§ VISCOUNT ELIBANK had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are now able to make a statement regarding the constitution, size of and opportunities for service in the post-war Navy, Army and Air Force; and whether, with a view to attracting the best material in man and woman power, they will arrange that the conditions of employment will provide those selected with careers, secured with adequate pay and pensions and with reasonable chances of promotion; and to move for Papers.
§ The noble Viscount said: My Lords, in July last I put a Motion on the Order Paper in very similar terms to the Motion which appears in my name to-day. I was told on that occasion that whilst the Government realized the importance of the subject they were not then prepared to make a statement. Some five months have elapsed since then, so I have ventured, once more, to put down the question in the form of a Motion. I do not think I shall be regarded as being too importunate seeing that I have allowed five months to elapse between my former Motion and this. Before I actually move the Motion I should like to make a few general observations. To begin with I realize that the issues which are contained in my question are not at all easy for the Government to answer at the present time when the war is at its full height. At the same time I believe that they are issues which must be settled so far as possible, so that when the war comes to an end there may be a smooth transition from the Armed Forces in war-time to the Armed Forces in peace-time. I am aware that there will probably be two phases of this war, the first being over when Germany is defeated and the second when Japan is 364 defeated. Many people think, rightly or wrongly, that there will be a year at least between these two phases. In any case it is important to prepare for the first phase and try to be ready as far as possible with our arrangements when the first phase is over, so that we may slide more smoothly into the position when Japan is defeated.
§ The first part of my Motion has reference to the constitution, size of, and opportunities for service in, the post-war Navy, Army and Air Force. These issues are of tremendous importance to any of those men and women already serving in the Forces who may wish to continue serving in them after the war, to younger people of both sexes who may wish to adopt service in the Forces as a career, and to all of us in your Lordships' House and outside it who have any concern for the future security and integrity of this country and the British Commonwealth and indeed any concern for world peace. If the assumption is correct, and I believe it is correct, that these issues are of vital importance to the whole community, I cannot but express surprise that whilst in many quarters a great deal has been said about demobilization we have had no authoritative statement about the future position and conditions of these post-war Armed Forces.
§ The slogan we hear everywhere is "First in, first out." That was the slogan of the Minister of Labour and it has been repeated so often that it has almost become a parrot cry. What is the result? Many of those now serving in the Forces probably have been persuaded to have uppermost in their minds demobilization and how soon it is to be accomplished. They have nothing to balance against the career which might be open to them when they return to civil life. There is another slogan now which may appeal to them, the slogan of "Food, work and homes." They have got nothing as far as I am aware to guide them as to whether they would do better to remain in the Services or whether they would be better off in regard to food, work and homes if they apply for demobilization. I believe I am right in stating that no conditions for post-war service have been indicated so far to any in the Services who might wish to remain or might be persuaded to continue to serve in the Armed Forces in which 365 they served during the war. Perhaps the noble Lord who is going to reply may have information to show that I am wrong about that, but if there is this omission it must have a dampening effect upon the enthusiasm of those serving in the Forces who might wish to remain, with the consequence that many who might be prepared to continue to serve will be lost in the maelstrom of demobilization.
§ I can see no greater advantage than retaining in the post-war years men now in the Armed Forces, and for the matter of that women also. In a debate in another place Lady Astor, I think, said—I do not know with what knowledge—that some 35 per cent. of the women serving in the Forces to-day would be prepared to continue after the war. It would be a great advantage to retain men and women who have already received training and have had experience. These men and women would form a valuable foundation for the post-war Armed Forces, and I submit that everything possible should be done to retain their services within the confines of their suitability and the numbers that may be required or selected
§ Next there is the important point of what will be the size of each of the three Forces. Obviously the size must be governed by our commitments for defence after the war with Germany is over and after the war with Japan has ended. I venture to suggest that those requirements might be suitably divided under three main heads—first, home defence; secondly, Commonwealth and Empire defence; and thirdly, United Nations defence against aggressor nations, including occupational forces in enemy countries. As far as home defence is concerned, it should not be difficult to determine, having regard to our past and present experience, what should be the size of that Force. Commonwealth and Empire defence, I hope, will be settled in close co-operation with the Dominions overseas and with India. This question obviously, like that of home defence, must be governed by the air, sea and military bases necessary. In the last two weeks a series of articles has appeared in the Sunday Times written by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, and in last week's issue he made what I believe to be a very valuable proposal as to how Commonwealth and Empire defence should be 366 organized. I think that probably the Government will look into his proposals in the light of the great knowledge that he possesses on this subject.
