SITUATION IN THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC.

HL Deb 29 January 1942 vol 121 cc529-80

Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved by Lord Denman yesterday—namely, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to the situation in the South-West Pacific.

VISCOUNT TRENCARD

My Lords, this debate has covered a great deal of ground. I am much tempted to follow up some of the points that have been made, especially those made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield. But I think time will not permit, even with the extra clay allowed for this debate, as there are still many in your Lordships' House who I understand are going to speak. I would like to take this opportunity of stating as publicly as I can, certain facts which are to be drawn from our experience in this war and which affect all our operations, including those in the Southern Pacific. The Leader of the House, Lord Moyne, made a statement that I welcome, and I hope that it will be given all the publicity possible, coming as it does from the Leader of this House. Yesterday, in referring to Russia, Britain and the Middle East, he said—if I may be allowed to read one or two lines— In each of these we well knew that the key to success lay in the balance of air power. After making a few other remarks on the same subject the noble Lord said: On every front the provision of necessary air power was a matter of vital importance. At long last has this been publicly stated by a member of the Government. If I read the noble Lord correctly, he means that air power at the present time is the dominant question. Those like myself who saw all the portents very long ago, will welcome the news, for we know that this is a matter which has been so much neglected since 1918.

I was also much interested to hear the noble Lord describe the Japanese landing at places behind our Forces in Malaya and compelling withdrawals. He said that "the west coast of Malaya has hitherto been the main scene of these tactics." Speaking of the Japanese landings, he said that men were landed from sampans all down the coast. He said that the coast consisted largely of swamp, and the sea was shallow, so that the Japanese made use of sampans to the utmost. He then went on to say: Therefore the Navy quickly improvized small boats and armed them to try and deal with this menace. Now in daylight they were at a crippling disadvantage because our small craft had no air protection, whereas the Japanese sampans had been collected all day along that coast from the Kra peninsula and along the mangroves from the west of Malaya. So that was what happened. We ought to have realized that that would take place.

The remarks I am going to make to-day have a very great bearing on the superiority of air power, which though depending a great deal on quantity, depends a great deal on how and where it is used. In fact, I sometimes think quality and how and where it is used are even more important than quantity. I regret that I feel that in this war it has often been used wrongly, or not at all, or not with the relentless driving force with which air power should always be used, and has been used at times. I have said that we do not use it relentlessly, and in saying that I am referring to the offensive power of the air.

I will now turn to the main subject of my speech, which is the reason for the setbacks which we have received in various parts of the earth. I feel that the setback we have received in the Southern Pacific, is due, like many other of our setbacks, to past history, and I am glad to see that my noble friend Lord Hankey is here to-day. Fifteen or sixteen years ago there were people who said even then—and there were people on the Labour Bench who said it—that making Singapore a great naval base would affront the Japanese, and that we should not do it. It was a view which was not very widely held, but it was held, and it was expressed several times in this House. Another reason for the setback, I feel, is that the Army and the Navy and the Government of that day would not agree to what we in the Air Service pressed for very hard— namely, to make Singapore a great air base in peace time. The other two Services wanted big guns to defend Singapore and aeroplane spotters only to spot for them. In other words, they wanted to defend the place in the old way in which ports had been defended for hundreds of years. We wanted it made into an air base, as the best defence, and as it had in it possibilities of great offensive action being taken from that base.

It must also be remembered that when plans for Singapore were made, no one, neither the Air Staff, nor the General Staff, nor the Naval Staff, anticipated for one moment that they would be trying to defend the base for a Navy that was not in any position to stop the free movement of Japanese ships. Nobody dreamt of that for a moment. And it is all very well to criticize what has happened, but nobody dreamt of defending a naval base with no Navy in it, or no Navy that could take on the Japs in those waters. The question of how to defend the base was debated very hotly in those years, but the Government would not decide on these rival views in my time. They were always seeking compromise. There was talk of one gun or two guns, one aeroplane or two aeroplanes. The matter was looked at in small, petty ways, and the question was postponed, though it was decided—so far as my memory goes—to build the dockyard. The question as to how it should be defended was left. With a change of Government all work on the Singapore base was stopped. Again, with the change of Government, it was decided to go ahead, defending it by the old methods. My advice on that subject, which was to defend Singapore by air, was not taken.

The other day, speaking in another place, the Prime Minister, referring to the sinking of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" stated that both ships were sunk by repeated air attacks by bombers and by torpedo aircraft. These attacks were delivered with skill and determination. Further on in the debate, the Prime Minister, in answer to a question, said: I will give a fuller account when full reports have been received, but I do not think that my right honourable and gallant friend ought to be in too great a hurry. Have those full reports been received? It is, I think, well known that some of those who saw the sinkings are in this country. Is there any reason why we should not be told how those sinkings occurred? Will it help the enemy one bit? It would be interesting if the Government, without giving away any information to the enemy, could give us now the facts of what happened.

I am saying this purposely because of the different criticisms I have heard in many quarters of the reason of that setback—and a very great setback it has been. There are certain facts which govern, and will always govern, the use of air power in war, which do not apply to forces which operate by sea or by land. It seems to me that these facts, which are of paramount importance, are still imperfectly understood by many of the most eminent and persevering critics of our combined strategy in this war. Indeed, it appears on occasion that even those whose business it is to advise the actual strategy and military plans do not yet understand the significance of these points, nor the penalties which are bound to be incurred if they are ignored. Yet they are very simple, extraordinarily simple, and once they are grasped it should be impossible to forget them. Many people think that they are technical. Well, I will try not to make them technical this afternoon; I hope to make the matter quite plain, if I can.

Generally speaking, I think the majority of the public feel, and have felt in the past, that our setback in Norway was due to deficiencies in the air, that the Germans used the air more successfully than we did. I think that was felt again over Greece and over Crete. Again they thought the Germans used the air more efficiently and that there was faulty command or organization of our Air Force. Again, in Malaya, some of the public feel that the Air Force did not do what was expected of it. I think it is generally admitted now that no Army or Navy in narrow waters can hope to fight successfully without air cover, without air support, and without obtaining air superiority. I will now state as shortly as I can the three fundamental facts. In the first place—and this is the cardinal truth on which everything hangs—the performance of short-range fighting aircraft, their speed, their rate of climb, their manœuvrability, their armament and hitting power, are superior to those of long-range aircraft, and always will be. Nothing and nobody can ever alter that unless some means can be found of neutralizing the power of gravity. It is not technical, it is simply that the short-rang aircraft can beat the long-range, and it is due to that one thing—gravity—because of the weight of petrol that every machine has to carry for a long distance.

That is the cardinal fact which must be remembered. If it is accepted—and I feel it must be by all—the second fact, arising directly from the first, is that geography plays a far more important part in the conduct of air operations in this war than it does in any form of surface warfare, because of that fact that short-range aircraft can always beat aircraft of longer range. There is nothing like, it in the Navy or in the Army. The geographical location of air bases, both our own and those of the enemy, and particularly the location of our short-range high-performance fighter aircraft, is one of the most important factors to be considered in planning any strategic move by sea or by land. It is not only the number and the quality of aircraft which we possess in any given theatre which counts. It is the position of their available air bases in relation to the operations of our surface forces, and, consequently, their ability to achieve, or at any rate to dispute, the mastery of the air above those surface operations, which is so vitally important. If we can operate our short-range fighters over the vital area and the enemy cannot owing to geography employ his own, neither his heavy bombers nor his torpedo bombers are likely to have any real effect upon our operations If he is able to provide the long-range aircraft with fighter protection, then, though the odds are less favourable, as long as we, too, can operate fighters, we can fight for local air superiority and when we can fight on equal terms with regard to our bases, numbers, though they are important, do not matter.

Surely we have seen in this war what a small force in this country, with our fighter aircraft based properly, can do against overwhelming numbers, and from what I read in the communiqués from Libya last night and from what our pilots are doing day by day there to help the Army and the tanks, it is apparent what can be done by the Air Force when they have got their bases and are fighting with due regard to geography. But if the enemy force us to fight where we cannot get that geographical position—and they can—then the Army, the Navy, the Government and the people must realize what the consequences will be. It may be that sometimes the higher direction of the enemy will choose a theatre, as in Norway, where they can use that lighter protection and we cannot. It is no good blaming anybody then. After all, we have seen in this war what happens when you try to fight without sufficient air superiority or air cover behind the Army and the Navy. The setbacks and victories on both sides in this war have been due chiefly to air power. The Army and Navy in narrow waters cannot fight without that air cover, without that air support and without that air superiority. Of course, the Air Force authorities must draw attention in Council to these facts if knowledge of them seems to be lacking, but after making these facts clear—facts which are recognized as fundamental by the R.A.F.—and their advice or warnings are not followed, then the true responsibility must rest elsewhere.

If you believe what I have said—and I firmly believe that nobody who is well informed can deny it; it is recognized by all—then it means that air must dominate strategy. I do not mean by that that air can win the war without the Army or the Navy. It cannot; but air must dominate strategy. In the past great captains of the military art have tried to choose the battleground. That is not always possible, but I hope that this question of air domination with regard to strategy will be remembered by all, and if I have made any impression at all may I ask you, with all the force at my command, to bear in mind the great cardinal fact about the fighters and the long-range aircraft which always means that air must dominate strategy in the future?

LORD ADDISON

My Lords, I am sure we have all listened with great interest to what the noble Viscount has just told us. I am glad that he emphasized the necessity of willingness to learn lessons from our setbacks. I confess to have been a little disappointed with the speech—I am sorry he is not here to-day—of the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, yesterday. I did not follow the logic of the case he was seeking to present. So far as anything seemed to emerge—and to some extent it seems to emerge from what the noble Viscount has been saying—it was that the expert advisers were not listened to sufficiently. I do not know whether that is a true inference, but it seems to be the inference. I am not aware at all of the machinery which is now being adopted in the Government for the determination of these questions, but if mistakes have been made out there in the disposition of what forces there were, I hope we shall be willing and anxious to learn from them.

But so far as one can see, surely it could not have been wrong to send these great ships out there to reinforce our Navy. I do not know what was sent with them. It depends on what cover was sent with them; but surely the disaster was due to the use of the ships after they had got there. We cannot blame anybody responsible for sending them out for that. Their loss was due to the absence of what the noble Viscount has been saying is essential—namely, adequate air support or cover. They were not far from land, and if they were sent out without adequate cover, the responsibility must belong to those who took that decision. I cannot myself see that that is in any way related to the machinery for the determination of strategic principles adopted by the Government at home. One lesson seems to me to emerge from this painful experience, and that is that the Japanese Naval Staff were really ahead of us in the widespread utilization of aircraft carriers. They seem to have had a great many more in comparison with us, and to have foreseen their utility much better than we did. I hope we shall learn from that.

