§ LORD STRABOLGI rose to call attention to the defence of India's Eastern Frontier; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I crave your permission to move the Motion standing in my name. I would say at the outset that the few observations which I shall venture to offer on the defence of India's Eastern Frontier will not include any sort of suggestions of constitutional reforms in India, or indeed anything political at all if I can help it. I understand that the mountains are in labour on this subject and if Sir Stafford Cripps is the midwife, or perhaps better still the gynæcologist, the results may be not altogether unsatisfactory. The whole question of the defence of India is very urgent. We cannot wait for mountains to labour. It is an occasion for hoping that the volcano will erupt and that something will be done very soon to meet a situation which everyone will recognize as one of great urgency. It will be generally conceded, I believe, that under modern war conditions the more advanced defensive positions can be the better. We see that in the action of the United States in taking time by the 171 forelock in acquiring British territories in the Atlantic for use as bases, and we are seeing further examples of the same thing in the Pacific at the present time. Of course the best main defences of the Eastern Frontier of India are obviously in Burma.
§ I must ask, in passing, as the result of a conversation which I had with my noble friend Lord Londonderry, why, when it was known or must have been recognized how hazardous it was to attempt a long defence of Singapore, was not the 18th Division which was passing Burma not long before the fall of Singapore diverted to Rangoon or, as I would have preferred it, landed at Tavoy to make a counter attack on the Japanese lines of communication instead of being sent to Singapore. Once the Johore Hills had gone it must have been clear that any further effort to hold out in Singapore would, I believe I am right in assuming, have been a very hazardous and doubtful operation.
§ Nevertheless there is a great campaign now in progress in Burma. The names of the British and Indian regiments which are taking part have been published, and therefore I am not giving away any military secrets when I say that, with ancillaries, there are eight battalions engaged in holding the Sittang river on its southern banks. I am not referring to the Chinese troops, and I am not going to speak of them further to-day. But if what I have stated is the case there are only about 8,000 rifles, using the old terminology, available for holding a very long valley. The difficulty is perhaps that of reinforcement, and this brings me to the other question connected with the defence of Eastern India, the absence of roads between India and Burma. The noble Duke who is going to reply for the India Office will, I know, not deny that it is a great pity that these roads were not built in the past. There was undoubtedly a lack of foresight. For some years now the India Office and the War Office have recognized that there was a problem connected with the North-Eastern Frontier of India as well as one connected with the North-Western Frontier but they did little or nothing to meet the peril in the east. These roads have been lacking. I understand that the matter has been taken in hand. I do not press for details, but I hope we are not relying on the old 172 P.W.D. methods for completing these roads, and that we are enlisting the aid of modern engineers with the most modern road-making equipment to carry out the work. There is equipment nowadays which can drive roads through the most difficult country with what to an older generation would have seemed incredible speed. There is no excuse at all for not using this machinery and for not employing the great reserve of labour which is available for completing these roads.
§ The other difficulty arises owing to the necessity of re-orientating the main defensive scheme of India from the North-West to the North-Eastern Frontier. That is difficult, and I am sure all my noble friends here, and certainly myself, are ready and willing to make all allowances, for we realize that it will take time. In these circumstances India may have to fight for the defence of her lands on her own soil, and what is worrying some of my noble friends and myself is whether this fact has been recognized and the necessary steps are being taken. May I put the matter quite bluntly? If that should happen, if India is actually invaded from the sea or over the mountains or through Chittagong, is India to be another Malaya with the vast bulk of the population acting as spectators, or is she to be another China with the manhood of the nation crushing and devouring the invader wherever he may be found at a disadvantage? That is the problem that is troubling our minds. Anticipating the reply which is to be given I may say that I know quite well what the noble Duke is going to say. He will say there is a shortage of weapons. We have been hearing that for the last two or three years, and I would like to make these observations upon that defence which I well know will come from any Government Department whenever it is in trouble or it is being criticized. The answer is always the same, and in this case I think that there are certain reservations which ought to be made.
