Lords Sitting of 4 February 1942

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
LORD GEDDES.
The Right Honourable Sir Auckland Campbell Geddes, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., having been created Baron Geddes of Rolvenden in the County of Kent—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
LORD WINSTER.
Reginald Thomas Herbert Fletcher, Esquire, having been created Baron Winster of Witherslack in the County of Westmorland—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
NEWCASTLE AND GATESHEAD WATERWORKS BILL. [H.L.]
Read 2a.

PRIVATE BILLS.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW)THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW) had given Notice that he would move, That the Standing Orders relative to Scottish Orders, etc., be amended as follows: Page 75. After Standing Order 202, insert the following new Standing Order: "A Bill conferring powers in respect of which it is intended to make a representation under subsection (4) of Section I of the Procedure Act, shall not be deposited before the representation has been made to the Secretary of State for Scotland."
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move a Standing Order dealing with Scottish Orders. I am going to move it, with your Lordships' permission, in a slightly different form from that in which it appears on the Paper. The last word but one in the second line of the proposed new Standing Order is "before". I suggest that that should be deleted, and the words "earlier than four weeks after" put in. The Scottish Office are anxious that this alteration should be made for the sake of clarity, and I hope your Lordships will permit me to move the Motion in that form.
Moved, That the Standing Orders relative to Scottish Orders, etc., be amended as follows:
Page 75. After Standing Order 202, insert the following new Standing Order:
"A Bill conferring powers in respect of which it is intended to make a representation under subsection (4) of Section 1 of the Procedure Act, shall not be deposited earlier than four weeks after the representation has been made to the Secretary of State for Scotland."—(The Earl Of Onslow.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly. The said new Standing Order to be printed.

ABYSSINIA.
LORD NOEL-BUXTON LORD NOEL-BUXTON rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can make a statement on Abyssinia; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, His Majesty's Government have indeed generously responded to my request for information regarding the situation in Abyssinia, and it is very appropriate that your Lordships' House should debate the Agreement which has been announced in the White Paper today. Full as much of that information is, I hope the noble Viscount who represents the Government will add to it in the course of his speech. I desire to express a view which is held by large numbers of people interested in the welfare of the Abyssinian population. I do not claim to speak for the Labour Party, but to be giving my own views.
Public anxiety has been great in regard to this Agreement, so long delayed, and I am very glad that that anxiety is now relieved. I should like to welcome the fact of the Agreement having been achieved, though I doubt whether some of its provisions are fully adequate. I think the period is too short, and I hope the noble Lord will be able to tell us what security we are to look to for good government in the future. As for the main provision for assistance to Abyssinia—namely, the advisers who are proposed—what is to happen if their advice is ignored years hence? Then we find a very generous financial contribution, which is surely on the right lines for such a backward country, but it is in the form

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of a grant not on the lines such as were used in the case of Austria, for instance, in regard to League loans, involving supervision or control of expenditure. So far as one can see that is not embodied in the terms of the Agreement, and one does not see how the financial aid given can be used as a lever to exercise pressure in the direction of reform. On these points I am sure the noble Viscount will be able to tell us more, but certainly the situation in that in many ways unfortunate country will be greatly improved by the achievement of the Agreement.
Our own conduct of the war will be greatly assisted, because in the absence of a separate Government, and owing to the disordered state of the country, our troops at this day are largely occupied in guarding communications. So far as they can be relieved that will be a great point to the good. Up to now the War Office has been the main factor in the Abyssinian situation. The political factor has been represented by District Commissioners, largely borrowed from the Sudan Government. Some of the very best of the Sudan officials have been combed out for service in Abyssinia. Disorder has not altogether been removed by the departure of the Italians. We must always remember that the normal condition of Abyssinia was a semi-feudal one, in which the Chiefs maintained a very large degree of independence of the Emperor's authority. Now that condition has been rather deteriorated as against the pre-Italian invasion period, because many of the Chiefs—and others who became successful guerilla leaders have now been exercising the functions of Chiefs—are difficult to remove. Even if in the Emperor's opinion they are not ideal as administrators, they are still in the exercise of power, and there is a large amount of disorder in the country largely connected with the stores of munitions which are still not under the control of the Central Government.
The Agreement, I hope, provides for the future more than it appears to do on the face of it. We must recall the conditions which existed before the Italian invasion as an indication of what they would return to if outside influence and help were not provided. Abyssinia was a country of forced labour, of serfdom. It had no efficient police; it had practically
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no roads, great as the country was; there were even Governors whose administration was more destructive than beneficial; and above all, there was an immense prevalance of slavery. Worse than that, there was kidnapping for slavery together with a slave trade. It would not be unfair to call the conditions chaotic. There was no Budget and there was not a Government in the modern sense of the term. To take another point, I wish the Agreement had some international aspects attached to it, because surely our main duty is to plan for the future order of Africa. International stability is the greatest interest of all, and we must not prejudice the future of Africa by what we do now. We must not prejudice the settlement which, after the war, His Majesty's Government may want to aid. I am very glad that the Agreement indicates the rejection of an Imperial policy. That is very timely, because in South Africa and in East Africa there has been a body of opinion talking about annexation and using such phrases as a "useful addition to the Empire." The Atlantic Declaration ought to have disposed of that, but now the Agreement makes it clear that we are not waging a war of annexation, and that will relieve many minds.
We must always bear in mind that the future African order is of paramount importance. We must trust that whatever is done now will lead to a system in which Africa does not become an incentive to war in the future. The feud of the "haves" and "have-nots" has been a main cause of strife, and I wish that the international factor could find a place in the Abyssinian settlement. The Times expert on Africa, Miss Perham, made an interesting suggestion the other day that a certain part of Abyssinia which is not in any sense Abyssinian—the Danakil country on the eastern side—might be separately constituted under an international regime. Then, of course, the appointment of officials might embody some international element, and it would be a step if we made it easy for many of these officials to be non-British, drawn from Allied countries, international on lines which Lord Lugard, for instance, has advocated in the past.
Some will criticize the Agreement on the ground that it does not merely and com-

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pletely restore the authority of the Emperor. But in my view that would not be possible. We were faced with a dilemma. On general principles we should wish to withdraw from all participation in the government of the country whatever we might have to do militarily during the war, but particular and definite duties compel us to stay. If Abyssinia were constituted like Norway, or like Greece, it would be a very happy task to retire altogether from concern with its internal government and have the Emperor to resume sovereignty in full. But surety the difficulties of that would have been insuperable. The Emperor is helpless without our protection. We are responsible for his restoration and consequently for the welfare, up to a point, of the population. We must remember that more than half the population of the country is not Abyssinian, but consists of tribes conquered in the past, who have no voice whatever as to the Government and cannot express their wishes—to use the words of the Atlantic Charter.
And there was, above all, this unique factor of slavery. It is provided in connexion with the Agreement that the Emperor shall issue decrees abolishing slavery. I hope that the noble Viscount, Lord Cranborne, will tell us something of the means by which a real termination of slavery will be secured. The Italians issued a decree abolishing slavery, but we have heard extremely little of any progress having been achieved as a result of that decree. Being responsible for the restoration of the Emperor, we surely must not be responsible in any way for the prolongation of this gigantic evil. We could not ignore the question of slavery without real dereliction. Your Lordships know that this has long been a preoccupation of the Foreign Office in a degree which has not been present in regard to our relations with other countries at all, and I shall be excused if I dwell for a moment on the extent and importance of this factor in the Abyssinian situation. Abyssinian slavery constitutes a unique case. It is supported by long tradition, by religious beliefs and, prominently, by the Abyssinian Church. Lord Lugard who knows the situation well, held it as his view that the Church furnished the strongest opposition of any element to the abolition of the institution of slavery. I equally recall that when I was in Abyssinia the head of the
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Abyssinian Church, the Abuna, told me that he himself was opposed to the institution, but it is perfectly well known that the vast numbers of priests feel that their position and rights are bound up with it.
It seems, on the face of it, that we are looking to the Emperor, as the power which will bring this scandal, as we rightly call it, to an end. He has shown himself active towards reform, but so were some of his predecessors. The Emperor Theodore abolished slavery, but he was followed by Menelik who greatly extended it. We cannot rely wholly on the factor of the Emperor's personality. While he is on the throne Abyssinia is fortunate—it is a stroke of luck for Abyssinia—because he, among Abyssinians, has quite a unique personality so far as I have seen and have been informed. We are planning now for a long future, and, the Emperor being alone, we must envisage a time when he is not there. Happily he is a youngish man, but we must look upon what may be the normal state of things in the future. I desire to pay my tribute to the work that he has done. In 1932 he invited the Anti-Slavery Society to send out two people to confer with him, and Lord Polwarth and I represented the Society. At the close of our discussions with him, and also with two of his Ministers whom he designated for the purpose of subsidiary discussions, he promised among other things that slavery would be terminated at the most in twenty years. But little progress, unhappily, followed, and it was only two or three years later that the Italian trouble began. We do need some guarantee that abolition will be real. It is not enough to issue a decree, which probably very few slaves would hear of or understand. It is a rather difficult operation to arrive at real manumission, and abolition of slavery means something like a system that we have in the Sudan, where a man before he takes out his evidences of freedom is definitely furnished with papers which prevent his recapture. The same thing applies to Nigeria and to our other African Colonies.
The Emperor has immense forces to contend with, and we cannot hope that there will always be men of the peculiar personality of the Emperor Hailé Selassié. He is opposed by the Church, he is opposed by tradition and by the Kings—because they really are Kings, almost, in

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their own country, some of them—and the Chiefs in general. He therefore needs very real help, and it will not be enough if advisers are furnished and are no more than the advisers of the past. He asked years ago for a British official and an official of the British Service, Mr. Halpert, was appointed, but so far was the Emperor from carrying out his advice that he felt compelled to resign about the year 1934. Therefore admiration for the Emperor must not be allowed to distract us from the real interests of the slaves and serfs, who are a vast population. And, to remind your Lordships of the magnitude of this obstruction which will confront the Emperor unless we can very vigorously help him, let me recall that the catching of slaves was not only prevalent in Abyssinia, but in default of further tribes to raid, it extended into British territory both in the Sudan and in Kenya. In 1927 a White Paper gave particulars of no fewer than 139 raids into British territory during thirteen years, and Sir John Maffey, who was then Governor-General of the Sudan, said there were no doubt other raids of which he had no definite particulars.
Another fact to remind us what the situation was is this. We have for a very long period maintained two naval vessels in the Red Sea for the purpose of preventing the export of these Abyssinian slaves, kidnapped in Abyssinia, to the markets of Arabia. They very seldom caught the slave-carrying vessels because the dhows, very small dhows as a rule, sneaked out of ports in French territorial waters—generally French territorial waters, but sometimes Italian—and it was extemely difficult to catch them. But we maintained the vessels up to the war. Later on the Emperor had the suggestion made to him that a League Commissioner would be a good guarantee and a help to him, but that proposition was very strongly objected to.
Your Lordships will remember that we opposed the entry of Abyssinia into the League of Nations in view of the magnitude of this factor of slavery. The well-known book of Lady Simon estimated the number of slaves at a minimum of 2,000,000, in a population which may have been 10,000,000, though nobody knows what it was; and more than half that population had been subjected to the rules of the Amhara by the Emperor
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Menelik with the aid of rifles supplied by France. It is true that slavery is not generally of the industrial kind that we abolished in the West Indies: it is mostly domestic slavery; but any form of slavery is inseparable from atrocious cruelties when the master is an ill-tempered or vicious person. And, more than that, experts have pointed out that the condition of slavery means a total absence of moral sense, because the slave is debarred from the exercise of any free will or responsibility. The world has really been lenient to Abyssinia on account of slavery, and I think there can be no doubt that if the country had been a Mahomedan country a great deal more would have been heard of it.
How are we to be sure—I hope we shall hear this afternoon—that the termination of slavery is real? The main factors in that direction will be the advisers and the financial grants. We must ensure that the advisers are not ignored. Are they to be advisers such as the adviser so-called in Egypt who, under Lord Cromer, could make sure of his advice being carried out, or are they to be no more than the advisers hitherto known in Abyssinia? There is one condition which I very much hope will be attached to them, and that is the right to travel about the country, which was not given in the past, and the right to report to the British Minister as well as to the Abyssinian Government. I do not see how effective pressure can be applied unless financial assistance can be made dependent upon compliance with reasonable suggestions. The lever of finance seems to be difficult to apply in view of the fact that the financial aid is to take the form of grants definitely handed over from quarter to quarter.
I have taken enough of your Lordships' time. We are responsible for the situation. Success will depend very largely on the personal force of the British Minister. We shall need to exercise influence continuously and actively, and to apply the spirit of trusteeship which we have so often proclaimed in regard to our control of native races. Let us hope we shall be able to use Imperial Government experts now in a new manner—use them in aiding a non-British country so that Abyssinia will be put really forward in the path of reform. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, we have listened to a most interesting speech from my noble friend