§ As to my third main head, United Nations' defence against aggressor nations including occupational forces, I agree that that probably cannot be finally decided until we know exactly how the map of Europe and of some other parts of the world will be redrawn, and what air, sea and military bases must be, or will be, held and defended conjointly with our Allies. There is no doubt that there will be bases of these different characters that will have to be held conjointly if it is a question of defence against aggressor nations, or even in connexion with the establishment of occupational forces. I believe that, in spite of the apparent difficulties of those questions, and of the different categories that I have named, the Combined Staff, with all their knowledge and experience, ought at any rate to be able to get out some plan, and some good idea, in order to make a start with this problem, and to be ready when the victory over Germany is completed and even more ready when Japan is also in the bag.
§ There is another matter connected with the subject of defence which I venture to touch upon to-day. To me it appears a very vital question, and one which will have to be faced after the war. That is the question whether we shall have—or retain I might almost say—in this country some form of National Military Service. Personally, I have not the slightest doubt that some form of national service will be requisite for maintaining the three Armed Forces at such strength as will ensure our security in the directions which I have indicated. Can anyone truthfully say that we should not have been far better off to-day if we had had some form of military service before the war which would have given our young men a disciplinary and military training for a year or two years before they entered their civil avocations or entered the Armed Forces if they wished to do so? I say that it is absolutely futile to deny this. It is also futile to deny that we should have been much better prepared for this war in every way, and that, at least, the nation would not have lapsed into a state of mind that could hardly visualize war at all as a possibility, which left us weak and inert and at the mercy of the enemy when war 367 was declared, and, in fact, almost led to our defeat. So I hope we shall be wise in this generation. However much some people may dislike the idea of it, let us profit by the bitter experience that we have had, and not hesitate to have a measure of national military service that will help to make certain of our future security.
§ Now I want to refer briefly to the last points in my Motion. We cannot, I submit, expect the personnel of our post-war Armed Forces to accept the same bases as in the past in regard to pay, pensions and chances of promotion. If these were the same as before the war there would be—in view of all the other opportunities open to them in civil life—little inducement for our young men and women to remain in, or enter, any of the three Services after the war. I venture to suggest that these conditions must be made much better in all the three Services, and that these people must be able to see secure careers ahead of them in the Services, with adequate pay, satisfactory pension prospects and reasonable chances of promotion. Security must be the watchword inherent in the conditions of employment in all three Armed Forces, for only then and in that way will it be possible to attract to the Forces the best material in man-power and in womanpower. I do not believe that this is an occasion on which to discuss the details of what the pay, pensions and so on should be. It is better to wait until the Government have put forward a plan, or a statement of what they have in view. Then we can if we disagree say so, and make it clear in what way we do disagree. But, as I say, to-day I do not propose to enter into the question as to what those conditions should be.
§ In conclusion I should like to add this. During last week there was a debate in this House, which extended over three days, on the subject of Reconstruction. It was a most interesting and informative debate. Unfortunately I was unable to be present as I was grappling with the prevailing enemy. But I did read the reports of the whole of that debate, and I could not help feeling that there was one point, and a very important point, which had been missed. Every sort of suggestion was made in most eloquent, and sometimes brilliant, speeches with regard to how we should reconstruct the 368 country alter the war. All sorts of social measures and remedies, costing not millions but hundreds of millions and, perhaps, thousands of millions, were proposed, and yet amongst all these suggestions there was not a single word as to how we were going to make secure these benefits in the event of their being obtained. There was not one word about the security of the country, that security which means so much to us, which it has been proved means so much to us, and which is vital if those benefits which we are visualizing are to be brought about and to become permanent. This question of the post-war Armed Forces is not going to be an inexpensive matter. It is going to cost—and let us face it—a great deal of money, a great deal more than our ante-war Armed Forces cost us both in regard to personnel and equipment. Therefore, in bringing this subject to the notice of your Lordships to-day, I feel that it might perhaps have been better if this debate had taken place before the Reconstruction debate, so that those who were visualizing all those benefits would, at least, have known that they could not have them unless this country was made secure, and unless they were prepared to pay for that security. I beg to move.
