HL Deb 06 May 1941 vol 119 cc117-48

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD MOYNE) rose to move to resolve, That this House approves the policy of His Majesty's Government in sending help to Greece and declares its confidence that our operations in the Middle East and in all other theatres of war will be pursued by the Government with the utmost vigour. The noble Lord said: My Lords, now that the evacuation of Greece has been completed, it is possible to speak with greater freedom of the operations which are the main subject of this Motion; but even now, with the enemy listening to our debates, many matters still remain upon which full information cannot yet be given. I think, however, that enough has been disclosed in the communiqués of the Service Departments to ensure the overwhelming support of public opinion for the action of His Majesty's Government in sending help to Greece.

The political side of the story goes back to April two years ago, when, with France, we entered into an agreement to stand behind Greece, without any obligation on the part of Greece. It was a unilateral agreement, whereas the agreement with Turkey was bilateral. In accordance with this agreement, when Italy attacked Greece last autumn British aeroplanes and munitions were sent to the support of Greece. Early in February of this year, however, it become evident that Germany intended to assist the defeated partner of the Axis and to advance to the Adriatic and the Aegean. Just at that time General Wavell had destroyed the Italian Army of Cyrenaica, and on February 7 had captured Benghazi. But the very next day a Note was received from Greece asking how far we could go and what form our assistance could take. The question of further assistance to Greece therefore had to be considered in arriving at a decision as to the strategy to be adopted in Tripoli.

The advantage of an advance to the western confines of the Italian Colony was that it would have prevented any possibility of counter-attack, but there were very great disadvantages in going beyond Cyrenaica. Firstly, the British force had already come about 700 miles from its base at Alexandria, and Tobruk, although practicable for small vessels, did not offer facilities which would have enabled it to become a base for large operations. If the British force had pressed on to Tripoli it would have added another 600 miles to the already extended communications, and would have thrown a very heavy task on the Navy in supporting this long line in addition to convoying shipping through the Mediterranean. There would also have been a heavy resultant demand upon our air resources, and this without in any way improving the position in the Narrows between Sicily and Cape Bon, seeing that Tripoli is 500 or 600 miles from the Narrows and could not challenge the dominating advantage of Sicily over these waters. In view, also, of the threatening situation in the Balkans and the approach which Greece made at that moment for co-operation in resisting the German advance, there was an additional and, I think, convincing case for concentrating our resources for the support of Greece and Turkey.

Suggestions have been made that there was a difference of opinion between the military and the Government authorities on this subject, and I wish to say that there is no foundation whatever for that allegation. The Chiefs of Staff, both here and in the Middle East, were in full agree- ment with His Majesty's Government that it was the right course not to press on to Tripoli, but to concentrate our resources in readiness for giving assistance in the battle which was about to develop in the Balkans. On the receipt of overtures from Greece, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Foreign Secretary went out to discuss with General Wavell and the Greek Government what form our help could best take. At the first interview between Mr. Eden and the Greek Government it was made clear that Greece intended to fight in any case. Her resistance was not contingent on our support. It is absolutely without foundation to suggest that we dragged an unwilling partner into a hopeless adventure. Seeing the resolution of Greece, Mr. Eden and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff worked out plans for sending the maximum help that our resources in men, material and shipping made possible. I want to stress this point, that it was a perfectly willing partnership between Greece and ourselves. We did not drag Greece into this campaign, nor did she send us a desperate appeal for help. She asked for our willing co-operation, and we stood by her side until that last generous message, which was published last week, when, in view of the straits of the Army of the Pindus, the Greek Government recorded the exhaustion of their Army owing to the lack of indispensable resources in munitions, mechanised vehicles and aeroplanes. They said that the Royal Government were obliged to state that further sacrifice of the British Expeditionary Force would be in vain, and that its withdrawal in time seemed to be rendered necessary by circumstances and by interests common to the struggle.

