Lords Sitting of 19 May 1942

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
ABERDEEN CORPORATION (FISH MARKET RATES) ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1936) deemed to have been read 2a and reported from the Committee.
ANGLO-VENEZUELAN TREATY (ISLAND OF PATOS) BILL, [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
NEWCASTLE AND GATESHEAD WATERWORKS BILL, [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.

COAL (CONCURRENT LEASES) BILL, [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): My Lords, this is a small Bill which has been rendered necessary by a recent decision of the Courts which showed that there has accidentally been left a gap in the provisions of the Coal Act, 1938, which ought to be filled up. Your Lordships will recall that the policy and intention of the Coal Act, 1938, were to get rid of the private ownership of royalties and, in return for compensation, to place that ownership, together with the development of the nation's coal, in the hands of the Coal Commission. Royalties were vested in the Commission whether they belonged to a freeholder or to a leaseholder; hence Section 5 (2) of the Coal Act provided that the property vested included "interests arising under a coalmining lease in coal which is subdemised by a lease derived out of that lease." Perhaps it will be convenient to give an
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illustration, using the letters of the alphabet. If A is a freeholder and B is a lessee, and C, who is actually working the coal, is an inferior lessee from B, then the words which I have just quoted were intended to secure the vesting of B's interest as well as A's interest in the Coal Commission, and that is the result in all ordinary cases; in the ordinary case, that is, of a lease granted by A to B and a sublease granted by B in favour of C which is carved out of B's lease.
However, a curious and quite abnormal case has arisen in the Courts, where A first of all leases the coal for so many years to C—that is, to the person who is actually working the coal, or to the company working it—and then A grants a lease of his interest—that is, A's interest—subject, of course, to C's lease, to B for a longer period of years. That is a most unusual combination, but it has happened; and, when it happens, in such a case C's lease is not "derived out of" B's lease, and the Courts have so decided. Consequently the the language of the Coal Act permits the royalties paid by C to be received by B, and those royalties do not directly vest in the Commission. That is quite contrary to the general scheme and purpose of the Act, and indeed constitutes what the lawyers call a casus omissus from its principal provisions. The obvious policy of Parliament was for the Commission to acquire B's interest in such a case, just as it acquires the lease in coal which is sub-demised in the ordinary case to the party engaged in working it. The sole object of this little Bill is to correct that accidental slip.
I will only add, so that there may be no misunderstanding, that, when this Bill becomes law, while under the Bill B's interests will be transferred to the Commission, B will become entitled to claim compensation for the loss of his interest in the same way as in the ordinary case of an intermediate interest. I do not know whether I shall be too sanguine if I imagine that I have made this Bill entirely comprehensible to all your Lordships, but no doubt those interested will in due course consult the Report, and I trust that they, will find that A, B and C are the right letters to use for so elementary a proposition. I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD GAINFORD: My Lords, the Mining Association of Great Britain have looked into this matter, and desire that whole-hearted support should be given to the passage of this Bill through all its stages. It is a reasonable Bill, and its purpose has been well explained by the noble and learned Viscount. Perhaps I may say that the usual practice in connexion with an expiring lease is to renew it, where there is still coal underground, to the firm which has been working the coal. On the particular occasion to which the noble and learned Viscount has referred, a firm acquired the reversion of that coal by getting a hundred years' lease—a most unusual period. They would thereby acquire a big interest in the amount of compensation out of the globular sum which has been arranged by the State to be given to royalty owners. The effect of the present law, unless it is altered, would be that the firm would get an unusual amount in the way of interest by acquiring a lease of one hundred years, and by doing another firm out of its property under the Act of 1938. On equitable grounds, therefore, it is right that, as there is only a global sum to be distributed among royalty owners, this Bill should be passed. On the whole I think that it is a very good Bill, and I hope that it will pass through all its stages without any difficulty.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF TUE ADMIRALTY (LORD BRUNTISITELD): My Lords, this is the first time that I have had occasion to address your Lordships, and I confess that the task with which I am confronted raises within me all those feelings of diffident uneasiness to which in unfamiliar surroundings the newcomer is prone. Accordingly I would ask your Lordships to be good enough to listen to me for a few minutes in a spirit of patience and forbearance. There has been entrusted to me the duty of answering for the Admiralty in your Lordships' House. That is a duty which carries with it a weight of
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responsibility of which I am fully conscious. Nevertheless, perhaps I may be allowed to say that for me this duty is a particularly congenial one. As the son of a sailor, from my very earliest youth I have been imbued with feelings for the Royal Navy which I can only describe as feelings of respectful affection, and with the passage of time (and in recent years due to a close association with that great Service) that sentiment has become even more deeply rooted. And so, when from time to time your Lordships have occasion to seek information or to offer criticism upon naval affairs, it will be my constant endeavour to give that efficient service which both the Royal Navy and your Lordships are entitled to expect
That that task will not always be an easy one I do not doubt, for I know full well that there are among your Lordships several noble Lords who have a long and intimate experience not only of the Navy itself, but of matters pertaining thereto. There are Admirals of the Fleet among your Lordships, there are also several officers now serving in the Navy, and I must not forget the two noble Lords whom I see sitting opposite me, Lords Strabolgi and Winster, who take a lively and sometimes a somewhat critical interest in the Admiralty's conduct of affairs. With this wealth of naval experience and knowledge in the vicinity it is quite clear to me that any one in my position will need to keep his wits about him. Well, I shall do my best, but I feel bound forthwith to point out to any would-be critics that there may be among your Lordships that, though acting as its spokesman, I must not be regarded as the Admiralty's whipping boy; nor shall I be willing on demand to assume the passive and pliant posture which is commonly required of one about to receive corporal chastisement.
The Bill, the Second Reading of which I beg to move, is as simple as it is concise, and its provisions can be explained within the compass of a few sentences. The Bill is necessitated by a peculiarity of the Naval Reserve Act. Under the Royal Naval Reserve Act, 1859, the Reserve can be mobilized by Proclamation for three years, and at the end of that time their service can be extended for a further period of two years by means of a fresh Proclamation. The conditions of service, however, which

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apply to the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, are governed by the Naval Forces Act, 1903, and that Act contains no power to extend the period of active service beyond the initial period of three years. This being so, it follows that as the law now stands members of the R.N.V.R. can claim release on completion of three years' active service, and the object of this Bill is to place the R.N.V.R. in exactly the same position as the other Reserves during the present war. A similar Act was passed in 1917 during the last war, and the Bill of course covers both officers and men.
Lest it be thought that the effect of this Bill is to vary the conditions of service which the officers and men of the R.N.V.R. accepted when they joined, perhaps I may be allowed to point out that their rights under the Act of 1903 have really been rendered nugatory as the result of the introduction of conscription. Supposing that, failing the passage of this Bill, an officer or man obtained release after serving his three years, he would at once become liable to be called up under the Military Service Acts. Much inconvenience would be caused in bringing him home, a most valuable, trained and experienced man would be lost to the Royal Navy and, so far as the man himself was concerned, there would in fact be very little change in his position. Therefore, as was done in 1917, we need and propose to put the R.N.V.R. in the same position as that in which other Reserves find themselves. The fact that some of the R.N.V.R. were mobilized in June, 1939, makes it essential that this measure should be speedily passed and put on the Statute Book.
Since this Bill concerns exclusively the R.N.V.R. perhaps it will not be thought out of place if I take this opportunity of making a very brief reference to the magnificent service which these officers and men have rendered since the beginning of the war. They serve in every class of ship from the largest down to the very smallest. Indeed, not only are our corvettes commanded by R.N.V.R. officers but our coastal and smaller forces are officered by them almost completely. And the regularity with which the names of officers and men of this branch of the Navy appear in the list of awards conferred by His
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Majesty the King is in itself a tribute to the manner in which this splendid Force does it duty. Some ten George Crosses, 32 George Medals and Bars, 140 Distinguished Service Crosses, 11 British Empire Medals, and 36 Distinguished Service Medals have been awarded since the outbreak of war to the R.N.V.R. Your Lordships will be aware that the entry of ratings into this Reserve was closed on the outbreak of war. Men entering the Navy now are entered as "hostilities only" ratings, and are not included in this Reserve. On the other hand, all temporary Commissions are R.N.V.R. Commissions, and this has had the effect of making the number of officers vastly exceed that of the ratings. This is the reason why there is an apparent discrepancy between the awards granted to the R.N.V.R. ratings which I mentioned just now and the awards to officers. I hope I have said enough to explain to your Lordships the provisions of this Bill, and I trust that the arguments which I have advanced will induce your Lordships to support the measure. Finally, I may say that unless any of your Lordships see some serious objection to the course, I would propose to take the Committee stage of this non-contentious measure to-morrow. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Bruntisfield.)
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, on behalf of my colleagues I should like to congratulate the noble Lord on his first intervention in our debates. From my recollection of many friendly encounters—more or less—with him in another place, I am sure that he will maintain his case stoutly, however it may be assailed. It may well be that in the discussions which are to take place to-day there will be some questions regarding the Navy which will be pointed and interesting. So far as the great Service is concerned to which this Bill relates, I am sure every one of us in every quarter of the House would like to associate ourselves with the eloquent and complete tribute that the noble Lord paid to these splendid men on whom we depend for our success in war and even for the maintenance of our lives.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, all of us in this quarter of the House desire to associate ourselves with the noble Lord

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who has just spoken in congratulating the noble Lord opposite on his first speech in this House and wishing him every success in the future debates, in which he will no doubt take a distinguished part, and at the same time in applauding to the utmost the gallant Service on whose behalf this Bill is introduced.
On question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

SINGAPORE.
LORD DAVIES LORD DAVIES had given Notice that he would move to resolve, That, in order to remove misapprehension and anxiety in the public mind, this House appeals to His Majesty's Government to reconsider the proposal to institute an inquiry into the circumstances and causes of the surrender and loss of Singapore. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name. In doing so I confess I rise with some reluctance for two reasons—first of all because this is not a pleasant subject to debate and, secondly, because one has no desire to embarrass the Government in any way in the conduct of the struggle in which we are now engaged. On the other hand, it seems to me, rightly or wrongly, that we have a duty in this matter because this is not a private war—it is not merely a Government enterprise—it is a war which is being waged by every man and every woman in this country, and indeed throughout the Empire. I submit that they have a right to know, and their Parliamentary representatives have a right to know, the truth about Singapore, the causes of this deplorable disaster and, above all, the lessons which may be derived from this tragic experience and which may help in the future conduct of the war.
There is one outstanding fact, and a very unpleasant fact, in regard to this matter. This is one of the greatest disasters, if not the greatest, in our military annals. Compared with the disaster at Singapore, the disasters in the past, especially our failures in the Dardenelles and in Mesopotamia during the last war, all sink into insignificance. There is a consensus of opinion in regard to this particular point. Government spokesmen, no less than other members of your
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Lordships' House, have emphasized this aspect. Therefore, one naturally asks why it is that, contrary to the sound traditions, one might almost say the constitutional practice, of this free country, the Government refuse to embark upon any sort of inquiry. Is this matter to be consigned to oblivion? Is no attempt to be made to elucidate the causes and the lessons of Singapore through an impartial, dispassionate, and objective inquiry such as has been conducted on similar occasions in the past?
Your Lordships will remember the debate we had here about six weeks ago on the Motion introduced by my noble friend Lord Addison. It was very impressive that almost every speaker in that debate, with the exception of the reply delivered by my noble friend the Leader of the House and one other speech, asked the Government for an inquiry into the causes of this disaster. I do not propose to reiterate the very cogent arguments which were advanced from all quarters of your Lordships' House during that debate. In reply, my noble friend the Leader of the House did hold out a ray of hope. He told us, in effect, that the door was not shut, banged, or bolted. This is what he said:
"In the future, when the evidence is available—it may be a short time, it may be a long time—there may be a very good case for setting up an inquiry or Commission. I am not saying that in no circumstances should you have an inquiry into this question."
That, at any rate, did not entirely dispose of this matter, and that is one of the reasons why I have put this Motion on the Paper to raise the subject again. I cannot help feeling that during the interval a considerable amount of dissatisfaction has been expressed in many quarters—feelings of apprehension up and down the country—and recent events have by no means allayed this restlessness or apprehension, but have rather increased it.
Therefore, in the words of the Motion on the Paper, I want if I may to appeal most earnestly to the Government and to those who speak for the Government in your Lordships' House, that they will at any rate be prepared to consider the question again, and that they will be willing to reassure the country that everything possible is being done to discover the causes and to remedy the mistakes which have been made during this particular

