Lords Sitting of 14 July 1943

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE) (Lord Cecil): My Lords, I beg to move that the sitting of the House to consider the Motion of the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, be in Secret Session. I should tell the House that, in accordance with the assurance that I gave to your Lordships, I have consulted the War Cabinet on the matter of this Motion, and they are firmly convinced that it could not possibly be taken in public.
Moved, That the sitting of the House to consider the Motion of the Earl of Mansfield be in Secret Session.—(Viscount Cranborne.)
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, if that is the view of the War Cabinet, of course, no exception can be taken to it. But I must say that I feel regret that we should have once again a Secret Session, particularly in view of the fact that at most of the Secret Sessions that I have attended nothing has been said in the course of the debate which could not well have been proclaimed from the housetops.
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

GLOUCESTER GAS ORDER, 1943.
PORT TALBOT GAS ORDER, 1943.
GAINSBOROUGH GAS ORDER, 1943.
WANDSWORTH AND DISTRICT GAS ORDER, 1943.
LORD TEMPLEMORE: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands in my name on the Paper.
Moved, That the Special Orders as reported from the Special Orders Committee yesterday be approved.—(Lord Templemore.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932:
URBAN DISTRICT OF ELLESMERE PORT ORDER.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE EARL OF MUNSTER): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands in my name on the Paper.
Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department under the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, and laid before the House yesterday, be approved.—(The Earl of Munster.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

MARRIAGES PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
Order of the day, for the House to be put into Committee on re-commitment of the Bill, read.
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Earl of Munster.)
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, on this Bill there is a point I would like to raise, but the Home Office have asked me to defer it until the Third Reading.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly: Bill reported without amendment.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROV ISIONAL ORDER (BUCKS WATER BOARD) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROV ISIONAL ORDER (CHILTERN HILLS SPRING WATER) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.

FORTH-CLYDE CANAL.
LORD TEVIOT LORD TEVIOT had given Notice that he would call attention to the advisability of constructing a great ship canal between the Clyde and the Firth of Forth; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I am indebted to my noble friend Lord Brabazon for putting an idea in my head. If your Lordships will recollect, he produced a scheme some months ago, so to speak, out of the pigeon-hole. I refer to the harnessing of the Severn tide. It occurred to me that in these days of planning it might be just as well to have a look round and see whether there were not some concrete plans which had been, so to speak, set aside; and that brought to my mind the question of the canal from east to west, or from west to east, whichever way one likes to look at it, of that narrow bit of Scotland between the Clyde and the Forth.
There is no doubt that this is a very big subject. It is one which has received a great deal of consideration in the past, but I am bringing it before your Lordships now in view of the fact that it has not been considered since 1930. As we well know, there have been events of great importance since that date which have quite altered what might have been the ideas of those days. Another reason why I am bringing the matter forward is that the Hydro-Electric Development (Scotland) Bill, which is now before Parliament, is going to mean that an immense amount of power will be available not far from the site of this canal. I am one of those who believe that, if this canal is built, industries will spring up contiguous to it because of several things. First of all, we have a very large population quite close; there is a great deal of coal; and, if the canal is built, a great deal of oil will be stored there. There are other raw materials of importance which, in my view, should induce great industries to set themselves up, as they will then be in the position of getting their raw materials by the cheapest possible method of transport —namely, water.
I am not asking for a definite decision to-day. All I ask is that the Government shall take into consideration this debate, and whether or not this scheme, which has not been looked upon with favour in the past, may not be now carried out. I have read a great deal about this scheme. There seems to have been such violent
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criticism of it from some quarters that I feel that the criticism must in some way come from those who are prejudiced. It is curious, in looking up the criticism of other canals, such as the Suez Canal, the Kiel Canal, the Manchester Canal, and the Panama Canal, that there has been this very strong criticism against building them—such criticisms as the "sea bubble," "it will never pay," and, in regard to the Manchester Canal, "it will reduce to beggary 800,000 people." All these prophecies have been wrong. Some of these canals, like the Manchester one, have ended in a cul-de-sac with an outlet only at one end. For that reason alone this Forth and Clyde Canal deserves further consideration.
This is not a new idea. It was first mooted, as no doubt many of your Lordships know, in the days of Charles II. When we come to modern days, with this great competition between countries, between trade and commerce, if we can by any means lessen the cost of transport, surely it is going to be of very great benefit to the country generally. Larger cargoes mean lower freights. And there is another point. This, in my view, will be a world service. Criticism has been made, I know, that you will never get an Atlantic ship coming into Glasgow to use the canal, that she will go either north or south in order to get to Western Europe. I somehow or other cannot believe that. I know there is the question of vulnerability from the bombing point of view. The Germans were at El Alamein, a very short distance from the Suez Canal, and although they tried to bomb it—and I believe on some occasions did bomb it— it did not make the slightest difference. Traffic may have been delayed a little, but it did not stop the materials or the stores going through the Suez Canal to our troops fighting in North Africa.
I am not in a position—there are noble Lords who are in a position—to express an opinion from the naval point of view. It seems to me that, when our eastern ports are so vulnerable from the point of view of repairing our battleships, it would have been a magnificent thing if we had had this canal, in the last two years particularly and indeed in the last two wars. Owing to the anti-aircraft defences, a bomber which has to fly across land has a very difficult job if it. is going to bomb a repair works on the west coast, while this tip-and-run business on the east coast

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seems to me a thing we have to think about. But I will leave that question to those who know far more about it than I do. That is just a layman's opinion. Then there is the danger, particularly in war-time, to a ship wishing to get to the west or to the east, to the North Sea or to the Atlantic. Imagine the dangers at the moment for such a ship of going through the Channel or through the Pent-land Firth. There must be danger due to submarines, whereas if there were a canal in existence the ship could quietly go through it and would be quite safe while passing from west to east or in the opposite direction.
Then there is the question of the saving of time and distance. In regard to this I will give your Lordships one or two illustrations that I have received from a reliable source. For instance, a ship which in the ordinary way went from Leith to Belfast seventeen times in a year would be able, if she used the canal, to go more than twenty-three times. I will not give the fractions. Then if a ship went from Leith to Glasgow, instead of sixteen times it could go twenty-five times; from Glasgow to Amsterdam, eighteen times instead of fourteen times; from Liverpool to Hamburg, fifteen times instead of thirteen times; from Liverpool to Copenhagen, fifteen times instead of fourteen times; from the Tyne to St. Lawrence, seven times instead of six times. Nobody knows better than my noble friend who is to reply how important it is for a ship to be working as hard as she can, and it seems to me for that reason that from the mercantile point of view this canal would help very much. If one draws a line from Bergen to Antwerp, I believe there used to be a great deal of coastal shipping coming from there to these shores, and the canal would be very useful to such shipping. Our own coastal shipping and those ships coming from the west of Europe could go through the canal to the large ports on the west coast.
This is a great national question. As I have said it has been thought of and discussed for many years. There are exhaustive reports by the most highly qualified engineers on the subject. One is bound to find that an enterprise of this sort will not suit somebody. I am not going to mention names, but it is peculiar that certain places have always been against this project, and quite obviously
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they are against it because they think that it is going to injure their past record of prosperity. I cannot see that anyone is justified in being influenced by any consideration such as that. We have to look at this question and all questions in the future in a national way and in an international way. There is one thing I cannot quite believe. Can your Lordships, for example, imagine a ship arriving at Leith and wanting to go west, not naturally wishing to use the canal in doing so? And, vice versa, would not a ship which had got to Glasgow and was going east prefer to use the canal rather than go round by the north or the south, and thereby greatly shorten the time she would take? That would be particularly so if the vessel wished to refuel. I can see characteristics in that part of the world being quite altered owing to the facilities which this canal would give.
There is no difficulty whatever in building it. There is no question about that, particularly in regard to the short route which would have no locks, and would have sea gates at each end. Let us visualize for a moment the question in bad weather. In winter a captain arriving in the vicinity and asking himself: "Shall we go round through the British Channel or through the Pentland Firth with the possibility of there being a thick fog at either place, or shall we just pop through the canal?" would almost certainly choose the last-named course because the inducement to use the canal would be so great. Then as regards our fishing fleet, I can see no reason why it should not use the canal, and I would suggest that special dues might be allowed the fishing fleet to do so.
I come now to what has always been in every Scotsman's mind, the question of the drift south. This project would mean the employment of a tremendous number of people at probably a very difficult time for ourselves, soon after the war. By its means large numbers of men would find permanent employment if some people are right in thinking (and I believe them to be right), that new ventures would be started on the banks of the canal. It would also have this effect, I think. At the present time we have terrible centralization. We do not want to increase the size of the big towns which in all conscience are already big

