§ LORD ADDISON rose to call attention to the war situation, and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, we are meeting, as your Lordships are aware, earlier in the New Year perhaps than some of us once thought we should be meeting; but I think it is impossible at the outset to avoid remembering that, with all our anxieties and with full knowledge of the labours and dangers to come, the prospect is very different from what it was a year ago. We had then survived the peril of the threatened invasion, but our cities, including this great City, had been subjected for months to nightly bombardments, and the alternating sounds of sirens and All Clears were our daily experience. We have to feel great relief, I am sure, that, for the time being anyhow, that is not our experience now. And, worse still, a year ago we were alone. Now how different it is!
§ We should wish, I am sure, in the first instance to pay a tribute to the distinguished service which the Prime Minister has undoubtedly rendered in his visit to the United States and Canada. How much he will have accomplished by his personality and vision only time will reveal, but it is manifest that it has consolidated the military alliance between the British Empire and the United States, and brought into a practical working relationship our great Allies Russia and China, and we can only wish that the arrangements—clearly in the early stages at present—will develop into an effective working direction of our military effort in all parts of the world. I believe, too, that every one of us was glad when we were informed that General Wavell had been appointed to the Chief Command in the Far East. Since then we have had the 380 heartening news of the great programme that President Roosevelt has placed before the United States industries, in figures which can only be described as of astronomical dimensions. And behind it all there is the hope which we must all feel that, however long postponed victory may be, it is undoubtedly certain that this great association of nations will provide at the beginning an effective and powerful instrument that will secure peace for the world after the war, and it is impossible not to think that the unity of purpose of the British Empire, the United States, the Soviet Union and China cannot fail to be affective. I only pray, as I am sure we all pray, that the same inspiration and guidance as those from which we are benefiting at present will be available in those years.
§ We are comforted, too, I am sure, by the progress which, despite unfavourable weather, has been made in Libya. It looks as if it is only a question of time before a more effective cleaning-up even than last time will be achieved in that area. We can quite rightly comfort ourselves with these great assurances which have developed so much even since we last met. But it is not right that we should fail to take note of some disappointments and deficiencies. So far the experience of the war with Japan has been one succession of disappointments. That is not unusual in British history at the openings of wars, and we are all familiar with the saying that it is the last victory that counts. We may be fully assured that in time, when the powers of the united nations are mobilized effectively in the Pacific, the tide will turn, and perhaps turn very quickly; but for all that we are warranted in asking His Majesty's Government—I believe it is an unnecessary request—to make certain inquiries into the causes and circumstances of the defects which have been unmistakable in the conduct of operations in Malaya.
§ One remembers that when we had an expedition to Norway we were unable to make good our ground largely because of two circumstances—the Germans had superiority in the air, and they had command of such railways as there were. With these two conditions against us, we were unable to maintain our foothold. Now, in the situation as it presented itself at the beginning of the Japanese invasion 381 of Malaya, the converse conditions applied. We had there a very valuable aerodrome, which seemed to be taken quite easily. We had control, not far off from Victoria Point in Burma, of the only line of railway which could be used for supply by invading forces down Malaya. Yet nothing effective, as far as I can see, was even attempted. An ordinary amateur like myself very naturally asks himself the question, what is the good of having a magnificent aerodrome as there was there, and also at Victoria Point, if you do not defend it when you have got it? Otherwise one is making a present to the enemy, as was done in this case, of splendid facilities. The Japanese seem to have marched from one point to another, taking first one aerodrome and then another, without any effective resistance. They are now in occupation of a large extent of the most important tin and rubber areas in the Malayan Peninsula.
§ I hope that the Government also will inquire as to who was responsible for the management of the defences in Penang. It appears now that a large amount of valuable stores, and even, I believe, some shipping, of a minor kind anyhow, were left behind undamaged. This evidently has been extraordinarily useful to the Japanese. It is difficult to parallel this series of misfortunes, but, of course, our usual British phlegm was undoubtedly displayed. At the same time, I notice that Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who was Commander-in-Chief in that area, is stated to have said more than a year ago with respect to Hong Kong that any idea that Hong Kong could be captured in a few days or a few weeks was erroneous Then, four months ago, he said in regard to conditions in the Far East: "We are fully prepared, come what may." And on the very day that Japan struck at the United States Pleet in Hawaii he is reported to have said: "We had plenty of warning and our preparations are made and tested." Well, I hope the Government will inquire into how it came about that this officer in a responsible position could make statements so grievously out of accord with what was actually the fact. The only comfort I have got—and I really do not apologize for the language—is that I am very glad that a nincompoop of that kind was promptly removed from command, and that in General Wavell we have got a man of proved capacity whom we trust.
382§ This whole case brings up another which I would ask the House to think of for a few minutes, one that I, amongst others, have brought up on at least three occasions in this House—namely, the defective arrangements so far devised for the defence of aerodromes. We see how grievous are the results of that in Malay. More than a year ago some of us described the medley of arrangements which had up to then been devised in this country for the defence of aerodromes, and so far as I know—anyhow I hope the noble Lord will be able to give us some further information on this—no very effective defence system has been devised, certainly has not been put into operation, in this country. There appear to be certain inter-Service rivalries, if I may so describe them without using the word in an unpleasant sense, between, say, the War Office and the Air Ministry as to who is to do the job and who is to be responsible.
§ LORD ADDISONI do not include the Home Office; I do not regard them as a combatant body. But I see that in recent manœuvres which took place in the Eastern and Midland counties some very remarkable facts emerged so far as they have been made public. It appears that the invading forces in the Eastern counties, by their surprise or whatever method they adopted, captured 25 per cent. of the aerodromes in the area and put a considerable number of others out of action, at all events for a time—a most disconcerting experience. I was only too thankful that at all events the lessons have been revealed. It was said by one important officer, I gather, that the Army is very much alive to the importance of defending aerodromes, but they eat up men in an amazing manner. That I can rightly understand. It depends, of course, upon the system that is adopted.