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campaign. I cannot help feeling that if there is to be an inquiry there should be no undue delay. If it is to have any practical value surely the inquiry should take place as soon as possible. If it is delayed until the conclusion of the war no doubt the Report will have an historic interest, but it does not follow that it will also have any practical value. Therefore I submit to the Government that they should constitute the appropriate machinery, whatever that machinery may be, whether it is a Select Committee or a Commission or an ad hoc Committee, as soon as possible, and that it should be representative not only of people in this country but also of our Dominions and the Empire.
What are some of the objections which have been raised? I gather from the speech of my noble friend who leads the House—I read his speech several times—that he was not satisfied that all the evidence was yet available. I suppose that is perfectly true. It is also true that the officials and the high military officers who took part in these proceedings are now, unfortunately, prisoners of war in the enemy's hands, so that their evidence will not be available, at any rate for a considerable time. On the other hand, as was pointed out in the speeches that we listened to in the last debate, there is a considerable amount of evidence already available, and therefore it might be possible at least to make a start with the inquiry. How long the inquiry would last no one of course knows. It may be, as the noble Lord said, short, or it may be long, but what is there to prevent such a Commission or Committee from issuing from time to time interim Reports when they have been satisfied that all the evidence on particular aspects of the case have been presented and they are in a position to report on particular points which may arise?
Obviously a final Report may take a very long time to complete for submission to the Government and the country, but one cannot help feeling that there are certain aspects of such a matter as this that require consideration. I venture to suggest three, among many others. For instance, I think it is very important that we should know what the morale of the Army was at Singapore during this campaign. It is very important that we should know what the attitude of the
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natives was towards the war and towards the military operations at that time. Another important point is that we should have some guidance as to the relative importance of air power and the part which air power must play in such operations. I cannot help feeling that, when it comes to the point that we can once more assume the offensive to reconquer these territories, the lessons to be learnt from what has already happened may then be of great advantage not only to the military commanders but also to the members of His Majesty's Government.
Another objection that my noble friend raised was this. He said this matter should be left to the Staff and to the experts to draw their own conclusions. I am not going to argue that point at length. All I would venture to say is that that is not the British practice. On broad grounds of policy we have in times past resorted to a different procedure, and I cannot help feeling that on this occasion, this being one of the greatest disasters we have suffered, that practice should again be adhered to.
In another objection the noble Lord said that the court of inquiry was essentially a British institution. I cannot help feeling that it is a very valuable institution; it is a very valuable procedure and one which should not be lightly thrown overboard. I think the Government should recognize this because only a few months ago an inquiry was instituted into the escape of German warships from Brest. As a result of demands in another place an inquiry was instituted, and no doubt the Report has been of assistance to the Government—at all events we hope so—in the conduct of the war. I am not quite clear that this is really and exclusively a British institution. After all, when a disaster occurred in Pearl Harbour the American Government at once instituted a court of inquiry which was presided over by Judge Roberts of the Supreme Court, who reported after a most exhaustive and intensive inquiry, to the Government; and when, the other day, the American bombers bombed Japan an inquiry was at once set into motion in Japan. I think it took the form of a Court Martial, but that also was a kind of inquiry not comparable to the one which I suggest in this Motion. Therefore I do not think that inquiries of this kind are exclusively characteristic of this country.
Another objection was put forward by my noble friend when he alluded to the attitude of the dictators. He said:
"Practically every country in Europe has had serious setbacks in this war."
After enumerating various setbacks he said that so far as he knew there was no question of a public inquiry in these cases by the Russian, or German, or Italian Governments, not because the General Staffs in those countries did not want to face the facts, or because they wished to delay and conceal facts from themselves or anybody else. Then he finished by saying:
"… this is possibly the main reason—they do not want to divert the attention of their public opinion from the paramount object of getting on with the war. They want their people to look forward; they do not want them to be perpetually looking back."
I cannot help feeling that the right way to get on with the war is not to be looking back all the time, but to have impartial inquiries when these disasters occur, because they are held not in order to discover scapegoats but in order to ensure that lessons are properly learnt and will be applied in the future.
We ought not to reject the procedure which the noble Lord has described as "a British institution" and fall back on the procedure adopted in dictator countries. To refuse to have an inquiry of this kind is not realty a display of strength on the part of the Government. I do not believe that refusal to have an inquiry inspires confidence in the minds either of the people in this country or of the people in the Dominions. I suggest to your Lordships that in face of this unprecedented disaster such a refusal is tantamount to a confession of weakness. Sometime ago I met a German friend who had been very closely associated with the German High Command during the last war, and I asked him what impression had been created on the minds of the German Staff by the disclosures in connexion with the Dardanelles inquiry. He replied that the Report of the Commission was certainly scanned, as all such documents were, for any information of military importance, but that the Dardanelles inquiry could only yield meagre military information after the battle of the Straits had been finally lost. He also told me that when he was asked to make a translation of the Report of the inquiry within twenty-four hours the real
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interest centred round the peculiar sources of Britain's strength and weakness. Nothing had impressed the High Command at that time, and also at a later time, more than the wisdom and the moral courage of British statesmen. One remark he made was that in independent men and constructive criticism lay the great strength of the Democracies. I quote that as an illustration of the way in which these inquiries are looked at through the spectacles of our enemies, and I cannot help feeling that it will increase, if anything can increase, our determination to win the war and persevere to the end if the people of the country are convinced that everything is being done to carry on the struggle with efficiency and foresight.
There have been many rumours, reports and statements appearing in the Press, and I expect many of your Lordships read the two very interesting articles which appeared in the Daily Telegraph last week written by a Mr. Hastings who, I believe, was a Judge in Malaya and also a member of the Malayan Federal Council. Perhaps your Lordships will allow me to quote one or two words from one of those articles. He said:
"Certainly the Supreme Command must have known that Malaya could not be held. Certainly the impression given after the campaign had started was that the Command in Malaya knew that full well."
I cannot help feeling that there is a strange connexion between that statement made by this gentleman and the recollection of the debate which took place at the end of January in another place. When that debate was over I heard people say: "Oh, that means that Singapore is gone." That was the impression left on the minds of a considerable number of people. The battle was then in full progress; Singapore did not fall until a fortnight afterwards. It would be most unfortunate, I am sure your Lordships would agree, if any impression of that sort reached our troops in Malaya; if they thought that there was any question of Singapore falling or surrendering to the enemy. Then Mr. Hastings went on to say:
"We knew from General Percival that there was no plan for evacuation. What was the plan? At least one British Division was landed only to be surrendered. Supplies were put on shore only for the benefit of the enemy. Recrimination may do no good, but are we not entitled to know who was responsible for the plan, or the absence of a plan, in Malaya?"

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As I say, these statements are being made in the Press and in other places, in speeches and so on.
Therefore I suggest that we are entitled to an authoritative statement from some impartial body which will regard this matter purely from an objective point of view, a dispassionate point of view. I appeal once again to the Government to treat the matter from that standpoint. Only on Saturday the Prime Minister made a very moving speech in which he told us that we should still have to traverse dark and dangerous valleys before we reached the sunlight. I am quite sure the people of this country are still prepared to pour out blood and tears, toil and sweat in order to win the struggle; but in return for their sacrifices they want to be assured that those sacrifices are not in vain and that everything possible is being done to bring this war to a victorious conclusion. Again I earnestly appeal to the Government to reconsider their decision in this matter. I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That, in order to remove misapprehension and anxiety in the public mind, this House appeals to His Majesty's Government to reconsider the proposal to institute an inquiry into the circumstances and causes of the surrender and loss of Singapore.—[Lord Davies.]
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I do not think there can be any question as to the vital importance of the issue which the noble Lord has brought once more before the notice of the House. Never, I think, in our history, quite apart from the human loss involved, has there been anything which has done us so much damage in the East, among the millions of India and China, and it behoves us to do everything that we can to restore confidence in Britain by every means in our power. It has never been our characteristic to seek to cover up our mistakes. We have derived great strength, often, from facing courageously the causes of our blunders and correcting them. I hope that the noble Lord, the Leader of the House, in noting anything which I have to say, will not take it—as, I think, he rather did the last time—as if it were an attack on the Government. It is far from being anything of that kind. This is a much bigger issue than any Government—that of the integrity and the safety
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of the British Empire and that good name and strength of ours upon which it rests in these vast countries in the East. I may say that, so far as we are concerned, whilst we deplore most sincerely the attitude of the Government in respect to this matter, we shall take no part in any Division—if there is one—on this subject. We regard it as far greater than any Governmental issue, and I think that history since then has fortified the demand for an inquiry.
I do not propose to go over the case I made before, of course. But I would recall to your Lordships that one of the matters which need not be inquired into at Singapore, but which could be dealt with in London, is the question relating to the dispatch of those great ships without aircraft protection. Since then we have had, I think, unfortunate experiences which go to show that lack of foresight and provision in advance has not been corrected. For example we have the sinking of three ships in the Indian Ocean through lack of aircraft protection. I do not know what the explanation is, but certainly this is a matter which should be inquired into. Then there was the sinking of the three destroyers in the Mediterranean a few days ago. And why it is that our aircraft are not equipped with aerial torpedoes of, perhaps, the same power as those which our enemies possess? I noticed in the papers only yesterday reports indicating that, although the German warship "Prinz Eugen" has been attacked I do not know how many times in Brest and during its passage along the Channel, the attacks yesterday still failed to stop it. It looks, therefore, as if the equipment and attention to our aircraft naval personnel has not been what it ought to be and what it deserves to be. As a matter of fact, I suggest that our experiences since Singapore have immensely fortified the demand for an inquiry into the quality of aircraft equipment and the association of air defences and air services with ships. We made that case before, and the strength of it has been increased by what has passed since then.
There is another matter which, I think, bears out my contention that subsequent history has reinforced the case which several other Lords and I have put before. That is our experience in Burma. It was abundantly evident that there had been a lack of decision as to what ought to be

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done about the defence of Malaya and Singapore, and the evidence which has come out since has clearly shown that that was so. It might have been a dreadful necessity to have to say to the people, or even not to have to say to the people but to recognize the fact, that we could not defend Singapore and that it would have been better to concentrate on Rangoon. No doubt that would have been an unpleasant decision to have had to make, but, in view of events, it would have been an extraordinarily sound decision if only it had been made. But I cannot imagine any decision which could be consistent with the landing of a British Division and its equipment 48 hours before they were handed over to our enemies. The strategic direction of the war which permitted events of that kind should be inquired into and its mistakes should be corrected. The history of what has happened in Burma suggests—to my mind anyhow—that they have not been inquired into, and that they have not been corrected.
There is another matter in relation to which there has been abundant evidence in support of the demand made before as to the oversight of the character and training of reinforcements. Your Lordships will remember that I quoted from a letter and I have permission to say that it was written by Colonel Alan Murdoch. It has been supported by much more evidence since than. I have in my possession, for instance, a pathetic letter from a widow whose son was mobilized only in July. He had had no manner of training whatever and he was sent out in November. And here I have—and the officers concerned are anxious for the matter to be inquired into—specific details concerning 1,400 men sent from Karachi to Singapore. They were supposed to be an A.A. battery, but practically none of them had even seen an anti-aircraft gun, and more than a thousand of them had never fired a rifle. And there is much more evidence of the same kind. As a matter of fact, these 1,400 men, who, of course, found themselves prisoners in the hands of the Japanese within a few hours of their landing, had had no efficient training and they had no efficient equipment. I think that it does behove the Government to inquire who was responsible for sending out men who were ill-equipped and insufficiently trained, for it was evident that, from start to finish, the
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Japanese in Malaya were excellently trained and well equipped for what they had to do. With regard to the quality of the fighting aircraft provided, they were—such as they were—very out-of-date types. We do not need to go to Singapore to know what they were. When the first lot of Hurricanes arrived, I understand that the pilots were not there, but came rather too late. The oversight of these important matters is something which is dealt with in London, and does not relate to what happened in Singapore.
As to the deplorable record in Malaya and in Singapore itself, although I expect that we have all received very much more evidence than we had at the time of our last debate, I shall not go into that again. The big things which emerge as demanding inquiry are the strategical direction of affairs, the oversight of equipment and training, and the harmonious direction and co-operation in particular of the Air and Naval Services. The necessity for an inquiry into these matters, and for putting right what is found to be wrong, has been abundantly justified by the course of our experiences since our recent debate, and I hope that His Majesty's Government will reconsider their decision.
LORD RUSHCLIFFE: My Lords, this is the first time that I have taken part in any debate relating to the war or relating to any question arising out of the war. I have, of course, no source of information open to me which is not available to every one of your Lordships, and indeed I make no pretence at all to any special or professional knowledge, an advantage which many of your Lordships possess. It did occur to me, however, when I saw this Motion on the Paper, that perhaps the ordinary impressions of a Backbencher on these matters might make some contribution to the debate. Having heard the debate the other day, and having heard the two speeches made to-day, I think that it is perhaps just as well that a private member should state one or two things which appear to him to be fairly obvious, and which may form a contribution to this debate.
We have now been engaged in this war for two and a half years. We are in the middle of the third year. It is obvious that we are in what is almost certainly the decisive year of the war, and that we are approaching a crisis which is going to determine the future and the fate not only

