INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AFTER THE WAR.

HL Deb 15 April 1943 vol 127 cc223-57

Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved yesterday by Viscount Cecil of Chelwood—namely, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to the nature of the International Authority which it would be desirable to set up after the war with a view to the maintenance of peace and the encouragement of international co-operation.

VISCOUNT MAUGHAM

My Lords, I should like, in beginning the observations which I am desirous of making to the House, to associate myself with those who have thanked the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, for introducing this Motion, and for introducing it in a very elaborate and well-conceived speech. Many notable speeches were made yesterday, and it would not become me to express my opinion of them seriatim. But I should like to say that when I heard the speech of my noble friend the Earl of Perth, I thought that had I been the next speaker on the list I should have followed the example which is sometimes set by Judges in cases where they are sitting with several other Judges, and have added merely the words "I concur". Reflection, however, has led me to think that I might usefully add some remarks on matters which, if not mentioned, might be likely to give rise to misapprehension as to the feelings of this House.

First, I want to say a word as to the Dominions. It too often happens, in this House, that we speak of "we" or "Britain" without remembering, or at any rate without observing, that our Dominions have also to be consulted in connexion with any important step which is proposed to be taken by this country. Some of your Lordships will, perhaps, recall that after the last war, on the proposal—a very plausible proposal—made by the Labour Party, to make arbitration in some respects compulsory, the matter was brought to an end because the Dominions refused to consent for reasons which, we had to agree, were perfectly reasonable. I should like therefore to remark that as regards the peace, and as regards any steps for setting up what I think we have agreed to call the Central International Authority, the Dominions have a very great call to be consulted and to have their opinions treated with the very greatest respect.

It so happens that I was in Canada during the few weeks preceding the war, and I must say that it was not without emotion that I observed the enthusiasm with which the men of Canada were determined to cross the Atlantic and to come to the aid of this country. I know that exactly the same feeling was entertained in the other Dominions. Having regard to their knowledge of the great losses which they incurred in the last war, and having regard to the great distance of their countries from Europe, it is really a most astounding thing that the invisible ties which bind them to the Mother Country should induce so many thousands of men to cross the waters and to risk life and limb in helping us. It is therefore beyond doubt, as I am sure that all your Lordships, without exception, will agree, that they have to be considered and their views very carefully weighed in regard to the steps which have to be taken to achieve the objects which the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, had in view in putting down this Motion. I would also say that, agreeing again with the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Perth, I think that there can be no doubt that, notwithstanding the observations which I am going to make now, there is nothing to prevent early consultation being undertaken both with the Dominions and with the other countries who happen to be our Allies.

Again, I think that there is almost universal agreement in this House that there must be a Central International Assembly or Authority of some kind, with complete right to deal with the major questions which will be involved at or after the peace, and having, no doubt, committees and other subordinate ramifications to deal with some of the various matters with which only a few of the nations will be concerned. I think, too, that there is universal agreement that the hope of success for the future is greatly dependent upon agreement between this country and the Dominions on the one hand, and the United States of America on the other. Therefore I want to suggest to the Government that there is a fence to be got over, or a caution to be observed, in regard to our ideas as to the powers which the International Assembly can have. My noble friend Lord Samuel very properly and usefully called our attention to the fact that the treaty-making power in the United States of America rests with the President, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Senate sitting at the time; and that, having regard to the large isolationist group in the United States, that is something which the Government have to consider very carefully in putting forward a scheme for the International Assembly.

I think I might help your Lordships also by reminding you of what is a very serious fact, based upon the terms of the American Constitution. It is that the power of making war, and the power of supplying and supporting Armies which are engaged on behalf of the United States in war, rests with Congress, and the language of the Constitution and its context certainly lead to a possibility that the Congress there referred to is the Congress which is in existence at the time of the declaration of war. I speak with very guarded language here, for no one who is aware of the hundreds of books which have been written for the purpose of construing and deciding the effect of the American Constitution—no British lawyer, at any rate—will express any opinion on the subject without great hesitation; but it may well be that that is the effect of the section to which I am referring—namely, that only the Congress in existence at the time is able to declare war, with the possible consequence that such a provision as is contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations, which involves the countries which are parties to it in taking the step of declaring war, is ultra vires the Constitution.

I repeat, to make my attitude clear, that I am not stating that as a fact; I am stating that as what occurs to me, as a stranger to this law, as a very serious doubt. In other words, I can see—and I think that this point was raised when the United States declined to sign the Covenant of the League—that it may be ultra vires the Constitution to enter into a treaty which binds the States party to it to declare war in a certain event, or to agree to support an Army in that event, because that is a matter which must be decided by the Congress in existence at the time when the matter arises for decision. Of course, if that doubt which I express is well founded, it would have a very serious effect on one of the most important clauses that one would expect to find in a renewal in some form of the League of Nations. If the United States were unable to enter into such a clause as we find in the League of Nations Covenant, which obliges the members who sign it to provide assistance in carrying out the objects of the League in the events mentioned in the text—if that were found to be ultra vires the United States Constitution, the other nations would also say: "We, too, cannot bind ourselves to anything more than the United States is willing to bind itself to or is enabled to bind itself to." So that I think we have to bear in mind that rock which may be in the way of a completely satisfactory International Authority.

As I say, a treaty promising armed intervention might be impossible, and here I want incidentally to mention a matter which was the subject of one of the questions formulated by my noble friend Lord Lytton. Among those questions was this: What contribution are His Majesty's Government prepared to make to the provision of that security? That is a thing which I think it may be impossible for the United States to say, if it involves armed intervention of a certain character. Then the noble Earl went on to say: Are they prepared to abandon finally that policy, which was so often and so disastrously declared in the years immediately preceding this war, of never using the Armed Forces of this country except for the defence of British interests? I conceive that that question does not arise here to-day. For my part, without knowing what the rest of your Lordships think about it, I strongly oppose the notion that we should bind ourselves to accept the view which the noble Earl is apparently advocating there, and I object very strongly to the notion that our care not to be involved in war during the years immediately preceding the present conflict led to disaster.

But may I add this? At a time when we are discussing the setting up of an International Authority to consider all subjects which might lead countries into war, to suggest that we can go to war on our own, whether our interests are involved or not, seems to me to be unwise. On the other hand, I do not think in fact that there is much difference between me and the noble Earl as to when Britain with her Dominions should go to war when her interests are not involved. I can conceive that there may be cases in which our material interests were not involved, but in which our honour was involved, or something of that kind, where, according to my view, we should be justified in going to war because the matter would involve indirectly the interests of this country. I only observe that because I do not want to be thought as differing altogether from the high sentiments which the noble Earl has stated to the House. Before parting with that question I would observe that the Sanctions Clause in the existing League of Nations Covenant was a very far-reaching and admirably drawn clause. It did not fail because of any faults in the Covenant of the League; it failed because the various people who should have been willing to support it refused to support it. Sanctions, of course, are of no use at all if, with half a dozen nations complying with their obligations under the Covenant, there are a dozen who refuse to comply. That is very much what happened in the lamentable case of the action of this country when Mussolini entered on a war of aggression against Abyssinia.

