Lords Sitting of 15 December 1943

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

THE ADDRESS: MESSAGE FROM THE KING.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, I have to convey to the House the following Message from The King, signed with his own hand:
"I have received with great satisfaction the loyal and dutiful expression of your thanks for the Speech with which I have opened the present Session of Parliament."

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands on the Paper in the name of my noble friend Lord Cranborne.
Moved, That Standing Order No. XXXIX be considered in order to its being dispensed with, for the purpose of taking the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill and the Local Elections and Register of Electors (Temporary Provisions) Bill through their remaining stages.—(Lord Snell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

B.O.A.C.: LONDON AIRPORT.
VISCOUNT ROTHERMERE VISCOUNT ROTHERMERE rose to ask His Majesty's Government what progress is being made by the new governing members of the B.O.A.C. with special reference to the need for an up-to-date London airport for the use of civil air transport after the war; and to move for Papers. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, one essential ingredient in a successful air transport service is a London airport commensurate in size and convenience with the capital city of Great Britain, which is the largest city in the world. I feel that until some decision is come to upon a London airport, the success of an air transport system after the war cannot in any circumstances be certain. Passengers arriving in this country from far away will not,
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I think, be satisfied with being landed some hundreds of miles away from London and have to finish their journey by train. It is essential that passengers arriving in this country should be landed at an aerodrome within, say, fifteen miles of London, so that they can be taken to their accommodation in the centre of London by motor car. There has so far been no sign from His Majesty's Government that they intend to deal with this matter, and in the last debate, when I raised the issue, I said that I would put a Motion on the Order Paper for a future occasion.
To-day I believe that we are going to be answered by the noble Lord, Lord Sherwood, representing the Air Ministry. I hope that he will be able to give us something definite on the matter, though, judging by past occasions, it would not be wise to place our hopes too high. It would seem to me in regard to this London airport that a number of stages in its construction can be accomplished without any interference whatever with the war effort. For instance, the choosing of the site could in no way interfere with the war effort; the buying of the site could in no way interfere with the war effort. Whether the planning of the site and the construction would interfere with the war effort—unless the aerodrome could be used in the interim for war purposes—is another matter; but it would seem to me that that aerodrome could quite easily be used during the remainder of the war for war purposes, and this would at least be one of the few expenditures of money for war purposes which would give us a certain asset after the war. If the Air Ministry could buy the site, and then sterilize the country round the site—by which I mean prevent any buildings going up on the area, which would of course interfere with the value of it after the war—that would be a considerable step forward. And even if today we only get the assurance from my noble friend that that has been done, I should look upon that as a very great advance. I naturally would not ask, nor would it be right for your Lordships to know, where that airfield is likely to be: we do not want any information of that kind. All I want to know is that the Air Ministry is active in the matter, and has accomplished the first and most important moves in this direction.
I would also like to suggest that this London airport should be planned, not for the next two or three years only, but as far as it is humanly possible, should be planned to last for the next twenty years; and that it should be of such a magnitude and with such a length of runway that it would take whatever aeroplanes it is imagined will use it in the future. I would draw the attention of my noble friend to the fact that in America they are at this moment busy with the construction of a new and magnificent airfield at Idlewild. Already New York is possessed of an airport at LaGuardia and, believing that that airport will not be large enough to take the traffic which they imagine is coming after this war, they are at this moment busy planning another one, greater in scope and, if the plans materialize, capable of meeting the most optimistic estimates of traffic after the war. This new airfield, according to the proposals that are being put forward, is not being constructed with merely one or two horizontal runways; they are trying now to experiment with new types of runway so that a much greater peak load of traffic can be accommodated. As my noble friend probably knows, the result of that has been that horizontal runways have given place to V-shaped runways, and V-shaped runways in turn may give place to tangent runways. These runways, if V-shaped or tangent, will enable incoming planes to land simultaneously, and if they are so arranged that they do not interfere with the direction of the prevailing wind, they will not only eliminate the waiting above the aerodrome, which is a cause of great delay, but they will make for safety inasmuch as planes will be able to land at the same time with considerable distances between them. Of course the question of landing is also the question of taking off—the same thing applies in the other direction.
This new type of airport is capable of dealing with an immense amount of traffic per peak hour, and I am one of those who believe that, after the war, traffic at an airport of such importance as the London airport will be enormous. That will entirely depend, of course, on the airport. If the London airport can be made, as I believe it can, the junction for Europe, if at this London airport aeroplanes from America, Europe, and the Empire will arrive, with passengers who
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will be staying in this country and other passengers who will be getting out of one aeroplane into another, in order to go on to their destination—if London is to become that junction (and there is no reason why it should not do so), the airport must be planned in accordance with the prospect of tremendous traffic. At the present moment there are no alternatives. Alternatives will be built; and aeroplanes, like ships, not only need good harbours, but they can by-pass bad harbours. If the London airport is a bad airport, there is no reason why the centre of the traffic should not shift to Paris or some other equally important centre. Therefore the London airport must be planned now in order that it may be in readiness as soon after the war as possible. I suggest that in planning this airport, not only should the new airfield at Idlewild be studied, but also that American pilots and their convenience should be taken into consideration. The American pilots who are going to fly into this airport should be consulted as to their convenience, because if they like the London airport they are much more likely to influence the flying into it instead of by-passing it in favour of another centre.
I am sure that the noble Lord realizes all these points, and that he will take into consideration the fact that you cannot have a successful air transport system unless you have a main terminus or a head to it. If that centre of the air transport system is in Scotland or the West of England, it cannot be the same thing as being near London. I should like to see the offices and the administration of this air transport system at the London airport so that those concerned may see the business which they are administering going on around them all the time. Passengers who have to be put off at other aerodromes because of weather conditions or some other mishap will not be angry on that account, but if they are put off unnecessarily when their main destination is London, I feel they will look for other places to go to.
Another part of my Motion deals with the B.O.A.C. I do not know how much the noble Lord who will reply can report on the activities of this organization. The B.O.A.C. is very limited in its scope today, because most of the decisions which have to be taken must be taken by the Air Ministry. Aeroplanes and airfields do not come within its scope—they come under

