Lords Sitting of 25 March 1942

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
RAILWAY COMPANIES (THOMAS COOK AND SONS, LIMITED, GUARANTEE) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 2a.

SINGAPORE.
LORD ADDISON LORD ADDISON rose to move to resolve, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, praying that His Majesty will be pleased to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into and report on the defences at Singapore. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving the Resolution that is in my name on the Paper, I think it is true to say that we have to search our annals for an event so shocking to the public mind as the loss of Singapore, such an affront to patriotic resolution, so unlooked for, so serious a loss. This was not a sudden overwhelming, but the finale of a two-months series of events during which one event after another betrayed unmistakable evidence of Jack of forethought by those on the spot, lack of appreciation of the power of our enemies, lack of adequate or appropriate equipment, lack of training on the part of the troops employed—or at all events of some of them—and lack of the establishment of the right relations with the native populations. I suggest that in these and in many other respects this was an astonishing sequence of misfortunes. It will not weaken our purpose, but I think that, to be worthy of ourselves and to be worthy of the Empire that our forefathers have built up, it behoves us to see that these things are inquired into, not for the purpose of blaming this man or that man, but to ensure that we correct mistakes, that we get rid of inefficiency, and that, instead of bungling, competence and good management characterize our future efforts. With them, victory is certain, but without them, many needless misfortunes may delay its achievement. I hope that we shall never again see a picture of a British General marching with his Staff with a Union Jack and a white flag to hand over to our enemies.
In another place we have been told that the Government view is that there is no material for an inquiry. So far as those unfortunate men are concerned who are prisoners of war, that is, of course, true; but, apart from them, there is very much which is material and which would be easy to inquire into, and into which I suggest that it is, therefore, our duty to inquire. In the Motion which stands in my name I suggest that there should be a Royal Commission. I agree that in putting the Motion down in that form, I was influenced by what took place in the appointment of Commissions during the last war; but, so far as we are concerned, it is immaterial whether the inquiry takes the form of a Royal Commission or not. What is vital, I suggest, is that we should promptly and vigorously seek to learn the lessons of our mistakes, and see to it that our effort is worthy of the valour and of the self-sacrifice of our Fighting Forces and of the people at home.
I understand that the German General Staff in their surveys have taken the view that the two key points in the British Empire are Suez and Singapore—Suez to the Middle East and India, and Singapore to the Eastern Empire and the Pacific. Singapore has gone. It has been described in various ways, and often in very picturesque language, as a bastion of the Pacific, as impregnable, and in many other kindred phrases. I think that it is material to inquire who was responsible for its fortification, and how it came about that the Staff work was so deplorable that there were no land defences, that the waterworks were left open, and that the Johore hills were undefended. Is this fortification in blinkers applicable anywhere else? It is a very material subject for inquiry. If so, it should be corrected. We do not need to refer that matter to prisoners of war; it can be answered in London. How was it that during two months of fighting there was no adequate preparation of defences nearer Singapore? What was the Staff organization responsible? It seems to me to be a record of terrible neglect. We have seen in Russia how, even in the depth of winter, the Germans, by improvised defences, have made quite a number of places up to now unassailable.
I see from the Daily Telegraph of March 17 that Mr. Gordon Walker, A.D.C. to General Gordon Bennett, who commanded the Australians, says that the

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statement that Singapore was impregnable was "the greatest fairy story in history." I understand that on the tape to-day we are informed that a report has been received from General Gordon Bennett. By contrast with that statement—and I mention this egregious thing only to point the moral subsequently—there was, according to a statement in the Evening News of March 10 an official broadcast, which was reported in the Weekly Rangoon Times of November 15, by a Major Richmond, who is described as military liaison officer to the Governor of Burma. It ranges over a wide field, and every prophecy, as far as I can see, has already been proved to be wrong. I shall mention only three. He describes Singapore—the date is November 15—as "the greatest fortress and combined air and naval base in the world," and says that the Commander-in-Chief there "has forged and perfected this smooth running and awe-inspiring war machine." He says of Malaya itself:
"There may be some places within our Empire where there is still room for improvement in our military equipment, but believe me Malaya docs not come under that category."
Finally, he has a word about the Siamese, and he says that they are "determined to fight to the last should their freedom and independence be threatened by an aggressor." That is an official broadcast.
I have here an extract, which I have permission to use, from a letter written by a Colonel commanding a Scottish regiment who fought in Malaya and who is now, I am sorry to say, returned as "Missing, believed dead." It is necessary, as I have permission, to read one or two short extracts from this terrible letter. This brave man says:
"I hardly know where to start in the telling of this little war and its position and effects on us and Malaya, but I am quite determined to let you have the whole story, censor or no, so that you may pass it round to influential people, as all should know what a disgraceful show it has been from the very beginning."
He goes on:
"As soon as we arrived in this country it was patent that the military were still behaving as though peace-time soldiering were the go—not much work Saturdays and none, if you could help it, on Sundays. Dozens of young and stupid Staff officers at headquarters, writing nonsense as to which form should be used for which return, while training was stultified by the fact that the rubber planter had to be so respected and looked after that if you went on to his ground the greatest care had to be
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taken that no damage was done. I was ticked off by a General because two of my trucks had gone into young rubber and scratched two small trees, in spite of the fact that there was no manœuvrable ground for miles other than rubber."
And in the course of this pathetic letter he describes how he and others at the very front had to prepare a plan for occupying, if necessary, Singora in Siam, about forty miles over the border, if the enemy were seen approaching, and he says:
"Well, their transports were duly seen steaming towards Singora about twenty-four hours out and the scheme was assembled behind the border, but being an entrance into a neutral country, at that time thought to be friendly by our Intelligence, or at least passive but subsequently found to be hand in glove with the Japs (a fairly frequent type of Intelligence misapprehension during this war), politics came into it and permission from home had to be sought. (Of course Wellington or Marlborough would have gone into Siam and told the Council afterwards that it was the only thing to do.) However, for three days we awaited instructions, just nice time to allow the Japs to land a Division uninterrupted and begin their march on Malaya."
There is much more, but I refrain from troubling your Lordships with it. But the mentality of the people who were responsible there is just frightening.
There is another inquiry I think we ought to make as to the character and training of the reinforcements which were sent. Some units, we know, were quite new and, poor fellows, they were prisoners of war within about ten days of landing. But what sort of training had they had? I think it is necessary to inquire. It raises questions as to the character of the training given to our troops; it raises questions as to the character of the training machinery and personnel. We all know-that there are very many good, keen and experienced men in the Army, ever so many of them, but I wonder if they are given as good a chance as they ought to have. I have heard reports as to the course of training in mechanical warfare which is adopted, and I am afraid the amount of training in the actual use of tanks and matters relating thereto is a much smaller proportion of the course than it ought to be. I cannot help being prejudiced—I will admit it—by my own personal experience in the last war, because I was a partner, an active daily partner, in the efforts to secure the better use and provision of tanks and of trench mortars, and I have a lively recollection of the long-continued resistance that had

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to be overcome. And I cannot help feeling that there is still more of that than there ought to be.
I am glad the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War is present, because a friend of mine, a Colonel who distinguished himself very greatly in these matters in the last war, the other day sent me a memorandum, and he had some observations to make about the noble Lord's speech on the equipment of the Home Guard, in particular as to the provision of the pike, and he says, to quote his words, that it "corresponds with the mentality of Marie Antoinette." Whatever may be said about that, I think that the equipment of the Japanese has been remarkable for its simplicity. It is true that the tank they appear to have used, according to the most accepted opinion of what a tank ought to be, was perhaps rather a primitive affair, but it got through the jungle, it did the job. The good, as we know, is often the enemy of the best; and I think that a hand grenade for the Home Guard, which could be made in millions, might often be much more effective as a weapon than a pike.
There are also matters affecting our air policy which I think we might well inquire into. How was it that those battleships were sent out there without adequate air cover? That was not decided in Singapore; that was decided, I suspect, in London. It is true it might be said that we had no aircraft carriers to spare. That raises the question whether we cannot carry aircraft on some kind of vessel which does not take years to build—whether we need to have something quite so elaborate as all that. I think it might readily be compared with some of the Japanese aircraft carriers which are relatively of a simple character; but they carry aircraft. Then another inquiry which I think is material is as to the type of fighter aircraft with which the Services there were equipped. At the beginning, I understand, they were not very up-to-date. A certain number of Hurricanes were sent, but too late and too few. It has been suggested that the objection might be made that if an adequate number of Hurricanes had been sent this would have detracted from our supplies to Russia. I think it is fair to say, knowing what little I do about output, that half a week's output would have been quite adequate, if they had been sent.
Then there is another matter affecting air policy, which seems to me appropriate to inquire into, arising out of our experiences at Singapore. That is the lack of dive bombers and support planes for the ground troops. According to a question and answer in another place a few days ago, I see that Mr. Wakefield, who has the official appointment of Director of the Air Training Corps, is reported to have said that dive bombers were obsolete, and that Captain Balfour stated he was only expressing his own personal opinion. That is not very comforting. He is the officially-appointed Director of the Air Training Corps, and I have a suspicion that if he had made that speech to the poor fellows in Malaya or on the Sittang River he would have had a very unpleasant reception because they were suffering from what dive bombers can do. Anyhow, it is certainly a matter that should be inquired into here.
I would only, in conclusion, give one other illustration of a type of inquiry which we ought to undertake, and that is as to the failure of our civil authorities to evoke the help and good will of the native populations. We have been vitally defective in that matter. The Malays themselves seem either to have been indifferent or to have been giving help to the Japanese. In Burma the Japanese have received help on a large scale from the natives. One cannot help feeling the contrast between this and the experience General MacArthur has had in the support he has received from Filipinos. They have fought, and are fighting, heroically on the side of the Americans. This is a very painful contrast to what we have experienced in Malaya and Burma, which is a fit subject for searching inquiry. I am afraid, though I am not going into it, that the attitude of some of those who have had responsible positions requires attention, and it very much behoves the Leader of the House to search into this matter, seeing the office he holds. I am afraid the type of people responsible in some of our Colonial Services has not been what it ought to have been. We hear all kinds of stories about the solicitude for social engagements even up to within a few days of the fall of Singapore. I am not going to enlarge on it; it is a painful story anyhow. The alert, friendly, and enterprising men who founded the British Empire were not of this kind.
At all events, the whole matter of the personnel and outlook of those responsible for administering these Colonies needs immediate inquiry and drastic overhaul, especially when we think of India. None of the matters I have mentioned involves inquiry into any major strategic matter. We all know we cannot be strong everywhere, and the public is quite willing to be told we cannot be strong everywhere, and to accept it. Nothing could be worse than a dissipation of effort, but it is important that where efforts are made they should be well made. Few errors are irremediable so long as we have the courage to face them and to remove their causes. No misfortune could be greater than that we should lack the manliness to do so. In that way we continue to provide a shelter for inefficiency—deplorable at any time, but in these days most perilous for the Commonwealth. Thereby it would be made almost certain that avoidable disasters will again come upon us. I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, praying that His Majesty will be pleased to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into and report on the defences of Singapore.—(Lord Addison.)
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, the interesting speech which the noble Lord has delivered in moving this Motion has voiced questions which must be in the minds of all of us, and the answers to many of which we should much like to know. I venture to think, however, that no useful purpose would be served by appointing a Royal Commission or any other formal judicial body of inquiry. It is not that I do not think these questions ought to be put. I am sure they should, and every lesson should be learnt, but I suggest to my noble friend that inquiry by Royal Commission is not the best way. I do not lay too much stress on the fact that many witnesses cannot be here, though there are many matters which, if you were to have an inquiry like the Mesopotamian inquiry, would necessitate an inquiry in detail into many questions—some of which, indeed, the noble Lord himself put this afternoon—which could only be sufficiently answered by the testimony of men who are now, unhappily, prisoners of war. I base my
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objections to this formal inquiry on wider grounds than that.
It would take men, whose whole energies should be concentrated on the vast tasks of this world war, away from their daily work, bringing them, as they must be brought, before such a court of inquiry. I would say this, and I am sure I shall not be misunderstood. We want to get at the truth, we want the facts to be frankly faced, and the lessons learnt and applied. I do not think you get that best by putting men, so to speak, on their trial. If men are summoned to appear before a Royal Commission or a, tribunal in an inquiry of this kind, they are bound to approach it in a spirit of wishing to make their defence, of justifying what has happened in so far as they can. I do not think that is the best way or the best spirit in which to approach the matter, and to learn and profit by the lessons. Lastly, even if such an inquiry were held, and in so far as the object of such inquiry be to inform and satisfy public opinion—and it is important that public opinion should be informed and satisfied as far as possible—there must be much of a secret nature which could not possibly be disclosed, although it would have been canvassed throughout the inquiry. I would rather ask for the assurance, which I am sure would be forthcoming, that all the lessons in strategy, in tactics and in leadership are being learnt and applied to-day, and I would submit to your Lordships that the right body to review and to draw those conclusions is not a Royal Commission but the men who are responsible for the conduct of the war. Surely it must be the constant and continuing function of a General Staff all the time to be applying the lessons whether of failure or of success.
If that argument be sound, surely it lends much force to what was said by many speakers in the last debate in this House as to the need for a Great General Staff and as to the form and functions of such a General Staff. The Lord Chancellor, in a characteristically lucid speech, gave us an account of all the Chiefs of Staffs Committees, and the Joint Planning Committee and the other organizations of the machine of the General Staff. Those particulars were not wholly unfamiliar to those speakers who took part in that long and, I must say I think, extraordinarily informative debate, who had been members of the Committee of