I have been able to obtain some detailed information as to the methods that are being adopted, at any rate in some areas, and I shall say nothing which will give any useful information to the enemy. There are, of course, the Home Defence battalions, which in many places detail platoons to be responsible for helping in the defence of aerodromes. Then there are the ground staffs of the Air Forces on the aerodromes and, in the background, potentially and frequently actually, a 383 small mobile platoon attached to the Area Commander. (I am not sure whether he is called the Area or District Commander.) I have heard that in some cases, the mechanical staffs which are there necessarily for the maintenance of the aeroplanes, for looking after the efficiency of the machines and keeping them in the air and doing a thousand and one other services which are necessary, have not even been trained to use a rifle. You cannot expect these men to be fully trained in that respect, for, of course, that is not their job. They are engineers, fitters, electricians and all sorts of other craftsmen of that kind; but it is not much to expect that they should, at all events, have received such training and equipment as will enable them to be of great service in the defence of the aerodromes. They have a certain amount of equipment, but they have not had the necessary training; that is quite certain in a large number of cases.
Then the platoons from the Home Defence battalions which are in the district clearly should be properly equipped for the defence, or for helping in the defence, of the aerodromes. I shall not mention the details of their equipment, but in some cases it certainly is not efficient enough. The so-called mobile platoon is in some cases only mobile by the aid of push bicycles. That is not good enough. I think that this matter, which to my knowledge has been in dispute for more than a year, should be dealt with effectively and put under a single Commander. It is quite clear that it would dissipate the Army personnel in an entirely unnecessary manner if we were to have complete units for each aerodrome. They would be multiplied, as many of us know, like leaves in Vallambrosa all over the country, and it would be a needless depletion of the effective forces of the trained Army. That, however, is not to say that it would not be a good thing to have highly efficient and properly equipped groups of forces which would be mobile, which would be available effectively to assist in the defence of aerodromes in support of the local forces and be equipped with proper transport and guns. Whatever may be the way of dealing with the matter, it is quite evident that it cannot be dealt with by two sets of people. It should be under the command of an officer, or a group of officers, who 384 would have control of the whole business and be capable of dealing effectively with threats as they might arise.
It is quite evident that those responsible in Malaya had not thought out any effective method of defending our aerodromes, and I think our experiences during the Recess have brought into greater significance than ever the necessity of effective forces and effective organization for the adequate defence of the growing number of aerodromes in this country. I hope that the noble Lord in his reply will be able to give us some comfort on this very vital matter. I have not introduced these two subjects with any other purpose than that of using the platform of Parliament, as it is our duty to do, to call attention to such defects as appear in our defensive and offensive organization, and in the hope that the Government—whether they reveal what they intend to do or not is of course for them to decide—will effectively create the right kind of organization and not be deterred by any inter-Service rivalries, because the present situation in this respect, anyhow, is undoubtedly alarming. I hope it will not be thought that in calling attention to these two defects I in any way lack appreciation of the services of our heroic forces—one only wants them to be able to operate to the best advantage. I would like in conclusion to refer to the subject with which I opened my speech—namely, our heartfelt gratitude for the services of the Prime Minister and our anxious and sincere hope that we shall see him actively and soon amongst us again.
§ VISCOUNT SAMUELMy Lords, my noble friend the Marquess of Crewe regrets that a slight indisposition prevents him from being in your Lordships' House to-day, and he has asked me to make some observations at this stage on behalf of noble Lords on these Benches. Since your Lordships' House adjourned events have been moving fast. Outstanding have been the heavy German defeats in Russia. The victories achieved by our Allies there can hardly fail to have a profound effect upon the immediate course of the war. Almost the whole of Cyrenaica has been reconquered. The great achievements there would perhaps have had fuller recognition and been received with greater enthusiasm if excessive expectations of immediate sweeping victory had not been 385 aroused at the outset. Forecasts are of minor importance; it is events that count; and perhaps in the future official spokesmen will be more chary of venturing upon military prophecies. The Japanese successes in the first onrush of an unprovoked aggression have had repercussions all round the Pacific and beyond. The United States have been stirred to intense activity and the resolute spirit of the President now seems to permeate the whole of that great nation. China, finding herself united with great Allies, has been stirred to fresh efforts and has lately won a notable victory in the field. She is offering to us welcome aid in the defence of Burma. The Dutch East Indies, occupying a strategic position of great importance, are meeting the situation with forethought and with valour.
In Australia much concern has been expressed on a matter which indeed profoundly concerns us all, the reverses that we have unhappily suffered in Malaya. Voices have been raised there asking for a larger share in arriving at vital strategic decisions. Undoubtedly if Tie Dominions asserted a claim for continued representation each of them in the Imperial War Cabinet, I imagine no one in this country would wish to deny it, although it would make the Cabinet, with four representatives of the great Dominions, and one necessarily of India, a very much larger body than has been desired for a War Cabinet. Furthermore, such a system might involve more delay rather than less, since it might be necessary for Dominion representatives to be continually in consultation with their home Governments. Nor is such a development desired by the Governments of Canada or South Africa. But it seems to be clear that some better method of regional co-ordination, especially in the Pacific, is desired, and it is to be hoped that arrangements may be made which will satisfy public opinion in Australasia that their voice is fully and adequately heard in the protection of the Empire in the Pacific.
I do not know whether the noble Lord, the Leader of the House, will be able to make any statement on that subject today. Possibly the Washington Conference may have consequences in that direction. That Conference has already evoked an historic declaration signed by four of the great Powers and by twenty-two of the smaller ones, endorsing the 386 Atlantic Charter and pledging the whole of the twenty-six united nations to the devotion of the whole of their forces and resources unremittingly to secure complete victory. I am sure all your Lordships will endorse what was said by the noble Lord who has just spoken in appreciation of the efforts made by the Prime Minister, and also I would add by the Foreign Secretary, in undertaking the fatigues and facing the risks, of long journeys under war conditions. Their action, I am sure, is fully appreciated by all their fellow countrymen.