I need not weary the House with a recital of the features in the Greek campaign. They have been detailed a few days since in official communiqués. It was from the first clear that the Greeks and ourselves would be heavily outnumbered by the German forces which had been concentrated in Bulgaria, and a successful stand would depend on the possibility of effective co-operation with the Yugoslavs. Unfortunately, when the Tsvetkovich Government fell, it was too late for General Simovich to carry out effective plans of concentration in the southern part of Yugoslavia. His half-mobilised Army was, in consequence, left and scattered along an extensive frontier which faces on several different States. This inevitably brought the destruction and eventual disintegration of Yugoslavia, and proved disastrous to the Greek Army, as the failure to hold the Monastir Gap, which was well within Yugoslav territory, enabled a wedge to be driven on the left of our line, cutting the Allied Forces in two. The Yugoslavs on their part put up a very gallant fight, but, without antitank guns and air support, human bravery cannot prevail against relentless attacks by armoured columns. Greece, after six months of victorious struggle against far stronger and better armed Italian forces, was unable to disengage in time to shorten her line. Her Army had fought its way across the mountain ridges away from road communications, and there was no means of transferring her troops for a swift strategic retirement.

In view of the pledges to Greece there was clearly no honourable alternative to this country's decision to send every possible assistance and to stand by her as long as she could keep up the fight. This country is in the habit of keeping its word, and it would have been unthinkable to leave our gallant Allies in the lurch. In February, when the decision was first reached, there was still a very good prospect of building an effective Balkan front based on the heroism of the Greek resistance to Italy, the example that she had given to the other small nations all over the world, and the prospect of saving Yugoslavia from joining the melancholy procession of helpless victims. In view of the situation as it then existed, in view of our pledges, we did not go in alone. We had the whole-hearted support of our great Australasian Dominion, and Mr. Menzies has spoken time after time in eloquent words of the way in which Australia went into this fight, not only because of what at the outset appeared to be reasonable prospects of success but also because we were bound in honour to do so.

The temporary overrunning of Greece must bring tragic sufferings to the gallant race whose stand against such overwhelming odds has been worthy of the land where the ideal of human liberty first came to birth, and has brought encouragement throughout the world where people are eagerly awaiting the overthrow of the modern barbarian forces. But, from the military angle, the reverse which has taken place has certain compensations. The expedition has given us two or three months of invaluable time to reinforce our position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the defection of France we have borne a colossal and unexpected burden. Firstly, we have lost the co-operation of her three Armies—the Army of Syria, the Army of the Red Sea, which was small but of some importance, based on Jibuti, and, much more important, the Army of North Africa. And besides that, our pledges to Greece and Turkey were shared by France, and the obligations we had incurred, the promises of moral support, had now to be borne by ourselves alone.

The loss of French assistance caused the Western Mediterranean no longer to be available as a safe line of communications, and we now have to send our troops and armaments and all their multifarious needs by the three months journey round the Cape of Good Hope. The figure has often been published that to transport a Division of troops with its ancillary services and all its necessities and munitions, involves about fifteen ships of 4,000 or 5,000 tons apiece. I cannot give the figure necessitated for a modern mechanised or armoured formation, but certainly the burden on our shipping in maintaining a force in the Middle East, owing to the closing of the Mediterranean, has been something staggering, and has added enormously to the demands upon the Navy. The transportation of aeroplanes makes an even larger call on our shipping resources. We cannot send our aeroplanes across neutral territories and we have to send them also by this very long sea route.

In this war the time factor is very much in our favour. Our factories, and those of the United States, are now turning out a great volume of tanks and guns and aeroplanes, and it is difficult to exaggerate the value of these months of which we have had the benefit owing to Greek resistance and during which these munitions have been pouring in ever-increasing volume into Middle Eastern ports. The Nazis had hoped to reach the Aegean without having to fight, but the Greek expedition has inflicted on them far heavier losses in killed and wounded than the ridiculous estimates given by Hitler on Sunday evening, and far larger losses than were suffered by the Empire Forces.

When Hitler recasts his dispositions after the delaying action fought in Greece he will find large forces awaiting him which during these precious months have been freed from the task of clearing up the remains of his Ally in Abyssinia and Eritrea. It is true that we have lost material in Greece. We have only been able to evacuate light equipment and have had to destroy heavy armaments, but meanwhile, larger quantities than we have lost have had time to arrive at the Red Sea ports.