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enough. We want to decentralize trade and commerce throughout our island. That being so, the cutting of this canal and the development of the hydro-electric scheme might relieve very much the congestion in the big towns in the south. Here you would have, I hope and believe, a new centre of industry which would not only relieve that congestion, but also relieve the congestion of the labour market. Turning for a moment to the question of land values, there would undoubtedly be an increase in the value of land contiguous to the canal, and it is quite justified that we should take notice of that. After allowing the owners of the land a reasonable amount, the rest of the increase should go either to the Canal Corporation or, if the Government built it, to the Government, so that the increase in land values would accrue to the benefit of the whole scheme.
Some of the criticisms which I have read in the past are not applicable in any way, I think, to the present day. No doubt many of your Lordships have been surprised when going to a place which you had not visited lately to see tremendous upheavals due to mechanical diggers and other modern methods of altering the face of the earth. As I have said, criticism of this scheme has been very violent, but curiously enough the critics have never given any thought-out or real reason for their objection. I hope His Majesty's Government will take serious notice of this question and will not be influenced by people who just say things without giving good and sound fundamental reasons for them.
I come lastly to the question of cost. The canal will cost a lot of money, but looking at some of the magnificent modern machines which are working in all parts of the country on excavation, and remembering that the canal will be only roughly thirty miles long, I think that with modern machines the work can be done at far less cost than would have been the case, say, ten or fifteen years ago. That, however, is a matter for the engineers. They know far more about that than I do. The question of upkeep has to be considered, but in the light of modern machinery I think that would be much easier and less expensive than in the past. I leave the question of cost to
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the engineers and others who have studied the matter for so long. I have put this matter before your Lordships in a very general way. There is an immense amount of evidence on this subject and, having read all I can get hold of in the last few weeks, I have come to the conclusion that the reasons for the canal are very much stronger than the reasons against it. I make an appeal to my noble friend that this matter shall have the very serious consideration of the Government for the reasons which I have stated in a general way. I beg to move.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: My Lords, I promised the noble Lord who raised this Motion that I would say a few words in support. I do not want to repeat all the very excellent arguments that he adduced, but I do think there is a very great deal in what he said. We in Scotland should take advantage of the peculiar geographical accident that Scotland has a very thin waist. We have seen canals built all over the world, in the British Empire and in America, France and Belgium and even in England, where geographical reasons were less strong than in the case of this particular canal; but I suggest that we should begin by getting canals working at home before we think of building canals in other parts of the Empire or other parts of the world. I can remember well that many years ago my father was Chairman of a Commission or Committee which sat to consider the question of cutting a canal from the Forth to the Clyde. It is a long time ago, but I remember his telling me about it. Nothing happened at that time, but I think it is very useful that the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, should revive a project which I believe would be a very fine piece of work after the war.
Excellent reasons were advanced, as I have said, by my noble friend, and although as compared with the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal or other great canals, it is a small project, none the less it would be of tremendous advantage in proportion to the cost. I consider that the advantages of this canal are both great and solid. It would greatly reduce the distance, as your Lordships have already been told, between many ports. I do not think my noble friend actually mentioned those ports, but there would be a great shortening of the distance from Leith, the port

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of Edinburgh, to Montreal and New York, or to Belfast, Liverpool or Dublin. There would be a similar shortening of distance between Glasgow and Aberdeen, Glasgow and Dundee, Glasgow and Newcastle, and Glasgow and Hull. Not merely would distance be saved, but as the noble Lord pointed out the very dangerous crossing, which I know well, of the Pentland Firth—I do not suppose many of your Lordships have passed through it without being seasick unless you are very good sailors—would be eliminated as far as the vast bulk of our shipping is concerned. Ships would either go through the canal or through the English Channel, thus avoiding the dangerous tide rips and the fog and every kind of pestilential weather experienced during nine months of the year in the Pentland Firth. The construction of the canal would bring also a vast economy of time and coal for all shipping on these routes.
At this moment when we are hoping that the development of hydro-electric power in Scotland will benefit the population, I cannot help thinking that this scheme will be just as great a benefit, if not indeed a greater benefit, for the population of the Highlands in the employment it will give. That is why I think the noble Lord was right to urge the project to-day. No better scheme than this could be presented after the war at a moment when we start looking round for work that is really both useful and economic to give to the vast numbers of men who will be coming back from the front and wanting employment of that kind. Quite apart from that if these two large Firths could be connected in this way it would, to my mind, be of enormous benefit to the internal economy of Scotland as a whole. I understand the whole route has already been carefuly studied by experts and an interesting and detailed report has been prepared by them. When you think of the vast network of canals that has been profitably built throughout France—one from Paris to Marseilles has just been finished, I believe, and many others have been constructed—one realizes that here is something at our very doors that should definitely be undertaken by the Government.
In the first place, His Majesty's Government should undoubtedly have a survey, a proper and official survey, for the Mid-Scotland Ship Canal, and should have an estimate of the cost prepared.
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The Manchester Ship Canal, as your Lordships will remember, brought untold millions into the Bridgewater family. No doubt your Lordships have read about it in that interesting book about the Duke of Bridgewater and know what he had to do with shipping and canals in the Manchester district. The Manchester Canal was an enormously profitable undertaking, chiefly owing to the amount of coal it moved about in the clays when railways were only starting. Now that canal is thirty-five miles long. This projected Scottish canal which we are discussing to-day will be only twenty-nine miles long I cannot help thinking that there is no reason why this canal should not be just as profitable as, or even more profitable than, the Manchester Canal. Finally, I consider this a more useful scheme for Scotland than any other which we can think of at the moment. It would be fully as useful as the hydroelectric scheme about which the Secretary of State for Scotland is so enthusiastic. I hope, therefore, that your Lordships will consider it and press it, and will see, if the answer which is given to-day is not satisfactory, that the matter is raised again. I believe that this scheme is something that would be of real benefit not only to Scotland as a nation but to the people of Scotland throughout the length and breadth of the land, both in the Highlands and in the Lowlands.
THE EARL OF GLASGOW: My Lords, in the year 1908 the question of the construction of a Forth and Clyde Ship Canal was very much in the forefront. The two lines of country along which the canal route would run were the same then as they are now, but the forty-mile sealevel route via Loch Lomond and Alloa was favoured then as being the least expensive. To-day opinion appears to be that the canal should run from Old Kilpatrick on the Clyde to Grangemouth on the Forth a distance of twenty-nine miles, and that it should be at sea-level, which of course will cost a very large sum, something like £50,000,000. This would be a great deal of money compared with the cost of a lock canal along this route, which was the idea in 1908, or compared with the sea-level Loch Lomond route. But if money were no object a sealevel canal by the short route would certainly be the better proposition.

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I cannot understand why this project was not taken in hand many years ago. What a relief the construction of such a canal would have been to Scotland in the bad old days of unemployment, if, of course, regulations had been made to prevent an influx of Irish labourers. Certainly the experience of the last war showed that a waterway of this kind was necessary. But nothing was done. Presumably the country was lulled to sleep by the perspicuity of our politicians who told our people that wars and preparations for wars were over and that rearmament was unnecessary. The strategic necessity of the canal for the Navy is important, and it must be so obvious to the Government and to your Lordships that it is needless for me to say anything about it. But what is more important is its usefulness to the Mercantile Marine of all nations, since one hopes that the world will enjoy a long period of peace after this war is over.
We should find out beforehand, I think, whether or not it would be largely used by these ships, especially as the greater the number of ships sailing through this expensive waterway, the less heavy would be the burden on the taxpayers. I hope to be able to throw some light on this. In 1908 I was very interested in the question of a Scottish Ship Canal, and, as a serving lieutenant, I wrote the only article which I have ever written for a magazine, which, to my surprise, was accepted. I got into considerable trouble with my captain because in those days serving officers were not allowed to write for the Press or for magazines. But he was a very kind man and he smoothed matters over for me at the Admiralty. I had a question asked in another place as to the number of ships from ports in the Baltic, Denmark and Germany, which entered the ports of Glasgow and the Clyde, Belfast, Dublin, Liverpool and Manchester in the year 1906. Unfortunately, I have not been able to look up the answer which I received, but I remember that the number of ships, many of them carrying timber, was astonishing; and after inquiries from shipowners I came to the conclusion that most of them would make use of the canal if the dues were moderate.
If one looks on the United Kingdom as a great barrier stretched across the route for ships sailing "between ports in America and Canada and the Baltic, Denmark and Germany, it is apparent that the point for
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it to be pierced must be the Clyde which is on the shortest route by great circle sailing. After getting the opinion of a large number of shipping lines in 1908, I was certain in my own mind that a canal constructed at one-third of the cost of the present sealevel project, and administered, as it might have been, partly by private enterprise would, in time, have been a paying proposition. Even allowing for less favourable conditions after this war than in 1908, it is probable that the burden on the taxpayers may not be as heavy as one would naturally expect from a Government-run concern, although the taxpayers would probably have to pay a great part of the interest on the £50,000,000.
I have looked up the Report of the Royal Commission on Canals and Waterways of 1909. The proposition was then to construct a lock canal from Yoker on the Clyde to Grangemouth on the Forth at a total cost of £23,000,000, the cost of excavating being £17,000,000. The policy put forward was that the Government should guarantee to the Forth and Clyde National Association 3 per cent. on £20,000,000 after the canal was opened and pay interest on capital during construction. The alternative to this was for the Government to take over the undertaking themselves. The present proposal is, as I have said, very costly, but there are good reasons why it should be carried out. Apart from the strategic value of this ship canal to the Navy and its certain use by foreign ships, including a number of great passenger lines, our own coasting trade would make good use of it. There is a considerable trade between Aberdeen and Glasgow at the present time, partly by rail and partly by sea, and, if the canal was available, the shipping trade between Aberdeen and Glasgow would greatly increase. In 1908 there was a large coastwise trade between Glasgow and London, and that still continues. With a canal linking Glasgow and the Forth, ships would prefer the east coast route, because it would mean a saving of time as compared with going round Lands End, and it would pay them to use it, especially if they could get cargoes en route. In 1908 it was calculated that if a 5,000-ton coal ship going from the Forth to Glasgow could use the canal, instead of going north about, it would mean a saving of 100 tons of coal. Another witness before the Commission pointed out that after the Forth