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Lord Noel-Buxton. He has very naturally and very rightly availed himself of what may perhaps be called a hereditary claim to address your Lordships on the question of slavery. All the same, deeply as I sympathize with him and having often, I am glad to think, collaborated with him in measures for forwarding the abolition of slavery, I cannot help feeling that he has a little forgotten the circumstances which have given rise to the present situation. May I therefore venture to remind your Lordships of what, I am sure, many of you are quite familiar with—namely, the statement made on November 26, 1940, by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who was at that time Mr. Butler, on the policy of the Government with regard to Abyssinia?
I would remind your Lordships that a statement made by a Minister in answer to a question is in some ways the most authoritative declaration of policy that can be made, because it is not made on the spur of the moment. It is reduced to writing before it is delivered, it is approved always by the head of the Office, by the Secretary of State, as in this case, or by a Minister in a similar position, and if there is any doubt he may take the view of the Cabinet or of the Prime Minister. This was the statement of Mr. Butler, was made at the beginning of the Abyssinian campaign just before the Emperor re-entered Abyssinia, when we were only just beginning to give assistance to the tribes who were rebelling against Italian authority. The statement is very short, and it reads, as follows:
"His Majesty's Government are anxious to see Ethiopia liberated from Italian aggression. They have no territorial ambition in that country, which they would wish to be free and independent. They are, therefore, affording every assistance possible to those Ethiopians who have taken up arms against the common enemy."
It is very important to remember that it was on the faith of that declaration, or a similar declaration made to him, that the Emperor re-entered his country and led his people in the very gallant efforts they made to overthrew the Italian domination.
It seems to me in this matter that our first duty, overriding all other duties, is to see that that obligation and that pledge are fully complied with both in the spirit and in the letter. That seems to me to be the case. When you come to see what has
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actually happened your Lordships will, I think, agree with me that that has been very successfully accomplished. We have had this White Paper. It consists, as your Lordships are aware, of an Agreement and two Conventions. The Agreement sets out the main constitutional system which is to be established as the result of the present state of affairs. There are two lines in it which seem to me to embody the keynote of the whole policy. It says that
"the Government of the United Kingdom recognize that Ethiopia is now a free and independent State and His Majesty the Emperor, Hailé Selassié I, is its lawful Ruler…"
That is the essential part of the policy of the Government, and I must say, as far as I am individually concerned, that I desire to tender respectfully my warmest congratulations to the Foreign Secretary for the perfectly honourable, straightforward, and effective way in which he has carried out the obligations that rested upon him. It has been my misfortune occasionally, though rarely, to criticize the Government, but in this matter I can do nothing but offer my warmest praise.
It seems to me that this Agreement with Ethiopia is a fitting climax to the policy that was pursued in Syria and in Persia and now again in Ethiopia. We were told yesterday that the Foreign Office had been making incursions into the India Office, for which I was somehow or other held indirectly responsible. I wish I could claim it. For my part I can only hope that the matter will not be only one of bricks and mortar, but that some part of the spirit which has guided the Foreign Office in these matters will extend to the operations of the India Office. Apart from that, which is a matter of minor importance, I do feel most strongly that this Agreement, coming on top of the two other operations, makes a very remarkable and extremely admirable contrast with the policy of the German Government and their New Order. Wherever the Germans have proceeded to occupy a country they have left a trail of outrage and slaughter. I cannot help thinking that all impartial people, who look at the contrast between what we did in Persia and are now doing in Ethiopia, will see that our New Order, at any rate, is founded upon liberty and respect for the populations who are involved. I hope

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and believe that this will be a great thing for the righteous and legitimate propaganda which we may be issuing to other nations.
In the interesting speech which Lord Noel-Buxton has made, he said over and over again that we were responsible for the government of Ethiopia in some degree. With great respect to him, I really do not think that is right. We have undertaken to make Abyssinia free and independent. If we are going to try and constrain the Government of Abyssinia, she will not be free and independent, and if we meant to do that we ought to have told the Emperor candidly that we could only engage in operations to restore him to the throne if he were prepared to submit to guidance and direction by us. We never said anything of the kind, and personally I should have been very much opposed to any attempt of that description. The greater part of my noble friend's speech was devoted to the question of slavery. There, I quite agree, he is on strong ground when he says that the slavery which has persisted in Abyssinia up to now is a great scandal, a great disgrace, to that country and ought to be removed as soon as possible. I entirely agree. I am also very confidently of opinion that if we made it a condition of the restoration of the Emperor that he was to carry out our wishes with regard to slavery, it would be most improbable that we should succeed in doing anything to diminish slavery, and it is quite certain we should gravely interfere with the authority of the Emperor. In my view by all means let us, when the Emperor is re-established and has become an independent sovereign, make whatever representations we like to him on this question of slavery, but let us in the meantime do everything we can to restore and increase his authority so that when he carries out not only our wishes, but what we know to be his wishes with regard to slavery, he will have the fullest power to do so. The best way of getting rid of slavery is to increase the power of the Emperor in the government of his country.
It seems to me some general propositions arise from this Agreement and on the details of the Agreement itself. I will say a word about the Conventions in a moment, but on the Agreement itself I
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really have no criticism to make. It seems to me to be an admirable document, and one which is likely to carry out the policy which His Majesty's Government are pledged to in the fullest extent. I would like to put one other question—it is not a criticism—on a minor point. In Article VI it is said:
"His Majesty the Emperor accepts full responsibility for seeing that private enemy property is dealt with in accordance with International Law. His Majesty agrees to consult with the British Diplomatic Representative as to the measures to be taken to this end."
I admit that I do not quite understand what that means. I do not know why we are taking these pains to protect enemy property. It is quite right that enemy property should be protected, and will no doubt be protected by the Emperor so far as it is entitled to be protected by International Law, but why is it a matter of British interest to insist that that should be done? I have a great difficulty in following that, and I hope we shall be told why it is that we have thought it necessary to interfere in the matter at all.
I do not know, but I presume it refers to Italian property created in Abyssinia during the period when, very unhappily I think, we had acknowledged the conquest of Abyssinia by Italy. That, as far as we are concerned, may possibly preclude us from objecting to the existence of such property, but whatever acknowledgment we made, how can that bind the Emperor? The Emperor never made any acknowledgment of the legitimacy or the effectiveness of the conquest by Italy. On the contrary, he always resisted, and as far as he is concerned no such conquest ever took place. There was an engagement, a lawless invasion, and that was all. I do not quite follow, I confess, what that paragraph means, and I hope that my noble friend when he comes to reply will be able to give some explanation of it.
There is another matter to which ray noble friend Lord Noel-Buxton referred, and that is the limits of the territory involved. Not only does he desire to put the Emperor in leading strings, as I understand him, but he wishes to bind him to accept whatever advice any of the British advisers may give him. He proposes that certain territory which belonged to Abyssinia before the Italian invasion

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should be taken from him and put under some kind of international body. I do not believe that a. policy of that kind would be a good policy on its merits, and I do not think such a policy is open to the British Government in the circumstances in. which it is suggested.
Just one word about the Military Convention which is attached to this Agreement. There is a Judicial Convention about which I do not desire to say anything, but in regard to the Military Convention I confess I should like to ask my noble friend whether really the very stiff provisions that are made in it are necessary from a military point of view. Of course if they are necessary from a military point of view that is the end of it, at any rate as long as this war lasts. But in the first place I should like to know what is the limit of time during which this Military Convention is to last. Is it really necessary to go as far as some of these provisions go? I will not trouble the House with any detailed examination of them. Let me take one of them by way of illustration. Unless I misread the Convention it frees all over Abyssinia all British military officers from Ethiopian law, and it includes among British military officers any British civilians who are in any way attached to the military, and all their wives and children.
If certain conditions are accepted as to the composition of the Judicial Bench, and if we are to accept the authority of the Ethiopian Government generally speaking in the enforcement of Ethiopian law, I cannot at present see why so very drastic a provision is made as to take all people, however indirectly connected with military officers, outside that provision, not in military zones, which would be reasonable enough, but, as I read the Convention, all over Abyssinia, which, as your Lordships know, is an immense place. If it is quite clear that that provision, and other provisions, are only to be enforced during the progress of the war, I should not myself be disposed to make any great objection, because we all suffer, and rightly suffer, considerable limitations of our ordinary rights during the war. How far that ought to be carried in a country like Abyssinia must, I quite agree, be left to the military authorities to say.
But I am a little doubtful as to what is the period in which it is supposed that these provisions are to go on. The preamble
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of the Military Convention says that they are to last so long as may be necessary for mutual assistance as Allies in the struggle against the common enemy. That means, I suppose, for the duration of the war. That is all right, but then at the end of the Convention there comes a curious provision which says that:
"This Convention shall come into effect with the Agreement signed this day … and shall, subject to any other Agreement between the Parties, continue in force so long as the said Agreement continues in force."
The said Agreement is to continue in force absolutely for two years, and almost certainly for another two years, because the subsidy to be given to the Emperor is to last for four years. It means, so far as I can see, that this Convention is to last for four years. It is a pessimistic view to suppose that that means that the war will go on for at least four more years, and that therefore it will certainly be within the period of the war even if it lasts for four years. I hoped for something better than that myself, and I should like very much to be assured that, whatever may be the actual wording of the Convention, the intention is that it should last only during the period of hostilities.
I have ventured to make these few observations because this is an important document, and it is right for us to criticize anything that is capable of being criticized. But, broadly speaking, leaving aside these matters which compared with the general purpose of the Agreement are minor matters, I can only say that I warmly approve of this Agreement and that I think it is a brilliant close to the somewhat chequered history of our international relations with Abyssinia. Your Lordships will remember how the original aggression of Italy began. I think you may describe it as the Axis at its worst. Some year or more before they actually invaded the country they had been making preparations for it. At that time there was no serious grievance they could possibly allege against the Abyssinian Government, but there was the manufacture of incidents like the one that used to be known as the Walwal incident, which when they came to be examined by impartial authorities—as often as the Italians allowed examination—turned out to be at least as much the fault of the

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Italians as of the Abyssinians. Nevertheless, the Italians went on and they invaded the country.
I will not go back on all the controversies as to whether we did everything we could to stop it. The fact was that the Italians were not stopped. They went on to the full accomplishment of what can only be described as their perfidy, and the means they used were the means of cruelty. Some of us have not forgotten the horrible gloating of one of the sons of Mussolini over the bombs which he dropped from his aeroplane on the absolutely defenceless villages of the Abyssinians, and his description of the beautiful affecting colour of the blood of the Abyssinians spurting out. Nor have we forgotten the ferocity with which Graziani suppressed any kind of opposition to the Italian Government. Through all that time the courage of the Abyssinian patriots never gave way. They went on fighting, many of them up in the mountains, denying the use of a very large part of the territory of Abyssinia to the Italians. In all that fighting the Emperor, whether he was in the country or outside it, remained as their leader and their ruler, even when he was apparently deserted by his friends and the Ministers of this country drank to the King of Italy as the Emperor of Abyssinia. It must have been a terribly trying and depressing time for him, but he never flinched, he never abandoned his rights, he maintained his fight for freedom. Then came the turn of the tide, the declaration of the general war, the splendid victories of the British troops with the assistance of the Abyssinians, and the complete restoration of the Emperor to his throne in Addis Ababa with, as far as one can learn, the support and approval of the great mass of the population. The Government have surely done well not to injure or in any way tarnish the splendour of the restoration of the Emperor by putting him under some kind of protectorate of this country when we have promised to create again for him a free and independent State.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, I wish my noble friend and comrade Lord Noel-Buxton would recollect that his family has been immortalised not merely by their abolition of slavery but by the protection of aborigines. The Society over
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which he presides is the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society. I think he emphasizes over-much the slavery side of the question and has been unduly impressed by the slavery question in Abyssinia for, even when Abyssinia was attacked by the Italians, he has consistently drawn attention to that side of the issue. Slavery is of many kinds. The worst is slave trading, and I would have your Lordships remember that the people who buy the slaves are nearly as as bad as those who sell them. This trade has been going on across the Red Sea and even through British territory, for slaves have been sold to people in the Sudan, to the west of Abyssinia.
I would have your Lordships remember, too, that slavery of the domestic sort is by no means extinct in the British Empire. You can go into any Sheikh's tent in the Jordan Valley and have your coffee served by a black slave. The abolition of domestic slavery is nothing to boast of or to use as an example for criticism of what goes on in Abyssinia under the present Emperor—I am not going back to the time of King Theodore. There was the mui-tsai system in Hong Kong, which is going on no longer, for the latest news in a telegram from Chungking in this morning's papers says the Japanese have rounded up successfully 2,000 dancing girls at Hong Kong, all mui-tsai. So do not let us be too virtuous about these things. Domestic slavery is unpleasant, but it occurs even in free countries. There is a slavery which locks up men's bodies and there is a so-called freedom which sets indeed men's bodies free but locks up all they need for subsistence. I do not think the condition of the ordinary peasant labourer in Abyssinia is much worse than the condition of the black peasant labourer in South Africa or even in our own Colony of Kenya.
The noble Lord said he wanted good government in Abyssinia. It has always been an old Liberal maxim dear to him and to me, that self-government is better than good government. I think that if we had had in this White Paper a real establishment of self-government under the Emperor Hailé Selassié we should have produced a better document than this. There is one point about which I wish to ask a question which the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, did not mention. I want to know what is the area, what is the eastern boundary of this Abyssinia which we are