In the new warfare battles are fought not in days but in months of time and spread over hundreds of thousands of square miles, and we ought surely to look at military operations in an entirely new perspective. Greece can be considered as the opening phase of a battle and, in relation to the scale of the whole operation, as an affair of outposts in the vast drama which is now being unfolded. If we stand back from this single feature and look at the ebb and flow of the tremendous forces which are being developed we shall find very much to be thankful for. My noble friend Lord Croft was good enough to give me an appreciation of the position from the military point of view, and he summed up the situation in the Middle Eastern theatre in the words that what we had lost on the swings we had gained on the roundabouts. Our casualties in Greece were at the most 11,500, of whom a large proportion were cut off from re-embarkation, but in less than five months Wavell has taken 200,000 prisoners in Africa, and the total loss of 380,000 Italians and native levies is made up by 179,500 which is the best estimate available of the killed, wounded and deserters.

We have a credit balance on the performances of the Fleet in the Mediterranean. The withdrawal from Greece has of course been a wonderful example of combined operations between the Navy, Army and Air Force. I should need the dialectic of St. Athanasius to do justice to the perfect co-operation between trinity in unity of these forces. The operation has been far more difficult than the classic example of Gallipoli because air observation and mobility in attack were fully developed in Greece, whereas they did not exist in the Dardanelles. The Navy, of course, had by far the most difficult task. We must look at the Mediterranean battle on the seas as a whole. We must remember that Matapan was part of the Battle of Greece. The result of Matapan was felt in the re-embarkation. It is shown in the fact that only 500 lives were lost at sea. In view of the air superiority possessed by our enemies it is certain that our difficulties and our losses would have been far greater if the Italian Fleet had been in a position to harass the operations. The full balance sheet has not yet been struck. During the last few weeks our Fleet has inflicted many heavy losses on the Italians taking stores and escorting convoys to Tripoli. When the balance is struck it will be found that there is a very heavy credit in our favour to be put against the debit side of the account.

We have heard, and rightly heard, very much of the spectacular triumphs in Cyrenaica where the Empire Forces, never numbering more than two Divisions at a time, destroyed—and absolutely destroyed—a host of 135,000 Italians. Since then our attention has been so much centred on the Balkans that much less notice has been taken of the destruction of Armies in Italian East Africa than that achievement has deserved. That campaign has removed a very great potential danger to the rear of our Middle East positions. When the battle is joined in North Africa it will be a great asset to us that we have no anxiety in the direction of the Red Sea, that those water3 are no longer a battle zone, and that we are able to get invaluable help from the United States through Red Sea ports. In Greece, the Nazis are said to have enjoyed a six to one advantage in aircraft. In Africa a different situation will gradually develop. As the Nazis get further from their base, the British will get closer to their sources of supply. Tobruk has already proved itself a very damaging sally-port on the invader's flank, and the persistent and costly attacks made by the Nazis show how very painful they find it.

Prospects of an advance on Egypt are much more difficult than is suggested by looking at the map because if you go beyond 200 miles south of the coast on the frontier from Jarabub southward our Western marches are protected from attack by any large mechanised force by a sea of shifting sand wherein an optimistic Egyptian archaeologist recently made an effort to find the remains of another scourge of humanity who was overwhelmed in the dunes of this sandy sea 2,500 years ago, in the time of Cambyses.

On the other flank of the Middle Eastern position, the Quislings of Iraq have seized political control and are trying to deprive us of our rights under the Treaty of Alliance. After the liberation of Iraq by the British in the last war, and our great expenditure of money and human effort in helping the Arabs under the Iraq Mandate, this action is one of singular ingratitude and treachery. It is early yet to forecast the progress of events in Mesopotamia; but we have two great advantages. Quick action has maintained our sea communications from Basra and we are in a position to concentrate overwhelming local air superiority. It has long been evident that Rashid Ali has been under the Italian influence and it is of course impossible yet to gauge the effects of underhand Nazi intrigue. But since I have been at the Colonial Office, it has been continually brought to my notice how the Arab people are inspired by a passionate desire for independence after their long centuries of alien rule. It is certain that this treacherous attempt of a handful of intriguers to sell their country into slavery must be condemned by the overwhelming majority of the people of Mesopotamia. They have not yet forgotten that we freed them; they know, too, that Italy has made no secret of her wish to dominate all the Arab countries, and after the blood-stained, sadistic record of Graziani and his lieutenants in Tripoli, the Arabs of Mesopotamia are not likely to look forward to a repetition of such horrors in their land.