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the Air Ministry. What, however, does come under the B.O.A.C. is the efficient organization of the service, and that is, I presume, what the executives of the B.O.A.C. are at present trying to create. I hope that the Air Ministry is giving them every help it can in order that they should do this. Everybody knows that the organization of our own air transport has never had such a good spirit of service as the air transport in America has had. It has never been conducted with the same efficiency, and I hope that the executives of the B.O.A.C. are most carefully going through the organization in order to see that these deficiencies are remedied. I believe that the new executives of the B.O.A.C, who have now been in office for about eight months, have already travelled a considerable distance over their own lines, and no doubt they have reported to the Air Ministry on what they have found.
I notice that several changes have already been made in personnel, and I hope that no resistance movement will grow up in order to avoid changes of that kind. If the executives are the right people, they should be trusted. If they arc the wrong people, they should be changed if they wish to make changes in the personnel, there should be no kind of intrigue, which is always a danger in a publicly-owned service. If a man is not up to his job in private business he is got rid of, and nobody says anything. If a man is got rid of in a publicly-owned service, there is immediately an outcry, nobody knowing the facts. No doubt the first repercussions reach the Air Ministry, and if they are unsuccessful there they probably go outside and get to Members of Parliament.
I am not going into the difficult question of whether we should have a publicly-owned air transport service or whether it should come under private enterprise, but I do say that unless it is given a chance, unless those who are put at the head of it are going to be trusted and backed up, it cannot, in any circumstances, be a successful service. I hope that the noble Lord and the Air Ministry are backing up those whom they have put in charge of the destinies of the B.O.A.C. If that is so, whether the B.O.A.C, after the War, is going to be the instrument or not, It has got a great mission to fulfil at the present time. It can build up the service and create the
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organization for air transport after the war, whether it is going to be divided up at the end of the war into a number of different subsidiary organizations or whether it is going to be given to private enterprise. At any rate there will be something to give. Unless it is created now there will be nothing either for the B.O.A.C. after the war or for private enterprise, or for a number of other instruments. It is the groundwork and the organization that I am anxious should be gone into by the Air Ministry and the executives of the B.O.A.C. at the present time. The B.O.A.C. must work in wartime under great difficulties—difficulties of aeroplanes and difficulties of being directed, for war purposes, to go in this direction or that direction in which they might not go in peace-time. Nevertheless they are the existing instrument created by law, and whilst that remains so I think we should do everything in our power to support them.
The noble Lord would probably not follow me as far as I am going this afternoon but I would like to ask him, on a rather broader issue, whether, in the framework within which the B.O.A.C. operates, anything has been done since the last debate to move ahead in the larger aspects. The debate that took place was, so far as information was concerned, more satisfactory than any we have had yet, though the information as disclosed was very small. Since then, although many of us have hoped there would be further information of developments, nothing at all has happened. Although the B.O.A.C. can accomplish a great deal in its own personal organization, it is confined by international decisions which we await, and until those decisions are come to I do not see how this House can decide any of the great problems of policy which at some time or other it will have to tackle. I would like to know from the noble Lord whether any progress has been made in that direction, even though it may not be possible for him to tell us exactly what it is. There was an Imperial Conference and we all hoped great things from it. I have no doubt that it made very considerable progress but everything has stopped again. Nothing seems to have gone any further and the decisions of the Imperial Conference, so far as we know, remain exactly where they were. I did hope that there was going to be a further International Conference, to be followed by

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another Imperial Conference, where more progress would be made, but so far as we know nothing of the kind has happened, and until those international decisions are come to, until the really basic decisions are made, I do not see how we are going to progress and lay the real foundations for the future of air transport.
There are certain basic considerations which it would seem to me must be agreed to, and can be quite easily agreed to by every country in the world. They are a number of what are called "freedoms," and there are at least four freedoms which it seems to me might perfectly well be agreed to by this country, America, Russia and the smaller countries without in any way preventing them from taking part in air transport. Your Lordships know what those four freedoms are but I see no reason why they should not be repeated. The first freedom of course is the right of innocent passage, and that would seem to me something to which no country could possibly object. Your Lordships know what the right of innocent passage is; it is merely the passage of an aeroplane on its lawful purposes. A second freedom is the right to land for non-traffic purposes. I think that is a perfectly easy thing to agree to. If an aeroplane has got out of its way, if it is landing somewhere where it had not intended to land, there is no reason why it should not have the right to land provided it does not pick up any passengers from the place at which it lands. The third freedom is the right to land passengers from the country of origin. Without that, of course, you could not have any international air transport at all. If an aeroplane coming from France had not got the right to land passengers in London it could not run a service at all. The fourth freedom about which I think there could not be anything but agreement is the right to pick up passengers for the country of origin. It a French aeroplane lands at a London airport it should be able to pick up passengers in order to take them back to France again. Those freedoms seem to me very elementary, but not even they have yet been agreed upon for post-war air transport, and until they are agreed to it seems to me rather difficult for us to tackle the problems which will have to be dealt with.
There are many other problems which may come afterwards and which we shall have to decide amongst ourselves. After all, we have to decide on the routes that we are going to run. Perhaps that has already been decided, I do not know. Perhaps the Air Ministry and B.O.A.C. have already mapped out the routes which they intend to follow. Then there are the air bases which will have to be decided upon. I bring these things forward only because I do not want to find when the war is ended that any of these things have not been decided. I would therefore ask whether the main air bases have been decided upon. All these problems have sooner or later got to be decided by Parliament. Another problem which has to be decided is whether the B.O.A.C, or whatever the instrument or instruments may be, is to receive a subsidy and if so what kind of a subsidy. My own opinion is that an air mail, like air passengers, should pay its proper price and that there should be no subsidy to lower the price of passenger air transport, but that the price of the mail should be made such that the air line can pay. These matters have to be decided as well as the fundamental question which has not been touched upon yet but upon which the Government have stated they have an open mind. That is as to whether the instrument after the war should be the B.O.A.C. or a number of B.O.A.C.'s or whether it should be private enterprise. That is a matter which sooner or later the Government and Parliament have got to decide. Without a great deal more information than we are allowed to have at present I do not see how we can ever come to a proper judgment upon that.
The other point that I would like to raise before I sit down is in regard to the controversy going on at the present time about the possibilities of air transport. There seems to be a feeling growing up that it is not going to be as great as many people have imagined. I am sorry if that feeling is growing up in this country because it is not growing up in America. On the contrary, the estimates of air traffic on the other side are being increased. Every expert conference that takes place increases the estimate of the number of machines expected to be in the air and the number of passengers they are expected to carry. The latest estimate from the United States of America, so far

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as the aircraft they hope to use are concerned, is that for domestic use they expect to operate 5,500 aeroplanes and for overseas 2,000. That may not appear to our minds very much, used as we are to the immense figures of aeroplane production in war-time, which we know are enormous. But if such numbers of aeroplanes are going to be operated in the United States the aircraft industry becomes immediately one of the biggest industries in the world. Instead of going back to desolation after the war, it can unquestionably be the most prosperous and essential part of our industry.
If the United States are going to operate 2,000 aeroplanes overseas, there is no reason why Great Britain should not be able to use 2,000. We have not got the same home market, but we have got the Colonial markets, and there is no reason why a great number of local planes flying from our Colonial possessions should not increase that number by some 500 or 600. If we include the Dominions the number can probably be raised by another thousand, so that we might have 3,500 aeroplanes being operated. I am not, of course, talking of the year after the war, but of three or four years after the war, and I think that in eight or nine years after the war these figures will look small. If that is the position, our industry must take its place in the future of this country. It would be a tragedy—as I am sure my noble friend Lord Brabazon will realize, and perhaps express if he tells us anything of the Committees over which he is presiding—if we do not have a. proper British type of air transport machine when the war ends.
That is another subject on which I do not suppose the Air Ministry will give us any information. I do not want, and I am sure your Lordships do not want, to see British air lines operated after the war with American aircraft. At the same time if American aircraft are better than our own we shall be forced to operate them or go out of business. It is a matter which the Air Ministry must take seriously into consideration, because however efficient B.O.A.C. may be or may not be, or may become or may not become, unless it has the best type of machines, it cannot hope to be a success. When we remember that after the war we as an Empire will have probably the greatest advantages any country could possibly have in the world
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with air bases and air routes, it seems to me that it would be a tragedy if we failed to rise to the occasion. There are always those who say that the future of air transport is not going to be so great as is imagined. There are always people who say that about any new industry. There were people who said steel ships were useless. Yet steel ships came to take the place of the wooden ships that had sailed the seas for centuries before. The same kind of people will say that air transport after the war will not become one of the greatest industries in the world. Your Lordships should take the optimistic view. I think there is a tremendous future for air transport after the war, and it is essential that we should take that view if we are going to be poorer after the war. I do not agree that we shall be poor, but if we do become a poor country, it will only be because we do not take advantage of the possibilities that lie before us. If we take advantage of these possibilities and of the resourcefulness and inventiveness of the British people, then we need not look forward to being a poor country but to becoming a rich country, rich by reason of human achievement. I beg to move.
LORD BRABAZON OF TARA: My Lords, I am sure you will agree that we have listened to a very eloquent and very instructive speech from the noble Viscount. We expect that sort of speech from a member of the great house of Harmsworth which played such a prominent part in the early days of flight. The members of that house were indeed great patrons. The noble Viscount's father was responsible, I suppose, for the great Blenheim machine which played an important part at the beginning of this war, and long before that, when others had no belief or faith in the future, his uncle always had faith in it and gave prizes with great munificence to encourage the art. I was lucky enough to get £1,000 of his uncle's money. For flying only a mile, it seems a very good reward, but I can assure your Lordships that it cost a good deal more than that to do it.
The Motion on the Paper deals with aerodromes, and the noble Viscount did indeed say a few words on that subject at the beginning of his speech. I must say I feel very great sympathy for the poor Minister who has to reply. I well remember when I first became a junior