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handing over by this Agreement. When the Italians started to invade Abyssinia we knew where the frontier was; it was at Eritrea. It was so no longer after they bad conquered Abyssinia by the methods described by Lord Cecil. They then proceeded to change the boundary of Eritrea. They took from Abyssinia a population, which is I think entirely Abyssinian, in the Tigre Province.
Does this Agreement restore to Hailé Selassié, except for the area specially mentioned, that territory up to the old frontier? I am glad to know that it does. That is all right then. So far as the territory is concerned, it is restored to the Emperor except for the fact that throughout the duration of this Agreement the very sinews of Abyssinia are taken away. Abyssinia has no sea port, it has one solitary railway, and that railway is to be reserved for British direction and management and order during the duration of the Agreement. I hope that the Agreement will come to an end at the end of four years; but I remember so many other cases. Was not it Egypt which we had to evacuate under an Agreement, and yet we remained there to our own disadvantage for a great many years? I would sooner have seen no territories cut out, least of all these territories which are the most civilized and developed.
My view of this document is that it is a victory for the pro-Italian-Roman clique in Cairo, which has always been against Hailé Selassié. They did their best to stop him going back to Abyssinia. It was not until that declaration which Lord Cecil read out was made in 1940 that he was allowed to go back. Even then there was very little assistance given him to get back. They were actually stopping him going into Addis Ababa until South African troops had got there. As I say, very little assistance was given. This is a document which exactly carries out, not the views of the Foreign Office which made that famous declaration in 1940, but the views of the clique in Cairo who have persuaded the Foreign Office to force through the Emperor's hand almost with a colossal bribe an Agreement which saves for the Italians all then property rights, perhaps not all their privileges, but their investments in that country, all the concessions that were made by the Italians during the Italian occupation That, I think, is a fatal blunder.
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We have been discussing in another place over and over again whether the Italian civilian prisoners in Abyssinia, were to be evacuated or not. We were always told by the Foreign Office that they were going to be evacuated to Italy, that Italy was going to send ships to evacuate all these Italian inhabitants of Abyssinia. Nobody who knew Mussolini would dream for one moment that he would ever evacuate one of them from Abyssinia. Naturally, he wants them all there at the end of the war to stake out a claim, if not for Abyssinia at least for Eritrea. Naturally, he cannot spare ships, and equally naturally' for the last six months therefore the British taxpayer has been keeping these people. They have not even been compelled to work, but they have been fed and looked after in the same way as refugees have been looked after in this country. Under this Agreement they stay in Abyssinia; under this Agreement they are still supported by the British taxpayer who will get no compensation, and under this Agreement they will still be there when the war comes to an end, and they will then automatically form a civilized Italian community—yes, I suppose you can call Italians civilized! Well, I would much sooner they were not left in that country. I had hoped that after the war we might have an international adviser; that we might have Americans helping the Emperor in the administration of the country. As I see it at present when we do step out we shall leave the Italians with all their bad traditions to take our place as the whites of Abyssinia in the years to come.
Now, my Lords, on this occasion I have the greatest possible pleasure in speaking for my Party. It is a pleasure which I have not enjoyed very often. I say they are not satisfied with any sort of solution of the Abyssinian problem which does not follow precisely the declaration made when we sent Hailé Selassié back to Abyssinia or issued the Atlantic Charter which was drawn up at the Conference between Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt. If this paper is meant to fall in with that solution I think it is a very helpful idea, but we should not look at the question in any other way save how far does it implement absolutely the establishment of a free country uncontrolled by this land. I am not thinking of

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Abyssinia only; I am thinking of the effect on the whole world if, so soon after the signing of the Atlantic Charter, we go back on the principles laid down in that Charter. We want out of this war nothing except the destruction of Hitlerism. If you are going to import into this war the old Imperial spirit, grabbing a bit here and a bit there to colour red, and governing the areas probably better than they are governed at the present time, you are giving the lie to what we are standing for in the present war, you are injuring the repute of this country, and injuring its good name at the very moment when we ought to sacrifice everything to preserve that good name.
LORD HAILEY: My Lords, to me at any rate it is somewhat of an improvement to be discussing the Abyssinian solution in a much easier atmosphere than one has been wont to encounter in the past, in the very numerous meetings, study circles and the like which one has had to attend in order to deal with this subject. For there it was a common experience that something of a controversial attitude and atmosphere speedily developed, with a fervour and a partisanship which at times recalled the theological controversies in days when, if I may say so, people took their theology a little more seriously than they do today.
There were, in my experience at all events, several currents of opinion that led to this controversial attitude. There was first of all a section of opinion which, deeply impressed with the strong nationalistic spirit of Abyssinia, deeply impressed with the long independence of the past, and also perhaps feeling strong sympathy with the present Emperor, could think of no solution whatever but the restoration of the fullest, the amplest independence to the Emperor. They were confident that if that were done all these difficult questions of slavery and all the difficult problems of slave raiding that we have had in the Sudan, in Kenya, and elsewhere would speedily find their settlement. Their confidence was as absolute as that which the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, has expressed to-day—such confidence not only in the good will but in the power of the Emperor that he is prepared to leave to the Abyssinian Courts and to that very
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curious thing the Abyssinian Law, the cases, criminal cases and the like, of a British Army of occupation. They had confidence as complete as that which Lord Wedgwood has just expressed. He would regard any derogation whatever from the authority of the Emperor as giving evidence of the influence of a pro-Italian clique. If there is slavery, and if slavery is not successfully abolished by the Emperor, he can feel that slavery is not the worst evil in life, and that in any case there are very unfavourable conditions of native labour in Kenya, as in South Africa. We have had this afternoon almost a perfect expression of the confidence that that section of opinion has felt in the Emperor and of its very strong determination that there should be no derogation whatever from his full authority.
And there was a second section, rather strongly opposed to the first perhaps; the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Buxton, is a representative of it. The members of this section realized that the Emperor Menelik was one of those who joined in the scramble for Africa, and his methods were certainly as forcible as those of the worst of the other scramblers. The Abyssinian Empire of course consists not only of what I may call the old administered districts under the Emperor, but of a very large number of outlying provinces held by his Generals, and held in a form of degradation and serfdom certainly far greater than that which you could find anywhere in other parts of Africa. That section hoped that an opportunity might now be taken of relieving those people from the serfdom from which they have suffered, of ameliorating their condition, and perhaps most of all they hoped that something might now be done to introduce civilization in that one remaining part of Africa where civilization is practically unknown even in name.
Let me take also a third party. I spare your Lordships a long catalogue of them, but there are many currents of thought on this subject. I noticed this particularly when meeting my friends coming from South Africa. They themselves have had a considerable part in reconquering Abyssinia for the Emperor. They were very reluctant to think that a large area should be given back to purely native rule which in their view was capable of European occupation, thus extending that long and narrow belt of civilized

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occupation, so dear to South African ideas, which runs through Africa. Then there were other people who used to take part in these discussions, people who have had experience in Sudan and Kenya, experience of slave raiding, and of the most unneighbourly behaviour of every kind. They hoped that something at least might be done to deal with that in the future.
Finally, there was a section of opinion which on a more general view, and without taking perhaps quite a partisan attitude on the subject, did realize that our intervention now in Abyssinia and the steps we have taken towards its reconquest, though the do not give us a political responsibility, it is true, do place us in a position in which maladministration in Abyssinia will undoubtedly redound to our disrepute. The world will hold us, in other words, responsible for it. If the handing back of Abyssinia on terms of full liberty to the Emperor remains an accomplished fact, and if as a result that part of Africa docs not come under any form of civilized rule, then undoubtedly there will be many people throughout the world who will say that we ourselves have been a stumbling block in the way of the progress of civilization in Africa. That is a fact that undoubtedly one has to bear in mind in this connexion.
To come to an Agreement in circumstances such as these, was undoubtedly difficult, and I think that considering the influences there are in England on the subject the Foreign Office is to be congratulated on having come to an Agreement at all with the Emperor, for I know how very difficult the task of negotiation did happen to be And if we discuss it here to-day, it can I think only be, not with any idea of any change in that Agreement, any alteration in the terms of the Treaty, certainly any alterations in disfavour of the Emperor himself—that would be unthinkable, and a breach of faith—but from a practical point of view to see what its disadvantages to us may be, and what steps may have to be taken by His Majesty's Government further to implement it. To do anything less, to suggest here that it needs radical amendment, would be most disturbing to those who have to carry the Agreement out, and would breed distrust throughout Africa itself. It leaves Abyssinia in the position not of a Protectorate, of course—that is very clear—but of what used to be
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called in old International Law a "temporarily protected State."
Clearly the success of the Agreement in achieving some of the objects we hope to see—namely, the improvement of civilization, the end of slavery, the end of serfdom in the outlying districts—must depend entirely on the extent, as Lord Noel-Buxton has said, to which the advice tendered to the Emperor is accepted by him. We know that the previous position of these advisers was sometimes one of influence, at other times of complete impotence. What are the sanctions we have that this advice will be accepted by him? There are two. The first is the continuance of military occupation. That in itself would be something like a breach of the understanding on which the Agreement is based. It must continue during the war, it must continue as long as Abyssinia—and this is a point we sometimes forget—is full of guerilla bands using arms left by the Italians and likely, if previous history is repeated, to stand in strong opposition to the Emperor's central rule. But we must all feel that military occupation must end when peace is really restored.
The second sanction is, of course, the withdrawal or withholding of part of the subsidy. I want to point out that, in the opinion of many of us who have taken some interest in examining into the resources of Abyssinia, the subsidy is already inadequate, particularly in the vanishing form in which it is put. May I give your Lordships a figure or two which would illustrate my point? Take the immediate neighbours of Abyssinia and their yearly expenditure. They are territories which have been administered for a long time; a good deal of capital has been put into them, and they are, so to speak, going concerns. Abyssinia is disorganized and undeveloped in every way, and its expenditure must, in the first instance, be much greater. Its next-door neighbour, Uganda, already spends £1,750,000; Tanganyika rather more than £1,750,000; Kenya, £2,250,000; and the Sudan, which has a population of 6,250,000 and in general characteristics comes closer to large tracts of Abyssinia, spends £4,750,000 a year. Far larger resources are required by the Emperor if he is really to develop the country on anything like modern lines or even to secure law and order and decent administration.

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Its own income is very small. It is difficult to calculate what it has been in the past, but if your Lordships divide in your own minds Abyssinia into two parts, one the administered part, difficult as it is to ascertain what is the income of a country that has never had a Budget, it is perhaps possible that the Emperor had from Customs duties and railway dividends something like £200,000 a year. Of the second part, the large area which was handed over to his Generals and fief-holders, you can say nothing whatever as they simply lived on the country. It has to be remembered that Abyssinia is a country without any minerals. One thing Italian scientific exploration of the country has proved is that its resources are very small. How are they to find for themselves an income that would be adequate for restoring order, establishing good administration, and, what is more, keeping up the very numerous and very expensive capital works that the Italians have introduced into the country? We may think what we like of the Italian invasion and its methods, but the fact remains that they have left in the country capital assets alive which cannot be valued at less than £80,000,000 or £90,000,000 after making all deductions.
The Abyssinians themselves, owing to the action of the Italians who murdered so many of their young and educated men, have not got a single man capable of looking after their roads, their electrical installations or the other capital works the Italians have left. I maintain that in these conditions what we have provided for is already inadequate, and if it decreases in the manner proposed year by year it will be more than inadequate. It is certain that if we are to give real assistance to the Emperor these sums must be increased. It is certain that if we wish to keep any real hold on him by the use of these sanctions, then we shall find ourselves quite unable to withdraw the subsidies. In the end we come to this, that there are no sanctions that we can prescribe in that direction, and that we depend therefore entirely on the personality, influence, and character of those whom we send as advisers. I know some of the officers already working there. I know the class of officer we can send from the Sudan and the Colonies. I have every confidence that they will fulfil their mission.
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Their influence will count for much, but we must realize that by this measure of restoration—a measure which some of your Lordships consider inadequate in itself—we are running grave hazards of a continuance of difficulties and maladministration in Abyssinia which may redound to our discredit.
I do not wish to go into the further questions that were raised on the actual terms of the Agreement, because I am sure that Lord Cranborne will be able to answer these; but I may say on one point, with regard to the respect to be paid to Italian property under International Law, that I hope some care will be exercised to maintain, as far as possible, the prescriptions of International Law in this respect, for we should be unwilling to set a bad example to other people who are now taking over considerable areas of our own in which there is considerable private property. We must be careful not to exhibit a flagrant and complete disregard of what has always been the conventions in this respect.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Surely not. I am very anxious to have the assistance of anybody on this matter, still more of the noble Lord, but surely at the end of the last war we took the whole of the German private property in this country and told the Germans they must look for compensation to their own Government.
LORD HAILEY: The usual procedure, if I may say so, is to set off one claim with regard to private property against another claim. You have your process under which you establish your debits and credits on account of private property. That was the process we ourselves applied in the last war, and I have no doubt we shall apply it in this war. It should apply equally to Abyssinia.
One last point. It was suggested that there might be some improvement, some greater security for the future of Abyssinia, if there were some element of international management introduced into the treaty arrangements. It was even suggested that part of this territory should be made subject to an experiment in international management. It would, no doubt, be interesting to have an experiment of that nature. Hitherto we have had to depend for our experience on the somewhat narrow basis of what we have seen in the New Hebrides—hardly an