I would just mention here another matter, the question of the suggested Council for Europe and of another Council for Asia, mentioned in the great broadcast of the Prime Minister. Though I think one of your Lordships has doubts about that suggestion, to my mind it is of great value, and I conceive that it is almost certain to come into force after the war is over. It is not to be supposed to be likely that the war in Europe will come to an end at precisely the same time as the war in the Far East. I think that the contrary is almost certain. Some of your Lordships have spoken of peace as if it would be peace all over the world at the same moment. To my mind that is exceedingly unlikely. I think it is much more probable that in the war in Europe there will be an armistice long before there is an armistice between Japan and the countries at war with her. What follows then? Surely no one of us is disposed to argue in favour of the proposition that we must postpone the making of a peace treaty in Europe until we have managed to settle with Japan. That would be the most disastrous thing to do. We and our Allies have to settle questions of boundaries of the greatest importance and difficulty, questions of customs, questions of trade, every kind of question which is involved in restoring the countries of Europe to a decent economic position again. That cannot wait—it may be for months, it may be for years—while in the Far East the war is continuing against Japan.

To my mind the best course for Europe will be to enter into a peace treaty for Europe as soon as possible after the armistice, without delaying a week longer than is necessary to have the terms of peace formulated in a reasonable way. In the last war the Armistice was on November II, and the Peace Treaty was signed at the end of June, if I am not mistaken. That was only the Treaty of Versailles. Some of your Lordships have spoken as if there were but one treaty in the last war. There were five, and I conceive it is quite possible that after this war there may be as many. I hope there will not be, but it is quite possible, and they may be entered into at different dates. After the first is entered into—I am talking now of the peace, not of the armistice, though the same thing is true as regards the armistice—we want to take various steps, to which some of your Lordships have already alluded, of the very greatest importance and value for those unhappy countries which have been overrun by the Hun. It has already been pointed out that one of the very first things to be done is to disarm the enemy. In a sense I agree—first or second does not matter for my present purpose—but I am not sure that the very first thing to be done, or the thing to be done contemporaneously, is not to help the unfortunate devastated countries to resume their economic life as soon as possible.

I have already in another speech occupied some of your Lordships' time in pointing out what most of you already knew—namely, that half of Europe, perhaps, has been devastated by the forces of Germany, its factories have been destroyed, its machinery taken away, and its skilled labourers removed to Germany. These are things we have got to set about at once because the alternative is that we shall have to feed and support all these countries, we know not for how long, and in the meantime their inhabitants will be in a perfectly miserable condition. Your Lordships will all agree to that. Therefore there are these two things to be done, and in the meantime we may be discussing and considering what is to follow. There is something else which can be done at once. Again it is something the expediency of which I do not think anyone will doubt. We are all agreed that the International Labour Office should start to function again immediately. That is a part of the Covenant of the League, and I do not know why that should not be done immediately there is an armistice with Germany. The other thing that can be done—again it has been mentioned—is that Article 23 of the Covenant of the League, under which such magnificient work has been done, should start to function immediately after the war. While we are discussing—because that will take some time—the precise form of a new International Authority to take the place of the League and the Covenant, I see no reason why the League of Nations should not at once be revived for the purposes at least of its functions so far as they relate to the International Labour Office and the multifarious powers under Article 23. These things ought not to wait for an elaborate system which, as I have said, will require a long time to discuss; they should be put into force at once.

I agree entirely with the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, that we must proceed by stages. I agree also with him and the noble Earl, Lord Perth, that there must be a central organization with a written? constitution. That central organization should have power to give directions to the various subsidiary councils which must be set up to deal with all sorts of other and, perhaps, not so vital matters. It is very desirable that we should begin consultations on these matters. There is one matter which I must mention. It is one on which I find myself with regret obliged to say I entirely disagree with the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel. I do not believe it would be right to accept his suggestion as to applying the Mandates system to all our Colonies or to a number of them. If we are asked to do that, other nations would have to be asked to do the same thing. I do not believe there is a chance of getting the other European countries with Colonies to agree to hand them over to a Mandates authority. I do not believe it is possible that our Dominions would agree to such a thing. I have strong reason to believe that some of them, at least, would totally disagree. I do not believe—this must be more a matter of conjecture—that the United States of America would have anything to do with such a proposal. Their conduct with regard to the Philippines leads me to suppose that no treaty of that kind which has got to be approved, as Lord Samuel has pointed out, by two-thirds of the Senate—a treaty which involves the United States coming under a Mandates authority with regard to a number of Colonies—would meet with the approval of a sufficient majority of the Senate to ratify it. Though with regret, I must say that that is a proposal which does not in any way gain my approval or approbation.

I have already said that I have been desirous of saving time by expressing agreement with Lord Perth's speech of yesterday, and I do not think I can usefully occupy your Lordships any longer, even on this complex subject, because I think it must be left so largely, not to the Government alone, but to the Allies in this war to determine even the most general scheme for the establishment of an International Authority after this war. I will conclude merely by saying that there never has been in the history of this country any problem so difficult and complex to confront our Government and the Governments of these Allied Powers as that which is involved in the noble Viscount's Motion. I think we shall all be desirous of wishing the Government God-speed in their attempt to solve the problems and we should be desirous of helping them in every way we can.

EARL DE LA WARR

My Lords, I think we are all agreed that we are deeply grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, for having raised the question, which is perforce very much in all our minds at the present moment. It is all the more appropriate to have done so following so soon, as it does, on the broadcast speech of the Prime Minister the other day, a speech, if I may say so, that raised the level of post-war dis- cussions to an entirely new height. So far as I know, during the course of this debate, there has been only one point of dissent expressed with regard to that speech, though it is a very important point. That is on the question of the time-table. The noble Earl, Lord Perth, particularly referred to it. The noble Viscount who has just sat down, so far as I could gather, made the appeal that we should not wait until Japan was defeated as well as Germany before we began preparations on the treaty of peace with Germany. God forbid that we should wait as long as that. What is concerning some of us is the suggestion that we should wait until Germany is actually defeated. It is not a question of over-optimism as to when the war is likely to end. There is the overriding point that however long the war may continue—and certainly I think he would be a foolish and optimistic man who assumed for a moment that it was likely to end soon—however far off the end may be, there are many reasons which lead one to think that there is at least a strong possibility that when it does end it may end very quickly, as did the last long war. Moreover, when the end does come, such is going to be the catastrophic position of Europe and the world that it will be necessary to have plans ready for immediate application. Further, if those plans are going to be worth anything at all they must be of a far-reaching and drastic character. Plans that are worth while are, therefore, going to take a very long time indeed to prepare.

VISCOUNT MAUGHAM

May I say I hope I have not so expressed myself that the House thinks I am averse from consultations beginning? I was only expressing my opinion against any delay in making our peace treaty after an armistice in Europe until we could make a peace treaty or have an armistice with Japan. It was another way of saying that the probability was we should have our peace treaty here a long time before there was another peace treaty in the Far East.