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Minister at the Ministry of Transport asking the senior civil servant what my duties would be, and he said: "If there is a deputation to which the Ministry can say 'Yes,' it will be taken by the Minister; if, on the other hand, the Ministry have to say 'No,' you will take it." When I learn that to-day the Undersecretary is going to reply, I feel somehow that the Air Ministry have not got a very good brief and are pushing it on to him again. As the noble Viscount has roamed over the whole field, perhaps your Lordships might be given a treat to-day in having a reply, not only from the Under-Secretary, but from the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House.
I should very much like to attend one of those meetings between the Undersecretary, Lord Cherwell, Lord Beaver-brook and the Leader of the House, to decide who is going to reply to one of these debates. It would be interesting because they lead to such very different things—to the generally unsatisfactory reply of the Under-Secretary (for which he is not in any way responsible), to the soothing reply from Lord Cherwell, the vigorous reply from Lord Beaverbrook, and the Government reply from the Leader of the House. I think to-day that on this big subject it would be indeed enjoyable to have a few words from the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House. I look upon him as an ideal Minister, and I think that as Leader of the House nobody can ever approach him. He has to speak on every subject and he has immense knowledge. He has a wit which stings but never bruises, and in his important speeches not only is he listened to attentively by the whole House, but in particular by two uncles and a father, two of whom have mechanical aids so as not to miss a single syllable. The way he distinguishes himself in such circumstances is really above all praise.
Your Lordships sometimes make me go away from the point. What we are meant to talk about to-day is aerodromes, so I will come to ground. At the beginning of flight we thought one lb. per square foot was a very good load for an aeroplane to carry. Now machines will carry up to 70 lb. per square foot. The normal load is about 25 lb. to 40 lb. In order to get these long flights the tendency is to pile up wing loading, with the result
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that runs are becoming longer and longer until some machines are requiring runways as much as 5,000 yards in length. Well, if you get an aerodrome with runways of 5,000 yards in every direction, it covers a very considerable area. I am not saying that, temporarily, that may not be required. It may be, but I seriously hope that the designer is not going to compel us to go on in that way, because the thing becomes quite ridiculous. Maybe for a few years these great spaces will be wanted, but I suggest that it will only be wanted in a very few cases, as for instance when air transport is doing a very special job such as the London' to New York flight of 3,300 miles.
We have heard from Lord Rothermere a good deal about the aerodrome to be built in New York. I sincerely hope that we shall take advantage of all the advice to be obtained from those who are gaining experience in these matters in America, and that we shall not be second to them in any way. But one of the troubles concerning aerodromes, small or big, is the difficulty of getting an immense number of machines down. If you can get them down at the rate of one a minute you are doing something very, very remarkable. It seems to me that the rate of frequency is not going to be increased simply by the provision of a very big aerodrome as against several small ones. It is, of course, ridiculous to fly 3,000 miles across the world, and then to circle round an aerodrome for an hour or so awaiting an opportunity to descend. I quite appreciate that for the machines flying on the great long-distance routes, a super-aerodrome is required, and I hope that the Minister will be able to tell us that consideration is being given to that matter. But what I wanted to point out to-day was that there are other kinds of aerodromes needed, and that the big aerodrome is for the very, very long distance craft. There will, I hope, be commercial service machines flying short distances with great frequency and for them other aerodromes will be required. I think it would be helpful if the Minister will make a note of this, and let us know what is going to happen with regard to that city aerodrome which was talked about the other day. I should like to know if he can tell us whether it is going on or not. I am sure some information would be helpful.

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I earnestly trust that we shall not gamble on one aerodrome, but that we shall have several quite efficient aerodromes around the great City of London. In that connexion I can quite see that there is a danger attaching to these great air termini in that the tendency may be to push the private flying man out of the sky. I hope that the private man, with his little runabout aeroplane—which he will have one day, and which should not cost more than about £150—is not going to be entirely neglected, and that he will have some facilities where he will be able to lane without being a nuisance, so to speak, to the great airports of the world. Personally I feel that the day of the great flying boat, so far as flights between the big cities of the world are concerned, is drawing to a close. It has its uses in other parts of the world undoubtedly, but viewing the question broadly it seems to me that the very long routes will pass from the seaplane and be taken over by the land plane.
I really cannot roam further, although I understand that the noble Viscount would like me to say something about the machine side of the problem. I am not an executive, all I can do is to recommend, but I can assure your Lordships that I am getting on progressively and making recommendations. With regard to the big question with which we are dealing, I may say that we are not behindhand with it and that the Government are reacting so far very favourably to our recommendations, for which I thank them. In conclusion I must apologize to the noble Lord who is going to reply to the debate on behalf of the Government because I shall not be here to hear his speech. I shall, in fact, be doing duty on his behalf. I can assure him that anything he likes to say by way of criticism or even of abuse of myself as to any remarks which I have made to-day, I shall read with interest. I shall not reply to them. I could not reply anyhow, so it would not matter.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: My Lords, I was very glad that my noble friend Viscount Rothermere raised this question which is of great importance at the present time. I intend to limit my remarks to the question on the Paper, the question of aerodromes. I feel that in spite of the very interesting things that have already been said there are perhaps
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one or two other matters which might be usefully touched upon, particularly the matter of the airport of London after the war. London, after the war, will require more than one airport. We shall have to deal in London with three types of air traffic—Continental traffic, European traffic and home traffic, and the idea of one central airport in Hyde Park or any other central site on which some clearance may have been made by "Blitz" or by Hitler, is, I think, out of the question. The aeroplane of to-day, as Lord Brabazon has explained to us, needs a very long runway and very long, clear approaches. It will be many years before these are no longer necessary. Even if in later years, in time to come, we get air liners that are able to ascend and descend vertically, it would still be better for them to do so outside a crowded and foggy area like London, especially if a lot of machines are to be in the air at the same time. In any case ascent and descent combined with some forward speed can be regarded as very much safer, more economical and more convenient than vertical ascent and descent as demonstrated by the helicopter method.
The problems of the defence of London after the war will have changed—for the better we may hope—and with the increasing range of aircraft the London defences will tend to be stationed further away from London. It may therefore be possible for the Royal Air Force to allow such aerodromes as Northolt and Hendon to be used for civil air transport. Northolt particularly, stationed as it is on a new main road, the Western Avenue, would be conveniently placed for either a Continental or an Empire terminus. Hendon is a little too crowded for very fast aircraft. It might, on the other hand, be useful for local lines and as a feeder for the main airports. In the south, the Air Force might be willing to exchange Kenley for Croydon, as Kenley is more fog-free. Croydon, as no doubt your Lordships are aware, is notorious for fogs. If another war threatened the Air Force would, of course, take over all the aerodromes as it has always done in the past, but it is, I believe, essential that the London airport should be linked by local air services. Even before the war there was such a service between Croydon and Heston. That, of course, would be tremendously extended after the war and all these airports would have to be linked in that way to