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adequate field, I think, for judging the value of international management. But it is said that it should now be tried in perhaps one of the most difficult places of the world, and in some of the most difficult conditions. I do not wish to argue here the case for international management in regard to Colonial possessions, but I am hoping that some day or other one of your Lordships may bring this matter forward when we can discuss it on its own merits. Some of us have very strong feelings on the subject, and we should like an opportunity of arguing the whole matter out and expressing our feelings upon it. Let me only say now, that the art of managing Colonies, the practice of Colonial administration, is not just merely a question of pure mathematics or of philosophy; it is a question of actual experience; it is an art that has to be acquired in itself, and I am not one of those who believe that we should quit ourselves of our responsibilities any the better if we brought into a share of them others whose methods of colonization and of administration most of us do not believe to be any better than our own.
LORD DAVIES: My Lords, I do not wish to follow the noble Lord in the interesting speech to which we have just listened upon a subject on which he speaks with so much authority, but may I venture to remind the House that this Agreement and our relationship with Abyssinia has a background going back a great many years? I believe it was in 1885 that Lord Napier made a speech in this House, just after we had connived at the Italian occupation of Massowah, in which he pleaded with the House and with the Government of that day to give Abyssinia what he described as a square deal. Then coming down to a later period there was the Tripartite Agreement of 1906, under which that part of Africa was divided up into zones, followed by the Agreement with Italy in 1924, when the Italians were supposed to have special authority and special influence in the affairs of Abyssinia. Then, of course, we all remember the abandonment of Abyssinia in 1936 to which my noble friend Lord Cecil has already alluded. We can hardly be surprised, therefore, that many of the Abyssinians are extremely suspicious of us and of our methods, and I think the great problem really is as to how those suspicions can be allayed and entirely eliminated.
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I was speaking to a friend of mine the other day who has occupied one of the most important positions in Abysssinia, and he said that in his opinion the first essential was to obtain the confidence of the Emperor and his people, and up to date it may be said we have hardly missed an opportunity of undermining that confidence. Once confidence has been reestablished the movement towards the abolition of slavery can be resumed to ultimate success. The question before your Lordships to-day is, it appears to me, how far this new Agreement will promote that mutual confidence. We know that as far as the Emperor himself is concerned he will do his best to carry out the terms which he has already made. We also know that in the State of Abyssinia he is beset with grave difficulties in endeavouring to carry out this policy, and the question is whether we are really, through this Agreement, assisting and helping him to overcome these difficulties, or whether we are creating greater difficulties than he has to face even at the moment.
May I ask the noble Viscount who is to reply on behalf of the Government to assure us that no pressure of any kind has been brought upon the Emperor to sign all the clauses of this Agreement? Is it a purely voluntary act on his part? That is the first assurance I hope he will be able to give us. The second one is this. I think my noble friend suggested that this is a temporary measure, that the military occupation clauses are inserted owing to the exigencies of the war, and that when the war has come to an end then the procedure in regard to Abyssinia will not necessarily be founded upon this particular Agreement. Those of us who have read the Agreement without knowing all that has gone on, without knowing about all the negotiations which have taken place, must have come to the conclusion that it is a very hard bargain. My noble friend Lord Cecil of Chelwood said Ethiopia is to be a free and independent State with a free and independent Government. I can hardly believe that so long as Abyssinia is bowed down by all the clauses in this Agreement we can really describe that country and its people as a free and independent country and people.
I would venture to make one or two criticisms in regard to certain clauses. The military clauses contemplate first of

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all a Military Mission. I am sure that is heartily welcomed by the Emperor, and by all the friends of Abyssinia, but there is also to be apparently a force of occupation which is to guard the railway and other parts of the country. Could the noble Viscount tell us broadly what this force will consist of? I do not imagine that we can afford at the present time to employ a considerable force in policing a country which belongs to our friends and at the same time fight our battles against the enemy. After all we have limited man-power. Why have not the Government in this document welcomed the offer which the Emperor made some months ago, when he said that he would reciprocate the benefits he had received from us by supplying armed forces wherever they might be needed in order to release Imperial troops for warfare on other fronts? There is not a word in this Agreement, so far as I can make out, in which the Emperor is asked to undertake the organization of forces to assist us against a common enemy. On the other hand, as far as the Senussi are concerned, we have succeeded in securing their support, and I believe one Division at least of that tribe is fighting alongside our forces in Libya.
The other point I want to mention is about Italian prisoners. In Article VII it is proposed so far as Italian prisoners are concerned to hand them over to the custody of the British military authorities, who will evacuate them from Ethiopia. Then Article VIII says that "the Government of the United Kingdom will use their best endeavours"—whatever that may mean—" to secure the return of Ethiopians in Italian hands, and to secure the return of artistic works, religious property and the like," which have been removed to Italy. May I suggest that that surely is a matter in which the Emperor should deal direct with the Italian Government? There should be reciprocity. Perhaps the noble Lord will tell us what is meant by "our best endeavours." I cannot help feeling that that position ought to be made plain.
The question of appointing advisers has already been dealt with. As I think my noble friend Lord Wedgwood said, what we want to know, and what we ought to be certain about, is that the Government are going to set up eventually a free and independent Ethiopia, and give the Emperor our benevolent help in reorganizing
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his country; that in return we expect him to assist us in every possible way in the prosecution of the war; and that this Agreement is not the prelude to some form of protectorate or sphere of influence, or whatever it may be called, but that it is our firm intention to restore the liberty and independence of Ethiopia.
LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, I have but one word to say, because the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, made the only criticism that I should make of this Agreement, on which I should like to congratulate His Majesty's Government. I know how exceedingly difficult the negotiations have been. I was much alarmed by the assurance given by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, during his speech, that the frontiers of Ethiopia are to be the ancient frontiers. I do not wish to suggest to your Lordships that there should be any carving up of Ethiopia, but I hope that the noble Lord will say that the Government are prepared to consider negotiations over the matter of the frontiers, when the final treaty comes to be drafted. I know, for example, that the Colonial Office will share the view that the Abyssinian-Sudanese frontier is unreasonable. There is also the famous maladjustment of the boundary where the so-called Baro promontory juts out of Abyssinian territory into the Sudan, actually dividing the territory of the Anak tribe.
Similarly I would suggest that it would be completely impracticable to try to restore the old position in regard to the Somalis and the Danakil. I would suggest that this is a splendid opportunity to unite all the Somalis into a single organic State. I myself would like to see the experiment of which the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, spoke in international direction and control, but however that may be I am perfectly convinced that nothing but bloody warfare can possibly follow if the Somalis are forced into subjection to the Ethiopians. I trust that the arrangements made will not supply the Ethiopians with the modern implements of war with which to effect this subjugation.
The noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, spoke rather easily of slavery. The fact that conditions are not perfect in one place is no reason why imperfections should

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be tolerated in another. I am in complete agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Buxton, and the noble Lord, Lord Hailey, in their belief that in the future, inevitably, we British people must share some responsibility for what occurs in Abyssinia, and it would not be in accordance with the Atlantic Charter, which was quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, to enable Ethiopians to enslave other peoples. There were peoples in the Ethiopian Empire who were in revolt and semi-independence. It may be better that they should be subject to Addis Ababa, but if so they must have some guarantees of good will.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS (LORD CECIL) (Viscount Cranborne): My Lords,.I think that in the debate which has taken place this afternoon over the Agreement which we have negotiated with the Emperor of Abyssinia, there has been a very general consensus of approval. There have been criticisms and questions on details, but on the main basis of the Agreement I think there has been no criticism. That is very satisfactory because this question of Abyssinia is one which does rouse very great interest and very strong feeling among wide sections of opinion in this country, even at a time when the world is being rocked by yet more important and terrible events than those which happened in Abyssinia in 1935 and 1936. It is natural perhaps that we should take this very strong interest in the country, because after all the invasion of Abyssinia, which took place in 1935, was not only at that time one of the most shocking events of modern times, but also one of the most significant. It was even more. I think it might be described as one of the turning points in modern history, because it really was the rock on which the post-war peace system split and foundered. Therefore I think it is all the more appropriate that Abyssinia, which was the first country to fall beneath the harrow of the aggressor, is the first country to be restored, and that after an interval of only six years since the time when he was driven from his country the Emperor is back upon his throne as an independent sovereign.
It is the more gratifying, I think, for all of us that it is the troops of the British Commonwealth of Nations who have been the instruments by which this restoration has been achieved. Following the destruction of the Italian Armies it was inevitable
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that there should be what may be described as an interim period. The country was in a very disturbed state and it is so still. The administration of the Italians has been swept away and the administration of the Emperor to take its place has not yet been re-created. Therefore quite naturally it fell to us to carry on a military administration and to maintain law and order. Now at last it is possible for us to proceed to a further stage. As noble Lords know, negotiations have been proceeding for some considerable time and now an Agreement has been signed at Addis Ababa between His Majesty's Government and the Emperor. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that it was a perfectly free Agreement and that there was no improper pressure exerted upon His Majesty.
This Agreement, as has already been mentioned in the debate, is to last two years. Under it we resume our normal diplomatic relations with Abyssinia and Mr. Howe is proceeding to Addis Ababa immediately in order to take up the post of His Majesty's Minister at the Emperor's Court. In his opening speech the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Buxton, urged that we in particular had a special responsibility, as I understood him, for the establishment of order in Abyssinia and for providing for the future of the country. That of course primarily—I would emphasize this—is a responsibility of the Emperor himself. As I have tried to explain, Abyssinia is now a sovereign independent State. I think it is necessary to underline this, because I got a slight impression when the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Buxton, was speaking, that he did not quite realize what the position now is. He seemed to have in mind some form of Crown Colony or Protectorate government. He asked how we were going to maintain our control.
LORD NOEL-BUXTON: My Lords, I am very sorry to interrupt, but may I just say that I took pains to state that I was very gratified that the Agreement did not embody an Imperial policy but the opposite?
LORD CECIL: Allow me to follow up what I was saying. I understood the noble Lord to speak about advice that is to be given to the Emperor, and to ask who were the advisers who were to be appointed; how were we to be certain that this advice would take effect, and how

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could it be enforced. These advisers, it is true, are being recommended to the Emperor by us, but they are his servants and not ours, and it is for him to decide whether the advice which they give is taken or not. To me it seems that anything less than that would be a hollow sham and quite unworthy of the steps which we are now taking. I do hope and think that the noble Lord has not too great cause for anxiety. The Emperor has made it perfectly clear that he recognizes the need for assistance to be given to him. He has asked His Majesty's Government to place a number of British advisers at his disposal and to assist him financially in the setting up of his Administration. We have agreed to do our best to provide for a limited duration advisers, and it will be their duty to assist the Emperor with their counsel. Lord Noel-Buxton, I think it was, asked a question about nationality. He wanted to know whether the advisers would always be British. The answer is that at present it is contemplated that they should be British, but there is nothing in the Agreement which prevents His Majesty's Government, if they should so wish, recommending to the Emperor nationals of any other country.
Then there was the question of meeting the Emperor's request for financial aid without inexorably tying him to this country. This has cost His Majesty's Government here very anxious thought. The Emperor asked for financial assistance and we gave it to him, as noble Lords know, on a tapering system, the idea being that his dependence upon a foreign country would become less and less until finally, at the end of two, or maybe four years, Abyssinia would again be standing on her own feet. I think Lord Hailey it was who said that this subsidy would be quite inadequate for the purpose. It is the hope of His Majesty's Government that, as law and order is restored and as the Administration becomes a proper working Administration, the need for the external provision of funds will become less. Clearly it would not be satisfactory to us or to the Emperor if he became permanently dependent on us in this way; that would not be independence in any true sense of the word. Moreover, there is a certain limit beyond which even this country must not go at the present time in the provision of funds to other countries, as I am sure noble Lords will
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appreciate. But we have tried to put the Emperor properly on his feet, and I hope that noble Lords, and the country, will feel that the contribution which we are making is not unworthy of us.
I think, perhaps, there is one other subject about which I ought to say a word: the question of the administration of justice. This question was not emphasized by Lord Noel-Buxton, but this is the third sphere in which the Emperor has asked for assistance and there is, as noble Lords know, a draft administration of justice proclamation annexed to the Agreement. In view of past protection enjoyed by foreigners in Ethiopia in relation to extraterritorial rights, it was necessary to provide some safeguards in this respect not only to restore extra-territoriality but modernizing the whole of the Ethiopian judicial system. This proclamation was drafted by a joint committee of British and Ethiopian jurists and promulgated by the Emperor upon the signature of the Agreement. The Emperor has asked us to recommend some British Judges to assist in the administration of justice and to sit upon the Bench of the High Court in Ethiopia. Here again, His Majesty's Government will do their best to find these Judges, for it will be to our common interest that Ethiopia should have the benefit of British experience if this can be found.
There remains only one other sphere to which I think I need refer and that is the military sphere. The Military Convention attached to the Agreement provides for the Military Mission for which the Emperor has asked us and for the maintenance of the force which His Majesty's Government may require for strategical reasons, for the evacuation of Italian prisoners of war, and also for training the Emperor's Army which will be an essential element in the reorganization on the enlightened lines which it is the Emperor's earnest intention to follow. I should add that this Ethiopian Army which is to be set up is to be equipped entirely from the material captured from the Italians, and thus those weapons which were forged for aggression will be used for the defence of liberty. I feel that there is a certain poetic justice in that. Lord Davies asked what would be the numbers of the troops which were temporarily left in the country. I feel sure that he will not expect me to give him an answer in regard to the numbers.