EARL DE LA WARR

I shall probably find when I read the Official Report that I quite misunderstood the noble Viscount, and of course if that is so I gladly apologize to him. I was speaking about the need for immediate preparation of our plans for what the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, has referred to in his Motion as setting up an International Authority, quite apart from the immense question of the feeding and succouring of stricken Europe, the occupied countries—a task that may well be even larger and take even longer than some of us have yet realized. There is something of even greater and more immediate importance than that for the future, and that is that immediately the war with Germany is concluded there should be erected over us, so to speak, an umbrella or a roof of security in order that all nations of the world shall feel able to face the future with some degree of security and confidence. Security and confidence are the greatest steadying forces possible, and what some of us, I think, fear is that if that roof is not speedily or immediately erected you will have every nation starting at once staking out its claims and having, perforce, to think on its own narrow lines.

The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, and the noble Lord, Lord Addison, yesterday referred to the inevitable increase of the already very strong feeling of nationality that has developed throughout the last few generations in Europe. That is bound to be so. Nothing increases the development of that feeling of nationality so much as the persecution to which these countries have been subjected. Therefore we might well find that people who yearn to take long views will not dare to do so. We only have to look at what happened after the last war for an example. Take France. There are many people who think France did not take an entirely wise view after the last war. There were probably a multitude of reasons for that. What was the overriding reason? Was it not that, first, the United States of America and then this country felt unable to give France that sense of security and those guarantees which alone would have given her the confidence to enable her to take a long view? And the real danger surely is that that situation may recur in every persecuted and occupied country in Europe.

If that umbrella has to be erected, by whom can it be erected? Many of us welcomed the reference in the broadcast speech of the Prime Minister to the League of Nations. I hope to see the return of some League of Nations system, but it is perfectly obvious that we cannot look to a new League of Nations for immediate security. That will have to be given by the four great victorious Powers, Great Britain, the United States, Russia and China, and I hope we shall not wait until the end of the Japanese War before we bring China into these vital discussions, even though to do so might seem more logical. If we are going to give security it must be on the basis of reality. We cannot afford the illusions of the twenty years after the last war. If this security is to be real—the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, encouraged me to think that he also feels the same—the principle of equal votes for all on all occasions, though it may be a very right: principle, is also very unpractical, for the simple reason that it will not give us the security which we must have. In this case if those who are going to give security are those who will have to do the fighting, they must have the means for implementing guarantees. Equally they have got to have the last word in the determination of policies affecting peace and war.

On that structure can be built up a League of Nations, Councils of Europe and Asia, and so on, to which the Prime Minister referred, but the roof of security must be provided by the four great Powers, and they must have the effective say in the matter. Even so it is going to be very difficult to get all these countries to agree. I only hope that our country will not forget the pre-war lesson that, if you seek to avoid the risk of accepting certain challenges at a certain moment, you may lay yourself open to the certain danger of certain war at a later stage. There was a phrase current before the war—the most pernicious and dangerous phrase ever coined—that Great Britain cannot police the world. If Great Britain cannot police the world, then she cannot paint red one quarter of the map of the globe. It may be right to say that we cannot police the world, or that we cannot paint one quarter of the map of the world red, but the two things cannot go together. But that is a digression.

The first reason for making preparations at once for setting up an International Authority immediately on the conclusion of the war with Germany is that there must be a sense of confidence and security in order that the necessary long-term plans may be made for the future. There is a second reason, possibly an even greater reason. It seems to me that we have got to face the eventuality that Germany may lose every single battle from now on. It is a certainty that, sooner or later, she is going to lose this war. It is a certainty that her surrender will be unconditional, because we have stated that we shall continue this war until Germany's surrender is unconditional. But supposing, when all these things have happened, Germany is surrounded by a vacuum composed of countries starved and diseased and depopulated. Are we quite sure that with that position, unless we are prepared to go ahead, Germany will not achieve her aim of domination by different means? Are we quite sure that even now, by the increased horrors she is perpetrating on these countries, she is not preparing a second line by which she is going to achieve her object of world or at least European domination? I am convinced myself that she is, but it is not inevitable that she should succeed if we are ready immediately the war is over with our International Authority that can go in, take control, and, if necessary, garrison Germany militarily as well as economically. We must have an International Authority that can undertake the feeding and rebuilding of devastated Europe so that, throughout the years when we are controlling Germany, we can be removing the vacuum, restocking devastated lands, restarting agriculture, moving the German settlers who have already been planted in these territories back into their own country, and encouraging the regional federation—or confederation as the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, said—of these small countries in order that they shall build themselves on the basis of strength and not weakness.

These, I believe, are two immediate reasons for preparing to set up our International Authority in the near future. We shall have to go on to rebuild, not the League of Nations, but a League of Nations and that body, as the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, said, will be responsible for such questions as economic reconstruction, international monetary problems, the exchange of raw materials, labour conditions, world food and agricultural policies, and the co-ordination of policies for dealing with backward peoples. I think most of us will agree with what the Secretary of State for the Colonies said the other day, that we do not believe in a condominium, but never- theless there must be co-operation on an international basis, perhaps on the lines repeatedly suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, of a Council of Africa. All these are fundamental problems that have to be dealt with. They are all foundations for the erection of the building that is to carry the roof, but the foundations will not exist for a day unless the roof is there. It is a programme that will take months or even years of preparation, and that is a reason for starting preparations at once.

The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, said yesterday that we shall need all the good will that we can mobilize. The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, agreed with him. We must all agree with him. But I think we must have something more than good will. The trouble before the war was that there were men with good will but without determination. We must have a spirit that sees not only problems and dangers but opportunities. There was a great and, to my mind, glorious phrase in the Prime Minister's broadcast the other day. Referring to the future, he spoke of "the mystery, the peril and the splendour of this vast sphere of action that stands before us." I cannot help feeling that that is a phrase which I would like to see set up in every school in this country where the young generation, which has got to tackle these problems of the future that we are discussing to-day, is growing up. That phrase embodies the spirit that built up this country and built up our Empire, and that is the only spirit in which Great Britain can plan successfully either for herself or for the world. It is the spirit that can see when action is necessary and is prepared to take that action when it is decided that it is necessary.

LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE

My Lords, I would like to add my quota of thanks to the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, for putting down this Motion. I think that it is rather overdue, but I hope that noble Lords and people in the country who read reports of this debate will not read into it the idea that the end of the war is near. Listening to some of the speeches made by noble Lords, and speaking to many of my friends, I have been imbued with a feeling that realities are forgotten and that their minds are occupied with the search for the ideal. At the end of this dreadful war, when it comes, we shall have, as a first measure, to deal with realities. I had certain experience after the last war of dealing with the German population and with the German mind. I was closely in touch with Cologne and the various occupation authorities there and elsewhere for two and a half years. I came into contact also with various bodies in Berlin and in Paris. My experience leads me to think that we ought to be very careful after this war that we do not make the mistakes that we made after the last war.