§ In China the Japanese very rapidly, at the beginning of the campaign, occupied all the industrial districts, all the manufacturing districts, and where the Chinese are holding out now is in an area which used to be the Wild West of China. They had to carry the machine tools and the plant and machinery for the factories into 173 the present districts where they are manufacturing weapons. And the Chinese are manufacturing weapons very well and in great quantities, and they are also helping us now in Burma with these weapons, I am very glad to say. They are making their own machine guns, their own rifles—and your Lordships will have heard stories about how many years it takes to make a rifle factory—and their own trench mortars. We all know of the admirable work done by the Sir Alexander Roger Committee in India some two years ago, and we have heard a great deal about efforts which have been made for manufacturing topees, uniforms, toots and, no doubt, light weapons. The information which reaches me, however, is that not nearly enough vigour has been shown in arranging for the manufacture of fighting weapons, killing weapons for the use of the troops and the population in the defence of India's soil.
§ I hope the cause is not the same as that which led to the refusal of the offer of a Chinese foundry firm in Singapore to make hand grenades. That offer was made in 1940, but they were not allowed to make hand grenades, the reason being that the Chinese were not supposed to be politically reliable. And so this offer was turned down. I hope that that is not the case now in India. I hope that ideas dating from the Indian Mutiny, which never seems to be forgotten in connexion with Indian affairs are not preventing the "democratization"—if I may use that term very loosely—of arms manufacturing in India. Your Lordships know that there is a big craftsman industry of metal workers in India, and the weapons which are made—not firearms, of course, nowadays—are of very high workmanship indeed. I should think that the Indian smiths, if they were mobilized for the purpose of making' parts which would later be assembled to make trench mortars or other weapons—even Tommy guns which are not difficult to manufacture—could make all the various pieces which are required.
§ My noble friend Lord Wedgwood has suggested that what is required to-day, immediately, is the formation of an Indian Home Guard, and I dare say that suggestion fluttered a good many dovecotes just as the formation of a Home Guard in this country fluttered a good many 174 dovecotes here. I hope that he will not mind my adopting his phraseology. Why should not we encourage the formation of an Indian Home Guard? The noble Duke will say that we have not the weapons with which to arm them. We had not the weapons with which to arm the Home Guard in this country when it was formed; the Home Guard went about with armlets and, in some cases, with one rifle to ten men. Indeed, I lent my shotguns to the Home Guard, and there were men guarding vital points all over the country with shotguns. A man with a shotgun at close range is a very dangerous opponent. We did not have pikes in those days; my noble friend Lord Croft had not then brought out his great idea of arming the Home Guard with pikes; but we did have lethal weapons. The chief value of the Home Guard, however, was psychological; give a man any sort of weapon in time of danger and his spirit is fortified immediately. I know the effect in my own factory in Coventry of having arms on the premises, when we formed our own Home Guard and mounted machine guns on the roof and fired at enemy aeroplanes The good effect on the workmen and on the women workers was extraordinary. The noble Lord, Lord Croft, knows perfectly well that the Home Guard was a great steadying influence in this country. I venture to say that the same thing would happen in India.
§
The noble Duke knows quite well that there are many more arms in India than is generally supposed. When a tiger begins to be too bold in killing buffaloes, it is extraordinary to see how many firearms are produced when the farmers turn out to destroy it. There is a very large number of arms in India; the police wink at them, because the farmers need them for the protection of their herds, and for use to protect themselves against dacoits and so on. There are many more arms in India than is generally supposed, in spite of the laws passed to prevent people having arms. I should like, if I may, to quote two statements which have appeared in the newspapers in the last few days, and which show that Indians of the political classes are thinking along the lines which I am now trying to put before your Lordships. Mr. Rajagopalachariar, a former Premier of Madras, a man who is often quoted by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, and who carries a great
175
deal of weight in India, said on February 27 last:
If the whole of India rises to a man with patriotic fervour, backed up by the military power of Britain, no power on earth can invade India—much less conquer her.
That is what I am trying to say, and I think that that statement by this prominent Indian Congress Leader should receive an instant response.
§
Even more interesting is a statement which I quote from this morning's Daily Herald, a very reliable source:
The Working Committee of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha at Lucknow called for the organization of an Indian militia and the relaxation of the Arms Act, so that Indians could resist an invader. … The All-India Azad Moslem Board made similar recommendations at New Delhi.