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It is not intended to leave those troops there permanently. They will be there for strategic reasons in connexion with the general conduct of the war, and partly to deal with the local position until the Emperor's Armies are constituted, armed and trained. When they have become a proper Army, an Army which can function, there will be no need any longer for our troops to remain there for the maintenance of law and order. The Emperor's Army will take its proper place in the administration of law and order as soon as possible. Those, broadly speaking, are the terms of the Agreement which has been reached. It is an Agreement which I was glad to sec was generally welcomed. It safeguards Abyssinian independence and provides that assistance, the necessity for which the Emperor, equally with Lord Noel-Buxton, recognizes.
There are one or two other points which have been raised in the debate. First of all the question of slavery, which was referred to, I think, by almost every speaker. There is no doubt in this House about what the attitude of His Majesty's Government on slavery is. This country has made it perfectly clear over many decades, and we should clearly wish to see slavery abolished in Abyssinia as in every other country. And I am very glad to be able to tell the House that the Emperor has already declared his intention to issue a decree forthwith abolishing the state of slavery in Abyssinia. He proposes to do that as soon as he is in a position to do so, and that is, of course, as soon as he is in a position to introduce legislation, which will be directly after the signature of the present Agreement; so that we may say that he is now already in a position to take that action.
Then Lord Wedgwood asked what were to be the boundaries of Abyssinia, and whether they were to be the same as before the Abyssinian war. The answer is Yes, they are. Then there was a rather more detailed point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, and I hope he will allow me to put it forward to the responsible authorities.
Two points were made by the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil of Chelwood. The first was about private enemy property. I understand that the objection he takes to Article VI, which deals with this question, is not to the first sentence of
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paragraph (b) but to the second. He accepts the fact that private enemy property must be dealt with in accordance with International Law. What he does not like is bringing the British Diplomatic Representative into the matter; he thinks it should be done entirely by the Emperor himself. The reason, as I understand it, for this provision is as follows. During our campaign, and during the evacuation of Italian civilians, much private property came into the custody of the invading troops. I understand we are answerable for this at the peace settlement and must be able to account for it. We arc, of course, handing over our responsibility in Abyssinia to the Emperor, and no doubt he would act as we would have acted had we been concerned; in short, he must be able to account for this property at the end of the war. This is not only his, but our obligation. It is a joint obligation, and we cannot repudiate it. Therefore I think it is natural that our representative, in conjunction with the Emepror, should be in close consultation together with a view to seeing that this obligation is carried out. It involves no reflection upon the Emperor, I need hardly say; it is only that we have a joint obligation, and therefore it is natural that we should deal with it together. Then there was one other point he made, arising out of the Military Convention. He took some objection to the drafting of the clause which deals with immunities for British troops. He said it was too widely drawn.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: I would not like to say I thought it was too widely drawn, but it seemed to me a matter of legitimate question why, when we recognized Abyssinian authority and Abyssinian administration of justice for ordinary civilians ail over the country, and even for British civilians subject to the presence of a British Judge, we should make a special exception for this particular class.
LORD CECIL: It really is because they are regarded as being part of a military machine. If the noble Lord will look at the Article he will see it refers to
"every civilian official of British nationality accompanying or serving with the said forces."
You might have a man who was not definitely in uniform but was part of the military machine, and you would not want that military machine to be clogged

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because he was in a different legal position from that in which the troops themselves would have been. It is based, though I would not say in every detail, on the similar article in the Anglo-Egyptian Convention. So far as the women and children are concerned, I do not think we need worry about them because women and children are not likely to go to Abyssinia in the next two, or perhaps the next four, years. In connexion with this point, I think the noble Viscount raised the question of the currency of the Military Convention. It is intended that it should be for two years, but there is a provision for three months' notice, so that if the situation changed to such a degree that it was no longer necessary for us to keep these troops there, or to keep the Military Mission there, it would always be open to us to go to the Emperor and arrange for the thing to be abrogated.
Finally, there was one question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Buxton, as to what will be the position at the end of the currency of the Agreement. I understood him to say that it was too short. I am afraid I really cannot answer his question. The point really is that we have by this Agreement set up a sovereign independent country with which we are in agreement and this particular Agreement is to run for two years. At the end of those two years we shall no doubt get into further negotiation with the Emperor and discuss whether the Agreement shall be continued for a further period of years. But it is quite impossible for me to say to-day whether the Agreement will be extended, and if so for what period. That must be a matter for the consideration of His Majesty's Government and the Emperor when the time comes. I feel that this Agreement marks a big step forward. I feel that it is the righting of a very great wrong. We are to-day fighting a war of liberation and, however dark the night through which we are at present passing, I feel that in this Agreement we do see the first clear indications of a dawn which is coming.
LORD WEDGWOOD: Before the noble Lord sits down would he say a word about whether the concessions and the grants made by the Italian Government, while de facto but not de jure, are binding
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upon the present Emperor, or whether this Agreement binds the Emperor to recognize those grants and concessions?
LORD CECIL: I should very much like notice of that question. I shall be delighted to make inquiries and to communicate with the noble Lord. It is rather a difficult technical point.
LORD DAVIES: May I ask whether it is proposed to avail ourselves of the assistance which the Emperor offered us some time ago?
LORD CECIL: I think the real need is to assist the Emperor to reorganize this military force. I do not think he is in a position at present to give extended military help in the war. As a result of this Military Mission we hope that he will build up a large, efficient, modern Army. If he does that and is in a position to offer the help we shall be very glad to consider it.
LORD NOEL-BUXTON: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for his full reply and for the additional information he has given us. I can only say that my anxieties are not altogether removed. If, as has occurred before, no progress is recorded in the implementing of a decree which in itself is of very small value, or if there should be another Emperor on the throne, possibly another Menelik, and we are bound to the continued handing over of large grants of money without conditions in regard to internal progress, it will be a melancholy thing. I can only trust that the Foreign Minister, recognizing the great British tradition in regard to native questions, and particularly in regard to slavery, will be active and ensure reform. I beg to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

THE HOME GUARD.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His Majesty's Government whether, in view of the probable increase in the numbers of Home Guards owing to the new conscription plans and compulsory hours of training, arrangements will be made for an increase in the number of weapons provided, with the ammunition necessary, and for a larger number of N.C.O. instructors to carry on during the extra

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hours of training; and if the public are to be instructed to what extent they are to co-operate with the Army and the Home Guard in the event of invasion; and to move for Papers.
The noble Duke said: My Lords, I want to say that this debate, staged in my name, was originally arranged for last Wednesday, but, at the request of my noble friend the Leader of the House, I very gladly charged it to this Wednesday. Although it is a little late, better late than never. I shall take the points in the order I raise them on the Order Paper. Firstly, comes the question of weapons and ammunition in view of the increasing numbers, of Home Guards under the new conscription scheme. Those of your Lordships who have served in the Army, Navy, or Home Guard will recognize how discouraging it is for a man who has been trained to have no weapons provided for him at all. This has happened quite often in certain areas in the Home Guard There is a definite shortage of the number of weapons provided. I can safely say that I can give the Under-Secretary of State for War details which I think will convince him that in some areas there is still a distinct shortage of weapons and ammunition.
One cannot go too much into detail publicly in your Lordships' House on these matters, and for that reason I was very glad to arrange with the noble Lord to give him any detailed matters when I saw him this morning at the War Office. But there are many general matters I feel should be aired publicly. For instance, we have heard so much from Government spokesmen and others recently about the efficiency and proficiency of the Home Guard all over the country. Although the bulk of the men themselves are splendid, one cannot help wondering how they can really be considered efficient to deal, with a possible, most ferocious, sustained and up-to-date air-borne invasion on a big scale unless they are fully armed and fully trained. We have heard recently in another place from the Prime Minister, as from Lord Beaverbrook, a most wonderful account of the way production of every kind is mounting in this country, and also that the Home Guard is more and more expected to take the place of the Regular Army, a great part of which may be leaving these shores. In other words, greater responsibilities are going to be put upon us. If our new
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production figures are really so good, surely the extra rifles and ammunition to make us safe could be obtained rather than risk a Home Guard "Singapore" when the attack comes.
What I urge is that the Home Guard should be given more rifles and ammunition so that they may have a fair chance of observing and delaying the enemy tactics, which, as your Lordships know, is their chief role. I am, of course, speaking chiefly of the Home Guard, not in the cities or urban areas—I know nothing about them—but in the large scattered areas of which I have had long experience owing to the fact that I have a very large area under my own authority. I know the men are splendid, but you cannot fight against a Tommy gun with a claymore or pike. "We will give them pikes if we cannot give them rifles" has been suggested. The least you can do is to give everyone a rifle with sufficient ammunition to use it to the best advantage. If you want them to hold up tanks at road blocks, you must give them antitank rifles in addition to the weapons they already possess. This is a thing we do not already possess, and it seems to me you must do one thing or the other. Either you must say "Here is the Home Guard, a magnificent citizen army, which must be fully armed with the latest weapons and brought absolutely up to date, and given great responsibilities," or else you must say" Here is the Home Guard; they are not very well armed or efficient, but being numerous and on the spot, we will use them for what they are worth to back up the Regular Army in tight spots here and there, and they are capable of observing and possibly delaying the enemy." The Government must decide in which of these two ways they are going to mould the Home Guard.
Now we have finished with the question of sufficient arms and ammunition, and we come to the second important question, that of training the Home Guard both to use these weapons efficiently and to fight—not in the way they fought in the last war, but in the most modern and up-to-date manner. In scattered country districts, where company commands are stretched over miles of country, a regular non-commissioned officer instructor is required for each company for training purposes. I was glad to see that The Times advocated this in a leading

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article on the Home Guard the other day. It is impossible to run a whole battalion of the Home Guard scattered over a vast area with one instructor. We must have one instructor per company if we are to make them efficient. That is, in my opinion, the absolute minimum. It has been said, "You must find instructors in the Home Guard and get them trained." The answer to that is that you hardly ever find an instructor belonging to the Home Guard who is up-to-date. He is usually thinking of the last war, and a short course of three days or five days cannot teach him half as much as a Regular Army instructor knows.
Now that they are going to get increased hours of training under the new conscription scheme, a Regular N.C.O. instructor per Home Guard company is essential, because there will be much more to do. If they are going to train three days a week, the instructors who have been doing the work cannot go on instructing them in the same things. You must have fresh blood and more people. I am not speaking, of course, of urban areas or areas where regular troops who can supply instructors are stationed. I am speaking only of those far-away country areas where the Home Guards are isolated and alone. In England there are a great many places where you have regular troops, and in those places you can have all the instructors that you want. I am talking about those remote places in the country districts. I find that the Home Guards on the whole do better under N.C.O. instructors than they do from lectures given by officers. They prefer that; that is the opinion I get from many people. As I said before, the average of one instructor per battalion is grossly inadequate. I should think by now that plenty of instructors are being turned out by the Regular Army after the long training they have had. I do not see how, in scattered areas like those in the far North and West, more than 24 hours' training per month could be attempted. In these areas some of the Home Guards are shepherds and such like, who could not even do that amount. That, of course, must be left to the local commanding officer to decide.
Now we come to my last point—the one upon which it is most important for us to have Government guidance. A short time ago a report of a most interesting lecture
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was sent round to the Home Guard senior officers by the Commander-in-Chief, Scotland. I also received a letter from the Commander - in - Chief, who strongly approved of the lecture, and asked me to do all I could in my own county and elsewhere to support the plan involved. The Regional Commissioner for Scotland also supported the plan. The gist of the lecture was as follows: We are fighting a total war, and, as in Russia, every man, woman and child in the country should be told what to do in the event of invasion; it was ridiculous that strong men should loll on sofas in their houses when the attack was going on outside, just because they were not in the Home Guard or defence forces. The public has only been told to stay put; on the contrary there should be a job for everyone against the invader. This should apply not only to factory workers, A.R.P., police, special constables, fire-watchers, and others, but to every able-bodied man and woman in the country, whatever their job; and if that was going to be arranged it was high time this arrangement should be organized.
After all, if Hitler is supposed to be arriving here in April we have not very long to prepare for him. That was the purpose of Colonel Nock's lecture which was very fully approved by the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland and the Regional Commissioner for Scotland, Lord Rosebery. To-day I want to know if His Majesty's Government also approve it, because if they do I would like to know what steps they propose to take to bring it about, and what instructions they propose to issue. It may be there that they cannot give us a full answer at the moment, but we should like to know what we can be told. We should also like to know if they do approve of the instructions they propose to issue to the county councils, the police, the mayors of cities and to the public, or are we all to be governed on the old lines of International Law and The Hague Convention, most of which apparently has gone by the board so far as the Russian war is concerned? We feel that we would like to know what is in the minds of the Government in regard to this matter. We want a lead from them one way or another. If the Regional Commissioner says something for Scotland and the Commander-in-Chief also says something, what we want to know is, what do the Government say?

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The Government ought to tell us beforehand so that everything can be prepared. Since Colonel Nock's lecture was delivered I understand things have moved forward a good deal, but I will not say any more about that, because the Under-Secretary of State for War will be able to tell us later.
I should like to quote another senior Home Guard officer of great repute who said:
" I feel very strongly that to the extent that arms of one kind or another are available, every able- bodied man. should be enrolled and trained to fight an invading enemy. When that enemy is in the immediate vicinity no man should stand aside on civil defence. No other task should take precedence over the duty of destroying the invade. The Home Guard, as the second line of defence of the country, should have the best remaining available men. Compulsory enrolment, combined with the suggestions I have put forward, should provide them."
Further, I would quote one or two paragraphs that are the absolute pith of the case which was set out in the lecture which was given with the approval of the Scottish Commander-in-Chief and Regional Commissioner by Colonel Nock. Dealing with what ought to be done he said:
" It seems very strange to some of us that a country which is fighting for its life, should be organized for the struggle with the workers in one compartment knowing little, if anything, about the functions of those in the others; this fosters the very opposite of friendly and helpful co-operation. This is a powerful drag on collaboration. It induces the attitude, ' You have your job and I have mine,' and makes no provision for the fact that, in the event, it may be necessary for all hands to be applied to the same pump to prevent the spread of a conflagration which threatens to destroy the means of carrying on any job at all. It cannot be denied that co-operation at some levels is spasmodic and half-hearted. The Army has its different branches: fighting troops, sappers, administrative and supply services, pioneers, and so on, all organized into one co-operative whole. Civil "Defence is organized in the same way: it has its casualty service, police, fire service and so on. is there any reason why the whole nation should not be organized for national defence? There is no insurmountable obstacle in the way of mobilizing everyone's efforts in this common task. Suppose we call them ' Home Defenders ' the task of guarding our homes has a lot of different sides to it. The military forces which include the Home Guard and Home Defenders, surely they should join hands. Can there be any doubt that when the last despairing efforts of the beast at bay is made the. most urgent duty of every person in these islands will be-to, help to kill Germans. And yet thousands of able-bodied citizens of this country at this
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moment have no idea how to set about doing it, how to help the military forces to increase their fighting capacity."
We must not forget the greatly increased number of rifles which will be required now owing to the larger number of Home Guards coming under the new call-up. There is no use conscribing a man if you have not got any arms for him. The only other way is not to conscribe so many men but to limit them to the number of rifles we have. If every man is to be called on also to fight, then many more rifles will be required, or at any rate many more weapons of a suitable character will be required, for total warfare. When the Home Guards were first formed at a time of great emergency, after the Dunkirk evacuation, we accepted quite naturally the great shortage of rifles, ammunition, etc., on the assurance that one day this would be made good. Now. after nearly two more years of war, when we have been told that our production output is both astounding and prodigious, we are in some units still in the same position as regards rifles and ammunition as we were in at that date, although it is true we have been given other weapons of different sorts since that date. But I still think the deficiency in rifles and ammunition suitable for the Home Guard should be made good before we can be considered a really effective and dangerous force. I beg to move.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I wish to add one word in support of what the noble Duke has said. He speaks with great knowledge, having all through the war been responsible for a great area in the North of Scotland with a large number of Home Guards. I would only address your Lordships and the War Office representative here, Lord Croft, on two points. I feel strongly that, although there has been this great increase in production, there may well still be a shortage of rifles and of anti-tank rifles and ammunition, because not only of the losses, which are inevitable, but of the immense calls, notably those for Russia, that have been made upon our supplies. May I say this to Lord Croft, and I beg him to note it and, if he can, get the Army Council to agree to it? I think the mistake we are making in this very difficult business of the Home Guard, in regard to which I know they are doing their best, is that we have not done for the Home Guard what has been done for other forces that

