Lords Sitting of 2 December 1942

Preamble
The House met, the LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

THE ADDRESS: MESSAGE FROM THE KING.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, I have to convey to the House the following Message from the King, signed with his own hand:
"I have received with great satisfaction the loyal and dutiful expression of your thanks for the Speech with which I have opened the present Session of Parliament."

ALLIED WAR EFFORT.
LORD ADDISON LORD ADDISON rose to call attention to the importance of the utmost possible unity in the Inter-Allied control and direction of the war effort; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, we have recently had a most heartening experience. We have had a splendid proof of what can be done: a remarkable demonstration of what can be achieved by united Staff work between the three great Fighting Services. Associated with that splendid effort, I think we should all wish to pay tribute to a Service riot ordinarily ranked as a Fighting Service; I refer to the work of the Ministry of War Transport. It sometimes seems as if, in our admiration for the skill of the timing and the inter-Service co-operation which characterized the descent upon North Africa, we think, and quite properly, in the first instance of the Fighting Services, and may be, perhaps, apt to overlook the months and months of careful preparation and splendid organization which must have gone to the assembling and the loading of the ships for the expedition, their assembly at different places at sea in secret, the timing of the various operations and the thousand and one other duties which must have fallen upon the Mercantile Marine and upon the branches of the war effort generally supervised by the Ministry of War Transport. It will, I am sure, be acceptable to your Lordships that we should emphasize our admiration for
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their share in this achievement. It is perhaps the greatest combined long-distance war effort in history, and it is exceedingly encouraging.
But the lesson of it, I think, is not only that we have the satisfactory assurance that we have the men in our different Staffs who can plan and carry out operations of this complexity and magnitude with such singular success and precision, but that, as we have the men who can do it, we are justly entitled to look to them for more of the same qualities. We know the difficulties—even those of us who are far outside the war effort of the Allied Nations know the difficulties—connected with operations extending, as these do, from the frozen North to the plague-ridden jungles of New Guinea, with all that that must mean in variety of equipment, planning beforehand and a hundred other things, and with conditions varying from the well-developed traffic lines of Great Britain and the United States to the infinitely difficult problems winch transport and supply must and will present in China. There is no suggestion of any kind of unfriendly criticism in the Motion which I am submitting to your Lordships, because we recognize that first things must come first, and that our war effort, as the Prime Minister indicated in his broadcast the other evening, must be concentrated in the first instance upon the defeat of the principal enemy. It is also heartening to notice that co-operation of a more effective kind is gradually developing with Russia. But there is clearly the possibility of a greater extension of united consultation with Russia, for united Staff work, for a common study of war problems, and for the taking of appropriate measures so far as we can join our efforts in that direction. I shall be glad if we can receive some encouraging intimation that united Staff work between ourselves and the United States and Russia is being developed as quickly as is practicable in view of the physical and geographical difficulties.
Behind this there is one other matter to which I think it is appropriate to call attention, and that is the position with regard to our great Ally China. One recognizes the difficulties, of course—they are obvious; and problems of India and Burma present themselves, one may say, at the threshold of China. But I confess to some sense of disappointment that one

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has not felt that there has been the deliberate fostering of co-operation between ourselves and China to the extent that will in the end be necessary. It does not follow that that has not been so, and I am not asking any improper questions. At the same time, that is clearly desirable, both in the interests of our future efforts to free China and for the encouragement of the Chinese people themselves.
In this connexion I must refer in a sentence or two to the delegation we sent to China not long since. It was a highly respectable delegation. I have nothing to say as to the gentlemen who composed it, but it would not be fair to pretend that it was an authoritative delegation. I do not think it was a delegation which put in its proper perspective the magnitude of China and the immense importance which attaches to co-operation with that great Power, which has been fighting for many years against determined aggression. It betrays, to me anyhow, and I know to many others, a disappointing lack of imagination, whether in the Foreign Office or elsewhere I cannot say. I hope that His Majesty's Government will make a definite and obvious effort to place on a higher scale of public concern their realization of the immense importance of putting in the very first place the development of close working relations between ourselves and China. Quite frankly, many of us have been rather disappointed over this, and I hope a more courageous imagination will inspire future efforts.
I think we should all agree that a much more highly developed Inter-Allied Organization for dealing with war problems is essential, not only for winning the war but for winning the peace. After all, the problems of post-war issues are inextricably interwoven with war issues themselves. The working of the war effort between the Allied Nations calls for developing and solidifying machinery for working together for war purposes; for getting established between the Allied Nations for war purposes a machinery of consultation whereby interchange of view becomes easy, for considering arrangements for supply, and in a hundred other ways for dealing with war problems. I think we all want to see an organization among the Allied Nations which is accustomed to work, which men are accustomed to look to as an instrument of effective co-operation during the war. Unless we can establish among the Allied
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Nations during the war effective co-operative machinery far greater than has yet been attempted, so far as I can see we shall find ourselves, when the turmoil of peace comes, confronted with centrifugal tendencies among the nations. The soldiers will want to get back to their homes, but no effective co-operation will be possible at that time by any machinery that is scrambled together quickly to deal with post-war problems.
It seems to me that the only way we can avert disorder and narrow national self-seeking is to use the incentive of war needs to develop Inter-Allied consultative machinery that works regularly during the war. One was glad to see that President Roosevelt referred to this necessity the other clay in his broadcast when he spoke of the need for establishing machinery during the war for "for putting people on their feet"—those were his words. The Prime Minister referred to it also in his broadcast on Sunday evening. I see that in the Beveridge Report there is a sentence which epitomizes very clearly what is at the back of my mind in putting this Motion on the Paper:
"Each individual citizen is more likely to concentrate upon his war effort if he feels that his Government will be ready in time with plans for the better world, but if these plans are to be ready in time they must be made now."
It is obvious that the necessities of the war present an occasion for the getting together of Inter-Allied machinery for consultation and work such as will be quite unattainable after the war. It is for that reason that I ask His Majesty's Government to tell us what they are doing to use the incentive of the war to establish, not occasional, not ad hoc, but an organized machine whereby the Allied Nations can attack their problems by united consultation.
We ought to have something developed during the war to which the people will gradually become accustomed—machinery of consultation which they will recognize as working amongst the Allied Nations, machinery of consultation competent to deal with their difficulties as they arise, and also a body of men accustomed to work with one another. The habit of working with one another, as we are all aware who have had any experience of Government, is essential to good working—it is essential to the establishment of any nucleus of a future Council of the Allied

