§ LORD BEAVERBROOK had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His Majesty's Government whether aircraft and tank shipments to Russia (as reported in the London newspapers) can be swiftly increased during the next several month; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Motion standing in my name is not a criticism of the Government. I have no desire to do other than praise the Government for all they have accomplished on behalf of Russia in the past. My purpose is to get a much greater measure of assistance for Russia in the future, a much bigger appropriation of supplies. The Daily Telegraph, a reliable and accurate paper, published on January 21 a statement from Mr. Stettinius, the Lease-lend co-ordinator at Washington. He told us that the united Governments of Britain and U.S.A. have sent to Russia up to December 31, 1942, 5,800 tanks and 4,630 aeroplanes. Of these shipments, the Daily Telegraph reported, Great Britain's share was 2,600 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. It is in no sense a complaint of what has gone on in the past if I press for a great deal more in the future, coming to your Lordships' House with the intention of trying to get encouragement from your Lordships and response from the Government. If I succeed in your Lordships' House I shall have done well. If not, then I must still press for more supplies for Russia.
§ Since the present offensive began—the offensive of the Russians against the Germans—I would point out that the 930 Russians have captured 7,000 German tanks and 4,000 German aircraft. In other words, in two and a half months, the Russians have taken from the Germans more than they have got from Great Britain and U.S.A. in the last twenty months. Again, no complaint; merely an illustration to show the obvious importance of giving more supplies of aircraft and tanks to Russia in future. More help is indeed needed. That is pretty obvious. Swift deliveries are essential. There is no time to be lost. The Prime Minister last July said that 2,000 tanks had been sent to Russia up to July 1. Mr. Stettinius says that up to the end of the year Great Britain sent 2,600 tanks, so that you will see 600 tanks are the total British shipments of tanks to Russia in the last six months, if these figures are accurate. It may be that Britain has sent more than 2,600 tanks. Figures from Washington are usually accurate, but not always. Possibly more aircraft have been sent. But in any case shipments are too slow and improvement is necessary.
§ I come now to the question why you should send more supplies to Russia. I am not prepared to make any reference to the quantity of production of aircraft in Great Britain, but I would point out that America in 1942 produced 50,000 aircraft and in the month of December 5,500 aircraft. In the last twenty months Britain has sent to Russia only the amount of two weeks of American production in the form of aircraft supplies. That illustration will show at once that there is a pressing need for sending more aeroplanes forthwith. There is no complaint on my part about what has been done in the past, there is only an earnest desire that we should succeed in getting more aircraft there in the future, and the need is greater now than ever before.
§
Your Lordships will have seen a speech of Goering made last Saturday, a very remarkable speech, which requires careful reading and cannot be easily interpreted. In that speech Goering says by inference that the Russians have no coal and no iron and that they cannot make steel. Certainly we know that the Russians have lost vast coalfields, and that ironworks at Stalingrad have been destroyed. Furthermore, Goering says in that speech that when the sun stands high again there will be German troops attacking again just as there were last year. So far as I can
931
understand the intention of the German High Command, it is to attack Russia again in the spring. Therefore we must now send a swarm of aeroplanes, it seems to me, in order that Russia may be prepared to resist that impending attack and perhaps launch, in the summer-time rather than wait for the winter, yet another offensive. But we must send a swarm of aeroplanes now, there is no use sending it in the spring or in the summer or autumn of next year; it must go now. There is an old proverb, well known to many of your Lordships, I am sure, that
A swarm of bees in May
Is worth a load of hay.
A swarm of bees in June
Is worth a silver spoon.
A swarm of bees in July
Is not worth a butterfly.
I do not know whether that is from the folklore of England or whether it is from that of Canada; but a swarm of aeroplanes now will mean a very great deal. A swarm of aeroplanes shortly will no doubt do much to resist the offensive that the Germans are threatening in the spring, but a swarm of aeroplanes in July may not be worth a butterfly.