I have dealt to-day entirely with the Mediterranean situation, as that is the main text of the Resolution which I am moving. The security of our Near Eastern front, of course, depends primarily on the maintenance of ocean communication, and here, as in the Battle for Britain itself, with ever-increasing help from America, we are hoping to send more and more support to the Battle of the Middle East on which the Nazis seem to be staking so much. I beg to move.

Moved to resolve, That this House approves the policy of His Majesty's Government in sending help to Greece and declares its confidence that our operations in the Middle East and in all other theatres of war will be pursued by the Government with the utmost vigour.—(Lord Moyne.)

LORD ADDISON

My Lords, the form of the Motion which has been submitted to us by the Leader of the House is not perhaps that which is altogether usual in Parliamentary procedure. It is quite often that votes of confidence in the Government of the day are moved from somewhere in the House other than the Front Bench; but it may well be—indeed I grant that it is desirable—that Parliament should have an opportunity of expressing its judgment, so far as it can form one at present, on the matters referred to in the Resolution, and in the circumstances it is, perhaps, very fitting that the Government should bring it forward. Anyhow, I would like to assure the noble Lord that there are quite a lot of us on this side of the House who would have been perfectly willing to move this Resolution. I certainly should myself, and that being so it is clear that I do not think that the Motion will give rise to any division fundamentally.

I was glad to find, in listening to that remarkable broadcast by the Prime Minister—in which I dare say this debate was in his mind—that he dealt as a preliminary with those nervous, fidgetty people who always harass the Government in times of difficulty, and that he subjected them to an outright condemnation. There is no place, so far as I know from my own political experience, where the jitterbug flourishes more actively than in this part of London, and it was quite fitting that the Prime Minister should say how refreshing it was to get amongst the people who are enduring trials, and to be free for a time from the whisperings of neurotics. I do not know anything about the inner counsels of the Government in this war, but I did in the last, and the same set of people who were very active then are, I dare say, active now. Thank heaven, they have precious little influence with the mass of the British people and I am quite sure the members of His Majesty's Government have common sense enough to put them in their proper perspective At the same time I was glad that the Prime Minister took an opportunity of saying what he did about people who spread misgivings on all kinds of trivial occasions.

The discussion of a Motion of this kind, as has often happened before, may well prove once more the value of our Parliamentary institutions, because it is often valuable in producing statements such as that to which we have just listened, in the airing of grievances, in the bringing forward of various constructive suggestions, and in a hundred other ways, which altogether conduce to the more helpful conduct of our national effort. I feel sure that the debate in this House and in the other one will be useful in that way. As to what the noble Lord said about our affording help to Greece, it seems to me that we had no alternative. I cannot, of course, express any opinion, having no inside knowledge of the facts, as to the amount of help that we could give, or the disposition of the forces. Those are matters only to be determined by those who have full knowledge of all our obligations, of our powers, and of the dangers; but I am quite sure it is true to say that we could not have looked free people in the world in the face if we had declined to do it.

Associated with these operations there are one or two questions in one's mind, and it would be desirable to answer them; but one hopes that perhaps it was the engagement of our Navy and our Mercantile Marine in securing the re-embarkation of troops from Greece that enabled the Germans to slip into Lemnos. It was an unhappy occurrence which also adds to the danger. I am quite sure the Government are fully alive to it and I do not think it needs a discussion in Parliament to point it out. As far as possible this threat to our friends in Turkey, this making of stepping stones into Syria, should be countered as soon as possible. I do not know whether the noble Lord himself is quite as satisfied as he would like to be as to our information services. We have raised this question before in the House. It is very material to the successful conduct of the war with the utmost vigour, as we all agree. I wonder if the very large volume of tonnage which must have been sent across into Tripoli was fully known by our Intelligence Services. Clearly it ought to have been, because the amount of supplies that had been sent was very great indeed.