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Imperial Defence either as Ministers of the Crown or as Service Chiefs; and yet I do not think that those of us who ventured to offer some constructive criticism were left wholly satisfied by the speech of the Lord Chancellor that nothing could be improved. He devoted much of his skilful argument to persuading us that the will to co-operation was there and that much co-operation was there. Everyone, certainly every informed speaker in that debate, never challenged the will to cooperate or the co-operation that in fact exists.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): Would my noble friend forgive me for a moment, merely to avoid misapprehension? I was most careful to say in the speech to which my noble friend so kindly alludes, that in giving that description I was not claiming that necessarily the arrangements were the best or the final arrangements.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: I am very much obliged. Then I am greatly encouraged to proceed and come back to an appeal for those improvements which not a few speakers with great experience, like my noble friend Lord Chatfield and others, were pressing for and to which, quite frankly, I think the speech of the Lord Chancellor was a negative reply; but I am delighted now to learn from the noble and learned Viscount that, so far from intending any such refutation of the contention we put forward, this matter is sub judice and that something more may be done. I say at once, and I know I, speak for my noble friends, that we repudiate entirely speeches and articles which suggest that the Services are at loggerheads. Articles or speeches of that kind are largely untrue, and do scant justice either to the will to co-operate or to the measure of co-operation which exists. By co-operation of a Great General Staff I do not mean for a moment that there should be no difference of opinion, no clash of ideas. The last thing that is wanted is a lowest common denominator of compromise. The happiest marriage, unless it be completely cow-like, has its rough passages. Surely the aim of the Great General Staff should be often, by the clash of ideas, to reach the right solution, and the closer the members of that Staff work together the more often will they reach that solution by common conviction; but, where conflicting views
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are sincerely and tenaciously held, far better that the decision should be the decision of the independent Chairman, the Minister of Defence, than a compromise in which none of the parties really believe.
The whole aim of those who spoke in the last debate was to make the machinery more effective, more far-seeing—I agree with the noble Lord in that—better in its workings, and I do press again that the men who have to plan strategy, who must think far in advance and have their considered plans ready for changing and varying conditions, shall have the time and shall be free from departmental routine. Any of us who are not in the Government speak as private individuals with no more than the ordinary man's knowledge, and it surely is not unnatural but reasonable that in any testing whether this system of a Great General Staff is working as well as it possibly can one should apply the test of what happened at Singapore. It seems to me that that is both natural and reasonable. It may be a matter of argument whether a new situation plainly arose immediately after the French collapse. I would say myself that it did; at any rate from that moment onwards Indo-China, which had been a part of the Empire of a great Ally, a large country standing in the way, could not be relied on at all. It was at least no better than a no-man's land. That was an altered situation. Without doubt, from the moment that it was known that negotiations—if you can call negotiations such transactions as were taking place between an aggressive Japan and a prostrate Vichy—were on foot, then quite plainly there was an entirely new situation in the defence of Singapore and in the risk to Singapore.
I find it difficult to be wholly convinced that a Great General Staff, looking forward, envisaging from that moment at any rate if not before the new risks by sea, by land, by air, and appraising the value of the prize that lay open to the Japanese if they could make a successful assault, the economic considerations for us and America as well as for Japan, and the economic consequences of defeat—I cannot believe, I say, that the organization and the working of that Combined General Staff can have been so far-seeing, so thorough as it should have been. This is not a criticism of men—there are plenty of good men—it is a criticism of methods and of the machine. In the light of what

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has happened I am not convinced that the men charged with the forward planning of strategy—embracing in their work as they must not only defence against surprise but initiative and attack, and in addition to that envisaging all the economic requirements which it is essential to safeguard, and calling to their aid all the help that applied science can give—are as free as they should be from routine work.
I suppose everyone would agree—it is an easy thing to say—that the most essential thing in war is to avoid being surprised and, if possible, to surprise the enemy yourself. There are times when unforeseen circumstances will necessitate improvised measures, but it is the function of a Great General Staff, by prevision and provision, to anticipate surprises and to reduce them to a minimum. In what has become literally a world war, we should be satisfied with nothing less than a great Combined General Staff, devoting itself entirely to strategy, with its economic consequences, and adequately served in personnel. It may be said that these are obvious truisms. That may be, but they are the kind of truths on the appreciation and application of which success or failure may well depend. I would add one other consideration not irrelevant to this. The trained Staff officer is not necessarily the best leader of men in the field. It is not every individual who can do everything. You do not very often find him just as you do not often find an absolutely all-round first-class cricketer. But that does not mean that there are not a great many men playing in first-class cricket who are first-class men in the team, provided they are turned on to do the right job in the team. It may well be that strategic plans of an operation or campaign are best drawn up by officers who are much the best men for planning operations but are not the best men to carry them out in the field.
I believe I am right in saying that the German principle—I speak subject to correction—is in essence that plans are made by the Great General Staff, plans for many emergencies or many possibilities, and that when a plan has to be put in operation then the selection is made of the General who by his qualities of leadership is the best man to carry the plan into
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effect and to lead his troops. I am glad to think that one or two recent appointments indicate that in saying this I am preaching to the converted. I am sure your Lordships will appreciate that in no sense is that an attack on the men, on the officers themselves. If I may say so, I deprecate almost more than I can say indiscriminate attacks on senior officers of all Services. I can think of nothing better calculated to diminish the confidence of the men in their leaders or the confidence of the leaders in themselves. In what I have said there is no trace of that. There is no dearth of good men, either as Staff officers or as leaders, but it is the duty of those in whose hands rests the conduct of the war to see that the good material is used to the best advantage.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I have no intention of taking part in the general debate, but as the noble Viscount made reference to a speech which I made on February 26 on behalf of His Majesty's Government, perhaps your Lordships will allow me to read the relevant sentences, because he spoke under a complete misapprehension of what I said. What I said is reported in Column 153 of the Official Report. I said:
"… I do not give this account with any idea that I am describing the perfect and final machine. Things grow. Experience shows that they ought to be altered, and I should think very poorly of the attitude of anybody with responsibilities at this time who treated everything that now existed as a sealed pattern which in no circumstances could be improved as the result of informed criticism or further experience."
Then at the end of my speech, reported in Column 157, I said:
"… I finish this part of the matter by saying, as I said when I began, that I do not for a moment claim—I am very ill-qualified to make such a claim—that this is necessarily to be judged as the best of all systems. But let us at least be sure that we give full credit to the system as it exists. It is not some hasty improvisation dictated by some volcanic genius; it has been the result of a vast amount of technical study, highly-specialized consideration and work for many years …"
I think that your Lordships will see that I am justified in my interruption.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, in normal times I should have hesitated to rise in a debate of this kind, within three weeks of my retirement from the Government, but the times are not normal, and I have

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something I want to say which I hope may be a small contribution to our war effort, and I do not want to delay saying it as if I do I may have to wait until after the Easier vacation. Apart from that, my retirement from the Government was not due to any difference of opinion whatsoever with the Government and my relations with my old colleagues remain as happy as ever. In fact, I am trying to help them by carrying on on a voluntary basis with the duties I was performing in connexion with technical personnel, but I do not want to mislead your Lordships into thinking that for that reason I agree with everything that the Government have said and everything that the Government have done.
That brings me to the subject before the House on which we have heard two very interesting and, remarkable speeches. The point which impresses me is that there is widespread public concern, concern not only among the general public but in the Services, at what has happened. And there ought to be concern because this episode is one of the gravest in our national history. To my mind, therefore, the Government would be well advised, in the public interest and in their own interest, to grant some kind of inquiry. I was very glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Addison, say that he was not asking, necessarily, for a Royal Commission. I should very much deprecate a Royal Commission for the reasons which have been so very powerfully advocated by my noble friend Viscount Swinton. Royal Commissions have always had rather unfortunate results. The Roebuck Commission in the Crimean war resulted, before it was ever formed, in, first, the resignation of Lord John Russell, and then of the Aberdeen Government. Then the Palmerston Government came in, and when it introduced the Commission a number of its members, including Mr. Gladstone, resigned. With regard to the Dardanelles Commission, although it did not report until after the fall of Mr. Asquith's Government, I had a very strong feeling that that Government was weakened for the reason given by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, that it is so difficult to carry on when you are on trial. The Mesopotamia Commission resulted in the resignation of Mr. Austen Chamberlain, who was one of the best members of the Government.
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But the really strong reason, the tremendous reason for deprecating the holding of a Royal Commission, has been given by the noble Viscount who has just sat down. That is the tremendous strain which is put on those who are running the war. May I give a very brief personal experience? In those days as Secretary of the War Committee I was something of a key man, and yet in the two months of August and September I was preparing my evidence. I was so cross about it that I used to write down the number of hours that I spent on the task. It adds up—and this came in two months at the height of a great war when I was working very long hours—to no less than 174 hours. That was the time that it cost one person. Everybody was coming to my room to work up their evidence. The Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, and nearly all the leading members of the Government, the Chiefs of Staff, the present Prime Minister—who was then retired—all spent very long hours working up their evidence. Well, that is not good in a great war. Finally, when the Royal Commission had reported, on each occasion the War Cabinet—the Government had changed by then—had to spend days upon days over most difficult and delicate questions relating to the publication.
I feel, therefore, that while inquiry is desirable it should be some different form of inquiry, possibly something very simple like the inquiry into the escape of the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" and confined to very limited references such as, possibly, the loss of the two capital ships and the question of why there were no modern aircraft there, which are two of the most dubious points. But there has been a good deal of inquiry into this in the two Houses of Parliament. There have been very interesting debates, and a great many valuable suggestions have been thrown out. My feeling is that advantage should be taken of these debates, of that inquiry, to carry out some reforms, some improvement which would lessen the risk of mistakes being made at this end in the Supreme Command.
I am not going to cover the ground covered by the noble Viscount who has just sat down, which was that of the General Staff. I am turning rather to a matter in which I have been concerned for a great many years, and that is the War Cabinet which is the other half of the supreme control. I have been through