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Nations—and I should like to see the war need used to compel us to make a beginning with the establishment of a Council of the United Nations. I am quite sure that, unless His Majesty's Government and those with whom they are in close consultation give a lead in a more constructive form than one has seen any indication of so far, we shall find ourselves at the end of the war trying hastily to bring together some machinery for international consultation under the most disadvantageous circumstances. Now is the time, I suggest, to create a real working Inter-Allied Council, because the need for it will crop up, not suddenly at the end of the war, but at all times between now and then.
We have had an illustration of that since the occupation of French North Africa. The question of supplies of food to those populations has immediately emerged, and, happily, I believe, through the efforts of the United States, steps will be taken to meet the most pressing necessities. As the war proceeds, if, say, the distresses of the Italians led them to give up their effort—if they are allowed to do so—nothing could be more encouraging to the war effort than that the oppressed nations should realize that the United Nations who are fighting for freedom have in existence a machine for counsel and action which can bring help to them. It is in order to elicit, if I can, some indication of what steps His Majesty's Government are taking to bring about this closer machinery of consultation that I have placed this Motion on the Paper. I beg to move.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, my noble friend was good enough to suggest that I should take this opportunity of adding one or two words to the very full and adequate statement he has made. I particularly welcome it because I am sure your Lordships will agree that my noble friend has chosen a very suitable moment for bringing this important subject before your Lordships' House. He brings it forward at a moment when the general fortunes of the United Nations on all Fronts are very much better, more promising and more favourable than they have been for a long time. Therefore, my noble friend and my other noble friends on these Benches—and certainly myself—will not be accused of choosing a moment of embarrassment to
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criticize the Joint Staff arrangements of the United Nations.
I particularly want to take this opportunity, as one who has had hard things to say in the past about leadership in certain of our Fighting Forces—the Army in particular—to join with my noble friend in paying the warmest tribute I can to the evidences of the excellent Staff work and leadership in the two North African campaigns. I speak of two North African campaigns because the Armies are still separated by 800 or 900 miles, and are in very different theatres of war, unfortunately, still. It is quite obvious from the very full accounts which have been given to us in your Lordships' House by the noble Viscount who leads the House and by the Under-Secretary for War, and also by the Prime Minister in another place, that in what I may describe as the Battle of Alamein the whole arrangements of our tactics, the artillery support, the use of the tanks, and co-ordination of the aircraft were admirable. Indeed, we outwitted and out-generalled the Germans at their own game. It is quite obvious from the accounts we have had already, which are fairly full, that the Staff work particularly was excellent. We seem to have got over our difficulties of material which were such a contributory cause to the terrible setbacks in June of this year. It is also quite obvious from what we have been told and have read that the joint Staff work of the two Staffs, British and American, who had the immense problem of making the arrangements for the West African campaign, was very well conceived and very well executed, which is not always the same thing, as my noble friend has reminded your Lordships.
Turning again to the eastern end of the Mediterranean, it seems to me, if I may say so with all diffidence, that we have there in the two Generals, the Commander-in-Chief and the General in the field, General Alexander and General Montgomery, two very great captains, and we seem to have found also two remarkably efficient and highly successful leaders of the Air Force in Air Marshals Coningham and Tedder. I would like, if I may—it is not perhaps usual in Parliament—to welcome the recently-announced appointment of Air Marshal Tedder, whose work I have known of for many

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years, ever since he was Air Officer Commanding in the Far East and in the important posts he has held since. I think the Government are to be congratulated on bringing him home now to be Assistant Chief of the Air Staff.
What my noble friend has said about Anglo-American co-operation in the North-West African campaign is, of course, very good news, for we seem now to have got a good working arrangement with the Americans. But I suggest to your Lordships that the need now is to extend that same close strategical joint command to Russia and China. This is not three wars, it is one war. At present it is being fought as three wars. There is the Anglo-American war which extends from the Pacific through Africa to the Atlantic and presently, I hope, will extend to the West of Europe; there is the German-Russian war in the East of Europe and there is the long drawn-out war, now in its fifth year, of our Chinese Allies against the Japanese invaders. They are being fought as three separate wars. We have not had any evidence yet that the strategies employed on those three widely separated theatres of war are synchronized. It may be so, but there is no evidence of it. I hope we shall have to-day some comforting words as we had last time when, I may remind your Lordships, the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, was good enough to reply to a somewhat similar Motion which I initiated. I hope we shall have more comforting words now, and that they will be a little more explicit.
I am going to present your Lordships, if I may, with two pieces of evidence which show that there is lack of coordination still, that there is lack of a real joint strategy, not between ourselves and the Americans—that is apparently all right—but between the four great United Nations. The first evidence was the extraordinary series of Russian official declarations during September and October by the Russian Ambassador in Washington, the Russian Ambassador in London, and, above all, by M. Stalin himself in his important speech of October 3 last. That is less than two months ago. It was then made perfectly clear that there was a misunderstanding between the Governments in London and Washington on the one hand and the Government in Moscow on the other. In case I should be accused
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of bias, which of course I never feel towards His Majesty's Government—I only feel the warmest benevolence towards them—or in case I should be accused of undue bias regarding the declarations of M. Stalin, let me quote from an unimpeachable source, The Times newspaper of October 7 last.
Your Lordships must all have read the remarkable leading article headed "Grand Strategy" in that paper. It referred to the "publicly prodding" statements of Mr. Wendell Willkie from Moscow and to the other statements I have mentioned. Mr. Wendell Willkie is not an ordinary travelling American, he is a person who, with another turn of the political wheel, might have been President of the United States of America, and may yet be American President. The Leader of the House will be the last person to belittle in any way the importance of Mr. Wendell Willkie. After referring to his statements and M. Stalin's recent declarations, The Times newspaper goes on to say that:
"But the fact that such a debate should be carried on in the enemy's hearing, between Allies in a life and death struggle, implies that something is wrong in the organization of the United Nations for war. It is evidence, if not of divided, at least of undefined purpose; it limits mutual confidence; and without a clear purpose and absolute confidence the enemy's dominion is not to be overthrown."
That was on October 7. It followed these remarkable statements by important American and Russian spokesmen and is the subject of the Motion of my noble friend below me. I would ask, has anything been done to remedy this deplorable state of affairs?
My other piece of evidence is another remarkable statement—it is really an amazing statement, for we had nothing like this in the last war when things were not altogether too per cent. efficient—made by the United States Ambassador to Russia, Admiral Standley, on October 7. I am quoting from the account given in the Daily Express newspaper of October 8:
"Admiral Standley, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, who is leaving Moscow to report to President Roosevelt, said: 'I got the feeling here that our aid is not meeting expectations. Somebody has thrown a monkey wrench into the works and the feeling here is that the utmost is not being done. I want to go home and see President Roosevelt and iron out difficulties.' "

