§ LORD NEWTON rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they are prepared to make any further statement regarding the recent failure of negotiations with the German Government in connection with the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving this Motion I do not propose to detain you for more than a few minutes, because everybody is already familiar with the circumstances; but I cannot forbear from remarking that the failure of these negotiations is, perhaps, one of the most discreditable incidents which have occurred in international affairs for a good many years. It implies the refusal of a Government to fulfil its engagements, and it also involves the fate of a number of helpless men who deserved better of their respective countries. I do not think that the Government will be likely to resent my asking for this infor- 261 because I am sure that they will be glad of any opportunity of proving to the world, if they have not already done so, that they are in no way responsible for what has happened.
§ In the former war it fell to my lot, with other representatives, to have direct meetings with representatives of the German Government. At those meetings, which were conducted in a neutral country—in Holland, as a matter of fact—we had prolonged discussions, which were frequently, as may well he supposed, of a very difficult and complicated nature; but on the whole we were successful in coming to agreements, and those agreements proved to he of enormous advantage to the combatants and non-combatants on both sides who happened to be prisoners of war or internees. I will take the opportunity of saying openly that the agreements which we arrived at were honestly adhered to by the German Government. I do not wish to draw comparisons between the Germans with whom we have to deal to-day and those whom we had to face in 1917, because I do not wish to be accused of doing anything to make future negotiations, should they he entered into, more difficult; but I remember that in those negotiations in 1917 we were extremely careful to avoid anything in the nature of publicity. Publicity is in great demand nowadays for all purposes, but occasionally it can be an extreme danger. We were extremely careful, as I say, to avoid anything of the kind and were much hampered in our work by the activities of the sensational journals over here, which were perpetually hounding the Government on to deal severely with the Germans settled or interned in this country.
§ I said that our negotiations on the whole were satisfactory and that the result was beneficial. I attribute that partly to the fact that we worked, so to speak, modestly and avoided drawing attention to what we were doing as much as possible. Now I am very much afraid it is quite possible that, in the desire for publicity, publicity has unconsciously been partly the cause of the deadlock which has arisen. So far as I can ascertain, these negotiations started a long time ago, and started under very quiet and peaceful auspices. We heard next to nothing about them, and apparently they were conducted as much as possible in an amicable spirit, so much so 262 that certain requests made by the Germans, which had no connection with the actual matter which was being discussed, were at once acceded to by our Government without making any difficulties. As time went on other requests were made by the Germans, which were met in as amicable a spirit by our representatives. But later on, for some reason which I am unable to ascertain, these negotiations, which had formerly been in the control of neutral Powers, seem to have passed imperceptibly into more or less direct negotiations between British representatives and German representatives, and at a later stage the relations between the two Governments evidently became much more difficult.
§ It was about this period that the B.B.C. intervened, and the intervention of the B.B.C., who probably acted with the best intentions in the world, was misinterpreted and falsified by the Germans into an endeavour to persuade the German public that the negotiations were really being used for the purpose of making a propaganda attack upon the German Government. Unfortunately this attempt was successful, and, as everybody knows, the negotiations culminated in a completely unexpected demand from the Germans that no attention should be paid to the pledges that they had already given with regard to the repatriation of incapacitated prisoners, but that the exchange should take the form of a numerical exchange. That clearly was a demand with which it was impossible for our Government to comply. Anybody who knows anything about the history of the Prisoners of War Conventions and so forth knows perfectly well that this particular Convention was not based upon numbers; it expressly excluded numbers and excluded ranks; it was based solely upon incapacity to fight. And it was not a question of exchange at all, it was a question of returning to their respective countries those combatants who had been incapacitated by wounds or by disease—a natural and humane project, which ought to have commended itself to everybody.
§ No doubt many people are wondering why the German Government insisted upon declining to carry out an arrangement which was just as beneficial to them as to us, and the question is somewhat difficult to answer. After all, what advantage is derived from keeping an in- 263 enemy a prisoner? Does it not stand to reason that it is naturally to one's advantage to get rid of such a prisoner at once in order not to be liable for his care and keep? What possible objection can there be to it? I can only suppose that in Germany there must have been two classes of opinion. It is quite evident that there must have been many people in Germany, perhaps including members of the German Government itself, who were anxious for an exchange—anxious from humanitarian motives. On the other hand, there must have been another class which was resolved to prevent the successful termination of these negotiations, and I can only surmise—for I have no information on the subject—that the class which was definitely determined to ruin the negotiations was the Gestapo, who probably not only had their own reason for doing nothing which seemed in the nature of a favour to us but were very reluctant to see their own countrymen return from captivity to Germany. That is only a surmise of my own, but I believe it will turn out that it is the right explanation. Anyhow, these people, whether the Gestapo or not, got their way, and the negotiations broke down when the impossible demand was made that they should proceed on a numerical basis and that prisoners should be exchanged singly. The result would probably have been that many of our men would never have got out at all until the end of the war.