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these debates very carefully; I have put together a number of constructive points that were made in them, and I have added to them some that came from my own experience. I should very much like to lay before your Lordships a brief compendium of those proposals, to make a coherent whole. And if I offer these suggestions I offer them in the spirit of an appeal which was made a week or two ago by the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, that everything should be done as from a friend to a friend.
In order to explain my proposals, I ask your Lordships to bear with me for a moment while I give a short account of Mr. Lloyd George's Cabinet, which was the prototype of the present scheme. It is not generally realized that Mr. Lloyd George's Cabinet system was brought in to correct certain defects that had arisen in Mr. Asquith's system. Mr. Asquith's system consisted, so far as the war was concerned, of the Cabinet which had the ultimate responsibility and which was of the ordinary peace-time size—about twenty people—and which, of course, in those days had no secretariat or minutes or record of decisions. It was assisted by a War Committee which, though small, was still rather too large, composed mainly of Ministers holding Ministerial Office, but it had the advantage of the presence of the Chiefs of Staff and it was assisted by the Secretariat of the Committee of Imperial Defence of which I was then the head. The defects which developed in that piece of machinery were divided control, difficulty in reaching decisions, with consequent congestion of business—the Secretary's list for the War Committee of questions awaiting solution became longer and longer—and a good deal of delay. In the case of the evacuation of the Dardanelles, the Cabinet insisted on revising the decision of the War Committee, and it took a fortnight over the process, going over all the ground again. Eventually it approved the original recommendations, but the fortnight which it spent in considering them occurred at a time when the weather might break at any moment and make the evacuation almost impossible. That shows the danger of divided control.
To correct these defects, Mr. Lloyd George's system created a War Cabinet
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and endowed it with the full powers of the ordinary Cabinet and with the machinery of the War Committee. There was no Defence Committee or War Committee, for the reason that the War Cabinet itself was the War Committee or, as we now call it, the Defence Committee. The War Cabinet consisted originally of only five members—it rose at one time to seven—and they were all Ministers without Departmental responsibility except for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Bonar Law. Although Mr. Lloyd George dominated the proceedings, as any Prime Minister must, the Cabinet worked essentially on the principle of collective responsibility. There were no "Yes men" and no "No men"—horrid terms! All gave their advice quite freely, and there was very little difficulty about reaching decisions. A special feature of that War Cabinet was the care taken to keep Ministers outside the War Cabinet in the picture. When men were invited to the War Cabinet, they were expected to regard themselves exactly as though they were members of the War Cabinet for the discussion of the business with which they were concerned. Every member of the Cabinet was sent the agenda paper every day, whether he was on the list to attend or not, so that, if the Secretary made a mistake and overlooked him, he could make a protest and get himself invited. Mr. Lloyd George also took great personal pains—I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Addison, will bear me out in this—to keep the Ministers who were outside the War Cabinet very fully informed. I do not suggest that that system ought to be slavishly copied—I agree with the Prime Minister there—but it was a good system. It was very simple, very easy to work and very successful.
Before I come to my suggestions, however, I want to say most emphatically that they are all subordinated to one overriding principle, and that is that the Prime Minister of the day, who has so tremendous a responsibility, must have a machine and methods that suit him. All that I am going to say is covered by that proviso. The main difference between the present model and the Lloyd George model is that the War Committee—or, as it is now called, the Defence Committee—has been re-established. It is quite certain to my mind that, if there is a War Committee, it must be presided over by the Prime Minister; for, as my noble and

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learned friend the Lord Chancellor explained in his very brilliant speech on February 26, the Prime Minister has a special responsibility and has to defend that responsibility before Parliament and the people.
But, my Lords, why should there be a Defence Committee? I suggest that if there were no Defence Committee certain advantages would follow. In the first place, it would make for greater simplicity; it would eliminate one Committee, and there are always too many Committees in war-time. It would ensure that the War Cabinet was much better informed than it is to-day. It would strengthen the position of the War Cabinet as a whole, because the War Cabinet must be weakened by giving up to some other body the most important part of its responsibilities, the decisions regarding and the knowledge of the war. It would create a larger cadre of—I cannot find a better word—potential Prime Ministers. In these days, when we are most likely engaged in a very long war, and when the Prime Minister has to run great risks, it is important to have a number of Ministers trained in the running of a war, which is a very technical and expert business, who can, in case of accident, take his place. It would avoid the risk of divided responsibility, which I do not think has occurred, but which might easily occur; it might easily blow up, as it did suddenly in the case of the Dardanelles evacuation. It would improve the collective responsibility of the Cabinet. I think that the collective responsibility of the Cabinet has been a little weakened by the establishment of the Defence Committee. I think that it was quite unintentionally weakened by a statement which was made on May 7 in another place, in which the Prime Minister described his own responsibility, and I think that it has been unintentionally weakened also by the title of "Minister of Defence."
That is the next point to which I want to come. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor told us that the title Minister of Defence did not connote any new office; it merely stated the position of the Prime Minister which was inherent in his office in time of war. And the Prime Minister himself has said that there is nothing he can do, and nothing that he has done, as Minister of Defence which could not equally well be done by him as Prime Minister. That does seem to
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make the title rather redundant, because it has, I think, some disadvantages. First of all, it seems to me that by removing it you would rather tend to strengthen the responsibility of the War Cabinet, and, secondly and more important, you would strengthen the status and authority of the Service Departments, especially of those three Councils, the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council and the Air Council, to which the Services have always looked as their highest authority. I should hope also that if the title could be dropped—and it is really only the shadow, it is not the substance, of power—it would facilitate a return to the system under which all messages to Commanders-in-Chief were sent through the constitutional and established channels. Finally, it would facilitate a proposal that I think was made by the noble Lord, Lord Winster, that the Service Ministers should make the announcements on operational matters in the future, whether the news is good or bad.
There is just one other suggestion that I should like to submit, and that is that late night meetings should be reserved for emergencies. It is not everyone who is at his best late in the evening. There are some who find it very trying. Many of the greatest men I have known have always gone to bed early. I remember at the Peace Conference that some trouble blew up in the Conference one night, and I had to consult in succession Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau and President Wilson. It was not very late, but they were all in bed, and they were all asleep. After all, in time of war the first principle is to keep everyone in high responsibility as fit as possible, and it is from that point of view that with great humility I make that suggestion.
I also suggest that it would be an advantage if something could be done to improve the position of the Ministers of Cabinet rank outside the Cabinet. I am not suggesting that there is anything very bad, because the system is practically the same in theory as Mr. Lloyd George's system, but in practice the principles are applied rather less liberally than they were in those days. And in this connexion it would be a great advantage if Ministers could feel a little more secure in their seats. It is very difficult for Ministers to do their best work when they do not know when they are going to be swept away.

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It is not only very hard on the Ministers themselves, but it is terrible, it is devastating, for their Departments. It takes a Minister some time to pick up the threads of his business, and it rather weakens the team work and the sense of loyalty and the sense of mutual confidence which are such a tremendous strength to a Government.
There was a leading article in The Times on the 5th of March which hinted that the recent changes resulted from "a nice balancing of Party claims—customary in peace, but neither encouraging nor edifying in time of war." I must emphasize, speaking quite impersonally, that if that is true, and if some of the changes were the result of Party place seeking or wangling—and for some it is very difficult to find any other explanation—it is a dreadful commentary on all the appeals that have been made to our people to make continuous sacrifices. And it is really an insult to democracy. This war is the most terrible episode in our history. We can pull it through; the three "U's"—the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—can pull it through, but it requires for its direction, especially since Japan came in, the concentrated and continuous efforts of the very best men in the nation. I submit therefore that there is only one criterion for their selection and for their retention, and that is merit.
I sum up the proposals in a word or two. First, concentration of supreme control, military as well as civil, in the War Cabinet, assisted of course by the Chiefs of Staff working in collaboration with the Pacific War Council. The second is the tacit dropping of the Defence Committee and of the title of Minister of Defence. Late meetings to be reserved for emergencies. All communications to Commanders-in-Chief through the established channels. Some strengthening of Ministers outside the War Cabinet, including, especially, less frequent changes of Ministers and the elimination of any consideration except merit in their selection and retention. I submit those proposals as a whole with the object of strengthening both the Prime Minister, in the substance as distinct from the shadow, and his Government; and I submit that, although these things may sound small things, collectively they are of the utmost importance, for, as was justly said by Cicero, armies can signify but little abroad unless
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there be counsel and wise management at home.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Addison has advanced very cogent reasons in support of his Motion for an inquiry into recent events in Malaya and Singapore. To support such a Motion, which raises grave questions of policy, public morale, and security, is like marriage—an enterprise not to be lightly entered upon. I only do so after great thought and with, I hope, a sense of responsibility. If my words are to have any weight, I have to try and convince your Lordships that there are grounds for such an inquiry, that material for conducting it exists, that it would not advantage the enemy, and that good would accrue from it to ourselves. There seem to be good grounds for such an inquiry by reason of the fact that, in three months of war, the Japanese have occupied 1,200,000 square miles of territory, and in the same time we have lost more vital sources of supply than during the previous two and a quarter years of war. Of world supplies of tin and rubber, the Japanese now hold 89 per cent. and 43 per cent., respectively. The net result of this is that Japanese war-making capacity has been enormously increased. At the same time the damage to our prestige has been incalculable, and this will be exploited in the future by the Japanese along the lines they have already followed at Hong Kong. By every foul and filthy means possible, they will, as a matter of policy, humiliate their white prisoners in the eyes of the coloured races.
What are the consequences of this dire disaster? One is seen in the threat to Australia, but the consequences go much deeper than that. The whole nervous system of the communications of the Allied combination have been jeopardized. The Japanese are not only moving towards Australia, but they are moving into the Indian Ocean. Allied supplies and reinforcements for North Africa and the Middle East, supplies to China, the sea route from Australia to this country, oil from Persia, supplies from India, our vital supplies to Russia via Persia, all have to go through the Indian Ocean. The route through the Indian Ocean has been for a very long time more important than that through the Mediterranean. It is the only route to Bombay, Calcutta, and the Persian Gulf. Before there was

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any threat at all from Japan, we had our difficulties in keeping this route open. Now we have to keep it open with sea power in these waters in the hands of the enemy. So far, we have been able to sustain the Battle of the Atlantic, although we have never had very much margin in hand. If the Japanese are free to operate against our communications in the Indian Ocean, this will call for at least equal provision in shipping and escort ships with the Battle of the Atlantic, and on this account alone events in the Far East have put an entirely different complexion on the war against Germany.
How have these things come about? There is too much evidence of lack of foresight at home and of incompetence on the spot for us to be able to dismiss it. Side by side with these failures there has been a constant stream of soothing talk. We heard repeated tales about the impregnability of Singapore, which has now been dismissed by General Bennett's A.D.C. as a fairy story; and last year we had stories of a stream of reinforcements flowing into Malaya. War was inevitable after the speech of the Prime Minister at the Mansion House last year and after the dispatch of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" to Pacific waters, but, in spite of that, Japanese preparedness and strength were just as hopelessly under-estimated as our own preparedness was over-estimated. I should like to ask, what counsel did we take with the Dutch before this war broke out? The Dutch certainly had no illusions about Japanese striking strength. But, in fact, there was incredible unpre-paredness, which was as much responsible for the fall of Singapore as Japanese strength. When the test came it was found that the island was super-defended against naval attack, which was never likely, and almost completely undefended against land attack, which had for long been the obvious danger. General Bennett has stated that no defensive positions were ready in the western half of the island. He says that wiring and repair of fortifications held in defence by the Australians did not begin until they had returned to Singapore, and for three days Japanese airmen photographed their positions without opposition.
It does not appear to have been foreseen that when, last year, Japan paid
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Siam a very heavy price in French-Indo-China, at some future date Japan intended to use Siamese territory as her own. From that date it was surely obvious that our airfields and our defences in Malaya were wrongly sited. It was surely obvious from that date that there was need for constant and thorough military liaison between Singapore and Burma, but there seem to have been no plans made even for the Burma Command to cut the railway line from Bangkok along which all Japanese supplies had to come. It is said that at Penang there was not one anti-aircraft gun, and that the shore defences there were sited against attack from the sea. It is said that there was only one gun available on the vital key aerodrome at Khota Baru.
Proof of this neglect comes in abundance from Australia. Mr. Menzies said he had "known for a year the weakness of Malayan defence." Staff discussions in Singapore in 1939 had "left him with no illusions about the position." The statements of Mr. Menzies in this respect are of supreme importance, and therefore I would quote them to your Lordships at some length. Mr. Menzies said that:
"Staff conversations in Singapore revealed an almost terrifying lack of aeroplanes, troops, guns, and munitions.
"Conference after conference was held in London at which, on behalf of Australia, the problem was put as one of the greatest gravity and urgency. The results were grievously disappointing.
"Service chiefs in London took a more modest view of the requirements than those on the spot. This was characteristic of the almost chronic under-estimation of our enemies."
Mr. Menzies goes on to say that:
"Australian Ministers always felt that the United Kingdom Government view of Singapore was too distant, and that their optimism had increased with distance."
Mr. Hughes has spoken of the "belated recognition of unfitness and incompetence" amongst responsible authorities. In that connexion let me quote from The Times of December 27, 1941:
"Singapore is getting into its war stride. The War Council meets regularly. The Civil Defence Committee will inquire into questions of civil defence."
That was on December 27. The Times of January 6, 1942, stated:
"Our greatest gain during the past four weeks has been the readjustment of Singapore to war-time conditions."