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and Clyde barge canal was completed it had the effect of attracting many industries, and made the industrial belt of Scotland still more industrial. With a great ship canal, one would expect still more industries to come into that part of the world.
I am sorry to give your Lordships so many instances dating from thirty-five years ago, but, after all, the position will not be so very different after this war, and this canal, in my opinion, is even more necessary now than it was then. Even if it is not possible to start the work now, I hope that the Government will see their way to adopt the proposal immediately as a war emergency measure. By exercising their powers now they will save considerable delay, for otherwise after the war it will be necessary to introduce a Bill, which would be a long business. I hope that the noble Lord who is to reply will not give us the usual assurance that the project will be examined as part of postwar planning, but will tell your Lordships that work will be started on this important national scheme as soon as labour is available. I realize that, generally speaking, it is difficult for the Government to give an assurance of that kind, because anything might happen after the; war, but in this case I venture to think that the Government could make a promise acceptable to my noble friend Lord Teviot.
For one thing, there would be no opposition from the Party of the noble Lords on my right. This project is one after their own hearts. It will be tremendously costly, and the money will be found by the taxpayer and not by private enterprise. It will have to be run by the Government, or by a Government Corporation. Over and above that, its construction will give employment to great numbers of people. All this should be agreeable to noble Lords on my right and to the Party which they represent, and should make it easy for the noble Lord who is to reply to give us an assurance on this matter. I am glad that my noble friend has put this Motion down. I have mentioned the naval point of view, but I do not advocate this canal entirely from strategic considerations, from the point of view of preparing for another war. We must think of this matter also as a
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great peace-time project, which will be of service to our Mercantile Marine and carrying trade, and therefore to the country.
THE DUKE OF MONTROSE: My Lords, I hope I may be allowed to intervene to make a few remarks on this subject, perhaps not altogether in harmony with the chorus of approval in favour of this project. I have studied the question of a Forth and Clyde Canal for about thirty years, and not without reason. As your Lordships will probably have gathered, there are more routes than one which have been proposed for the canal, and one of those routes runs, for a very large proportion of its constructional area, right through the middle of my estate. I first began to take an interest in this matter about the year 1909, when the chief protagonist in favour of the canal was a very distinguished admiral, the late Admiral Sir Charles Campbell. He sponsored the formation of an association called the Forth and Clyde Canal Association. He got behind him seven other admirals almost as distinguished as himself, and in reserve he had behind the admirals seven generals, almost of the same calibre as the admirals. Behind the generals he had a great galaxy of valour and talent from the two Houses of Parliament, and not least from your Lordships' House. With the temerity of youth, I entered the lists and opposed the gallant admiral on platforms and in the Press. With the coming of mature years, I am still unrepentant, and I am ready to oppose this scheme again.
It has been put forward on several grounds. First of all, it might be a help to the Navy; secondly, it might be a good commercial investment; thirdly, it would provide work for the unemployed. I was surprised to find so much sympathy given to the Yoker route for this canal. The route generally favoured is that the canal should go via Loch Lomond. I know every mile of both routes intimately. In 1919, both these canal projects were carefully investigated on behalf of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce by the great firm of Armstrong Whitworths, and after going into all the routes—the first route via Loch Lomond and then into Loch Long, and another route into Loch Lomond and down the river to Dumbarton, as well as the Yoker route—they came to the conclusion that the Yoker valley scheme

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should be scrapped. It was more difficult to construct than the Loch Lomond route, and it was very much more costly. They said that it would cost half as much again, even taking into account the use of all the latest machinery. In any case they came to the conclusion that the cost of constructing a Forth and Clyde Canal would make it the second most costly canal in the world. Even at that time it would have cost £826,000 per constructional mile, and by the Yoker route it would cost 50 per cent. more. The total cost, they said, would be £33,000,000 via Loch Lomond and £49,000,000 by the Yoker route. That was in 1919; wages have advanced a great deal since then, and I think it would cost £59,000,000 or £60,000,000 to-day.
That is a prodigious sum, and that is merely for the construction of the canal. If merchandise is to be loaded along its route, it will be necessary to construct loading basins, which will add greatly to the cost of the canal. If the Yoker route is used, there will be opposition from almost all the dock authorities on the Clyde and the Forth, because they have gone to vast expense in providing railways for the transit of goods from the Yoker valley either to the Clyde or to the Forth for shipment, and, if those goods can be loaded in the ships along the course of the canal, these new docks will lose an enormous amount of revenue. I think there is no doubt that the Yoker route will prove far and away the most costly and unsuitable.
From the point of view of the Navy, when Admiral Campbell and his association started their campaign they had the idea that this canal might be of strategic value to the Navy; it might so happen that you would find the British Navy on one side of Great Britain and the enemy's Navy on the other. That presupposes very grave faults in our naval intelligence. Such a thing might have happened in the days of Nelson when the Navy was under sail. But that was before the days of wireless and before the days of aerial reconnaisance. Such a thing would be impossible to-day, and we have the evidence of the last war and the present when the enemy fleet was bottled up in harbour by our Fleet from the first day of the war. I still believe in the old Masonic motto that the frontier of
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England is on the enemy's coastline. If that is the case, then this canal, from the point of view of the Navy, is useless. Admiral Campbell and the powerful body supporting him pressed so hard that the Admiralty actually appointed a Committee to investigate it. Mr. Haldane, or the late Lord Haldane as we would know him, one of the most able men who ever adorned your Lordships' House, was the Chairman of that Committee.
He went into this question, and he was asked in another place what was the report of the expert committee on this canal from the point of view of the Navy. This is what he said in reply:
"The expenditure necessary to make this canal of any use would be enormously out of proportion to the value to be got from it. There was no prospect whatever of its paying as a commercial concern more than would provide for its upkeep. They were not anywhere near providing for interest on the capital. The conclusion was clear that the money would be enormously better spent in other directions, and this is the conclusion come to by the most distinguished Admiralty experts who examined the matter."
What can be said about this canal from the naval point of view when you get the most distinguished experts condemning it like that, and saying that the money would be enormously better spent in other directions? I believe it would. Then what advantage would the canal be to our commerce? The vast majority of our commerce to-day sails from the southern and western ports of Great Britain—from the Thames, from Southampton, from Plymouth, from Bristol, from Liverpool and from the Clyde. But ships leaving those ports would never use the canal. As for the east coast trade, that is mostly timber, coal and corn—trade with the Scandinavian ports and the Baltic. The ships leaving our east coast and trading with ports on the Continent, in the Baltic and in Scandinavia would never use the canal at all; so we may take it that a very large proportion of British shipping would never make any use of the canal, by whichever route it went.
And I must say that when you come to consider the cost of this canal, you find it is enormous. The Suez Canal is the cheapest canal that has ever been made. It cost £290,000 per mile. That was a canal made through an open desert area. There were no great industrial places to bypass, or factories to destroy, no telegraph lines or railway

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lines to interfere with; it was a straight operation through the desert, made with the cheapest labour, and it cost £290,000 per mile. Twenty-four years later we built the Manchester Canal, and that cost £428,000 per mile. Later there came the Panama Canal, which cost £1,500,000 per mile. Each time, as the years went by, canal construction became more costly, and there is no shadow of doubt that this canal that we are now considering would be the most costly of all, except the Panama Canal.
And now what about the canal as a source of employment for the unemployed? But are we going to have any unemployed after the war? I thought we had been talking about the Beveridge Plan as a guarantee or security against unemployment. We are to have £107,000,000 spent to provide subsistence for men attending training centres to train for industry. Are we going to have another £50,000,000 or £60,000,000 spent on digging a canal as an alternative training for industry with pick and shovel? If so, I do not think the Beveridge Plan will be so popular. I cannot conceive that it is right to make this canal solely from the point of view of providing employment. Of all labour in the world, unemployed labour is the most expensive, the most inefficient and the most wasteful. We had an idea in Glasgow of employing the unemployed on a public undertaking at a place called Palace Rigg, and it was not very long before Palace Rigg became a byword for discontent, waste and inefficiency. In London we had the same idea of employing the unemployed on public work, and they were employed in the parks, on open spaces and in gardens. At the end of the year the L.C.C. had spent £59,000 in wages, and the assessed value of the work was £7,800. You can imagine the appalling waste and inefficiency there would be when you had 24,000 men supposed to be working on this canal simply for the sake of unemployment. I think I can say that the prospects are exceedingly unpromising for this canal, by whatever route it goes, and the Yoker route is by a long way the most expensive; while from the point of view of the Navy, as a commercial undertaking, and from the point of view of unemployment I oppose it.
THE EARL OF ELGIN AND KINCARDINE: My Lords, I shall not stand long
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between your Lordships and the noble Lord who will reply for the Government, but as the eastern entrance of this proposed canal would be visible from my own bedroom window, it is probably appropriate that I should say something about it. Hitherto my energies have been devoted mainly to bridging and getting across watercourses in order to provide transport facilities for getting north and south in Scotland, and I must confess to having given more individual attention to those schemes than to this particular scheme which will create a new obstacle to such traffic. But undoubtedly there is in this project something which deserves very careful attention, and for that reason I was glad that the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, thought fit to place it on the Order Paper. I confess I had some anxiety when the noble Earl, Lord Glasgow, carried the thing rather further and pressed for this to be undertaken immediately, because the Government could undertake it during the war with greater facility than if we waited till peace-time.
THE EARL OF GLASGOW: I did not say it should be undertaken immediately. I said it should be put on the Statute Book, that legislation under war-time emergency powers should be passed so that there would not be any delay after the war in getting a Bill through.
THE EARL OF ELGIN AND KINCARDINE: That is the whole argument. The argument is to make use of the emergency powers given to the Government during the war to force through certain projects, whether they are digested or not. As most of your Lordships will have realized, particularly from the vigorous speech made by the noble Duke (the Duke of Montrose), this project has not been fully digested, and certainly could not be accepted unanimously as the verdict of Scotland. We have been talking of different routes. There is no cohesion of opinion as to which of these routes should be adopted. On principle, there is a great deal to be said for asking the Government to take the matter into careful consideration rather on the lines of Lord Nathan's Motion which appears later on the Order Paper—that the Government should consider these projects of postwar reconstruction and give them the proper priorities. That seems to me the place which this particular scheme should have now.