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I have known both in these islands and in the Colonies, and those with which I myself have served, as have many of your Lordships, in different wars.
Always, before, you have said, "When we give you a rifle—and with that we include an anti-tank rifle or machine-gun—\the one thing we insist upon is, however much ammunition or however little we are going to give you, in the end that will depend on how much we have got, but we give you enough to practise and get proficient, and we insist that you shall have this ammunition and that you shall practise." Now in the case of the Home Guard, this elementary truth was forgotten and it has gone on being forgotten to this very day. When I see the Commander-in-Chief of a particular area in which I may be and say, "Oh well, but is it not rather absurd that there should be all these tens of thousands of men who really have not got confidence in their weapon because there is no ammunition? "he says," Well, you had better ask the War Office." Really the War Office have on this occasion forgotten the first elementary rule and reason for a fighting force. When you give a man a weapon, give him enough ammunition to ensure that he shall get confidence in it and used to it. Far from the Home Guard coming to my noble friend and saying, "Please will you give us some ammunition?" I want him to say, through the Commanders of the Home Guard, "Here is the ammunition." Do not let them have to be asked how many rounds may be necessary, but let what is required be found so that the men may have confidence in the use of their weapons. I beg my noble friend to do that. However great the shortage may be, let him see that the same rule applies to the Home Guard as applies to every other force that I have ever heard of.
The second point is the point raised by the noble Duke in quoting Colonel Nock, who wrote the well-known memorandum in which he humorously suggests the strange thought that when the Germans landed it would not be the people playing golf, as in the well-known poem, but the people lying on their sofas and saying, "I do not belong to the Home Guard, I do not belong to the Regular Army, and I do not belong to such other force as may be named; I am going to loll on
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my sofa." May I venture to point out to the noble Lord, Lord Croft, that the man who lies on his sofa when the sudden onslaught comes is committing a crime against the law of the land? If he doubts that it would be a very good thing if he would consult the Attorney-General, who will tell him that by the law of the land, whenever an enemy suddenly appears, every able-bodied man is bound to leave his sofa, spring to his feet and by every possible means in his power join with others in repelling the enemy. The point of the Hague Convention was raised again. I beg the noble Lord who represents the War Office to ask the Law Officers to give him a resume of that Convention by which we are still bound.
Of course, as we have a great many prisoners in our hands and the enemy has our prisoners in his hands, it is not for us to say that we do not stick to that Convention. By that Convention it is made abundantly clear that the signatories to it are pledged—and none of them have gone back on their word—to respect the action of any man who assists in repelling the enemy when the enemy suddenly attacks him. There is no question about it whatever. Not only is a man entitled to do it by International Law, but by the law of England he is bound to do it. The consequences of that position have been well described by the noble Duke. We want more rifles and more instructors, but what I want made clear to the country as a whole is that a man who lies on the sofa when the enemy comes is committing a crime against the law of the land and is liable to severe penalties. I hope the noble Lord will make this clear and, above all, that he will see that there are sufficient munitions to enable every armed man to have confidence in the use of his weapon.
VISCOUNT BUCKMASTER: My Lords, I am in the happy position, though taking no credit for it, of seeing that every one of the major reforms for which I have pressed since the days of the Local Defence Volunteers have been brought about. There are, however, one or two things that still must be said and I will endeavour to say them with the greatest brevity. The question of arms and ammunition has been dealt with by the noble Duke, and my noble friend Lord Elton has something to say on that point, so I will turn to the question of training. The Home Guard in my view cannot as

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a body become proficient without the support of the Army. In the area in which I am privileged to serve that co-operation has been most helpful and most friendly. If I may have your Lordships' permission to digress for a moment, I would like to pay a most whole-hearted tribute to the Canadian forces for what they have done for the Home Guard. There seems to exist between us a special bond. I cannot quite identify its quality, but it does exist. They have done everything they can for us and I wish I could express my gratitude more publicly. Of their efficiency it is not for me to speak—it is well known—but: perhaps it would not be out of place for me to say that the Canadian tank regiment is composed of as fine a body of mo as I have seen for many years.
Passing from that, the point I wish to make is that this co-operation, however full, however generous, is not in itself enough. Some measure of control is needed, and if my noble friend who will reply will forgive me reminding him of this once more, it has been expressly laid down that the Army is to accept responsibility for seeing that the Home Guard is trained. Such responsibility must extend to matters such as criticizing officers, reporting on them, considering training programmes, but never have I found responsibility accepted or interpreted in that sense. Until it is you cannot make the Home: Guard a teal, efficient and effective fighting force. You will not, until that happens, get rid of constant complaints about training. In the last few weeks I have had several instances. One is of a volunteer who resigned because, after working hard all day, he had to spend many hours each week sitting up at night under conditions in which no useful purpose whatever could be served. Another is of a man who tried to accept every opportunity for training but whose platoon commander gave him only one parade a month. I suggest that until you get the Army actively saying "We are responsible and these things must not be," you will never be able to rely on the Home Guard to the extent which its fighting spirit deserves.
To pass quickly to my second point, the question of relationship between the Home Guard and the Civil Defence Services, I would point out that as your Lordships of course are aware compulsion for the Home Guard is purely local and operates
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only in those vulnerable areas which are already short of men, where man-power cannot meet the twin demands of Civil Defence and the Home Guard. It is in these very areas that one would suppose a sense of reality would exist, for in this country we have a front on which we cannot say we under-estimated the strength of the enemy, a front from which we cannot withdraw. Yet we cannot deny the possibility of invasion. If it be coming it may well come in the spring. That being so it must be our urgent duty to get these new Home Guard recruits and train them without delay. Weeks slip by, weeks which once lost can never be recovered. Yet it seems that nothing is being done. I was privileged last week to take part in a conference at which a representative from the Regional authority was present. To say that I was surprised is to put it mildly, when I learnt the position of fire-watchers from whom we expected to get the bulk of recruits, for in this area fire - watchers outnumber the Home Guard by three to one. When you take into account special constables, the Auxiliary Fire Service, air-raid wardens and other people in Civil Defence, the proportion is six or seven to one.
In the event of invasion where would you be? The fire-watchers would be evacuated and would leave the town. How are we then to defend it? Any person who entered this town after compulsory enrolment escapes compulsion. Furthermore, if he is not registered at a labour exchange you cannot" trace him. I was told of special constables, exempt from the Home Guard, who have never performed a single act of duty as special constables. One, indeed, told me that he had just received a medal for long and meritorious service, although he had never performed a single act of duty. When at last I was invited to partake of tea I felt that all that was required was the presence of the Mad Hatter and the March Hare to complete the gathering. I ask my noble friend bluntly: Are the Government serious, do they mean to get these men or not, and having got them will they be trained without delay?
Then there is the question of the flood of correspondence, this flood of paper which never diminishes; these constant returns which irritate and exasperate. There is another matter of which I quote two examples. Several times weapons have been issued—and that takes time in

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rural areas—but hardly are they issued before they are called back again for examination. Surely it should be possible to have weapons properly checked and to be certain about them before they are issued to us. Only last week every rifle, every weapon was called in for inspection—a perfectly sound and perfectly proper precaution. But it takes time. It is not easy in these rural areas where there are no telephones, and in many cases, it may mean a house-to-house call. The moment we got the weapons in, the inspection was cancelled. They had all to be sent out again, and the inspection, no doubt, will be carried out at a later date. That kind of thing does press hardly on us, and I hope something will be done to check it.
One other point; the question of these women who help us in our Home Guard offices. They are sworn in in our area under the Official Secrets Act, and their work is of first importance, and of a confidential nature. I feel sure that where they are not very young women, and where they cannot be replaced, the Ministry of Labour will exercise a sympathetic attitude towards us, and will not disturb our organization by calling them up if it can be avoided. It needs but some imagination and some further effort and out of the Home Guard we can forge a weapon for the defence of this country which will never fail us.
LORD ELTON: My Lords, I think that in any discussion on the Home Guard we should do well to remember the sombre background against which we are talking. Whenever, and wherever, so far, the enemy has struck first, has got in the first blow against our land forces, he has driven us back with heavy losses. These grievous blows have so far been dealt us on the circumference of the vast struggle. We have accordingly survived; we have been accorded time to learn lessons from our defeat and to begin painfully, under the strokes of war, to equip our troops with the armaments with which they should have been provided at the outset. But if ever scenes remotely resembling those which we have had to witness in France, in Greece, in Crete, and in Malaya, were to be enacted in this small island, there would be no time for recovery, no time for learning—it would be extinction, swift, and, possibly, for ever. Therefore it is
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against some such background as that that we should consider the problems which we are discussing this evening, and ask ourselves whether the Home Guard may not be suffering from much the same deficiencies of administration which have brought about the catastrophes we have had to witness elsewhere.
As to equipment, it is, as the noble Duke has observed, very difficult to speak with any particularity in your Lordships' House. I fully believe that there are many areas in which, the Home Guard are lavishly equipped, in which, in fact, as we have rather gathered, from the last speaker to whom we have listened, there are more arms than men. It still undoubtedly remains true that there are also far too many areas in which there are more men than arms. But, no doubt, the noble Lord will reply, as he is entitled to reply, that the areas in which the arms are less than the men, are areas regarded by His Majesty's Government, by the War Office, as not being danger spots. I only wish that I felt any confidence that that reassuring opinion was shared by the German High Command. We have seen a good many guesses of our own High Command as to the enemy's intentions, and they have not been so uniformly correct that we should stake very much of our confidence on their being correct this lime. If the noble Lord will permit me, I shall pass to him in private certain typical statistics with regard to the equipment of certain sections of the Home Guard, which may be no surprise to him, but which would be, I think, a considerable surprise to some of your Lordships.
I would like to say that I can introduce to the noble Lord from among my own friends and acquaintances, with many of whom I have served as a private in the ranks—men from various walks of life, but alike in being veterans of the last war, and in having served in the Home Guard, since the first hour of its enrolment—able-bodied men, fully fitted for this hazardous service, not one of whom has yet received a rifle, not one of whom has yet had the opportunity, since the last Great War, of firing a single practice shot from a Service rifle on a range. That, of course, is not Lord Croft's fault. He has never been one of those who told us that our salvation would be disarmament, or who has resisted or misinterpreted our belated demands for rearmament. I suppose

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there is no one in your Lordships House more anxious to see every wearer of the Home Guard uniform fully equipped. Responsibility, I suppose, rests chiefly on the Minister of Supply, as to whose magnificent achievements we hear so much. I hope that the next time: he sees fit to address us, he will tell us a little of what he has done, and also a little about what he has not done, for the Home Guard.
I would like to suggest that apart from that very grave responsibility resting on the Minister of Supply, there are certain responsibilities resting on the British Regular Army, and the Government Departments too. I would suggest that, if as I understand is the case, Lord Croft has recognized the obligation Of the Regular Army to assist in the training and supervision of the; Home Guard, that obligation is not taken sufficiently seriously, at any rate; in many parts of the country. Too much of the Home Guard training is haphazard and unco-ordinated, depending not on clearly thought out plans bearing obvious relation to the needs of that particular area, but rather to what some harassed platoon commander can vamp up out of the exiguous resources at his disposal. It may be that Sergeant This has been through a course on decontamination. "Oh, very well," it is said, "let him give instruction in gas." Private That has been employed at a printer's, where he has had something to do with maps: "Let him lecture on map-reading." And when all else fails, there is always arms drill to fall back on.
Over this question of filling up time with close order drill or presenting arms, I do suggest to the noble Lord that the War Office could do very real service to the Home Guard by expressly prohibiting more than a small percentage of its hours of training being devoted to anything remotely resembling barrack-square drill. I know of erne Company Commander in the Home Guard who obtained some promise of co-operation from the neighbouring unit of the Regular Army. He received an offer of training for his motor-cyclists and he laboriously prepared a list, a list of the kind that the Army so loves, giving even birthplaces of the men and, it may be, the Christian names of their mothers. At last the men went to the appointed place at the appointed hour, full of enthusiasm and interest, but they were told,," There is no instructor for you; you had better go home." That was four weeks ago. Nothing has since been heard of any
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instruction, and these men are beginning to melt away. That is one example of lack of co-operation, contact and supervision between the Regular Army and its neighbours in the Home Guard.
Another Battalion Commander has prepared his road blocks and his tank obstacles; he only needs some small minor works by the local Regular Royal Engineers to prevent the enemy tanks—as they can at present—sailing round his obstacles with scarcely a check in their onward progress. He received a promise that this would be carried out. That was four months ago, and still the work is uncompleted. This kind of incident is, I think, largely due to the practice of moving on Regular battalions quickly, so that they do not often take root in any one place, and a promise made by one unit may be completely unknown to its successor. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly unsatisfactory, and I would suggest to the noble Lord that there is a dangerous tendency not only to starve the Home Guard of its proper equipment, but to deny it proper supervision and assistance.
Finally, do not the Government need to pay more attention to the needs of this great citizen force in the plans which they are laying down for the latest call-up to the Forces? After all, we cannot have it both ways. If the Home Guard is important enough to require compulsion to be applied to it, then it is important enough for its key men to be left to it. I know of a battalion which has a railway platoon which until recently was under the command of a railway specialist, deeply versed in all the railway technique of derailment and so on. Then came the call-up and, in spite of every effort by his Battalion Commander, that man has been taken away. He is now serving as a private in a non-specialist line battalion, and it has proved quite impossible to provide an efficient substitute for him. I suggest that in the provisions for the call-up, not only to the factories, but to the Forces, some further regard should be paid to the needs of at all events the indispensable key men of the Home Guard battalions. The enthusiasts who are the core of the Home Guard are a magnificent body of men. I have served in the ranks, as many of your Lordships have, during the last few months, and that at least I know of them. They have an incomparable incentive to valour and self-sacrifice, such as no other