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of this country but of all mankind. During these two and a half years our Army, our Navy and our Air Force have had an immense strain put upon them; and, to use a phrase employed by the First Lord of the Admiralty the other day, "the Navy has been stretched to the uttermost." During this time our Commanders in each branch of the Service have been confronted with responsibilities and with anxieties of which they alone can tell. We have had disasters, we have had disappointments, we have had defeats, and we have also had some striking victories. During the whole of this time the morale of our civil population has been put to a test to which it has never before been subjected; and during the whole of this time—and I have rather special reasons for knowing this, by reason of the post which I recently held—their morale has never been broken, their courage has remained completely unshaken, and their confidence in victory has never been disturbed in the very least. Last but not least, the members of the British Commonwealth, bound together by mutual confidence in victory, have acted in complete co-operation. They have been prompted, they have been inspired and they have been inflamed by what Burke once called "that fierce spirit of liberty."
In these circumstances and at this time, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has put down the Motion which your Lordships are now considering. Of course, every one will agree with what he and Lord Addison said, and with what many of your Lordships have said and all of you have thought—namely, that the loss of Singapore was a military disaster of the first magnitude, that its loss and the consequences of its loss are almost incalculable, and that its loss came as a terrible blow to the British public, to the British Commonwealth, and indeed to the whole world. That, of course, is perfectly true, and is so obvious that it need not be further pursued. Its repercussions are also obvious, and this point was well dealt with, I thought, in a most informative speech by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, on the last occasion, when he pointed out the consequences of the loss of Singapore to our sea communications. All that is perfectly true. It is also true, I think, to say that the sense of loss in the public mind was increased and exacerbated by the fact that certain
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speeches and statements made not long before the loss of Singapore seemed to show complete confidence that Singapore would be held.
In spite of all that, I am satisfied, from the best care and thought that I have been able to give to this matter, that an inquiry such as that asked for to-day would be undesirable. The inquiry for which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, asks is much wider than the inquiry asked for by the noble Lord, Lord Addison, on the last occasion. Lord Addison limited himself to the defence of Singapore, but the noble Lord, Lord Davies, goes very much further, and, "in order to remove misapprehension and anxiety," asks for an inquiry "into the circumstances and causes of the surrender and loss of Singapore." I am satisfied that such an inquiry at this time, far from being fruitful, might be fraught with infinite mischief; and I shall endeavour to give my reasons for saying that.
The first observation which I would make is this. If this Motion were passed to-day, and if in consequence, "in order to remove misapprehension and anxiety," an inquiry were instituted, it seems to be obvious that it would have to be a public inquiry. Unless it is a public inquiry this Motion is completely meaningless, because the object of the Motion is stated to be to allay public misapprehension and anxiety. An inquiry set up after such a debate as this, unless it was held in public, might, far from allaying misapprehension and anxiety, go very far to increase it, because suspicions would arise that the public were not to know what was going on at the inquiry, and, so far from the results which Lord Davies seeks being attained, the fears of the public would be made worse. Therefore I say first of all that this inquiry, if made, must be a public inquiry.
Now what is this public inquiry to inquire into? According to this Motion, it is in the first place to inquire into the causes of the loss of Singapore. I should have thought if such an inquiry were held—no doubt it will be held in the future, must be held in the future—but if it were held, or whenever it is held, it might well be said that one of the causes of the fall of Singapore was the fact that Indo-China and Siam fell into Japanese hands owing to the defection of France. The results of the defection of France are manifold.

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They have been obvious in the whole course of the war; and to inquire in isolation as to the results of the defection of France in this matter seems to me to be premature and to serve no useful purpose whatever.
Then it may be said—in fact it was said the other day, I think—that the fall of Singapore took place about eighteen months after the defection of France, and why was not that period of eighteen months used in order to "re-adapt" (if that is the proper word) the defences of Singapore to the possibility of an attack by land through Malaya? Well, I do not at all know, I have no means of knowing. I do not venture to offer an opinion as to whether that was possible at that time or not; I have not the slightest idea. But a public inquiry at this time into that subject, so far from serving any useful purpose, would, I think, be entirely mischievous. The speech of the noble Lord, Lord Addison, was really a continuation of what he said the other day, and so one is perhaps justified in referring to what he said then. The noble Lord in that speech compared the Malayans with the Filipinos, and the Government of Malaya with the Government of the Philippines, very much to the detriment of Malaya, and he said:
"This is a very painful contrast to what we have experienced in Malaya and Burma, which is a fit subject for searching inquiry. I am afraid, though I am not going into it, that the attitude of some of those who have had responsible positions requires attention, and it very much behoves the Leader of the House to search into this matter, seeing the office he holds. I am afraid the type of people responsible in some of our Colonial services has not been what it ought to have been."
That really involves a very serious charge against those civil servants under the Colonial Office who have been responsible for the administration of Malaya, and the man who has been primarily responsible is, of course, the Governor.
The Governor was Sir Shenton Thomas. see from the reference books that he had been Governor for eight years. This is obviously a matter in which he is most vitally interested, for not only indeed is his capacity in issue, but also his honour. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, talks about British practice Has it ever been the British practice to try a man in his absence on a charge so serious as that outlined by Lord Addison? Sir Shenton Thomas and all his principal officials, so
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far as I know, are in Japan, and therefore at this inquiry which is now asked for and which, says Lord Davies, is in accordance with British practice, these men are to be tried in their absence. I think such a course of action, so far from allaying public anxiety and apprehension, would be regarded with repugnance by the British people. I do not know, but I rather imagine that Admiral Byng was present at his own Court Martial. At any rate, I feel quite certain that an inquiry now into the conduct of Sir Shenton Thomas and his colleagues in their absence would be absolutely repugnant to every British sense of justice.
One other thing I want to say is this. The object of this inquiry, I suppose, would be to apportion blame where blame is due, and to give credit where credit is due. One knows—and this again is a fact known to every one of your Lordships and to the whole country—that the Force in Singapore was an Imperial Force. It comprised British, Australians, and an Indian contingent. Now what effect would it have upon those bonds of mutual confidence to which I have referred and upon that spirit of co-operation which is now so staunch if it were found as a result of this inquiry that certain units or certain persons were entitled to great credit, while with regard to others criticisms had been well deserved? I can imagine nothing more likely to cause, I will not say jealousies, but argument and disappointment, and no doubt a feeling that injustice had been done would undoubtedly be caused. And so, when the noble Lord, Lord Davies, says that he thinks a considerable amount of evidence could be taken already, I suggest that it is quite fantastic to open an inquiry of this kind when the principal part of your evidence is not available.
Then he talked of precedents. He talked of Pearl Harbour and the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau," and I think Lord Addison or somebody else the other day cited the Mesopotamia Commission as an example. With regard to Pearl Harbour, it strikes me at once that Pearl Harbour, where the disaster took place, is still in American hands and those who took part in it who are still alive and presumably in America or under American jurisdiction. Of course the situation at Singapore is entirely different. The same thing applies to the

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"Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau." Those who are concerned—such of them as survive—are in this country and their evidence was available at the Court which inquired into the matter. With regard to Mesopotamia, I have heard Mesopotamia quoted over and over again as a precedent for this inquiry. I am speaking very much from memory, but so far as I recollect the Mesopotamia inquiry was instituted because of very serious allegations with regard to the shortage of medical supplies and of hospital ships, and there were criticisms that the right kind of transport was not available on the Euphrates or the Tigris. But the principal point referred to the Mesopotamia Commission was the question of the medical supplies. I cannot think there is the smallest analogy between an inquiry as to whether medical supplies were sufficient, or hospital ships available, or whether doctors were there in sufficient numbers, and a roving inquiry, to complete which you would probably have to go back for years, as to what the causes of the fall of Singapore were.
The only further remark of Lord Davies that I will refer to is in reference to the rumours that have been heard or statements which have appeared in the papers. We have all heard gossip with regard to the state of things in Singapore. Everybody has heard rumours, which have been repeated in more than one country, but I venture to think that those malicious rumours, when they are dispelled, will be found to make no reflection upon the honour of the Imperial Force which was in Singapore. The time is not yet to attempt to probe how much of these rumours is false and how much true.
Then there is this final point. How is it possible to institute an inquiry involving the fall of Singapore when General Percival and his staff are prisoners of war in Japan? He is not only the man most concerned, but he is the man, above all others, who could give the sort of information for which a court of inquiry would ask. Furthermore, to embark on such an inquiry, it seems to me, would involve the greatest injustice to an officer who is in the unfortunate position which he now occupies. With regard to General Wavell, he, of course, would also be a witness of absolutely essential value. So far as he is concerned, I shall only
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quote an answer which, I think, completely disposes of the question as to his presence before a court of inquiry. The answer was given by the Prime Minister in another place on April 13, when he said that Sir Archibald Wavell had been instructed to appoint an officer to collect such information as was of value from persons who had escaped from Singapore to India and to send it to this country. The Prime Minister added—and that is what I ask your Lordships to note—
"Moreover, Sir Archibald Wavell will, no doubt, furnish a report or dispatch on what took place, but I cannot expect him to divert his attention from the immediate conduct of the war on the Eastern frontier of India at the present time."
Indeed, to expect anything of the kind, it seems to me, would be quite fantastic.
That really is all I wish to say except this. It was Herbert Spencer, I think, who either wrote or said that this country is, above all countries in the world, prolific in producing men who always appear to wish to decry their own country and their own countrymen. I am disposed to think there is some truth in that. I remember, in an entirely different connexion some years ago, when I was in another place, myself venturing upon the observation that this country seemed to advertise its troubles much more effectively than it advertised its manufactures. That is certainly true, not only with regard to manufactures but with regard to other things. I can only make one final suggestion. If we are to have these inquiries—an inquiry into Singapore, an inquiry into this, that and the other—I suggest to your Lordships' consideration just one other inquiry. I suggest that we have an inquiry into Madagascar and into the causes of that brilliant success with a view to its repetition. I am sure such an inquiry would be a great comfort not only to this House but to the country. Really the answer to both suggestions is the same—namely, that such an inquiry in public could do nothing but give useful information to the enemy, and at the present time both are out of the question. For these reasons I think this Motion is ill-judged and ill-timed, and I hope your Lordships will decisively reject it.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, while I yield to no one in support of the doctrine that Parliament must keep a vigilant eye on all operations, including operations in time of war, I have read this