In listening to yesterday's debate I was impressed very much by three speeches—not that the other speeches were not first-class; they were all, in fact, of a very high standard; but three speeches appealed to me very much. The speech of my noble friend Viscount Samuel, I felt was an extremely well thought-out and statesmanlike utterance. I thought, also, that the noble and most reverend Lord Lang made a very useful contribution which was in close touch with realities. Then there was the speech of my noble friend the Earl of Perth. He approached the matter very much from his own side, which is the Foreign Office side, and with his great knowledge of that Department and of the League of Nations he certainly got down to the realities of the situation. It is perfectly true to say that the time has now arrived when the Governments of the various United Nations ought to get together and consult as to what they are going to do when the "Cease fire" comes. We ought to discuss that matter now; but I hesitate to think that we should go to the length of preparing to set up an organization or an instrument to deal with the situation that will arise when the "Cease fire" is sounded.

We have got to consult—and I am speaking now, not of the world situation, but largely of the European and Mediterranean situation—as to how far we are going to carry through what various politicians. Pressmen and others have been speaking of—namely, the definite disarmament in all directions of these aggressors against whom we have been fighting in the cause of freedom. That task of disarmament was very badly performed after the last war. I wonder if noble Lords can visualize what is going to happen when the "Cease fire" is sounded this time. There is not going to be any rush to Paris or to London or anywhere else to draw up a peace treaty. I hope and trust that there will be an interval of years between the time of the "Cease fire" and the formation of a peace treaty. We want to examine and carefully consider many matters, and to get away from what I call the impulses of the war, before we go the length of considering the formation of a peace treaty, reconstructing frontiers, and dealing with all the other matters that were dealt with in the last treaty. We do not want a form of treaty that is going, during a short period of years, to demand reform and alteration. That was the curse of the last treaty. Everyone knows that those various frontiers, negotiated in a manner similar to the selling of carpets in Eastern markets, were the cause of many of the troubles from which we suffered after the last war.

There is no doubt that we—and when I say "we" I mean the Associated Nations—shall have to occupy Germany and Italy, Germany especially. I wonder if noble Lords really understand what occupation means. Occupation means not only the sending of Armies to remain in the occupied countries, but it means a long-term policy of occupation. It means the planning and building of barracks, it means the setting up of married quarters for officers, non-commissioned officers and men. You cannot send an occupying Army into a strange country unless you send their women and children with them. The curse of an Army of Occupation is that otherwise they get mixed up in the population abroad. That is why in the occupation of Germany we had to take the wives and families of the troops over in order to restrain what after all is only the human instinct of soldiers—or indeed of all human beings—the instinct to get mixed up in the population among whom they are stationed. Therefore, as I say, you must have at once a policy of the building of barracks, the building of married quarters, and all the other paraphernalia concerned with occupation. And may I say this: the country which is going to provide those facilities can well afford to pay for them, because it will not have to pay for an army of its own.

How long will it be necessary to keep troops in the occupied countries? I venture to think that it may well be that the Allied Powers may not all think alike about the length of time for which their troops should be kept there; but the fact remains that the present generation of Germans will not change their attitude of mind in our time, and our only hope lies in the new generation, which will have to be guided as regards education and moral instincts. I hope that this country will understand, therefore, that many years of occupation will be required if we are going to safeguard our people and the people of Europe from another devastating Germanic war. It is quite true that the United States may not regard the matter in the same way as ourselves. I can quite understand their point of view. They may want to withdraw their troops from occupation after a certain period of years, but I think that we and Russia will have to make up our minds that we shall need a standing Army for a very long time in order to see that we obtain thorough disarmament. Disarmament means not only the destruction of physical arms but the control of the means of production. It means dealing with the chemical industry; it means dealing with the Prussian spirit; it means dealing with the home of the Prussian. We shall do well to think of what will be required of us when the "Cease fire" sounds.

There is another matter which will require consideration, and that is the characteristic of the British soldier. It is very curious that when soldiers occupy a country for a period of years they become extremely friendly with the population of the country in which they find themselves, and it may well be—and I say this in the presence of two old members of the Foreign Office, the noble Lord, Lord Tyrrell, and the noble Earl, Lord Perth—that a long occupation of German territory may lead ultimately to a different orientation of politics in Europe.

I hope and trust that the instrument which must ultimately be created, other than the military instrument, will not be the League of Nations. Whatever good the League has done—and it has certainly done very good work on labour questions, in dealing with drugs, and in many other directions, especially with regard to refugees—the League of Nations is an unfortunate name now, in view of its past history, and it ought not to be continued. We ought to have a new body, and I hope that the Council of Europe, which was referred to by the Prime Minister in his famous broadcast, will take the place of the League. But, looking at the realities of the situation, that Council of Europe must certainly for many years consist mainly of the Allied and United Nations, and, however much other nations may want to come into that body, they can do so only as observers and without executive power. The old League of Nations was swayed one way and another by the votes of people who had no intention of carrying out any of the obligations of the Covenant. I hope, therefore, that the new Council of Europe will consist of those who are prepared to nominate beforehand the quota of force which they are prepared to put behind the decisions of that body, and behind the decisions of the other bodies which will hinge on it.

In addition to the quota of troops, possibly by far the best controlling force will be, as my noble friend Lord Davies has advocated for many years, the control of the air. We shall have to be very hardhearted on this question of air control. We shall have to say that other people shall not have an Air Force, and that this Air Force is to be used for one purpose alone, which is to reinforce the decisions taken by the Council and the decisions taken by the various Courts of Law which will have to be formed in Europe on a much larger scale than the old Court at The Hague. These Courts will have to be independent of the national Governments of the various countries. It is only by the fair and prompt administration of justice, coupled with the power to enforce the decisions taken, that it will be possible to get some form of confederation in Europe—not federation, but, as my noble friend Lord Samuel so well said, confederation.

There is another point to which I think it is necessary to refer. In dealing with the political situation after the military occupation, we may find that other countries than Germany may be difficult to handle, and it may be well for the United Nations to agree amongst themselves how they will handle the possible situations which may arise. I can see the possibility of political wedges being driven in all directions when we ultimately come to the formation of a political instrument in the form of a Council. The first thing which I think we must do, apart from a purely military occupation—and we must do it quickly—is to set up Courts to deal with war criminals and their just punishment, and to secure the return of law, to which my noble friend Lord Maugham referred so well the other day, and the establishment of law and order. The restoration of law and order will not be needed in German territory alone; there may be other places where it will be necessary for the United Nations to step in and establish law and order.

I hope that we shall not, in establishing this Council which is going to direct the affairs of Europe after the war, make the terrible mistake of writing a constitution. I think the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, was very wise when he expressed the hope that we should keep clear of the incubus of a written constitution. Let us start the organization and build it up as it grows; the laws will come along as they are required. If you put it down in writing, as was done in the Covenant of the League, then we shall get into all the old troubles that we had in past days. It would be a terrible thing to make the same mistake again and establish a political authority to deal with the affairs of Europe before you have got a settled and properly organized series of Courts dealing with law and order. I believe the soldiers will be able to see to that much better than the politicians, and if there is one person whose authority the German thoroughly recognizes it is the power behind the throne. Without power you can do nothing. All the talking machines of the world will never persuade the Germans to do anything; it is the power behind the talking machines that will convince them. I hope the Government will refuse to assent to any early formation of an international instrument of the kind referred to in this debate and will stick to realities, and that, however many ideals they may have for the distant future, they will not allow them to influence what they do when the "Cease fire" sounds.