The noble Lord, in referring to the need for sending supplies round by the Cape, by inference suggested a question in relation to air power. Is it not possible that we can send ships through the Mediterranean? I do not know how many times our aircraft have tried to bomb these two stationary vessels in Brest, but they have had a large number of shots at them, and the ships are not moving about. We all have a most profound respect for the valour and skill of our airmen, yet they do not seem to have had a very rapid success with these two big vessels standing still in port. If that is so—and it is so—does not it seem to suggest that it might not be so altogether easy to hit a vessel steaming as fast as it could past Gibraltar or through the Narrows? I wonder whether we really have as much to fear as the noble Lord suggested. Anyhow, we feel that in the interests of the forces in Libya and elsewhere, it is right that we may voice misgivings as to the efficiency of our Intelligence Service. They have not been removed by recent events.

There is another section of our war effort which perhaps we might becomingly mention, and that is our propaganda and information about the war effort. I do not know what we were doing, how active we have been in Iraq, but I hope that we have been doing something to counter the Italian operations with these very bribable Sheiks. In all the world we find that Goebbels' organisation is very busy, and whilst, of course, it is not our habit to brag about our own performances—and quite right too—our propaganda efforts do not seem to be well or skilfully directed. They are certainly scattered. We have a Ministry of Information. I am not quite sure what its place is in the field of propaganda, but it clearly is very important. There are the broadcasts of the B.B.C., all of which are, I suppose, "vetted" by the Ministry of Information before they are given. They are always very respectable statements, but sometimes they are not very inspiring. Then I suppose there is the propaganda section, if there is one, of the Foreign Office. In addition to that, we know that the Department of Economic Warfare has various activities into which we will not too closely inquire. There are also the various statements issued by the Service Departments from time to time, in addition to a number of miscellaneous broadcasts, including the statements of Parliamentary Private Secretaries. It is a miscellaneous collection of what are no doubt good efforts, but it does not seem to me that this propaganda part of our work is being properly directed.

I do not know whether any of your Lordships have read a little book which my noble friend Lord Davies wrote not long ago, and which is called The Foundations of Victory. He there sets out some very interesting facts with regard to our propaganda effort, and I think that we might well give that subject closer attention than is possible to-day. Our propaganda efforts should be anticipatory to a greater extent than is the case at present, and they should be concerted, directed and coherent. I am sure that none of us wants to disseminate lies, and we have no need to do so, for we have a magnificent case; but I do not think that our case is got into the minds of the millions of oppressed people under Hitler so well as it might be. I do not know whether we do all that we can to encourage discontent and to be beforehand with him in his operations, which are clearly going on very actively in Spain, Morocco, Syria and many other places. At all events, I suggest that it is material to our war effort that there should be singleness of direction and more power of direction in our propaganda efforts, taken collectively.

There is one other topic which relates to our war effort to which I may perhaps be permitted briefly to refer, and that is our effort in the direction of industrial production. Mr. Morrison and Sir Andrew Duncan inherited a congeries of activities, thrown together, which were presented to the people and called a Ministry of Supply. That arrangement was subject to adverse criticism on all sides of this House more than once. Sir Andrew Duncan and Mr. Morrison, as I say, inherited this jumble of arrangements, and it must have prejudiced their work very much; but, for all that, I do think that there is some ground for misgiving in the fact that we have not yet overtaken the deficiencies in our industrial production which existed before this Government came into power. It is well worth more close inquiry than it seems to have received to find whether we are making full use of our machine shops, and whether, although we are clamouring for men and often pay very high wages, we are really fully employing all our ancillary factories, especially the small factories. Such information as I have suggests that we are not.

The example that I wish to give is perhaps trivial, and I bring it forward only because of what I am leading up to. We have all been exhorted to save everything that we can, and I am sure that we do, even including bones. Three or four times a week, however, it is my duty to go on the road to Aylesbury, and in doing so I pass a place where there was once a pond, but which is now occupied, apart from mud, by a large collection of iron of all kinds—agricultural implements, iron sheeting and all sorts of things; in fact, a miscellaneous assortment of iron goods, occupying a considerable area. It has been there for a year and a half, and it was there yesterday. It lies beside a main road, and within one hundred yards of a railway station. I suggest that it is a vain effort to try to impress upon those who see that hideous thing every day that it is of vital importance that they should save their tins. Such propaganda is thrown away in their tins of a spectacle of that kind. We were told a long time ago to collect our metal. It is no use blaming the local authority; for, if the local authority are responsible and are indolent, they should long ago have been replaced by somebody more efficient. This is an outward and visible sign that we have not yet gone as far as we need to go in the efficient management of our own industrial production.