§ Many of us believe that the war in Europe may be won by the Russians. That belief is very widely held. Usually it is put in this way: "The Russians may pull it off." It is not only false but very foolish to say that such a Russian victory would be dangerous to the British Empire. Far from it. If Russia should win the war in Europe, if Russia "should pull it off," every sensible person in the British Empire will rejoice, and rejoice greatly. We cannot imagine a victory that will give us more happiness, greater joy or more complete comfort than the complete triumph of Russia in Europe at the earliest possible moment. There can be no obstacle at all to good relations between the Russians and ourselves. For my part, I welcome the growing influence and the expanding power of Russia. I look upon it as the event in Europe that gives us a guarantee that we have not had for a long time. I am sure that all of us, all Britain here and all Britain abroad, are determined to remain friends with the Russians after the war is over. The Russians have captured Generals and they have captured Armies. We are told on reliable authority that there are as many as a million dead and incapacitated Germans; but we must not 932 forget that in the spring the Germans had an intake of 500,000, so that in weighing up the Russian question and the present necessity for sending more supplies to the Russians we must beware of over-optimism, for over-optimism would stand in the way of our fulfilling a plain duty and a necessary task.
§ There is a great deal to be said from the German point of view. In the first place the German line is practically the same as it was a year ago—practically the same as it was on January 1, 1942—for the bridgeheads held by the Germans at that time are still in their possession with the exception of two in the north, and these losses are countered to some extent by one additional bridgehead held in the south. We have heard about the relief of Leningrad, but that relief has not succeeded in re-establishing the railway line from Leningrad to Moscow. The railway line from Leningrad to Moscow is still in the hands of the enemy. It is true, fortunately, that there is another way round about by rail, but it is not the direct line to Moscow and you cannot regard Leningrad as relieved until that direct line has been recovered by the Russians. Then again, the Germans may be shortening their line, and if your Lordships will look at the map you will not require the assistance of professional strategists to tell you that the shortening of the line will greatly relieve the numbers that the Germans will find it necessary to keep in Russia during the coming summer if no offensive action is undertaken.
§ Going back to Goering's speech for a moment, let me say that twice Goering has said the Russians have nearly defeated the Germans, once in 1941–2 and again in 1942–3, and he has also said that all of the available German troops were mobilized on the Russian Front. He said that in his speech the other day. What an opportunity we lost a little time ago when there were not any German troops in France, according to the statement of Goering! But to return to my argument, the Germans may be intending to shorten the line. Then, again, remember that the Russians have lost the Donetz and the Donetz basin is where the great steel industry is centred. It was the centre of the aircraft industry and for the manufacture of aircraft engines. It may be that these areas will all be recovered. They are being recovered, but your Lordships 933 can see that the steel industry and the aircraft engine industry will have been completely obliterated before the Russians are back there again. We have, therefore, to face a Russia considerably damaged by events and seriously handicapped. That is yet another reason for taking a decision to give more and more supplies to the Russian Army forthwith.
§ Compare the Russian defensive and offensive with the position in France. France had 300 miles to hold against 3,000 miles in Russia. It is said that 30,000 Frenchmen were killed in 1940 when the Germans struck. Of late 7,000 Russians have been killed every day. Yet think of the assistance that we sent out to France with the limited scale on which the war was then conducted compared with the very parsimonious way in which we have dealt with the Russians. Not that I make any criticism of parsimonious methods. I merely make my point in order to get more help for the Russians in future. That is Inv sole purpose. The Germans are losing 10,000 dead in Russia every day, but I am not myself greatly a believer in the final conclusion of the war on tae basis of casualties. I believe the war will be fought entirely in the final phase on engine-power, engines for aeroplanes, engines for tanks, engines for motor vehicles. That is my belief, but I do not want to put it up against others except in a deferential way.