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This American Ambassador in Moscow is one of the key men in the whole war effort.
May I now ask your Lordships' attention particularly to some other words? If these words had been used by a man in this position in the last war the Opposition of those days, when there was a real Opposition, would have been up in arms against the Government, and there would have been a first-class Parliamentary crisis. Now, of course, we are so united and so kind to each other that these things are allowed to pass and the Government go their way. I ask your Lordships what you make of this statement of the American Ambassador in Moscow:
"Sitting here in Moscow, we are a long way from where they know what is going on. We know nothing. It is in London and Washington that the knowledge is—so that, not knowing, I would be ill advised to criticize."
The American Ambassador in Moscow can say that—Moscow responsible for the Armies now holding up 300 German and satellite Divisions on the Eastern front, Moscow whose Armies make possible our victories in North Africa, Moscow which has the one Army that is able to stand up on level terms to the whole might of the Wehrmacht. To complete the statement of the American Ambassador in Moscow, I quote this:
"But from what I do know, I feel that supplies from America and Britain have been of assistance to the U.S.S.R."
Yes, these supplies have been of great assistance. We sent a remarkable catalogue of supplies which was revealed by a statement in Parliament recently. We have been very good in sending materials from our own scanty resources to Russia and they are apparently being made good use of there. Apart from the last sentence that declaration reveals, I suggest, an appalling state of affairs and shows a woeful lack of understanding between one great Ally and two other great Allies in this war.
Then my noble friend mentioned the case of China. I think it is rather regrettable—and here I except the Leader of the House who is not one of the guilty ones—that important Ministers in the Government, whenever they make speeches about the war, invariably seem to leave China out. China is a very great nation and a great Ally. If we
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are going to drive the Japanese back into their islands, as we must drive them back, we shall need Chinese help. The Chinese have an Army of 7,000,000 men, who are very good soldiers, and China ought to be mentioned on equal terms with the United States, Russia and ourselves in this great struggle. I was very glad indeed to see a report that Madame Chiang-Kai-shek is coming here from America. She is not only a very beautiful and a very clever woman but a great warrior and one of the organizers of the victorious resistance of the Chinese Armies. I am very glad to hear that she is coming here, and I am sure all your Lordships are, too. I am not so sure that the physical and geographical difficulties, which are always pleaded as an alibi on these occasions, are so great. Nowadays with modern air travel, actual contact between the representatives of Governments is far easier than it was formerly, and, as my noble friend has reminded your Lordships, it is imperative that we should have the closest possible working between London, Washington and Chungking.
If there had been a closer co-ordination of strategy between ourselves and the Nationalist Government of China earlier, I venture to say that the Burma campaign and even the Malaya campaign, might have turned out differently and more favourably for us. General Wavell has since then been to Chungking and we hope things will be better; but obviously we must have not two strategies but one with China if we are to reconquer Burma, as we must reconquer it at the earliest moment. For these reasons I hope that my noble friend will manage to extract from the Government some satisfactory statement with regard to the solution of the admitted difficulties of this problem of strategical unity.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): My Lords, a question which, in substance, was the same as the question raised by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition to-day, was raised by Lord Strabolgi in a debate in April last. As he has reminded your Lordships, on that earlier occasion he received a very full reply from my noble friend the Minister of Economic Warfare, the Earl of Selborne. I recall, and I dare say your Lordships will also remember, that in the course of that reply several misapprehensions were swept away. The noble Earl