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We have had various points brought before us which emphasize this. The noble Duke, the Duke of Sutherland, pressed for the scheme because it would be a great help to the interior economy of Scotland. Personally I cannot think of anything that could upset the interior economy of Scotland more than driving a great ship canal right through the heart of its industrial belt, involving the necessity of a bridge across the Forth as well as a number of bridges across the canal if the road and rail transport of the country was to be allowed to continue. It therefore involves very large problems in addition to the problem of its construction. For all that, I again say that it is a scheme which should receive careful consideration from the point of view that a canal so situated, driving through the centre of Scotland, would not only provide a seaway from one coast to the other, but would provide on the banks of that canal the possibility of trading estates which might be of tremendous value not only to Scotland but to the country in general.
As to the usefulness in a small way of having a canal through central Scotland, I may give your Lordships an illustration; the fact that the two ferry boats constructed for the Queensferry passage, in 1928 or 1930, had to proceed from Dumbarton to Queensferry via the Pentland Firth, and one of them had a very rough passage. Again, when we are talking of a canal through central Scotland we are discussing, as I see it—certainly if it is to be of use to the Navy—a canal which will take the biggest ocean-going ships. That is a very different thing from the canal instanced by the noble Duke, the Duke of Sutherland, when speaking of the waterways of France and Belgium. If your Lordships agree that this is a matter of importance and that the Government's attention should be drawn to it, then on the lines of Lord Nathan's Motion it should be put in its proper priority.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, very briefly I desire to support this Motion and to ask your Lordships to consider particularly the temperate and measured speech of the noble Earl who has just spoken. Whether the great cost this great project would entail would really be justified is a matter to be investigated, but surely the best thing is that the whole project should receive thorough investigation
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by proper experts so that it may be realized whether it is feasible or not. Whether the canal might or might not be the most expensive the world has ever known does not really matter. It might be the most expensive and equally the most worth-while. Surely the great thing is that it should be investigated, particularly as there is, here at least, no danger of diminishing the amenity of Scotland. The area through which the canal would pass is one which is not of any particular scenic value and which is already largely industrialized. I hope, therefore, while deprecating that the Government should undertake anything definite in the way even of legislation during the war, they will at least assure your Lordships' House that due consideration will be given to this project in all its aspects.
LORD CHATFIELD: My Lords, I have only a few remarks to make, and speak as an Englishman with some temerity on what is really mainly a Scottish question. We have had a very bright debate, and it seems rather to have followed the lines of downright assertion and flat contradiction. It is very difficult for noble Lords to get a balanced view, but that will no doubt be given by the Minister who is going to reply. If I speak at all it is purely because the naval side of the question has been mentioned. It is a side of the case, and it would be wrong if no sailor other than the Earl of Glasgow, who has already given some very good advice, spoke on a matter on which he has some knowledge.
I was at the Admiralty during the years of peace when this subject came up. As your Lordships have been told, it is a very old subject which has been often thought of. It always appeals to men of imagination and enterpirse, whom we do not always have as our rulers in this country. In these two investigations, although I was at the Admiralty, I took no part myself. They were held in 1922 and 1929 by a small Committee mainly representing the Board of Trade, the Admiralty, and merchant shipping. They were held at a time, it must be remembered, when the conditions were very unfavourable to any consideration of the problem— that is to say, they were held shortly after the last war when we had been told there was never to be another. They were also held at a time when

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nobody was thinking of spending money but rather of saving it, at a time when we were dealing with international disarmament, and when the idea of spending £50,000,000 on building a canal when we could not get even £5,000,000 for a ship, seemed ridiculous to the Admiralty.
Therefore, in those days, our view was that the expenditure of so much money for a combined commercial and strategic purpose was not justified. We would rather have spent the money in other ways if we could have got it at all, which we did not. That being the case, what we have really got to consider is, have the bases on which this Committee advised the Government fifteen to twenty years ago changed? Are they the same, or have new conditions arisen due to the lessons of this war or to the prospect of future commercial practice, the future of our Merchant Navy, and the types, size, and speed of ships? None of us know, or very few of us here know, what are the lessons of this war as regards the sea, whether if we had this canal from the Firth of Forth to the Firth of Clyde it would have made any real difference to us in this war. Not that that alone would be a satisfactory guide, because the conditions of this war and the German occupation of Norway have entirely altered the value of our eastern coast bases, quite apart from the menace of air attack. I very much doubt in reality whether the Clyde canal if it had existed would have been of very great advantage, but it may have been. I do not know, but I think it is a circumstance which should be inquired into.
Then it seems to me that we ought to satisfy public opinion in this matter—and there is considerable interest in it—by having an up-to-date investigation of the question. It is not a difficult thing to do and it would not take very long, and if it was hold I think it would satisfy public opinion that the Government had not just turned it down out of hand because of old ideas. But it must be recognized that the value of the canal must stand on the commercial basis alone. The naval basis must not be an overriding factor. It is a factor but it is not an important factor. As has been suggested we are not likely, if we are going to have a better peace than we had before, to have another war for some years, though it
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will come one day no doubt. Therefore there will be no necessity from the purely strategic point of view to build a canal.
But the commercial side is very important. I personally doubt whether the saving of mileage is really sufficient in these days of fast ships and of long periods of ships at sea to make them use the canal, unless it can be so cheaply built that the canal dues will be far less than anything that has been anticipated in the past. When Kiel Canal was built the German Government did all they could to make merchant ships going from the Baltic and the east coast to England and the Channel use the canal. They failed. The Kiel Canal has never been really a commercial success because it was not worth the while of the merchant ship, just to avoid the journey round the Skagerrak, to go through the canal with its disturbances of locks, etc., just to save four hours in the time of its arrival in England. It does not make much difference, if you arrive at sunset, whether you arrive then or at midnight. The saving was not worth while, so the canal has never been a commercial success. Whether this canal, if built, would be a commercial success is a matter on which modern conditions justify an inquiry, but I would not myself put it higher than that. I very much hope that the noble Lord who replies for the Government will be able to say that the matter will be inquired into on the basis of up-to-date figures due to war experience and the prospects of the future as regards commercial practice.
THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORT (LORD LEATHERS): My Lords, I should first like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, for once more having raised this most interesting subject. I think we shall all agree that we have had a very helpful contribution from all round the House. The fact that the Firths of Forth and Clyde are only separated by some thirty miles of land has always lent attraction to the consideration of schemes for cutting a canal between them. As one noble Lord said, King Charles II toyed with the idea but, as with all subsequent schemes, it fell to the ground because of the cost. Schemes of this kind had a very able advocate in Daniel Defoe. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many schemes were put forward for this canal but, broadly speaking, I think they

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reduced to two—one the direct route from Grangemouth to Clydebank, which would be about thirty miles long, and the other a route via Stirling to Loch Lomond, which would be about forty miles long. The first and obvious advantage urged in favour of such a canal is the shortening of the distance by sea that would be effected. Although the shortening of sea routes would be by no means negligible we must remember that in order to make the use of the canal commercially attractive it would have to be cheaper as well as shorter than the alternative route through the Pentland Firth. Canal dues therefore would have to be very low if the canal were to be used. It was estimated about a dozen years ago that to construct such a canal would cost £50,000,000 sterling or more; in spite of subsequent development in engineering plant the cost to-day would probably be higher. Unless therefore it could be shown that the traffic using the canal would be very large and that the benefits to industry, the improvements in site values, etc., were also very great, there could be no question of the canal being an economic proposition.
There remains however the strategic ground. Up to now it has been held that the strategic advantages were not sufficient to justify the expense of making a detailed survey. Such a detailed survey was estimated to cost about £35,000 twelve years ago and it probably would be a little more to-day. The canal has sometimes been urged on the ground of avoiding the navigational dangers due to frequent fogs in the English Channel. Statistics show that this argument is not well founded. Fog dangers in the English Channel are comparable with those in the Clyde from Ailsa Craig to Glasgow. Furthermore fog is more prevalent in the Clyde than it is in the Pentland Firth where in any case there is ample sea room and the fairway is by no means crowded. A Committee was appointed to consider this project by the then Minister of Transport in 1929 under the Chairmanship of the Chief Economic Adviser to the Government. There were also on the Committee representatives of the Admiralty, the Scottish Office, the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Transport. This Committee reported against the proposal. They came to the conclusion that the whole of the capital would have to be provided by
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the Exchequer and that the revenue to be derived would be conjectural. Even if it were sufficient to cover maintenance and working expenses the return, if any, on capital would be negligible. The Committee furthermore saw no prospect that the development of the canal area would justify the expenditure.
In weighing the Report of this Committee it should be remembered that there was at that time considerable pressure to find suitable public works for providing employment. This need does not exist at present, and is unlikely to arise in the course of the next few years. Nevertheless we should keep this consideration before our minds. On the other hand, it may be that new circumstances have arisen which would greatly intensify the demand for transport between the east and west coast of Scotland. The whole question of post-war economic development in Scotland is very relevant to this canal project, and we must remember that views which were right twelve years ago will not necessarily be right after the war. There can obviously be no question of undertaking the construction of such a canal now, nor can I hold out any likelihood that it will be undertaken in the immediate post-war years. Even if it were unanimously held that the canal was desirable on general grounds, there will be many reconstruction projects of much greater urgency to be fulfilled after the war which would necessarily take priority over the building of this canal.
The problem will be, not to find a useful way of investing £50,000,000, but to ensure that available energy, labour and resources are expended in ways giving the maximum return. I very much doubt if this canal project will take a high priority on this scale. Nevertheless it is always well to be prepared, and far from ruling out the possibility of the building of the proposed canal, I have set up a small group to review this matter department-ally and to make a confidential report to me on the advantages and drawbacks. I have asked a representative of the Admiralty to join this group in order that the strategic considerations may be considered in the light of the latest developments. I am also, of course, consulting the Secretary of State for Scotland, who is the planning Minister concerned. Although I am taking this action, I do not wish to hold out to the noble Lord

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any hope that the result will be any different from the decisions hitherto reached on many occasions. I can say no more than that the possibility is in our minds and we are considering the matter afresh in the way indicated.
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord. He has really told me exactly what I wanted to know, and realty has complied with ray request, perhaps anticipating this debate. No doubt this subject was so important in his mind that he thought that an investigation was necessary. I thank him for what he is going to do, and shall look forward to having the opportunity of asking him, if the report is not too secret, what conclusions are arrived at. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

SECRET SESSION.
The Notice on the Paper in the name of the Earl of Mansfield was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are satisfied with the defensive fire-power of our heavy bombers; and to move for Papers.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): Strangers will withdraw.
Then, in pursuance of the Resolution that the sitting of the House to consider the Motion of the Earl of Mansfield be in Secret Session, the Official Reporter withdrew.
House in Secret Session.
Sitting resumed in Open Session.