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Motion of my noble friend Lord Davies, and after thinking it over in a detached frame of mind, like Lord Rushcliffe, to whose excellent speech we listened with such interest, I came to the conclusion that it would be indeed unfortunate if we were to adopt it. I shall endeavour to give your Lordships my reasons. Let us first examine the terms of the Motion very briefly. We are asked to resolve that there shall be "an inquiry into the circumstances and causes of the surrender and loss of Singapore." It is made plain by the noble Lord that he wants the inquiry to be made by an impartial, judicial body, and also that he wants it to take place now—he laid stress upon that—so that it may begin its labours at once. I believe that that, far from being in accordance with precedent or wisdom, would be unprecedented and unwise. I shall try to show why that is so. First of all, the phrase "the circumstances … of the loss of Singapore," means "just what happened there." My noble friend Lord Rushcliffe points out that it really would be not only unfair, but completely unjust, to attempt to find out what really happened when the people responsible are all interned. That really disposes of any idea—I submit this to my noble friends on this side of the House—that you could have a judicial inquiry, whether public or private, into what actually happened at Singapore now. It would be wrong and unjust to every officer and man and to the civilian Government. It would be manifestly wrong. It ought not to be, and if the Commission were to be set up it could not go into that question. If so, perhaps you had better not set it up at all.
Before I leave the question of Singapore, my noble friend said—and I have heard it so often said—that the loss of all these prisoners was unparalleled in our history. I have heard that said again and again. That it was indeed a tragic event none would be found to deny, least of all myself. The surrender of un wounded prisoners is always a tragic event in the history of our Array. But it just is not the fact that it is without precedent. It is worth remembering that in March, 1918, the British Army lost far more un wounded prisoner; than it lost at Singapore, and it is also worth remembering that eight months afterwards the British Army won the most complete and resounding
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victory in the whole of its history. I believe that that is the fact. Reference to history will show that it is so. So much for the difficulty of inquiring into the circumstances of the loss of Singapore. It seems to me you cannot do it.
What about the causes? If you are going to go into the causes of the loss of Singapore, you are going to hold a judicial inquiry into what really happened in all the periods preceding it. You are going to inquire, as Lord Rushcliffe said, into what happened when the French collapsed, and immediately thereafter. You must also go into the question of why reinforcements were not sent at one time and were sent at another, and, as Lord Addison pointed out, what kind of reinforcements were sent at the last moment. On that may I respectfully point out to the House that there is nothing comparable to this episode in difficulty in all our long history? So many people are involved, if you are to have a judicial inquiry; and of course it is plain, as Lord Rushcliffe said, if it is to achieve the purpose set out it must be public, because you cannot relieve public anxieties unless there is a public inquiry. If you are to have that, think of the people who must be summoned to it. First of all there are, of course, our own Ministers—the Prime Minister and other Ministers—involved. You must have an array of people without whom you cannot begin to inquire—the Prime Minister of Australia, for instance, and, do not let us forget, the Prime Ministers of the States of Australia, for those States contributed to that Force which was overwhelmed at Singapore. That Force consisted, approximately, of the following. There were, as I understand it, two Indian Divisions, one British Division, and one Australian Division, and there were parts of a Divison of Malayan persons whom I will call Malayan personnel. If you think of the composition of the Force and of the number of people who would have to be summoned to take part in the inquiry, you realize how impossible such an inquiry would be at the present time.
There is, again, the Viceroy and the members of his Council who were responsible. They must attend and give evidence. Moreover, I go much further. You must have evidence, if you can get it, from France, and you can get some from Free France.

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You must, too, have evidence from the American statesmen, for they were deeply involved. You must, above all, have evidence from Russia. How far is it true that, had we reinforced Singapore sufficiently to save it, Russia might have been overpowered in the desperate onslaught under which she staggered? No one can tell. A Royal Commission might well be an historic body which would give a report of immense interest to mankind, but it would never attempt to do it without calling in evidence from all the people, and especially the senior people, whom I have described. When you add to them the people already referred to—Sir Archibald Wavell and the senior soldiers—it will be seen that to attempt an inquiry into the causes of the loss of Singapore is perfectly impossible. I do implore my noble friend to consider that and not press forward with his proposal, for indeed we are treading on dangerous ground.
Not that there are any secrets; probably there are none. I spend much of my time, as so many of your Lordships do, as a student of the war, and we know that the wildest rumours always fly about as to this, that and the other cause for everything. I do not suppose that there is any particular secret to be revealed, but think of the susceptibilities of people if they are told that it is all their fault. When you think of the people who must be called to give evidence, I do not think it is too much to say that in endeavouring to arrive at the truth you must strike a shattering blow at the cohesion of the Empire and the whole Allied cause. That is putting it high, but when we come to think of the kind of feelings that people have when they are smarting under a sense of defeat, I think you will perhaps agree that it is not putting it too high.
I am, of course, in favour of Parliament insisting that Ministers shall see that due inquiry is made by the Services into the causes of these defeats, and into all the points which Lord Addison mentioned. We want Ministers to assure us that when these disasters occur the responsible Staffs and the Ministers responsible above them do really go into the facts, find them out, and endeavour to put right at whatever cost to prejudice or old-fashioned theory, anything that is wrong; but you cannot do that by a public inquiry. The one comparable case was
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the Mesopotamia Commission. My noble friend Lord Crewe points out to me that such a Commission would be of no advantage to Lord Davies for it was a secret Commission. All the evidence of value given at the time was given in secret, so I cannot conceive that this inquiry would be of any use to him. I think the course suggested might be most dangerous and, therefore, for all those reasons, with great respect I would beg your Lordships to reject the Motion.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I should like to begin, if I may, by very respectfully congratulating the Government on the brilliant successes of the joint operations against Diego Suarez. According to the present state of our information they appear to have been well conceived, well planned and brilliantly executed. But, coming to the subject of this debate, it seems to me that the two noble Lords who have just spoken have really been under a certain kind of illusion. They have assumed that no inquiry is of the least use unless it is a public inquiry. I confess I never dreamt of a public inquiry. I cannot imagine anything more foolish. The Dardenelles inquiry was not public, and to the best of my belief the Mesopotamia inquiry was not public, but the mere fact that people knew that these things were being gone into reassured public opinion, and my noble friend Lord Mottistone did himself say that what the public wanted to know was, that the Government and Staffs were going into these mistakes, if mistakes they were. How could you produce that result better than by, an inquiry where the evidence was not published? As a matter of fact, the Dardenelles evidence has never been published until this day.
I am in entire agreement with both the noble Lords that this inquiry ought not to extend to what happened locally at Singapore, for the reasons that have been given. The evidence is not there, and you cannot get a definite conclusion as to what happened; therefore I do not think you should make the attempt. I advocate an inquiry at the London end. Now the very prescience displayed in the Diego Suarez affair throws into the highest relief the contrary impression produced by the disaster at Singapore. One reason why I, in spite of the powerful speeches which we have just heard, advocate this

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inquiry, is that so far as I know we have had no public answer whatsoever to the three main issues that have been put in these debates. Those are, first, why were such important ships as the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" sent to such a dangerous place at such a dangerous time? They were too small a detachment to succeed and too large to be put at risk. The second point is as to why a sufficiency of up-to-date aircraft was not sent to balance the large military forces that were sent and to provide cover for the Fleet. The third point is as to why the lessons of Singapore, so far as our present information goes, were disregarded in the subsequent operations off Java and Ceylon.
But in addition to those main questions there are a large number of subsidiary questions that have been raised for the most part in our debates and to which no answer, I think, has been given. There is, first, the question whether sufficient foresight was shown in reply to clear warnings that Japan gave us, first by joining the Axis in September, 1940, and secondly by starting to overrun Indo-China in July, 1941. In that connexion there is the question which was asked by my noble friend Viscount Swinton on May 5. When that new situation arose in Indo-China were the economic dangers made present to the minds of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, away back six months before Singapore was invaded, the questions of rubber, and tin and oil? Another question is, was the psychology of the Japanese taken into account in the policy that was adopted combined with the public statements that were made? Was it ever thought and seriously believed that a nation like Japan, so venturesome and so well informed, so proud and so sensitive, so calculating and so strong, would be deterred by boastful talk and half measures? Then, were any demands received from local defence authorities? If so, how far were they met? What were the views of the other Empire Governments that were concerned, and how far were they met? By whom and on whose advice were all these decisions taken?
All these questions have been raised in one place or another and there is no question that the public is concerned. I can well believe that, although three months have elapsed since the fall of Singapore, it is very awkward to give answers to
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these questions in public, and that really is a very strong part of the case for inquiry. I agree with what my noble friend Lord Rushcliffe said about public opinion. I do not think the morale of the population is shaken at all; I do not think confidence in ultimate victory is shaken; but I do think that people are bothered, that people are rather bewildered. Every day some fresh bit of information comes to light. The noble Lord who moved this Motion has mentioned" some of them. I am not a very ardent student of these things but every day something comes to my notice. Last week there were a couple of articles in the Daily Telegraph. There is a rather notable letter to-day. Then I picked up Blackwood's Magazine and in that there was rather a disturbing article. I turn on the wireless, I hear Dr. Evett's inspiring broadcast, and I notice this rather significant statement:
"If the danger of Japan had been fully appreciated it is impossible to believe that so little aid could have been sent, and sent so slowly, to the crucial points."
This argument of public opinion was very much the one used by Mr. Asquith when, somewhat reluctantly, he conceded the Dardanelles inquiry on July 20, 1916. He said:
"There is a widespread and legitimate anxiety which cannot and ought not to be allayed by a general assurance that all these matters will be inquired into after the war."
That describes the question is a nutshell. Then there was Mr. Churchill—he was Colonel Churchill in those days—who was very active in pressing for the Dardanelles inquiry, and very properly and naturally, because the affairs of the department that he had administered, the naval operations at the Dardanelles, were in question and he had a very good story to tell. He therefore was pressing not so much for an inquiry as for the laying of Papers, and one of the reasons which he gave was this. On June 1, 1916, he said:
"Great decisions both in regard to the naval and military operations which governed the Dardanelles and Gallipoli enterprises were taken here in Whitehall and examined by the War Committee, and it does seem to me that it would be very injurious to the reputation of Ministers, and those who have been Ministers, if it could be thought or represented that they were in some way trying, by delaying the publication of the Papers, to shield themselves and to allow the whole burden of blame to fail upon the naval and military commanders at the scene of action."
When Colonel Churchill learnt that the Government had decided to depart from

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an earlier undertaking to lay Papers he sent to the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, a letter which he read out in Parliament on July 20, 1916. From that letter take this extract:
"The pledge to publish was not given at my request, though as you know I have always wished that the whole truth should be known to the nation and to the Dominions and that nothing essential should be concealed."
There seems to me a lot of good sense in all that, and it applies very closely to the present case. But really the argument today is infinitely stronger than it was in 1916. There is no comparison really between the Dardanelles operations and those at Singapore. The Dardanelles campaign was to a large extent a success. It rivetted to the vicinity of the Straits the greater part of the Turkish Army for ten months and kept it from attacking the rest of the British Empire; it kept Bulgaria out of the war for some seven months; and at the end the whole of the troops were moved away almost without any casualty at all. But Singapore was a very different story. There is hardly a word that can be said as to the help it did give us. It is for that reason that I think, if ever there was a case for inquiry, we are justified in asking for it here.
Nevertheless, for the reasons I developed on March 25, I would be altogether against a large inquiry of the type of the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia Commissions. Something much less than that is what I suggest, and that is an inquiry into the London end—and a secret inquiry at that—to reassure the public that these things, or rather that this particular operation is being gone into as rather a special case. The documents alone would give the Commission a very good idea of what decisions had been taken and by whom, and their reasons and on whose advice. They need not make a heavy call on the time of the witnesses at all. With the aid of the Departmental staffs, I do not believe that the burden on any of the principal witnesses would be more than that of the preparation of a single Parliamentary speech. I should suggest that the inquiry should be quite small; that it should consist of an experienced statesman, an Admiral, a General, and an Air-Marshal, and I would like to add a scientist, for the very special reason that scientists are so very experienced in ascertaining
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and getting constructive conclusions from the analyses of past successes or failures. I should hope also that the result of the inquiry would not be merely a narrative of events and a few comments. What we are really thinking of, of course, is solely the future, and I hope that the Commission would be able to lay down some principles that would be of value in the future. I hope, therefore, that the Government will not shirk this issue. To do so would, to my mind, be sheer obscurantism. I believe that they would gain very much more than they would lose, and that, even if it came out that they had made some mistakes, they would be much more readily pardoned by reason of their submitting the whole case to inquiry.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, without committing myself to the exact form of an inquiry, or to the exact nature of the matters which should be submitted to inquiry, I would certainly support the view of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that there are matters arising out of the loss of Malaya and the fall of Singapore that certainly should be inquired into. I am quite sure the noble Lord realizes that he will not get the inquiry that he hopes for. I think it is easy to forecast the nature of the Government reply; the arguments which will be put forward to the effect that witnesses are not available and so on, and that it would take up the time of responsible authorities in the middle of the war. I think that there is a further argument which probably operates very strongly in the minds of the Government and that is that self-preservation is the first law of Governments. In this matter of Singapore, it is, I am afraid, all too apparent that what would be revealed by an inquiry would be of such a nature as gravely to shake the Government and to impair reputations of people very much in the public eye. That, I think, is one of the reasons why no inquiry will be granted. There have been many disasters and many reverses in this war, and after each of them the Government decontamination squad gets extremely busy. That will be the case this time also.
I thought that the case against an inquiry was most powerfully argued by the noble Lord, Lord Rushcliffe, in a speech which made a very deep impression on my mind. But in regard to what the noble Lord said about the inquiry necessarily