§ In spite of the humiliating results of these negotiations I hope that the Government will not be disposed to abandon the attempt. I sincerely hope, and I gather from what was said in another place yesterday, that there is an intention to renew negotiations as soon as an opportunity permits, and I presume that these negotiations will be conducted under the auspices of some neutral Power. It would be contrary to common sense and to feelings of humanity if this attempt were not made, and I hope I shall receive some further assurance with regard to it. I would merely like to say that I have added to this question a demand for Papers and I have done so, not with the purpose of making another speech, but because I feel that it is very desirable that it should be made plain that the attitude of His Majesty's Government and their 264 conduct of the negotiations have not been responsible for the unfortunate breakdown which has taken place. It seems to me that it is in the strong interests of the Government that Papers should be produced, and I therefore beg to move the Motion standing in my name.
§ THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD CROFT)My Lords, in answer to my noble friend, I regret that there is nothing fresh which I can add to the statement that my right honourable friend made in another place. I would, however, emphasize that throughout the negotiations His Majesty's Government were, at all times, anxious to secure the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners and of the protected personnel also entitled to repatriation. They conceded to the German Government agreement in principle on questions not directly relevant to the repatriation of prisoners—that is, the repatriation of combatants in third countries and the repatriation of civilian internees; but their paramount concern to bring home all the repatriable made it impossible to accept the final demand of the Germans for an exchange on a numerical basis, an action which would have postponed indefinitely the repatriation of the vast majority of the sick and wounded and which was contrary to International Law and to humanitarian practice.
My noble friend asked for a further assurance that if the opportunity occurs His Majesty's Government will be ready to look into this matter again. I think the answer was given very emphatically by my right honourable friend in the House of Commons yesterday. I do not expect my noble friend would want me to read what he said, although I have it here if he desires me to do so. My right honourable friend made it very clear that we were only too ready, on all the grounds which have been stated, to look into this matter whenever the occasion offers.
With regard to publicity, my noble friend may have learnt—I think it has been mentioned—that the claim was made in a certain German newspaper that one of the reasons for the breakdown of these negotiations was the propaganda which was used. I want to assure my noble friend that, as far as any activities of that kind in this country were concerned, we were blameless. In fact, at no period 265 during the negotiations prior to October 6, when negotiations broke down, did the German Government suggest that any publicity given in this country to the proposed repatriation scheme affected the negotiations then proceeding. On the evening of September 28 date-line telegrams emanating from several neutral countries gave the news of the proposed repatriation scheme. This news was held up in this country until the afternoon of September 29, when it came through on the tape. It was in consequence of that that the Financial Secretary to the War Office made his broadcast that evening. Your Lordships may rest assured that, until it was clear that this matter was being discussed in neutral countries, no statement was made until the negotiations had actual y broken down. No statement was made in the Press of this country which could have been criticized. It con-not be too strongly emphasized that the objections which the Germans made to the publicity given in this country were only raised after the negotiations had broken down, and the broadcast statements pointing out that the numerical exchange of sick and wounded proposed by the Germans was contrary to Inter- 266 national Law and humanitarian practice were only made when the whole repatriation scheme had been called off.
§ LORD NEWTONMy Lords, I rise only to ask my noble friend whether he proposes to publish any Papers or not.
§ LORD CROFTIn view of what my right honourable friend said in another place yesterday, no good purpose would be served by issuing Papers at the present time.
§ LORD NEWTONI do not mean at the present time—I mean at any time.
§ LORD CROFTI shall convey my noble friend's request to the Secretary of State that he desires that Papers should be published with reference to this matter. My noble friend probably agrees that the moment is not opportune.
§ LORD NEWTONI do not wish to press for the immediate publication of Papers, which I gather from my noble friend may take place at a later date, and I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
§ Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
§ House adjourned.