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This readjustment is in the third year of war. Again The Times said:
"The relationship between the Civil Government and the military authorities has been virtually redefined."
This was in January of this year. But I think the most illuminating comment of all comes from the Daily Telegraph of January 16 this year. It stated:
"Singapore is rushing ahead with her air-raid precautions."
What a series of deathbed repentances and, as usual, repentance came too late!
Such an inquiry as my noble friend proposes would give great satisfaction in Australia and, I think, clear up many misapprehensions which exist there. It will do no good if Australians believe that our Government are trying to cover their tracks about matters which went so seriously amiss to the very grave detriment and peril of Australia. Australians feel that the Pacific was regarded as a minor segment of the great panorama of war, and, most unfortunately, their belief was given support by an unfortunate speech by one of our Cabinet Ministers. Whilst making reasonable allowance for alarm and perturbation, the Australian Press has been very uncomfortable reading. Indeed, one paper speaks of "an appalling story." Another says:
"Australians are filled with righteous anger. It is impossible to pretend that they have confidence in those directing Far Eastern strategy. The explanations are based on blunder after blunder."
This righteous anger will not be dispelled but will be accentuated by a refusal to have the facts out.
How do these revelations of lack of prevision and provision square with what has been said by various authorities in this country, many of whom do not seem to have been possessed of the type of mind needed? Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Moyne, said in January:
"We are incomparably stronger and readier for this development than we should have been a year ago. It is extraordinary that the Japanese have not realized the tremendous gamble they are taking."
And again at the end of of January, the noble Lord, Lord Moyne, had "good hopes of the battle in Malaya," and was of opinion that "Allied sea-power was already recovering from the shock of initial disasters." I do not wish to join in attacks upon Air Marshal Sir Robert
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Brooke-Popham. It is true to say that he was pressing for more aircraft in January, 1941. He no doubt had his local difficulties, caused by the ingrained belief of the white population in Singapore that the Japanese would back down. All the same, I do not think Sir Robert need have said last October: "We are ready," because Singapore was not even blacked-out when the first bombs fell there. On February 7 General Percival said:
"We will hold Singapore. There is no question about it."
And in April, 1940, General Bond, who was commanding Malayan land forces, publicly announced that Malayan defences had reached their peak and could be defended against all comers. In the event the aerodromes in Northern Malaya and Penang were lost in a few hours.
A prime cause of the disaster appears to have been shortage of up-to-date fighter aircraft. It is said, as regards Malaya, that we had none at all until we were on the point of losing the Malayan aerodromes. By the bombing of our advanced aerodromes and by attacks on aircraft on those aerodromes, the enemy established mastery of the air within the first twelve hours, or at any rate within the first twenty-four hours of battle. I have seen it stated that a hundred Hurricanes on the spot before the fighting began might have changed the situation. A young Hurricane pilot, during the fighting, said:
"With more aircraft of the same type we could easily smash the Japanese fighter formations which escort the bombers."
I entirely agree that such statements are of course speculative, but it is fair to ask, why were one hundred Hurricanes not there?
Successive Ministers of Aircraft Production—and heaven knows there are plenty of them—almost deafened us with their tales of aircraft rolling off the assembly lines. That is the accepted phrase—"rolling off the assembly lines." Every week, according to their statements, a new record in the production of aircraft was set up, but, like the flies in the winter time, nobody seems to know where the aircraft go. When they are most wanted they are most frequently lacking. Where are all the aircraft? An Australian newspaper asks if they are considered to be more usefully employed in a storehouse in Britain than where they are wanted. For the lack of these aircraft our Commanders in the Malayan

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fighting rarely knew what troops the enemy was bringing up or where he was making his thrusts. It may be quite true that Russia and Libya had competing claims for aircraft and other equipment as against Malaya; nevertheless, there were shortcomings which were not inevitable.
For certain personal reasons I do not wish to say very much or to dwell upon the naval side of matters at Singapore. Once the "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse" were lost, the Japanese could move convoys across the China Sea at will, without any interference, and could make landings to all intents and purposes unopposed. The only naval point to which I will call attention is this. President Roosevelt, in his last fireside talk, referred to the attack upon Pearl Harbour and said:
"Even if the attack had not been made your map will show you that it would have been a hopeless operation for us to send a fleet to the Philippines while all those island bases were under the sole control of the Japanese."
I have been under the impression that we have been told that the naval side of matters at Singapore and in Malaya went wrong because, owing to the attack upon the American Fleet at Pearl Harbour, certain combinations which were in prospect, certain combinations upon which the dispatch of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" to those waters depended, had come to nought. I would not like to express an opinion at this moment—the various statements on this point would have to be put together and analysed before an opinion can be formed—but it does seem very remarkable that President Roosevelt in his fireside talk should have apparently entirely discounted the proposition that there was ever any question of a combination between the American and British naval forces in the Pacific.
I pass from that to one other interesting question—namely, that of Intelligence. I mention this in regard to what I have said about lack of prevision and of foresight. In the Malayan campaign the Japanese had at their disposal their own nationals. In all the little villages in Malaya there were Japanese shops. Everyone out there knew that the proprietors of those shops, the barbers, the photographers and the dentists, were not earning their living from their shops, but
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everywhere they were left in peace to gather information. Malaya and Malayan waters, as a result of their work, became an open book to the Japanese Intelligence Service. When questioned in London in 1936 concerning Japanese espionage, the Governor of the Straits Settlements replied, "There is a special branch of the police which deals with that and it is extremely efficient." How does that statement made in 1936 square with what has taken place in 1941 and 1942?
In resisting the request for an inquiry the Government, in another place, stated that no material exists upon which to conduct such an inquiry. I cannot agree with that statement. There is all the correspondence and the telegrams which must have been exchanged between the Government and the Diplomatic and Consular and Civil Services in the areas concerned over many years and, similarly, with the naval and military and air commanders. There must be many files in the Departments concerned dealing with matters since war broke out as well as with pre-war arrangements in the Far East. This afternoon we have had the great advantage of hearing some observations by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey. If I recollect aright, the noble Lord paid a visit to Australia before the war for the express purpose of inquiring into these matters. The noble Lord indicates dissent and I apologize. I was under the impression that one of the objects of his visit was to inquire into matters of defence, but I understand now that it was a health visit and I apologize.
At any rate there are correspondence and exchanges of views with the Australian Government to which Mr. Curtin and Mr. Menzies have referred. A report has been received from General Bennett and another report has been called for. General Wavell and Admiral. Layton surely must have rendered reports, or at any rate their evidence is available. Then there is General Pownall, and finally there is the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Let me say at once that I do not think any blame attaches to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster for his inability to clean out the Augean stables in those parts of the world. He had very little time indeed, but in a not very informative speech on March 17 the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster told us he was sent to the Pacific

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"to find out whether the administration and conduct of our affairs, Consular, Diplomatic and other was in need of improvement and what that improvement might be."
He sent home a report and he also reported to the Australian and New Zealand Governments. Surely in these reports there must be a mine of information open and available to an inquiry if an inquiry is set up. To say that it is no use to have an inquiry because no information is available is really not being candid. For the Government to take up such a line is to create suspicion that the Government intend to cover up what they know too well to be a very bad business. If the Government are to say that there is to be no inquiry because not all the witnesses are available that would reverse the whole of our judicial procedure. I have not yet heard of a murder trial in which the evidence of the victim was available, but in spite of that we succeed in convicting a reasonable number of murderers.
Then there is the further plea that an inquiry would yield information for the enemy. I know it is very difficult for members of the Government to realize that those who from time to time criticize their actions are just as anxious as the Government are to win the war and just as anxious not to help the enemy. But what information is it that an inquiry would reveal to the enemy? I feel convinced that the High Command in Tokyo know by now that their Army has captured Malaya and Singapore. I feel equally certain that the Army authorities on the spot have already counted up the number of prisoners they have taken, and that they have also counted up the weapons and the equipment that they have captured. They have, no doubt, estimated very accurately the number of hours of work which have been put in on making those weapons and equipment in our workshops only for them to be lost in a hopeless endeavour. The number of aircraft we have lost must be known and the strength of our naval forces operating there must be known. Our lack of foresight and our failure to make adequate preparation must have been accurately known to the enemy for many years. So what exactly would such an inquiry as my noble friend proposes reveal to the enemy? I think the enemy probably know a great deal more about these affairs already than we ourselves.
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Then it is asked, what purpose would an inquiry serve? May I say that I do not want an inquiry for the purpose of embarrassing the Government, or of fomenting a political intrigue, or for the purpose of going head-hunting for scapegoats. Nor does any responsible person. But I believe an inquiry would give great satisfaction in sorely-tried Australia, and that it would relieve public opinion here at home, which, rightly or wrongly, believes that mistakes are covered up and those responsible are whitewashed in order to save the Government embarrassment. There is not enough whitewash in the whole world to cover up Singapore, but an inquiry would help, in my opinion, to relieve certain officers and officials and regiments of unjust criticism.
Finally, I believe that such an inquiry would bring out the fundamental causes, enable the lessons to be learnt, and the mistakes to be avoided in the future. I desire an inquiry in order to promote greater efficiency in the conduct of the war, and I press for it particularly in the interests of our fighting men who pay with their lives for the mistakes of those who are set over them. The American people have been through a very mortifying experience at Pearl Harbour, but they had the satisfaction of seeing an inquiry promptly held and responsibility fixed where it belonged. Such an inquiry cleared the air and restored confidence. If there is not to be an inquiry into Singapore, I wonder what this Government would think worth inquiring into. If Paris was worth a Mass, well, surely, the crash and destruction of our Far Eastern Empire might be thought worthy of a little investigation.
The noble Lord, Lord Croft, recently made a speech in which he expressed resentment concerning slanders on the troops who fought in Malaya. I share his resentment. When very chivalrously defending the troops, Lord Croft made, by implication, very severe reflections on the Government. He spoke of two Indian Divisions fighting day and night for two months, of an Australian Division fighting for one month without rest, of a British Division thrown into the fighting when they came straight off the sea. The noble Lord wishes those slanders to be treated with righteous wrath. I think that some of this wrath might be expended on those whose mistakes and lack of foresight exposed those Divisions to such trials.