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described in detail the organization that is known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee at Washington and he corrected what appeared to be an erroneous impression that that most important body was dealing only with the war in the Far East. He told your Lordships that it is a most important body organized at Washington which is dealing with the general strategy of the war and not merely with the war in the Pacific. Then again my noble friend gave a detailed account of the nature of the Pacific War Council and explained, what I think had not everywhere been understood, that it really sits in duplicate both in Washington and in London. Its functions are not executive but are consultative and advisory functions and its purpose was fully explained.
My noble friend went over the rest of the ground and gave us what I thought then, and having re-read his speech to-day I think now, was a very complete account of the organization that had already been created and was working for the purpose of Inter-Allied strategy. There are a few additional facts I can state now, but broadly the organization then is the organization now. The difference is that when the debate was raised in April there was little to show—perhaps nothing to show—as direct advantages already gained by that organization. In April, when the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, raised the earlier debate, things looked black. What has happened it the interval is that that joint organization which was set up before and was working before the debate in April, has now contributed, as we can all see and rejoice to know, to bring about results which the noble Lord, Lord Addison, rightly described in his first sentence as a most heartening experience. I think it is useful to contrast the situation in April and the situation to-clay in order that we may all of use realize fully that this combined organization for United Nations' strategy is a body which in course of time has brought about these very considerable and highly satisfactory achievements.
I do not know whether your Lordships are like myself, but in these matters that happen from month to month, even though they vitally affect our lives and the country, I do not find it easy at the moment to recollect their chronology. I take the view that chronology in these matters has a great deal to do with it.
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We all know ancient chronology; we know what happened in 1066 or 1815; but we find people begin to wobble when they are asked what was the year in which George V came to the throne, and become exceedingly confused if you inquire about the months in which very important recent events have happened, all of which vitally affect us at this moment. I hope, therefore, I may be excused if I give a short, broad survey from that point of view.
As I have said, when the debate took place in your Lordships' House in April the situation, as it appeared I imagine to all of us—certainly to all of us except those who were very much on the inside of information—was in the highest degree depressing. The United States had entered the war in the previous December. December 7th was the date of Pearl Harbour and of the entry of the United States into the war. The devastating attack on Pearl Harbour was quickly followed by the invasion of Malaya, which culminated in the middle of February in the fall of Singapore. The gradual reduction of the Dutch East Indies quickly followed and in April the last resistance of the Philippines ceased with the fall of Corregidor. The Japanese Fleet entered the Indian Ocean, launched their air attacks against Ceylon, sank shipping in the Bay of Bengal. Heavy attacks on Port Darwin appeared to be a possible prelude to the invasion of Australia. On March 8 Rangoon was occupied by the Japanese and meanwhile, in the Middle East, the Eighth Army, which had captured Benghazi on Christmas Eve, was forced back during February to Gazala. On the Russian Front a new German offensive was awaited.
I feel, therefore, that there was a great deal in the situation, as it appeared to us in April, to justify the anxious inquiry whether there had been set up, and was in actual effective working order, an organ of Inter-Allied strategy. April was just the time when such a question could, I think, very reasonably be put, and the question whether we had working effective machinery to secure the best use being made of the Forces at the disposal of the United Nations was the question that was being put not only inside this House, but outside too. While, of course, the statement then made by

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the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, was everywhere accepted as authoritative and, so far as it went, consoling, it still remained painfully true that there was nothing to show for it.
That, I think, fairly states how, on this subject, matters must have appeared to the ordinary man, and indeed to the student, in the month of April, 1942. In actual fact, although things were going so badly during the early months of this year, the cause was not to be found in lack of co-ordinating machinery. That was not the cause; it was to be found in the treacherous attack on the United States and the comparative unprepared-ness of the United States Forces—which latter matter was, in its turn, partly due to the fact that America was doing her utmost to supply the Forces of the British Empire. These palpable facts prevented rapid intervention, and they forced on the Allies, for the time being, a purely defensive strategy. But, my Lords, let us put two or three events together and see how they bear on this. Immediately America entered into the war, immediately there was a prospect of Anglo-American strategic co-operation, the Prime Minister accompanied by the Chiefs of Staff flew to Washington. He took with him, for example, General Sir John Dill and the heads of the other Services of the Crown. As a result, then and there, the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee was brought into existence and, to take the matter then immediately at hand, unified command in the South-West Pacific under General Wavell was then and there set up. As your Lordships know, Sir John Dill has remained on the Council in Washington ever since. The study that then took place of the problems confronting us showed us—as I recollect the Prime Minister warned the country—that for some months to come at least we should have to content ourselves with trying, to the best of our ability, to prevent irreparable disasters, with doing everything we could to stop the Axis onrush, and, in the meantime, to build up our Forces to the level at which, later on, we would be enabled, as we hoped and resolved, to wrest the initiative from the enemy.
Now it is useful to know, in slightly more detail, a series of dates which show at what point the tide turned, when this surge of the Axis onset was at length
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checked and brought to a standstill. We may have many untoward reverses before we can end this business, as we all realize, but if we are considering the subject of how far there is in existence, and, in fact, effectively operating, a co-operation of Staffs and a united instrument of strategy these dates are very relevant. The high tide of enemy success reached its mark at El Alamein in July, at the Indian Frontier of Burma in May, at Stalingrad, owing to the heroic and almost incredible resistance of Russia, between August and October, in New Guinea, on the Owen Stanley Range, in September, and, to take what perhaps is the most critical date of all, the point when the line on the chart really definitely began to show that the rise was checked, with the Midway Island Battle on the 4th of June. Note how significant it is—of course I am not seeking to cast the slightest reproach on anybody—that the critical debate to which I have referred was raised in April, because that is months after the organizations to which I have referred had been set up and were at work. And yet it was before any one of the dates which I have just ventured to mention for the turn of the tide. That shows how difficult it is to live through that period between the time when arrangements for co-ordinating thought and action have been made, when the plans are as secret as the grave, and the time when first you get news that this onset of the Axis stream is at least checked. If I apprehend rightly, though I am no strategist, it is not much use imagining you will be able to carry out a series of positive attacks and drive back the foe until at least you have succeeded in stopping his onset; and that was the first object of us all.
Let me then carry my little chronological sketch—which I apologize for presenting, as I am stating nothing but the most elementary facts, though I think it is interesting, and I hope it is useful, to mention them here—a little further. As soon as it began to be clear that the enemy's offensives on the various Fronts could be held and would be held, then was the time for adopting the best method to secure the initiative and to strike back at the enemy. Here again I venture to bring in the Prime Minister's name, because it seems to me that, if we correctly view the events of this year, we must every one of us pay him a double tribute for the services he rendered. The