LORD MELCHETT

My Lords, we are all very grateful to the noble Viscount who introduced this very interesting debate. Yesterday's speeches tended rather to deal with the big moral issues involved, and to-day the speeches have stressed rather more the problems of the disarmament of the enemy and the occupation of the enemy countries after victory has been won. I should not like the House to think that because I propose to direct my observations to an entirely different aspect of this question I consider either of those matters less important. But whatever is done in regard to the holding down of our enemies, and whatever is done in regard to the organization for peace after the war, we shall not achieve success unless that peace is based on sound conditions. The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, said yesterday that a proportion of those nations who were engaged in the experiment of the League of Nations were not in earnest in their endeavours, and he attributed part of the failure of that system after the last war to that reason. I think we should also attribute a considerable proportion of that failure not so much to ill will as to ignorance—ignorance of a number of the essential matters which affect the life and the livelihood, the prosperity and therefore the peace, of mankind.

One of the gravest criticisms of the Treaty of Versailles and of the efforts of the League of Nations afterwards was the total ignoring of the industrial problems with which they were faced. The greater part of mankind lives by means of productive industry or by distributing the products of industry, and until those problems are settled on some reasonable basis, future peace cannot be ensured, whatever treaties you make We have lived through the very interesting experience of having seen in the last war a brilliant young man, a Treasury official, now a member of your Lordships' House, who wrote a book in which he predicted with great accuracy the economic consequences of the peace we were making. He was ignored, and his work was ignored until relatively recently. If we make that same type of mistake again, however high our moral endeavour, and however much good will we start with, we shall fail in this matter again. That is why I wish to stress the vital importance of intelligent administration in any type of organization that is set up after the war and, with that, of an efficient and effective monetary policy both for national and international affairs.

I welcome, and I am sure there are many members of your Lordships' House who equally welcome, the efforts that have recently been made under the auspices—shall I say of the United State Government and His Majesty's Government? to introduce new types of currency, signalized, I believe, as "bancor" and "unitas," which we may later on see united into a common policy. There are many criticisms that can be, and undoubtedly will be, levelled at these novel experiments. If you consider carefully the great dangers that you are faced with, the disaster that has befallen us and the extreme collapse of orthodox finance of the past, I think you will agree that the time has come for men with experience such as are engaged on these new proposals to be allowed to have their say and to discuss these matters among themselves.

There is one last point to which I wish to refer, and that is that in all these matters again you will achieve no sound result if you are not equally advised by some eminent and knowledgeable and practical men of science. Science is capable of upsetting the plans of the wisest statesmen, of producing a condition of affairs in the world quite different from that which everybody thought likely. Therefore you must have your scientific aspect of this problem before your eyes in any organization that is set up and any type of treaty that is made and any proposal looking forward to the future. I wonder how many members of the House realize the detestation with which most men of science see the use that is made of the fruits of their labour and genius. Things that should have been of enormous benefit to man are used for the most horrible type of destruction, and the men who have done so much to make the forward movement of man possible are entitled to be consulted when plans are made for the future.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE) (Lord Cecil)

My Lords, we are at present—we in this country and the other countries who are engaged in the war with us—at that most difficult moment which occurs in every war; we are beginning to see through the fog of battle the end of the conflict, and yet, as my noble friend Lord Hutchison said just now—and he was wise to remind us of it—we have not yet nearly reached that end, or cannot be certain that we have nearly reached it. In such circumstances, if we concentrate our eyes entirely on the future, we are only too likely to prejudice the present, and in we concentrate our eyes entirely on the present we only too probably shall prejudice the future. It is in those very difficult circumstances that the debates in this House nowadays take place. One day the attention of noble Lords will be entirely devoted to questions relating to the conduct of the war, questions such as the structure of the War Cabinet, which was discussed last week, or the U-boat campaign; then the next day we allow ourselves to peep into the future, to raise our eyes from the bogs and jungles through which we are so painfully wending our way to the blue hills of the future, and try to visualize the life which we hope to lead when we get there. Such, as I understand it, is the purpose of the Motions which the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, have put on the Paper and which have been under discussion by your Lordships during the last two days.

Their object, as Lord Cecil himself explained, was not hostile. The purpose was to ventilate these difficult questions so that when the war comes to an end the people of this country will not be found totally unprepared. I do not suppose there is anybody who would suggest that the question of a future International Authority was not a proper subject for discussion. Clearly it is both right and proper that we should look forward. There is, I know, a tendency in some quarters, to draw, or attempt to draw, a sharp division between peace and war, and to say that we must not consider the one until we have finished with the other. I suggest that, in fact, no such sharp dividing line can be drawn. Obviously, as Lord Cecil of Chelwood himself pointed out, our immediate preoccupation must be with the war, and we must not allow anything to cause us to relax our efforts; but no one can tell when or how the war will end and when we must be ready to face the new problems which the cessation of hostilities will bring.

If it be true that in peace we must be prepared for war, it is surely equally true that in war we must be prepared for peace. We must be making, if I may use what has become a fashionable political term, "blueprints" of the new international structure which we aim to set up when peace comes. Very likely these blueprints will require substantial alteration in the light of circumstances which are not yet known. It is no good at the present stage attempting to go into very great detail, but at any rate we can clarify our minds as to the general plan and—this is important—see that we do not incorporate features which past experience has shown to be faulty. Lord Cecil of Chelwood, speaking yesterday, said—and your Lordships were reminded of it by Lord Hutchison just now—that in his opinion the nations entered the League too light-heartedly last time, that they did so without sufficient forethought of the obligations they were incurring. Surely we must not make that mistake again this time.

The first point, it seems to me, on which we must make up our minds is this: Is an international organization necessary at all for the future prosperity of the world? The answer to that first and very simple question is, I imagine, not in any doubt. It has already been given in this debate. We have had contributions from noble Lords of very different political views; but on this particular point they were absolutely united. The need for some system to regulate the relationships of States was universally recognized. As the most reverend and noble Lord, Lord Lang, said in his speech, referring to the League before the war, and paying tribute to the framers of the Covenant, the goal which they were seeking is the one which is still before us at the present time. The first League of Nations may well have failed to achieve all that some of us hoped, but the spirit which inspired its creators, one may be certain, burns more brightly than ever. Those framers of the Covenant, of whom Lord Cecil was himself one of the most eminent, sought, to quote the words of the Preamble of the Covenant, "to promote international co-operation and achieve international peace and security." Who can doubt that on the successful achievement of that aim depends the whole future of civilization?