§ Then I come to almost my last point. What can we do to help the Russians? There is one thing perhaps we can do and that would be to send them some of the bombing power that we are now expending upon Germany, for surely it is worth while to hit the enemy when he has difficulties. The enemy is in difficulties in Russia, not in Berlin. That is the danger point for the enemy now. That would be one possibility. There is a great deal of talk about attacking Germany in the "soft belly," as I think it is called. Surely the soft belly of Germany is somewhere on the Russian Front. That is lie best soft belly to penetrate, rather than to think too much about Italy. Some of you have doubts and hesitations because of the political complexion of the Russian Government. There are not many, but there are some persons—not in the Government, not at all, but some persons in the country who need reassurance about the political complexion of the Russian Government. It is a sub- 934 ject you have to face. There is anxiety on that account which ought not to exist. It is in very few quarters, certainly not in Government circles. I know fun well that Stalin has been a figure in our public life of which we have not always approved, but it will not be long before he will be spoken of as Stalin the Great. He will go down in the long list of Russian heroes as Stalin the Great. Be sure of that. Again, in soma respects he does not differ in his ideology from many sensible people in this country. Stalin wrote a book on organization. It is a very interesting book. You can buy it for 6d. if you want to read it. It is a good book to read. He deals with crimes, and the crimes are lack of individual responsibility and lack of personal responsibility.
§ LORD BEAVERBROOKYes, he lays down fourteen points for the guidance of those who produce and those who organize, and the eighth point deals with collegium management. In Russia that means committee rule. I must say he has my support on more than one point and certainly on the eighth point. In his twelfth point he says there must be removed from Government posts all the window-dressers and the windbags, who are to be replaced by business people. I am no Communist. I am essentially individualist and I believe in private enterprise and the profit motive. I have believed in it all my life and I believe in it sincerely, but I must say I am tremendously impressed by the Stalin philosophy. I am not going to follow that portion of the philosophy that does not agree with the fundamentals of my political faith, but in other respects I am immensely impressed by it.
I have a story from Stalin, taken from his book on organization, which is an excellent account of things as they are in Britain to-day. It is a story of Stalin's conversation with a Commissar. In the book Stalin writes in the first person and uses "I", but I will change the "I" to "Stalin." The story reads like this:
STALIN: How are you getting on with the sowing?
COMMISSAR: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilized ourselves.
STALIN: Well, and what then?
COMMISSAR: We have put the question squarely.
935 STALIN: And what next?
COMMISSAR: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will be a turn.
STALIN: But Still?
COMMISSAR: We can say that there is an indication of some progress.
STALIN: But for all that, how are you getting on with the sowing?
COMMISSAR: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not begun to sow.
In my twenty months of office I talked with that Commissar many a time. We should try, each one of us, to emulate the example of Stalin, to emulate Stalin's drive, his impatience with the talkers who do not get things done. We should determine to be equal to the Russians in sacrifice and fervour. Remember the ordinary citizens of Moscow, how those citizens of every type, every class and every age went out into the forests, how women—actresses, typists, all of them—went to the forests and gathered in timber for firewood in the hour of Moscow's terrible peril.
We must recognize, finally, that the future of Europe, in war and peace, depends upon Britain and Russia; it depends upon our relations with the Soviet Union more than upon any other single factor. Without good relations with the Soviet Union, for my part I believe there will be no peace. In days past some hoped that the balance of power in Europe would keep the peace. That hope has been proved idle. It is a hope that can never be revived. The fall of France brought that to an end. The balance of Europe lies in ruins, not only because of the collapse of France, but because of the resolve of the United Nations to strip Germany of the capacity for making war. That leaves Britain and Russia the two dominant Powers in Europe, Britain and Russia only. Peace will be impossible unless a firm, absolute and secure friendship is established between these two nations. Nor can that friendship be taken too much for granted. It must be assured. A Treaty for twenty years has been entered into, and that is something. But it is not enough. It would be idle for any speaker to deny that distrust and suspicion still remain, and an effort more drastic and more earnest than anything yet attempted must be made. We must sweep aside the old misunderstandings between the two countries which were really responsible for Hitler's war on the world.