Not least important of the effects of the Japanese aggression, and the initial success that it has won, is to be seen in India. At last, and very belatedly, the political Parties there seem to have gained a greater sense of the realities of the world situation. I have been for many years a friend, and, in many respects, an admirer of Mr. Gandhi, but I am constrained to say that in the present juncture his withdrawal from the Congress leadership is an advantage to the cause of the freedom and peace of the world and also of India, which cannot be isolated from the travails of the world. The uncompromising pacifist, however little he may intend it, is, in effect, the accomplice of the aggressor. Nevertheless, India has been playing a great part in the war through her material resources and through her immense man-power, and the valour of the Indian Forces in the field, in many of the campaigns, has aroused the admiration of us all. Yet India, through lack of political unity, has hitherto been doing less than her duty to the world in this great crisis of our times.
I have felt it my duty, during recent years, on several previous occasions, when affairs relating to India have been debated in this House, to say that, in my view, the whole situation has not been happily handled by the Imperial Government here in Westminster. It has been said at the outset, and has been repeatedly declared, that it was obvious that no great constitutional changes could be made in India during the course of a great war, and that has been very widely accepted. I venture to submit that so far from it being obvious such a conclusion was wholly unjustified, and that at all events important preparatory steps might be taken in spite of the fact that the attention of the Empire must be mainly devoted to the conduct of the 387 war. The continuous repetition of phrases, well-worn during the last decade and more, about "India's goal" and "'India's manifest destiny" merely irritated Indian political opinion, and those who voice it have urged that something very different and more effective is needed. The repetition of phrases about "ultimate Dominion status" is regarded as a form of procrastination.
But to-day, at this moment, there has been undoubtedly a considerable change, and the immediate situation is, I venture to think, more hopeful than it has been at any time during the course of the war. The release of the political prisoners; the notable change in the constitution of the Viceroy's Council; the withdrawal of Mr. Gandhi with his uncompromising Pacifism from the leadership of the Congress Party; the emergence in the forefront of that very wise Indian statesman, the late Premier of Madras, Mr. Rajagopalachariar, and the appeal recently by thirteen distinguished leaders of Indian opinion who are not members of either of the contending Parties, including three members of His Majesty's Privy Council and that leading figure in present day Indian thought, Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan—all these things create a fresh situation of which I hope His Majesty's Government will not be slow to take full advantage. This is not the occasion on which to consider in detail the specific proposals which have lately been put forward, and I should be sorry to pledge myself in advance to support them in every particular, but I earnestly trust that the Government will give to these proposals not only respectful consideration, for that will be assured, but also sympathetic attention, in the hope of arriving at a provisional solution of the problem of securing united Indian effort in a cause that is supremely great.
LORD STRABOLGIMy Lords, I hope that the two noble Lords who have already addressed your Lordships will forgive me if I do not follow them in referring to the two most important matters they have just raised, and that they will allow me, for a few minutes, to deal with one subject—the situation in the Pacific. I am sure that all your Lordships feel most keenly for our fellow subjects, both Asiatic and European, in Hong Kong, Borneo, Malaya and else- 388 where who have done so much to build up the prosperity, peace, happiness and progress of these great British Colonies. Two noble Lords I know, my noble friend the Earl of Cork and my noble friend Lord Chatfield, will remember the great kindness and courtesy which we always received from our fellow subjects who were temporarily exiled in Penang, Singapore, Hong Kong and elsewhere. Those people upheld British traditions and were a credit to the whole Empire.
I gave notice to the noble Lord the Leader of the House, as Colonial Secretary, of certain questions which I proposed to ask—one or two of them have already been put forward by Lord Addison—with reference to recent events in the Western Pacific and South China and what occurred at Hong Kong. I gather that lately, and for some years past, it has been the view in higher circles that Hong Kong was isolated and could not be held against determined attack without outside help, and this we were not in a position to give when Japan attacked. We had to face the Japanese alone there, a great part of the American Fleet being temporarily immobilized in the Western Pacific. It has been suggested that in the circumstances Hong Kong was untenable. I venture to say that that was an error. It could have been held, and not only held but made into an invaluable bridgehead for further operations towards the territory of Kowloon. The territory of Kowloon is defended by a perimeter of hills, and these hills during the last two and a half years—I will not now talk about the time before the war; I will come later to reasons why more was not done—could have been strongly fortified. There was ample labour available. The same people who built the Burma Road could have put up almost impregnable fortifications.
Of course to hold the Kowloon mainland as well as the island of Hong Kong with a couple of brigades of British, Canadian and Indian troops was impossible. The Japanese brought up six divisions. But if we had pursued the proper policy during the preceding two and a half years, and had recruited our Chinese fellow citizens in Hong Kong to be soldiers, we could have had six divisions. The noble Lord the Leader of the House will say, "Ah, yes, but what about munitions?" Well, you might 389 have had munitions made there. There is a big engineering industry in Hong Kong with ample skilled labour and it could have provided a very great deal of equipment. That would have had to be done preferably in collaboration with the Chinese National Government. I was very disappointed indeed to see that General Wavell made his most valuable journey to Chungking to consult with the Chinese General Staff only after Hong Kong was under siege. A little prevision, especially when the Japanese went info Indo-China, and when everybody knew, or should have known, what was most likely to happen, would have led to these consultations being arranged for months before the trouble began. I should also like to ask, in connexion with Kowloon, a similar question to that which has been asked with regard to Malaya: how far did we go, before evacuating the Kowloon territory, in destroying the very valuable docks there, and the engineering installations and workshops?