I would like particularly to say a word or two on two different subjects to-day, both of which are immensely important. In the first place, every one of us felt indebted yesterday to the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, for the contribution he made to our deliberations. He was dealing with a matter of fundamental importance to the British Empire and to freedom all over the world. I well remember myself having a part in some of the deliberations in 1917 and 1921 to which he referred, which led later to the Declaration made in 1926, and finally to the Statute of Westminster. There does seem, perhaps, to have been some overlooking of the emphatic independence as separate nations of the countries represented by our Dominion brothers. One hopes that ways will be found to associate them, as they must be associated, with the Councils which take the major war decisions, but whatever we do we can never escape the difficulties of geography and distance. I well remember these questions presenting themselves continually during the last war when it was my honour and privilege to be associated with General Smuts in Cabinet work for more than two years.

There is one other matter to which attention has not been called as it should have been in this matter, for its governs and must govern our policy in the Pacific, and that is our relationship with China. I do not know whether any of your Lordships have had a chance of reading that remarkable book by Madame Chiang Kai-shek—I think it was called China will Rise Again. I confess it made me ashamed when I realized that for three years, all by herself, China had been struggling with very imperfect supplies against a highly armed aggressor—ashamed, too, that a very large percentage of the supplies to the aggressor were provided by the Democracies. If it had not been for the supplies from Democracies the aggressor would not have made progress. In one part of the book, I remember, Madame Chiang Kai-shek expresses wonder as to what would have been the position now if, notwithstanding all these tragic drawbacks, China had not struggled against the aggressor all by herself for three years. Our position would have been infinitely worse in the Pacific than it is. Hong Kong and the whole Chinese coast might, without interruption or threats from the rear, have been in possession of the Japanese. The moral of that, to me, is that, just as we bring the Dominions into our Councils, so we must have a wider vision of what is needed in our co-operation with China in the future than we have had in the past. I cannot understand how it is that those who have hitherto been responsible for much of the policy pursued out there did not see to it that we were supported with Malayan and Chinese troops reasonably trained and equipped at the beginning. They were anxious enough, I believe, to take arms against the Japanese if we had given them the chance.

That is past history. The important thing for the future is, surely, that more and more we must bring China into our Councils, and I hope that in the Pacific Council or Cabinet—whatever it is to be called—that is proposed to be set up, it will be possible to incorporate representatives of China along with the Dutch and our Dominion representatives. They are equal partners in this great business. I am only intervening now to bring out what seems to me that governing necessity of our future policy in this great conflict—namely, that we should ally, as brothers and fighters in the common cause, those people who have put up such a heroic resistance against aggression for some years past, and the more so because, in the future of the Pacific and in the future security for peace throughout the world, the co-operation and help of the great Chinese Republic will be of the first consequence.

LORD DAVIES

My Lords, I think the House is indebted to my noble friend Lord Denman for having put this Motion on the Paper, but I think the course of the debate has not been confined merely to any one war zone. It has roamed over all the incidents and the proposals which have been made in connexion with the prosecution of the war. I am sure we shall agree that it is impossible to divide this war into compartments. The problem of the war is one and indivisible, and deals with questions of policy, of strategy, of organization and of production. But in any case it seems to me that this debate has been memorable for the speech delivered yesterday by the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, who gave us a clear exposition of the constitutional relationships between the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and a recital of the outstanding events which have occurred during the last thirty or forty years in the development of those relationships.

What he said was fortified by intimate knowledge and personal experience in those matters. I sincerely hope that his speech will be carefully read, not only by persons in authority in this country, but also by the Dominion Prime Ministers and their advisers. I am sure he will forgive me for saying that I think it is a pity he did not make that speech some months ago, because I cannot help feeling it might have had considerable influence upon events, and hastened the creation of an Imperial War Cabinet. As I understand it, the noble Viscount told us that he was in favour of an Imperial Cabinet composed more or less on the same lines as the Imperial Cabinet that existed during the last war, which, he told us, was composed of British Ministers and of representatives of the Dominions, who were also Cabinet Ministers in the Dominion Governments.

He also said that the Imperial Cabinet during the last war did exercise executive responsibility, what I think the Prime Minister in his speech the other day described as "powers of decision," and that of course, does involve on the part of the Dominion Prime Ministers the devolution of a certain amount of responsibility and authority. We can only hope that they will be prepared to adopt such a course. Then, in regard to the composition of the Imperial Cabinet, it will be remembered that during the last war the Indian Government was represented by Lord Sinha, and it would appear that, owing to the entry of Japan into the war, and the importance of production of war materials in India, and of mobilizing all the resources of that vast country, a representative of the Indian Government might be asked to serve in an Imperial Cabinet.

After having recited all the facts up to the passing of the Statute of Westminster, the noble Viscount omitted, I think, to explain to us why it was that the Imperial Cabinet created during the last war ceased to function afterwards, and really faded out of existence. That apparently was not the intention at the end of the war. Mr. Lloyd George, in his Memoirs, tells us that these great countries had no responsibility for the policy or diplomatic methods that preceded the war. He says: At the concluding session of the Imperial War Cabinet, I expressed the satisfaction of the British Cabinet with the experiment and proposed that it should be repeated and incorporated in the machinery of the British Empire. To this effect they considered that sessions of the Imperial Cabinet as distinct from the British Cabinet should be convened annually, and that as an institution the Imperial Cabinet should have an annual session, though they did not preclude the summons of a special session if questions of urgency arose in the interval. While the war was in progress the main business of such a session would be to review the position of the war. Apart from that it would naturally review questions of foreign policy, Imperial defence and other matters of common concern. It was to be inconceivable that in future the Dominions should be neither fully informed nor consulted on questions which might lead to war. This proposal was largely endorsed by the Dominion representatives.

I think it is quite clear from that statement that at any rate the mind of the Prime Minister at that time, and therefore I suppose of his colleagues, was that it was intended the Imperial War Cabinet should go on functioning after the war, in times of peace, and that its functions, roughly, would be to determine a common foreign policy for the Empire, to make adequate preparation for the needs of Imperial defence, and that if a war ever came again they would be able to speak with one united voice in the Councils of their Allies. I cannot help feeling that if these arrangements had been made and developed during the twenty years of peace that followed, we might not have been caught in such an unprepared condition for this struggle which has been imposed upon us; that it would not have been necessary to improvise arrangements under the stress of war; and, thirdly, which is very important at this juncture, that there would have been no muddles and recriminations between any Member States of the British Commonwealth. There would have been no point, no substance, in some of the speeches of the Prime Minister of Australia or in the strictures of the Australian Press. Therefore one hopes that now, as the result of the speech which the Prime Minister made the other day, an Imperial Cabinet will be reconstituted, and that it will go on functioning not only during the war but when it comes to making the peace and afterwards.

The noble Viscount in his speech yesterday dwelt upon the Statute of Westminster, and having regard to the fact that he supported and still supports an Imperial Cabinet, I really was quite at a loss to understand why he should have waxed so eloquent over the virtues of the Statute of Westminster, because, after all, that Statute was not in any sense a constructive one. It was simply the legal recognition of equality of status between this country and the Dominions which had been recognized, at any rate in fact, for a very long time. It is true the Statute gave legal recognition to that position, but he will recollect that, when the Dominions became States Members of the League of Nations, they did so as sovereign independent States quite apart from their connexion with the British Empire. Therefore I cannot help feeling that the Statute of Westminster was, if not retrograde, at any rate not constructive, because it insisted on the claims of national sovereignty and, in a negative sense at any rate, repudiated the claims of federalism. In the words of a distinguished historian, perhaps it is not too much to say that it "legalized anarchy and called it a constitution." I hope that the Statute of Westminster is not going to be the last word in the relationships between the members of the British Commonwealth. There are, of course, many constitutional difficulties to be overcome, but I cannot help feeling that the ultimate solution is to be found in the proposals which that distinguished historian. Sir John Seeley, made over sixty years ago when he suggested that the future of the British Commonwealth depended upon the introduction of some form of federalism.

May I turn now for a moment to what my noble friend discussed a few moments ago—namely, the vital importance of securing the closest co-operation between us and our Allies? Up till quite recently the British Commonwealth alone had to stand the full blast of the Nazi onslaught. Now we find ourselves with Allies in the field—the United States, Russia, China and our Dutch Allies. If we go back to the last war, we remember that it took a considerable time to constitute what was known as the Allied Supreme War Council. It was not until that Council was fully under way that all the resources of the Allies at that time were concentrated in defence of their freedom and in order to secure the final victory of their cause. I cannot help feeling that we are faced to-day with the same problem and that it is vital that the vast resources in man-power, in materials, and in potential production, should be organized as soon as possible in order to secure a maximum war effort.

The Prime Minister in his speech gave us the outline, at any rate, of the plan which, during his visit to Washington, he had been able to agree upon with the President of the United States. In the first place we were told that there was to be a Pacific Council which might meet cither here in London or in Washington. That Council apparently is to be composed of representatives of this country, Australia, New Zealand and our Dutch Allies, but as my noble friend pointed out there does not seem to be any provision for representatives of China who have been fighting for our cause during the last three years. The Prime Minister praised the heroic stand that China has made, and therefore one cannot understand why it is that representatives of China and of the United States are not represented on this Council. The second proposal is that the Staffs of Great Britain and of the United States shall meet together in conference and discuss the means of carrying on the war. One cannot help feeling that here again the representatives of China and of Russia should be brought in in some way so that we should have reproduced at Washington what we had in the last war at Versailles, where all the Staffs of the Allies met together in order to be able to advise the Supreme War Council. I hope this is only a beginning. These arrangements resulting from the visit of the Prime Minister to America are no doubt only tentative arrangements, but perhaps the noble Lord who replies to this debate may be able to give us some assurances on the points I have raised. We should be thankful, i think, to the Prime Minister for undertaking this arduous journey, for having discussed personally with the President of the United States, and for having, at any rate, laid the foundations of what we may hope will develop into a co-ordinating organization for the effective prosecution of the war.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, I am sure we have all listened to the speech of my noble friend Lord Davies with very great interest and, if I may be allowed to comment upon one part of it with great diffidence, I should like to invite him, as he has studied these matters and speaks upon them more forcibly than most people, to devote his attention to a curious hiatus in the organization of the planning of the war as so far disclosed by the Prime Minister and those who have spoken for the Government, including the noble Lord the Leader of your Lordships' House. All the organizations of Staff Councils, the Pacific Council and the various bodies which we are told will be set up, will be concerned—I know this will appeal to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard—with the day-to-day administration of the war, with the administration of supply, with day-to-day strategy and so on. I fail to see any body—and this of course applies to the Prime Minister's Chiefs of Staff Committee and other bodies described so graphically by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield—which will be engaged in thinking out the future strategy of the war. That must be the chief consideration of all modern Staff practice. Until we have that I am afraid we are going to have more blunders and more setbacks, as prophesied by the Prime Minister on Tuesday. I hope my noble friend will not mind me making this suggestion and not following his speech further.