§ The Hindu Mahasabha speaks for that large section of Hindus who have a philosophical objection to the bearing of arms, as well as for many Hindus who have not. I think that that is very satisfactory. The Indian people are not only alarmed at the approach of the enemy to their gates, but at any rate some of their leaders are prepared to lead resistance to the invader. By giving arms to the people of India and by creating a Home Guard movement there a great deal can be done. Leaving aside the peoples who are definitely not of the military castes, how many men could you raise? Twenty millions? The difference between a man with a rifle or even a shot gun in his hands and an unarmed man is the difference between a man defending his own land against infiltrating parachutists and a helpless fugitive. I have no doubt at all as to what we ought to do in these circumstances.
§ To-day wars are fought not with lethal weapons alone; political warfare is most important. The Japanese, and I see now the Germans as well, are engaged in a very violent campaign of propaganda in India. The Japanese cry or slogan is "Asia for the Asiatics." We have been hearing about it for some years; I heard it in Burma when I was there three years ago, and it manages to attract a certain amount of attention. It is most easily countered, and I do hope that the Government of India and the Government at home are concentrating upon a very powerful counter-propaganda, using the wireless and every other means of rousing public opinion against this Japanese 176 slogan. It is the easiest slogan in the world to counter; all that you have to do is to tell the cold truth about what "Asia for the Asiatics" means when Japan overruns a conquered territory. You have only to tell India—and it ought to be told throughout the Far East and in Africa as well—what happened in China when the Japanese Armies conquered a Province.
§ LORD WEDGWOODAnd Korea.
LORD STRABOLGIThen you have what these barbarous people have done in the Philippines, not only to the Americans but to the Filipinos, such as the tying up of High Court Judges in the streets and their public flogging—this will appeal to the Lord Chancellor!—because they would not support the Japanese invader, the outraging of the women, the slaughter of helpless civilians, and the bombing of Manila again and again after it had been declared an open town and all the defences and guns moved away, with the destruction of the ancient historical and religious monuments in the old Spanish city. These barbarians led the way in the bombing of open towns; they were doing it even before the Nazis began committing atrocities of the same kind in Spain. The Japanese were the first to do it; they did it in China as a deliberate act of terrorism. We talk of them as aping the Nazis, but they were the forerunners of the Nazis in what they did in Asia. We have only to tell the Indian people this, and especially the religious-minded Indians, and the response must be instant.
The other line that we should take is to point out what conditions are like in Japan itself. Many of your Lordships know Japan, and will bear me out when I say that the poverty and degradation of the masses in Japan are appalling. There is a vast and most dangerous underground proletarian movement in Japan; given one real setback to the Japanese Armies, there will be an uprising of the crushed masses in Japan and the present misrulers of that country will get their deserts. Then there is the corruption of Japanese rule in the conquered territories. Behind the Armies come the camp-followers, the adventurers, the scoundrels who set up opium dens and brothels, and the men who engage in drug-peddling, all with the connivance of the Japanese High Command, who share the proceeds with them. That 177 has happened in China, in Korea, in Formosa and everywhere else where the Japanese have gone. Wherever the flag of the Rising Sun flies, underneath its shade are these pillagers and corrupters everywhere. You have only to tell these things in India, and the cry of "Asia for the Asiatics" will fall on ears as deaf as those of the 490,000,000 people of China.
Let us also remind India of her past history. India has been conquered again and again, always for the same reason: because when the conqueror came India was disunited, and it was possible for the conqueror to play off one section against the other. That is India's history, and the Indians themselves knew it; they only need to be reminded of it. We did not conquer India; we infiltrated into India, and we were welcomed by large numbers of Indians because a gap had been left by the fall of the Moguls, and we were able to restore order and the machinery of government. But, for the same reason, the fall of the Moguls had left a disunited India, and that is why 150 years ago the British were able to take the place of the dying dynasty. Those are the things, I suggest, which we should be using now as the counter to this hollow cry of "Asia for the Asiatics."