With regard to the defence of Malaya, I had the privilege of being shown over Singapore, and was also in Penang, in the year of the war, 1939. When I returned, I made a detailed report, as far as I could, to the then Colonial Secretary, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, who is now our distinguished High Commissioner in Canada, and to my noble friend Lord Chatfield, who was then Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, in the latter case with regard to certain aspects of the subject only I ventured to point out that not in my opinion, but in the opinion of everyone to whom I spoke out there—men in responsible positions, men whom I used to know as young planters, and with whom I played football, but who are now leaders of commerce, members of the Legislative Council, and so on, men who have devoted their lives to building up our interests in Malaya, as well as the Service people—there were certain defects, which I brought, as I thought it was right to do, to the notice of the appropriate authorities here. I am sure that a great deal has been done since then to improve matters. First of all, however, I wish to pay a great tribute to the then General Officer Commanding, General Dobbie, who is now in Malta. He was undoubtedly a great loss to Singapore. Everybody had the greatest confidence in him; but the people did not have the same confidence in cer- 390 tain other high personages holding most responsible positions in the Colony and in the Federated States. There were certain defects of character and of temperament which I thought it right to point out, of which I knew not from my own observation but from the information of people who could be trusted; and I am not surprised that there was a chaotic position when the trouble began, because the same people retained high office.
With regard to the defence of Malaya, there again we had an opportunity which was lost. There are in the Malay States two million Chinese, who are, for the most part, British subjects. They hate the Japanese like poison. They raised large sums of money at that time and subsequently for the support of the Government of Chiang Kai-shek at Chungking. We could have raised an Army from these two million Chinese, supported by a much larger Army raised from among the Malays—I will come to that in a moment—which would have eaten the Japanese who came into Malaya. The vaunted invincibility of the Japanese is sheer nonsense. They have storm troops who no doubt are very good, but man for man in the fighting of the last four and a half years in China the Chinese soldiers have been the equal and the superior of the Japanese, and, when they have had anything like the same equipment, they have defeated them again and again; all the world knows that.
It was obvious that the fortress of Singapore was very strong, but the defence of the hinterland demanded a much larger field Army than we had available, and the obvious thing was to recruit from our Chinese fellow-citizens. I was told, "Yes, we know, but unfortunately there is trouble between the Powers That Be and the leaders of the Kuomintang." It is to that Party that the Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Wellington Koo, and the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, belong; it is the National Party of the present Government of China, and probably the majority of the Chinese in Malaya are members of it. There was, however, some friction there, and I understand that the leader of the Kuomintang, a very respectable and respected Chinese citizen, was deported from the Colony and has now had to be brought back.
With regard to the Malays, the account that we have had of the tiny State forces 391 of Malays—in one of the great States they numbered only one hundred, maintained for the dignity of the Sultan—is that they behaved admirably; but why were there so few of them? The population of the Malay States would support a very large Army: why was it not raised? His Majesty's Government will say, "You could raise them, but you would not have the equipment for them." In Singapore, however, a local arms-making industry could have been built up, because there is a very large engineering industry there now, and much skilled labour. I venture to ask for some explanation of this point from His Majesty's Government.
With regard to the general lack of preparation of the civil population, and the lack of proper civil defence arrangements, I do not want to emphasize the position, which has been described in the newspapers, but it is obvious that a great deal was lacking, and that a great deal of preparation was required. I should like to ask who is responsible out there for the broad scheme of defence, and particularly of civil defence. A very distinguished British statesman, Mr. Duff Cooper, who has held high and important offices here, is out there as a direct representative of the War Cabinet. Is he really in a position of authority there now, and can he resolve the conflicting interests which are apparently holding up certain very essential preparations? My noble friend Lord Addison asked about the destruction of plant and stores at Penang. I should like to amplify that, and in particular to ask the noble Lord, Lord Moyne, whether it is a fact that the wireless station was allowed to fall intact into Japanese hands. I understand that the Japanese used it very shortly afterwards for their usual poisonous propaganda to the local population. It is also stated in the Press that in Penang the Japanese captured 1,000 motor cars, 1,000 tons of copper, 2,000 tons of rubber, 500 barrels of petroleum, and so on. In a dispatch of January 4 last appearing in the Daily Mail, and describing the Japanese landing which has caused so much trouble on the west coast of Malaya—the guarded side—it is stated that the landing was effected by soldiers from barges towed by two steamers from Penang. There must have been something very wrong there if those ships were allowed to fall into enemy hands. Those are just a few questions 392 which I really think should be answered, and the reason I put them forward is, as my noble friend Lord Addison has said, that by attention to these matters we may hope to get some remedy for the future.
Referring generally to the defence of the British and Allied possessions round the South China Seas, what is the present responsibility of the Committee of Imperial Defence? Does it exist any more? Has it functioned during the war? My noble friend Lord Chatfield shakes his head. Before the war, what was the Committee's responsibility? Surely the duty of the Committee of Imperial Defence was to keep a very close eye on the developments in the Far East, and particularly on the defence preparations which we were making. We have to-day the responsibility of the Prime Minister as Minister of Defence and Chairman of the Defence Committee, but my noble friend Lord Moyne—who himself, I am glad to remember, has an intimate and wide knowledge of the part of the world which I am discussing—will be the last man to divest himself of his responsibilities as Colonial Secretary. We shall not find him dropping his office of Colonial Secretary as a sort of chrysalis skin and appearing only as the glittering butterfly the Leader of your Lordships' House. He will not shirk his responsibilities. I am afraid that the Colonial Office will have a great deal to answer for in the future with regard to this part of the world.
While we are talking of these matters I must also draw attention to a topic touched on by my noble friend Lord Addison, and that is the very disquieting event of the cabling direct from Canberra of the Australian Prime Minister to President Roosevelt and our own Prime Minister in Washington on matters of strategy. I know the valuable work that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in His Majesty's Government does, but there must be some lack of consultation and information to make it necessary for the Prime Minister of Australia to have to cable direct to our own Prime Minister and to the President of the United States in Washington on matters of the highest importance regarding the defence of the Pacific and of Australia.