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make a satisfactory job of the whole thing. The most important matter is that there should be good road communication between airport and the centre of London. Rail communication, I believe, is not so good as passengers have to find their way to the terminal railway station and have then either to walk or be transported to the aeroplane from the aerodrome station, whereas road transport can pick up the passengers in various parts of London and convey them straight to the door of the aeroplane. Therefore road transport is obviously much the best method. The road vehicle could also quite possibly be used during its journey from the centre of the City to the airport as a customs clearing station, thus saving a great deal of time.
London will also need a terminal for flying boats for some years after the war. I do not think myself that the flying boat that is unable to use land has a great future, but there will be a great future, I believe, for amphibians, and in due time I think that every large aeroplane will be able at least to land safely on the water. For passenger carrying, generally speaking; land aeroplanes provide far more speed in embarkation and disembarkation, and less inconvenience to the passengers. So I do not think we should waste too much money on flying boat stations. If flying boats are as convenient for load carrying as people maintain, then Bomber Command would probably be using them now. On the contrary we find that Bomber Command prefer land planes, and even Coastal Command now use a large number of land planes. The Empire and European airports in London should be owned and maintained entirely by the State, and one or more aerodromes for internal traffic might be owned by the City or County of London. I think, on the whole, it may be said that the airport problem should be fairly simple to solve. The harder problem, to my mind, is to get adequate roads between the airports and the centres of population; that is the crux of the situation as I see it.
LORD ROSSMORE: My Lords, I rise to address your Lordships for the first time, and if I use simple words I hope you will forgive me, for I cannot possibly compete with the great eloquence we
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have had in the debate to-day. I am sure you will wonder why I should be breaking silence to trespass on your Lordships' patience when I am in naval uniform, but, as you will see, I am only a temporary sailor; I have had the great honour of being appointed by the Admiralty and accepted by the Air Ministry to work in the Deputy Directorship of Air-Sea Rescue. That, as your Lordships know, is a service and an organization formed by the Air Ministry to take care of our pilots who force-land in the sea. Actually my work takes me somewhere between the air and the sea—a half-way house—and I would like to raise the question of the safety of aircraft after the war. That, I think, has not been raised in your Lordships' House at any time, and it is, we all agree, a very important question. But first, before I go into that, may I say a word as to how I see this flying business after the war? During the last war flying received a tremendous impetus, and then seemed rather to fade away. After this war I think we should endeavour to see the opposite happen and get the greatest use and value out of the air that we can. I would like to suggest that, instead of bringing people to the air, as in the past, we should plan to bring the air to the people; instead of taking people to. the airport, we should bring the airport to the people. Therefore I do think that London should have a greater airport.
But to come to the question of safety. Tremendous advances have been made in this sphere during the war. Safety is divided into two parts, the prevention of the accident and, if the accident does take place, the rescue; and it is, of course, the sea and air-sea rescue that I have been working on. The prevention of the accident, that is, the regulating of the aircraft and guiding and diverting it, particularly if it becomes distressed, is taken care of by Flying Control, and they have prevented accidents by the thousand, I suppose, during this war. Air-Sea Rescue, however, comes into play when the accident cannot be prevented, the aircraft force-lands in the sea, and the pilot and the airmen have to bale out. I am glad to tell your Lordships that that organization has been responsible for saving thousands of airmen, including airmen of our Allies, Norwegians, Dutch and Czechoslovaks and many Americans.

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The joint I want to make is that when the war is over all the Services which deal with the control and guiding of aircraft in the air, and also the rescue side, should be united under one independent body. I say independent because I think it should be in complete authority, and be free of any vested interests. If you want to ensure rescue from the sea you must operate from both shores and you must have a say in the other man's aircraft as well as your own. Thus at once very many international questions are raised if you want to have complete safety round the world. And it is no good having your organization to work half-way across the ocean, or half-way round the world. You must take it the whole distance and work from both shores, because then the distance from which you have to rescue anybody, or guide a distressed aircraft, is halved. Therefore I would like to sow a seed in the mind of my noble friend Lord Sherwood by suggesting that after the war there should be some sort of authority in this country, which has always played an important part in the work of rescue at sea. We have, for example, Trinity House for ships, and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, which have rendered such sterling service in this war. But they have got a very limited zone of operation, and what we want is one that will have no boundaries and stretch across the sea. We want safety in the air, security by the air, and success through the air. That is, perhaps, building castles in the air, but I would like to lay my foundation stone in the heart of the Empire, in the citadel of the world; and therefore I think we should have an airport for the City of London.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER -SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR (LORD SHERWOOD): My Lords, I am sure you would wish me to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Rossmore, on the speech he has just delivered. Those of us who happen to know the work he is doing, and the advance it has made during the time he has been identified with it, realize that when he was dealing with the question of safety in the air and the rescuing of people in peril through an accident, he was speaking on a subject with which he is very familiar. As I say, great progress has been made during this war, and the work is going forward with great strides. Your Lordships will always listen to someone so well informed as the noble Lord, and we all look forward, not
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only during the war but after the war, to hearing his views on a subject about which he knows so much.
I am glad that the noble Viscount, Lord Rothermere, has brought forward this Motion to-day. The noble Viscount put down his Motion in a very much narrower form than the other Motions he has introduced, but that did not prevent him, needless to say—there is no method of preventing it, as we know in this House—straying into a wider and broader field in the hope of throwing a fly over me or over the Leader of the House at a moment when, perhaps, we might not be entirely ready. I am not going to be caught. In the first place this is not the occasion, because definite points have been put down by the noble Viscount which are of sufficient importance in themselves to be fully considered. After all, this Corporation is our own. It belongs to the country. It was set up by Parliament and, as your Lordships know, nine months ago there was a change in the Board. Nine months ago the old Board suddenly handed in their cap and jacket to the Secretary of State for Air, and he was left to find another Board. My right honourable friend took considerable time and a great deal of trouble to get together a Board which, in his opinion, would be suitable and satisfactory to Parliament which had authorized its constitution. This new Board has only been in being for about six months, and that is not a long time for us to judge it. I can assure you that we feel, and I am certain that the public know well, that the choice my right honourable friend made in Lord Knollys, who sits here among us, and the various other members of the Board, has proved a great success. I can assure you there has never been a more vigorous, more enterprising, and more energetic Board than there is to-day.
Under their control the Corporation has more aircraft, more equipment—naturally a lot of it is not the best equipment we should wish it to have, and some of it is still in short supply—and more personnel than ever before. During this time they have achieved a greater route mileage than ever before. The mileage which the Corporation has flown this year comes to 13,000,000 miles compared with 10,000,000 miles last year, which is an increase of 24 per cent. As your Lordships know, practically all this flying is on official business, and is of the greatest help