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body of troops in the world possesses. They are not only fighting for their country and on the soil of their country, they are fighting, if invasion should come, on their own familiar streets and fields, almost within sight of their own wives and children. I ask the noble Lord to make every possible effort to facilitate the work and efficiency of men 'such as these, and to see that at long last they get the weapons that they will undoubtedly know how to use.
THE EARL OF ELGIN AND KINCARDINE: My Lords, I was unable to be present at the debate which was initiated by the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, about ten days ago, and I had hoped that we might have heard him again to-day lay emphasis on that particular point which he raised on that occasion—namely, the great need for closer co-operation between the Home Guard, the military, and Civil Defence. I was much impressed by the argument he brought forward on that occasion, and, on reading the debate, I shared with him disappointment, and I might almost say dismay, at the answer he received from the representative of the War Office. It seemed to me that in that answer the noble Lord did not appreciate the position at all. The most that he could say was that this was a matter which for some time had been in the mind of the Government. As the noble Lord, Lord Elton, said when he opened his speech just now, these are extremely grave times, and it is with a grave background that we speak in a debate of this kind. Surely, after two years' illustrations of what has had to be faced in Poland, in Russia, in Yugoslavia, in Norway, in Greece, in Crete and in France, the Government could have made up their mind by this time. After these months and years of travail, surely it is time for a speedy deliverance. There is an urgent need for more instructors, more weapons and more men.
I shall not go over those points in detail which have been dealt with by the noble Duke and other speakers, but I feel that I must, as the lecture has been quoted by more than one speaker to-day, mention that Colonel Nock is one of my own Battalion Commanders. When the Home Guard, or rather, the Local Defence Volunteers, as they were then called, were originally started, the Government
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took one of the few opportunities they have had during this war of consulting the Lord-Lieutenant of the county. He has been, so far as I know, generally cold-shouldered in any responsibility in regard to this war, but on that occasion he was consulted, and was asked to recommend someone to act as zone organizer. It seemed to me when that responsibility was laid on my shoulders that the one thing that mattered for the organization of really efficient service was to ensure that that service had the closest possible liaison with Civil Defence, or A.R.P. as it was then called. I nominated the A.R.P. Controller of the county, and he was accepted.
For a year he carried the dual responsibility of zone organizer and became Zone Commander and A.R.P Controller. Throughout the county there has been a very close liaison of the two Services, built up on that principle that you should take advantage of the communications, take advantage of what one Service can do to build up the other, recognizing that it is difficult to find man-power for everything. But before that had been allowed to grow into complete fruition, the whole thing was smashed—smashed deliberately by authority from above, who dictated that there must be a complete divorcement between the two Services. Public opinion, I think, is swinging the pendulum now back again to closer co-operation, but it is not yet realized, or has not yet been made clearly public from the point of view of the responsibility of the Government, that they authorized this close co-operation. Various passages from the lecture which has been referred to have been quoted to your Lordships explaining the views of Colonel Nock, the Battalion Commander who has been in charge of that battalion ever since the inauguration of the Home Guard.
I wish to bring one other point before your Lordships in that respect, and that is in regard to the instruction which can only be given from above. What do the Government really mean by asking the civil population to "stay put"? It has been already referred to by one other speaker this afternoon, but I want to take it a stage further. What is meant by "staying put"? Surely it is that every man, woman, and child shall be given a job to do, and helped and encouraged to take their own part in the defence of their own homes. There must be no

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shielding of one Service as against another, no disposition or attitude on the part of one Service to say, "This is my job—you get on with yours." We have only got one job and that is to defeat the enemy, to defend our own homes. So I put it that if the Government would come out much more strongly with this kind of instruction, and make it quite clear that when they say "Stay put" they are giving to each citizen occupation of mind and body and letting him feel that he is needed, as needed he is, we shall have no refugee problem and no panic. In this lecture which has now the approval of the Scottish Command and of the Regional Commissioner—I wish it had a little bit more approval from the Regional Commissioner and more lead from the Government—it is suggested that in certain places there should be local committees, and that the Home Guard should take the lead in these local committees. It may be that the Home Guard representative in a village is merely a volunteer or a platoon or section commander, and it is difficult for him, without real guidance from above, to make sure that such plans as he may make for the defence of his own locality are in accordance with the plan for the whole country.
There needs to be much more guidance from above as regards the formation of these local committees and as to what they are to do. We are confronted at once in the local committee with a problem such as this. The police have their instructions, but they are secret; the Home Guard have their instructions, but they are secret; Civil Defence workers have their instructions, but they are secret. How can we discuss them? If you are really to enthuse a local population, if you are to instruct the individual man, woman, and child as to what to do, you must get their confidence, and the only way of getting their confidence is to let them know what the position really is. Various speakers this afternoon have spoken about training. On these matters, possibly, the War Office are a little bit apt to be guided by, and get their picture from, the Home Guard centred round and about London. The noble Duke has already pointed out the peculiar difficulties that may exist in sparsely populated country away from big centres.
Let me put another difficulty such as I have experienced during the past two
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years. In that locality we have not had the assistance of the British Army. We have had the assistance, protection, and collaboration of the Polish Army. I should wish to pay a great tribute to the gallantry, courage, spirit, and endurance of the Polish Army, but your Lordships will appreciate that it is very difficult to get that same loan of instructors from a foreign nation as you can get from the British Army. So there is a special need, in localities of that kind, for an extra provision of instructors, from localities where there are large numbers of British troops such as the area the noble Viscount, Lord Buckmaster, mentioned.
One aspect of training has not been referred to this afternoon, and I do feel a great deal of good could be done by an extension of that kind of training such as was given by actual illustration in two forms—first, a visit from a Commando actually performing certain duties of attack, and, second, a visit by a travelling wing from the Home Guard School. I feel a great deal more could be done on these two lines than has yet been attempted or achieved. The lectures of the travelling wing were tremendously appreciated by all my Battalion Commanders. Again, another method by which much training could be given, which has not yet been developed, is the film. We should develop the film in the instruction of the Local Defence Committees. It is the public who want to see these films as well as the Home Guard. I would like to conclude by saying that the time is now ripe for a new definite move forward by the Government. Let the noble Lord, Lord Croft, take his courage in both hands. Let him go to the War Office and say, on the responsibility of this debate to which he has listened, that he stakes his reputation, and let us get some real results, some real deliverance from the difficulties in which we are placed.
THE LORD BISHOP OF TRURO: My Lords, I venture very briefly to lay stress on three points in connexion with this subject. The first is that it is very desirable that priority in equipment should be given to the men who are defending aerodromes, whether the ground staff of the aerodrome itself or members of the Home Guard or any other unit which has this most important responsibility laid upon it in the interim period till the new force is fully organized and in position. My own observation, in a remote and exposed part

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of the country, has suggested that the authorities have been somewhat slow in recognizing the great importance of this matter.
The second point concerns the Home Guard rank and file. Most of the men are in full employment. One of those, for instance, with whom I go on patrol at night, has to leave the post at six o'clock in the morning because he has to go to work. His work is important, urgent, Government work. It is only right to be economical of the energies of such men, and to concentrate the training, somewhat meagre as of necessity it must be, on essentials. Let first things be always kept first. Every man should have his musketry course. He should be familiar with the use of the weapons at his disposal. Every man should have practice in getting quickly to his action station. The action station should be placed in a state of adequate preparation. Communications should be practised and arranged in some detail. Liaison with the Civil Defence should be improved, and so on. In every exercise of the Home Guard, invasion or an invasion raid should be envisaged. As the noble Lord, Lord Elton, has already said, barrack square training, presenting arms, and that type of thing must be reduced to the absolute minimum. I realize that the Home Guard authorities, and especially the highest authorities, recognize this; but I do not think any harm is done by reminding them of it occasionally, and especially reminding the authorities who are intermediate or lower. Here, I believe, lies one of the secrets of Home Guard discipline. The relationship between officers and men in the Home Guard is in the nature of things somewhat different from the relationship between officers and men in the Regular Army. The difficulties that arise are brushed aside if all ranks have this one object steadily in the centre of the picture the whole time.
The third point is this. It is greatly to be desired that changes in schemes and commands should be reduced to a minimum. Constant rearrangements are discouraging and even bewildering. It is difficult to stop all sorts of rumours circulating among the rank and file and reducing confidence. I do not want to labour the point, but these choppings and changing" have been very trying. If I may say so, we have great confidence in
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the General now commanding the defences of the county in which I live, and we hope he will be allowed to stay for a considerable time. If he is to be moved, we hope the General who succeeds him will adopt his dispositions, or at any rate the main lines of them and so preserve as much continuity as possible; and that, of course, applies generally throughout the country. May I add in conclusion that, as I move about, I find encouraging evidence that the Home Guard as a whole is keen and determined and has steadily gained in efficiency? I am now only asking that even more attention should be concentrated on the three points which I have mentioned.
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, I will intervene if I may for only one or two moments, because there are one or two very important questions which have not been quite touched on, although they have been very nearly touched on during the debate. The first is the question of liaison between the Home Guard and the Regular Army and the Home Guard battalions themselves. I have been Acting Deputy Adjutant of a battalion, and I find that there is really very inadequate liaison with the military and also between battalion and battalion of the Home Guard. Whose fault that is I cannot make out. The Battalion Commander has done his best to put it right. There ought to be somebody who can co-ordinate and put out of the picture anything of this sort. I beg that my noble friend when he replies will deal with that, but if he does not reply to it, I hope he will remember it, because it really is happening to-day in an area which, of course, I will not mention.
The next point I want to raise is this. It was touched on a little by my noble friend Lord Mottistone. There are many places where the men have rifles, but they do not practise with the rifle with which they are going to fight. They are given their fighting ammunition, and their fighting rifle, but they practise with another rifle, which is not sighted in the same way as their fighting rifle. That no doubt is a matter for the Ministry of Supply, but everyone who has done any soldiering knows very well that you want to get your men so familiar with their weapons that it becomes to them just like a walking stick—something they can handle which is very familiar to them. I hope this question will be very seriously gone into,

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because I am aware that when the shooting at a real man has to come, one will shoot a great deal better with the rifle one has practised with than with a rifle one has never fired at all. There is one other point on that. This debate perhaps would have been much better if it had taken place in Secret Session, because one cannot say very much now. There are other weapons which have been served out. We all know that a big noise is very frightening to people who are not familiar with it, and some of these weapons make a great noise. If we are to get men, particularly when they are in a real battle, not only familiar with the fire of this weapon which I speak of but others, we ought to have more opportunity for training in their use. If that is done I think our results in killing the Boche when he comes will be very much better. That is all I have to say.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD CROFT): My Lords, before answering the noble Duke, I would like to congratulate the right reverend Prelate on what I understand is his first incursion into debate in this House. I am sure I am voicing the opinion of all your Lordships when I say that we hope his voice will be frequently heard here. He has displayed so many virtues. He was so concise with the three main points which he put before us and which I promise him will receive the consideration of the War Office. He made himself heard; and he seemed to be extraordinarily brief. I would also like to say how much we appreciate the great work which is being done in the Home Guard in that part of the country from which he comes, and I hope that he has not fallen foul of my warrior cousin, who takes such a big part in the Home Guard in that area.
I am sure we were all pleased to hear the speech of the Duke of Sutherland, because we all realize what an immense amount of time and labour he has given to the Home Guard as a Battalion Commander in one of the most difficult areas. Many of us know he would have been here on several previous occasions but for the fact that he felt it was his duty to remain there amongst his people training them in the military duties which he has done so much to impart to them. The points he has raised have, of course, been very
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carefully considered both before and since the introduction of powers for compulsory enrolment and training in the Home Guard. However, I would like, if I may, to correct any impressions that may be abroad that the introduction of compulsion is intended to involve any large immediate increase in the numbers of the Home Guard, except possibly in some limited areas. This being so, your Lordships will appreciate that the question of a large increase in weapons and ammunition on that account does not immediately arise. It is, in fact, a separate problem, and, as I indicated not long ago in the debate on the Motion of the noble Earl, Lord Cork, it is inseparable from the problems of supply of weapons and ammunition to the Army generally.
There seems to be a feeling abroad that the rifle is essential as a weapon for all the Home Guard, and I should like to remind your Lordships that in the event of invasion in a great part of this country we shall be engaged in fighting of a close character. For instance, in the actual cities, towns and villages the opportunities for using hand grenades against enemy motor cyclists and infantry, and incendiary and high explosive grenades against vehicles of all descriptions will be immense. If every platoon had its trained sections of grenade throwers or bombers there is no doubt that operating from trenches or from windows or doorways, or suddenly emerging round houses and cottages, they would he able to inflict great casualties upon an advancing enemy. If I were organizing an attack—I am afraid this sounds rather absurd from one so aged as myself, but my noble friend Lord Mottistone, who I always feel is so much younger than many of us, would probably bear me out in this—I would rather have trained bombers for fighting in urban areas, and if a bombing attack could be swiftly followed up by cold steel, it would be most effective. If I were a bomber in such a formation—and I think I have thrown most types of bombs that have been used in the Army—I should like to have a pike in order to follow up my bombing attack, especially at night. It is a most effective and silent weapon.
I think your Lordships will agree that in street fighting many commanders would far prefer to have trained platoons of bombers, flanked by men armed with Tommy guns, rather than a platoon of riflemen, although where you have open