RECONSTRUCTION SCHEMES.
LORD NATHAN LORD NATHAN rose to call the attention, of His Majesty's Government to the importance of the time factor in the preparation of schemes for post-war reconstruction, and to ask whether His Majesty's Government propose to establish a system of priorities in regard to plans for reconstruction; and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of the Motion which I bring be-fore your Lordships' House is to draw attention to certain matters of urgency, as I conceive them, which ought to be
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decided while the fight is still on and before the war comes to an end. The immediate cause of my bringing this matter before your Lordships is a recent speech on behalf of the Government by the Minister of Economic Warfare. In that speech he said in almost as many words that it is not possible to make decisions while the war is on. That was a statement which was disconcerting and, indeed, alarming to many of us. Naturally, I wish to be in every way completely fair, so I will ask your Lordships' leave to read one or two passages from the speech of the noble Earl. In order not to weary your Lordships I must indulge in the gentle art of selective quotation, but I hope, and indeed I am sure, that the noble Earl will not complain that in what I quote in order to make my point I am doing him less than justice.
He was speaking in a debate on agriculture on May 27 and making a declaration on behalf of His Majesty's Government. In the course of his speech he made these observations:
"… you cannot draft the policy of one great department of our national economy without reference to issues of basic importance in other great departments of national economy."
I have no adverse comment to make on that. Then the noble Earl went on:
"… the blunt fact is that Cabinet Ministers, when the whole of their energies are devoted to winning the war … simply have not got the time to go into these numerous and immensely complicated questions with the thoroughness and care with which they will have to be gone into one day. The Civil Service and experts can, of course, do preparatory work. An immense amount of preparatory work is going on at the present moment, and has been going on for some time; but there are matters which must come before leading members of the Government in any such considerations of policy, and"—
note these words, my Lords—
"it is physically impossible for them to give the requisite amount of time to these problems at this juncture. Moreover, Cabinet Ministers do not yet know enough of what the conditions of the post-war world are going to be to be able to form a correct judgment on some of the questions which will have to be answered."
Then the noble Earl went on to make quotations from the speeches of Sir John Anderson, Sir Kingsley Wood, Mr. Herbert Morrison, and the Lord Chancellor on the Beveridge Report. He selected for quotation just those passages which had given rise to the greatest indignation and

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the utmost suspicion and hostility. I now quote the noble Earl again:
"I have made those quotations at some length to show that the considerations which forced the Government to adopt that attitude with regard to the Beveridge Report apply equally to agriculture, and indeed to all these very great questions which are awaiting solution after the war and which cannot be considered in isolation and which have to be considered as part of one picture. All that we are saying is that that consideration must necessarily take a considerable amount of time."
Here is the last passage I wish to quote:
"Therefore all that I am saying to your Lordships this afternoon is that our reformers, whether they be reformers in education or in agriculture or in social security or in housing or in planning, must have a measure of patience and confidence in the Government, and may I add they must have mercy on the physical capacity of Ministers?"
The noble Earl will agree that I have fairly represented the point I wish to bring to the notice of the House.
My noble friend Lord Addison, in a speech following the noble Earl, characterized his statement as having indicated that nothing could be decided until everything was decided. Your Lordships have heard the main passages of the speech out of which the criticism arises. I do not think anyone would question that that speech, and those quotations, indicated to your Lordships and to the country that the experts are indeed gathering data and preparing memoranda, but Ministers have no time, in the pressure of war work, to take decisions. Of course Ministers are busy, of course there is a strain upon their energies and time. No doubt it would be a very good thing if every issue but war-making could be set on one side, but it cannot; that will not do. Perhaps the noble Earl did not really mean what his speech appeared to mean. Here is his chance to say so.
Let me indicate to your Lordships some of the matters which, as it seems to me, need and must have decision whilst the fighting is on, before the war ends. First, there are the urgent and inescapable problems of what may be called, in general terms—because I mean more than the mere coming back of the members of the Armed Forces—demobilization. There is a bare minimum of decisions that must be made, certain steps which must necessarily be taken; these are short-term, immediate, urgent. These are matters
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that must be decided before the fighting stops, however busy Ministers may be now. What are these matters? Let me just indicate them in headlines. There is demobilization proper. That means the release of men from factory or war service. There is the reassembly, rehousing, re-equipment of war-scattered families. There is the question of homes for those who come home or go to peacetime work. We shall need every expedient, temporary and permanent, to deal with the inevitable overcrowding. There is the question of equipment for industry as remobilization starts, and there is a priority order that must be decided, as the noble Earl, Lord Elgin, said in another context earlier this afternoon. What in effect I am referring to is the orderly change-over: the release of men and machines according to set, known and accepted principles, the re-engagement of men and machines for peace work in order of need, the building of essential living places and work places.
So much for the short-term problem, but there are the longer-term problems of reconstruction or remobilization as distinct from demobilization. There is an essential minimum of decision that must be made in these broader matters also and made now, immediately, before peace breaks out. Let me indicate in outline what some of these matters are. Let me put first agriculture, for it is out of that subject that this discussion arises. It was in a debate on agriculture that the noble Earl made the speech to which I have referred. Take agriculture then. After all, on the farming policy and programme made now or not made now depends the diet and the standard of living of our people for a very long time to come. Is it to be self-sufficiency on the war model or is it to be specialization on world co-operation on the Hot Springs model? This is a decision that has to be made now. Lord Woolton has welcomed Hot Springs and recognized the obligations to act. As recently as May 27 the noble Earl stated that the Government had not made a decision and could not at that time, for the reasons I indicated, make a decision on agricultural policy. But does Lord Woolton's statement in this House the other day in the Hot Springs debate mean that Mr. Hudson has now had time to make a decision? And if he has, what is the decision? Let us know it, for if we start on the wrong foot

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we can never get right. We must start as we mean to go on. We would like to know how it is intended we should start.
Close to farming is of course the land. There can be no conscious direction of the nation's resources unless there is positive and effective control of the use of land. If post-war building and postwar re-equipment of industry and transport begin without a decision as to this there will be no plan. If we start on the wrong foot we can never get right. We must start as we mean to go on. We want, then, three decisions. Is the Barlow proposal for a plan to prevent the wrong use of land, the wrong allocation of industry and the consequent congestion of cities to be acted upon? Is the Scott proposal for the protection of agricultural land to be acted upon? Is the Uthwatt proposal for solving the compensation problem to be accepted and applied? Barlow, Scott and Uthwatt are there. The work has been done. I ask, what about it? I must ask, what about it? If there are no decisions there will be no policy and remobilization will be as haphazard, as chaotic, as disastrous and as blighting as it was last time. We must make up our minds before we start.
Then there is the whole broad issue of social security. There again the work has been done. Beveridge is far better known than Barlow, Uthwatt and Scott. The Beveridge Report has two main aspects; first, the plan for social security for the prevention of want by guaranteeing a subsistence income for every family against every contingency. Here, my Lords, there is a decision. It has been turned down for the moment. The Government have said No. I do not want to elaborate it but the noble Lord will realize that what I said is that the Government have taken a decision in the negative as to a subsistence income. That is of course the case. But there is another aspect of Beveridge, a series of proposals to reform particular social services, health insurance, workmen's compensation, pensions, unemployment insurance, and Beveridge would add new ones, children's allowances, maternity benefit, training benefit, medical services. The Government say they have accepted most of these. Some of the reforms have been overdue for a generation. The Prime Minister has said that the work is
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in progress, but now we are told. "No decisions whilst the war is on."
To me at least, and to my noble friends, that is a frightening prospect. Is it really intended that the men who come back from the wars are to come back to the old inadequate cash benefits, the old insufficient treatment benefits, the old extravagant administration? That is what there will be for them if decisions are not made and action taken before they come back. What about their houses, their homes? Here there is indeed a plan, a ten-year plan, to employ 1,250,000 workers and erect 4,000.000 homes, Excellent. I congratulate both Mr. Ernest Brown and Mr. Ernest Bevin. But there is more to it than that. What sort of houses, what is to be the cost of the houses, how are the houses to be furnished, by whom built? The building will start at once when the men begin to come home because some kind of shelter will be an imperative and urgent need, but unless other decisions are made and unless steps are taken what is done will be as costly, as ineffective and as chaotic in meeting real needs as it was last time. We must start as we mean to go on and so we want before the peace not only Barlow, Scott and Uthwatt but a decision about housing finance, building organization, administration and costs. We must start right or we shall never get right at all. What about the men's children? Where is the Education Bill? What kind of schools are they going to have a chance of going to and for how long? What kind of teachers? What about school buildings and equipment? These are things that must be decided before the evacuees and their fathers come home. What has been done to work out the intention to bring about full employment?
It is said that no decision can be taken because there is no time for decision. Does this really mean that all of them— agricultural plan, social security, housing, full employment, civil aviation—must all go by default? Does it mean that the technique of maintaining the nation's consumption and its investment, public and private, in order to provide ample and lasting work for our people must on no account take up a Minister's time, that Ministers are too busy? Surely not. Surely preparations are being made. Why then this timid refusal, this coy denial?