May I ask the Leader of the House a question about the Intelligence Service? I do not know whose responsibility the Intelligence Service in Malaya is. I do 393 not know what Department it comes under, but it seems not to have provided the necessary information. For example, what reports did we get of the attitude of the Thais? We were led to suppose that they would resist Japanese aggression, that they would fight for their independance. Well, everything seems to have been well prepared in advance for the Japanese, and they did nothing of the kind. What Intelligence Service have we functioning in Thailand, and what information did it provide?
With regard to the whole question of strategy generally, if your Lordships will permit me just to make this remark, I can see a danger in these new arrangements that we are making for joint planning and control of the various theatres of war. The danger I see is that we are not separating the planning departments, the thinking departments which prepare our future plans, from the bodies which are engaged in the day-to-day strategy. The same body cannot do both. You must have your planning committee of the best experts you can get, who have access to all the information and intelligence from all sources. It ought to be a joint international body, with access to intelligence reports from America, China, Russia, the British Empire, and so on. It must have the fullest information as to our material resources in the future, and it must make plans for the future, which is not a simple matter in modern conditions, when you have to co-ordinate three different Fighting Forces and the action of twenty-six nations engaged. That body cannot possibly also conduct the day-to-day strategy and administration, and the danger I see is that you are not separating those two bodies.
There are two policies with regard to strategy in the future. One is the policy of Mr. Micawher. We have seen it in action for two and a half years. It was the Franco-British policy during the first period of the war, the policy of sitting down behind the Maginot Line and waiting for something to turn up. It was our policy in the second period, when we were waiting for the Germans to invade us. Then, when something does turn up, such as the German invasion of Russia or America's entry into the war, we are not ready to take advantage of our good luck. That is the attitude of Mr. Micawber. The other policy is to prepare in advance. 394 You have an excellent example of that in the present Libyan campaign, prepared six months beforehand in most careful detail. That is a strategy, that is a policy, and its preparation in advance in all its details is a matter that is carried out very efficiently by our two principal enemies. Both the Germans and the Japanese are very good at it; they make all their preparations well in advance, and perhaps in too great detail.
I said just now that we were not ready with plans when the United States entered the war. Curiously enough, we were not ready last time; we had an ad hoc strategy then. I should have thought the chance of America being drawn into the war was so obvious that we would have had three plans ready, and that they would have been discussed in advance, the first envisaging the United States being at war with Japan only, the second their being at war with Germany only—that was a possibility; the Japanese might have kept out altogether—and the third contemplating a war with the whole Axis. Those are the three master plans that could have been prepared in advance, and I can find no evidence that they were seriously considered. What we did was to go on planning for the United States continuing as a non-belligerent. It was equally urgent to make plans for co-operation with Russia in certain eventualities.
Now there was a certain amount of local preparation made in what were called the A.B.C.D. talks in the Western Pacific with the Dutch, the Americans and the Chinese, and may I echo what has been said by my noble friend about the magnificent help we have had from the Dutch East Indies and the far-sighted Dutch Commanders in Asia in their preparations for this eventuality? If there had been a thinking department functioning with American representatives such as I have been trying to describe, and if these plans had been made in advance, the American Pacific Fleet and its aircraft would not have been at Hawaii at all, they would have been at Manila, or, better still, at Singapore; and the time to have moved the Pacific Fleet and its supply ships there was when the Japanese walked into Indo-China. That was the danger signal; that was the time when we should have taken action. If that had been done, I venture to say there was a possibility that the Japanese might have kept out altogether. But I only cite 395 this as an example of the need of the most expert and competent planning body you can find, which you must separate from your day-to-day administration and strategy.
Just one word about the Japanese propaganda of Asia for the Asiatics. It is very dangerous unless it can be countered, and it can be countered. It was already at work when I was out there two and a half years ago. The Chinese and the Malays laughed at it; they said it only means "Asia for the Japanese." "Asia for the Asiatics" is the policy of His Majesty's Government—of successive Governments of His Majesty for two decades. The late Duke of Devonshire laid down the whole policy of trusteeship with regard to our Colonies, which I believe on the whole we have tried to follow out. That really is Asia for the Asiatics, at least Asia for the Asiatics in our own Dominions and territories. If we plan on those lines and encourage these peoples in the control of their own affairs and the defence of their own territories I am certain we shall have the right response, and the Japanese propaganda will fall on stony ground.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD MOYNE)My Lords, the scope of to-day's debate reflects the enormous extension of the war which has unfolded itself during the last month, and it is impossible in the time during which I should feel justified in claiming the attention of your Lordships to do more than touch very briefly on some of the more important questions which have been asked. I had better begin, I think, with the matter of defence of home aerodromes which was raised by the noble Lord, the Leader of the Opposition. I know that this matter has caused very deep anxiety in many quarters, and it has been the subject of long and careful consideration by our military advisers. The difficulty is obvious. It is a problem which affects the join-up between the Air Force and the Army, and in this problem of co-operation we had to find a solution which will avoid the danger of divided responsibility. The loss of aerodromes in Crete brought home to us the vital need of some solution which will avoid these dangers at home. In Crete we had command of the sea but hot of the air. Malaya is perhaps hardly in point in comparison with this country, because 396 we lost the aerodromes in Malaya not from lack of local defence, but because the whole line went back. In the case of Malaya also we had command neither of the sea nor of the air.