I for one, from the little that I know of India, have no doubt whatever of the response of India's manhood. But give them arms. A slave, to be free, must draw the sword himself. The mark of the free man to-day is the right to bear arms in the defence of his own country. The Japanese military successes, I am informed by those who have recently returned, are due to their soldiers being like a swarm of ants. You kill two hundred or three hundred of them and a thousand still come on. Very well, the best way, perhaps, to defeat a swarm of ants is by another swarm of ants; and if this swarm reaches India let there be a swarm of armed Indians in every Province and district prepared to do what the Chinese masses have done. The 390,000,000 Indians and the 490,000,000 Chinese, united geographically, could also be united as a great force of resistance. The Japanese ambition to dominate all Asia will be checked completely and they know it, and they will recognize defeat the moment that new state of affairs arises. I beg to move.
§ LORD WEDGWOODMy Lords, I hope I shall not be misunderstood if I say that what we need in India is a right-about face—a right-about face as regards the Frontier to be defended and a right-about face so far as our attitude in the past towards the Indians is concerned. If we are to save India from the Japanese we have to trust the Indians instead of distrusting them; we have to use our Armies on the Frontier instead of as a garrison in the country; we have to remember that the loss of India is not only our loss but also the loss of the Indian peoples. I think we might also adopt a right-about face so far as military tactics are concerned. I cannot help thinking that the habit of ever defending has got to be changed if we are to win this war, and the policy of attack from India on the Japanese Armies is only possible if we have behind us in India an armed people, not merely anxious, not merely capable, but willing to defend that country side by side with us.
The speeches quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, from Mr. Rajagopalachariar and from the Indian Mahasabha are extremely interesting as representing a complete change in the opinions of the Congress Party and of the non-Congress Mahasabha. We must remember that Mr. Rajagopalachariar was Congress Prime Minister of the Madras Province, and resigned office two years ago because the Congress at that time would have nothing to do with helping to govern the country, for reasons into which I need not go, but which never seemed to be very pertinent. Anyhow, Mr. Rajagopalachariar is a leader of the Congress Party and you could not have anything more enthusiastic, more clear-cut, than his statement as to the attitude towards the defence of that country against the Japanese at the present time. As for the Hindu Mahasabha, that was a body which was always more or less opposed to Congress, principally because it was pre-eminently anti-Moslem. I think it is a great step in advance when you have a thoroughly pacifist party—they are the Quakers of India—coming out with this strong statement of the need for defending their country.
We want a right-about face also so far as concerns that somewhat out-of-date idea as to who are the fighting races 179 of India. I am sure that all your Lordships have heard over and over again that the fighting races of India are only to be found in the northern part, in what the Mahomedans call Pakistan—in the Punjab with the Mahomedans of Bengal and the United Provinces—and that the people of southern India are useless as fighters. I do not think it is necessary to divide India into any two such categories. It is not physical characteristics which matter so much at the present time as whether their hearts are in the right place. And there is no doubt that the south of India from which Mr. Rajagopalachariar comes are quite as much moved in this matter as the northern Provinces. Indeed they have more to lose than have the Mahomedans. If you cast your minds back in history you will recollect that the great victories of Lord Clive, Arcot and Plassey, were carried out by his Sepoy Army, raised entirely in the south of India; they were Madrassis that won those marvellous victories under Clive's generalship. And even recently they had some Madras regiments—which may have been disbanded now for all I know—with a great reputation in the annals of the Army of India.
I do not think we should make these distinctions. We weaken our hold upon India by making them. We weaken it because the main charge against Great Britain in India has always been that we have attempted to divide and rule, to divide the Mahomedans from the Hindus and thereby sit in an uneasy saddle balanced between the two forces. The sooner we clear the mind of India of the idea that we wish to govern that country by dividing it the better. And there is no better way of giving this evidence to India and to the world of a complete change of heart—a change to confidence in the Indian people—than by allowing each Province, as independently of the Central Government as possible, to form its own local defence, its own Home Guard. I believe that the mere institution of that body, without arming it at all, would set the match to a patriotic enthusiasm which is more needed for the winning of battles than equipment. I believe that you would have each taluk with its own Home Guard, just as you have each village in this country with its own Home Guard, armed, as were our own Home Guard at the beginning, with 180 what shotguns they could raise. In my own village they armed themselves with knuckledusters and with other things the police do not allow—a lump of lead on the end of a piece of wire. That is a most efficient weapon if you get your man in the dark—better than your pike—but they are both useful, believe me. What you want is to have the people organized and enthused. If you can do that by getting the help of the Congress people, and switching the politicians from politics, which lead nowhere, to the defence of their country, which may lead to the freedom not only of themselves but of the whole world, you will have done a great work, and you will find it worth while to have organized this Home Guard. What is the population of India? At present it is 388,000,000 people—far larger than the population of China.