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Some preparations, as I say, are being made. The Prime Minister has said so. Lord Selborne has said so. But we want more than that. Decisions must be made. These really are matters of urgency. We really must start the moment peace breaks out as we mean to go on, which means that we must make up our minds before we start.
As I have already said, these are remobilization as distinct from demobilization problems. The remobilization long-term policy will be decisive for our future, but remobilization and demobilization are not really always quite separable. The siting of new houses and factories, for instance, will depend on or will itself determine by default long-term decisions about the location of industry and the growth of cities. Decisions taken now on these matters are an essential part of the long-term background to the short-term policy. Remobilization of men and businesses and re-equipment of factories must depend upon the policy that is to be adopted in the longer term for full employment at home and commercial relations with foreign countries and with the countries of the Empire and Commonwealth. The short-term expedients of the Armistice must take their colour from the longer-term intentions; indeed, there is good ground for saying that if the short-time expedients are out of step with the longer-term intentions, the longer-term intentions will never be realized. The fact of the matter is that the fate of reconstruction will be largely determined by the character of the demobilization that is carried through on the cessation of the fighting and in the period that immediately follows upon that.
There are certain matters, then, which, whether we like it or not, must be decided before the fighting stops. To decide nothing beforehand on these questions will be tantamount to deciding badly. To have no policy before the fighting ends will be tantamount to having the wrong policy. I have indicated some of the questions which must in my opinion be answered now—not only dealt with by careful and expert preparation, but answered now by decisions on policy at Cabinet level which will produce a programme of action ready to apply the moment the fighting stops.
Finally, my Lords, I would say this. The situation in the period immediately before the peace is the same as the situation in the years immediately before the war. Then there was much preparation, but no preparedness. That was the difference, or one of the differences, between Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Churchill. Now again there are preparations but no proof of preparedness, and the tasks of peace are not likely to be less than those of the war. Time is no more on our side in matters of demobilization and remobilization than it was in the whole grim business of mobilization for battle. I hope there may be some reassurance to our anxiety from the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, and I urge upon His Majesty's Government that we should be prepared, and by prepared I mean prepared by decisions made, by policies laid down, by programmes in train. Preparation is not enough; what is needed is preparedness. I beg to move.
THE EARL OF GLASGOW: My Lords, I will not keep your Lordships more than five minutes. I am very much in agreement with a large part of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, but not altogether. I am as anxious as anyone else to see reconstruction started after the war as soon as possible. I want to see at least four million houses built, a large increase in the Exchequer grant for education, the progressive measures of the Beveridge Report coming into effect, and also town and country planning carried out to the greatest extent. I should like to see all these things done in due course, but where is the money coming from to carry them out immediately after the war? Enterprising individuals, men like Lord Nuffield, who would like to use their brains and their energies to produce the necessary merchandise and goods wanted by foreign countries, are being crushed by taxation. After the war this country will live or die by her export trade and at this time, when the call should be for all hands to pull together, it is looked on as heresy to challenge the notion of some politicians that private enterprise must go and be replaced by State-managed businesses.
I think the noble Lord's question is so important that it is a great pity it should be relegated to the end of a rather busy sitting. I cannot understand why there should be such a small attendance when

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we are discussing this very important point. The second part of the question, which refers to priority, is interesting because it is evident the noble Lord himself does not believe it will be possible to build houses, improve our education and bring in the Beveridge recommendations all at the same time. In my opinion, with the exception of housing and the reconstruction of armament factories for peace-time needs—which should have priority—all those other measures should be postponed until the country is on a firm financial basis.
People who say that these big social improvements should be made immediately after the war at a cost of one month's war expenditure, do not realize the true position. We hear it said very often, and of course it is very hard to counter when we are spending millions of money on war. But people who say that do not realize that directly the war ceases, the whole financial outlook of the world, including exchange and credit, will change. If this country continued to carry on a war expenditure in peace time, she would be considered to be heading straight for bankruptcy and our credit in the countries with which we do business would dry up. It cannot be said too often that we live by our export trade. The more commitments and promises the Government make now which will mean the expenditure of vast sums of money after the war, the less chance shall we have of regaining our export trade and giving employment to our returned soldiers. We shall have to ease the burden of taxation to give a chance for private enterprise to get going.
I do not want to break the Party truce, but if the Socialist Party obtain power—and they have said they propose to do so—and take over all industrial undertakings, they are going to kill individual enterprise, and the source from which the golden eggs have come will be destroyed. Are they quite sure that what they propose to put in the place of incentive and endeavour will work? In my opinion to change over from the free system of individual enterprise and initiative in industry to a Socialist dictatorship in the management of the business of the nation—because to function properly it will have to be a dictatorship —would be a mad risk which it would be folly for the Government of a warworn and exhausted country to take.
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So-called capitalism has given this country the finest social service in the world, and, whatever may be the faults of that system better the devil we know than the devil we do not know. The first thing in post-war reconstruction that we have to think of, in my opinion, is to give our people employment and to get back the export trade by which we live. And of course we must have housing. To get that it will be necessary to give every assistance possible to firms formerly employed in producing goods for export, in their tasks of changing over from war to peace, and, over and above that, to encourage the siting and setting up of new industries all over the country. I would give that and the provision of houses for the people priority over everything else.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, arising out of some remarks which were made by my noble friend Lord Selborne in the debate on the 27th May last on the subject of agriculture, the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, has put upon the Paper a Motion which is apparently very anodyne in character He has asked "whether His Majesty's Government propose to establish a system of priorities in regard to plans for reconstruction." Now if the noble Lord's purpose had been merely to seek information, to find out whether there was any further statement which the Government could make upon post-war planning, I do not think that anyone could possibly have complained. As the war progresses it is, obviously, natural that noble Lords, as other Englishmen, Scotsmen and Welshmen, should look into the future, and should wish to know how the minds of the Government are moving. But unfortunately and, if he will forgive me for saying so, I think rather unjustifiably, in the speech with which he has introduced his Motion the noble Lord has gone a good deal further than that. He has suggested—I think it was implicit in his speech, which conveyed the impression to me at any rate as I think it will have done to other noble Lords—that His Majesty's Government are, in fact, at the present time, failing in their duty in that they are neglecting, if not their consideration, at any rate conclusions upon essential problems, and failing to reach decisions which could, in the view of the noble Lord himself, easily be taken.

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Such suggestions are not in accordance with the facts, and I feel that they are extremely regrettable because they are liable to shake confidence in an Administration which is composed of all the leading elements of all sections of opinion, including leaders of the noble Lord's own Party—an Administration which is extended to the utmost in facing problems with regard to both the present and the future which are unparalleled in history. I do not think that the British people take so poor a view of His Majesty's Government as does the noble Lord. They realize that the Government have done, and are doing, a good job; that they have mobilized the nation as it has never been mobilized before; that they have ensured, in spite of immense difficulties, that the troops abroad should be provided with munitions of war to enable them to march forward to that victory news of which is daily coming in. Further, they have ensured that the people at home are provided with food and clothing and necessities, and, so far as possible, the amenities of life in difficult times like these. Foreigners who come here—and in this I think I am only echoing what would be said by other noble Lords—go away full of admiration for the even-handed and efficient administration of this country at the present time. I really cannot understand why Lord Nathan should assume that the Government are not facing the problems of the future in that same spirit, and are not applying their full energies to the solution of the post-war problems which are coming upon the world.
The noble Lord spoke in very mellifluous tones, but I do not think that his outlook was the statesmanlike outlook to which we are accustomed in this House. I would remind him of some words which were spoken by the Prime Minister in his broadcast last March. My right honourable friend said:
"Nothing would be easier for me than to make any number of promises and to get the immediate response of cheap cheers and glowing leading articles."
That is exactly what the noble Lord is asking me to do to-day. But I would remind him of some further words spoken by my right honourable friend in the same broadcast. He said:
"I am absolutely determined not to falsify or mock that confidence"—
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that is the confidence accorded to him by the nation—
"by making promises without regard to whether they can be performed or not."
That, my Lords, is surely right. Nothing could be more fatal than for His Majesty's Government to paint too rosy a view of our difficulties in order to get a little temporary popularity. There is only one thing to do in dealing with the British people, as the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, would I am sure agree, and that is to tell them the truth, whatever the truth may be. It is only so that any Government will ever get their trust and confidence.
I hope the House will forgive me for speaking with some little warmth, but I feel very strongly on this question. Of course His Majesty's Government accept full responsibility for making all possible arrangements to ensure the future of the ordinary Englishman, that man whom the noble Lord has rechristened "Tom Snooks," whom some other people call, rather offensively I consider, "the Common Man," but whom I and I think most people prefer to call by his old and truer name, "John Bull." But noble Lords in this House have a responsibility too— it is not only the Government that have a responsibility. It will not assist, in my view, the survival of democracy if legislators understate the complexity of the matters with which we are likely to be faced, and give the impression to the electorate that it is quite simple to reach ideal solutions of the terrible problems with which we shall have to deal when hostilities come to an end. I am always full of admiration for my noble friend Lord Addison in that respect. He never attempts to ignore the complexity of these problems, and he faces them frankly and fairly. I would suggest that my noble friend Lord Nathan might well take a lesson from his Leader's book.
The noble Lord enumerated a large number of questions which he suggests are not being energetically tackled. In fact all these questions are being intensively studied, not only by civil servants and experts, but by Committees and Ministers. My noble friend Lord Selborne will bear me out when I say that as much of the time of many responsible Ministers is being taken up by the consideration of problems of demobilization and the postwar problems as is taken up by consideration of problems relating to the conduct