These experiences have taught many lessons as to the necessary tactics and equipment for local aerodrome defence. In the Battle of Britain we had superiority both on land and sea, and we have every intention and expectation of keeping this in both respects. To-day we are much stronger than we were a year ago, but our aerodromes are likely to be the first objective in case of invasion. The first lines of defence will be on the sea and in the air, and our superiority there will deal with surface invasion. Air superiority will strike at air-borne attack, and frustrate attempts to attack aerodromes from the coast. But even if our main defences hold, successful raids on our aerodromes might well result in very grave consequences. Though local aerodrome defence is the last line behind the Navy, the Air Force, and the first line Home Forces, it must be a vital part of our organization. The new arrangements will cover not only Royal Air Force aerodromes, but also the naval aerodromes and those of the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
It is evident that local defence strategy must dovetail in with the operations of the mobile Army, and far more coordination with the mobile and static defence must be a primary responsibility of the military commander in planning our land defences. The Royal Air Force on an aerodrome possess a large fund of disciplined man-power, primarily for serviceing aeroplanes but also of very great value, when armed and trained, for local defence in an emergency. This ground staff is necessarily under the control of the Station Commander and the problem consists in avoiding divided responsibility between him and the local Army Command. After careful examination by all three Services, it has been decided that, while Army responsibility for ground defence as a whole must be maintained, the Royal Air Force under military direction and as agent for the Army shall undertake the entire local defence arrangements at its aerodromes. A corps of aerodrome defence troops called the Royal Air Force Regiment under the executive and administrative control of the Air 397 Council will be formed for that purpose. Major-General Liardet, until recently Inspector of Aerodrome Defence, has been appointed Director-General of Ground Defence in the Air Ministry, and as the senior officer of the Regiment, although not exercising operational control, he will be given the title of Commander.
§ LORD ADDISONMay I ask my noble friend what he means by "operational control"?
§ LORD MOYNEOperational control will be in the hands of the local aerodrome commander carrying out the plans which have been concerted with the local Army Command. The Director-General will have a staff of other Army officers of all ranks and high qualifications and experience, who will be seconded to the Royal Air Force for that purpose. The corps will be equipped for its special task not only with ordinary infantry arms, but with artillery and armoured fighting vehicles. The Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces will decide the disposition of aerodrome garrisons, and will indicate to the Air Ministry the necessary methods of defence. At the same time each Royal Air Force Station Commander will, under the direction of the Royal Air Force, be responsible for the local defence of the station, and exercise full executive control not only over the ground staff auxiliaries, but also over the whole-time garrison troops of the Royal Air Force Regiment. In the event of active army operations near an aerodrome, the Station Commander, for purposes of defence, comes under the operational control of the local military Commander, with whom he will previously have concerted plans for combined defence. This scheme is the result of prolonged and careful examination by the three Services, and we believe that it is the best that can possibly be developed to prevent the confusion of divided responsioility.
§ VISCOUNT SAMUELMay I ask whether these arrangements are limited to Great Britain or whether they will apply to other parts of the Empire?
§ LORD MOYNEI cannot, at this moment, give any indication as to future developments outside this country. It will clearly take considerable time to build up this new force, and for the moment there is no definite decision as to how far it will be available for service in other 398 theatres. That matter is still under consideration.
§ LORD MOYNEThe naval aerodromes and the aerodromes of the Ministry of Aircraft Production come into the scheme parallel with the Royal Air Force aerodromes. Now, I would like to come to the wider field. Most of the discussion to-day has dealt with the situation in the Far East after a month of war. We have to remember that Japan started with a great strategic advantage of interior lines, which have enabled her to concentrate overwhelming force in the shortest possible time at any selected point. She seems to be staking everything on quick results, and on the dispersal of her forces which, collectively, are incomparably stronger in man-power and resources. Prompt measures have been taken to counter this initial advantage.
Of outstanding importance are the meetings of the Prime Minister with President Roosevelt. They have in four weeks brought about against Japan that unity of command which it took nearly four years to achieve against Germany in the last war. The indomitable General Chiang Kai-shek gave a heartening lead by his message: at the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, when he stated that all the Chinese man-power, armed forces and resources were unreservedly at Allied disposal. We welcome the invaluable advantage of General Chiang Kai-sheks experience. I also would like to re-echo what the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, said of the wonderful tenacity and courage of the Chinese Army, and the splendid qualities it has shown during these years of war with inferior equipment and with everything against it. The war cannot, of course, be divided into compartments, and the next step after securing unity of command in the Pacific will be to solve the problems of co-ordination on a world scale. We were told on Tuesday by President Roosevelt, in effect, that American resources are also being pooled with ours for the war on Germany. The Foreign Secretary's Mission to Moscow has also been a very important step towards world-wide unity of control and the best use of our resources within the great alliance, not, I 399 hope, only in war but also in post-war re-settlement. There is, of course, no historical precedent to guide us in the problem of strategic control of a world war, and it would be premature for His Majesty's Government to embark at this stage on public discussion of the problem and its possible solution.
To come back to the theatre of war where unity of command has already been arranged, the Battle of the Pacific began with two naval disasters, and the balance has for the moment been still further tilted in favour of Japan by the surrender of invaluable bases in Indo-China by the Vichy Government for the attack on Malaya. Japan no doubt timed her treachery to suit the interests of the Axis. The Nazis remind one of an old fox with the hounds close to his brush who is lucky enough to kick up a fresh fox and who, with crafty cunning, must be hoping that the pack will go off on the new scent. The Prime Minister is far too good a huntsman to allow such a diversion. In this war first things must come first. Germany is the main enemy, and we must never forget it. We have got to look at our commitments as a whole, and keep our perspective against the huge background of the world war. Taking these earlier commitments, Malta has shown that a small island inhabited by a gallant people, and led by the indomitable General Dobbie, can stand up in a way which has certainly defeated Nazi expectations from their incessant bombing. We surely cannot lessen the defence which the Air Force is able to give them, and which has helped them to face these heavy odds. The long-drawn battle of Cyrenaica has shown that in that theatre, too, we did not overestimate our needs in aeroplanes and tanks to secure the defeat of Rommel.