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country, or in defending the beaches where there is a good field of fire, the rifleman is of course invaluable against parachutists and troops landed from aircraft or the sea. I would suggest to the noble Duke that those men of his battalion who are not fully armed should be trained as bombers, as ammunition carriers, who I think do a vital work, as signallers, as trained scout observers and even as stretcher bearers. I believe they all could perform a very useful function in the Home Guard. In the wider areas the very large number of machine guns and sub-machine guns which we have now issued to the Home Guard will, of course, be invaluable. Now also that the Home Guard have been provided with large numbers of what I may describe as close-range artillery, it would appear wise to have special sections of the Home Guard trained as specialists in this form of fighting. I imagine that this is feeing done. Where Home Guards have this form of artillery, men who have no personal weapons become parts of the gun teams and can take an active part in the operation which only requires to be covered by a limited number of riflemen.
In those company areas which have no priority in the matter of rifles and in which a large proportion are not armed with that weapon, I cannot help feeling that with a little imagination every single member can be armed with offensive weapons and trained so as to take a vital part in the defence of his company area. The noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, made a good point that if possible more rounds should be found for practice. I am sure we all feel a great deal of sympathy with that, but I am also sure that he and other noble Lords will agree that with a shortage of ammunition it is better to concentrate as far as possible on miniature rifle practice and to let a man fire a few rounds to get used to the kick of the rifle so that he would know what happens when the rifle is used. The noble Lord, Lord Teviot, suggested that it was a mistake to issue for practice ·303 ammunition when ·300 rifles are used. But if you have a considerable amount of ·303 ammunition coming along it is far better to give the Home Guard where we can a chance of firing the real thing with ·303 rifles, because if they can fire with the ·303 then the 300 is a far easier weapon to use hereafter. That is the explanation
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of that seemingly strange policy. Arrangements for additional practice are at the present moment being worked out and it is hoped that bigger issues may be possible.
I want to make one remark with regard to machine guns because sometimes people seem to have an idea that you ought to have vast reserves of machine gun ammunition. I hope that no machine-gun will ever be tired unless there is a machine-gun target, and that means a group of at least twenty or thirty men bunched together, flank fire on an extended line, or advancing vehicles within decisive range. It is very rare—this will be a platitude to most of your Lordships—that a target will present itself for more than fifty seconds. I remember that in many battles in 1914, 1915 and 1916, we rarely fired a full belt. One minute was the machine-gunner's dream. I hope it may be a dream that will come true for the Home Guard. May I press the imperative need of communications between posts? Company reserves of ammunition must be speedily conveyed to the threatened post from Headquarters or from posts which are distant from the direction of attack. Most of the areas of Home Guard formations are of a circular character so that you have posts all round the area. If you know that the enemy is coming from the north you can take ammunition from the south to the threatened post in the north to relieve the position. If private cars are not available for this purpose I suggest that cadets on bicycles or runners might fill the bill, and I rejoice to think that the Cadet Force will now have that aid which is essential.
When the noble Duke stated that we are still in the same position as regards rifles and ammunition in some units as we were two years ago, I must protest that if that is true in some units it is definitely contrary to the facts with regard to the country as a whole. Many rifles have, since that time, been imported and issued to the Home Guard. Scores of millions of rounds of S.A.A. have been secured from the United States of America and thousands of Northovers, thousands of bombards and many thousands of submachine-guns have been distributed. I always think comparisons are a mistake, but it will be found in regard to a thousand members of the Home Guard that if you take info account their sub-machine-guns, machine-guns and rifles, they have

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probably a good deal greater fire power than we had when fighting the Prussian Guards in 1914- If noble Lords ask whether we are satisfied I say, "No, of course not," but I can give your Lordships this assurance, that we shall never cease to strain every nerve to secure greater supplies.
I am bound, however, to ask your Lordships how you would act in the matter of priority for rifles. Surely you would put the Regular Forces first. You would say that they must have absolutely the first priority. Would you not put next the Indian Army, with its great perils in the East, in Malaya and Burma and in India itself? Are we to ignore the changed position of Australia and New Zealand? They will want all the rifles they can get. Must we not arm all the trained native forces which we have been building up in West Africa, East Africa, and for the defence of the Sudan? Are we not bound to provide rifles for the trained men of the Allied Forces who have sacrificed so much and who are coming to our aid? And when the call went forth for rifles for the Poles in Russia, surely we were right to provide these magnificent and trained fighting men with rifles?
Let us come home. Is it not the Air Defence Force of aerodromes which perhaps ought to have the most urgent of all answers to the call? Supply all these needs and then any surplus that we have should surely go to the Home Guard, and only when the Home Guard's needs are satisfied, it seems to me, can we possibly think of arming these civilians who have not yet joined the Home Guard with the precious weapons which are wanted all the world over. It is true to say that service rifle production is now on the increase and we hope soon that cur Army requirements will be fully satisfied. I therefore urge the Home Guard to continue to be patient, and, where the units are not yet in the possession of a full complement of rifles, I would suggest that they should endeavour to train their men in other essential forms of fighting which I have indicated, so that they can learn from the Russian guerillas on the one hand and from what our own troops in Libya have done on the other hand, in close fighting in towns and villages. There we found men ready to tackle tanks with the first primitive Molotov cocktails and they did, in fact, do it successfully.
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The noble Lord, Lord Elton, asked whether anything could be done to stimulate the co-operation of the Regular Army. I think that in most parts of the country there is now very real co-operation. I find that the Army realizes that it is most dependent on the brotherhood of the Home Guard, and I do know of many Corps whose non-commissioned officers, after being on duty all day, go out at night to assist in training the Home Guard. I have seen N.C.Os. from the Brigade of Guards spending their leisure evenings at work at which one would have thought they would almost have become stale, with remarkable results. One realizes, of course, that there are areas where you have no Regular troops on establishment, and that Is a question into which we have to look. With regard to his point about drill we have long ago realized, in fact we have realized from the very first, that the Home Guard should not be treated like Regular soldiers and have so many drills as to make their work uninteresting, and we have never intended it. Where there is a tendency that way it is in fact actively discouraged. Instructions have been issued to that effect and I should have thought the position was improved very much.
I also want to say this in pursuance of the other side of the question. I have known scores of Home Guards, N.C.Os. and men, who were in the last war, and at the start of the organization were rather distressed to find results so slow because there was no cohesion and no readiness to answer the word of command. I did think of this after seeing a Guard of Honour three days ago. You may say "How absurd having a Guard of Honour of the Home Guard," but I can tell you they were a splendid unit. They turned out, about 150 of them, and they were extraordinarily steady. I assure your Lordships that men do want to do that sort of thing. One has only to sec the results to realize, not only that they do like it, but that it is giving them cohesion and that quality of discipline which must be helpful when the real trouble emerges. I can promise the noble Lord that we are taking steps to see that that side of soldiering is not being overdone.
Lord Elton asked a further question with regard to key men. This is a matter which has been under very earnest consideration. Where a Battalion Commander definitely considers—and he is

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backed up by the opinion of the Zone Commander—that a man is essential—I think it is in the 35–41 Group—and application is made on the form N.S.300, this man may be reserved for what is regarded as the priority duty of training in the Home Guard.
The problem of providing additional permanent staff including, of course, N.C.O. instructors, has been under consideration for a long time; in fact for some time before the issue of compulsion ever arose. But it is not merely a question, as the noble Duke will realize, of sparing the available man-power which, I admit, even in these days of man-power stringency is of relatively lesser consideration. It is much more a question of finding suitably qualified instructors who are of a sufficiently high standard to justify their appointment to the Home Guard. I think the noble Duke will agree that it is no use providing old and out-of-date men. What are wanted are young and active men with proper training in modern warfare, and, if possible, experience with a field force. There are many demands for this type of N.C.O. and the right type of man is difficult to find. There is also a concurrent demand from the R.A.F. Defence Regiment. The matter is now in hand and I hope that as a result, we shall see, before long, that steps are being taken in the right direction, and we shall not fail to give special consideration to those scattered areas where much time has to be spent by instructors in travelling. I know the noble Duke has those areas particularly in mind.
The action to be taken by civilians in the event of invasion is, I think, an entirely separate matter from those raised in the first part of the Motion. It raises far wider issues, particularly the main issue as to whether civilians should or should not be encouraged to use weapons, and to co-operate with the armed forces of the Crown. My noble friend Lord Mottistone quoted from a lecture which has received some interesting advertisement this afternoon, although I frankly confess that I had not read it before, and referred to a passage in it, about lying on sofas. I do not think there will be very much of that.
I want to say this in conclusion, in answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Buck-master, that the Government are regarding this question as a really serious one. It is the next great step. We have got on,
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we are training the Home Guard, we are training and have trained the Civil Defence Services, and their co-operation is of great importance, and the next step seems to be—and we have very likely arrived at that now—that perhaps more general instruction should be given to the general public.
But it is not the policy of His Majesty's Government to arm civilians, and my right honourable friend, the Secretary of State for War, confirmed this as recently as 22nd January in another place. Instructions as to this were issued in May last in a pamphlet over the Prime Minister's signature entitled "Beating the Invader," and these instructions still stand. I am aware that the course of modern warfare in Russia and elsewhere has caused many people to take the view that these considerations should no longer prevail, but I would remind your Lordships that the presence of civilians actually taking part in operations of war—not hundreds of miles behind the front, as the partisans are in Russia, but actually where your military formations are operating—may by no means assist the responsible military commander in his conduct of the battle. There are many tasks which civilians can perform such as immobilization of vehicles and other stores and equipment which may be of value to the enemy, but haphazard action would not be desirable. The action which civilians should take in these circumstances is a matter for the Civil Defence authorities, and they have already issued certain instructions on these subjects. They will continue to issue such instructions as may be necessary from time to time.
On this matter of co-operation, on which great stress was laid by the noble Duke and by Lord Elton, I would like to say that I believe there is far greater cooperation now, at any rate among the military and Home Guard authorities, with the Civil Defence Services, than there was, say, six months ago. I have myself recently attended one or two very big exercises in one Command, in particular one three or four weeks ago, and I can assure the noble Lord that the whole of the Civil Defence people were out during the whole time of that mock invasion, which I think took place over a weekend.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: If the Government would assure me that they

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favour that co-operation, that would have a much stronger effect than anything else.
LORD CROFT: I do appreciate that, and I was going to say that I will most certainly convey the ideas which have been so freely expressed in this debate to my right honourable friend in another place, in order that that may be appreciated. As far as I am concerned, we have always been desirous,, especially in the rural areas, that there should be the closest integration of the military with those who are in the Civil Defence Services or in the Home Guard, and personally I am very hopeful that steps will be taken to make that easier, although many local authorities have already done everything they can in that direction. Meanwhile, may I suggest that all civilians who feel that they have the time to train and undergo instruction should volunteer for the Home Guard wherever its ranks are not full, in order that their very proper desire to have fighting knowledge may be satisfied, and before vacancies may be filled by direction under the new scheme? I am very grateful to the noble Duke for the tone and manner in which he has introduced this subject. I am sure the debate has been a great help.
LORD TEVIOT: I think my noble friend has not gone into the question of the general strategic liaison, which I find, and the Home Guard find in the area where I live, is very wanting. I hope he will bear that in mind.
LORD CROFT: Yes, most certainly.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord very much. There are one or two things about which I am a little bit indefinite. With regard to the cooperation of the public, for instance, my Command is in Scotland, and I am asked to approach the county council. I cannot do that without the authority of the Government. I want to know whether the Government favour that co-operation between all the Forces and the A.R.P. I understand something is going to be stated about that at a later date. Is that so?
LORD CROFT: I can only assure my noble friend that the question is at the present moment under very active consideration. Perhaps I might further it by sending along the gist of the noble Duke's speech.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: May I mention the anti-tank rifles? I asked if we could have them at road blocks.
LORD CROFT: We certainly will give that consideration.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: Because obviously we cannot stop tanks without something of the kind——
LORD CROFT: I should not like that to go out to the public——
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): May I suggest, not as Lord Chancellor, but as a member of the House, that when a Minister rises to speak it is desirable that the other noble Lord should sit down.
LORD CROFT: I am grateful to the noble Duke, but that in our opinion is a most fallacious argument, and we are absolutely satisfied that other weapons, generally described as bombards, are most effective anti-tank weapons. They are distributed in many thousands. And do not let those men who have not got rifles believe for one moment that we have not got the hand grenades now, which can be very effective if fearlessly used against tanks or other vehicles.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND: My Lords, I beg to withdraw my Motion. Although I am not absolutely satisfied, I think the debate will be a tremendous help.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932: BOROUGH OF CLITHEROE ORDER.

  HAILSHAM RURAL DISTRICT ORDER.
  LORD SNELL: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend the Duke of Devonshire I beg to move the Motion standing on the Paper in his name.
  LORD SNELL: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend the Duke of Devonshire I beg to move the Motion standing on the Paper in his name.
  Moved, That the Orders made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department under the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, and laid before the House yesterday, be approved.—(Lord Snell.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  House adjourned.