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of the war. These Ministers sit on these Committees for many hours a weak. They consider these problems day and night. But I certainly would not claim, and I do not intend to do so, that these Ministers, or the Government as a whole, are yet in a position to ask Parliament to decide on detailed schemes on all these questions. Indeed, they are not themselves yet in a position to come to decisions on all of them.
Some problems, of course, are comparatively simple; they are what may be called self-contained problems—problems such as that of education, although even that overlaps on to other domestic issues, as noble Lords know. Others are more difficult, and have immense ramifications, both national and international. Of such a type, I suggest, is the problem of agriculture, out of which this debate arises. That has vast international implications, which have been emphasized on many occasions in your Lordships' House by the noble Lords, Lord Addison, Lord De La Warr and others. To attempt to deal with agriculture in isolation would be utterly futile and greatly to be regretted. As the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, said in the debate to which Lord Nathan has referred, Cabinet Ministers do not yet know enough of what the conditions of 1he post-war world are going to be to be able to form a correct judgment on some of the questions which will have to be answered. That is perfectly true; we are not in a position at present to answer a great many of these questions.
It is no use the noble Lord chanting "We must have a decision now." In many of these cases, in the nature of things there cannot be a decision now; these questions need patient and careful study. The Government have to take account of developments in other countries than our own. These questions must be linked op with a constantly changing war situation, and any solution must be applicable to a post-war situation the exact character of which we do not yet know. The task of allotting priorities as between these various schemes of reconstruction is equally complex. It must take into account the importance of avoiding hardship during the demobilization period; it must take into account the essential need of re-creating normal trade and employment; and it must take into account the practical possibilities of our economic and financial position, to which
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the noble Earl, Lord Glasgow, so rightly drew attention. These factors are often conflicting in their nature, and they are not easy to harmonize. What is essential —and I am in absolute agreement with Lord Nathan about this—is that preliminary preparatory work should be undertaken; and that in fact is being done.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord for letting me know some of the special points which he intended to raise, and I have tried to get as much information for him as possible, although I know he will not expect an answer on all the points I am in a position, however, to give him a considerable amount of information. Let me take agriculture first of all. I do not intend to go fully into this question this afternoon, because the subject has been recently discussed here, but I should like to say something about one decision which the noble Lord said ought to be made now. "Is British policy," I understood the noble Lord to ask, "to aim at self-sufficiency on the war model, or at world co-operation as advocated by the Hot Springs Conference?" In the first place, this statement as it stands seems to be based upon a misinterpretation of the recommendations of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture as laid down in the Final Act. No one has suggested that this country should be self-sufficient, but the Hot Springs Conference, although it advocated world co-operation, specifically rejected specialization in agricultural production. If the noble Lord will refer to Resolution XV of the Final Act of this Conference, which deals with the principle of agricultural production, he will see that it specifically states that the principles of good farming "can best be assured by balanced mixed rotational farming and by avoidance of single-crop production, or monoculture."
Having made that quite clear, let us see how far the facts support Lord Nathan's argument that a decision is required now, in case the war should be brought to an end in the near future. One fact that stands out quite clearly is that whenever the war in Europe ends, be it this year, next year or the year following, food production in this country will have to be maintained as far as possible at the present high level for some time to come. My right honourable friend the Minister of Agriculture dealt with this point in a recent speech, when he said:

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"Even if victory in Europe comes before 1947, the demands for food from our own soil will not abate. Ships will still be needed for other vital purposes. The Japs must still be beaten. The starving peoples of Europe must be fed. Far from there being an easing off, the shoe may pinch even tighter. Whatever fate may have in store for us in the more distant future, the outlook in the next four years is, to my mind, tolerably certain. We must go on producing as much food as we can from our own soil."
That is what my right honourable friend said, and he went on to say that he was laying his plans for four years ahead, up to the harvest of 1947.
The Hot Springs Conference also recognized the distinction between the shortterm and the long-term periods. The general shortage of food in the world was very much in their minds, and, as a first step in overcoming that shortage, they recommended that countries that are now producing more than the normal quantity of food should maintain such production, if not increase it still further, in the short-term period. Questions of long-term policy and of transition from the short-term to the long-term programme were also considered by the Conference, but those are matters which will arise later on. The important thing is that for the short-term period—and the Minister of Agriculture has put this period as running until 1947 at the earliest—plans can be laid and are being laid, and no further major decisions of policy arc immediately necessary, although clearly the formulation of long-term policy must continue, and is indeed at present going on.
Then I come to the question of Planning—the Barlow Report, the Scott Report, the Uthwatt Report and so on. With regard to town and country planning, certain decisions, as your Lordships know, have already been taken, and I hope that noble Lords will not forget them. First of all, last winter His Majesty's Government decided to set up a Ministry of Town and Country Planning, and the Minister is already at work at his extremely complex, difficult, and I think rather thankless task. That decision which the Government took at that time marked the Government's agreement in principle to setting up a central body and planning the use of land throughout the country, and it provided machinery for controlling the use of land in accordance with future policy. Secondly, only the
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other day, as noble Lords will remember, the Government decided to introduce the Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Bill, which passed through your Lordships' House. The purpose of this Bill, as your Lordships know, was to give the powers which are necessary to enable the new Minister and the local planning authorities to fulfil their duties, and, when it becomes law, the essential framework for future planning policy will, I think, have been set up. Those were two essential and fundamental decisions on which future post-war planning policy must rest.
I will add that the location of industry, which was the subject of the Barlow Report, raises issues of policy which are under consideration by a Committee of Ministers over which the Minister without Portfolio presides. It will be apparent that considerable further investigation is necessary, especially in the light of changed war conditions, to continue the analysis presented by the Royal Commission and to frame concrete proposals to implement their recommendations. On the physical side, preliminary work is necessary for the preparation of plans for the redevelopment of areas of excessive urban concentration and congestion. Such work is proceeding in the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, the Board of Trade and the other Departments concerned.
As regards the protection of agricultural land, the importance of preserving land of high agricultural value is now well recognized, and machinery for securing its protection within the framework of the Government statement of February 11, 1942, has been erected. The Government then said that they would seek to avoid a diversion of productive agricultural land to other purposes if there is unproductive or less productive land which could reasonably be used for those purposes. As regards Compensation—that is the Uthwatt Report, to which the noble Lord also referred—I would assure the House that the Government have never failed to recognize the importance of the question, nor acted on the supposition that a decision upon the policy involved could be postponed for post-war consideration. They have on the contrary been devoting continuous and concentrated attention to it. The future arrangements to be made to secure that land can be acquired without reference to other considerations than

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the dictates of national and local planning policy raise issues of extreme complexity, and affect, directly or indirectly, every man, woman and child in the country. It is essential that the right decision should be taken; and the Government are handling the problem with a full sense of that responsibility.
Next we pass to Social Security—the Beveridge Report—to which the noble Lord also referred. He gave an impression, I think—certainly to me, and I think to other noble Lords—that the attitude of the Government to the Beveridge Report was negative. I do not know where he got that impression; he certainly has not got it from the speeches of the Government spokesmen. I do not want to prolong indefinitely the speech I have to make, but I must remind the noble Lord of a few brief words which were said by the Home Secretary in the debate in another place. He said:
"Sir William Beveridge summed up his proposals in 23 suggested changes.… it can be stated that one non-essential change is rejected, six held up for final judgment and 16 are accepted in principle. There were six fundamental principles in the Beveridge Report on which the plan itself is based …. The Government have accepted the whole substance of these, save for one point, the subsistence basis, and while not accepting this in principle, the Government have intimated their aim to fix a benefit for unemployment and ill-health on the same basis as nearly as possible."
That was not the impression the noble Lord made in his remarks.
LORD NATHAN: I am extremely unwilling to interrupt the noble Viscount, but these words were what I said. I said that the Beveridge Report includes a "plan for social security for the prevention of want by guaranteeing a subsistence income for every family against every contingency." And I went on to say that "here there is a decision. It has been turned down for the moment." My noble friend, the Leader of the House, has in turn confirmed what I then said. I went no further than to make that statement about their proposals as regards social reform.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I wish the noble Lord had gone a little further, because, if he had gone on and quoted the words of the Home Secretary which I have just quoted—
"and while not accepting this in principle, the Government have intimated their aim to
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fix a benefit for unemployment and ill-health on the same basis as nearly as possible"—
he would then have made the position clear. He gave me the impression that the whole thing had been completely turned down. It is true that that particular proposal had been turned down, but the Government were hoping to put forward an alternative proposal which would have produced the same effect.
LORD NATHAN: I do not want to prolong the discussion of the point. But this question of subsistence income or no subsistence income is really the central point of the Beveridge Plan, and my view—and I speak not for myself only, but I think for my noble friends also— is that when the subsistence income is rejected, the central feature in this regard of the Beveridge Plan is also rejected.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Well, that is a matter of opinion, upon which we both have a right to our own views. It is true, of course, that practical possibilities have still to be considered, and it is also true that detailed proposals have still to be worked out. They are in fact being worked on now. It is true also that financial aspects must be examined, and I am quite certain the noble Lord would not dispute that, for obviously any Government with a sense of responsibility must go into details and must examine the financial aspect. But I certainly would not accept the view that the attitude of the Government to the Beveridge Report has been a negative one.
I come to housing next. The noble Lord has said that he welcomes the decision of His Majesty's Government—I was glad to hear that—to embark on a ten-year programme, which is to employ one and a quarter million workers on the building of four million houses. But he suggests—anyway he suggested to me— that no real detailed work was being done —or he did not know that any detailed work was being done. Well, at any rate, for all that, detailed work is being done; a great deal of detailed work is being done. Indeed, I have here a very full account of what is being engaged in by the Government at the present time. I rather hesitate to inflict anything further on the House, but I should just like to give some indications at least of the sort of steps that are being taken, because as these suggestions have been made, I think