After all is said and done, I agree with my noble friend that the expedition to Greece will be looked upon as an incident. The issue of the war depends upon the equipment of our Forces, and upon having an adequate number of men trained to use that equipment, and all the rest is secondary. It is a great thing for us that we have in the Prime Minister one who never seeks to say light things to the people or to deceive them. Nothing surpasses the patience and firmness of the British people, and they know that the issue of the war depends upon the provision of equipment for our Forces, and on the adequate training of men to use it. These two things are great and decisive, and I believe that in the Prime Minister we have a leader fully worthy of the opportunity. I trust that, in helping to provide an administrative organisation which will be equally worthy of the opportunity, this debate in the two Houses of Parliament may be found hereafter to have served a useful purpose.

VISCOUNT SAMUEL

My Lords, it is unusual in Parliamentary history, if not unique, to hear a Leader of the Opposition complaining that the Government have not invited him to move a vote of confidence, but that is symptomatic of the times and suitable to the present occasion, for in this matter of the expedition to Greece I feel sure we shall all be of one mind. From the beginning, public opinion in the country and in both Houses of Parliament approved its having been undertaken. Withdrawal after a very gallant fight, in which the House ought to pay tribute to the valour of the troops from Australia and New Zealand as well as to the other Forces engaged, has not altered the rights or wrongs of the initial undertaking. From a strategic point of view it might have been more prudent not to have attempted it. The same considerations arose a year ago when our Army in France advanced beyond its defensive lines to the assistance of the Belgians. Yet if it had not been done, and if the expedition to Greece had not been undertaken, we should have suffered a moral defeat much more disastrous than the military. If we had remained behind our defensive lines or beyond the sea, and watched our Allies being overwhelmed, unaided, then we should have alienated our friends all over the world, particularly, perhaps, in the United States of America, and disheartened our own people more than any repulse could have done.

Sometimes one sees it said in the Press that if the Government decided to undertake this expedition at all, they ought to have sent larger forces from here, even at some risk. None of us has any materials on which to form an opinion on that point. Only the Government and the General Staff can form a valid view. We may do well to be suspicious of amateur strategists. I remember seeing a very forcible newspaper article at the moment when we were suffering our reverse in Cyrenaica, condemning General Wavell for not having advanced further into Tripolitania and not having finished his job by depriving the Italians and Germans of their base there. If that operation had been undertaken, and if at the end of an immensely long line of communications General Wavell's Army had suffered a defeat, you may be quite sure that these critics would have been the first to condemn him for a rash and unnecessary adventure.

However, the situation is that Hitler is now in control of the whole of the Balkans. Fifteen independent countries have been overrun, or sixteen, if Italy is included, as of course she should be! We have been passing through a very bad phase in the war, and the threat in the Middle East is still serious. As one who has been closely connected with the administration of Palestine, I would express the hope that the Government have taken action to arm the population of Palestine, both Arab and Jew, for their own defence. I am told that action has been slow in that regard, and I trust that the delay has, as far as possible, been made good. Whether in the Middle East or elsewhere, we shall certainly not be immune from further setbacks. All of us who lived through the last war will remember that such setbacks were far worse then. Study of the history of the past is the best cure for pessimism in the present. I wish our friends in America would realise that. We read that our American friends are subject to waves of pessimism when things go badly. It was so last summer, and it has been so again recently. There have been no waves of pessimism among the nation here, perhaps because we realised from the beginning the reality and the gravity of the danger. There is anxiety, grave anxiety, but anxiety is wholesome. George Eliot said, "Anxiety is good for nothing if we cannot turn it into a defence." Anxiety will help to cure us of the standing British sin of complacency and procrastination.