§ LORD WEDGWOODChina as it is today. A far larger population, if you exclude Manchuria and Mongolia; a population twice as large as that of the whole Soviet Union, and a population which has now got the knife at its throat. The noble Lord quoted what the Japanese have done in China. My memory goes back to what they did in Korea and what they did in Formosa. Indian dislike to being ruled by these people is such that they will hold us guilty if we do not allow them to defend themselves and yet fail to defend them. I do not see any possibility whatever of the British Army in India as it is to-day, or as it will be six months hence, being sufficient to defend that country. I do not see any possibility of saving India, even if we raise Home Guards, unless these Home Guards are there to act as guerrillas behind the Japanese lines just as the Russians are operating behind the German lines. This total war is not a war of the front line. It is a war of infiltration on both sides of the fighting line, on both sides of the contending Armies.
Of that population of 388,000,000 you have at least 50,000,000 capable of being organized either for the Army or for the factories and workshops. We have hitherto prevented the development of Indian industries. We have got to make a right-about face on that point also. We have got to do everything in our power to encourage the development of industries particularly on the western side of India. 181 Unfortunately, if we look at the map, we find that the main centres of war production in India are on the line of any Japanese advance. It is not enough to say that we have a steelworks in India which is now producing 1,500,000 tons of steel a year. That is only one-fifth of what we are producing in this country. It is not enough to say we are assembling tanks or even making the armour for tanks in India. We know that the machinery has got to come overseas—across seas which are now in the hands of the Japanese Navy.
You have got to start afresh in India, to change your minds about the Indian people, to welcome their assistance, to get rid of the Blimpish ideas that have separated the English from the Indians throughout the last hundred years. Honestly I do not see how it can be done in any other way save by this open and visible sign of asking for their armed cooperation through a Home Guard. The only chance of getting full co-operation, even then, is to get by some means the assistance of the Chinese in inspiring the organization. We all know that in starting any Home Guard the difficulty is not one of getting equipment but of getting people to train them. It might be possible, if people cannot be spared from the Indian Army, to get them from the Chinese Army; they have a remarkable facility for learning languages. It is not enough to have co-operation between English people and Indian people to win this war. We have to get the co-operation of the Chinese and the Russians also. It is no longer our war. It is no longer a question for us of keeping India. It is a war for all the peoples who desire to remain free, and if it helps in that struggle to get drill sergeants from Soviet Russia, from Chiang Kai-shek or from America—get Mahomedans training Hindus and Sikhs training Mahomedans—by all means let us do it in order that we may get an efficient result, and in order that we may cement an alliance between free peoples which may endure when the war is won.
§ LORD CATTOMy Lords, I had not intended to intervene in this debate. I have not the eloquence of the noble Lord who has just sat down, but as I listened to my noble friend Lord Strabolgi and to the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, on the subject of India, I was amazed at 182 my own ignorance. It so happens that I spent a good many years of my life in that country. It so happens that I and my friends have at the present moment great interests there, and I confess I have not the same pessimism as has been running through the speeches of the two noble Lords. Your Lordships will agree that I have not been sparing in my criticism of the Government on political questions, and if this debate had been on the question of India's Constitution I would have taken part in it with more pleasure than I am taking part in this debate.
This is a debate on the defence of India. Surely the defence of India is not a matter for debate in your Lordships' House. It is a matter for action. Whatever our strength, whatever our weakness, it is a matter for our military leaders at the present time. It is for us to back them up. It is not for us to talk as if, as the noble Lord suggested a few minutes ago, we thought it was possible to lose India. That is the last thought that should be in any of our minds. The enemy is in Burma, a very sad and very unfortunate fact, but Rangoon is 800 miles from Calcutta; and we have had the enemy within thirty miles of our coast for two years and we have not lost heart. I venture to say that my friends in India, Indian and European, at the present moment have not lost heart, and have far less pessimism about the present military position than some noble Lords who have spoken here.
§ THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE)My Lords, if I answer the noble Lord who has introduced this motion with extreme brevity I hope that he will not suspect me of being either discourteous to him or unmindful of the extreme gravity of the situation. It is quite impossible for anyone who sits most of his days with a large-scale map of Burma and Bengal immediately before his eyes, to be unmindful of the gravity of the situation. But we have quite recently had a debate in this House on the political aspects of the Indian situation, and it is quite clearly undesirable for me to anticipate the statement which is expected in the course of a few days from the Prime Minister in reply to a letter addressed to him by the thirteen Moderates in India. I really cannot say anything on that 183 aspect of this question, and I think your Lordships will agree it is in the highest degree undesirable that I should say anything whatever about the military aspects of this problem.
Noble Lords opposite have no particular responsibility, but even so I cannot help thinking that things have been said this afternoon from the Benches opposite which had very much better have been left unsaid, and I am not going to say anything which might give the smallest information to the enemy. I can say that the Government of India, who are of course responsible for India's defence, with the Commander-in-Chief, are fully conscious of the fact that the defence of Burma is essential for our own security, and from the moment that Burma was threatened India has been sending to Burma every man who could be spared after meeting India's already very large commitments. I would remind noble Lords that India is already making a very large contribution indeed to the campaign in the Middle East, in Iraq, in Persia, she is having to bear a part in the defence of Ceylon, and she has sustained heavy losses in Malaya. India is exerting herself to the utmost to stem the invasion of Burma, and to maintain that vital link with China. Chinese forces are also advancing and are now co-operating from the north-east in the very important, the very vital campaign in Burma.
The Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, and the other authorities in India have recently had the very great advantage of conferring about measures affecting the common defence of India, China and Burma, with the Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who visited India for that purpose. As your Lordships will have seen in to-day's papers, Sir Archibald Wavell has now returned from Java to India. He returned too late to have the advantage of meeting General Chiang Kai-shek on this occasion, but he had previously visited him at Chungking and there is the closest liaison. I am also able to tell your Lordships that arrangements are actually in progress by which India will have a representative in China and China in India, and, as India is already represented in Washington, the link between India, China and America 184 is thus made a very much closer one than it was before.
I would say a few words about the situation in Burma. It is extremely grave, I will not deny that for one moment, but I should like to pay a tribute to the really magnificent way in which the Governor has led and inspired the defence. The Portfolio of Defence in Burma is still in the Governor's hands, and the Governor is responsible; but since the outbreak of hostilities, and indeed before, when hostilities were threatened, the Governor has actively associated the Government with the war effort and has daily been in consultation with the Prime Minister there. The Governor, by his action in the whole field of administration, has given inspiration to the troops and to the civil population, and has played a great part. I should like to take this opportunity of paying a tribute to his very inspiring example, which has been of very great value and has contributed greatly to the heroic defence of our troops.
Many of your Lordships have been in Burma, but to those who have not it is hard to imagine how much our troops have to contend with. The climate is an extremely enervating one, so that to walk a mile even in the lightest of civilian clothing is quite a considerable undertaking, while to fight with all the equipment required by modem conditions and to sleep, as soldiers under field conditions inevitably have to do, without mosquito nets, exposed to the debilitating effects induced by the various insects, make conditions very much worse than anything experienced on the Western Front in the last war. In the circumstances the defence of our troops has been nothing short of heroic. I would also refer to the very remarkable results which have been achieved up to now by the relatively small forces of the Royal Air Force and by the American Volunteer Group, in repulsing frequent and of late almost constant raids by the Japanese. Exact figures are hard to come by, but I can tell your Lordships that on the 25th and 26th February fifty-one enemy aircraft were accounted for with the loss of only two of our own, and that, including our successes on those two days, it is calculated that no fewer than 160 Japanese aircraft have been accounted for. Those are losses which the Japanese have suffered in raids over Burma or Rangoon, 185 and those figures do not include any losses which may have been inflicted by us either on enemy aircraft on the ground or in the course of our raids over enemy-occupied territory. In a picture which is a dark one we should take note of that very striking success which has been achieved.