936 How, then, can our objective be secured? An objective which I would describe as the greatest objective of British statesmenship in coming years. Speeches are not enough. Letters of mutual congratulation are not enough. Treaties are not enough. The true foundations can only be laid in battle. By the exertions which we display in sending supplies in prodigal plenty to the Russian Front, by the support we give to the Red Armies in daring offensives of our own, and by the absolute assurance that we give the Russians that we will match their sacrifices and share their burdens—by these means, and these means alone, can we bring the war to a speedy conclusion and lay the real basis for the future peace of Europe. I do not say that it is easy to establish such an alliance between two nations with such different traditions. But by the determination with which we set out to achieve it, by our readiness to overcome all obstacles and to abandon all prejudices, this generation of British citizens, and most of all our statesmen, will be judged in the pages of history. For upon this comradeship between two nations will largely depend the hopes of civilization, the hopes of Europe and the destiny of our own children. I beg to move.
§ THE MINISTER OF WORKS AND PLANNING (LORD PORTAL)My Lords, no one realizes better than I do the great work that my noble friend Lord Beaver-brook achieved when he was Minister of Supply, and when I had the honour of serving under him in that Department, in both initiating and carrying through with his great energy the forwarding of supplies to our Russian Allies. We are all at one when I say that we are watching with the greatest admiration the great and far-reaching successes which the Russians are achieving in their present offensive.
Before I discuss the Motion of the noble Lord I would like to say that there is one point upon which I do not quite agree with him. That was in his use of the word "parsimonious" in relation to our efforts to send supplies to Russia. That was not quite what I should have said in the light of what we have tried to do and what we have; in fact, effected. In the Motion which stands on the Paper my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook asks whether "aircraft and tank shipments to Russia (as reported in the London newspapers) can be swiftly 937 increased during the next several months." I presume that the reference—indeed he has already said so in his speech—to reports in the London newspapers relates to the figures issued by Mr. Stettinius on January 20, which were published in the British newspapers on the following day. In addition to the figures for United States shipments of tanks and aircraft to Russia the following passage occurs relating to United Kingdom supplies:
The U.K. have also supplied the Soviet Union with quantities of military equipment produced in Great Britain. The U.K. have shipped to Russia over 2,600 tanks and over 2,000 aeroplane. These arms are being supplied to Russia by the U.K. on a lease-lend basis.Comparative figures for U.S. supplies are quoted. The number of tanks is given as 3,200 and aircraft as almost 2,600.It is only fair, I think, to say that our actual figures for the United Kingdom up to December 31, 1942, were: tanks 2,974, aircraft 2,480 based on our agreement with the U.S.S.R. while aircraft sent by us outside our agreement brought the total up to over 3,000. This is rather an important point. Perhaps some noble Lords may not have fully realized it before, but my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook knows it better than anyone. Then we have given promises to our Russian Allies to supply them with aeroplanes, tanks, equipment and other commodities at the various centres of production, and we regard it as a moral commitment to get them to Russia. This obligation His Majesty's Government, in close consultation with the Government of the U.S.A., intend to carry out to the full extent of their power.
Your Lordships will have noticed the announcements which have recently appeared in the Press on the safe arrival in North Russian ports of substantial convoys of British and American cargo ships escorted by the Royal Navy. No one knows better than my noble friend Lord Beaverbrook, the hazards of these Arctic voyages which have now to be undertaken in almost complete darkness and in the face of most determined attacks by enemy forces based on North Norway, not only by surface snips and submarines but by torpedo-carrying aircraft, and we are showing to the world the determination of both the Americans and ourselves to render effective assistance to our Russian Allies. We have no intention of discontinuing the 938 flow of supplies, but, on the contrary, we will do our utmost to maintain the flow by every means and every route. It is as well perhaps to point out now, with regard to the help we have actually given and the promises we have made, that the geographical position of Russia creates difficulties. Russia is so situated as to make it difficult for us to get supplies through. That, I think, is a point which should be made. My noble friend says, quite rightly, that in the recent offensive our Russian Allies have taken 7,000 tanks. I would point out that those tanks were a good deal nearer to the Russians than the tanks we have to send to them from this country.