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being public, may I point out that in the case of the inquiry into the disaster at Pearl Harbour, the proceedings were held in camera, although of course, findings were made public? Those findings, I understand from the Press, greatly reassured public opinion in America, and did a great deal to restore confidence. There is no necessity at all for the inquiry to be held in public, provided that the findings of the inquiry are made public. As regards what the noble Lord said about morale, I most fully agree that the state of morale in this country, after nearly three years of war is excellent. But what is likely to impair morale is a continual hushing up and whitewashing of reverses and defeats. That is what shakes public confidence and public morale. I fully agree with what the noble Lord said about the Governor: that it would be most unfair to try the Governor in his absence. But I am quite sure that nobody wishes to do anything of the sort. There is no suggestion for one moment of acting unfairly or of doing any such thing. It is mainly an inquiry as to what happened in London, in Whitehall, that is required. Nor would the object of such an inquiry as one-would wish to have be the apportioning of blame or credit. The object would be to learn the lessons which are to be learnt from the disasters to profit by them and apply them to the course of the war. I agree again with what the noble Lord said about rumours. Most unfortunate rumours have been going around. They certainly ought not to be repeated, but nothing would kill these rumours more quickly than an inquiry such as my noble friend proposes.
There is one particular point which I wish to raise in connexion with the suggestion for an inquiry. J think that the Prime Minister had been very much misled and deceived all along before Singapore and before the events in Malaya. I feel that his information and his intelligence and the advice which was tendered to him must have been very faulty indeed. I think that is particularly unfortunate because of the repercussions which events in Malaya and Singapore have had in Australia, Australia which is facing a very great trial, a very grim prospect at the present moment. I must say that it occurred to me the other day, when the Prime Minister in his broadcast spoke about the ridge being in sight, that
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that statement must have fallen very oddly indeed upon Australian ears, when one thinks of the trial which confronts them at the present moment.
But I believe that public opinion in Australia was most gravely perturbed by the events leading up to and culminating in the loss of Malaya and the fall of Singapore. I am quite sure that the prevailing feeling is that the British High Command was so obsessed by events nearer home that they really did not appreciate the tremendous implications of the Pacific and the unpreparedness of defences in the Pacific. I believe that an inquiry of the nature proposed would have one very good effect indeed and that would be to reassure Australian opinion and satisfy Australian opinion that these matters were to be inquired into so that the Pacific defences should receive their proper attention and proper consideration in the future. I think that on account of Australia alone there is a very good case indeed for an inquiry.
There is only one other point that I wish to make. Can we have some information about what has happened to the floating dock at Singapore? That is a matter of great interest and importance. At the Admiralty the importance of it must have been foreseen at the time when Japan entered the war, and in fact it might well have been foreseen before Japan entered the war, for it was obvious that Japan was likely to come in, and the question of the floating dock might have been considered them. Was it ever proposed to take it away from Singapore, or was it just left there to fall into the hands of the Japanese? Were any preparations made and put into execution for its destruction? The floating dock is the making of the base of Singapore, and, if it fell uninjured into the hands of the Japanese, then indeed they secured a prize of very great value. It would be of great interest if some information could be forthcoming as to what has happened to that floating dock.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, I have advocated in your Lordships' House and in the Press an inquiry into this question, and therefore I do not apologize for asking your Lordships to listen to me for a few minutes this afternoon. Unfortunately I was unable to reach your Lordships' House until a few moments ago, and therefore I have not heard the

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arguments which have been advanced in favour of an inquiry, apart from those of the noble Lord who has just spoken; but I have not the slightest doubt, from what I have heard, that the full case for an inquiry has been made in your Lordships' House this afternoon. The Prime Minister has described the fall of Singapore as the greatest national disaster which has occurred in our history. As a result of that disaster, we have had slurs and imputations cast upon the characters of the local residents in Singapore and Malaya, upon the characters of the planters, and upon the characters of the civil servants in Malaya, and we have had slurs and imputations cast upon the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and those in control during these operations. That being the case, I cannot conceive how there could be greater need for an inquiry into this matter.
I appreciate, however, that it is difficult at this moment to hold the full inquiry which all of us desire, because I fully realize that the Government cannot have in their possession or made available to them all the information which is required in order to have a full inquiry. But I do urge the Government that the least they should do would be to inform the country and to inform Australia and the other Dominions—because the whole of the Empire is interested in this matter—that, whilst at the present moment it may not be possible to hold this inquiry, they do intend to hold an inquiry as soon as it is possible to do so. If the Government give that assurance, I feel certain that it will allay a good deal of the feeling which is aroused in the country today. Up to now we have had a rigid refusal to hold any inquiry whatever. An acknowledgement on the part of the Government that they will hold an inquiry as soon as circumstances permit will, I am sure, meet with very great acceptance in the country and throughout the Empire, and, as I have said, it will allay the feelings which have been aroused. I therefore urge the Government to take that step, and I hope that they may be able to do so this afternoon.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am able to reply for the Government at the end of this debate much more briefly than might otherwise be possible, because, to my mind at least, the speeches which have been made by the noble Lords,
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Lord Rushcliffe and Lord Mottistone, should have demonstrated to any one who approaches this subject without previous commitment that the arguments against accepting this proposal are at present overwhelming. I listened with particular interest to the speech made by my noble friend Lord Hankey, and the more so, of course, because, as far as I remember, he was a member of the Government at the time when some of the matters now under discussion were dealt with. I was particularly interested in a certain contrast which I noticed between the speech which he made in your Lordships' House on March 25 last and the arguments which he very persuasively advanced to-day. My noble friend explained that he had never thought of anything but a secret inquiry. Be it so. He describes it now as "a secret inquiry at the London end." He went on to urge that documents could do all that was necessary, and then, by way of analogy, he reminded us—and he has great knowledge on this subject—that both the Dardanelles inquiry and the Mesopotamia inquiry were themselves secret.
I must remind your Lordships, however, that six weeks ago my noble friend was referring to the Dardanelles inquiry and to the Mesopotamia inquiry—these secret inquiries—as providing the most conclusive argument against the wisdom of a corresponding course now. I will read the passage. He pointed out to the House the reasons for not holding a Royal Commission, and he said:
"But the really strong reason, the tremendous reason for deprecating the holding of a Royal Commission, has been given by the noble Viscount who has just sat down."
He was referring to the very powerful speech then made by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton. I shall in a moment point out how much importance there is in emphasizing a Royal Commission. He went on to say:
"That is the tremendous strain which is put on those who are running the war."
He then went on to explain, from his wholly exceptional knowledge of the circumstances, how he had watched the Ministers who were concerned in those investigations turning aside from their proper tasks and devoting themselves for hours and days, and I think weeks, to an intense study of the material—pre sumably the documentary material—

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which was at that time in the noble Lord's own office. Having drawn this picture for us, he proceeded to say, I thought most sagaciously, "Well, that is not good in a great war."
It does not make a row of pins of difference whether you call a thing a Royal Commission or a judicial inquiry or any other sort of inquiry. By common admission, and as the speech just made by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, shows, the matters which it is suggested should be investigated must acutely touch the reputation, the wisdom and the judgment of extremely important people in this country, people who are now carrying on the war, and who have a far greater burden on their shoulders than any of us find it easy to imagine. Every argument used by my noble friend six weeks ago to show that this "is not good in a great war" seems to me to apply at this moment, whatever the method of inquiry may be.
LORD HANKEY: I think I ought to point out that I said to-day that it was for the reasons I developed on March 25, that I was opposed to a Royal Commission on the scale of the Dardanelles Commission, and I think—I have not refreshed my memory—that on March 25 I spoke of something more like the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" inquiry.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Yes, but the point is this. We can all follow it together in the most friendly way—the suggestion is that this is an admirable moment to gather together the documents which can be found at the London end for the purpose of having an investigation, and in due course a report, as to the part which has been played by different people, and as to where the responsibility lies and where any mistakes were made. I cannot conceive that such a process could take place without all that dislocation of energy which my noble friend explained to us six weeks ago must happen if you have the Prime Minister or the First Lord of the Admiralty—who in those days might have been Mr. Asquith, or Mr. Churchill—or other individuals involved; and there really is no difference in principle between saying that the form of inquiry shall be this rather than that. It depends what you inquire about. I do not know the exact terms of reference in the case of the "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau." I
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should be very much surprised if they involved any inquiry whatever into the view that was taken, let us say, by the Prime Minister or the Chiefs of Staff on that particular occasion.
It does appear to me that we have to make up our minds what we want. Of course if we want a heresy hunt, if we want to find where the blame ought to be put—whether on some professional or on some politician, I do not know—that is a perfectly arguable case—it may be rather a tempting case to make. I can well understand that some people would be eager for it for the sake of its results. But if we are to make up our minds on this point, we have to ask ourselves whether this really is a good moment to start an inquiry of this sort, even though it be what is called "at the London fend." I must say for my part I do not quite understand how you would draw the line. My noble friend Lord Davies, I think, told us that one of the things he wanted investigated was the morale of the Army at Singapore. How are you going to find that out "at the London end"? Then I think he wanted to find out what was the attitude of the Malayans. How is that to be ascertained in any quarter of the Metropolis? And there is a whole series of questions which he suggested—very interesting and important questions—but they have no more possibility of being dealt with by documentary inquiry "at the London end" than anything one can imagine.
It really is a mistake to suppose that there is a shirking of the issue here on the part of the Government: and I am disposed to think that there is at least a certain confusion on the part of those who asked for an inquiry. There was a speech made in the last debate to which I think reference has hardly been made to-day—it was referred to by Lord Davies but not by name—the speech made by my noble friend Viscount Swinton. I really think that what he then said may well be regarded as standing now as a very formidable argument which I have not seen answered. My noble friend Lord Swinton expressed himself then as being strongly opposed to the appointing of any formal body of inquiry at all, and he gave two reasons, of which he said the second he thought was the more important. His first reason was—and surely he was quite right—that it would necessitate an inquiry