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in the war effort. Lord Knollys and the Director-General, General Critchley, have themselves visited practically every station abroad that there is, and have gone into the administration and seen the difficulties on the spot. I can assure you that, where they found it necessary to take drastic and immediate action, they have taken it. These two, between them, have covered in a short space of time something like 50,000 miles on the Corporation's routes, and another member of the Board, Sir Harold Howitt, has just returned from India. It has been found necessary—I was glad that my noble friend Lord Rothermere mentioned this—to make certain changes in the administrative personnel. Such changes are inevitable in any proper reorganization, but I want to make it quite clear, with regard to the internal arrangements, including the administration of the staff, that it has always been the intention of Parliament that the Corporation should have autonomy in these matters, subject always, of course, to the power of the Secretary of State to dismiss the Board if he considers their management inefficient. It follows that the engagement and dismissal of staff is entirely the responsibility of the Corporation. I am sure that Lord Rothermere, who has always felt strongly on these matters, will agree that that is as it should be.
As I said, this Board has only been going about six months, and it is very difficult to tell the story of what has happened in the Corporation during war-time without giving away a great many interesting facts which would certainly be of advantage to the enemy. Therefore, I cannot say more on the question of the Board other than this, that whereas many people thought that there might be difficulties between the Board, the Air Ministry, and the Transport Command—several noble Lords expressed the view in this House that such a danger might arise—none of these fears has come true. I can assure noble Lords that at no time has there ever been such a spirit of working together and of joint understanding of the difficulties we have all got to face.
In the second part of his Motion the noble Viscount raised the matter of the London airport. I am fully aware, and everyone must be, of the immense importance of this question. As has been pointed out, not only is there a
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question of convenience involved, but there is also the question of how we stand in the world as regards other countries. Before the war, there is not the slightest shadow of doubt, other countries stood higher because of their fine airports—Templehof in Berlin and Le Bourget in Paris for instance. No one who has visited these aerodromes can doubt that they were finer than we had at Croydon. It is fully realized that this is not entirely a matter for the convenience of the Corporation. It is a matter which is obviously of national interest. My noble friend in his Motion seemed to be thinking it was a matter for the B.O.A.C. to deal with, but as he himself pointed out in his speech, it is not. This is a question for the Secretary of State to deal with. The question of airfields is entirely a matter for us, and not for the Board of the B.O.A.C. In fact it is laid down that the Corporation shall not, except with the authority of an order of the Secretary of State, acquire or construct any aerodrome in the British Isles.
On this question, with which Lord Brabazon also dealt—the question of what type of airfield we are going to have—three or four points have to be borne in mind. First, there are the types of air services which will in future serve the London area. Secondly, there is the future design of long-distance civil transport aircraft. So far, developments in design have called for a progressive increase in the size of airfields and the provision of hard surfaced runways, zoned approaches and extensive radio and lighting equipment. This has gone up by leaps and bounds, but I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, said when he hoped that people would not go too far in thinking that size was to be the only thing. Nevertheless there is no doubt that at the moment size is a big element when you come to choose an airfield. Thirdly, developments in operating technique, particularly in regard to aircraft arrivals and departures, in conditions of bad visibility, have to be taken into account. In the future, airfields will have to be planned to enable them to handle high densities of air traffic in all weathers by day and night. That, of course, is becoming clearer to everyone now. Air traffic, instead of consisting of just one or two machines coming in, will be such that you will

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have a great many doing so, and therefore air control is going to be very important indeed. Then, fourthly, you also have to take into account the development of internal "feeder" air services.
Lots of people have views on the question of an airport in London, and some have actually taken up the idea that you can have an airport in London itself, but I can assure your Lordships that if you cleared even the biggest bombed area in London you would not have anything like the size of land which you need for an airport. Proposals have also been examined on the question of having an overhead airfield, but this has been found to be impracticable. Apart from the impossibility of finding a site in the centre of London there are such questions as the amenities of the people who live in the area to be considered, and these cannot be dismissed. For example, we know that low flying, of which we had complaints before the war, would take place, and I have no doubt that if you tried to put an aerodrome in the middle of London there would be many complaints about the infringement of amenities. Whatever the advances may be that are made, one of the things we have to deal with at present is the noise of aeroplanes and another is the low level at which they fly, especially when taking off. They have to remain for a considerable time at a low level, and I am certain that that fact makes this idea impracticable. Coming to the question of safety, including the risks of a crash while landing or taking off, I am not so much concerned with that as with the question of amenities, which I do think would be a very big one indeed in densely populated areas.
Noble Lords will understand that for reasons of security we do not give away the names of aerodromes. If questions are to be asked in public we always request that the name of the aerodrome should be sent in privately and should not be put on the Order Paper or mentioned in any question. Therefore it would be wrong of me to say at this time where any aerodrome is going to be sited. All the airfields which are now being constructed are, of course, being constructed for the war, and no civil airports are being made. Everything is being done from the war point of view, but in planning our war-time airfields, especially those
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near large centres of population, we have had in mind, so far as military considerations allow, the needs of peace, and a chain of airfields has been provided which should go far to satisfy the requirements of post-war civil air transport. I do not wish to go further into this matter at the present time. We are fully aware of what is entailed and when we go into these questions we do consider how far the airfields should be used after the war.
I understand that at a later date there is to be another debate on a Motion by the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, to deal with some of the other questions that have arisen. To-day I only wished to deal with the two points that have been raised. Regarding the B.O.A.C. I desire to satisfy your Lordships that the choice the Secretary of State made has been a wise one and that this matter is going forward. I have also dealt with the question of a London airport, and I can assure your Lordships that on this point, as on the others which the noble Lord brought up, I have said what I could. I was glad to hear Lord Brabazon say that your Lordships could be satisfied that in the work he was doing in his Committee he was receiving the greatest help and was not in any way being hindered. I hope that statement will lead your Lordships to see that in these matters we are progressing as far as we possibly can.
VISCOUNT ROTHERMERE: My Lords, the Under-Secretary for Air, the noble Lord, Lord Sherwood, has certainly lived up to the reputation of past debates; in fact he has gone beyond it, because he has told us less to-day than practically at any other time that I can remember. There are only two points in his speech which I think gave us information. One was the mileage that the B.O.A.C. travelled in the last twelve months, the other the statement that the London airport obviously was not going to be in Hyde Park. He did not, however, tell us whether they had found a site, whether they had bought the site, or even whether they had the slightest idea where the site was going to be. Those were really the questions in regard to which I wanted to get an answer from him. He has found himself unable to tell us to-day. I never asked him to tell us where the site was, I did not want to know in any case, and I knew he could not possibly tell us, but I think he might have told us something

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concrete to the effect that at least he had found the right place and had set about buying it. He has not been able to tell us that to-day so we shall have to go through the routine, I am afraid, of another debate on the subject in the future, when we hope he will be able to come to us with the information. In the meantime I should like to ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