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The case for inquiry as I have tried to put it is, in my opinion, summed up in a leading article which appeared in The Times on February 21. When I read it I realized how truly that newspaper deserves its nickname "The Thunderer." When it does decide to speak its mind it does indeed discharge a broadside. The Times in this leading article states:
"The chief concern now with the past is to apply its lessons to the future. There is still need to look failure in the face, to understand its underlying causes, and to discover the means of remedying it… The most constant feature of the military defeats and setbacks sustained during the past two years has been lack of imagination. The failure to estimate correctly the novel character of German tactics.… could be doubtfully excused on the ground of un-familiarity. But this plea could no longer suffice for the absence of local preparedness, the tragic naval blunder and the total confusion of our defences in Malaya. Inadequacy of material resources is at best only a partial explanation.… there has been evidence of failure to anticipate the nature and quality of the hostile attack or to frame a coherent plan of campaign …, to counter it. The directors of our strategy persistently underestimated the strength of our enemies."
There, in that passage, is the case for an inquiry.
It is an ungrateful task to criticize. I realize that the responsibilities which rest upon those in authority in these days must be well nigh unbearable. The nation is willing to give those in authority any support that they ask for. There is no sacrifice that the nation will not make, and in return it expects failure to be examined. In this struggle for our existence we cannot afford to show any tenderness to failure. The discards have to be ruthless, for if we are to win through these grim and terrible days to victory then only the best will do.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: My Lords, I do not propose to trespass upon the indulgence of your Lordships for more than a few moments, but I should like to say one or two words in connexion with the Motion proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Addison. The noble Lord who has just sat down has made a most powerful indictment and he has also supported the contention which has been put forward by Lord Addison. The difference between them is with regard to the actual form in which an inquiry should take place. I agree with him and with my noble friend Lord Hankey—whose speech, I am sure, your Lordships
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were all most interested to hear—and I am sure that we agree that a Royal Commission is not a suitable tribunal for discussing these very important matters. I know quite well what was in the mind of the noble Lord when he stated that he wants all these matters which are now covered up by a strange and disturbing kind of secrecy to be brought out before the public.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, that is not so. I hope I do not misunderstand the noble Marquess, but I have not asked that an inquiry should necessarily be public—not at all. As long as these matters are inquired into in an effective way, and action is taken as the result of the inquiry—whether it has been held in public or not—I shall be satisfied. The national interest must decide this question.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: My Lords, I am sorry. I must have been putting words into the noble Lord's mouth. But I am not sure that I agree with him. I have had occasion, as have many others of your Lordships no doubt, to go about in many parts of the country and I find that this subject of Singapore is being continuously canvassed and discussed in all quarters, and wonder is expressed as to why we do not know exactly what has happened. The noble Lord who sits behind me has made a very powerful speech indeed, and I am bound to say that I agree with every word he has said. He has told us that he wants an inquiry, and that the results should be made known not only here but in Australia for the purpose of satisfying public opinion there. He is quite right in saying that there is plenty of material. Of course there is plenty of material. We in our independent positions know a certain amount, and, of course, the Government have practically all the material before them. This suggestion that if any information or facts are given away that will reveal something to the enemy is, I am sorry to think, usually an excuse for hiding something not from the enemy but from the public in this country.
It seems to me that this matter should be gone into very carefully. I venture to go further than my noble friend; I should like the Government to make a complete statement on Singapore. It does not satisfy any of us when the Government

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say that they have not sufficient information, that they do not know, and that they cannot tell the public, what has gone on. I should like the Prime Minister, in one of those broadcasts which we always welcome, and in the phraseology which he uses better than anyone else, to tell us exactly what did happen in Singapore. At the present moment, apart from any independent information which we may have received, all we know is that between 60,000 and 80,000 British troops laid down their arms, and that is practically the end of the story. I think that I am right in saying that something like 3,000 casualties were incurred. I suppose that that is the greatest disaster which has ever happened to British arms; and yet there has been no statement from the Government.
There are, I think, innumerable objections to a Royal Commission. It is quite true that these facts will be on record in history, and, if there is a Royal Commission after the war, no doubt they can be sifted; but it would be quite impossible to have a Royal Commission now. It would be possible to have an inquiry, but I think we should then find that the results of that inquiry would not be made public. I would much sooner that the Government, through the Prime Minister himself, told us exactly what the facts are—exactly what has happened and why it happened. First of all, we want to know what was the original idea as to the ability of Singapore to hold out. My noble friend Lord Addison has given us various quotations which show exactly what was the opinion of people on the spot and elsewhere, an opinion which naturally caused everybody in this country to believe that Singapore could be held. We find that large reinforcements were sent at the last minute, which shows that the British Government themselves believed that Singapore could hold out. And yet we find—I might almost say in the twinkling of an eye—that there is a general collapse, that practically no steps were taken to hinder the invader, that when the dive bombers came there was nothing to meet them, that Singapore was shelled from all sides, that the Japanese crowded in boats across what stretch of water there is, that they came through Malaya with almost no opposition at the last minute, and that the fortress, for some reasons which have
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never been given to us, collapsed and fell—the most terrible surrender of British arms in the whole of our history. Yet we are still waiting for an explanation.
The noble Lord, Lord Addison, wants a Royal Commission; other noble Lords want an inquiry. We have had nothing of a definite character from the Government either admitting that we have suffered a disaster or telling us why that disaster has happened. One feels that they are hoping that something will turn up to show us that there is some mitigating influence in connexion with that disaster. I do not know when that is coming, or when we shall be informed of it. I am inclined to think that the British Government know the British public far less well than do the great majority of your Lordships. The British public are ready and anxious to know what is going on. They are not scared by disasters, and they are not unduly elated by successes; but they do want to know what is happening, and the more direct information which the British Government give to the public the more will the public be ready to redouble their efforts in the tremendous work which lies before us at the present time.
There are one or two words which I should like to say about the speech of my noble friend Lord Hankey. Lord Hankey, as we know, has been a public servant for over twenty-five years; and there is no matter of major importance, in addition to all the abstruse details connected with such matters, of which he has not had full cognizance, and in regard to which his valuable influence has not been brought to play. I have had experience of that myself, and I look back with satisfaction to the political connexion which I had with Lord Hankey for a short period. When Lord Hankey speaks he speaks with overwhelming authority, and I sincerely hope that what he has told us to-day will be acted on by the Government. He has dealt, in very simple and very eloquent phraseology, with a matter which has been disturbing our minds, and the minds of a great many other people in this country, in relation to defence— the Minister of Defence, the Ministry of Defence which people want, and the Committee of Imperial Defence. I think that Lord Hankey has straightened that matter out in the speech which he has made. As I understand it, he does not want a

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Defence Minister or a Committee of Imperial Defence; what he desires is a Great General Staff, where the whole of the Service authorities are co-ordinated. This would be an independent body, which would report to the body to which I shall come in a few moments, the War Cabinet.
The noble Viscount who is to reply to this debate has, I am glad to know, held his position now for more than a week, but I am not sure exactly what his position is. I understood that he was a member of the War Cabinet, such as it was, but I do not understand exactly what the metamorphosis is which has happened now. I understand that my noble friend is not now a member of the War Cabinet, nor is there any member of the War Cabinet in your Lordships' House, which I think is a great misfortune. I hope that in the position which my noble friend does occupy—the very nebulous position, if I may call it so—he has an opportunity of making his influence, which I am sure is powerful and attractive, felt by those authorities who should know what goes on in the debates which take place in your Lordships' House.
Your Lordships will remember the last debate on this subject, which took place a short time ago. The two main points which emerged from that debate were, I think, that your Lordships desired a War Cabinet and a Great General Staff. A great many changes occurred, but, when we looked through them, we found that they did not really touch the main points which were in our minds. The War Cabinet which I then ventured to describe, and I understood that I described it with the approbation of your Lordships, was a Committee consisting of a small number of men—I think that in the last war there were five—untrammeled with the burdens of office, who were to devote their entire energy and capacity—"day in and day out" was the expression which I used—to the conduct and direction of the war. We pick up our newspapers and we find that, with all the panoply of promotion, Sir Stafford Cripps became a member of the War Cabinet; but he is in India at present, which means that his great abilities cannot be devoted to the direction of the war at this moment. We then find another, and what I consider to be an astounding, proposal, that Mr. Casey is to a member of the War Cabinet, but that
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he is going to carry on his work at Cairo. I suppose that he will have to give his advice by telephone, or by rapid journeys backwards and forwards from Cairo to the War Cabinet.
My Lords, that is not a War Cabinet. The danger which we have in this country—and I do not mind saying it before your Lordships—is that we are under a one-man Government. I would yield to no one in my personal affection and regard for the Prime Minister. I have known the Prime Minister for a great number of years. I have the greatest admiration for his abilities and his achievements, and I feel that at one moment in our history he carried out something which I believe that nobody else could have carried out: he rallied the whole of this country, he rallied the Empire, and he rallied the whole world; and we started on a course then which really laid down the certainty of the victory which we will achieve at some future date. But, great as he is and powerful as he is, he cannot carry the Government of this country on his own shoulders, and I want to see a War Cabinet of men, as I said, untrammelled with office, continually sitting in session, and giving him that assistance and that support which any Prime Minister must necessarily require. It is for that reason that I have ventured to trespass on your Lordships' time.
LORD CHATFIELD: My Lords, I have not come to make a prepared speech. I wish to make a few remarks only, due entirely to what has been said in the debate to-day, and as briefly as possible. I wish very strongly to support this Motion for an inquiry in the main in the spirit expressed by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Hankey. I feel that an inquiry is necessary to give confidence not only to the country but also to the Fighting Services. Whenever we have disasters—and, as has been said, we have never in our history had such a military disaster as we have seen in the last few months—you always find that people become very wise about things, and can see something which they believe they saw many years ago. I think you will find that on those occasions it is quite natural perhaps that the Fighting Services, whose inability to stave off the disaster has brought it about, are blamed. They are generally blamed by what they call "the politicians," and you may be quite sure that in their messes

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they blame the politicians too. It is undesirable that feelings of that sort of one set of men as opposed to another should be so expressed, so freely and so frequently, and yet that there should remain uncertainty in the public mind as to what is the truth.
If an inquiry is held, and I hope it will be, it should be, as the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, says, of a simple nature, and it should be one which can adjudicate between the politicians and the fighting men. Therefore it should to my mind be a judicial inquiry, supported as necessary by technical men. I am quite sure, for instance, that the deplorable disaster in the loss of the "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse" should be fully inquired into, and it is an inquiry which could not be properly made in the well-established way by a court-martial of the survivors. We want to know what was the reason why those two ships were sent out there, as they were totally inadequately supported, and whether blame attaches to those on the spot, as has been said in this House, or whether blame attaches to those at home. It is only fair that that should be inquired into in order to give confidence to the Fighting Services.
The only other thing I wish to say about Singapore is about the defences. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, in the very able speech he made this afternoon, said that the only thing that we had defended ourselves against at Singapore was sea attack, which was unlikely and did not occur. Well, that is also, with all due respect to the noble Lord, being wise after the event. We did not know before this war with Japan started that attack by naval forces against Singapore was unlikely. Supposing that we had had no defences against the Japanese Fleet, supposing we had had no 15-inch batteries at Singapore, it is more likely perhaps that the Japanese Fleet would have come down and bombarded Singapore, but they did not do so because of the artillery that we had provided before the war. It has been said frequently: Why did not we foresee that the Japanese would attack by land from the north? Well, you must remember that before the war, as has been said quite frankly by the noble Viscount who leads the House, we did not know that France was going to capitulate. We did not
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know that Indo-China was going to be overrun by the Japanese.
But there was a time when we did know it. Eighteen months ago, or rather more, when the present Government came into power, the disaster to the French Armies had happened. We suddenly lost the whole of that great French Fleet which we had to support us. Instead of having the British and French Fleets, allied in enormous strength, to cope merely with the German Navy, we lost the French Fleet and we added to our enemies the Italian Fleet. That was a most important moment in our naval history. What did we do? What have we done since that entirely unforeseen event?—unforeseen except perhaps by certain psychical people, who wrote to me and told me that they foresaw it, and wrote to the Prime Minister and told him. What should we have done when that disaster occurred? Surely we should have re-laid our plans then.
The possibility that Indo-China would go then became patent. The attack from the north became a possibility; indeed, it had been talked about for a long time in public. Did we take every step, did the War Cabinet take every step that they could take from the summer of 1940 until the disaster occurred, to make the resistance against land attack all that it ought to have been? That is a question which should be inquired into, just as we should inquire (only it would not be the same inquiry) whether since we lost our naval position—perhaps that is too strong: since our naval position was so jeopardized by the loss of the French Fleet and the addition of the Italian Fleet to our enemies and the threat of the Japanese Fleet to our solitary British Navy—we have used our productive power in this country sufficiently to support the Navy and to rebuild our Fleet to make up for the very serious handicaps that we have suffered by the change in the international position. That is a thing one wants to know and the country has a right to know.
Are we now using our productive powers sufficiently to make up for naval losses in aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers compared to what we are doing in regard to other arms, which are also so necessary? After all, we have an immense productive capacity now. We are working day and night,