The prodigious change of fortunes in Russia is a great encouragement to her Allies and to the enslaved and tortured nations under the Axis yoke. We know that Russia is inflicting deadly wounds on Germany, and that our material help in fighter aeroplanes and tanks is a vital contribution to the full exploitation of her success. It clearly would not be right for me to disclose the vast scale of that help which we have been able to send at the time of Russia's emergency owing to the removal of her original war 400 factories, but when those figures are disclosed I think it will surprise the world that, in our own difficulties, it has been possible to organize and to transport such a great contribution to the reorganization of the Russian lines. I ought, perhaps, to mention that the Foreign Secretary saw Russian troops in the field and was able to judge their wonderful morale. They have performed an astounding feat of arms by turning, after a long retirement, upon their aggressors with newly-organized Armies, and they have driven back the invaders in a way which may well prove more disastrous to the Nazis than the retreat of Napoleon. But I would remind your Lordships that there was a long road between Napoleon's retreat and his final overthrow. We must not base on this marvellous performance of Russia any complacent view of the task which still awaits us; but with all that reservation we cannot but be heartened by the evidences of distress which this has caused in Germany. The frantic appeals of Dr. Goebbels for fur coats and one glove at a time show that this retirement of the Nazis was not, to use the well-worn phrase, according to plan.
In the Far East our needs are of course very heavy on sea power, but they must not induce us to take any risks in the Battle of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Our sea power in the West is cutting deep into the Nazis with a two edged weapon, first destroying their submarines and protecting our convoys, and with its second edge drawing away the life blood of our enemies by the dislocation of their supplies. Our forces in the Far East have had to take their place among these other urgent claims. The overwhelming resources of this country and the United States have been speedily mobilized to deal effectively with the Pacific war, but we have to reckon with the inevitable delays caused by time and space. Your Lordships will perhaps forgive me for saying that I think some of the suggestions which have been made would apply rather to a war fought in a vacuum than to the present Far Eastern war, which is being fought by the Allies not in a vacuum but subject to very heavy previous pressures. Before the Japanese attack we were straining every nerve to catch up Germany in man-power and resources. The war in the Pacific can only take its place as part of the Allied 401 war effort as a whole, and no one ignorant of the resources available and of our previous commitments can judge whether the best possible measures have indeed been taken to organize victory.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked a question about the Committee of Imperial Defence, and clearly it was in his mind to discover whether far-sighted plans for the Far Eastern problems had been worked out in this country. The Committee of Imperial Defence was a peacetime organization and it was part of its function to advise the Government of the day and the Service Departments as to preparations for war emergencies. That Committee, as was planned and as took place in 1914, was dissolved at the outbreak of war. It was a purely advisory Committee and it would hare been a very cumbrous method to keep this advisory Committee advising the Cabinet and the results of the decisions going out through executive channels. Therefore at the outbreak of war the previous Government set up, as was intended, a War Cabinet and under that War Cabinet there was organized a Defence Committee which has delegated to it from the War Cabinet certain executive functions in connexion with the carrying out of plans which are worked out by the Services. The noble Lord need have no fear that the dissolution of the peace-time Committee of Imperial Defence has in any way been the cause of lessening responsibility for far-sighted plans.
On the details of the recent fighting in Malaya I would like to clear up one or two misapprehensions. Reference has been made to the loss of aerodromes. I think the noble Lord probably had in mind the aerodrome at Kota. Bahru. Undoubtedly its capture meant a great deal to the Japanese, but no amount of static and local ground defence would have saved that aerodrome nor the other ten or fifteen aerodromes which have fallen into Japanese hands owing to the whole line going back. Static defence cannot secure an aerodrome as an island in the midst of conquered territory. The static garrison cannot stand like Casabianca on the burning deck. They have got to be part of the defence while the territory round them is occupied by the mobile Army.
§ LORD ADDISONI am sorry to interrupt and I hope the noble Lord will not 402 think me discourteous, but the anxiety in my mind when discussing this point was due to the fact that these aerodromes were abandoned practically uninjured and were made a present in an efficient form to the enemy. They could easily have been destroyed.
§ LORD MOYNEI understand that heavy destruction did take place, and that only a very small number of these aerodromes are actually in Japanese use. The noble Lord is well aware of the difficulty of the whole destruction of aerodromes. The blowing of craters is only a temporary measure, but we have evidence that the orders for maximum total destruction were carried out. I am afraid it is inevitable that the advantages of flat ground will again be used and the craters will be filled up. The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked many questions about Hong Kong, of which he has close personal knowledge. He will understand that we have few details as to what actually took place, and he probably knows just as much as we do from the statements which have appeared in the Press from the members of the garrison who made their way into Chinese territory. We do know, however, that the plan for creating a strong defensive line had been carried out on the mainland. That line was about fifteen miles in length covered by pill boxes in depth and sited about six or seven miles from Kowloon on very favourable hilly ground. It was never intended that the main line of defence should be on the mainland. The plan always was that this line should be held long enough to allow the evacuation of Kowloon and the destruction of the great docks and engineering establishments which existed in Kowloon. We have every reason to believe that that plan was carried out, and that demolitions were effected before evacuation took place.
The noble Lord suggested that we ought to have taken greater advantage of local man-power. I am afraid that, although he dismissed it very cursorily, the difficulty of equipment is a very real one, and the same problem exists throughout many of our territories. We are doing everything we can to produce equipment wherever there is available plant and manpower. As the noble Lord well knows, the Chinese are excellent workers, and a great deal of military equipment has actually been produced in the Colony of 403 Hong Kong. I can only give the numbers of the forces engaged in round figures, but there was a local force of about 6,000 apart from the armed police, and they are to be added to some 4,000 British, about 2,000 Canadians and about 2,000 Indians.
LORD STRABOLGIMy Lords, may I ask if the 6,000 to whom the noble Leader of the House refers, were Chinese troops?
§ LORD MOYNEMy Lords, I am afraid I have not got the full details. That was the local force but the men in it were by no means all Chinese.
LORD STRABOLGIIt would include European volunteers, who are a very valuable force, I know, would it not?
