neighbourhood of that which was mentioned, and a little more; but that does not mean that these ships must travel in convoys having a speed of 7½to 8½ knots; they will be capable of going in faster convoys. The "Liberty" ship, built on the other side of the Atlantic, also has a speed of that order, but will be able to do more than the convoy speed to which my noble friend has just referred.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, I am aware that in the American "Liberty" programme the speed is being stepped up. I was only anxious to establish the point that, looking into the future, we shall be building a type of ship—not a fast ship, but a faster ship—which will not be condemned to these slow speeds in a convoy of 5¼ to 6 knots in bad weather, and which provide an easy target for the U-boat. I was particularly interested to hear that the Ministry of War Transport have more say and more voice in the matter of what ships should be built than I have known to be the case, and I feel that that is very satisfactory. But, while I quite realize that important members of the shipping industry have every possibility of making their views and opinions known to the Minister and to the Admiralty, I am still under the impression that the industry as an industry has not been invited to put its views forward on the general question. There is, of course, a considerable difference between giving your views as an individual to the Minister inside his Ministry and what you may say as a member of the industry putting forward certain views on behalf of the industry. But I have no doubt the industry will note what has been said to-day and we shall hear if it is satisfied with that state of affairs.

Whilst most anxious not to detain your Lordships, I feel there is one word I must say which arises out of the noble Lord's saying that owners were not pressing their personal or industrial interests with regard to what ships should be built. I agree that that is so, and I had intended to refer to that in my speech, but I was trying to save time. I think it is very necessary to emphasize that the industry has really no say in the Admiralty shipbuilding policy, and shipowners can say or do nothing about ships built on Government account. Shipowners who get a licence to build a ship can only build the type of ship which the Admiralty says they are to build. Therefore when it is argued that shipowners are governed by personal considerations as regards the type of ship being built, I cannot see on what foundation that argument rests. While I am always quite ready to join issue about matters of this kind, I do not believe in joining issue upon what I believe to be a false basis, and I am very happy to agree with what the noble Lord said in that respect. I will only thank the noble Lord again very sincerely for his answer, and beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.