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it is only fair to the Government that they should be answered. The Ministry of Health has, in fact, done far more than estimate, as between three and four million, the housing needs for the first ten or twelve years of the peace. First of all, they have submitted detailed estimates of the labour and materials needed for the repair of the war damage, for overtaking arrears of work of ordinary maintenance and repair, and for the new building programme, including the rebuilding of houses destroyed by enemy action. On the basis of these estimates and those of other Departments, the Government will decide what is the number of new houses that can be built in the earlier years of peace.
Secondly, without waiting for a decision on the Barlow, Uthwatt and Scott Reports, the Minister of Health sent a circular to local authorities in March last in which he suggested that there were, in each local government area, sites which, whatever the future local or national plan, are bound to be suitable housing sites. He asked them to decide, in conjunction with the Regional Planning Officer and, where agricultural land is involved, with representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, on sufficient of such sites for a one-year programme. He informed them, with the ready approval, I am glad to be able to tell your Lordships, of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that he was able to sanction the raising of loans for the purpose, and he indicated his willingness to entertain compulsory purchase orders. Further, he requested the authorities to begin immediately after the selection of the sites on the preliminary work of surveying and of preparing the general lay-out, so that it can be further filled in when the manual of post-war house plans and design is issued. He emphasized that local authorities must be ready to go ahead with a substantial programme immediately conditions permit. Up-to-date, replies from 586 local authorities, whose proposals relate to the provision of nearly 130,000 houses, have already been received.
In addition to that, several Committees are hard at work. I do not intend to go fully into their labours, but I would say quite briefly this. There is a Dwellings Design Committee sitting under the noble Earl, Lord Dudley. Their report is expected
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in the autumn and will cover cottages and flats, not only for ordinary family occupation, but for occupation by special classes, such as old people and single women. Then there is a Rural Housing Committee under Sir Arthur Hobhouse. Then there is a Committee under Sir Felix Pole, which is considering the part which private enterprise can best play after the war. And, finally, there is the Committee under Mr. Silkin, M.P., which is considering policy as regards temporary construction. All these Committees are working in close touch with study groups of the Ministry of Works. There is, finally, the Inter-Departmental Committee under Sir George Burt which has reviewed the various methods of building during the inter-war period and is considering any proposals for new methods that may be suggested.
The Government are fully aware of one problem to which the noble Lord devoted special attention, and that is the dangers and difficulties of the immediate post-war period. Obviously it will be extremely difficult to make available an adequate number of houses immediately after the war. It is inevitable for some considerable time that there will be a shortage of labour and a shortage of materials, and I am afraid I must say quite frankly I do not think there is likely to be any complete solution of this difficulty. There is bound to be a gap, but at any rate the Ministers and the Departments concerned are studying urgently any and every means of bridging that gap as rapidly as can be done. If the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, or any other noble Lord, has in mind any speedy method of doing this, the Burt Committee will be ready and anxious to consider it. If they report that such a plan is worth while, I can assure the noble Lord no one will be better pleased than His Majesty's Government.
There is one other subject on which I shall say one word—it will be very brief —and that is Education. I got the impression that the noble Lord considered nothing adequate was being done in that respect. Perhaps he did not intend to give that impression, but it would be a particularly unfair charge because my right honourable friend the President of the Board of Education has been working for months with assiduity and devotion, and it will be generally agreed with very remarkable success, on the future

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problems of education. I do not think the Government can be accused of dilatoriness or indecision where education is concerned. In fact, plans for the reconstruction of the educational system are now ready. I will, if your Lordships will allow me, refrain from saying any more to-day because the House will be aware, or at any rate will be glad to hear, that my right honorable friend the President of the Board of Education will be making an announcement about the Government's proposals in another place at, I hope, a very early date.
That is the present position in all these matters to which I have referred so far as it is possible to give it up to date. I apologize most sincerely for taking up so much of your Lordships' time, but I thought it was only fair, in view of what has been said by Lord Nathan, that the House should have the fullest possible information so that it should know that the Government are not quite so supine or so lazy as he appeared to suggest. In point of fact, an immense amount of work is being put in both by Ministers and Departments and, as noble Lords will I hope have seen from my account, good, sure foundations are being laid to the Prime Minister's Four-Year Plan. That work will continue methodically and conscientiously. In due course, as and when possible, plans will be introduced for the approval of Parliament.
In the meantime I would recall to the House the closing words of the Prime Minister's broadcast on March 21. This is what he said:
"Let us get back to our job. I must warn everyone who hears me of a certain unseemliness and also of the danger of it appearing to the world that we here in Britain are diverting our attention to peace, which is still remote, and to the fruits of victory, which are still to be won, while our Russian Allies are fighting for dear life and dearer honour in the dire, deadly, daily struggle against all the might of the German military machine, and while our thoughts should be with our Armies and with our American and French comrades now engaged in decisive battle in Tunisia."
It is Sicily now! We have moved on since then! The Prime Minister ended with these words:
"Let us wish them Godspeed in their struggle, and let us bend all our efforts to the war and to the ever more vigorous prosecution of our supreme task."
That, I believe, if the noble Lord will allow me once more to borrow a phrase from him, is what Snooks really wants.
LORD NATHAN: My Lords, I am sorry this discussion should have taken place with so few to hear what has been said, especially what has been said by the noble Viscount. I know that part of the reason is that another meeting is taking place of some interest and importance at which doubtless both the noble Viscount and I should have wished to be present. Had it not been that our Order Paper is so full for some weeks to come—another indication of the useful public purpose served by the labours of your Lordships' House—I should have wished to postpone this Motion because, despite the way in which, at the beginning of his speech, the noble Viscount was inclined to describe it, this is not a trifling subject nor was it in any spirit: of trifling that I raised it. On the contrary, as the noble Viscount's speech showed, the further it proceeded, it is a subject of great moment, and I consider myself fortunate in having been able to place before the noble Viscount questions which elucidated matters which required elucidation and which it is useful, in the public interest, should be elucidated.
In the early part of his speech the noble Viscount was rather inclined to adopt the well-known habit of certain attorneys— that is, to abuse the opponent's attorney. I have made no attack, and I particularly refrained from making any attack, upon the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, out of whose speech this discussion immediately arose. I felt sure that the impression given by the noble Earl in that speech did not faithfully reflect what, in fact, he had intended to say. My questions to-day were directed to clarifying the position, not to making an attack upon the noble Earl or making any criticism of the Government. I was speaking in a spirit of interrogation and with a view to clearing up any misunderstanding that might have arisen, as indeed had arisen, from the speech to which I have referred.
The noble Viscount mentioned that I indicated to him, in advance, some of the points which I proposed to mention. Let me say at once that I intended, as I hope I made clear in my opening observations, to mention these various matters as indications of the subjects upon which it seemed to me decisions were, or would become, urgently necessary. I had not intended to put upon the noble Viscount the labour of inquiring into and giving your Lordships, at this stage, information

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falling under each of the headings of the matters to which I referred. But I am grateful to him, and I am sure your Lordships will be grateful, that in the course of one speech he was able to give to the House shortly, yet comprehensively, information which I myself found reassuring and which I am sure will be found reassuring by those who will read what he has said. Indeed the speech that he has made is the justification of the Motion which I placed on the Order Paper and, despite what the noble Viscount said, I submit it is the justification also of the content and manner in which it has been placed before your Lordships' House.
It is no part of my desire to arouse heated controversy but to get, as I think to a large extent we have got, straight answers to specific questions. I am delighted to know that in so many respects the noble Viscount is able to give us so satisfactory a report. I could wish that the information had perhaps been given earlier. Anyhow, we have had it now. We shall look forward to the White Paper which I understand is shortly to be issued with regard to the Education Bill. Whatever the contents of that White Paper may be they will of course have to be most carefully considered and discussed. It is another evidence that a certain stage has been reached in an important piece of work and so far so good. I am not going to traverse the various other headings to which both I and the noble Viscount in his reply have referred. On the whole I think it may fairly be said that there is evidence of real progress being made. That is all I wished to elicit by this debate and to disabuse the public mind from any misunderstanding which it might have, and indeed did have, as a result of the noble Earl's speech as to Ministers having no time to deal with these matters.
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Some of them fall within a sphere which cannot be decided without reference to outside affairs. That we all realize. Others fall within a more restricted and domestic sphere and they can be settled by themselves. But my chief interest in these days is he to whom the noble Viscount has referred in all his aspects and relationships. My chief interest is in Tom Snooks at home and at war and I would close on the note upon which the noble Viscount closed. We are all thinking of the valour and, as we confidently hope and believe, the successful outcome of the magnificent exertions of our Armies together with the Dominion and Allied troops in Sicily. Upon them our thoughts and hopes are concentrated. But when the noble Viscount closed with the moving statement of the Prime Minister, to which I would without reservation subscribe, it should be recognized that the situation which will arise immediately the fighting ends is from some standpoints no less part of the war, and in particular from the standpoint of Tom Snooks is scarcely less part of the war, than the actual fighting itself. I make no apologies for having brought this matter before your Lordships' House. I would always give great weight and attach importance to anything the noble Viscount may say as to the manner in which I may bring a matter before your Lordships' House, but having heard his speech and having reflected upon what he said I feel that I have nothing to apologize for to your Lordships' House. I feel that no member of your Lordships' House need apologize if he brings forward a matter in good faith and with the single-minded desire to serve the public interest. I beg leave to withdraw.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
House adjourned.