It would of course be readily understood that during the initial operations in North Africa the concentration of our resources on that task necessarily limited for a period the volume of supplies which we were able to dispatch to Russia. This position has, of course, been fully explained to the Soviet Government and is fully understood by them. His Majesty's Government have always been conscious of the colossal strain which was thrown on our Soviet Allies as the result of the German invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941. Forced, as they were, in the early stages of the campaign, to yield considerable territory in which were situated industries and raw materials for industry vital to the prosecution of the war, our Allies carried out one of the most remarkable achievements of all time in evacuating both swiftly and methodically to the interior, far from the threat of the invader, whole plants and industry devoted to, or which could be transformed for, the production of the sinews of war. These evacuated plants and industries, together with those which the foresight of the Soviet Government had previously established beyond the Urals, have produced, and are now producing, tanks, aircraft and other weapons of war in such quantities-as to enable the Soviet Armies, first of all to resist the tide of the German advance and then to throw it back in the offensives which our Allies are now undertaking with such brilliant success on so many fronts.
We have to remember that the Soviet Armies are well equipped in tanks and aircraft. Yet, as the noble Lord suggests, British and American tanks and aircraft in addition have been and are required to assist our Russian Allies in their 939 immense task, and the substantial contribution of these weapons which we and the United States of America have made is much appreciated by the Soviet Government. That is the point which I was trying to make at the beginning of my speech; I use the word "substantial," and my noble friend said "parsimonious."
As the noble Lord well knows, upon the German invasion of the Soviet Union, His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States promptly offered to assist the Soviet Government with supplies of raw and war materials of all kinds, and the first agreement between them was most successfully concluded by the noble Lord himself on his visit to Moscow in the autumn of 1941. His Majesty's Government have faithfully fulfilled their obligations under this agreement in respect of tanks and aircraft, and indeed of all categories of supplies. In the spirit of that agreement, His Majesty's Government have provided in addition the bulk of the merchant shipping necessary to deliver the supplies which we have made available, while the Royal Navy undertook the perilous task of escorting the ships by the hazardous route to the North Russian ports. In addition to the supplies which His Majesty's Government agreed to make available under the terms of this agreement, we have endeavoured to meet to the best of our ability numerous supplementary requests received from our Soviet Ally.
A second agreement between the three Governments, again covering not only tanks and aircraft but an immense variety of other supplies, was concluded on the expiration of the first. That second agreement is still in force, and it is the firm intention of His Majesty's Government to fulfil their obligations thereunder as strictly as they did in the case of the previous agreement. His Majesty's Government are fully impressed with the necessity for rendering all possible assistance to Russia, not only in their admiration for the magnificent achievement which the Red Army and Red Air Force have accomplished during the past weeks of successful operations, but as a direct contribution which they can make to the destruction of the aggressive hordes which the enemy have launched against the free peoples of Europe.
§ LORD BEAVERBROOKMy Lords, my noble friend rides off on what the Government have done, instead of dealing with what the Government are going to do. I call what the Government have done in the past parsimonious. I do not deny in the very least that bargains entered into have been discharged—I accept the noble Lord's assurance to that effect—but I do complain that the present flow of supplies is entirely inadequate, and I would confide to my noble friend the information that those aircraft figures include spares. The spares are always totalled up nowadays as aircraft. In the days when I was a Minister, we counted only aircraft, but some ingenious person discovered the method of classing spares as aircraft also. I think that the method was invented in America, but it has now been imported across the Atlantic. I recommend my noble friend to examine the food situation and to look into it very carefully, because the food going to Russia does not constitute a very big flow of supplies.
Something much greater must be done, not for the glory of Great Britain but for the benefit of Russia, so that Russia may win battles. We must get supplies there. It is no use saying that the convoy system is difficult, that the road is long, that the path is over the sea, and that ships are difficult to come by. The defence of Stalingrad was difficult—extremely difficult—and to their glory the Russians captured those tanks which my noble friend says were much nearer to the Russians than were ours. The Germans wished that they had been much further away from the Russians! We must give the Russians credit for the capture of those tanks. I am going to ask leave to withdraw my Motion, winch I understand is the usual method in your Lordships' House. I have not wide experience of the procedure in your Lordships' House, but I hope to have a little more, because I think that it is possible to get here some things for Russia, and I am going to try. I ask leave to withdraw my Motion, therefore, but I shall come back again if the Government do not increase supplies to Russia—again and again.
§ Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
§ House adjourned.