Now may I make a comment on the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard? He spoke of Singapore not being a great air base. But it was a great air base. There were magnificent aerodromes all over the peninsula. And I myself have seen aerodromes on the island which are certainly of the very first order. The trouble was that there were not aeroplanes for the aerodromes. And the reason, we are told, is not that there was a lack of planes but that there was a lack of shipping to send out the short-range fighters, the great importance of which must surely have been recognized in peace time. My noble and gallant friend Lord Trenchard has chided the Labour party— and this is not the first time that this has been done in the Houses of Parliament—with having stopped the building of the Singapore base in 1924. Of course that is going back a long way, but the naval base was ready, when this war broke out, as was the air base.

Now I will make the noble Lord a present of this. I was always opposed to making a great battleship base at Singapore. Lord Hankey knows that, perfectly well. I have said that again and again in Parliament and in my writings. I still think it is a mistake to have a great battleship base at Singapore. I was also opposed, and so was he, to great battleships themselves. I do say, however, that if we are going to have these great Super-Dreadnoughts the bases for them should be safe. As I say, I will make my noble friend Lord Trenchard a present of that and he will no doubt enlarge upon it in another speech at some future date.

But this is a time for constructive suggestion, and I venture to make one to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, who I understand is going to wind up this debate. I have given him notice of this particular point, for this is a time when we all try to help. Yesterday the Colonial Secretary drew a very favourable picture of the position at Singapore and threw his protecting cloak over officials there, who I do not think have been unfairly attacked in your Lordships' House, though there have been certain strictures on them in organs which usually support the Government. Of course, Lord Moyne, as head of the Colonial Ministry, is bound to do that, but it was obvious that there were—and one has to say it—very serious defects in the organization of the Colonial people and resources in Malaya and the Federated States for defence. I am going to give an example of what I mean by quoting from a letter from a responsible official in Singapore. A copy of this has gone to the Prime Minister, so there is no harm in quoting it in your Lordships' House. Lord Moyne said it was not possible to make munitions in Singapore to arm the forces which my noble friend Lord Addison said should have been used there. Lord Moyne said that to me also in a former debate, when I suggested this possibility of making munitions on the spot.

The letter is dated 8th November, 1940, six months after Dunkirk. One passage in it reads: When I came out here I made an unofficial survey of plant and labour which would be available for the manufacture of munitions. I drew up a complete scheme of organization for the manufacture of 9,000,000 rounds of 303 per month together with shells, aerial bombs, Mills and rifle bombs, mines and sinkers for the Navy, etc. This was fully detailed, but the powers that be were not interested. Then he goes into details, and later he summarizes things in this way: Malaya is as far from making anything now as it was twelve months ago, and this notwithstanding I have Vickers-trained men all eager and ready to join with me in putting over the job, and all the Services are waiting for our production. It is more than galling to know you have the organization all ready for the word 'Go' and yet no one will assume authority. Well, my Lords, if Lord Addison had known of a similar state of affairs in this country, what would he have said speaking at that box in our debates on production?

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

My Lords, may I ask if this letter is from an official or from a gentleman in the commercial world?

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, it is from an important official and I shall have great pleasure in showing it to my noble friend. As I have said, a copy of the letter has gone to the Prime Minister, and no doubt they are aware of its contents at the Dominions Office. This is one more piece of evidence that things were not right in Singapore. But there are other Colonies which may presently find themselves in danger of attack, which are, in fact, now in danger of attack. I would like to know if the Government are taking steps to make themselves acquainted with the state of things in these Colonies, not by reports from Governors and Colonial Secretaries or from statements of permanent officials in their Departments; are they taking independent steps to satisfy themselves that all is well in these other very important Colonies? I do not know any thing about the state of affairs in West Africa, where we have some very, very important Colonies indeed. I would like to see the Secretary of State for the Colonies, much as we would miss him from this House, using modern means of transport to go out and find out things for himself by personal inspection. He is very familiar with the part of the world which we have been discussing, though I do not think he has visited Singapore since he became Colonial Secretary. I do suggest that he or some other responsible person should make a tour of inspection of our West African Colonies which may soon, if certain things develop in a certain way, be under serious menace. Failing that, could not some authoritative Commission be sent out to see if things are right in these Colonies? This is an area which may have to play a great part in the defence of the Commonwealth. I make that suggestion in no spirit of criticism of the Government or of the noble Lord. I make it as, I hope, a contribution to the prosecution of the war.

Criticisms that have been made have been repeated in speech after speech both here and in another place. The Prime Minister's defence is that we could not scatter our Forces all over the Far East. Of course we could not scatter them all over the Far East; no one suggested that we should. But I do say that Singapore was more important than Gibraltar, because of the existence of the great battleship and air base there which you have not got at Gibraltar. Both Singapore and Gibraltar, before the Japanese invasion, were under a potential menace of attack. In the case of Gibraltar it is known that adequate steps have been taken to reinforce the garrison and immensely strengthen the fortress. If that was right with Gibraltar under a potential menace which has not yet developed, it was more necessary, I submit, in the case of Singapore. I think that is the complaint that the Australians have to make, a complaint which was quoted by Lord Denman in his very interesting speech yesterday. It was felt that we had failed to deal with the situation in Malaya brought about by the French collapse and the Jap occupation of Indochina, and failed to recognize the imminent and dangerous threat to Singapore which we had to meet. I think it is a poor defence to say we could not be strong everywhere, that we could not scatter our Forces all over the Far East, and that we had to send munitions to Russia, and strong supports to Libya. We should have taken the necessary steps to strengthen the defence of Singapore, and we did not do so.

I am afraid the other criticism to be made is that for the four or five critical weeks after the Japanese intervention there was still a tendency—and we heard it in a speech by the Leader of the House in the previous debate—to regard the Pacific theatre of war as secondary to the European theatre of war. I suggest that the idea, which one hears echoed in the most unexpected and exalted quarters, that we have only to defeat Germany for the Japanese automatically to collapse, is one of greater danger. The Germans might be utterly defeated this year—the Russians are hoping that they will be, and I hope that our strategy is provided for—and yet Japan, if she fortified herself in a position of immense strength in the Pacific, could defy us for a considerable time. During that period of four or five critical weeks there has been a lack of energy on the part of the Government, and that is the serious criticism which has been made in both Houses.

The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, knows perfectly well that the reason why we have been short of fighters was the lack of shipping, which was a very serious impediment to our whole war effort. May I give him this thought? The Prime Minister in another place, and the noble Lord, Lord Moyne, yesterday, were very hostile to those who had suggested last year that we ought to have used the opportunity of the German entanglement in Russia to open up a front in the West. I am one of those, and I do not retreat one iota from the position I took up then. We will see who is right in twenty years' time. I will exchange reminiscences then with my noble friend the Leader of the House. We will see what the historians say about it, and what he himself will write in his memoirs. I would ask the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, who is the greatest strategist in your Lordships' House, to consider this. We are short of ships, yet we send immense quantities of tanks and munitions five thousand miles right round the Cape—I agree we have to defend Egypt—when we might send these tanks and warlike stores and the men to use them a distance of between 40 and 120 miles to the western coasts of Europe. We have deliberately chosen to make a second front in North Africa—perhaps for very good reasons—and have been unable to do so at our own doorsteps and at the same time to utilize the immense Army that we have enrolled and trained in this country.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

My Lords, this debate has ranged over many subjects, which have hardly touched the Motion on the Paper, but it is to some extent a continuation of the debate which took place, or was to have taken place, on the war situation; consequently if I touch on one or two other points which are slightly extraneous to the Motion on the Paper I am sure your Lordships will allow me to do so. There is a Motion before another place, in which the Prime Minister has asked for a vote of confidence in himself and in his Government. I am sure that if such a Motion had been brought into your Lordships' House the Prime Minister would have received an overwhelming vote of confidence in himself and, to some degree, in his Government. But as I listened to the Prime Minister's speech in another place, I could not help feeling that he was slightly out of touch with the feeling in the country regarding certain aspects of his Government, and that he did not realize that there is, and has been for some time, a strong rankling of discontent with certain things that have been happening in connexion with parts of his Administration. If I refer to this to-day very shortly your Lordships will forgive me, because I feel that at least in this House we ought to express what we know of the conditions in the country, and of the feelings entertained there.

I would very shortly define the items of that general discontent. I should first of all refer to the regulation of man-power, which has never been satisfactory since the beginning of the war. It is still not satisfactory, and now that woman-power has been added to it there are still more reasons for inequalities appearing and causing fresh dissatisfaction. The second broad point which is causing a great deal of discontent is the lack of co-ordination between labour and production problems in the factories, and the large amount of time taken up by members of managements in interviewing committees and filling up forms, which prevent them from getting ahead with the extension of factory buildings and the renewal of plants. The employees are also affected by these delays, and are fully aware of them. As industry is situated throughout the country, these points of delay become a common topic and the discontent grows widespread, because nothing apparently is done to put them right. So far as those points are concerned, I do not suppose that one man in ten knows which Department is responsible for them, or who is the political head of that Department, nor does he care; all he wishes is that the Prime Minister would take hold of these matters and put them right, and that if he thinks that the right honourable and gallant gentleman the member for whatever constituency it may be is the right man to put them right he would select him to do it. It is not a question of persons, it is a question of acts and facts: not a question of loyalties and colleagues, but a question of getting these things put right in order to remove this widespread discontent.