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Prime Minister paid a second visit to Washington in June. Why was the visit paid at that moment? He was there in December as soon as America was in the war to start this co-ordination; why did he go a second time in June? It was because the indications were already apparent, to those whose business it was to study this matter at the centre, that we were reaching a moment, as I have just shown, when the tide was going to turn, and within a short time it might be possible to seize the initiative and to advance.
There followed a return visit to this country by two very distinguished American officers, Admiral King and General Marshall. I recall that on the last occasion the fact that they came was almost used as a comment on the imperfect character of our existing organization. My noble friend Lord Selborne, if I may say so, gave the very proper reply that, however good your organization is and however complete the co-operation of the Chiefs of Staff at Washington, personal visits by men in that position to deal face to face with their opposite numbers may very well be an additional way of securing the best results. It was not an indication that we had not got a joint organization. The views of the British and the views of the American authorities were in this manner identified and checked over. What remained? What remained—and this was emphasized in the speeches made by the two noble Lords in this debate—was Russia. It might well have been a matter for reproach if we had gone ahead in this matter without seeking to bring Russia in as closely as we could. The Prime Minister therefore went to Moscow and did all that he could do, and with very considerable success, to bring the Russians fully into the counsels of the United Nations as regards this initiative. Your Lordships will no doubt have read or heard—I think that the speech was broadcast—the Prime Minister's observation that he then made a bargain with Stalin about an exchange of telegrams, and that the exchange of telegrams had now duly taken place
Meanwhile, the machinery of the combined Chiefs of Staff, and all its subordinate staff, had been brought into complete working order. The Pacific War Council had by now had some months of
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experience. The representatives of the Dominions and of the other Allies were brought into consultation on the planning level, so that the work of final decision on the highest plane could be greatly facilitated. The process for which we were waiting was preparing and was nearly matured; and, as even the amateurs amongst us now recognize to the full, the work of planning was carried out in complete secrecy over months of most precise and elaborate calculation. In fact, it is possible to say now that all was decided by July. There is a certain sardonic pleasure in remembering that that was the month of a vote of censure in another place. No word was said in defence of Allied preparations in that debate. Not a word was said; those who knew—and they were very few—bided their time, and the rest of us waited with as much patience, or with as little impatience, as we could command. Although all was decided in July, it was not until nearly the end of October, as your Lordships know, that the events began to take shape in accordance with the decisions taken. I do claim that it is useful for us all to consider my little chronology, because it does throw a light on how this elaborate machine has been working; and, with so many hard things to bear in the past, and with so many hard things to bear, I have no doubt, in the future, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Addison, when he says that we may take a sober satisfaction in what we now know.
Let me now, in the same way, deal with another great field of warfare, the Pacific. As I have said, the turning point in the Pacific war was the Midway Island battle on June 4. If that had gone against us and against the Americans, developments might have been of a much more serious character than they are. Let us again trace how the tide began to turn. Up till the Midway Island battle, the Japanese had extended their conquests uninterruptedly, with the single exception of Port' Moresby, where the Australians still retained a foothold in New Guinea. Meanwhile, the United States had been straining every nerve to reinforce Australia and to secure a chain of island bases connecting that country with America. The Japanese were fully aware of the importance of breaking that chain; if they could only have separated those links and broken that chain they would have gained much.

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Their first move, therefore, was directed against Midway Island, and, if they had captured it, it would have been a stepping-stone to further attacks. But the Americans were ready—and we owe much to them in this matter. The Americans were ready; they threw back the Japanese with crippling losses, and the time had come in that Pacific area also to take a limited offensive which, by seizing the initiative from Japanese hands, would accomplish that which is, I imagine, the object of all military initiatives, and that is to force the enemy to fight where we want and not allow him to fight where he wants. Unified command had been arranged. The Pacific area was under Admiral Nimitz. The South Pacific was at first under Admiral Ghormley, and is now under Admiral Halsey, while the South-West Pacific area was under General MacArthur. Now see what follows—and here again we get the palpable results of pre-arranged strategy months after the time when the organization was set up to plot it. On August 6 the United States attack on the Solomon Islands was launched; on September 29 the Australian counter-attack on New Guinea began. Since then the Solomon Islands struggle has swayed backwards and forwards, but the final advantage firmly lies on the American side, and the most recent developments are known to you all.
It may be said, and indeed it was said by the two noble Lords who have spoken, that that is largely a story, not indeed of Anglo-American co-operation, but co-operation between the United States and the British Empire, including our own island. I will deal in a moment with the suggestion—and it is a very important one and I entirely agree with the proposition—that China comes most importantly to the front in many of these matters, but China is rather a special case for a reason that I will show. Let me first, just to complete my chronology, if I am not being too wearisome, remind your Lordships of the three or four essential dates in North Africa. Before our debate of April, as I have said, we had had the most bitter experiences. In February the Eighth Army had been forced back to Gazala. The next three months were taken up on both sides in building up their Forces for the coming battle. There were intense attacks on Malta during
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those months, designed, of course, to enable Rommel's reinforcements to cross the Mediterranean. The tale of misfortune did not by any means stop in April. It was on the 27th May that the Germans took the offensive, and after severe fighting we were forced to retreat to the Alamein position. There the line was stabilized.
These are some of the events which I am venturing to put together for the purpose of drawing, as it were on a chart, the line of high tide. Tobruk fell on June 21. But meanwhile, as we knew to some extent then, but know much better now, large reinforcements from the United Kingdom, which had been set in motion in the early part of the year, began to arrive in the Middle East, long before the censures of our critics were heard. They began to arrive in the Middle East with the latest type of equipment, both from the United States and from this country. There were consultations between the Americans and ourselves—special consultations I think in April, and then, as I have already said, at the time of the Prime Minister's second visit to Washington in June, carried on by other means in July, and the Prime Minister visited Cairo and the plans were laid for the great Mediterranean offensive in the autumn. General Alexander assumed command in the Middle East on August 15. On August 31 Rommel's attack on the El Alamein position began. The way was clear for those tremendous events (every one of them the result of the most minute and painstaking planning), at the very thought of which no Englishman's heart can tail to beat more quickly. So far therefore as Inter-Allied organization, particularly between the United States, and ourselves, is concerned, I conceive that by this time all the world knows that it has been one of the most remarkable and in the end one of the most promising, and I hope one of the most successful, organizations in history.
But now I come to China. I do not quite agree with the observation—it was hardly more than an aside—of Lord Strabolgi when he said that, excepting the Leader of the House, when Ministers make speeches about the war they leave China out. Well, I do not think that is so. At least, it is neither my experience nor my reading of my colleagues'