POST-WAR DEFENCE SERVICES.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK VISCOUNT ELIBANK had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are now able to make a statement regarding the constitution, size of and opportunities for service in the post-war Navy, Army and Air Force; and whether, with a view to attracting the best material in man and woman power, they will arrange that the conditions of employment will provide those selected with careers, secured with adequate pay and pensions and with reasonable chances of promotion; and to move for Papers.
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, in July last I put a Motion on the Order Paper in very similar terms to the Motion which appears in my name to-day. I was told on that occasion that whilst the Government realized the importance of the subject they were not then prepared to make a statement. Some five months have elapsed since then, so I have ventured, once more, to put down the question in the form of a Motion. I do not think I shall be regarded as being too importunate seeing that I have allowed five months to elapse between my former Motion and this. Before I actually move the Motion I should like to make a few general observations. To begin with I realize that the issues which are contained in my question are not at all easy for the Government to answer at the present time when the war is at its full height. At the same time I believe that they are issues which must be settled so far as possible, so that when the war comes to an end there may be a smooth transition from the Armed Forces in war-time to the Armed Forces in peace-time. I am aware that there will probably be two phases of this war, the first being over when Germany is defeated and the second when Japan is
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defeated. Many people think, rightly or wrongly, that there will be a year at least between these two phases. In any case it is important to prepare for the first phase and try to be ready as far as possible with our arrangements when the first phase is over, so that we may slide more smoothly into the position when Japan is defeated.
The first part of my Motion has reference to the constitution, size of, and opportunities for service in, the post-war Navy, Army and Air Force. These issues are of tremendous importance to any of those men and women already serving in the Forces who may wish to continue serving in them after the war, to younger people of both sexes who may wish to adopt service in the Forces as a career, and to all of us in your Lordships' House and outside it who have any concern for the future security and integrity of this country and the British Commonwealth and indeed any concern for world peace. If the assumption is correct, and I believe it is correct, that these issues are of vital importance to the whole community, I cannot but express surprise that whilst in many quarters a great deal has been said about demobilization we have had no authoritative statement about the future position and conditions of these post-war Armed Forces.
The slogan we hear everywhere is "First in, first out." That was the slogan of the Minister of Labour and it has been repeated so often that it has almost become a parrot cry. What is the result? Many of those now serving in the Forces probably have been persuaded to have uppermost in their minds demobilization and how soon it is to be accomplished. They have nothing to balance against the career which might be open to them when they return to civil life. There is another slogan now which may appeal to them, the slogan of "Food, work and homes." They have got nothing as far as I am aware to guide them as to whether they would do better to remain in the Services or whether they would be better off in regard to food, work and homes if they apply for demobilization. I believe I am right in stating that no conditions for post-war service have been indicated so far to any in the Services who might wish to remain or might be persuaded to continue to serve in the Armed Forces in which

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they served during the war. Perhaps the noble Lord who is going to reply may have information to show that I am wrong about that, but if there is this omission it must have a dampening effect upon the enthusiasm of those serving in the Forces who might wish to remain, with the consequence that many who might be prepared to continue to serve will be lost in the maelstrom of demobilization.
I can see no greater advantage than retaining in the post-war years men now in the Armed Forces, and for the matter of that women also. In a debate in another place Lady Astor, I think, said—I do not know with what knowledge—that some 35 per cent. of the women serving in the Forces to-day would be prepared to continue after the war. It would be a great advantage to retain men and women who have already received training and have had experience. These men and women would form a valuable foundation for the post-war Armed Forces, and I submit that everything possible should be done to retain their services within the confines of their suitability and the numbers that may be required or selected
Next there is the important point of what will be the size of each of the three Forces. Obviously the size must be governed by our commitments for defence after the war with Germany is over and after the war with Japan has ended. I venture to suggest that those requirements might be suitably divided under three main heads—first, home defence; secondly, Commonwealth and Empire defence; and thirdly, United Nations defence against aggressor nations, including occupational forces in enemy countries. As far as home defence is concerned, it should not be difficult to determine, having regard to our past and present experience, what should be the size of that Force. Commonwealth and Empire defence, I hope, will be settled in close co-operation with the Dominions overseas and with India. This question obviously, like that of home defence, must be governed by the air, sea and military bases necessary. In the last two weeks a series of articles has appeared in the Sunday Times written by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, and in last week's issue he made what I believe to be a very valuable proposal as to how Commonwealth and Empire defence should be
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organized. I think that probably the Government will look into his proposals in the light of the great knowledge that he possesses on this subject.
As to my third main head, United Nations' defence against aggressor nations including occupational forces, I agree that that probably cannot be finally decided until we know exactly how the map of Europe and of some other parts of the world will be redrawn, and what air, sea and military bases must be, or will be, held and defended conjointly with our Allies. There is no doubt that there will be bases of these different characters that will have to be held conjointly if it is a question of defence against aggressor nations, or even in connexion with the establishment of occupational forces. I believe that, in spite of the apparent difficulties of those questions, and of the different categories that I have named, the Combined Staff, with all their knowledge and experience, ought at any rate to be able to get out some plan, and some good idea, in order to make a start with this problem, and to be ready when the victory over Germany is completed and even more ready when Japan is also in the bag.
There is another matter connected with the subject of defence which I venture to touch upon to-day. To me it appears a very vital question, and one which will have to be faced after the war. That is the question whether we shall have—or retain I might almost say—in this country some form of National Military Service. Personally, I have not the slightest doubt that some form of national service will be requisite for maintaining the three Armed Forces at such strength as will ensure our security in the directions which I have indicated. Can anyone truthfully say that we should not have been far better off to-day if we had had some form of military service before the war which would have given our young men a disciplinary and military training for a year or two years before they entered their civil avocations or entered the Armed Forces if they wished to do so? I say that it is absolutely futile to deny this. It is also futile to deny that we should have been much better prepared for this war in every way, and that, at least, the nation would not have lapsed into a state of mind that could hardly visualize war at all as a possibility, which left us weak and inert and at the mercy of the enemy when war