LORD STRABOLGIMy Lords, I thought when I read the Motion in the name of my noble friend Lord Elibank, that this was to be a continuation of the Reconstruction debate. I do not think it clashes with the very interesting debate we had last week, and I am sorry that public engagements have kept Lord Woolton away and prevented his hearing the speech of my noble friend because, obviously, the strength and the numbers of the post-war Armed Forces will affect the whole problem with which Lord Woolton is now grappling. But no doubt there will be other opportunities of bringing this matter up, and I am glad that my noble friend has joined the small band of prodders in this House. The only part of his remarks with which I disagreed was that in which I rather thought I detected that he favours conscription after the war for the sake of conscription, because he thinks it is good for young men to go through the mill of the Army. I am prepared to support him, if it is necessary—I think it will be necessary—to have conscription after the war for at any rate a term of years; but let us regard it as a necessary evil and not as something good in itself. It is too contrary 369 to British traditions to accept compulsion as a benefit, apart from the real necessity of defending our vital interests.
VISCOUNT ELIBANKI went on to say that it was very important in connexion with keeping up the scale of armed strength which would be required after the war. I made both points.
LORD STRABOLGII do not want of course to misrepresent my noble friend. He is a soldier and I am a sailor: I think it is a good thing for a young man to go to sea, he thinks it is good for a young man to go into the Army. But it is a fact that immediately after the last war there was no settled policy on this subject at all, as on many others, and we found ourselves in great difficulties. The Army practically disbanded itself, and the pressure of relations and friends to get their men home was so great that the Government had to give way. The men were sent home and we found ourselves, during the long-drawn-out peace negotiations, with an ever-diminishing Army and our policy was adversely affected. As for the Air Force of the day, it was deliberately disbanded—a terrible blunder, as we now know. This time I do beg that we shall not be quite unprepared in that kind of way and I am sure that here I should get the support of the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank. We may need—and I think we shall need—considerable Armies for purposes of occupation and garrison duty, police duties, and so on, in Europe, for some considerable time.
I personally hope that whatever peace treaty follows this war will not be drawn up in a hurry, just for the sake of getting the peace treaty signed. I hope there will be a long cooling-off process before the final settlement is attempted. One of the troubles of the Peace Conference of Versailles was that we and our Allies were not prepared for it, and there were such conflicting interests that many blunders were made which could have been avoided. I hope that will not happen again. In the meantime, we may have to keep order in Europe and, as Lord Elibank said, I think we shall have to guard the position in Germany for some time to come.
How are we to get these troops? First of all let me say that I am only speaking for my noble friends on this side of the House on one aspect of the matter, of which I am going to speak. On the other part of my remarks I have not had the opportunity of consulting them, and in- 370 deed I do not think our Party has a policy; I do not think we can have one yet. The part in which I have the agreement of my noble friends and indeed of the Labour Party is this, that whether you have a professional voluntary Army after the war or a conscript Army—and I think we shall need both—you must raise the basic rate of pay. That will be found to be inescapable. I do not think you can expect men, after the German power has been broken, to continue for what may be a long period serving in the Pacific theatre of war alongside of American and Dominion soldiers, with the vast differences in pay between them, and if the men are to be asked to stay and finish the job in the Pacific, meeting the equally great menace of Japan in what may be a long-drawn-out and very difficult campaign, I think you will have to raise their pay. That applies also to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. My noble friend Lord Bruntisfield would never tolerate the pay of the Army being raised without a compensating rise of pay for the Navy. We are quite safe in his hands I know very well. But particularly with regard to the Army I think we shall have to face this problem, and pretty soon, and the sooner that is made known the better. I think the men serving now in India should have their pay increased. The cost of living is rising very fast in India, where the little luxuries which make life worth living for them are getting more and more expensive, and there are large American forces there with their much higher pay.