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speeches, and one can hardly imagine a greater piece of injustice or a greater piece of folly, if that were really the case. But I said that China is in some respects in a rather special position. How easy it is to indulge in the general assertion that in all matters connected with the war there should be a single direction, to which in particular all our great Allies should at every stage contribute an equal part! I apologize for mentioning what must be known to the noble Lords who have spoken, but as they did not mention it, it may not have occurred to others here. * China is not at war with Germany, or with Italy. Soviet Russia is not at war with Japan, and Japan is not at war with Russia. And it is surely obvious, is it not, that while every possible opportunity for co-operation should be taken, still in concerting measures between ourselves, the United States and Russia, this concerted strategy cannot be directed against Japan, with whom Russia is not at war.
These are very elementary considerations, but they have something to do with the application of what sounds a most admirable general proposition. And they have a very material bearing on the case of China. That heroic country can do nothing to help us in the war against Germany because of the fact that the world is a very big place. Geographically speaking, it is Russia and China that are contiguous to one another, and they are both our Allies; but then, as I have said, Russia is not at war with Japan. I do not for a moment refer to these very elementary facts as though they disposed of the strong desire which my noble friends expressed, and which we all share, to make the maximum possible effort to get close military co-operation with China. But I do not think it would be possible altogether to exclude from our minds these elementary circumstances to which I have ventured to allude.
On the positive side there is a good deal to be said. First of all—and it is no small matter—the President of the United States, who in addition to all his other functions and influences is Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces, and our own Prime Minister are in constant, direct, personal communication with the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. I remember that in a recent speech made by the Prime Minister in another place he said that
* See correction, 3rd December, at col. 373.
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some people—and this of course has no reference to noble Lords—in their enthusiasm for the idea of confederated action, seemed to think that the way to win the war is to make sure that every Power contributing Armed Forces, and every branch of those Armed Forces, is represented on the Councils and organizations which have been set up, and that everybody is fully consulted before anything is done. The Prime Minister said—and I am sure we shall all agree—that that is the surest way to lose the war.
There is a second point. While we cannot in all respects have as close an inter-contact as is represented by the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington in the case of China, China is both here and in Washington represented in the most authoritative way on the Pacific War Council. Your Lordships will remember that the Pacific War Council really exists in duplicate, one body in Washington and the other body here. That, I am informed, does constitute a very effective link for the purposes of the war in which China is concerned. But I am not at all sure that the most important fact is not one which I shall now mention. It is this: There is a close and constant contact between the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, General Stilwell, who commands the United States land and air forces in China, Burma, and India, and General Wavell. There is, in fact, an Indian Mission at Chungking for the very purpose of effecting this most necessary contact. While, therefore, I most warmly sympathize with what inspires the questions about China which have been put to-day—friendly questions, without any attempt to criticize—it might be useful to your Lordships to reflect on these considerations. We may sum it up in this way. China is primarily concerned—and she has her hands full—with Eastern Asia and the Pacific. There is close contact in the Eastern Asian theatre of war between China, the United States, and ourselves. It is in that theatre of war that China can play a part, and most nobly is she playing it.
Now I must break off from the even tenor of my discourse for a moment to deal with a particular observation by Lord Addison which I confess I regretted to hear. We have sent a Parliamentary delegation to China, and we ought to be greatly indebted to those members of both L Houses who have undertaken what is a

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fairly severe journey. Lord Addison thought it right to pass some criticism on the individuals who compose that delegation. Let us first of all begin at home—his home. I hope he does not suggest that there is any member of the Labour party who could more fitly be a member of that delegation than Mr. Jack Lawson. Here is a Labour member who has been Financial Secretary to the War Office and Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour, who has a long experience of the House of Commons, who has the highest possible character, and who carries the respect of everybody. I should be very sorry if I were to understand that the noble Lord's comment was addressed to the Labour choice, for I cannot imagine a better one. However, that is a matter for the Speaker, because it was he who chose the Labour member and one of the Conservative members. I shall no longer defend Mr. Speaker because I do not think he needs any defence. As regards the two noble Lords who are members of the delegation, I must say it is a very poor requital to suggest that they are not fit for the position of representing this House.
The noble Lord said he thought there was a want of courageous imagination. May I beg him to exercise a little imagination himself? Let him look round this House now and tell me who are the really representative members who ought to have gone, and then find out whether I asked them to go. I see several, and there are several not in the House at the moment, because they are discharging very important duties elsewhere. It is not the easiest thing in the world to find a member of Parliament who is able and willing to undertake so laborious a mission, and I must say, for my part, as far as I had anything to do with selecting these noble Lords, I made many requests in many quarters, but I never expected that those who were ultimately chosen would be reproached in their absence as not being able to represent the authority of Parliament. At any rate, that is not the view of the Chinese. I communicated with the Foreign Office when I received a letter about this from my noble friend a short time back, because I was a little astonished at what the letter contained and wondered where he had got his information. I gathered from it that China was discontented with the delegation. Not at all. The Foreign Office were able to
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inform me that they had no information to suggest that that is the case. On the contrary, the delegation has received the warmest welcome, and the most appreciative references have been made in the Chinese Press.
Let me read two or three of them. The Central Daily News, of China, on November 10 says:
"It is the first time in 700 years of the history of the British Parliament that a good will Mission has ever been sent abroad to visit a foreign country on behalf of both Houses of Parliament. The four members of the Mission are old and distinguished statesmen of Great Britain, and are representatives not only of both Houses of Parliament but also of the three major Parties of Britain as well as of British capital and labour. … We are aware that the Parliamentary Mission has brought us the sincere friendship of the British people, which we are sincerely glad to accept."
The second paper has a name which I regret I cannot pronounce, because I do not understand Chinese, but this is what it says:
"The British Parliamentary Mission is coming to Chungking to-day. It may be said to be representative of the whole body of the British people. We extend a hearty welcome to our distinguished guests."
The Ta Rung Pao, one of the most important and independent newspapers in Chungking, writing of the arrival in Chungking of the British Parliamentary Mission, states:
"At a time when the turning point of the war may have come in North Africa, the visit of the British Parliamentary Mission to China on behalf of the British people is a happy and highly significant event."
I do regret that the Leader of the Opposition in a speech dealing with great public affairs should have felt it necessary to introduce this jarring note, which I do not think is deserved, at a time when we surely ought to support our delegation in China to the utmost of our powers.
Another question was asked about Russia. Russia, too, necessarily stands in some respects in a rather special position. She has, as we all know, a most tremendous task on her hands. Nobody dreams that Russia could be asked to do more than she is doing. Nobody conceives for a moment that Russia could take part in some newly-planned campaign elsewhere in the world. I think, therefore, that the chief thing we have to do in the case of Russia is to keep her most fully informed of what we should be disposed to do, to secure from her criticism, if there be