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was declared, and, in fact, almost led to our defeat. So I hope we shall be wise in this generation. However much some people may dislike the idea of it, let us profit by the bitter experience that we have had, and not hesitate to have a measure of national military service that will help to make certain of our future security.
Now I want to refer briefly to the last points in my Motion. We cannot, I submit, expect the personnel of our post-war Armed Forces to accept the same bases as in the past in regard to pay, pensions and chances of promotion. If these were the same as before the war there would be—in view of all the other opportunities open to them in civil life—little inducement for our young men and women to remain in, or enter, any of the three Services after the war. I venture to suggest that these conditions must be made much better in all the three Services, and that these people must be able to see secure careers ahead of them in the Services, with adequate pay, satisfactory pension prospects and reasonable chances of promotion. Security must be the watchword inherent in the conditions of employment in all three Armed Forces, for only then and in that way will it be possible to attract to the Forces the best material in man-power and in womanpower. I do not believe that this is an occasion on which to discuss the details of what the pay, pensions and so on should be. It is better to wait until the Government have put forward a plan, or a statement of what they have in view. Then we can if we disagree say so, and make it clear in what way we do disagree. But, as I say, to-day I do not propose to enter into the question as to what those conditions should be.
In conclusion I should like to add this. During last week there was a debate in this House, which extended over three days, on the subject of Reconstruction. It was a most interesting and informative debate. Unfortunately I was unable to be present as I was grappling with the prevailing enemy. But I did read the reports of the whole of that debate, and I could not help feeling that there was one point, and a very important point, which had been missed. Every sort of suggestion was made in most eloquent, and sometimes brilliant, speeches with regard to how we should reconstruct the
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country alter the war. All sorts of social measures and remedies, costing not millions but hundreds of millions and, perhaps, thousands of millions, were proposed, and yet amongst all these suggestions there was not a single word as to how we were going to make secure these benefits in the event of their being obtained. There was not one word about the security of the country, that security which means so much to us, which it has been proved means so much to us, and which is vital if those benefits which we are visualizing are to be brought about and to become permanent. This question of the post-war Armed Forces is not going to be an inexpensive matter. It is going to cost—and let us face it—a great deal of money, a great deal more than our ante-war Armed Forces cost us both in regard to personnel and equipment. Therefore, in bringing this subject to the notice of your Lordships to-day, I feel that it might perhaps have been better if this debate had taken place before the Reconstruction debate, so that those who were visualizing all those benefits would, at least, have known that they could not have them unless this country was made secure, and unless they were prepared to pay for that security. I beg to move.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I thought when I read the Motion in the name of my noble friend Lord Elibank, that this was to be a continuation of the Reconstruction debate. I do not think it clashes with the very interesting debate we had last week, and I am sorry that public engagements have kept Lord Woolton away and prevented his hearing the speech of my noble friend because, obviously, the strength and the numbers of the post-war Armed Forces will affect the whole problem with which Lord Woolton is now grappling. But no doubt there will be other opportunities of bringing this matter up, and I am glad that my noble friend has joined the small band of prodders in this House. The only part of his remarks with which I disagreed was that in which I rather thought I detected that he favours conscription after the war for the sake of conscription, because he thinks it is good for young men to go through the mill of the Army. I am prepared to support him, if it is necessary—I think it will be necessary—to have conscription after the war for at any rate a term of years; but let us regard it as a necessary evil and not as something good in itself. It is too contrary

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to British traditions to accept compulsion as a benefit, apart from the real necessity of defending our vital interests.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: I went on to say that it was very important in connexion with keeping up the scale of armed strength which would be required after the war. I made both points.
LORD STRABOLGI: I do not want of course to misrepresent my noble friend. He is a soldier and I am a sailor: I think it is a good thing for a young man to go to sea, he thinks it is good for a young man to go into the Army. But it is a fact that immediately after the last war there was no settled policy on this subject at all, as on many others, and we found ourselves in great difficulties. The Army practically disbanded itself, and the pressure of relations and friends to get their men home was so great that the Government had to give way. The men were sent home and we found ourselves, during the long-drawn-out peace negotiations, with an ever-diminishing Army and our policy was adversely affected. As for the Air Force of the day, it was deliberately disbanded—a terrible blunder, as we now know. This time I do beg that we shall not be quite unprepared in that kind of way and I am sure that here I should get the support of the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank. We may need—and I think we shall need—considerable Armies for purposes of occupation and garrison duty, police duties, and so on, in Europe, for some considerable time.
I personally hope that whatever peace treaty follows this war will not be drawn up in a hurry, just for the sake of getting the peace treaty signed. I hope there will be a long cooling-off process before the final settlement is attempted. One of the troubles of the Peace Conference of Versailles was that we and our Allies were not prepared for it, and there were such conflicting interests that many blunders were made which could have been avoided. I hope that will not happen again. In the meantime, we may have to keep order in Europe and, as Lord Elibank said, I think we shall have to guard the position in Germany for some time to come.
How are we to get these troops? First of all let me say that I am only speaking for my noble friends on this side of the House on one aspect of the matter, of which I am going to speak. On the other part of my remarks I have not had the opportunity of consulting them, and in-
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deed I do not think our Party has a policy; I do not think we can have one yet. The part in which I have the agreement of my noble friends and indeed of the Labour Party is this, that whether you have a professional voluntary Army after the war or a conscript Army—and I think we shall need both—you must raise the basic rate of pay. That will be found to be inescapable. I do not think you can expect men, after the German power has been broken, to continue for what may be a long period serving in the Pacific theatre of war alongside of American and Dominion soldiers, with the vast differences in pay between them, and if the men are to be asked to stay and finish the job in the Pacific, meeting the equally great menace of Japan in what may be a long-drawn-out and very difficult campaign, I think you will have to raise their pay. That applies also to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. My noble friend Lord Bruntisfield would never tolerate the pay of the Army being raised without a compensating rise of pay for the Navy. We are quite safe in his hands I know very well. But particularly with regard to the Army I think we shall have to face this problem, and pretty soon, and the sooner that is made known the better. I think the men serving now in India should have their pay increased. The cost of living is rising very fast in India, where the little luxuries which make life worth living for them are getting more and more expensive, and there are large American forces there with their much higher pay.
With regard to the question of how you are to get your men after the war, in the considerable numbers you may need, I do not imagine there will be any trouble with regard to the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy have always been able to get all the officers and men we have required for many years, indeed we have been able to pick and choose. And I dare say that will be the case again. There is something in the blood of our people and men go to sea very readily in this country. I think we can always draw on the volunteers and I hope that the Royal Navy will always be a voluntary service. Many seamen go in as boys because their fathers and grandfathers were in the Navy, and that tradition should be preserved. I imagine also that with regard to the Royal Air Force you will be able to get all the officers and men you require by voluntary means. If

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you can, so much the better. With regard to the Army I can visualize the need of a long-service professional Army for service overseas—the garrisons overseas, the Far East and so on. If possible, that should be on a voluntary basis, with good pay and good conditions of service, and, above all, a wide avenue of promotion, so that intelligent young soldiers have every prospect of reaching the commissioned ranks. We want that sort of longterm professional Army for oversea duties, and I suggest that we shall find it necessary to scrap the Cardwell system of the alternating service at home and abroad. I do not know but I rather think we shall have to do that.
With regard to the Army for service in Europe—and here I repeat that I am speaking for myself, because I have not had the opportunity of consulting the members of my Party on this matter, and I do not think we have a policy yet—I think we shall have to maintain for some time after the war compulsory national service. I think it will be equitable, at any rate for the first few years. Why should a young man, just because of the year of his birth, escape the attentions of my right honourable friend Mr. Bevin? Why should he, because the war has been won, be exempt from all obligations to the State? Surely the young men who just missed the war should be retained with the Colours, or should be called to the Colours as the case may be, in order to form the Army of Occupation. The sooner this matter is decided upon by the Government the better, because I warn my noble friends on the Government Bench, especially my noble friend Lord Snell, who is Deputy-Leader of the House, that they will have to do a lot of educating of the people in this matter.
There will be a clamour to get the men home, and there will be great obstruction to continuing some form of national service for His Majesty's Army after the war unless you tell the people well in advance why it is necessary and the reasons for it, combined with an increase in pay, as I suggested earlier and as my noble friend Lord Elibank has stressed. That pay should be comparable with that of a skilled artisan in civil life, for a soldier is a skilled artisan to-day. It is a very complicated business to be a soldier, and he deserves the same pay as
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a skilled artisan. If you explain the matter in advance, and also offer this better pay, you will avoid trouble. Otherwise, I feel, you will have trouble. These are the points I wish to make to your Lordships in the debate on this very important Motion, and I congratulate my noble friend Lord Elibank on bringing it forward in spite of his earlier rebuff.
LORD KEYES: My Lords, with reference to the noble Viscount's question as to whether His Majesty's Government will endeavour to attract the best material in man-power to the three Fighting Services, and in continuation of the appeal made by Lord Strabolgi, I wish to ask the noble Lord who is to reply whether it is really the intention of the Government to conscript for service in the mines boys who have voluntarily given up much of their spare time to train and qualify for the Army, Navy and Air Force, and to this end have spent, perhaps, two or three years in one of the Cadet Corps or training services. The majority of these boys, thanks to the training they have voluntarily undertaken—and perhaps also to hereditary instinct and ability—are all potential officers and noncommissioned officers, and under the Minister of Labour's policy of conscripting for service in the mines 20 per cent. of the boys who register, the country will be deprived of many potential young leaders who will be sorely needed in the great military campaigns that lie before us.
I understand that the Minister of Labour has arranged to exempt from the ballot boys apprenticed to certain skilled trades. If the exemption is limited to those under trade union protection it will be very invidious. May I point out that the Fighting Services are now also skilled trades, and that their leaders require special qualifications of courage and initiative? I quite appreciate that my noble friend who is replying for the Government may not be able to give a definite answer to-day, but I hope he will call the attention of the Government to the very grave anxiety that exists in the country on this point, and that shortly the Government will give an assurance that exemption will be extended to boys who have served their apprenticeship in the various Cadet Corps and training corps, who have voluntarily qualified for