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into questions which could only be sufficiently answered by the testimony of men who are now unhappily prisoners of war. The same point was very effectively made to-day by the noble Lord, Lord Rushcliffe, and it appeals to everybody. Nobody could really be happy at the idea that a judgment, possibly adverse, was going to be given even by implication on British Commanders every one of whom became a captive in that melancholy disaster.
I dare say your Lordships will remember years ago a very amusing play by Sir James Barrie called Leonora, which depicted a scene, I think, at the Old Bailey. The scene went on for some time. It looked to me very much like the Old Bailey. There was a Judge and a jury, and suddenly I noticed there was nobody in the dock. But the play went on just the same. But three-quarters of the way through the scene Mrs. Patrick Campbell, as Leonora, appeared and apologized for being late, saying, "Pray go on, don't stop for me." Is it supposed that, having started this inquiry in the absence of Sir Shenton Thomas and General Percival, you can say: "Well, there is plenty to go on with"? Nobody who understands the way in which an inquiry should be conducted would ever be contented to say "there is plenty to begin with." You want to know that you are able to hear the case on the one side as well as the other, and if you cannot do that that seems to me to be a strong argument against such an inquiry.
But the second reason given by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, was the overwhelming one. Lord Swinton said:
"It would take men, whose whole energy should be concentrated on the vast tasks of this world war, away from their daily work, bringing them, as they must be brought, before Such a court of inquiry."
How can you imagine that the distinguished members of the Staff who may have had some responsibility for this Singapore business—how can you imagine that if you are going to add to their labours now in this way, with all that is involved not only in appearing but in preparing for this investigation, upon which the whole of their professional reputation may depend, you can at the same time say "Well, let everybody carry on with the war, as that is the only thing that really matters"?
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Lord Swinton went on to make a stipulation, not altogether unlike the suggestion made this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, and I wish to do what I can to meet it. Lord Swinton said:
"I would rather ask for the assurance … that all the lessons in strategy, in tactics, and in leadership are being learnt and applied to-day, and I would submit to your Lordships that the right body to review and to draw these conclusions is not a Royal Commission, but the men who are responsible for the conduct of the war. Surely, it must be the constant and continuing function of the General Staff all the time to be applying the lessons whether of failure or of success."
My noble friend Lord Mottistone made a very similar suggestion in his speech just now, when he said he would like to be satisfied that due examination was taking place, and an effort was being made to draw therefrom the lessons that ought to be drawn by Ministers and by the Staff from the events of Singapore. I did not think it right, in finishing this debate for the Government, merely to offer my own assumption on such a subject. It might well have little value, and I therefore made inquiry of those who know, and I am authorized to tell your Lordships, and I do tell your Lordships, that, so far as material is available, and as it becomes available, I can give the unqualified assurance that that which was asked for by my noble friends Lord Swinton and Lord Mottistone is being carried out.
I submit to the House that, while this very interesting question has many aspects, we should keep our minds on the main point and then there can be no doubt what the answer should be. No man should form a judgment on this subject until he has made up his mind whether he is asking for a private or a public inquiry, and there has been great uncertainty about that. No man should form a judgment until he has made up his mind as to the limits of the matter that you are inquiring about; and there has been remarkable diversity in the opinions expressed on that point. And no man should form a judgment on this subject unless he is satisfied that an inquiry can take place now without damage to the active pursuit of the war.
LORD DAVIES: My Lords, I am sure we are greatly indebted to the noble and learned Viscount who has just sat down and who has summarized for us the arguments put forward in this debate. There

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seems to be a considerable amount of misapprehension as to what is suggested in the Motion I have brought forward this afternoon. As to whether there should be a public or private inquiry, that surely is a matter which the Government should decide. Up to now, they have told us that they cannot countenance any form of inquiry at all. Lord Hankey has made it perfectly clear that, so far as we are concerned, we should welcome an inquiry, even though it was conducted in private, which is perhaps the only practicable way of doing it.
The noble and learned Viscount made great play with the fact that the time and energy of the Staff and Ministers would be taken up by their having to submit evidence. He also assured us—and I am delighted with the assurance—that the matter was being inquired into by the members of the Staff and by those responsible for the strategy of the war. I am sure the House will be grateful to him for that assurance, but may I point out that in securing the material they require to form their opinions and to elaborate their strategy, they must, of necessity, spend a considerable amount of time—at any rate the members of the Staff entrusted with the job—on research and thought in preparing the various statements and memoranda required? They would have to do that in the case of an inquiry, so I do not think there is very much in that argument.
With regard to the points raised by Lord Rushcliffe, I never for a moment suggested in my speech that the officers and officials who were taken prisoner should be judged in their absence. I tried to point out that there would possibly be interim Reports, and that, until their evidence was available, obviously the Reports would not be regarded in any sense as official. He also said that we wanted to apportion blame and credit. What we are particularly anxious for is that these mistakes which have been made in the past should not happen again. That is the sole object of the inquiry. There are other Motions on the Paper, and therefore I shall not take up more of your Lordships' time. I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for having given us an assurance that inquiries are proceeding. Evan Lord Rushcliffe admitted that an inquiry must be held at some time, and that means, I hope, that
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when the appropriate moment arrives the Government will, in spite of the negative answer given to us this afternoon, inquire into this matter further. Having consulted my friends, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE)THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE) (Lord Cecil): My Lords, before we proceed to the next Motion on the Paper, I should like by leave of the House to say one word with regard to the business. We have, as your Lordships are aware, three Motions on the Paper. One has been completed. There remain one in the name of Lord Gainford and a further one in the name of Lord Vansittart. I understand that a large number of Peers wish to speak on Lord Vansittart's Motion, and it is perfectly clear we shall not get through it to-night. What I suggest to the House is that we should take Lord Gainford's Motion and Lord Vansittart's speech, and then adjourn, resuming the discussion of Lord Vansittart's Motion at a later sitting. I think that would be for the convenience of the House, because there is no prospect of finishing Lord Vansittart's Motion to-night.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I heartily support the suggestion which has been made by the Leader of the House. It seems to me that it would be quite impossible to give adequate consideration to the very important Motion by Lord Vansittart at this time of day. A more adequate opportunity would certainly be available on the day suggested.
LORD ARNOLD: My Lords, speaking as an independent member of the House, I should like to point out that this is a very unusual procedure and an extremely inconvenient one. This Motion has been on the Paper for some time, and, as the noble Viscount says, there are a great many speakers—I am not one myself—who wish to take part. The position that has arisen could have been perfectly well foreseen by the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart. Any one could have seen that this Motion would not be reached until a late hour. The speech by Mr. Herbert Morrison that he is criticizing is already out of date, and altogether this is a procedure

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which, in my opinion, ought not to be followed. I for one enter my protest against what has been arranged.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I am very sorry that this procedure does not suit my noble friend Lord Arnold, but I can assure him there is nothing new about it. It is a very frequent procedure in this House, when there is not time for a debate to be completed, that it should be adjourned. There is an important debate at the next sitting, and therefore the proposal is to adjourn this debate until later. The only alternative would be for Lord Vansittart to make his speech to-day, and nobody else would be able to get in except the spokesman of the Government, which would be unsatisfactory when there are many other Peers who wish to speak.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: My Lords, it appears to be agreed that the sittings of the House should terminate at a certain time each day. That seems to cut really across the debates and the freedom of this House. I hope that in the longer days the House may sit for a longer time than it has been sitting up to now. In the House of Commons one got used to sitting for a great many hours, and I do not think the sittings of this House impose any undue pressure on its members. It has to be remembered that this debate may go on for a long time, in which case we might get through a portion of the debate to-day, in addition to the speech by Lord Vansittart, and take the rest of the speeches on a subsequent day. It seems to me artificial that only the one speech should be delivered to-day, and the debate then come to an abrupt end.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: The noble Marquess was not present when we discussed this subject. Owing to existing circumstances, it is a great inconvenience to many noble Lords when the House sits late, and therefore an arrangement has been reached. There is no fixed limitation—it is purely a matter of convenience—but I understand most noble Lords consider that it is for the convenience of the House that we should adjourn early. Therefore I propose that Lord Vansittart, who is prepared to make his speech, should be allowed to start the debate, and the whole of the rest of the
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debate should be taken on a later day. I should have thought that was for the convenience of the House as a whole.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My Lords, there are several noble Lords who are prepared to make their speeches to-night. We ought to have a clearer definition of what the expression "at this late hour" means. One day it seems to mean one time and another day another time, and it is very difficult to make one's arrangements.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: The definition of "late hour" is an hour which is too late for most of your Lordships. As I say, in war-time and in conditions under which people have to live, it has not been found convenient for this House to sit late, and I, as Leader, have to take account of that fact. I have consulted this House on that subject quite recently, and the distinct impression I got was that your Lord ships did not wish to sit to a late hour. Therefore I suggest that it is for your Lordships' convenience that we should begin the debate by allowing Lord Vansittart to make his speech and then adjourn, and that the rest of the debate and the reply of the Government should come on another day. That is not an unusual procedure. I have known debates adjourned several times since I have been in this House—and that is only a short time—and I am convinced that what I have suggested is the most satisfactory arrangement.
LORD ARNOLD: Can the noble Lord give us any precedent for the mover of a Motion only making his speech and then the House adjourning?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: It is not a question of whether the mover of the Motion makes his speech, but it is a question of the time at which the mover of the Motion finishes his speech.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: May I suggest that we should wait to see at what time the mover of the Motion has finished his speech, and whether there will then be time for a continuation of the debate? Is it necessary to decide now what should take place perhaps an hour hence?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I have consulted the convenience of several noble Lords who want to speak and I understand that this is the most satisfactory

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arrangement from their point of view. I suggest, therefore, that we had better stay by that arrangement. There is really nothing new about it. As I said the House could have a later sitting and give a full day to this subject. There is nothing else on the Paper to prevent that, and whether you have one speech or two speeches this evening will not make much difference.

PUBLICATION OF HOURS ORDERS.
LORD GAINFORD LORD GAINFORD had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His Majesty's Government why the Emergency Order for Potteries, dated December 23, 1941, extending the hours of child employment, was not: published in the Labour Gazette before February; why the Emergency Order for Cotton Spinning dated February 5, 1942, extending the hours of child employment, was not published before April; why these Labour Gazettes were not on sale and available to the public for a further month; and whether steps will be taken to ensure that in future such Orders shall be published promptly and placed on sale so that Parliament and the public may be given the earliest possible knowledge of the contents of such Orders; and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the only object I have in putting this question on the Paper is to give the Government an opportunity of removing a suspicion which has existed, that when the spirit of the Factory Act has been annulled by the issue of Orders, those Orders should be available to members of both Houses and to the public. I beg leave to ask the question.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, I will delay your Lordships for only a few minutes. The Minister regrets very much the delays that took place in regard to the publication of the Order mentioned. The explanation is that the Ministry's Gazette is not considered to be the primary channel for publication of such Orders. The subsequent reference to them in the Labour Gazette was a supplementary method af publication. Other steps were taken to bring the matter before the notice of those concerned. For instance, the Order was at once communicated to representatives of the employers and the employed and it was thus found to have an immediately wide
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circulation in the areas affected. Then copies of the actual Orders were sent to both sides concerned, and it must be remembered that no firm could use them without the written consent of the Inspector of Factories who would in the ordinary course send copies to firms authorized to use the Orders. It cannot, therefore, be said, according to the view held by the Minister of Labour, that reliance has to be placed on the Ministry's Gazette for knowledge of the Orders concerned. The delays, such as they were, were due first to this, that the Gazette was regarded as a supplementary step, that copies were not sent to the Editor at once, and that war-time difficulties of printing and of issue had something to do with the delay. New arrangements have been or are being made in the sense that in future the Editor will at once receive the special documents, and that the Orders will be placed in the Printed Paper Office of your Lordships' House. In regard to the sale, which is a part of the noble Lord's question, this matter was discussed with the Stationery Office, and the Ministry was advised that the demand for such documents was far too small to justify the very much greater use of Paper that would be involved in the publication. Copies, however, of the Orders are obtainable at the Ministry, and the Ministry is considering at the present time what further steps could appropriately be taken to avoid delays in future.
LORD GAINFORD: My Lords, I beg to thank the noble Lord for his reply.