Further than this I am unable to go. Responsibility for India's defence rests with the Commander-in-Chief and I think we are all glad to know that General Wavell has returned to India. The interesting, and some of them no doubt valuable, suggestions which have been made in the course of this debate I will pass on to the proper authorities. Further than that I am not prepared to go at the present time. The noble Lord opposite also referred to the question of political warfare. There I can give him a very definite assurance that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State and the Government of India are not only fully alive to the importance of countering Japanese propaganda and Fifth Column activity, but that they have taken and will continue to develop a positive and constructive line through the various publicity and propaganda methods, including broadcasting, which are available. There again the noble Lord will not expect me to go into detail, which doubtless the enemy would be glad to have, but as he is; clearly interested I should be ready to furnish him privately with any further information and to have a private talk with him on this subject as to the possible line on which the offensive can be carried on. I think your Lordships will agree with me that it is most undesirable that I should say more in public. My answer has necessarily been very perfunctory and I apologize to the House for not going into greater detail. Your Lordships, I hope, will know that that is not clue to discourtesy or to any failure to realize the great gravity of the situation, but is due to the necessity of not doing anything which might lead to undesirable results.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERYMy Lords, I should like to be allowed to intervene on two very small points. While I agree that the Governor has done wonderful work, I must point out that there is a General in command of these troops. Yet as my noble friend Viscount Trenchard said on a recent occasion, 186 senior officers are rarely mentioned. Surely we might have the General's name mentioned. It is the General and not a civilian who inspires troops. If they are inspired by a fine spirit that is largely due to the man who leads them. Secondly I would like to inquire, what is the point of mentioning the hardships that our troops are undergoing. That cuts both ways. The Japanese are not a hot-weather race and they do not do well in hot weather. That is one of the reasons why they are not welcomed and why they have not done well in northern Australia. If our troops are handicapped so also must be the enemy troops who are no more used to these conditions than a great number of our own troops.
§ THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIREI am very much indebted to the noble and gallant Earl for having called attention to this matter. I had not the slightest intention to leave out General Hutton, who has proved himself a most magnificent soldier, nor was there any intention whatever of casting a slur upon him. Under his command our troops are doing magnificently. I as a political chief rather naturally referred to the Governor, because he is responsible not only for the defence of the country but for civilian morale and for the maintenance of essential services without which the troops could not remain in action. It was not my intention to leave out General Hutton, who has done, and is doing, quite magnificently.
LORD STRABOLGIMy Lords, I do not complain at all of the noble Duke's reply. It was too short, as all his speeches are, but there was plenty of substance in it and really as much as I expected. I do not say that in any cynical way. Before I withdraw I would like to refer to one matter which my noble friend Lord Catto raised. I am afraid he misunderstood me. I was not suggesting that the people of India or our own countrymen in Indian are defeatists. I never suggested that. It is because I do not think they are defeatists that I want them given a chance of defending themselves and obliterating any invaders who dare enter India. I am sure my noble friend did not wish to misinterpret me.
§ LORD CATTOI do not think that any of my remarks indicated that. What I did say was that the remarks of the 187 noble Lord seemed to imply that we at home were adopting that attitude.
LORD STRABOLGII did not intend to imply that either. Before we lose India we shall have something to say in this country. We will change the Government first. My noble friend the Duke of Devonshire paid a well-deserved tribute to the troops fighting in Burma under very critical conditions. I have no intention of belittling their efforts. I think not only our own soldiers but the Indian soldiers, and particularly the Burma Rifles, who are well acclimatized, have done splendid work under very difficult conditions. What I want to see avoided in India is what happened in Rangoon. When the first bombing raid was made on Rangoon the labouring population took to the jungle and disappeared. Rangoon was left with no dock labourers, although the quays were piled with munitions needed for our own troops and needed for transport to China by the Burma Road. We had to bring in Chinese labourers to do the work. I do not want that to happen in India. That is why I want Indians made to realize that they are citizens defending their own country. If there are air raids in India we do not want Calcutta dockers to leave the docks any more than dockers here left the docks at London or Hull. I am 188 very much obliged to the noble Duke and I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
§ Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.