Let us consider the events that might have taken place and have not. Last September the whole German Press was proclaiming the immediate invasion of England. It was announced that Field-Marshal Goering had gone to review the whole of the German Air Force in Northern France, Belgium, and elsewhere and so direct the culminating operations. Admiral Raeder, we were told, had visited the ports, and assured himself that everything was ready for the invasion by sea. It did not come—because of the signal defeat inflicted upon the Luftwaffe by the Royal Air Force in what may prove to have been one of the decisive battles in the history of the world. The night bombers then became the great peril for this country. It might have been that, for month after month, and possibly year after year, our munition factories, our docks and shipyards would have been the helpless victims, one by one, of the night bombers; but now, after indeed long delay, although there is still immense loss and suffering, our night fighters do seem to be making headway against this peril. Hostile bombers have been destroyed at the rate of more than 100 a month, and possibly those numbers may steadily and largely increase. On the Atlantic sea routes the new reconnaissance by the whole Naval and Air Forces of the United States will help immensely to meet the submarine peril, while the Americans are also sending whole fleets of ships with munitions and supplies directly to the seat of war in the Middle East.

The House, I feel sure, will be ready to express its confidence that the operations will be pursued in all theatres of war with the utmost vigour. The task of Parliament is to express and to fortify the unity of the nation. There are grounds of criticism—indeed, many of them—in matters of Civil Defence organisation, the fight against the fire bomb, and the continuance of unpardonable waste in many directions. These criticisms are valid and ought to be expressed on proper occasions and in their proper proportion. A small object close at hand often seems much bigger than much large objects further away. Something that happens in our own street may seem more important than anything that takes places in the Balkans or on the Atlantic. Such criticism is natural and proper, and should be expressed on the right occasion; but this is not such an occasion. To-day the British Parliament in both its Houses will rally round its leaders, feeling fortunate in the personality of its Prime Minister, and ready to assure him and his colleagues that they need have no anxiety in the political field at home, but that the ground is firm beneath their feet.

VISCOUNT GALWAY

My Lords, I rise to intervene very briefly in this debate to speak on behalf of the Dominion of New Zealand, because I have just returned from being Governor-General of that Dominion, and I can speak on behalf of the Government with whom I worked in the closest and most friendly co-operation for the last five and a half years. I should like to assure your Lordships that any rumours that may be spread to the effect that there is any lack of information between the Home Government and the Government of New Zealand are absolutely and entirely without foundation. The Government of New Zealand have been kept informed of anything they require to know for the effective prosecution of the war. Appreciations of the situation have been sent with regularity, and the Government have always been informed as to when, how, and where troops should be employed. So if anybody states that there is a lack of cooperation between the two Governments, I can assure you that they are completely and entirely in the wrong.

It might interest your Lordships to know a little of the great war work of that Dominion of New Zealand, small in numbers but great in heart. The population numbers only 1,750,000 people; yet they are trying to do their very utmost to support the war work. Perhaps the first thing in importance for the moment is the Air Force. I may tell you that when the Italian Dictator was engaged in his operations in Abyssinia, we decided in New Zealand that the Air Force must be completely overhauled and brought up-to-date, so as to be an effective instrument in the Empire defence schemes which we felt sure were bound in time to be required. Therefore the Air Force was entirely reorganised. Aerodromes were made, hangars, barracks and buildings were constructed, and training schools were thought-out and planned. The Air Force in that Dominion ever since 1936 has been small, but surely moving forward. At the time of the Munich crisis the Prime Minister and I had a thorough discussion, and decided that probably the first and greatest help that New Zealand could give to the home country in the event of war would be trained pilots in the largest number that could possibly be sent. So we trained in New Zealand as many as we could, and the number was only limited by the number of training machines that we were able to acquire from the Home Government.