With regard to the question of how you are to get your men after the war, in the considerable numbers you may need, I do not imagine there will be any trouble with regard to the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy have always been able to get all the officers and men we have required for many years, indeed we have been able to pick and choose. And I dare say that will be the case again. There is something in the blood of our people and men go to sea very readily in this country. I think we can always draw on the volunteers and I hope that the Royal Navy will always be a voluntary service. Many seamen go in as boys because their fathers and grandfathers were in the Navy, and that tradition should be preserved. I imagine also that with regard to the Royal Air Force you will be able to get all the officers and men you require by voluntary means. If 371 you can, so much the better. With regard to the Army I can visualize the need of a long-service professional Army for service overseas—the garrisons overseas, the Far East and so on. If possible, that should be on a voluntary basis, with good pay and good conditions of service, and, above all, a wide avenue of promotion, so that intelligent young soldiers have every prospect of reaching the commissioned ranks. We want that sort of longterm professional Army for oversea duties, and I suggest that we shall find it necessary to scrap the Cardwell system of the alternating service at home and abroad. I do not know but I rather think we shall have to do that.
With regard to the Army for service in Europe—and here I repeat that I am speaking for myself, because I have not had the opportunity of consulting the members of my Party on this matter, and I do not think we have a policy yet—I think we shall have to maintain for some time after the war compulsory national service. I think it will be equitable, at any rate for the first few years. Why should a young man, just because of the year of his birth, escape the attentions of my right honourable friend Mr. Bevin? Why should he, because the war has been won, be exempt from all obligations to the State? Surely the young men who just missed the war should be retained with the Colours, or should be called to the Colours as the case may be, in order to form the Army of Occupation. The sooner this matter is decided upon by the Government the better, because I warn my noble friends on the Government Bench, especially my noble friend Lord Snell, who is Deputy-Leader of the House, that they will have to do a lot of educating of the people in this matter.
There will be a clamour to get the men home, and there will be great obstruction to continuing some form of national service for His Majesty's Army after the war unless you tell the people well in advance why it is necessary and the reasons for it, combined with an increase in pay, as I suggested earlier and as my noble friend Lord Elibank has stressed. That pay should be comparable with that of a skilled artisan in civil life, for a soldier is a skilled artisan to-day. It is a very complicated business to be a soldier, and he deserves the same pay as 372 a skilled artisan. If you explain the matter in advance, and also offer this better pay, you will avoid trouble. Otherwise, I feel, you will have trouble. These are the points I wish to make to your Lordships in the debate on this very important Motion, and I congratulate my noble friend Lord Elibank on bringing it forward in spite of his earlier rebuff.
§ LORD KEYESMy Lords, with reference to the noble Viscount's question as to whether His Majesty's Government will endeavour to attract the best material in man-power to the three Fighting Services, and in continuation of the appeal made by Lord Strabolgi, I wish to ask the noble Lord who is to reply whether it is really the intention of the Government to conscript for service in the mines boys who have voluntarily given up much of their spare time to train and qualify for the Army, Navy and Air Force, and to this end have spent, perhaps, two or three years in one of the Cadet Corps or training services. The majority of these boys, thanks to the training they have voluntarily undertaken—and perhaps also to hereditary instinct and ability—are all potential officers and noncommissioned officers, and under the Minister of Labour's policy of conscripting for service in the mines 20 per cent. of the boys who register, the country will be deprived of many potential young leaders who will be sorely needed in the great military campaigns that lie before us.