POST-WAR POLICY TOWARDS GERMANY.
LORD VANSITTART LORD VANSITTART rose to call attention to the post-war policy towards Germany outlined in the recent speech made by the Home Secretary at Blackpool; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to move this Motion in no unfriendliness to the Home Secretary. On the contrary, I feel that we all owe him a debt of gratitude for having provided, in his speech at Blackpool, a long overdue occasion to rectify a distorted perspective. I rise, therefore, not as a critic but as a debtor. The Home Secretary began by insisting on justice for the German people. So far, well and good. We all agree. But what sort of

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justice? President Wilson, to whom I think history may be kinder than his contemporaries, faced precisely that question without demur when, on April 6, 1919, he said:
"Justice, therefore, is the only possible basis for the settlement of the accounts of this terrible war. Justice is what Germany shall have. But it must be justice for all. There must be justice for the dead and wounded, and for those who have been orphaned and bereaved that Europe might be freed from Prussian despotism. There must be justice for those millions whose homes and land, ships and property German savagery has spoliated and destroyed. …
"Somebody must suffer for the consequences of the war. Is it to be Germany or only the people she has wronged? Not to give justice to all concerned, would only leave the world open to fresh calamities. The Allied and Associated Powers therefore believe that the peace they have proposed is fundamentally a peace of right fulfilling the terms agreed upon at the time of the Armistice. … The Treaty is frankly not based upon a general condonation of the events of 1914–1918. It would not be a peace of justice if it were."
It is, I think, precisely that term of this pronouncement of President Wilson that the Home Secretary seems, though I am sure unintentionally, to be criticizing when he proceeds to say:
"I am against that foolish and purposeless vindictiveness which was sought to be imposed on the German people after the last war."
I cannot allow German propaganda to make of this a misuse which was little intended by the Home Secretary. Germany was treated with no "foolish and purposeless vindictiveness." That is a German legend which it is high time to explode before it does further damage.
The last war, my Lords, cost mankind, directly and indirectly, 25,000,000 lives. I am taking Professor Gilbert Murray's estimate. Germany, as being responsible, was required to disarm. Germany's sympathizers denied her guilt, but the Germans themselves continually boasted of that guilt so long as they thought they were winning. There is a whole library of those boasts. They never dreamed of denying it save as an afterthought in defeat, and then only because to their agreeable surprise they found that there were Englishmen who would sooner believe them than the overwhelming evidence contained in the simple and straightforward books of the late Lord Grey and Prince Lichnowsky among many others which settled the question
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"beyond a peradventure," to quote President Wilson again.
I could produce lists of authoritative Germans who, even after defeat, never attempted to deny that guilt privately, and there were other honest and more courageous Germans, men like Eisner and Haase, who admitted it publicly. For that they were murdered. They were murdered because they were right. These men had seen that in confession and repentance alone lay the hope of a change of German heart. When that recognition was refused there was never any hope of peace. I have only time here for one comment on that period of duplicity. When Eisner was murdered the assassin Count Arco Vally was injured, and Eisner's Republican colleague, Auer, Minister of the Interior and Vice-President, sent a bouquet to the assassin. That episode alone speaks volumes. Germany, then, was required to disarm but did not disarm. On the contrary, she hastened to rearm with the full connivance of the Republican Government. The school text books in use under that Republic without Republicans were as "vindictive" as under the Kaiser. This is not the place for the long story of German rearmament, culminating as it did in the reintroduction of conscription, which enjoyed wild and nation-wide popularity because the great majority of German mothers had raised their sons to be soldiers.
Indeed, the Home Secretary is certainly not protesting against the disarming of Germany. He does not think it was vindictive to require Germany to disarm, for if that had ever been his view he would have protested against the Atlantic Charter, which again promises that Germany shall be unilaterally disarmed. So little "vindictive" were the Allies 22 years ago that they did not even enforce that legitimate condition. This time the Governments concerned will live up to their undertaking, and it is clear from the rest of the Home Secretary's speech that they will have his support. It is therefore not the fictitious disarmament of Germany which has troubled the Home Secretary. Nor can it possibly be the restoration of Alsace Lorraine to France. How could it be foolish, purposeless or vindictive to restore to France what was taken from her by force in 1871? In any case, the Prime Minister has undertaken

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to do that again, and very rightly. Nor can the Home Secretary be troubled by the case of Poland and -the Polish Corridor. How could it be foolish, purposeless, or vindictive to restore to life a Poland thrice criminally torn asunder in the eighteenth century? How can it be vindictive to give to that Poland access to the sea through territory which has been overwhelmingly Polish since the dawn of the Christian era? In any case we have undertaken to restore Poland again, and no country has ever better deserved that "justice for all" of which President Wilson spoke. Well, then, the trouble is not Poland.
Can it be the restoration to Denmark of territory forcibly taken from her in 1864? Clearly not. That also is justice and we shall do justice again. The Home Secretary is not troubled by the restoration of Czecho-Slovakia because I know him to sympathize with that brave democracy. Moreover, the case of Czechoslovakia was not one that affected Germany at all; it affected Austria. Germany had nothing to complain of, although Germany did complain until she had devoured Czecho-Slovakia, as she has always sought to devour her neighbours. Once again we are pledged to restore Czecho-Slovakia. Debts of honour must be paid in full. Was it vindictive to forbid Germany to eat Austria without permission? Surely no one now would deny that that prohibition was not only extremely wise but an absolutely indispensable condition of peace, indispensable also to the very existence of others as events have proved. In any case the Prime Minister has repeatedly undertaken to liberate and restore Austria.
We cannot indict the Treaty of Versailles without indicting the greater part of the proclaimed policy of the present Government. I am sure that it is not the intention of the Home Secretary to indict himself. No, I think we may be very sure that the Home Secretary is not complaining that the post-war settlement took care of the little man and the under-dog, because to his great credit he has been a lifelong champion of the little man and the under-dog. Before the Versailles settlement nearly 50,000,000 human beings lived under alien rule in Europe. The post-war settlement brought that figure to below 20,000,000. That achievement, no mean one in an imperfect and
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entangled world, moved the late Mr. H. A. L. Fisher to write this:
"Judged by the test of self-determination, no previous European frontiers have been so satisfactory."
Self-determination may have its faults, but it is certainly not purposeless or vindictive. There is something of the same sort in the Atlantic Charter.
Where, then, is the grievance? Was it in the punishment of war criminals? But war criminals were not punished. There were plenty of German criminals steeped in all the atrocities that they have perpetrated in this war, but the Allies renounced their right to try them. They allowed the German Republic to do so, and in consequence the very few who were brought to trial were acquitted or lionized. There were more bouquets for murderers. Was that foolish or vindictive? Yes, it was foolish because the Germans then learnt quite early that they could flout any clause of the Treaty, and for that extreme leniency—leniency, not vindictiveness—multitudes of poor people have had to pay with their lives which might have been saved by making a timely and deterrent example of bestiality. Once again not only our Government but many others have pledged themselves to exact the punishment of German butchers as a condition of peace. This time the world will not allow any Government to weaken. Here, then, we are already pledged to humanity to be more, and not less, severe than at Versailles.
Let me try again. Perhaps the Home Secretary was troubled by recollections of Reparations—possibly because he does not know the full story, or else has forgotten part of it. Here is its essence. The last war cost the Allies a minimum expenditure of £24,000,000,000, or according to the late President Wilson's estimate £30,000,000,000. They asked for an indemnification as to one-fourth or one-fifth of that sum. The demand was not purposeless or vindictive, but it was impracticable, and, for that reason alone, perhaps, foolish. The whole trouble was that the harm done by Germany was irreparable—and it is even more irreparable this time. But even that demand was not enforced, because, from the outset, Germany was determined to bilk in order to rearm. What actually happened was that, leaving aside Reparations in kind, Germany paid on balance, in cash,

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£153,000,000, and borrowed from the Allies and the neutrals £1,500,000,000, and then fraudulently defaulted on the lot. If that is oppression, I should be very glad to be oppressed myself at the price. I will most willingly and repeatedly pay £153 to anybody who will lend me £1,500 and allow me to keep them. If the Home Secretary would so oblige me, I feel sure that he would be legitimately surprised if I had the subsequent temerity to rise up and call myself oppressed.
With the oppressive and vindictive Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest on their consciences, the Germans had expected harder terms than they got at Versailles. Their subsequent outcry was largely a "try-on," and again, to their surprise, it very largely succeeded. Their real rage was against their loss of a war of conquest which they had thought themselves, almost to the end, to be winning. It is perhaps the most astonishing feat in history that the Germans have been able to persuade the minds of an educated and half-witted world to believe that they were vindictively treated by a Treaty the reparation and disarmament clauses of which were never enforced, and which took from them nothing in Europe which they had not acquired by robbery and murder. In the very moment when you examine "the cloud-capp' d towers" of German self-pity—the only architecture in which Hitler is an artist—they "dissolve and … leave not a rack behind."
Perhaps the Home Secretary is troubled by Germany's loss of her former Colonies, but I am pretty sure that that is not the case. I am sure that nobody now would describe the application of that purposeful precaution to an unregenerate Germany as "foolish and purposeless vindictiveness." On the contrary, wisdom has been justified of her children. If—with our madly reduced Navy—we had had this Germany firm-based across our ocean life lines we should certainly have been strangled when France fell. South Africa, India, Australia, New Zealand would have been conquered and enslaved. I do not think that any one now would propound that German whine to any Dominion, and I am perfectly sure that the Home Secretary would be the last person to do so.
Let me make a final attempt to find out exactly what the Home Secretary has
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in mind. Perhaps he is haunted by shadowy memories of the maintenance of the blockade. Here also I think that I may be able partially to relieve his mind. In Article 16 of the Armistice Convention of November 11, the Allies stipulated, and Germany conceded, free access and unimpeded supply to the evacuated territories on Germany's Eastern frontier. In Article 26, the Allies expressed their intention of similarly supplying Germany. On December 12, 1918, Herr Erzberger complained that this promise was not being fulfilled, although Germany, on her side, was not fulfilling the Armistice conditions. On the next day, December 13, Marshal Foch referred to a letter from Mr. Hoover to the effect that there were over 2,500,000 tons of idle German shipping, and asked whether these ships could not be used to help in the importing of food. One would have thought that, possibly, they might have been made available sooner. Yet more than another month elapsed before, on January 16, 1919, the Germans did undertake to make the ships available against a suitable indemnity.
Moreover, in the course of their bargaining, the Germans had flatly refused on January 15 to pay for their food, on the ground that they had no money. But that was not true, because Germany finished the war with £114,000,000 in specie in the Reichsbank. In spite of that, however, the Allies agreed to provide Germany with certain specific quantities of food. Mr. Hurley, in the Shipping Committee, had decared, on January 15, that there was enough to go round, but that the Allies and neutrals must come first. France, indeed, was justly challenging comparison between conditions in Germany and in the devastated regions. The great difficulty throughout was one of transport and supply. For that Germany was very largely responsible, and we shall be faced with the same difficulty again. In the last war the Germans sank over 10,000,000 tons of merchant shipping. If, said the Shipping Committee, problems of payment and supply could be solved Germany could count on considerable imports.
Unfortunately, on February 14, 1919, the Allies had again to complain that the Germans were breaking Article 16 of the Armistice Convention with which was bound up Article 26. A German friend of