Even the failure of the League—for it did fail in what it intended—was not wasted. As the Prime Minister said in the broadcast, to which so much reference has been made in this debate: I hope we shall not lightly cast aside all the immense work accomplished by the creation of the League of Nations. Certainly we must take as our foundation the lofty conception of freedom, now, and morality which was the spirit of the Leaque And he added, and very properly added, that if we are to avoid another catastrophe, we must create this time a more effective League. If we are to create a more effective League we must evidently examine, not only what was good in the League, but also what was bad, and try and clear our minds as to what weaknesses have been shown up by twenty years' application of the Covenant to the problems of the world.

Immediately, it seems to me, we come up against a fundamental question. The League was an association of sovereign States. How far can an association of sovereign States achieve the objects which we all have in view? This is a very difficult question; it is no good pretending it is not. To-day we are fighting a war for freedom and the rights of man. The Foreign Secretary the other day at Mary-land, spoke of the United Nations as a close-knit framework of free nations—free, as we in Britain and as you here understand the word. We believe that it is only within such a framework as this that the individual can rise to the full height of his powers and call his soul his own. If that conception is correct—and I think it cannot be doubted that it is correct—it must seem illogical to seek to impose on free nations, against their will, the dictation of an arbitrary International Authority. Indeed, I believe such an attempt would be bound to fail. As Lord Cecil said in his speech yesterday, one of the strongest passions to-day is the desire of nationalities for independence and that they should not be under the control of any other nationality; nor, he added—and this is equally to the point—was there any likelihood that nations would be willing to hand over the whole control of their foreign policy, their defence, or their finance to any outside authority, whether it be national or international. The great majority of us would agree with that and, if so, it seems to me our object must be to obtain respect for the decisions of the new International Authority not by compulsion but by consent.

We ourselves in this country, as the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, pointed out yesterday, of our own free will, subordinate our individual interests to the interests of the community as a whole. We must seek to extend that conception to the community of nations. I do not pretend that it will be easy. This question of sovereignty in my view—I put it with all deference—is probably the hardest one the nations will have to face after the war. But there is no way of avoiding it; it has got to be faced. I do not propose to dogmatize about it to-day. I would only suggest that the new structure is more likely to endure if it is based on voluntary agreement than if it is based on dictation, artificially or arbitrarily imposed.

I come next to the second question which I think we should ask ourselves: Must the new international organization be universal? That surely is the second main point. The failure of the League has often been ascribed to the fact that it was not universal, and no doubt the decision of the United States of America not to join the League did strike it at the outset a very severe blow from which it never entirely recovered. Equally, I suggest, the failure to bring in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the earlier and more important years of the League must now be regarded as very unfortunate. But it is not necessary from those reflections to draw the conclusion that any international peace system to be effective must be absolutely universal. What I suggest is essential is that it should be more powerful than any potential aggressor, and that it should contain all those nations who are inspired by the principles for which it stands. In particular—this is perhaps a more practical point—it should contain those nations who control the raw materials without which modern war is not possible. In other words, to quote the Foreign Secretary in his speech in the House of Commons on the 2nd December last, it should be "fully representative of the Powers that mean to keep the peace."

It must contain, for instance, the British Commonwealth of Nations. Here I would say how strongly I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Maugham, who pointed out the important part which the Dominions play. People are apt sometimes to talk of Great Britain alone; but our power in the world depends on the close connexion, on an absolute basis of equality, of this country and the Dominions oversea. It should, then, contain the British Commonwealth of Nations. It should also contain the United States of America; it should contain the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and it should contain China. All those great countries should obviously be members. Their policies are founded upon those principles which the Foreign Secretary enunciated in the speech which I quoted just now. On the other hand, I suggest to your Lordships that Germany, Italy and Japan should clearly not be members until they have shown by deeds, and not merely by words, that they are animated by the principles of freedom and justice and not by a crude lust for domination. If the object of the future world organization is to prevent a repetition of war, it is clearly of no use to attempt to admit States which do not believe in the observance of international agreement. There may come a time, we hope there will come a time, when there will be a change of heart in those countries, but until they have shown that such a change has taken place not only by their words but by their actions, I believe that it will be the view of the House as a whole that they should be rigorously excluded.

The third essential requisite for a successful international peace system, I suggest, is that there must be behind it, as the most reverend Lord Lang said, the backing of an overwhelmingly strong armed force. That is the final sanction of law and order in international as in domestic spheres. The fact must be faced that it was here, above all, that the League failed. It was, I know, hoped by many people, many high-minded, excellent people, that economic sanctions would be in themselves enough to defeat aggression. But the lesson of the last twenty years surely is that it is no use embarking upon economic sanctions unless you are prepared to proceed to military action. That was the experience of the League of Nations in the Abyssinian dispute, and that was more recently the experience of the Allied Powers when they imposed economic sanctions on Japan in the present conflict. The heavier the economic restrictions which are imposed upon an aggressor, the more likely is he to snap out like a cornered rat at those nations who impose the restrictions, and the only chance, I suggest, of bringing an aggressor to heel without an extension of the conflict is to show him that the forces of order are so overwhelmingly strong that it is no use his attempting to resort to violence. Otherwise, you may call it collective security, and indeed it will be collective, but it will not be security.

I have been asked by Lord Cecil and by numerous other noble Lords who have spoken, what is to be the character of this international force? That is clearly a question which it is very difficult to answer with any accuracy at the present stage. Some people, as your Lordships know, favour an International Police Force in the strictest sense of the term—that is to say, a force on a permanent basis under international control. There are others who favour an aggregation of national forces. At present it does not seem possible to go further than to recall what the Prime Minister said in the broadcast to which I have already referred, that the new League should be supported by armed forces, national or international, or both, held ready to enforce its decisions and prevent renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars. At any rate, whatever the exact form of these forces, every member of the new League, or the new organization, must clearly make its contribution. As my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said in his Maryland speech, the defence of one is the defence of all and security and peace have no frontiers. Every nation, great or small, in its own interest, must show itself ready to put all its resources into the common pool and fulfil the obligations that are laid upon it under the new system.

My experience is that efficient organization always tends to make for economy and it may well be that once an effective system is in operation the individual contributions of States will not be so heavy as seems now probable, especially as under the Atlantic Charter we know that the Axis Powers are to be kept disarmed. But it is much better that that force should be too large than that it should be too small. During the present war the Allied Nations have not hesitated to pool their resources to a degree never known before in the history of the world. If they are ready to do this to win a war, how much more ought they to be willing to do it to preserve peace? The principle of pooling resources, of granting mutual facilities for defence, must, I believe, form the basis for the post-war security system.

Lastly, there is one other point which I would like to emphasize. It seems to me there must be provision under this system to enable members to consult together at the earliest moment on any de- velopment in the international situation that is likely, in future, to lead to a breach of the peace. In this respect I am afraid the Covenant was defective—or if the Covenant was not defective, the Members of the League were defective. As your Lordships know, Article 11 of the Covenant—I do not want to quote the whole article—says, in the second paragraph: It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever effecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. It may well be thought that that ought to have provided an adequate safeguard; but it is always embarrassing, as the noble Earl, Lord Perth, pointed out yesterday, for a nation, and especially a small nation, to attribute aggressive intentions to a neighbouring country with whom it is ostensibly in friendly relations. Consequently the tendency, as he knows well, was for States Members of the League only to raise a question of this kind when the situation was already so acute that there was no way of averting armed conflict.