I understand that the Minister of Labour has arranged to exempt from the ballot boys apprenticed to certain skilled trades. If the exemption is limited to those under trade union protection it will be very invidious. May I point out that the Fighting Services are now also skilled trades, and that their leaders require special qualifications of courage and initiative? I quite appreciate that my noble friend who is replying for the Government may not be able to give a definite answer to-day, but I hope he will call the attention of the Government to the very grave anxiety that exists in the country on this point, and that shortly the Government will give an assurance that exemption will be extended to boys who have served their apprenticeship in the various Cadet Corps and training corps, who have voluntarily qualified for 373 the Fighting Services, which they are eager to join, and to whom in many cases it would be a real hardship and injustice if they were sent to the mines and thus deprived of following their chosen careers. Apart from that, the efforts which have been put into that training, and their qualification for leadership, would be lost to the country.
§ LORD SNELLMy Lords, I am afraid that the short answer to the question put by the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, has to be in the negative. However desirable it may be to be able correctly to estimate; the constitution and size and the opportunities for service in the post-war period of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, it is not at the present time possible to make that estimate. My noble friend himself agreed that it was a question which it was not easy for the Government to answer. Let me say at once that the many problems, including the one just mentioned by the noble and gallant Admiral will be closely considered by the Departments, and the observations of noble Lords will be taken into account. I should like to say, however, as a preliminary, that it is not wise to assume that, because the Government are not able to make a statement on these specific matters to-day, they have not these things in mind and that preparatory work is not going on. The problems of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, raised by my noble friend Lord Elibank are now receiving a good deal of careful study, and his suggestions will certainly be borne in mind as this study makes progress. It is, however, far too early to make a statement on this and other closely connected points as a statement would imply that plans had been formulated and worked out, if not in detail, yet in firm and definite outline. We have, in fact, a long way to go before it will be possible to do this on a sure basis.
When Germany has been defeated, the over-riding purpose of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force will be the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible moment. We cannot say with the necessary precision what commitments the three Services will have in a world in which German and Japanese militarism no longer exists. Until we know what the military commitments of the Services are likely to be in the post-war period, it is impossible to decide either on the size of 374 the Navy, Army, and Air Force or on their constitution. The study of these questions which is now going on will certainly cover the principles to be followed in manning the Forces, and also the conditions of service and emoluments that are likely to build up a post-war Navy, Army, and Air Force worthy of their great traditions in the past and equal to all the calls of the future. Noble Lords who have spoken on these important matters will realize that I am not able to answer specifically the various questions they have raised, but I shall undertake to see that their remarks are considered by the respective Departments.
VISCOUNT ELIBANKMy Lords, not long ago in a debate the noble Lord informed us that he had qualified as one of the best counsels for defence in this country. To-day he has been practising again, because we have learnt absolutely nothing from his reply except the fact, which we were told five months ago, that His Majesty's Government were considering this matter and that they regarded it as of great importance. Beyond that we are left exactly as we were in July of this year. I believe that it is a very serious situation because, as I stated in my remarks at the time, we are talking about demobilization and we may be losing some of the best material at present serving in the Army because the men will come back to civil life as soon as they get the opportunity of doing so. I therefore do beg the Government to do something to put this matter right. Even if they are not able to say what the requirements are, I do ask that they will at least issue some form of statement or announcement to the serving Forces telling them that they have got this matter under consideration, and also that they are considering the question of improving the conditions under which men will serve after the war. If that were done it would enable those serving who wish to remain in the Services to get at least some encouragement to do so. I think the Government must take this matter seriously.
I was very glad of the support which was given to me by my noble friend Lord Strabolgi, but I think he did not quite understand what I meant when I used the words "National Military Service." I meant to differentiate it from National Service of another character such as service in munition works and other war- 375 time work. That is the only reason I used the words National Military Service. Before the war if one used the term "National Service," one was understood as applying it to the three Services, but now "National Service" has a very much wider implication. I have the greatest sympathy with the suggestion my noble friend Lord Keyes put forward. We are told all these things will be turned over in the Government's mind. Although I agree that there are difficulties I am far from content with the reply which has been made to-day, and I shall at some future time put down another Motion of a similar character for the purpose of having a debate upon it. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
§ Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.