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mine said to Herr Erzberger at the time: "We cannot possibly expect the Allies to give us priority, especially when we are breaking our side of the bargain." Herr Erzberger replied: "I know, but we must make a fuss." In that one sentence, Herr Erzberger has presented to your Lordships the key of much German propaganda. There are two sides to most questions, including this question. The Germans have always hoped that if they make enough fuss, the world will be persuaded to see only one side—their side. And in this they have rarely been disappointed. But I think those concerned, particularly those Americans of the highest standing and integrity, would indignantly and rightly undertake to repudiate the charge that they had been animated by" foolish and purposeless vindictiveness." There were, indeed, considerable practical difficulties, and the Germans were frequently far from helpful. Here also I think it is necessary to get the past into focus, lest we confuse the future.
The legend wilts, and I have exposed it not from any motive of vindictiveness but because I think it is time that we got out of our system a falsehood that has long traded on good nature. How came such a perversion to obtain such currency? The answer is contained in one of Dr. Rauschning's books, where he writes of those deceived by German propaganda:
"The personalities who are treading the path of destruction remain completely blind to the way they are being led, the way they are passing on ideas and phrases which have been put into their minds and mouths by a subtle master of revolutionary technique. In their weakness they imagine that the ideas are their own."
That is roughly true of all those who have played the German game by pretending or representing that the Treaty of Versailles was an intolerable hardship, and the cause of this war.
But Brutus says we were vindictive, and Brutus is an honourable—nay, right honourable—man, and must therefore have had something in his mind; but, I ask, what? I wonder. Is he quite sure? For this, indeed, is the state of mind of all the birds who for four and twenty years have been singing the German song of sixpence, and that is why I have welcomed this occasion, not in any partisan
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spirit, for I belong to no Party, but merely as an advocate of the truth.
"I speak not to disprove what Brutus spoke,
But here I am to speak what I do know."
The Treaty of Versailles has little to do with this war; it has long gone the way of every treaty ever signed by Germany, and not one German in a thousand could ever have given a coherent idea of its contents. As to those contents, the plain truth is this. You might have reduced its terms somewhat, but not very greatly without utterly betraying President Wilson's axiom of justice for all; and a small reduction would have been quite incapable of deterring from war a people set, and still set, on world domination.
Let me recall to your Lordships and to the Home Secretary the Prayer to Mars in Sheridan's satire, The Critic:
"Behold thy votaries submissive beg
That thou wilt deign to grant them all they ask;
Assist them to accomplish all their ends,
And sanctify whatever means they use
To gain them!"
That is the simple German faith, that replaced Jehovah by the Kaiser, the Kaiser by Wotan, and Wotan by Schicklgruber. And if the deity falls down on the job, he in turn is dethroned, and you, my Lords, are "foolish, purposeless and vindictive." That anyone should have believed this stuff is, I think, a proof that nothing gives so clear an idea of the infinite as human credulity.
The great Democracies have been and are being riddled with German ideas, which in their weakness "they imagine to be their own." I think that we are all indebted to the Home Secretary for showing up that weakness; for, under cover of highfalutin and "justice to Germany," the new appeasers are at work on the old creed of sucking up instead of standing up to Germany. I think it likely that the Home Secretary himself may have his eye upon them. Paradoxically enough, they include some of the people who were most bitter against Mr. Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement; and, as I was a notorious opponent of that policy, I am entitled to be just in saying that the new appeasers have for the truth the regard of a snob for a distant and unsuccessful relative. The Home Secretary, in my judgment, has deserved well of the Home Front in providing the occasion for some home truths.
I personally am indebted to him for something more, and sincerely indebted. When I first spoke in your Lordships' House, I observed that in certain quarters there was more interest in justice for Germany than in justice for all our Allies put together, and that our Allies resented this injustice. When I said that, one of the quarters which I had in mind—I may as well be frank—was the New Statesman, and, as the New Statesman has always assailed me, perhaps I may for once retaliate by saying that I consider them neither new nor statesmanlike. The Home Secretary will have added to his services and reputation if he has made it impossible for any statesman, new or otherwise, hereafter to refer to justice for Germany without making it clear that justice for her victims comes first. In what does this justice consist? Its purpose is—and here I use words which have been used both by Mr. Chamberlain and by Mr. Churchill at the outset of this war—"to redeem Europe from the perpetual and recurring fear of German aggression." We are not fighting this war to give Germany yet another chance.
Six hundred years ago our first great poet rejoiced
"That I have had my world as in my time."
It is a tragic commentary on progress that Germany has deprived the whole twentieth century of the possibility of sharing that joy. But the old Democracy also had its faults. When I arrive at the frontier of another world, and am asked whether I have anything to declare, I shall confess that I have carried away a conviction that part at least of our earthly troubles has been due to our own loquacity. In the unlikely event of my getting past the Celestial Customs, I should hope to see from "another place" a new Democracy, of which it will no longer be possible for Stevenson to say that "Politics is perhaps the only profession for which no previous preparation is thought necessary." I shall also hope to see an England having once again a mind of her own and not one" made in Germany" by the mechanical iteration of the same untruth. I believe that the Black-pool speech may prove to be a milestone on that happy road.
There I would willingly have closed, but I must add an unwilling post-
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cript. In this morning's Daily Herald, in a leading article, I have been personally assailed with a vindictive, malevolent misrepresentation which is truly Teutonic. The Daily Herald has undertaken to write my speech in advance, and I think it may well be disappointed at my moderation. In any case I had believed that in this country it was usual to allow an Englishman to open his mouth in Parliament without abusing him like a pickpocket before he starts. I pass over much of the distortion. They have not even quoted Mr. Morrison correctly. They have also stated that the German armament factories that we are bombing are all factories that have been built by the Nazis. That is quite untrue; many of them were built under Weimar. I have been hit below the belt, and with a knuckle duster, and I shall forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing.
There has been German influence at work, and if I am challenged I am prepared to give it a specific name. I cannot speak for the Daily Herald, but whatever may be the intentions of the Daily Herald or the Home Secretary I have this to observe. The Home Secretary talked of disarming the "Fascists." There are such people as the Nazis also. I can answer for the intentions of some of these alien influences here: they mean that only the Fascists should be disarmed, and that therefore we shall be left with a nice portion of the German Army on our hands. I have no doubt that the Government will emphatically disclaim on behalf of themselves and of the Home Secretary any approbation of any such tendency as that. I apologize for adding that postscript, but I must frankly say that I do not think I have ever read anything like that in English journalism before. I beg to move for Papers.
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to the post-war policy towards Germany outlined in the recent speech made by the Home Secretary at Black-pool.—(Lord Vansittart.)
LORD NATHAN: My Lords, I beg to move that the debate be now adjourned.
Moved, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Lord Nathan.)
On Question, Motion agreed to; debate adjourned accordingly.

PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE.
Order of the Day for the consideration of the First Report from the Select Committee read.
The Committee reported as follows:
"The Committee are of opinion that a statement made by a Minister on a matter o£ urgent importance should not be made the occasion for immediate debate, but if debate upon such statement is desired, a Notice should be put upon the Order Paper for a subsequent date.
"The Committee are further of opinion that the practice of appending to Motions on the Order Paper the names of Peers who wish to notify their support of such Motions should be discontinued."
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD STANMORE): My Lords, in moving the consideration of this Report I ought perhaps to say a few words as to the two recommendations which it contains. Since the outbreak of war the practice of asking Private Notice Questions has shown a great tendency to increase. It is natural that the Government may wish to make and the House to hear statements of immediate public importance. On a recent occasion something in the nature of a debate took place on a Private Notice Question, and subsequently the point as to whether such procedure was or was not in order was brought before the House by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchison, and referred to the Committee on Procedure. The Committee considered the matter, and on this point report as follows:
"That a statement made by a Minister on a matter of urgent importance should not be made the occasion for immediate debate, but if debate upon such statement is desired, a Notice should be put upon the Order Paper for a subsequent date."
On the second point of the Report perhaps I may remind your Lordships of the origin of the procedure referred to therein. The practice under which a Motion appears on the Order Paper in the names of several Peers has never formed part of the procedure of your Lordships' House. In 1939, when a group of Peers was active in connexion with motor traffic, it was suggested that the practice of putting down a Motion in several names should be adopted. It was felt that to introduce such an innovation into the ordinary course of the business of the House was not desirable, and a compromise was suggested, by which Peers who wished to signify their support of a Motion should do so by a note to this
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effect under the Motion on the Order Paper. This practice has shown a tendency to develop into a procedure which confers a right of priority in debate on Peers whose names appear in support of a Motion. The House will be quick to recognize that this is not only contrary to the principles of debate which have always obtained in this House but, if a large number of Peers signified their wish to support a Motion and thereby established their right to speak in sequence, very serious inconvenience would be caused. Therefore the Select Committee recommend the abolition of this practice and a return to the status quo ante-1939. I beg to move that this Report be now considered.
Moved, That the Report be now considered and agreed to.—(Lord Stanmore.)
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, there is one question I would ask. I quite understand that, as in the case of another place, when the Government make a statement it may not be desirable to debate it. But there may come events of great public importance, and in another place it is arranged that you can move the Adjournment of the House in order to discuss the matter which has been made public. Under this proposed procedure, would that be possible in this House? I think it is wise to safeguard it because we should not like to condemn ourselves to silence till the next day on a matter of really vital public importance.
LORD STANMORE: The Committee did go into that very question, but they decided against it. The present practice, they thought, was really the better one.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My Lords, although I was not able to sit on the Committee recently, I would express my approval of their findings on these two questions, because I think that any attempt in this House to imitate the procedure in another place is bound to fail and to lead to confusion. What the noble Lord, Lord Stanmore, said with regard to a list of names coming after a Motion only means that it gives those people priority to speak and dislocate the present arrangement, which works very well with the Chief Whip, as to those who wish to participate in a debate. I feel sure that it is best for our procedure that we should not make any innovations which do not seem to help the proceedings of the House.
LORD ARNOLD: My Lords, might I remind the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, that on a certain Monday—whether it was in reply to a Private Notice Question I do not know—the Government made a statement that we were committed to Poland? The noble Marquess who sits on the Liberal Benches said a few words and the noble Lord who led the Labour Party at that time said a few words, and I myself ventured to say a few words. It was right on the eve of Easter, but the position taken up by the two noble Lords I have referred to, the Leaders of the Liberal Party and the Labour Party, was that the matter could be discussed later on. As a matter of fact, it never was discussed later on, and I think it would have been very much better on an occasion like that if it had been possible to discuss the matter there and then. As it was, we were estopped from doing that, and I wonder whether a consideration of that kind was taken into account by the Select Committee.
LORD GAINFORD: My Lords, I do not wish in the presence of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, to suggest a course which he with his experience could speak to with very much greater weight, but I think that on an occasion of great importance the Motion that the House do now adjourn would offer an opportunity which could be taken by Peers. A statement could be made by a Minister and there might be a reply.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I cannot pretend to have the vast experience which the noble Lord has been good enough to assign to me, but I should like to say that the course he suggests as possible is, of course, quite possible. It is quite possible for a noble Lord to rise in his place and move that the House adjourn and, upon that, discussion could take place. Under the liberal system on which we work a topic not strictly relevant to the actual adjournment would be appropriate. But nothing of that kind should take place or ought to take place without the general consent of the House. Anything like the noble Lord charging—if he will forgive so disrespectful an expression—at any time he thinks fit in order to upset the whole line of our Orders of the Day, to bring forward a particular subject, would inevitably throw our business into absolute confusion. That can never be the rule.
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No doubt in a great emergency, when there was a general feeling—not the feeling of the majority; it is not a question of a majority; it is a question of the general feeling of the House—if there was a general feeling that something ought specially to be discussed, then, speaking from my own experience, I should say that that was quite regular. But I hope the House will allow me to say that none of these ultimate possibilities ought ever to be used except by the general consent of the House. That is really the very essence of our procedure. It is the general consent of the House, not the tyranny of the majority, not even the wishes of the majority; but the general consent of the House. Upon these very extreme occasions, what the noble Lord suggests would, in my experience, seem to be quite legitimate. But I hope very much that the House will accept the Report of the Select Committee to which they referred these points. I had the honour to be a member of that Select Committee, and I have never sat upon a Committee which was more unanimous, though it was drawn from all sections of the House and contained men of great distinction. I feel that your Lordships cannot do wrong if you accept the Report.
LORD MOTTISTONE: I am entirely satisfied.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House that the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificate from the Examiners that the Standing Orders have not been complied with in respect of the Petition for the following Bill: South Wales Electric Power. And also the Certificate that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bill have been complied with: Land Drainage Provisional Order.
The same were ordered to lie on the Table.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.
Message from the Commons for leave for the Lord Ashfield to attend to be examined as a witness before the Committee of that House. Leave given for his Lordship to attend, if he think fit, and a Message ordered to be sent to the Commons to acquaint them therewith.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932.
Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department extending Section one of the Act to the Urban District of Cannock:
Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) for affirmative Resolution and ordered to lie on the Table.

BRIDGEND GAS ORDER, 1942.
Special Order proposed to be made by the Board of Trade on the application of the Bridgend Gas Company:
Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) for affirmative Resolution, and referred to the Special Orders Committee.

COAL (VALUATION PROCEDURE) RULES, 1942.
Report from the Special Orders Committee that they have examined the Special Order as required by the Standing Orders of the House; that in their opinion the Order raises important questions of policy and principle; that the Order is founded on precedent; that in the opinion of the Committee the Order can be passed by the House without special attention; and that no further inquiry is necessary before the House proceeds to a decision on the Resolution to approve the said Order:
Read and ordered to lie on the Table.
House adjourned.