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criticism, which will, of course, have to be considered, but, if possible, her concurrence and support and, above all, so to lay our plans that we do really help Russia to the utmost in this time of tremendous trial. Nothing appealed to the British people, the ordinary British citizen, so much in the cry for a "Second Front" some months ago, as the feeling, the instinctive and, if you like, uninstructed feeling, that by that means we were going to help Russia. That is what the feeling was. I think it is now apparent that the plans which were made and which Mr. Churchill went to Moscow to discuss with Premier Stalin to get his concurrence were as a matter of fact well devised to that end. There is a British Mission in Russia just as there are Russian representatives here in England. They exchange information and communicate on everything that is material. Neither ourselves nor the United States make the slightest attempt to limit the information that Russia gets. There is a Russian Mission in Washington, and there is a United States Mission in Russia, all connected with the subject of Allied activities. I think that when those considerations are borne in mind, together with the difficulties about geography, your Lordships will agree that, while these comments are naturally made, probably there is a good deal to be said for the view that the best possible is being done.
I conclude with this reflection. Let no one suppose that the existing co-ordination between the Allies, the United Nations, for the purposes of strategy and the like has some fixed pattern which is not hereafter to be altered and improved. These things grow, as I think Lord Addison hinted. They change with circumstances, and it may well be that circumstances will so develop as to require a modification. After all, we are all aiming at the same thing which is to get the most complete and effective co-operation possible. I would like to remind the House of a very obvious distinction. We must separate two quite different things. One is the deciding upon a matter of high strategy, what is to be the next objective of the Allies—should we aim to strike here, should we aim to strike there? Large fundamental propositions have to be argued out at the highest level, and when decided become
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the direction in which the effort is to be made.
As opposed to that, there is not only the working out in detail but the carrying out of the plan which involves, I apprehend in most cases, at a very early stage the appointment of the Commander. We have carried joint command in this war to a far higher point than it was carried in the last war. Marshal Foch was Commander of the Land Forces, and I think also of the Air Forces of Britain, of France, of Belgium and of America on the Western Front, but he never had any command over any Naval Force. Now we have General Eisenhower in supreme command in connexion with the North-West African campaign not only of Armies of different nations but of the Naval Forces led by Admiral Cunningham. General Foch had nothing to do as commander with Salonica or Palestine or Mesopotamia, and I doubt whether it will be found possible even under modern conditions of communication to create anything like a single command for the whole globe. I should suppose that political and geographical considerations make it impossible. But whereas the decision of matters of the highest strategy—the strategic objective—is a matter which once decided has then to be carried out by others, the work that has to be done in preparing to carry it out is, as we have seen in this instance in North Africa, a work of months and months of the most intense and continuous employment.
If it has that essential quality I venture to think we have to bear in mind these two reflections. What a magnificent thing is secrecy! What a grand thing it is that this immense scheme that in part or in whole must have been known to great numbers of officers of more nations than one, should none the less have been maintained as so absolute a secret that it took the enemy by complete surprise. We owe more than we can ever express to the gallant men in every Service, who preserved that secrecy, aye, and to the Civil Service too and to the clerks and the typists—every one of whom had their part in recording preparations for this great plan. So fine was their sense of duty and their patriotism that the whole thing was carried through in absolute secrecy and without a hitch.
Lastly, I invite the reflection from any one of your Lordships who may feel on