Thirdly—and this touches a much wider aspect of the war—we have had disaster after disaster over the past two years, and we never seem to have had any valid explanation of them. In the past there was a good old rule, which hardly ever failed to be carried out, the traditional system of Court Martial or inquiry; if you go further back, even of impeachment. But during this war the system of inquiry has been abolished altogether. The public feel—I am a member of the public, and I feel it myself—that no proper explanation is given of these various disasters that take place. First of all there was Scapa Flow. There was no public inquiry into that, and nobody has really ever known how that happened. Then we had Narvik, then Dunkirk, and then—the most flagrant example—Dakar, which was one of the most astonishing things that ever happened. Then we had Benghazi, and now we have Singapore, accompanied by the sinking of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse."

LORD STRABOLGI

I do not think the noble Viscount would like an error to go out from his lips. He should not have said Narvik, but Norway. Narvik was a great victory.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

I thank the noble Lord for his interruption. I ought to have said the retirement from Norway, which would have covered what I meant. So far as the sinking of the "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse" is concerned, the noble Viscount who spoke earlier this afternoon suggested that there ought to be an inquiry into that event. I heartily concur. That surely ought to be the subject of inquiry. We remember that when the Americans had a disaster at Pearl Harbour shortly before, they immediately instituted an inquiry, which may, we understand from Press reports, be followed by Court Martial. I would ask the noble Lord who is going to reply, why the Government feel that so far as the sinking of the "Repulse" and the "Prince of Wales" is concerned no inquiry should be held of such a character that the results can be conveyed to the public of this country. I would ask, generally, that this system of public inquiry and Court Martial, where necessary, be reinstituted in this war. It was of the greatest value in the past and would probably be of the greatest value now, if used again.

So far as Malaya is concerned, I cannot follow the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, quite so closely in his arguments with regard to the blame attaching to the present Government arising from the present situation in Singapore. When I cast my mind back sixteen or eighteen years I remember that this question of Singapore—the defence of Singapore and the making of it the greatest defended port and place in the Far East in order to protect our routes and trade in those waters—formed the subject of controversy time after time by Government after Government. Whilst a certain amount was done, not everything was done that ought to have been done in order to create Singapore the defended port which was necessary in a war of this kind. I am not blaming any particular Government. I cannot help referring to the Labour Government of 1930 which refused to do anything at all.

LORD ADDISON

May I ask the noble Viscount to ascertain the facts before making these statements? I happen to know some of them. One of the great controversies about Singapore, as mentioned by my noble friend earlier, was whether it should be a battleship base. There was no question of defending it—the question was what should the base be used for.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

The point I am making is that the Labour Government of that day declined to vote anything at all for the Singapore base. As to whether it was to be a battleship base or not is a matter into which I, as a layman, cannot enter. I do not only blame the Labour Government of that day. I blame the Baldwin Governments as well. They were all the same. They did not go far enough; with the result that when this war broke out Singapore was only defended from the sea, and there was no defence of any kind from the jungles, if I may so express it, behind. I happen to know the Federated Malay States. I spent Christmas of 1927 in Singapore when the first sods were being cut. I was in Penang for the New Year, 1928, and for about two months I wandered up and down the Malay Peninsula. The fact remains that, whether it was a Conservative Government or a Labour Government, they did not provide sufficient funds to defend Singapore properly.

As I understand it, from the advice given to me, it would have been quite impossible for the present Government, when they came into power in May, 1940, to have revised the whole of the defence of Singapore in such a way as to protect it from the rear, for which no protection was available at the time, I am advised that it would have meant the transport of so many troops—60,000, 80,000, or 100,000 troops—which it would have been quite impossible to send out there, having regard to our commitments in other parts of the world. It would have meant the transport of a great many aeroplanes which at that time we had not at our disposal, again because of our commitments in other parts of the world, especially in the Battle of Britain in August, 1940. So, whilst I feel very strongly that we have been let down over the defence of Singapore and the defence of Malaya, I do not blame this Government, for the reasons I have given, as much as I blame the Governments which preceded them during the past fifteen or sixteen years.

Yesterday the noble Lord, Lord Moyne, made a defence of the Civil Service and of the planters of Malaya against what in my view are the most unfair attacks which have been made upon them in connexion with the lack of preparation in this war. He referred to the fact that they had voluntarily given £18,750,000, out of £28,000,000 from all the Colonies, towards assisting the war effort in this country. I should like to add this fact to that. A very large number of companies, both rubber and tin, and merchants, have offices that are registered in this country, and I believe I am not going outside the mark when I say that something like £25,000,000 to £30,000,000 was contributed by those companies and merchants in this country towards the war being waged here as well as there. Consequently, to say that these civil servants, these planters, are nothing but a drinking lot, whose only concern is to amuse themselves and look after themselves, is one of the greatest misrepresentations that has ever been made against any people in any Colony.

I want to pass to another point. I want to congratulate the Prime Minister on the work which he did in America for this country and for the world. I feel that in the references which have already been made to that great effort not sufficient attention has been paid to the great change of world outlook which has been secured by the Prime Minister's visit to Washington. I think those two speeches of his, in Washington and in Ottawa, will go down as two of the finest pieces of oratory that have ever been delivered in the world. What he has started in Washington is bound to grow from strength to strength, supposing there is good will on both sides, and I feel that there must be good will. I feel that at last the English-speaking peoples have come together because of the terrible dangers with which they are confronted to-day. It is often danger that creates the best comrades and the friendships which last longest. Therefore I think we cannot be too grateful to him for what he did on that occasion. We must also be grateful for the work he did in connexion with the formation of the Allied Councils there for co-operative war effort between ourselves, the United States of America and the Allies.

I should also like, as others have done, to pay tribute to the speech which was made by my noble friend Lord Bennett yesterday, on the subject of our Imperial War Cabinet. Your Lordships are aware that I myself on a number of occasions last year urged the formation of such a Cabinet. I agree with what Lord Davies said a few minutes ago, that if Lord Bennett had made that speech a few months ago it might have been a very great help to our cause then. At the same time we must acknowledge the fact that the Prime Minister has agreed to ask the Dominions to have Dominion representation in the War Cabinet, and that is a great step forward. I understand from Press reports that Canada has not yet accepted. We know very well that there are difficulties in connexion with South Africa. So far as Australia and New Zealand are concerned they have accepted, and we are all very glad to know this.

But this point does arise in connexion with what we were told by Lord Bennett yesterday. He referred to the fact that an Imperial War Cabinet met in the last war, and that there was provision, in the event of a Prime Minister not being able to be present and sit in the War Cabinet, to appoint someone else in his place from his Cabinet, to represent the Government of his Dominion. He further went on to say that that War Cabinet had executive authority. Now, the measure which the Prime Minister is now arranging—that is, entry of Dominion representatives into the War Cabinet—will not enable the Dominions to have that executive authority which they would have under an Imperial War Cabinet. I for one, in accepting and welcoming the Prime Minister's proposal as a start, hope that it will be regarded as a start only, and not as a finish, that the whole matter will be kept open, and that as soon as possible a real Imperial War Cabinet will be formed upon the basis outlined by the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, yesterday. As has been stated, that Imperial War Cabinet will be required not only for questions of foreign policy, but also for the victorious winding up of this war, when all the Dominions will have to be represented on a body with executive authority, in order to enable their points of view to be properly put forward and amalgamated as the views of an Imperial Cabinet. The questions which are going to arise will be of the utmost and vital importance, not only to this country but to the Empire and the world. I strongly urge the noble Lord who will reply, who is still not in the War Cabinet, to bring to the Prime Minister's notice the strong feeling that there is in your Lordships' House that he should continue with what he is doing, and that an Imperial War Cabinet should also be the Premier's ideal and his aim, and his quick aim.

LORD HUTCHISON OF MONTROSE

My Lords, I would like to begin my few remarks by saying with what delight I listened to the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. I hope the members of the Government will carefully read the report of that speech and will learn the lessons which he laid down. I do not think it is necessary for me on that particular point to do more than express the hope that they will read, learn and digest what he said. I find it very difficult to dissociate the South-Western Pacific from any other part of the world or from any other war theatre. After all the war theatre is the world. We are fighting everywhere. You cannot consider any one theatre without considering other theatres. I fear that Democracy has not come out too well in ability to run a war. It seems to me that the Houses of Parliament are the wrong place in which to discuss strategical and tactical problems. Who ever speaks and criticizes must speak with less knowledge than those who are running the operations. They certainly speak with no knowledge of what is happening on the spot.

Therefore I think that as the war goes on we ought to bottle up Parliament in the matter of the discussion of strategical and tactical problems. In matters of administration I think members of Parliament in both Houses are fully qualified to criticize and find fault, and to try and correct the Government where they are doing wrong. Outside the Administration we have many men of experience, men with inside knowledge of all branches of war production. Whether it is a question affecting coal, steel, machines or wool or anything else, you can find people in both Houses with expert knowledge, who can say that a certain thing is being clone in the wrong way and their views ought to be considered by the Government. But when it is a matter of criticizing the movement of troops, the handling of troops, the movement of stores or guns or aeroplanes, then Parliament runs a very great risk, first of all, of giving voice to ill-informed criticism, and secondly, of giving information to the enemy. I am quite satisfied that the reports of debates going on now in another place and here, if read by experts, would give a good deal of information to the enemy. I feel that in war-time something ought to be done either to have discussions in secret or at any rate to prevent the enemy getting access to reports of the debates. Members speak probably after having conversation with members of the Forces and undoubtedly they do impart information which can be gleaned from these reports.

That is where Democracy fails to some extent in the management of a war. We cannot run a war by a committee. Any country which goes to war has to appoint a man to run that war. We have, luckily, a Prime Minister with very great knowledge of all the vicissitudes of war, and also great knowledge of all sorts of Department of State. We have appointed him Prime Minister, and I think it is only right and proper that we should support him to the fullest extent in what he tries to do. It is his business to appoint a team and it is no good attacking the team and not attacking him. It is no good saying we are satisfied with him and then telling him that lie should have a new team. If he keeps that team and you do not approve of that team then you ought to get rid of him. To say "We like you but we do not like your Government" is to my mind quite false. It is like telling a Commander-in-Chief that we like him but we do not like his Staff. If you are dissatisfied with the Government you ought to go for the Prime Minister and not for his Government.

But I am not at all sure that any other Government would do any better. You may put in other individuals to run various Departments, but although there are exceptional cases the average Department is very largely run by the permanent staff. They are in control. They tell the Minister exactly what is going on. They more or less lead him along. I have said before in your Lordships' House that I think in war-time the weight of Civil Service control is too heavy. We are economizing in staff in many directions in this country, but I have not seen the slightest attempt to economize in the staffing of these Departments. Whole grades of staff could be cut out with great advantage to expedition in getting things done. Economy in administration ought to be called for, both in your Lordships' House and in another place, when the Government are being criticized. There should be economy and simplification in administration and they can be achieved. Civil servants—I am speaking now of the permanent and temporary civil servants—will unfortunately sit in their Departments and take the line of least resistance. I hope noble Lords will not mind my referring to this matter, because I have it very much at heart and I believe a lot could be done in this direction.