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and everyone is working with enthusiasm—on the whole anyhow. We ought to be able to do these things, and we do not know whether they are being done or not. The noble Viscount on the Woolsack told me the other day he could not answer my question as to what was happening about the British Battle Fleet because it would be giving information to the enemy. That excuse of giving information to the enemy is a very useful peg to hang a difficulty on, but it is not really a fair one. There is a great deal of information which could be given to the country, to restore its confidence, if it has lost it, without telling the enemy anything at all.
The only other thing I wish to say is in regard to the very important remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, as to the constitution of the defence organization. I do not want to say very much, because I have already on two occasions spoken in your Lordships' House on that subject, but I wish to endorse very strongly what the noble Lord has said. He has advised that the title of the Minister of Defence should be done away with. In the speech I made in your Lordships' House a few weeks ago I also recommended, if there was not to be a Deputy Minister of Defence, as I had proposed, that at all events the Defence Ministry should be merged into the War Cabinet, or a part of the War Cabinet specially selected and competent to deal with defence matters. I therefore wholly endorse what the noble Lord has said. It is much better to do away with the extraordinary position as it has grown up and to merge it into the War Cabinet, so that the brains of several men can be applied to the task of making these very vital decisions, which are going to affect us for all time, instead of the burden resting so largely on a single pair of shoulders, however broad, however able, whatever confidence we may have in these shoulders.
The noble Lord also suggested we should do away with what is called the Defence Committee. The only thing I have to say about that is that the Defence Committee was set up originally in the summer of 1939, when I was Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. It was done in order to bring the Service Ministers—the political side of the Fighting Departments—into the consultations about important affairs which were going to result from the advice given by the Chiefs
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of Staffs to the Cabinet, which affected their own Ministries, and in which they had no say. I therefore instituted the Defence Committee in order to bring the Service Ministers into touch with the Chiefs of Staffs on these important questions such as war plans.
When the war started the Defence Committee disappeared. I told your Lordships the other day that it was resurrected at my instance by Mr. Chamberlain in order to work out for the War Cabinet detailed problems and so save the time of the War Cabinet in dealing with a great mass of technical matter. In that respect it did a great deal of good, and it did relieve the War Cabinet of a great deal of work; but Lord Hankey's experience is later than mine, and it may be that the Defence Committee is now unnecessary—that if the Chiefs of Staffs were to report direct to the War Cabinet it is unnecessary for their deliberations first of all to be "vetted" by the Defence Committee, if, indeed, they are so "vetted"; I do not know. I feel that if the Defence Committee is done away with, then the Service Ministers must be sure of some representation in the deliberations. They are not in the War Cabinet, so it must be a corollary—no doubt Lord Hankey will agree—if the Defence Committee is done away with, that the Service Ministers must attend the War Cabinet on every occasion when the Chiefs of Staffs do so. That, I believe, is the practice at the present time, as the noble Lord who leads the House told us. If that is the case, if there is advantage in doing away with the Defence Committee, there can be no real objection to the proposal.
The only other point I wish to support Lord Hankey on is this matter of going to bed early. I feel that the remark he made is worthy of promulgation and repetition, and I do not apologize for saying that I strongly support him. I can assure your Lordships that I have had representations made to me by those who work in Whitehall that the hours they have to work are perfectly intolerable. It does not lead to efficiency, as the noble Lord said. Nobody is at his best in the middle watch. What we must remember is that when these Committees, which start at half-past ten at night and very often go on to one or two o'clock in the morning, have finished, we hope they go to bed, but not so the Secretariat. They have to go and do two hours work clearing up

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the mess, to be ready with their report at nine or ten o'clock in the morning. This is perfectly intolerable when you are working seven days a week. I believe it is the height of inefficiency and bad administration to work such hours, which really cannot be necessary, and it only wants a certain amount of sacrifice of habit on the part of different people in order to get a proper working arrangement, efficient in all respects.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, I wish we could stop statesmen, military correspondents, and leader writers saying that anything is "vital to our success." Singapore was said to be vital. The Suez Canal is said to be vital. Ceylon is now said to be vital. Not even the death of the Prime Minister or the capture of this island would be vital to the cause for which we are fighting. But there is no doubt about it that the loss of Singapore—the surrender at Singapore—is the blackest page in our military history for all time. I am glad that my noble friends Lord Addison and Lord Winster have so ably indicted, not so much the Government as the administration of Singapore for the disgrace that has overtaken British arms. It is not so much vital as a bad black mark. In passing, may I say to Lord Chatfield that Lord Winster did not complain of the sea defence of Singapore, but of its super-defence? When Lord Chatfield says that during the twelve months before France dropped out we could not be expected to think about defending Singapore from the land, he forgets that that was solely due to the persistent belief of the Admiralty, and indeed of our War Office, that landings from the sea were impossible.
LORD CHATFIELD: Might I interrupt the noble Lord as he has referred to me? I did not say quite what he said. I feel that if in the years before we had suggested that not only should Singapore be defended from sea attack but also that it should be defended from land attack, we should have been told that we were mad. I cannot remember in our six years struggle from the year 1932, when the defences of Singapore had been set up and we got them restarted, until the war broke out, one single speech to help
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the Service Chiefs in defending Singapore—not a single one—yet to-day you say "We know where the blame lies."
LORD WEDGWOOD: That is all very well, but the Service Chiefs had £25,000,000 of the taxpayers money to defend that place with. They spent it all upon sea defence, and none was spent upon land defence. You cannot get away with it by saying "You could not have expected a land attack." You did not expect it because, since the landing at Gallipoli and other landings, we had banished from our minds the possibility of landings from the sea. Till the Japanese came along we did not believe it was possible, and to say now "It is only the people who have been in charge since France surrendered who are responsible for the blunder" is, I think, carrying it too far. We were all blind. We all thought, like the Admiralty and the War Office, that landings from the sea were so exceptionally difficult that they were not worth bothering about. Therefore they defended Singapore island and left the Johore hills without any sort of defence. We are all to blame. Lord Chatfield is perfectly right in saying it is easy to be wise after the event, but that applies equally to the time after France dropped out as it does to the time before. But some of the speeches I have heard to-day—those of Lord Chatfield and the noble Marquess and Lord Hankey—made me a little nervous about this proposal of ours. We are asking for a Royal Commission, and what the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, is asking for is a judicial inquiry into the respective blames of the Fighting Services and of the politicians.
LORD CHATFIELD: Not alone, but it should be an inquiry which would cover that very important side of the matter.
LORD WEDGWOOD: I think that is because the noble Lord attaches great importance to reassuring the public and the troops. I do not think that is the purpose of a Royal Commission. The purpose of a Royal Commission is not to punish anybody, not to decide between two sets of disputants, but simply to prevent the country suffering from the same mistakes again.
LORD CHATFIELD: Certainly.
LORD WEDGWOOD: I do not want this Royal Commission to be a postmortem court martial or anything of that

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sort. I want it to be the best form of inquiry to prevent worse happening if there is a Singapore again.
LORD CHATFIELD: I quite agree.
LORD WEDGWOOD: I particularly do not want it to be what Lord Hankey and Lord Chatfield were thinking of—an inquiry as to whether the Admiralty or the Admiral were to blame for the loss of the "Repulse" and the "Prince of Wales." The very worst result that could come from an inquiry would be to have the Government or the Admirals or the Captains of any ships in this war made more nervous than they are about taking risks. The supreme merit of the Admiralty throughout this war is that they have gone on taking risks, and I am certain that, although they had not got an aircraft carrier to send out with the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse," they were perfectly justified in sending those ships out. You cannot go on with your Admiral Mahan's doctrine of keeping your battleships perfectly safe in war. You might just as well have sent them to the Falkland Islands to be a "Fleet in being" in the South Atlantic. If battleships have to be of use in war and not merely a threat, they must be used. If they are not used then they are of no use whatever, and that is why we complain of the noble Lord for going on building these monster battleships which cannot be made unsinkable. The worst result of the Mesopotamia Commission, on which I sat, was that the main Report passed some censure on General Nixon for having ventured to go beyond Basra and move up towards Baghdad with insufficient troops. If any inquiry is going to hamstring what spirit of attack there is left in the Services I think it is to be deplored. That is not what I want.
LORD CHATFIELD: Suppose the "Tirpitz" was to slip across our Fleet into the middle of the Atlantic, how would you prevent her from stopping our trade?
LORD WEDGWOOD: Do it as they did with the "Bismarck." Send out the best ships you have got. Do not bother about a superior force. After all, this war has seen the "Ajax" successfully attack the "Graf Spee," a battleship. Our smaller ships got away with it, and I would sooner they went on trying rather than that we should wait till we have a sufficiency to ensure victory. We do not
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want any more Jutlands in this war. We want attack, and one of the things we want this inquiry for is in order to prevent what has occurred happening again. I am quite certain that the things the whole of your Lordships' House most want are two. One is that a British General and Army should never again surrender, and the other is that there should be in future in Ceylon and in India co-operation on the part of the inhabitants of those countries so as to get the same efficient defence as we have got in this country, a defence which does not depend upon barbed wire on the sea coast but which depends on the fighting spirit of the people and their determination to resist the invader, however he comes, as long as they are alive. It was the complete absence of any use being made in Malaya and in Hong Kong particularly of the Chinese that led to our disaster. In Hong Kong there were over a quarter of a million Chinese inhabitants, and not one of them was used, although their brothers and their relations were fighting to the death against the Japanese just across the border. In spite of that no sort of use was made of these Chinese to help to defend themselves, and when it came to the end the unfortunate Chinese women and children were left behind.
The most important thing for our success is that that policy should change. I do not see any way of changing it except by a Royal Commission. It is nonsense to say that you cannot get the evidence. I was on the Royal Commission with Lord Quickswood which inquired into Mesopotamia. We sat for over six months. For the first four or five of those months all the evidence we took was the correspondence that had passed between the different Departments, supplied to us in volume after volume which we read through. By following that course you find out what the rough facts are. Finally, we got back the Commander-in-Chief and the Viceroy, and they had the opportunity of stating their case. We knew then what to ask them; but before that inquiry had sat a month the whole attitude of the Indian Government towards the war changed completely. For two years India had hardly known there was a war on except for the troops she was sending. After that inquiry the people in India suddenly discovered, as the people in Singapore did,

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that they were being blamed for not having put their backs into the war and started making munitions and guns and rifles. In the last two years, largely owing to Lord Willingdon, who was then Governor of Bombay, the whole position changed. The turning point was the appointment of that Commission and the sudden awakening of the Viceroy and the Government in India to the fact that they were being blamed, not for not defending India, but for putting India before this country and the success of the war. I remember Lord Kitchener actually wired to the Viceroy: "Send the troops. It is better to lose India than to lose the war."
Is not exactly the same problem before us now? What has the Colonial Empire done for us in this war? There were a few troops which have now been sent back to West Africa. There has been no development of the railway workshops in our Colonial Empire comparable to the development that took place in the Indian railway workshops when they got down to it. There has been no recruiting of labour, no initiative shown. As the result of an inquiry into what went on in Malaya we may get the Colonial Secretary writing to the Governors asking them what they can now do to help. There has been no effort on the part of the various Colonies and Protectorates to help, although in Palestine, India, the Gold Coast and other places you have men who are quick learners at engineering business and you have the railway workshops at least ready. In Palestine there are large industries but no real use has been made of them
That is one side, but the other side is more important, and that is getting the inhabitants of these countries to join up as comrades in the fight. I know there is difficulty in getting arms, but nowadays it is easy enough to make bombs in the back garden and a knife is as good as anything else in the jungle. The great thing is that these people should feel that they are being asked to help in the defence of their own country, to help in a cause in which they believe as much as we do. Coloured people have infinitely more to fear from Hitler, not to mention Japan, than we have, but nothing has been done to secure their co-operation. I think a Royal Commission taking evidence as to the lack of any formation of local levies
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or Home Guards or anything of that sort would prick the conscience of the Colonial Office, and we might have the whole future of this war carried on on a very different level.
The next vital spot I understand is Ceylon. If you imagine we can spare troops to garrison every single island in the Pacific and the Atlantic you are imagining a vain thing. If you are going to defend these countries you have got to get the people to defend themselves as the Russians are defending themselves. Ceylon is about the size of England with 6,000,000 inhabitants, a diverse people, most of them very good fighting men, especially the up-country Singalese and the Tamils. And remember that all these people count two on a division. If they do not fight for us they will fight against us. The person who gets them first will get their support. I believe the Malays would have fought. If in Burma we had relied on something in the nature of Home Guards men would have found it a little less popular to show roads to the Japanese.
That is what we want to get from this inquiry. We want to prevent any future disaster in Ceylon or elsewhere resulting from complete failure to secure any cooperation from the native communities, ending in an expression of surprise and some annoyance at finding them joining only too readily with the Japanese. It is no good taking them into a Pioneer Corps. If you take them in as coolies, they immediately see that you do not regard them as equals; but if you take them into a Fighting Corps then immediately they are equals. Look at the extraordinary difference in the respect paid by our fighting men in this war to the Chinese who are fighting compared with the attitude towards the Chinese who were in a Labour Corps in the last war. In this war the Chinese have suddenly become men, equals, brothers. If we could do that with the whole native population of the British Empire we should break down the colour bar and have a community of comrades fighting for the right cause. You are throwing away that opportunity.
There is another thing I want to stop. Ninety-three thousand British troops and a General at their head surrendered. I asked for an inquiry when General Fortune surrendered with 40,000 men. If we had had an inquiry then it would at