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the Fighting Services, which they are eager to join, and to whom in many cases it would be a real hardship and injustice if they were sent to the mines and thus deprived of following their chosen careers. Apart from that, the efforts which have been put into that training, and their qualification for leadership, would be lost to the country.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, I am afraid that the short answer to the question put by the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, has to be in the negative. However desirable it may be to be able correctly to estimate; the constitution and size and the opportunities for service in the post-war period of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, it is not at the present time possible to make that estimate. My noble friend himself agreed that it was a question which it was not easy for the Government to answer. Let me say at once that the many problems, including the one just mentioned by the noble and gallant Admiral will be closely considered by the Departments, and the observations of noble Lords will be taken into account. I should like to say, however, as a preliminary, that it is not wise to assume that, because the Government are not able to make a statement on these specific matters to-day, they have not these things in mind and that preparatory work is not going on. The problems of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, raised by my noble friend Lord Elibank are now receiving a good deal of careful study, and his suggestions will certainly be borne in mind as this study makes progress. It is, however, far too early to make a statement on this and other closely connected points as a statement would imply that plans had been formulated and worked out, if not in detail, yet in firm and definite outline. We have, in fact, a long way to go before it will be possible to do this on a sure basis.
When Germany has been defeated, the over-riding purpose of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force will be the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible moment. We cannot say with the necessary precision what commitments the three Services will have in a world in which German and Japanese militarism no longer exists. Until we know what the military commitments of the Services are likely to be in the post-war period, it is impossible to decide either on the size of
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the Navy, Army, and Air Force or on their constitution. The study of these questions which is now going on will certainly cover the principles to be followed in manning the Forces, and also the conditions of service and emoluments that are likely to build up a post-war Navy, Army, and Air Force worthy of their great traditions in the past and equal to all the calls of the future. Noble Lords who have spoken on these important matters will realize that I am not able to answer specifically the various questions they have raised, but I shall undertake to see that their remarks are considered by the respective Departments.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, not long ago in a debate the noble Lord informed us that he had qualified as one of the best counsels for defence in this country. To-day he has been practising again, because we have learnt absolutely nothing from his reply except the fact, which we were told five months ago, that His Majesty's Government were considering this matter and that they regarded it as of great importance. Beyond that we are left exactly as we were in July of this year. I believe that it is a very serious situation because, as I stated in my remarks at the time, we are talking about demobilization and we may be losing some of the best material at present serving in the Army because the men will come back to civil life as soon as they get the opportunity of doing so. I therefore do beg the Government to do something to put this matter right. Even if they are not able to say what the requirements are, I do ask that they will at least issue some form of statement or announcement to the serving Forces telling them that they have got this matter under consideration, and also that they are considering the question of improving the conditions under which men will serve after the war. If that were done it would enable those serving who wish to remain in the Services to get at least some encouragement to do so. I think the Government must take this matter seriously.
I was very glad of the support which was given to me by my noble friend Lord Strabolgi, but I think he did not quite understand what I meant when I used the words "National Military Service." I meant to differentiate it from National Service of another character such as service in munition works and other war-

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time work. That is the only reason I used the words National Military Service. Before the war if one used the term "National Service," one was understood as applying it to the three Services, but now "National Service" has a very much wider implication. I have the greatest sympathy with the suggestion my noble friend Lord Keyes put forward. We are told all these things will be turned over in the Government's mind. Although I agree that there are difficulties I am far from content with the reply which has been made to-day, and I shall at some future time put down another Motion of a similar character for the purpose of having a debate upon it. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

MRS. GANDHI.
LORD STRABOLGIs: My Lords, I beg to ask the question standing in my name.
[The question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government, what is the state of health of Mrs. Gandhi; and whether it is the intention of the Government of India to release this lady from detention.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE EARL OF MUNSTER): My Lords, Mrs. Gandhi, who has been subject to heart attacks for some time, had two severe heart attacks at the end of November. Since then she has had a further slight attack, but although weak is reported to be better. The Government of India some time ago considered her release on grounds of health, but they formed the view, to which they still hold, that it would be in Mrs. Gandhi's own interest to remain where she is with one of the most eminent heart specialists in India living on the premises and able to attend her at any time.
LORD STRABOLGI: Do I understand from that reply of the noble Earl that there is no question of the safety of the public or safety of the nation, and that it is only a matter of Mrs. Gandhi's own well-being which actuates the Government in India?
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I thought I had answered the question on the Paper. The question addressed to me by the noble Lord referred to Mrs. Gandhi's health. Therefore I replied on that point. I have said the Government of India have considered her release on grounds of health, but that they believe, taking it by and large, she is better where she is at the present time with a heart specialist in permanent attendance upon her.

LANDLORD AND TENANT (REQUISITIONED LAND) BILL [H.L.]
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.

EXPIRING LAWS CONTINUANCE BILL
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been dispensed with, Bill read 3a, and passed.

LOCAL ELECTIONS AND REGISTER OF ELECTORS (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been dispensed with, Bill read 3a, and passed.

COURTS (EMERGENCY POWERS) (SCOTLAND) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a(according to Order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (ADAPTATION OF ACTS OF PARLIAMENT) (AMENDMENT) ORDER, 1943.
  GOVERNMENT OF BURMA (INDIA-BURMA FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT) ORDER, 1943.

    GOVERNMENT OF BURMA (AUDITS AND ACCOUNTS) ORDER, 1943.
    THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name.
    Moved, That the Special Orders as reported from the India and Burma Orders Committee yesterday, be approved.—(The Earl of Munster).
    On Question, Motion agreed to.

ELECTORAL REGISTRATION REGULATIONS, 1943.
Report from the Special Orders Committee, That they have examined the Special Order as required by the Stand-
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ing Orders of the House; that in their opinion the Order raises important questions of policy and principle that the Order is not founded on precedent; that in the opinion of the Committee the Order cannot be passed by the House without special attention, but that no further inquiry is necessary before the House proceeds to a decision on the Resolution to approve the said Order.
Read, and ordered to lie on the Table.
House adjourned.