A great deal of criticism has been uttered about the Far East. I know the Far East like the noble Viscount who has just spoken. I know Malaya. Before this war I wrote a memorandum on the subject of the land defence of Singapore, in which I called attention, with the assistance of a very able Secret Service agent, an officer who had just come home, to the landward side of Singapore. In that I pointed out that many of the fishermen were really Japanese ex-naval ratings, and that there would be great difficulty in the jungle and in the plantations unless we were prepared beforehand. Whether any action was taken on that I do not know. That was in 1939. The trouble is that it was never thought that there would be any infiltration into Siam and so into the hinterland of Malaya. It was always considered most likely that attack would come from the sea. The most deadly form of attack that we have had to stand up against in Malaya has been infiltration from the sea, infiltration by troops landing round the shallow shores from fiat-bottomed boats, Japanese dressed like the native population, or like Chinese. It is very difficult for our soldiers to know the difference between a Malayan, a Japanese and a Chinese. But whatever the cause of the trouble, it was quite impossible with our resources that we should be strong everywhere. Whatever blame may be attached to this Government or past Governments, at least the apportioning of that can be left to the future.

The Prime Minister said that the whole thing depended on shipping. If everything depends on our shipping, then our production is not the vital matter. What matters is to get production into the vital place, at the right time. I am not happy about shipping. I do not think the Minister who has railways and every other form of transport to look after has enough time to deal with shipping, about which he knows so much. He ought to be simply Minister for Shipping, and he ought not to be overwhelmed with other troubles which are now put on his head. I heard the other day of large numbers of transports coming over from Canada and other places with troops on board but with nothing in their holds. The troops complained about the rolling and said that if only the vessels had had cargo in them they would have been much steadier. I do not know whether the noble Viscount has any knowledge of what is happening but undoubtedly the floor space in the holds of these ships might have been filled with cargo of some sort.

In addition there is the question whether we are making the best use of the shipyards in this country. President Roosevelt stated that in America they could produce-very large numbers of new ships. I will not venture to quote figures. In view of that great production in America might it not perhaps be well for the Americans to build the new ships and let our yards adapt themselves, to a greater extent, at least, for the repairing of damaged ships? I have heard of many cases of ships hanging about waiting for repairs and unable to get a berth in any of the yards in which those repairs could be carried out. If this suggestion were adopted repairs could be done much more quickly, and ships could be repaired very much more speedily than new ships could be built. To that extent I think we might be able to improve our shipping position. Another point in connexion with shipping is the danger round our coast arising from the fact that our various lights have been put out. I am speaking especially of the Western coast and I speak with some knowledge of the subject. It is perhaps necessary from the war point of view that these lights should be out, but we have to consider whether this is a factor which really works out for us or against us. I know that many companies who run these ships along that coast think it would be a very great advantage if some of the lights were relighted in order to guide our ships safely into port.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, who I am sorry to see is not here to-day, in the course of the speech which he made yesterday referred to the orders given to the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse," and suggested that they were of a political nature. I may say that perhaps political considerations sometimes override what is necessary from a purely military or naval point of view, and perhaps the political situations were such that those decisions had to be taken. At any rate, I cannot conceive it possible that those orders were given without consultation with, and approval of, the Admiralty, and I am sure that the question whether the orders were of tremendous importance politically was taken into consideration. Therefore, I do not think it is quite fair to say such things as the noble Lord did say.

The last point I would like to make is this. Of course, and quite naturally, the South-West Pacific is very largely in our eyes at the present moment. But I have great confidence in our leaders and in our people. We shall deal with this sudden surprise, given time—and I think we are getting time—and whatever the fate of our Possessions in the Far East, of this I am sure, that those with the greatest reserves in men and material will ultimately win this war. If we go on steadily and progressively and not allow ourselves to be driven too much either to one side or the other from our purpose, which is to beat the Hun, I am certain we shall arrive in port safely in due course.

LORD SEMPILL

My Lords, like your Lordships I have listened with keen interest yesterday and to-day to this debate. Every aspect of the war from the naval, military and air angle has been touched upon, and the Empire focus has been vividly portrayed by the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, in his brilliant maiden speech in your Lordships' House. In order, however, that the maximum effort may be obtained from our manpower and woman-power in all fields, it is essential that they should be inspired with the knowledge to-day that the best use is being made of the equipment that they are fabricating and using, and also be equally enthused as to the potential of the right using of all that we shall have in the post-war world. Every one of your Lordships, and everyone else also, is aware of the fearful economic plight that fell on the world after the last war, in spite of all the pronouncements made to the contrary between the years 1914 and 1918. We must and can avoid this state of affairs coming on us again, and it does not take any great stretch of imagination to visualize how fearful the conditions-would be in the post-war world if it was to attempt to function under the out-of-date economic system now in force.

Your Lordships will remember that this matter was debated at some length in your Lordships' House in November last, and following on that debate my noble friend the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs said, in reply, that he appreciated greatly the immense importance of the matter under discussion and hoped that at no very distant date an important pronouncement would be made in another place by the Minister concerned. Three months have passed since then, and I hope my noble friend, when he makes his reply to this debate, may be able to give some indication on these matters, or an indication as to when a full statement on the economic future of the post-war world will be made in another place.

VISCOUNT SAMUEL

My Lords, I think that there will be general agreement that this debate has been one of the most valuable we have had during the course of the war. The House is fortunate in counting among its members men who have held the offices and have gained the experience of a Governor-General of Australia, a Prime Minister of Canada, and a head of the Royal Air Force, as well as the Secretaries of State both for the Colonies and the Dominions, and the speeches that they have made and the speech that we shall hear from the Dominions Secretary have been, and will be, of the greatest interest and significance. My noble friend Lord Denman, who inaugurated the discussion in a speech in which he presented a very able survey of the situation, dealt mainly in the first place with the military position in the South-Western Pacific. Public opinion in this country has been specially perturbed at the fact that the Japanese, although they were facing the two strongest Navies in the world, were able for many weeks to move great forces all over that vast theatre of war with almost complete impunity. That was due undoubtedly in part to the naval disasters suffered both by America and ourselves during the first few days, but was also undoubtedly due to conditions of geography. The noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Trenchard, claimed powerful allies for his argument He was supported on his right hand by gravity and on his left hand by geography But while gravity, on the one hand treats both parties with neutrality, geography, on the other, is, in the Southern Pacific, an ally of the Japanese, at all events for the time being, and it was that advantage which unquestionably has enabled them to win these preliminary victories.

However, there may before long be a turn, and already our Allies the Dutch, whose strategic situation in the Dutch East Indies is a strong one, have shown those great warlike qualities which the Dutch possessed in a high degree in earlier centuries, as England had many occasions to note. And within the last few days the attack on the great convoy in the Straits of Macassar has been a very significant turn of fortune. Furthermore, the advantage in air power which the Japanese have had hitherto is not likely to continue indefinitely, and to my mind, speaking as a layman, one of the most significant events hitherto in this war in the Far East has been the striking victory of the British and American airmen in Burma where, if I remember the figures rightly, the Japanese have lost 90 aircraft to our 15, a proportion of six to one. A victory has been repeated there such as was won by the Royal Air Force in the Battle of Britain, showing our superiority, and that of the Americans, both in men and in machines. If the figures had been the other way about, and if we had lost 90 planes to the Japanese 15, we should have regarded it as a very serious matter and a foreboding of disaster. Such figures—and there is no reason why they should not be repeated in other theatres of this campaign—are certainly most hopeful for the future.

The defeats that we have suffered and the dangers to which we are now exposed could not have occurred, of course, in the last war, since then Japan was in alliance with ourselves and the Far East was secure. The Japanese alliance was ended, it has always been understood, largely because of the feeling in America, where it was regarded as detrimental to their policy in the Pacific. If we had to choose between Japan as an Ally and America as a friend there is no doubt which choice should be made; and, looking back, I think that no one can regret, in view of all these circumstances, that we terminated the Japanese alliance; if, as was probably the case, its termination was the condition for the gradual approximation which has now brought us into wholehearted co-operation and alliance with the United States of America and all that that implies. But at the time of the termination of the Japanese alliance the Washington Treaty was entered into, under which limitations were imposed upon the Navies of the three Powers who were parties to it.

I was much surprised to hear the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, speak of the Washington Treaty and the subsequent Conferences as though they imposed limitations upon the British Navy alone—as though it were a unilateral agreement. He stated, for example: Naval Conference after Naval Conference was created in order to stop our Battle Fleet and our aircraft carrier force being rebuilt. And again: '' …. we had another Naval Conference, the third, and in that unfortunate moment we signed away our naval superiority and deliberately hamstrung the British Navy. … Well, of course, it was a tripartite convention, and in capital ships the proportions were: British ten, American ten, and Japanese six. If we imposed restrictions upon our own shipbuilding, much greater restrictions were imposed upon Japanese shipbuilding. And it was not ourselves who found it to our interest to bring to an end that treaty but the Japanese, who consequently must have felt that they were more disadvantaged by it than the other parties to the treaty. So far as I know, those proportions were always honourably observed by the three parties, and it seems to me quite illegitimate to condemn the Washington Treaty as being detrimental to British interests. But one provision in the Washington Treaty did prove very detrimental, and that was an undertaking by Britain and the United States that neither would build any new advanced fortified bases in the Pacific before the year 1936.

LORD STRABOLGI

Japan was a party, too.

VISCOUNT SAMUEL

Yes, but it made very little difference to them, because they had their bases at hand in their own territories and in the territories that belonged to them. And the consequence was that they were left in a position of absolutely dominating naval power in that part of the world. It was that as much as anything else which enabled them to enjoy a free hand in Manchuria and in their attack on China. However, it is the case, as has been mentioned by many who have spoken in this debate, that far-sighted wisdom ought to have foreseen, after the Japanese alliance was terminated, that some day we might find ourselves at war with Japan and that provision ought to be made for the defence of Singapore on the land side. My noble friend was fully justified, I am sure, in criticizing the long delay that took place after Japan had shown her aggressive spirit in Indo-China before effective measures were taken for the defence at Singapore on the land side. And indeed it would have been wise if, as several noble Lords have suggested, and especially Lord Strabolgi, an Army had been created years ago in Malaya on the model of the Indian Army, and maintained perhaps by munition factories in those regions in order to meet possible eventualities. However, so far as I am aware, in those previous years no voices were raised in this country to urge such a policy, and certainly the present Government are not to be blamed for it not having been adopted long ago.