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least have shown that it was not the right thing for a British General to surrender his Army. I do not know whether your Lordships recollect that the last surrender of British troops was at Yorktown in 1781, when Cornwallis surrendered with 20,000 men to the Americans. But they marched out with all the honours of war. They did not hold up their hands and go into Japanese concentration camps. It all depends on example and tradition. When General Fortune surrendered he was breaking a great tradition, he was setting a bad example. Since then we have had Hong Kong, which was worse, and Singapore, which was worse still. How long is it going on? How long is it since a British ship of the Navy struck its flag in action? Never. Why? Because the Navy have a tradition that no captain strikes his flag in action, and thus they never surrender. My one consolation is that we have an Admiral commanding the troops in Ceylon. I hope he will continue to set the great naval example.
It does not matter in the least if we lose islands or even battles; it does not matter really if we lose our lives. But what does matter is blackening the history of our country, destroying traditions, and building up bad traditions. No Japanese General ever surrenders, no German ship ever strikes its flag in action. We did not use to do so. Hold your Royal Commission, hold your Royal Commission on that: in what circumstances does a British General yield himself alive? Perhaps you might combine with it the question, in what circumstances are British troops justified in surrendering their wives and children to the Japanese? I think it would be good to get back to the excellent tradition of the nineteenth century that when fighting savages you kept your last bullets for your wives.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE) (Lord Cecil): My Lords, this debate, after the manner of debates in this House, has expanded rather beyond its original limits. The Motion which the noble Lord, Lord Addison, originally put on the Paper dealt with the question of setting up a Royal Commission to inquire into the defences at Singapore. In fact, I think that there is hardly any question of public policy that has not been touched upon in this debate—military policy, naval policy, air policy, Colonial policy and so on. It
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is quite clear that the House would not require me to deal with all these many subjects, but I should like, if I may, to say one word regarding the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, who has just sat down, particularly with regard to his comments on Colonial policy, and the contributions which the Colonies have made during this war. I do not think that he was just in what he said. What he said, in effect, so far as the Malayans were concerned, was that they had done nothing at all.
LORD WEDGWOOD: I said that they had sent us some money.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Yes, they have sent millions to assist us in our very great extremity. Not one single word did the noble Lord say about that. He said very much the same things about other Colonies without exception. He did not make any exceptions. He swept them all together. I must say that it is very difficult to justify remarks of that type. We all, in this House, know the noble Lord and we all love him, but we all know that he may not, and very often does not, think very much before he actually speaks. I remember the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, in another place, referring to another member, who shall be nameless, saying: "What does the noble Lady's motto appear to be? 'How do I know what I think until I hear what I say?'" One gets an impression of that sort sometimes when listening to the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood. But there are other people, people outside, who do not realize his idiosyncrasies, and who might feel hurt. After all, wonderful contributions and sacrifices have been made by the Colonies in our great cause. I should like to say a word in their support at the beginning of my speech, and I am sure that what I say represents the view of the House as well. There has never been a time when the Colonies have made more noble and whole-hearted contributions to our assistance in our hour of need.
Another subject which went beyond the original scope of the debate was the question of the machinery of Government. It was dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, and by the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry. I think there is none of us who did not welcome Lord Hankey's contribution to the debate. He gave an

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intensely interesting account of the structure of the Government as he knew it—and he knew it better, perhaps, than did anyone else—during the last war. The noble Lord, of course, speaks with the very greatest authority on this subject. There is no one, I suppose, who has a longer experience of the inner workings of the Cabinet. He will always be listened to in this House, and indeed everywhere else, when he speaks on this subject, with the very greatest interest and respect. I may say that we who sit here on this Bench find it a comfort to think that, although he is no longer sitting side by side with us, we, at least, can still have the benefit of his constructive advice in the future. He will not, I am sure, wish me to comment in any detail upon what he said. He did not give me notice exactly of the line which he was proposing to adopt. I can assure him that everything he says on this question will always receive the most serious consideration. I was delighted to hear of his anxiety about the health of Ministers. I know that he is a practical expert on matters of health, and his advice should certainly carry weight.
The same thing applies to the very thoughtful speech made by the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton. With much that Lord Swinton said I am sure that we should all be in very strong agreement. He spoke in particular of the different functions which are needed in the Army, the functions which should be allotted to Staff Officers and to fighting officers. Of course, that is a matter of the first importance. We all know that there are men who are admirable on the Staff, but who are, I will not say quite useless, but fairly useless in the field, and vice versa. The difficulty has always been to find out which are which, to determine which man can be expected to be admirable in the field and which man would be likely to be more useful on the Staff. I agree that this is one of the matters to which the General Staff should pay most careful attention. The great value of a fighting soldier whose capabilities extend to both Staff Work and to Service in the field has, I think, been exemplified by General Alexander in Burma.
With regard to the general theses regarding the Government and the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence and the
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General Staff, on which the noble Viscount touched, of course no one will pretend that the present arrangement is perfect. Nothing is perfect in this world. The Prime Minister's view, which he has expressed in another place, is that it is the most perfect arrangement which he can devise, but if there is any machinery which, in his view, can improve it, I have no doubt that he will not have the slightest hesitation in adopting it. The House has heard the very authoritative exposition of the Lord Chancellor on this subject a few weeks ago, and they will not expect me to add to it to-day. I promise the noble Viscount, however, that anything he says, like anything which the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, says, coming as it does from eminent ex-Ministers, will receive all the consideration which it deserves. But he will not, I am sure, expect me to go into details now. In fact, I am clearly not in a position to do so.
Then there was the contribution of the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry. He first asked what is my position. Perhaps I may be allowed to re-state that, although I have made reference to it in an earlier debate. I am not a member of the War Cabinet, but I am empowered to attend its meetings as often as may be necessary for the efficient performance of my duties. If the mental activity and the versatility of interests of noble Lords keep at their present high level I expect I shall have to attend almost every meeting. So far as the remark of the noble Marquess, that the present Government is a one-man Government, is concerned, I do not think that is borne out by the facts. The Cabinet, as at present constituted, I can assure the noble Marquess, does work exactly as a Cabinet should. It works harmoniously, and it works by a system of consultation. I do not believe that any alteration which could be made would better its present composition.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: Are you referring to the War Cabinet?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: The War Cabinet, yes.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: The War Cabinet is not what I suggested that it should be; it is at present a Cabinet consisting of a number of Ministers.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: It is a Cabinet of seven or eight Ministers.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: It is really the old Cabinet.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: It is the Cabinet which was created after the last reconstruction. It is the smallest Cabinet, I think, that the noble Marquess or anyone else would find that it is possible to create at the present moment. I feel that he is unduly anxious about this matter, because this is just such a Cabinet as he himself has known in the past, and to which, I am sure, he took no exception.
I should like now, if I may, to come to the main subject of the debate which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Addison. In his speech the noble Lord pressed very strongly for a Royal Commission on Singapore.
LORD ADDISON: No, I pressed very strongly for an inquiry, but I said that I did not tie myself to whether it was a Royal Commission or not. I pressed for an inquiry; over and over again I said that.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: An inquiry, yes. I was perhaps quoting too closely the Motion which the noble Lord has on the Paper. He said that it was not his object merely to find scapegoats, and I am ready to accept that view, although in his speech the noble Lord did fire a very general broadside against the Government and all their advisers, and against their Colonial policy, their air policy and their military policy. There was almost nothing which he did not criticize, and the impression which I had was that he thought there were many scapegoats who ought to be exposed.
LORD ADDISON: So I do.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: If the object were merely to find scapegoats, it would be a very wasteful employment of time, because the only result would be that we should divert from their proper functions in time of war many important and eminent people who ought to be working hard to win the war. I accept the statement, however, that that is not the noble Lord's object. I understand that what he really wants, and what other noble Lords want, is, to put it quite simply, to get at the facts. In this they are absolutely at one with His Majesty's Government. We also are only too anxious to get at the facts, just as they are. But that is exactly the point at
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which we come up against our main difficulty. I must maintain—because it is the absolute truth—that material facts for a full-dress inquiry are not available at the present time. Noble Lords who have spoken have quoted a number of facts which are available, but that is not the point; we must also see that there are material facts which are not available, but which are necessary in order to arrive at a conclusion. That is the position at the present time. We have had inquiries in the past, where the facts were available. In the case of the Dardanelles inquiry, for instance, the campaign was completed and all the facts were available. That, however, is not the position at the present time.
I do not pretend for a moment that we have had mo reports from Malaya. Noble Lords know perfectly well that we have had reports. In fact, my predecessor, Lord Moyne, quoted some of them in various debates in this House. But these reports are incomplete for the purposes of a Royal Commission or of a full-dress inquiry, and they are also in many respects, as must be the case, conflicting. The noble Lord, Lord Addison, quoted in his speech a large number of instances—he read a very moving letter, and quoted from the newspapers—which are all on the same side, giving the impression of incompetence, inefficiency, lack of foresight, and so on. It would be quite possible to produce an equal number giving exactly the opposite impression. I do not know whether noble Lords saw in the Daily Telegraph the other day the account given by a woman who came away by the last boat from Singapore, and who said it was quite untrue that people there were dancing and leading a social life up to the last; on the contrary, they were all strenuously engaged in war work.
What I want to convey to the House is that the information which we have had is fragmentary and not adequate for enabling a full-dress inquiry to come to proper conclusions. So far as Singapore is concerned, we really have no official information yet. The Prime Minister has said so in another place, and it is still true. I have been asked about a report from General Gordon Bennett. The Government themselves took the initiative in asking General Gordon Bennett for a complete report, but that report has not