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these matters as I do—how necessary it is to remember that we shall not see the results of any elaborate strategical plan till long after the plan has been made and the scheme has been prepared to carry it out. How chary we ought to be of jumping to the conclusion that a Government calls for censure or that these enormous responsibilities are being carelessly handled because it is not possible to say at the moment what ought to be the fruits of the labours of those who are working away in close co-ordination to achieve them. I think this debate, short as it has been, has been a debate of interest and we are grateful to the noble Lord for raising it. I hope that what I have said may be regarded as some contribution towards answering the questions which he was good enough to put.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, we shall all, I am sure, have been exceedingly interested in the chronological account, to use his own expression, of the series of operations which the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack has unfolded with his usual lucidity and charm. I was as interested as any other member of your Lordships' House, but I suggest, nevertheless and with the most profound respect, that the noble and learned Viscount omitted in his exceedingly interesting reply, to refer to certain great matters which were behind my quite friendly interrogation.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Does my noble friend refer to co-ordination about economic matters? If so, I owe him an apology. I had it all in my notes, but for the moment it slipped my attention.
LORD ADDISON: The noble and learned Viscount animadverted on my reference to the delegation to China. Except for that there was no word I spoke which even suggested censure. It was purely interrogation. Accepting the fact that the noble and learned Viscount did not refer to his notes on the question of economic co-ordination, I would like to be allowed, in concluding this short discussion, to draw your Lordships' attention to what to my mind are the two greatest things of all. The first is that our recent heartening experiences, to repeat my own words, which we have had in North Africa and the circumstances leading to them which the noble and learned Viscount has revealed to us to-
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day, give us immense encouragement because they show that we have a body of men capable of doing these things. If they were able to do what they have done they will do a lot more.
The second thing is that it is inseparable from the war effort that we should get together during the war an association of men to work upon certain problems other than strategy because they are a part of the war effort. The noble and learned Viscount referred to allied operations of a strategical order. I had in mind and I thought I indicated in my speech, a great world of other matters which are inseparably bound up with the conduct of the war and which will emerge as urgent the moment hostilities cease. To deal with those other matters there ought to be established during the war machinery gradually acquiring practice and form capable of dealing with these other great matters. That was my point, and in thanking the noble and learned Viscount for his reply I think it is fair that I should recall to your Lordships that other great consideration which lay behind my question.
May I just refer to the noble and learned Viscount's animadversions on what I said about the China delegation? It was not on the persons of the delegation that I in the least wanted to cast any reflection, and I did not. If my noble and learned friend will look at the Official Report to-morrow I think he will find I did not. I think that when we were sending a delegation to a great Power like China, one of our great Allies, in close co-operation with whom lies the best hope in the Far East, it was not the right way of dealing with the matter to find out who conveniently could go from the different political Parties in the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The Foreign Office or whoever was concerned should have had a little more courageous imagination. That was not the right method of dealing with this matter, and I say that without a word of reflection on those members who were willing to go. I maintain my view, and it is widely shared, that that method of selection was very unimaginative, that it was not as bold and worthy of ourselves as it might have been. I do hope that it will be clearly understood that I say that without the slightest reflection on those willing to go. Perhaps I expressed myself badly, but it

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was the general conception of the way of representing our Parliamentary institutions in China that I was criticizing. However, I thank your Lordships for having listened to me patiently, and I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

STARRED QUESTIONS
LORD ADDISON LORD ADDISON had given Notice also that he would move to resolve, That the question of giving priority to starred questions over other Notices and Orders of the Day be referred back to the Select Committee on Procedure to consider and report to the House. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name, which I believe will enable friendly consideration to be given to the matter referred to.
Moved to resolve, That the question of giving priority to starred questions over other Notices and Orders of the Day be referred back to the Select Committee on Procedure to consider and report to the House. (Lord Addison.)
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT CRANBORNE) (Lord Cecil): My Lords, I do not think that this Motion needs any words from me. The question has come before your Lordships on a previous occasion. It is a very interesting suggestion which has many supporters, although some of your Lordships do not feel quite so much impressed by the idea. However, the supporters of the proposal return periodically to the attack and have done so on this occasion. The suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Addison, is that the correct thing would be to submit the matter to the Committee on Procedure and then any discussion of it would be taken on the Report of the Committee to the House. I think your Lordships will agree that that is the right procedure and I suggest that it should be adopted.
THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: My Lords, I think it would be unfair to your Lordships if I did not remind you that this matter was very carefully gone into last Session. I, like the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, pay a tribute to the noble Lord opposite who returns to the charge, but he will, of course, remember that he did not get a majority of the Committee to support him last time.
LORD ADDISON: I did not propose it.
THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: It was certainly discussed.
LORD ADDISON: It was discussed, but not on my initiative.
THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I beg the noble Lord's pardon. I did not know that. The proposal certainly had supporters, but there were many more opponents, among whom I was one. Therefore the noble Lord will not expect, if we consent to rediscuss the matter, that we shall change our minds about this being an undesirable proposal.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, may I venture to support my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition, and to express the hope that this Motion will be repeated until counsels of wisdom prevail?
LORD RANKEILLOUR: My Lords, lest it should be thought that this is simply a proposal by both Oppositions, I would say that the view of the noble Earl, Lord Donoughmore, is not shared by some of the heartiest supporters of the Government on this side of the House.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I should just like to say that, while there is no reason in the world why the procedure suggested by the noble Lord, the Leader of the Opposition, should not be adopted and the matter again referred to the Committee on Procedure, of course it is not a very usual thing when a Committee have been entrusted with a particular task and have performed it, to ask the Committee to reverse their decision. I should have thought, if I may be allowed to make the very faintest criticism of the action of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, that it would have been more satisfactory if the noble Lord could have indicated some reason why the Committee were likely to change their minds it the matter were returned to them. If he could have brought forward matters which we had not considered before that would have been very material. But not at all. He gave us no reason; he simply said: "I and my noble friends who are with me do not happen to agree with the decision which the Committee adopted, therefore we think that the Committee had better consider the matter again." Well, we are perfectly willing to consider it again, but I think it would be more satisfactory if the noble Lord could have given us a reason why we should do so.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I hope the noble Marquess will not think that there was any lack of respect on my part in not taking the line which he has suggested. As a matter of fact, like the noble Lord opposite, I was present at the meeting of the Committee, and I know the matter was discussed. I believe I gave it—shall I say—tepid support, but nothing more. So I hope the noble Marquess will not think that there is any suggestion of Party in this. There is no question of Party in it at all. I was informed that there was considerable support for the view that the matter might be reconsidered, and, in order to secure its reconsideration, I was advised that this was the right procedure to adopt.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It is right.
LORD ADDISON: I have no doubt that we shall have an opportunity
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thoroughly to debate this when it gets to the Committee, and I think, therefore, it will be wise for me to withhold any further observations until then.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, I think I ought to say, in justice to my noble friend Lord Addison, that he did consult me on this question before he put down his Motion, and for reasons which have just been stated I thought this was the proper procedure. It seemed to me that it would give another opportunity to supporters of Lord Addison's proposal to state their views. For all I knew there might be some new arguments which they had not used before. I think it is only fair to Lord Addison that I should make that clear to the House.
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.
House adjourned.