Speaking personally I suggest that it will be necessary in the new organization, that the chief permanent official of the new organization, who will be an international official and therefore not open to the same embarrassment as the Ministers of individual States, shall be empowered to bring before its members, on his own initiative, any potentially dangerous development at an early stage before the aggressor has had time to gird himself for war. Unless there is some provision of that kind it will, I believe, be impossible this time, as it was the last time, to keep the situation under control. If the noble Earl, Lord Perth, had enjoyed this power as Secretary-General of the League, the history of the League might have been a very different one.

Now I would like to turn to the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, a very remarkable speech, as I think we shall all agree. At the end of the speech he asked me live pregnant questions as to the purpose and the aim of the International Authority. Perhaps it will be convenient to your Lordships if I try to answer him now. He will, I am sure, understand that in my reply I can only speak for His Majesty's Government and not for the Governments of the United Nations, although most of his questions really refer to the United Nations as a whole. His first question was: Can he"— that is myself— give us an assurance that, having restored their independence to the occupied countries, we intend to collaborate with them to secure the economic conditions which will enable them to thrive? The answer to that is, quite simply, Yes. The second question was: If the international society which we hope to establish … is set up, if it gives greater freedom to its members than would Hitler's New Order, will it afford them equal security? To that question I would answer that it is certainly the intention of His Majesty's Government that the International Authority should achieve this object.

The third question the noble Earl asked was: What contribution are His Majesty's Government prepared to make to the provision of that security? In answering that question I think I cannot do better than refer your Lordships to words spoken by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on December 2 last. Speaking of Europe—I emphasize that at this moment he was only speaking of Europe—he used these words: The first need of Europe will be to build up an enduring system of defence against the possibility of renewed German aggression. We are prepared to make our contribution to that system and we are prepared to do this because we understand full well that peace and security in Europe are part of our own peace and security; and never again shall we turn our backs on Europe. What he said about Europe it is perfectly clear, I think, to anyone who reads the speech he intended also to apply to other parts of the world as well, because he added later on in his speech: After this war we must in my submission be ready to make our military contribution to the United Nations to enable them to keep the peace. That is a statement of a more general character, referring to the world as a whole. Such is the declaration which the Foreign Secretary made and such remains the policy of His Majesty's Government.

Now I come to the noble Earl's fourth question, whether His Majesty's Government are prepared to abandon finally that policy, which was so often and so disastrously reiterated in the years immediately preceding this war, that the Armed Forces of this country would never be used except for the defence of British interests? I should like to know whether His Majesty's Government are prepared finally to abandon that policy. I hope the noble Earl will forgive my saying so, but I do not much like that question in the form in which it was posed. It is a little like asking whether you have stopped beating your wife. It is that type of question. I could not accept the assumption—and I think many other noble Lords would not accept the assumption—that our Armed Forces have never been used except for the defence of purely selfish British interests. I should have thought that the conclusive proof that that is not so is the fact that we came into this great and terrible war by virtue of our obligations to Poland. However that may be, as my noble relative, Viscount Cecil, said yesterday in his speech, the main interest of this country is the maintenance of peace and it has already been made clear in numerous Government declarations that it is towards the maintenance of peace, wherever it is disturbed or threatened to be disturbed, that the policy of Great Britain, as that of the other United Nations, will be directed. I think that this is both right and natural. For, after all, as the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Maugham, said this afternoon, the British Commonwealth of Nations is essentially a world Power and we are therefore in a position to recognize perhaps more than smaller countries the indivisibility of peace and of war. It is clearly right therefore that we as a world Power should have a world policy.

I hope the noble Earl will forgive me if I do not give a specific reply to his fifth question, as I think I have already answered it in my replies to his earlier questions. All these important points which the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, raised are in fact, I submit, already covered by the Atlantic Charter, the Articles of which, as is stated in the Preamble, represent the common principles governing the policy of the signatories. The principles of political and economic security for small nations as well as great, and of the use of national forces not merely for the aggrandisement of individual States but for the furtherance of peace and prosperity for all, find a place in that justly famous document, which has received the adherance of all the United Nations. I can give the noble Earl and the House an absolute assurance that His Majesty's Government for their part intend to do their utmost, both in the spirit and in the letter, to implement its provisions.

I have tried to indicate some of the lessons which are to be learnt from experience of the League of Nations and some of the pitfalls which we may hope will be avoided next time. They will be familiar to anyone who has had the experience of representing his country at Geneva. But I have been asked in this debate to go rather further and to indicate not merely the broad principle which must inspire the International Authority but the actual machinery for international collaboration which His Majesty's Government would like to see brought into being. The Prime Minister in the broadcast to which I have already referred sketched, as your Lordships know, with broad strokes a picture of a possible World Institution, consisting of a European League and an Asiatic League, with over all, as the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, said yesterday, a central body of world-wide scope, of which these Councils would be as it were, subcommittees. I do not think that I can, for obvious reasons, go beyond what my right honourable friend has already said. These matters, with others that are cognate to them, are at present under examination by the Allied Governments, and if I may again refer to the Prime Minister's own words in that broadcast: Nothing could be more foolish at this stage than to plunge into details and try to prescribe the exact groupings of States or lay down precise machinery for their co-operation, or still more to argue about frontiers now while the war even in the West has not yet reached its full height, while the struggle with the U-boats is raging, and when the war in the Far East is only in its first phase. I think no one will dispute the wisdom of those words.

As the noble Viscount, Lord Maugham, pointed out to-day, it may well be that this war will not end, like the last one, with the simultaneous defeat of all our enemies. Germany and Italy, as the Prime Minister said in his broadcast, may well be beaten first, and in that case, clearly, the Powers concerned must proceed as soon as they can to the reconstruction of Europe. But they will not be able to embark upon a peace structure for the whole world at that stage. For that they must await the end of the Eastern war and the full collaboration of a victorious China. Moreover, even when hostilities cease throughout the globe, it is idle to suppose that we shall be able to proceed immediately to hold a final peace conference to plan the future. The nations will be exhausted; they will be licking their wounds; they will be reconstituting stable Governments. There must, as I think the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, put it, be stages by which we must proceed. The first stage, which perhaps I might call the armistice period, will begin when Germany and Italy are prostrate and when they have given their unconditional surrender. During this armistice period, which may last months, or may even last for some years, the guilty States will have to be effectively disarmed, war criminals will have to be brought to justice, and the immediate needs of the oppressed peoples will have to be supplied. As my noble friend Lord Hutchison said, it is not until that initial chaos has subsided and comparatively normal conditions are restored both in the West and in the East that the moment will arrive for a formal peace conference to mould the future.