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yet arrived. I say that merely to explain that the Government are not so supine in this matter as the noble Lord seems to think.
LORD WINSTER: Has General Wavell made any report?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: General Wavell may have made a report, but I am coming to that point in a moment. The noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, says, in effect, "We want an inquiry to show us immediately and finally the cause of the dreadful surrender in Singapore." That is just the thing which no inquiry at the present time could possibly give us, because the information is not there.
LORD WEDGWOOD: You could censure the surrender.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: That is not the subject under discussion, nor is it what the noble Lord said in his speech. He did not say that we should censure it; he said that we should find out the reasons for it by inquiry.
LORD ARNOLD: Would it be possible to start the inquiry and, by the time it had gone a certain distance, other information would be available?
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I am afraid that in that case it would probably have to be a very long inquiry.
LORD ARNOLD: I agree.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I do not think that it is much good beginning an inquiry and then having to wait weeks and months, and possibly years, until the essential information is to hand. That is the position. Moreover, I should like to say this. There has been a kind of suggestion that no inquiries are already going on, that nothing is being inquired into at all. That is not the case. So far as we have reports of the campaign, scanty and imperfect though they be, they are, of course, the subject of expert inquiry and consideration directly they come in by our technical advisers of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the Chiefs of Staff.
LORD WINSTER: They are inquiring into their own defence.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: They arc the experts, and they are inquiring into a subject into which they are qualified to
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inquire. There seems to be an impression among noble Lords that experts must always be distrusted. I have heard people say that experts should sometimes be distrusted, but I have no reason to suppose that these experts are not fully qualified to draw conclusions from the reports which come in, and I think that it is rather, a shocking suggestion to make that they might be moved by such considerations as the noble Lord has in mind.
I have detected, and I suppose that most of your Lordships have detected, in the speeches which we have heard, a suggestion that there is, on the part of the Government and on the part of the Chiefs of Staff and of the military, naval and air experts, no serious attempt to draw conclusions as to what has happened, that they are not really looking into the matter, that they find it inconvenient, that it might be awkward and embarrassing, and that therefore they do not intend to inquire into it. Really, my Lords, that is absurd. It is not only absurd; it is also, if I may say so, very mischievous. It creates the worst impression, both at home and abroad, at a very critical moment in the war. I do not think that the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Addison, was very helpful from the international point of view. He made a violent assault on the Government. He made the strongest attack on them for their lack of forethought and for not providing equipment. He did not balance his case at all. He took no account of the immense difficulties of the situation; he took no account of our commitments in the Middle East or of our commitments to Russia. He must have been well aware of all these things, which have been explained again and again in this House. I think, it he will forgive me for saying so, that his speech was a mischievous speech, and I greatly regret that it should nave been made by a noble Lord occupying his position. If the noble Lord himself and others really think what he said they did, then really they ought to get rid of the Government. If they think they are as incompetent and as untrustworthy as his speech made us appear, he and his friends should turn us out. I do not believe they really want to turn the Government out at the present moment—they may want to, but I do not believe they do.
But, however that may be, I would say once more that there really is no foundation

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for the suggestion that the Government are not attempting to get to the bottom of these things. Every trickle of information that comes in is examined, and is sifted, and the lessons are drawn by the people best qualified to draw them. Many of such inquiries and examinations have already taken place. I think it was the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chat-field, who referred to the "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse." He will no doubt have read the account of the debate on the Naval Estimates in another place, and he will remember that the First Lord said there was no special inquiry. There was a careful investigation on the spot to marshal all the facts that could be obtained, and a report of this is now being examined in the Admiralty from every point of view. That is to say, action has already been taken on the facts available. I asked whether there was anything further I could tell the House on this subject, and I am told that there is nothing further I can tell the noble and gallant Lord at the present time. But I am anxious for him to know that the inquiry is being made and that the facts are now being examined.
LORD CHATFIELD: But that surely was only a partial inquiry into the events in so far as they occurred on the spot.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: Perhaps the noble and gallant Lord will allow me. I am coming to his other point in a minute. As I was saying, these ad hoc inquiries—of a limited character, I quite agree—are already taking place. But of course the procedure and the information necessary for an ad hoc inquiry of that kind are very different from the information and the evidence which are necessary for a Royal Commission, or a full dress inquiry if Lord Addison prefers that phrase. The object of a Royal Commission, as we all know, is to hear the whole story, to obtain by examination of those principally concerned a balanced picture, and to draw balanced conclusions. That was the object of the Dardanelles Commission and other Commissions of the same kind. For that purpose, the Commission must have at its disposal the evidence of the principal actors.
It is suggested that we could call now on my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who was there for a certain time, and on Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, and that we could call
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anyhow for the evidence of General Gordon Bennett. That is perfectly true. But I think, if you were to speak to any of these gentlemen, they would be the first to say that they could only tell half the story, and that their evidence would be of very little value without the evidence of, say, Sir Shenton Thomas and General Perceval and many others who are unhappily at present in enemy hands, and yet whose testimony is really essential if the conclusions which the Commission is to reach are to be conclusions worth having. Then there is General Wavell. I think Lord Winster said we could get the evidence of General Wavell. I should certainly not be prepared at the present time to ask General Wavell to come back here and give evidence before a Royal Commission. He has got far more important things to do than that.
In short, I do not think that the procedure that has been suggested would be fair to the public servants who are involved. The type of letter which was written by a Scottish officer, to which the noble Lord, Lord Addison, referred, makes it the more necessary that these people should have a chance of giving evidence and answering the charges that have been made. And indeed the conclusions of the Commission clearly might be altogether altered by the sort of evidence that is given by the only people who are really qualified to describe what happened at Singapore. I am personally driven to the conclusion—and I think the House must be too—that to hold an inquiry in present circumstances, without the essential witnesses there, really would be nothing but a farce, and I do not think the conclusions reached would be worth the paper on which they were written. The only result would be that later on these essential witnesses would come back and give their evidence, and it might turn out that the conclusions of the Commission had been entirely erroneous.
Into the general question of the merits and demerits of public inquiries, or full-dress inquiries, in war-time, I do not propose to enter to-day. I think it probably would be true to say that they are sometimes useful, and sometimes not. They are of course a purely British institution. I do not think that other nations make use of them in war-time when they have had setbacks, unless perhaps noble Lords would include the Riom trial in that particular category.
LORD HANKEY: The noble Lord will remember Pearl Harbour.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: But Pearl Harbour was a very different situation. If we were in a position to hold a sort of Pearl Harbour inquiry on Singapore, very likely it would be the right thing to do. But Pearl Harbour is still in American hands, and Singapore is not in ours. At any rate that is the only case that I know of where such an inquiry has been held. Practically every country in Europe has had serious setbacks in this war. The Germans had a setback in the Battle of Britain—a certainly unexpected and very disastrous setback—yet no one would have suggested that the German Government should have an impartial inquiry. And the same applies to the Italian Government after Marshal Graziani's defeat. And another case: the Russian Government at the beginning of the Russo-German war had very serious setbacks. They were driven out of White Russia, they were driven out of the Ukraine, but there was, so far as I know, no question of a public inquiry by the Russian Government.
And what is the reason? Surely nobody thinks that the Russian General Staff, and the German General Staff, and the Italian General Staff did not want to face the facts, because they wished to delay and to conceal facts from themselves or anybody else. That is not the truth. In all probability the reasons which inspire other countries were these. The first one is that they do not want, to give anything away to the enemy. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, says that that argument is overdone. Possibly it may be overdone; but still there is a considerable element of truth in it. Secondly, they do not want to take the time of very important people who ought to be getting on with more urgent things. That was the point made by Lord Hankey when he described his own, experiences over the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia Commissions. And, thirdly—and this is possibly the main reason—they do not want to divert the attention of their public opinion from the paramount object of getting on with the war. They want their people to look forward; they do not want them to be perpetually looking back.
As I say, I do not want to dogmatize about such considerations. In the pre
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sent case they are indeed academic, because in the particular instance which we have in mind, the case of Singapore, there is an overriding consideration, and that is the very simple one that we have not got the facts and we have not got the evidence. Somebody—I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood—mentioned a post-mortem. Well, you cannot have a post-mortem of any kind unless you have got a body, and to-day we have not got the body. In the future, when the evidence is available—it may be a short time, it may be a long time—there may be a very good case for setting up an inquiry or Royal Commission. I am not saying that in no circumstances should you have an inquiry into this question: I am only saying that to have it now would be a farce, and a futile farce at that. It is for that reason, and not for any other, that the Government regret that they are at present not able to accede to the proposal of the noble Lord, and I feel sure that they will have the good sense of the House to support them in this decision.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, every one of us must have listened with a good deal of surprise to the exceedingly irrelevant speech of the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, in reply to this Motion. I never attacked the Government. I mentioned five matters affecting the loss of Singapore which should be inquired into. I do not regret doing so. My only regret is that it evoked the speech to which we have just listened. I am afraid that the noble Viscount, as was pointed out by the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, really does not appreciate how the British people view this matter. I regard it as the most terrible disgrace that has ever befallen British arms. There has never been anything like it. What is the good of the noble Lord trying to get away with it by saying that all the material facts are not available? I know they are not available. I should think they never will be, because, unfortunately, some of those who are acquainted with them will be dead.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: I did not say material facts, but many of the essential facts are not available.
LORD ADDISON: There are facts available on all five matters I mentioned.

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There is no doubt whatever as to that. The matters mentioned excluded deliberately the group of facts which could only be ascertained from prisoners of war, but there were other vital matters essential to a consideration of this matter which I suggested should be the subject of inquiry now. I am sorry that, as far as I heard, the noble Lord did not adduce a single reason why any of these five vital matters should not be inquired into.
The scope of the considerations I raised was very much enlarged by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, which was dwelt upon by Lord Chatfield. I think, myself, they touched on extraordinarily vital matters—perhaps at the root of the difficulty. I am glad they did, because some of these matters will come up for consideration. As I was sitting here, an exchange of reminiscences took place between my noble friend Viscount Cecil of Chelwood and myself. Both of us had first-hand knowledge—I for a long time—as to how Mr. Lloyd George's War Cabinet system worked. I do not say it was perfect, but I do say this, and I think the noble Viscount will agree with me. Under the Cabinet system then working—which was a War Cabinet, in fact—in the way matters were deliberated, with its review over the Air service, as it would be now, though it was not so much then, over naval and military considerations, and all other considerations required and provided, I do not believe that the disaster of Singapore could have occurred. I do not, honestly. Therefore the consideration of the War Cabinet is very material to the issue, and I am glad the noble Lord raised it.
I know there has been no support for the particular form of inquiry I recommended. I do not mind that a bit. The thing I do want is that there should be an inquiry of some kind, and I do entreat the noble Lord to try and get his colleagues in the Government to view this matter as I am sure the British people view it, as was expressed with great force by the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry. It is a terrible business, and they will gain public confidence, they will help the successful prosecution of the war, by facing up to this thing. I entreat them not to persist in their present attitude. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.
LORD DAVIES: My Lords, I beg to ask the question standing in my name.
[The question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government, if they will make available in the Library copies of all leaflets and other propaganda material dropped by the Royal Air Force or distributed by other means in enemy territory.]
LORD TEMPLEMORE: I have been asked to reply. The answer is in the negative. His Majesty's Government do not regard publicity in these matters as desirable.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932:

  URBAN DISTRICT OF FORMBY ORDER.
  LORD TEMPLEMORE: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend the Duke of Devonshire, I beg to move that this Order be approved.
  Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department under the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, and laid before the House on Wednesday last, be approved.—(Lord Templemore.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

R.A.F. TARGETS.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I beg to ask the question standing on the Paper in my name.
[The question was as follows:
To ask His Majesty's Government, if they are aware that it was announced by the British Broadcasting Corporation in their news bulletin that on the night following the escape of the "Scharnhorst," "Gheisenau" and "Prinz Eugen" from Brest, and when they were approaching Wilhelmshaven, or other German port in the Heligoland Bight, attacks were made by British bombing aircraft on the inland towns of Cologne and Aachen; if this statement in the news bulletin was true; if so, whether there were technical reasons against changing the target for the German

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North Sea naval ports; and whether this matter was inquired into by the Committee under Mr. Justice Bucknill's chairmanship.]
LORD SNELL: My Lords, the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau" and "Prinz Eugen" passed through the Channel on the day of February 12. No attack was made on Cologne and Aachen during the night February 12–13, nor did the B.B.C. news bulletins on the 13th announce that an attack had taken place. These towns were attacked on the night February 13–14, and this was announced by the B.B.C. on February 14. The rest
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of the noble Lord's question does not therefore arise.

BUDE GAS ORDER, 1942.

  TORQUAY GAS ORDER, 1942.
  Report from the Special Orders Committee, That no Petitions have been presented praying to be heard against the Special Orders, and that there is nothing in these Orders to which they think it necessary to call the attention of the House: Read, and ordered to lie on the Table.
  House adjourned.