Meantime, from now on, and indeed from a couple of years back, the vast forces which are on the side of the united nations are being mobilized. Sir Stafford Cripps has told us that Soviet Russia has 9,000,000 men now under arms, and yesterday the American Ambassador told us that America is mobilizing an Army of 7,000,000, while in China the effective man-power of their forces is limited only by the amount of equipment that they can get. And it is significant of the variety and the vastness of these forces which are coming to our general support that at the same moment that the vanguard of a great American Army has landed in the British Isles, with the result, no doubt, that forces of our own will be released for service elsewhere, great Chinese Armies are coming into Burma in order to assist us in the defence of that territory. That fact is a significant comment on the Japanese claim that their policy is "Asia for the Asiatics." What Asiatics? For the Japanese! Their relations with China show that they do not even believe in a policy of "China for the Chinese." To the heroic endurance and persistence of the Chinese people we have frequently paid tribute in this House, but we did not expect the day would come when, in addition to our bringing aid to them, they would be able to bring military aid to ourselves.

Defeats in the military field always throughout history have had repercussions in the political field. This debate has given prominence to two great constitutional issues. One is the organization of the British Commonwealth, and the other is the organization and composition of the Government of the United Kingdom. We have been all much concerned to hear the voices of dissatisfaction in Australia—voices sometimes raised in terms of anger and resentment—and Parliament would view with deep concern any break in the friendly, indeed affectionate, spirit that has prevailed between the two peoples, and would require, if it were not forthcoming from the Government, an immediate remedy for any legitimate grievances. The cohesion of Great Britain and the Dominions is of course a matter of the first importance.

The white population of the British Commonwealth amounts to about 70,000,000. Of these, 46,000,000 are in these islands, and 24,000,000 are in the Dominions, so that one-third of the manpower of the British Commonwealth is in the Dominions. Of the 24,000,000, it is true 3,000,000 are in Eire, where they are immobilized. Naval bases are denied us, some of the finest troops in the world are not forthcoming in our support, and a German Legation is still functioning in Dublin. In this terrific conflict between nations struggling for liberty and nations fighting for domination, in this great conflict between the spirit of freedom and the spirit of violence, when the material and spiritual fate of all mankind—not excluding Eire—for generations, perhaps for centuries, to come is at stake, we are told that to the Government and people of Eire the matter which is of real importance, which should determine their views and decide their actions, is the question of the boundary between the Six Counties of Ulster and themselves. But if Eire remains isolated and aloof from the travails of mankind, not so Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, for the 20,000,000 there have sent, and are sending, Forces which have already proved in many fields of warfare that they are of a quality that is unsurpassed. If, therefore, the Dominions desire that in the governing direction of the war they should be assured of a full voice, of course such a plea must at once be granted. Indeed it is implicit in the Statute of Westminster.

This is the first test of events to which that Statute has been put, although as was said just now by my noble friend Lord Davies, it did no more than formulate in Constitutional Law the state of things that already existed in actual practice. It would not be enough, quite clearly, as has been suggested in some quarters, that the Dominions Secretary should become a full member of the War Cabinet. Whatever his personal qualifications may be, he could not take responsibility for Dominion action. We had yesterday a most valuable speech from the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett. After serving for so many years in another Parliament, his maiden speech here yesterday was of somewhat qualified virginity, but it deeply impressed the House, and dealt with matters of the greatest importance and significance. He urged that an Imperial War Cabinet should be re-established, as in 1917, in which, with representatives of the United Kingdom, the Prime Ministers of the Dominions should be members or, in their absence. members of their own Cabinets appointed by them as deputies. In principle that seems undoubtedly the right solution. However, a difficulty has been created by the fact that that suggestion or request is not made by the Dominions as a whole. The noble Viscount's own successor in the Premiership of Canada, Mr. Mackenzie King, made a statement yesterday in which he expressed his preference for the arrangement that now prevails, although he did not close the door, as it appears from the very brief report that has so far appeared, to a modification later on.

It it were to be adopted, I would support very strongly the plea of my noble friend Lord Davies, that, with those who have already the formal status of Dominions, India should be included. The political effect in India of a representative of their own taking his place with the Dominions in a truly Imperial War Cabinet would be excellent, and go far to remove the hard feelings that were aroused by what was regarded as an affront to India in general by her being brought into the war at the outset without consultation with any of the representative political elements in that country.

The other political point that has arisen in this debate springs from the dual position of Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Here the noble Lord, Lord Chatfield, made a speech of much gravity and great importance. He stated that the disaster that was suffered by the sinking of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" was due to their having been sent into action without air support either from aircraft carrier or from shore bases, and he said he did not believe that that could have been the decision of the Admiralty and must have been a political decision. From that he came to the conclusion that it was a mistake that the Ministry of Defence and the Premiership should be concentrated in a single hand. And indeed it does seem to me an overwhelming burden for any individual, no matter how great his capacity and his industry. There ought to be a court of review from decisions of the Military Departments, and that court of review should be a Cabinet containing strong and independent personalities. As it is, Mr. Churchill, as Prime Minister in the Cabinet, hears appeals from his own decisions as Minister of Defence and Chairman of a Committee of the Service Ministers and Chiefs of Staff. That seems wrong in principle, and I think that public opinion generally would welcome a change.

Many criticisms are heard of the disadvantages of concentrating too many responsibilities in a single hand, that there are delays, and that errors may be committed. I think that only those who are in close touch with the inner working of the system can really speak with any confidence. For my own part I should be sorry indeed to express any opinion. And, furthermore, to find someone other than the present Prime Minister to be the Minister of Defence would be hard. At the same time one cannot believe that anywhere, either at home or in the Commonwealth, it would be impossible to find some statesman of the requisite authority, status and aptitudes who could fill that office, and if the Prime Minister ' were to see his way—though no one in any quarter wishes for a moment to see him change from his office—to secure the assistance of such a Minister, I feel Certain public opinion would cordially welcome it.

This debate, my Lords, is not to end in the moving of a vote of confidence, for there is universal consent that that would be quite superfluous. It has been a debate of informed criticism and constructive suggestion, but not one of attack, and indeed our friends abroad would be gravely concerned and our enemies would be much encouraged if there were any signs of a serious rift forming in the British nation or the British Parliament. That is not so. The national front now is as solid as it was at the beginning of the war; indeed it has been, if anything, further consolidated under the hammer strokes that we have endured. That unity is reflected in Parliament, and this House of the Legislature is itself an expression and a staunch example of that national unity.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS (LORD CECIL) (Viscount Cranborne)

My Lords, the debate which is now drawing rapidly to a close has been, I think, one of the most important and valuable discussions that we have had in this House for many weeks and possibly many months. The original Motion which was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Denman, dealt with the South-Western Pacific, and we have had contributions on that subject from many noble Lords with personal experience of that area, notably Lord Hutchison, Lord Marchwood and Viscount Elibank, but the discussion has also extended, as discussions tend to do, over a very much wider area. They have covered the whole machinery for inter-Imperial co-operation in the direction and conduct of the war, and I think they have trenched on almost every subject of interest at the present time. Indeed the noble Lord, Lord Sempill, even went so far as to ask for a statement on a post-war economic system. I think that is stretching a Motion on the South-West Pacific a little bit far; but I will assure the noble Lord that I will get into communication with my right honourable friend the Minister without Portfolio, who deals with this particular subject, and see whether some statement cannot be made.

In those circumstances, when so much ground has been covered and I am replying to a debate which has lasted two days, I hope noble Lord; will forgive me if I do not cover all their points quite fully in the time at my disposal. That, indeed, would be impossible. So far as the Southwestern Pacific itself is concerned, my noble friend the Leader of the House dealt very fully with that, and there is not a great deal that I can add. However, there are certain points which have been raised since he sat down about which it would perhaps be for the convenience of the House that I should now say a few words. Firstly, I would like to say how strongly His Majesty's Government agree with what was said by Lord Marchwood and Lord Elibank, about the people and the officials of Malaya. They speak with intimate personal knowledge, and we do welcome the very spirited defence that they made for these most ill-used people. There has been, I think, in certain sections of the Press, far too much sneering and jeering at these people by people who are sitting comfortably in armchairs here in London and speaking of men who have given, after all, their whole lives to the development of those countries, to the mutual advantage of the countries themselves and ourselves here and the world. It has not been a very edifying exhibition, and I hope that these people will take what has been said by noble Lords to-day-very much to heart.

The noble Lord, Lord Addison, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, made reference to China, and I think that everyone in this House must have welcomed and agreed with the great tribute they paid to the Chinese resistance. Very many people in this country, I think, are only just beginning; to realize what an immense debt we owe to the Chinese people and to their great leader, Chiang Kai-Shek. I do not suppose in all their very long history—and it is an immensely long history— there has ever been a finer chapter than that which is now being written. Lord Addison asked if it was intended to bring China into our Councils. It is not very easy for me to go into greater detail than the Prime Minister did on Tuesday, but I can give the House an absolute assurance that the interests of China are not being neglected, and that the Prime Minister, and, I understand, the President of the United States, too, anxiously desire the closest co-operation on the lines of which the right honourable gentleman spoke. I can give the House that assurance without going into further details at the present time.

Then a question was asked by Lord Strabolgi: who is going to plan the future strategy of the Pacific? As I understood him he talked of the Chiefs of Staff in connexion with the Far-Eastern Council, and the American Chiefs of Staff, and the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. He said, those of course will deal with strategy from day to day to prevent a repetition of the blunders which the noble Lord suggested had been made. I do not think it is the duty of any Chiefs of Staff Committees merely to deal with the day-to day strategy. It is the whole business of Chiefs of Staff to look into the future, and I assume, and I should have thought everybody would have assumed, that these Chiefs of Staff Committees would also look into the future. At any rate that is the duty which is being laid upon them.

LORD STRABOLGI

May I intervene for a moment? I do not think I explained myself properly. The people doing the day-to-day administration and strategy of the war cannot be doing the planning work. We have the Special Planning Committees in which the Air Ministry and the Admiralty are divorced from the day-to-day administrative work. What is required is an International Planning Committee of this nature.