It would clearly be impossible in the armistice terms to attempt to deal with such questions as the future welfare of the Colonies, to which the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, referred yesterday. Apart from anything else, as he knows, that is a question that affects not only belligerents but a number of neutral countries as well. Whenever that question is dealt with—and I do not propose to deal with it to-day—whether it be late or soon, it will not form part of the armistice terms. That does not mean—and I would say this in particular in answer to my noble friend Earl De La Warr, who has referred to it today—that we need wait till then to clear our minds either on the main question of the International Authority or on questions of comparative detail such as the welfare of Colonies. On the contrary, in the view of His Majesty's Government, and I quote the words of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary in his report in the House of Commons the other day after his visit to the United States: It is necessary that the Governments of the countries principally concerned shall begin now to make certain preparations, so that they may not be completely unready when the moment comes. That is very much the same view, I think, which the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, had in putting down this Motion for debate in your Lordships' House.

That object, which my right honourable friend, the Foreign Secretary, defined in the words I have just quoted, was one of the main purposes of his recent visit to Washington. The results of his conversations there are, as noble Lords already know, extremely encouraging. Admittedly, if I may quote my right honourable friend again, these exchanges were entirely exploratory in character. They neither committed the United States Government nor ourselves, nor could they do so, because other Governments have to be consulted and exchanges have to take place with those Governments. But a good beginning has been made and a close similarity of view has been established. As noble Lords know, His Majesty's Government have already for some considerable time been in frequent informal consultation with other Allied Governments here on post-war questions, and in reply to my noble friend Lord Melchett, who spoke just now, I would emphasize that these questions which have been under discussion are not merely political. They are economic as well, and I would, personally, agree with him that that is right, for nowadays, as probably always, economics and politics are very closely interlinked, and a political solution which did not provide a solution for economic problems as well would be of no permanent value whatever.

My noble friend Lord Davies's suggestion, if I understand aright, is that a formal Inter-Allied Commission should be set up now. With all deference to him I, like the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, prefer the present procedure. Noble Lords will, I am sure, appreciate that many of these questions are extremely delicate in character. It is surely far better that we should proceed by means of inter-Governmental negotiations; first of all by informal negotiations, then, at a further stage, by formal negotiation, until, at last, so large a measure of common ground has been found that the nations will be prepared for final agreements. Clearly these inter-Governmental discussions must continue between the United Nations, both great and small. But while the closest collaboration and the closest consultation are essential to ensure that the plan which is eventually devised will have the full approval of the United Nations—whether, I repeat, great or small—I am quite certain that the smaller Powers would be the first to agree that the new international system which we hope to set up will only endure if there are the closest collaboration and mutual understanding between the four great Powers—the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States of America, Russia and China.

As the noble and most reverend Lord Lang said, small nations may help, but policy depends on power, and power will rest with the great nations. I am not quoting his exact words but giving what I understand to be the sense of what he said, the four Great Powers must be the buttresses on which the world must rely to withstand the storms and stresses of the future. If they stand together, peace will be preserved. If by any evil chance a rift should come between them, the world will collapse into chaos. The establishment of their mutual relations on a firm and enduring foundation must clearly be the primary object of the Governments of these four great Powers. To the achievement of that object the efforts of His Majesty's Government will be unremittingly directed, in order that we may hand down to our children a heritage of peace and prosperity such as many of us have ourselves never known.

VISCOUNT MAUGHAM

My Lords, before the noble Viscount who moved the Motion replies, I should like to ask whether the Leader of the House has omitted to mention the very important question of the Colonies deliberately?

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

I did mention the Colonies in connexion with the time at which the question should properly be dealt with. I do not propose to go into the substance of the Colonial question to-day; I suggest that that goes rather beyond the scope of the debate.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

My Lords, I wish, in the first place, to express my great appreciation of the full and very interesting reply which my noble friend has given to this Motion, and to thank him and, if I may be allowed to do so without impertinence, to thank all the other members of your Lordships' House who have contributed to the discussion, which I think has not been in vain. I wish to say only a very few words about what my noble friend has said. In the first place, as to his controversy—if that is not too strong a word for it—with my noble friend Lord Lytton, I think that what my noble friend Lord Lytton had in mind was that there were utterances—we do not need to go into them in detail—by very highly-placed persons to the effect that in no circumstances would the Forces of the Crown be used except for the defence of what are technically called British interests—that is to say, British land, British trade and so on. It was in the hope of drawing what I think in fact he did obtain from my noble friend—namely, a definite repudiation of that doctrine—that he no doubt put the question which he did. The kind of attitude which he had in mind created great anxiety not only in this country but, I think I may say, all over the world, because it was thought that in effect this country was withdrawing from the position of being active in maintaining the peace of the world. I do not want to go further into that; I think that my noble friend Lord Lytton is probably well satisfied with the general structure of the reply which he has received.

I should like to thank my noble friend Lord Cranborne particularly for the passage in his speech in which he described the machinery for drawing attention to dangers which might exist, and in which he suggested that whoever corresponded to the Secretary-General of the League should have a special duty to call the attention of the new Authority to any dangers of the kind in question. I venture very respectfully to suggest that that is a wise and fruitful suggestion, and one which may well be most important in the whole machinery of the new League. The great thing is to interfere at an early stage; if you wait until war has actually broken out, you will be faced with all kinds of difficulties which may be overwhelming.

My hope is that this will not be the last debate of this kind which we shall have in this House. My noble friend Lord Melchett seemed inclined to regret that we had not discussed the economc position at greater length. I am not sure whether he was able to be here yesterday, but, if he reads the debate, he will see that we found it difficult to keep the discussion within something like reasonable limits, because of the vast mass of subjects which are open to discussion the moment that one begins to talk about post-war aims. I hope, however, that my noble friend Lord Melchett will raise specifically the question of post-war economic problems, because we could certainly discuss them, just as we have discussed, to some extent at any rate, the political questions in this debate.

There is only one slight criticism which I venture to make of my noble friend's answer, and that is as to his suggestion that it is necessary to put off the peace treaty until after the conclusion of all hostilities everywhere. I hope that that is not to be treated as an absolutely hard-and-fast rule, because I think it will be found extremely difficult to avoid discussion of a great many subjects if, for instance, the Far Eastern war drags on for another year or two. My noble friend Lord Hutchison of Montrose, although I did not agree with everything he said, did indicate that something in the nature of a central authority—I did not quite gather how it was to be constituted—would have to be created in order to provide against starvation, to keep order, and, most of all, to restore the populations which have been ejected from their homes. This last will certainly be an extremely difficult thing to do, and will necessarily involve some provisional establishment of frontiers.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

I did not mean to indicate any hard-and-fast lines, indeed, I went out of my way at the beginning of my speech to say that it was not possible to speak with exactness on any of these questions. It would be very difficult, however, to draw up a plan which included the future of the Pacific before the Pacific war was concluded.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

My Lords, I can well understand that it will not be possible to deal with the whole position until a later stage, but I ventured to make that criticism in case there might be some misunderstanding. I thank the noble Viscount for his reply, and I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.