§ LORD MOYNEYes, it would; there was no racial discrimination in this force, but, as I say, I have not got the full details. We do not yet know how the Japanese were able unexpectedly to effect a landing on the island, but once this had been achieved reinforcements of overwhelming strength crossed the narrow straits, and it was then clear that it could be only a matter of time before the height and the water supply were in the hands of the enemy. After a phase of hand-to-hand fighting in the streets, all further effective resistance became impossible. I think it will be obvious to any one who has been to Hong Kong that once the high ground and the water supply were lost the garrison could only fight on, as they did, to exact the highest possible price from the swarms of attackers who so greatly outnumbered them. Evacuation of Hong Kong in advance of attack has been suggested from various quarters, though not by any of your Lordships to-day. I would point out in regard to this matter that it would have been a very great military advantage if we could have retained Hong Kong because if the Chinese had been able to effect a junction with us it would have given them a new, and far shorter, line of seaborne supply than the supply line they possess in the Burma Road.
The noble Lord, Lord Addison, and other speakers, have made inquiries as to the alleged failure of the scorched earth policy in Malaya and elsewhere, and have asked on whom must be thrown the responsibility. The stories of failure to destroy essential equipment of value to 404 the enemy at Penang are at present the subject of inquiry, and I can only make a very provisional statement on the information which has reached the Colonial Office. I hope that the House will bear that reservation in mind, and will understand that I cannot be sure that the picture is complete. The account which has reached us of the destruction in Penang suggests that there has been considerable exaggeration as to the alleged failure of the policy of destruction. In Penang the problem of destroying commodities was much complicated by the need for speed and secrecy, which were essential for successful evacuation. The destruction had, accordingly, to be effected by other means than by explosion or fire. By various methods, the Army rendered the fixed defences useless except as scrap iron, but the embargo on fire is said to have made it impossible to destroy a considerable amount of commodities which thereby fell into the hands of the enemy. I have made inquiries about the wireless station, but I have not been able to get any definite information either way.
As to shipping, all vessels were successfully evacuated except about fifty small craft, the largest of which were six vessels, none of them exceeding 75 tons. It was impossible to remove these in the short time available owing to the effect of the series of heavy bombing attacks which had caused the disappearance of their Indian crews. The absence of air defence and fighter aircraft to which the noble Lord alluded was due to lack of resources and to the loss of the forward aerodromes and many of the aeroplanes. As to Thailand, full reports were received over the whole period preceding the Japanese war from our British Minister, and he had a Military Attaché on his staff. The probable attitude of the Thailand Government was accurately appreciated, and no effort was spared in a prolonged attempt to promote a spirit of independence and resistance to Japanese aggression which was so clearly threatened by reason of their taking over bases from the Vichy Government.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked about the responsibility of the Minister who has been in Malaya, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. I am afraid that I cannot say anything definite at this moment. As your Lordships will realize, reorganization is in progress, and I do not know exactly how the Singapore com- 405 mands will be arranged under the Commander-in-Chief, General Wavell. On the smaller problem of civil defence, the arrangements are controlled by the Government, while the Army and Air Defence are under the Commander-in-Chief. There has been the fullest co-ordination by means of a War Council, as to the future of which I am afraid that at the present time I can give no definite forecast.
VISCOUNT ELIBANKBefore the noble Lord leaves that question of the defence of Singapore, may I ask whether the military Commander-in-Chief, if I may so call him, is satisfied with the arrangements which have been made? With the Japanese knocking at the door, is he satisfied that Singapore should not be under Martial Law?
§ LORD MOYNEIt is under Martial Law. We have had considerable discussion as to exactly how Martial Law was to be legally founded, and it is actually in force. Our Colonial outposts have so far borne the brunt of the attack. It has clearly been impossible to defend all our Dependencies, many of which, such as Borneo, are of great area. The chief prize in Biitish Borneo consists of the oilfields in Sarawak and Brunei. A scheme for their complete destruction and for the demolition of refineries, pipe-lines and other plant was worked out by experts specially sent out by the Petroleum Department. A telegram was dispatched to complete the scheme even before the outbreak of war, and we have received a report to the effect that it has been fully carried out. There can therefore be no foundation for the reports that the Japanese are obtaining any oil, because this must be impossible until they have sunk new wells and erected new refineries and pipe-lines. Russia has shown the importance of this policy of "scorched earth," and of course, the developed resources of Malaya are far richer than those of Borneo. The scorched-earth policy will be ruthlessly applied. The War Council at Singapore have given instructions that all stocks of rubber, copra, refined metals, oil and other commodities of value to the enemy, and also mining plant and transpont, are to be denied to him by ruthless destruction.
There is a peculiar practice known in the Far East as "running amok"—a state of murderous frenzy where his own 406 life seems as nothing to the aggressor. There is something of this spirit in the ferocious exploitation of their opportunities by the Japanese. Undoubtedly we have anxious weeks and months ahead; but the vast resources in shipping and munitions announced by President Roosevelt show that, once we have settled with our main enemy in Europe, it will be impossible for a nation with the limited man-power and small productive resources of Japan to escape the overthrow which she has challenged.
§ LORD ADDISONMy Lords, I understand that other noble Lords who had thought of speaking have decided not to intervene. I would therefore thank the noble Lord for his statement. But I am bound to say that in some respects it increases the misgiving which I previously felt. I am sorry to have to say that. With regard to the proposals which the noble Lord announced for the defence of aerodromes, various questions immediately occur to one's mind, but I think the matter is so grave and so important "that we ought to have time to consider it. I should like the noble Lord to know, however, that I feel that it would be right to have a full discussion of that important matter as soon as possible and, if need be, in secret. On that, of course, I can confer with him as to his wishes', but I am sure that the matter should be discussed. My mind is left extremely dissatisfied.
I heard what the noble Lord said about Malaya, and about what was done with regard to the scorched-earth policy in Penang. It does not make me feel any happier. The whole thing speaks of indecision and feeble direction, and without a doubt he must know that as well as I do. I only hope and pray, as we all do, that the new arrangements will have abolished that sort of thing, and that under General Wavell's direction we shall have a clear-sighted, ruthless war policy. I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.
§ Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.