LORD CECIL

I think it may be assumed that these large organizations which are being set up will have various sections, and that these various sections will work on the same lines as those in our own Chiefs of Staff organization. If we have a number of people planning for the future, no doubt they will have a number of people planning for the future. Naturally, all these things will be co-ordinated. In war it is very difficult in any case to divide the present entirely from the future.

Then there was the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, who of course we are very fortunate in having with us, because he speaks, I suppose, with the greatest authority on air policy of any one in this country, and probably in the world. Without going into the details of what he said I can assure him that it will have the earliest consideration of His Majesty's Government, and of the Secretary of State for Air in particular. He spoke of the history of the Singapore air base. He told us that his advice was not taken, and that, as I understood it, the advice of the experts of the Admiralty was taken. It is inevitable that when there are two Services moving in different elements they should take rather differing views, and I thought it was particularly interesting to see the fundamental difference of opinion which there was between the noble Viscount and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chat-field. Your Lordships will remember that Lord Chatfield, in effect, said there was no defence against Japan, and that is why he thought it such a great mistake to bring to an end the Japanese alliance. That is why, in effect, he really favoured a policy of appeasement of Japan. The noble Viscount took quite a different view and said, as I understood it, that there was a new arm in warfare, and that with the aid of this new arm we could hold Singapore, but only with the aid of this arm. Recent events, I think, rather give an advantage to the noble Viscount, and I can assure him that the Government do fully realize the great and increasing importance of the air in warfare.

He raised one other question which has also been mentioned by other noble Lords, the question of the report on the loss of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse." I am afraid that there is nothing more I can say about that. There is, as your Lordships know, a careful inquiry being made and I can only assure your Lordships that further information will be given when it is practicable. The noble Lord, Lord Hutchison, who spoke later, went so far as to say that he thought subjects of this kind should be taboo in wartime, both in your Lordships' House and in another place. I do not go so far as that, but I do think that this is the sort of matter in which we have to use the utmost discretion. If there is a certain delay, I am sure noble Lords will understand the reason.

I would like, if I may, to refer for a few moments to what was said by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Chatfield, yesterday. He, of course, speaks with all the prestige and the intimate knowledge of a man who has been First Sea Lord and also Minister for the Co ordination of Defence. He went into an examination of past history both as regards our policy towards Japan and as regards the Naval Treaties that were negotiated during the years of which he spoke. We all of us have strong views on what was done during those years, some on one side and some on the other, and I do not think it would be very helpful or edifying if we were to enter into controversy at the present time. In any case time would not allow me to do so. There is, however, one part of his speech about which I think it only right that I should say something. That was his criticism of the present machinery of Government as set up by the Prime Minister. The noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, said it was a satisfaction to us all, as I understood him, that this debate had disclosed no rifts and that there had been no attacks. I am bound to say, after listening to the noble and gallant Lord's speech yesterday—I am sorry he is not here this afternoon—that he made something approaching a personal attack on the Prime Minister.

As I understood him—and I hope I have not misinterpreted him—he explained that under the last Government the three Service Ministers were in the War Cabinet and that when the present Prime Minister came in he moved them out while retaining them on the Defence Committee. The impression left on my mind was that the noble Lord implied that the Prime Minister's object was to increase his own control of strategy. I got a conception—perhaps it was a jaundiced conception—that the noble Lord envisaged the Prime Minister getting them into a private room and badgering them into submission, and ensuring that the War Cabinet's policy would be his policy and hot the policy of the Service Departments. It is a startling theory, rather picturesque, slightly sinister, but I would say that it bears no relation to reality. Why, in fact, did the Prime Minister put the Service Ministers outside the War Cabinet? It was not to gain power for himself. It was merely because there was a very strong feeling in the country, which was shared in Parliament and in the Press, and which no doubt he shared himself, that to run the war you needed a small executive War Cabinet composed of very few members; and as you will remember he cut down the members of the War Cabinet and as Minister of Defence spoke in the War Cabinet for the three Service Departments.

But—and this is very important—to ensure that the Service view was available to his colleagues in the War Cabinet, he arranged also that the Service Ministers should practically always be present at the War Cabinet meetings, and that is what has happened ever since. They are there to give the Service point of view, though they are not members. It would have been open to them at any time, if they had a disagreement on the Defence Committee with the Prime Minister, to raise it at the War Cabinet. If there were disagreements between them—and I know ot none—which were not brought before the War Cabinet, then to my mind that is a very serious criticism of the Service Ministers because they would have failed in their duty. But it is not a criticism of the Prime Minister or of the system which he set up, and set up, I think, in accordance with the wishes of the vast majority of the people in this country who were in favour of a small War Cabinet of that kind and I believe are still. I am sorry to have gone in such detail into this matter, but it is only fair to the Prime Minister that I should give this explanation in your Lordships' House.

Recent events in the Far East have also brought to the fore another line of criticism. It has not shown itself particularly in the debate in your Lordships' House, but it has shown itself outside, and I feel that it should be answered. It is especially due to me that I should answer it because it comes rather near the sphere of my office. It is suggested, or it has been suggested, that the present situation in Malaya and the Far East generally is due to a material extent to the fact that the Dominions were not taken sufficiently into consultation. That is the charge which your Lordships may have seen made in the newspapers. It is said that if the Dominions had been represented earlier in the War Cabinet different views would have prevailed in regard to strategy in the Far East. That view rests upon the assumption that the question of the Far East has been neglected by the War Cabinet and that the eyes of Ministers have been concentrated rather nearer home, on the Middle East and so on. But that in fact is not true; the Far East has never been neglected by the War Cabinet. It is a matter which constantly, throughout the period of this war, they have faced and discussed. It has had high priority in their discussions, as I think the noble Lord the Leader of the House said yesterday. The difficulty for the Cabinet was not whether they should discuss one area or another, or whether they should say, "Is there a risk in one area and no risk in another?" but to assess priority of risks. There were risks in all areas. What they had to do—and it was a very difficult job—was to assess priority of risks, and send the materials which they had to the areas that needed them most.

In this connexion I would recall to noble Lords the situation in which the Government and the nation have been in the last year and a half. Noble Lords will remember, for instance, the position in the Middle East arising from the fall of France and the dissipation of General Weygand's Army, which was, after all, the main bastion of Allied strength in that area before the collapse of his country. That created a situation of the utmost urgency. Noble Lords will recall the passionate pleas that were made, both here and in the Dominions, for reinforcements for Egypt—for tanks, for planes and for every other form of armament. A similar view was taken later at the time of the expeditions to Greece and. Crete. The Government were told that never again must British and Dominion troops be sent into action without adequate protection. That, however, was not the view merely of the members of the Houses of Parliament and the public; it was the view of the Government, too. As you know, they always felt that they must reinforce, and they did so, and that is the reason why to-day the situation—whatever temporary setbacks we may have had—appears to be much more stable and more solid than it was last year. Supposing there had been representatives of the Dominions in the War Cabinet at that time, would they have been against reinforcing the Middle East? I am quite certain that they would not; they would have taken the same view as was taken by people here.

The same thing is true of the Russian war. When Russia was attacked by Germany there were most violent appeals from the Press and the public, both here and in the Dominions, with regard to assistance for Russia. We were told that everything possible must be done. I have a quotation here from an Australian newspaper which is rather interesting in this connexion. The paper is the issue of the Sydney Daily Telegraph for October 13, 1941. This is what it said: But amongst the people of Australia and of Britain there is a growing feeling of disquiet… If Russia does have to seek terms from Hitler, the balance will not swing back to where it was in June. It will dip steeply against democracy, both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. That is why we must do something desperate to help Russia… more Russian reverses would strengthen the Army and pro-Axis faction in Japan and bring the danger of war much nearer to Australia's own coast. That was the view which was taken at that time in Australia, and what is more it was the view which was taken by His Majesty's Government here. They always, from the very first, from the time of the Prime Minister's original broadcast on the night that Germany attacked Russia, recognized the essential importance of giving the utmost assistance possible to the Soviet Forces in their great resistance. And, in fact, we did give everything possible. We stoked up our factories to new records; we stripped ourselves to the very edge of risk.

Now, if there had been Dominion representation in the War Cabinet at that time, would those representatives have taken a different view? I, personally, cannot believe that they would. It seems to me that throughout the Empire, as in this country, the universal view was that Russia must be helped, and that, in fact, the successful outcome of this war depended on the assistance given. I believe that that would have been their view just as it was ours. It is now suggested, in some quarters, that we should denude ourselves in this country. I cannot help thinking that this is because there has been no invasion. This is, in fact, I believe, a case of being wise after the event. Suppose invasion had been attempted—and it might very easily have been, if we had not been sufficiently protected—then we should have been told that the Government had been guilty of criminal folly and negligence in allowing too many armaments to leave this country.

The real truth, as noble Lords will recognize, is that there was not, at that time, quite enough to go round. My noble friend Lord Strabolgi said he knew that that was always said, but he thought that there ought to have been enough for Singapore. At the time of the outbreak of the Russian war, I remember that in the speeches he was making then, he said that everything must be sent to Russia. This is the fact which, even if noble Lords do not have to face it, the Government must face. They have to face the fact that there is only a certain amount of armaments, and they must be sent where they are needed most. These places must be the places where at the time there is actual danger as against places where at the time there is only potential danger. I would commend that particular point to noble Lords who have suggested, yesterday and to-day, that more ought to have been done for everybody. To provide really enough for this country, for the Middle East, for Russia, and for the Far East was really beyond our power last year. It was beyond our power to provide adequately for all. We have got, in this country, some 45,000,000 people working as they have never worked before, working magnificently to supply us, the Dominions and Russia, but there are limitations to what can be achieved.

We were delighted to read and to hear of the magnificent and colossal programme which has been put forward by the United States. It is a tremendous contribution, and it should, I think, make successful outcome of the war absolutely certain. The fact remains, that we did not have that great flow of weapons last year, and we had to a great extent to do all that we could to provide for ourselves. If this country was to blame it was because we started too late. We often do that, and we did it this time. I could not help recalling yesterday when Lord Marchwood asked, "Why were there not enough planes, and why were there not enough tanks?" how I and some of my friends used to be making very much the same sort of speech he made, three years ago, and we did not get much encouragement from the Whips Office. At any rate none of these very hard facts which I have mentioned would have been altered or could have been altered by increased Dominion representation. But equally this is not an argument against Dominion representation. It is in fact a very strong argument in favour of improved means of co-operation, because we should, at any rate, have been able to show all concerned, not only what could be done but also what could not be done, and that itself would have been valuable not only to us but to them as well.

Dominion representation in the War Cabinet, which has been mentioned so often in this debate, does raise indeed difficult practical problems, which are recognized both here and in the Dominions, problems which it would be foolish for this House to ignore. There is, first of all, the problem of the efficient war machine, which affects us and the Dominions equally. In war, decisions are sometimes necessary at a moment's notice in order to meet the changing needs of the situation. Perhaps it does not happen very often, but it always may happen; and when it does happen, it is likely to be on a very important issue indeed. Now the present War Cabinet—the United Kingdom War Cabinet—whether it is a good thing or whether it is a bad thing, is in a position to take immediate decisions and to stand or fall by them. The Dominion representatives are not in that position; they have to refer home.

The House was privileged yesterday to hear a very remarkable speech by the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett. I think it was probably one of the greatest Parliamentary performances which have been heard in this House for many a long day. Speaking with all the authority of a past Prime Minister of Canada, he gave a lucid exposition of the whole machinery of inter-Imperial co-operation, and by doing so, if I may say so with all deference, he made an invaluable contribution to our knowledge of this all-important subject. He traced this co operation back to its sources. He showed how it blossomed in the last war into an Imperial War Cabinet, and he appealed very eloquently for a revival of that institution on the present occasion.

I think we all share his desire—I know we all share his desire—and I know we all hope that that desire is realizable, but we should be wrong, I think, not to recognize that the circumstances in this war and in the last war are not altogether identical. The essence of the noble Viscount's proposition, as I understood it, was that the Dominions should be willing to give to their representatives authority to take decisions for them. He made this abundantly clear when he referred to what happened in the last war. He said that was exactly the position in 1917 and 1918. If he will allow me to refer to his speech, he said: The decisions were taken at the moment; they were not delayed, they were not referred back to their several Governments. The members of the Imperial War Cabinet were there in their executive capacity, as were the members of the Home Government, and they decided, and having decided, then action was taken immediately in accordance with that. And nothing could be more crystal clear than that.

But is the noble Viscount, and is the House, certain that that would be true in this war as well as in the last war? All our evidence goes in exactly the opposite direction. It goes in the direction of showing that the Dominions would not be willing to give their representatives carte blanche to make a decision. I would like to quote to your Lordships a speech which was made by Mr. Mackenzie King about a year ago in the Canadian House of Commons. Speaking on February 17, 1941, he said: At the present time there are means of effective communication and consultation in all matters pertaining to the war, much more comprehensive than anything which existed during the last war. I doubt, indeed, if a more efficient arrangement could possibly be made. The real but invisible Imperial Council made possible by these means of constant and instantaneous conference has one all-important advantage which would be denied to an Imperial War Council sitting in London. It affords the Prime Minister of each of the Dominions the opportunity of discussing immediately with his colleagues in his own Cabinet all aspects of every question raised. His expression of view, when given, is not his alone. It is the expression of view of the Cabinet of which he is the head. It is an expression of view given by the Cabinet in the light of its responsibility to Parliament. It is, moreover, an expression of view given in the atmosphere, not of London, but of the Dominion itself. Now that was Mr. Mackenzie King's view a year ago and it is a very natural view to take. As your Lordships will have seen from the extract from the newspapers which I think was quoted by the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, probably he has not changed that view at present. General Smuts, too, indicated not long ago that he was satisfied with the present machinery. It is possible, of course, that Dominion Prime Ministers might be given even now authority to bind their Governments, but even this, I think, is doubtful in some eases. But in any case it is exceedingly difficult for the Prime Ministers to come. Since the war broke out General Smuts has never been able to visit this country, and Mr. Mackenzie King has only had the opportunity of coming once, for about a fortnight I think. It is true that Mr. Menzies and Mr. Fraser paid us longer visits, which were immensely appreciated in this country, but I do not think any noble Lord would suggest that it would be very easy for the Prime Minister of Australia to leave his country at the present time. If they cannot leave their country then the Imperial War Cabinet, if it existed, must consist of deputies, that is to say, subordinate Ministers appointed by the Prime Ministers to take their place. And would the Dominion Governments be likely to give authority to them to bind them? As I say, all our indications are the opposite. If they will give this authority, of course, we are through all our troubles; they would all be over; we should have our Imperial Cabinet at once. But if they are unwilling to go so far, then an Imperial War Cabinet in the very strictest sense in which the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, described it, is practically impossible, and we shall have to see how far we can go towards it, and how close the co-operation we can get in other ways.

Now what I think is possible, what the Government of Australia have asked for, and what the Prime Minister here has agreed to, is that the accredited representative of the Commonwealth Government should have the right to be heard in the United Kingdom War Cabinet in the formulation and in the direction of policy. That is possible, and to that His Majesty's Government were very glad indeed to agree. I would urge that any Dominion that wished to collaborate, that wished to send representatives on this sort of basis would give them all the authority which constitutional custom in that Dominion allows. For any arrangement of this kind to be really effective I think, like the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett, you must have authority to take decisions, otherwise it does not produce the result you want, and it slows up the whole war machine. So any authority that can be given by the Dominions will, I think, be very greatly welcomed here.

VISCOUNT BENNETT

The difficulty in the proposals put by the noble Viscount is this, that the instantaneous necessity has not changed, and that the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom will be making decisions affecting the overseas Dominions without their having any opportunity of expressing agreement.

LORD CECIL

I absolutely agree. We should all like to see an Imperial War Cabinet, and the further we can go towards it the better we shall like it. At present it looks as if some of the Dominions would wish to send representatives, some possibly not, but any one who can come we shall be very glad to see. We have had Mr. Menzies, we were delighted to see him. We have had Mr. Fraser, we were delighted to see him. We have had Mr. Mackenzie King, and we were delighted to see him. Now we have got Sir Earle Page, and I think his visit has been of real value, and we have benefited very much by his courage, independence, and sturdy common sense. Now this new proposition has been put forward by the Australian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom are very glad to accept it. If there is any further proposition which will tend to closer and more harmonious collaboration we shall certainly be willing to give all consideration to it.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

As I understand it, the position now is that if the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, or their representatives, come over here, they are automatically members of the War Cabinet. Up to the present, when they have arrived in this country, they have been invited to attend. As I understood the speech of the Prime Minister the day before yesterday, that position is going to be altered. They will be automatically members when they arrive.

LORD CECIL

They have an automatic right to be present when the general conduct of the war is under discussion and to take their part in the formulation and direction of policy. They cannot be actual members of the United Kingdom War Cabinet, because the United Kingdom War Cabinet is responsible to the United Kingdom Parliament, just as the Australian Cabinet is responsible to the Australian Parliament; but they can be given a definite right to be heard in the United Kingdom War Cabinet. That is what is being given to them, and these facilities will be available to any other Dominion that likes to take advantage of them. I would also mention one further step which we are taking. We are considering the possibility of further facilities for consultation at a lower level in matters of defence, matters of foreign affairs, and matters of supply—that is to say, at the level when policy is still being formulated, the formative stage. We have got some definite propositions which we are putting forward to the Dominions, and any Dominion that likes to take advantage of these facilites will find they are available to them. We are only anxious—and I would emphasize this again—to devise satisfactory machinery. Anything we can do which provides satisfaction and produces harmony we shall be delighted to adopt so long as it is practically possible.

In conclusion—and I would apologize to the House for having occupied it so long—let me return just for a moment to the subject of the Pacific, and particularly Australia and New Zealand. I do hope there is no doubt in anybody's mind over here or in the Dominions as to how deeply His Majesty's Government and the British people sympathize with these two Dominions in their present anxiety. We speak with experience. We have ourselves been threatened with invasion now for over two years. We are threatened with it still at the present moment, and we know what an extraordinarily unpleasant sensation it is. We are quite confident that the people of Australia and New Zealand will face the situation with the same courage and resolution as they and other British people have always shown in the past. For our own part, we in this country are quite resolved to go to their assistance in any way and anywhere that may be practically possible. We do not forget the contribution which these two Dominions have made to the common struggle. We do not forget the soldiers, sailors and airmen that have travelled so many thousands of miles to light here and in the Middle East, and by doing so have weakened the defences of their own country. This is not a war, as noble Lords know very well, which is being fought about Great Britain or Australia. It is a world-wide war for the preservation of civilization, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Hutchison, said this afternoon, it has got to be fought everywhere. It must be our object, as I see I it, in the British Empire, whatever the practical difficuties may be, to pool our resources and wisdom and counsel to the best advantage.

I do feel that the British Commonwealth of Nations is to-day one of the greatest, one of the main, elements of stability in a distracted world, and any division of opinion would only tend to weaken counsels and prolong our ordeal. Noble Lords may have read in The Times to-day an extract from the words of an Englishman who lived a very long time ago. I must confess I think they are particularly applicable to the present time. They are by General Lord Brooke, and this is what he says: Citizens of London, you must not think to fight in the sighs; of your wives and children. Therefore when you hear the drums beat, say not, I beseech you, 'I am not of the trained band,' nor this, nor that, nor the other, but doubt not to go out to the work, and this shall be the day of your deliverance. What is it that we fight for? It is for our religion, and for our God, and for our liberty, and all. And what is it they fight for? For their lusts, for their wills, and for their tyranny, to make us slaves and to overthrow all. That spirit of Lord Brooke is, to my mind, the spirit which is at present animating the people of London, the people of Great Britain, and the people of the Dominions. It is in that spirit that we must, and shall, go forward side by side and hand in hand until this tyranny be overthrown.

LORD DENMAN

My Lords, I need not make any apology to your Lordships for having put down this Motion on the Paper of the House. It has, as has been said, given us an interesting and important debate. It has elicited one very notable declaration from the Leader of the House, so important that I would venture to read again one sentence. He said this yesterday: I want to give the assurance, on the part of His Majesty's Government, that in the Allied Councils to-day the very first priority is being given to measures to re-establish our position against Japan. That was a very notable utterance. I have no doubt it was cabled yesterday to the other side of the world, and I have no doubt it has gladdened the hearts of many of our fellow-subjects and Allies in distant Dominions and in parts of the world threatened with immediate invasion at the present time. There have been other notable speeches in this debate, particularly, perhaps, the maiden speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Bennett. I do not suppose a better maiden speech has ever been made in your Lordships' House. We have also had a very valuable contribution from the Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs. I do not wish to detain your Lordships further, but I should like to thank the Government spokesmen for the trouble they have taken to answer the points raised in this debate. I would ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

House adjourned.