On the sea, as your Lordships probably know, the two cruisers on the station, the "Leander" and "Achilles." were manned up to 75 per cent. by New Zealand crews. The "Achilles" earned her right to fame in helping in the destruction of the "Graf Spee," while the "Leander" quite recently put an Italian raider into its right place, which is the botttom of the sea. As to the Expeditionary Force, at the very outbreak of war New Zealand did her utmost to man strategic points which were essential for the Empire training and communication scheme, and the New Zealand Division was put into training at once to be sent overseas. As perhaps your Lordships know, the first body of troops duly arrived in Egypt, but the second, which was on the sea when Italy entered the war, was diverted to come to England with the full approval of the New Zealand Government, and the third was able, duly, to arrive in Egypt. Perhaps some grumblers will say there was great friction between the two Governments here and in New Zealand because it was not possible to send the second body to England as early as the New Zealand Government wished. I can assure you that there was no friction whatsoever.

We looked at the thing from the highest and widest point of view, and the Government of New Zealand realised perfectly well that the first thing required in Egypt was mechanised units, guns and tanks. They saw that those things were more required than infantry for the defence of Egypt and, eventually, for General Wavell's attack which crushed the Italians. Therefore the departure of that third part of the Force was delayed, but they duly arrived in Egypt and the troops came together as a complete Division during the month of February. I can assure your Lordships that the New Zealand Government were fully aware of, and fully sympathetic to, the employment of the New Zealand Division in the expedition to Greece, and the people of the Dominion of New Zealand were as proud as were people in this country of the action of those New Zealand troops in the campaign in the Balkans. They trod in the footsteps of the New Zealanders of 1914–1918, and they proved themselves to be a Division well trained who will in the future, as in the past, give a good account of themselves in the battles that are yet to be fought.

I may add that in New Zealand the whole war effort is going forward with the utmost determination. The women of New Zealand have already sent hundreds of tons of clothing for the bombed areas in this country. They are doing their best to help. The whole of that Dominion is working whole-heartedly and to the utmost of its ability for the prosecution of the war, and for the bringing about of the victory which we feel sure will come if we all do our utmost to work for it. I can only assure your Lordships again that the two Governments are working in the closest harmony and the closest co-operation, and I feel sure that that co-operation and harmony will continue until the very end of the war.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

My Lords, I am sure your Lordships will agree with me that nothing is so refreshing in your Lordships' House as to hear the voice of one who speaks with close knowledge of the subject he is bringing before your Lordships, and in this case words from the noble Lord who has held with such conspicuous success the position of Governor of New Zealand for some five years would be listened to as giving us not mere hearsay but close views of the actual feeling that has inspired that Dominion to come in and to work with such success with the forces of the Mother Country. I want, if your Lordships will allow me, to join in the praise of the three Fighting Services, because in my opinion their tenacity, their endurance, their valour and their fortitude have still further enhanced their already high reputation since this war began.

I should also, at once, like to express my complete agreement—and I do not believe I have heard of anybody who takes another view—that as matters stood we could certainly have taken no other course but to help the Greeks in their heroic struggle. But I think this is an opportunity, after we have heard the very full, detailed and clear statement of the Leader of the House, to point out where we think that things are not going so well. Talking with other people, when I mention the Fighting Forces I find that they are enthusiastic and their praise knows no bounds, but when I say, "What do you think of the politicians who are governing us?" the language they use I could not repeat in your Lordships' House without being called to order. Now, I do not know exactly whether it has been due to what my noble friend Lord Addison pointed to, a deficiency in the Intelligence Services, which it would almost seem to be, or whether it is innate inability on the part of the War Cabinet to grasp fully the significance of this enormously intricate, complex, difficult and dangerous situation which the war presents as it extends still further month by month; but there are a series of grave errors anyhow to be accounted for—Norway, Dakar, the failure to know about the landing of Armies in North Africa, the Balkan situation—which are giving a certain fear and misgiving that the direction of affairs is certainly not on a level with the execution of the various military, naval and air exploits on the different fronts. We must remember the Walcheren expedition in 1809 which brought about the fall of the Government because of its failures and its losses. That indicates that in those days Parliamentary criticism was allowed and active. To-day, we seem to live under a spell—the spell of the Prime Minister's oratory. It is very remarkable; no one doubts that. He casts his spell in an unrivalled way, and there is no question about it that he has the House of Commons in his pocket. He has embraced the Labour party, and they like very much that embrace.

To turn to another point, it is a matter of diplomatic negotiations and forethought and doing in time the preparatory work which my noble friend Lord Addison said is done so often by the German secret authorities or directing authorities. There was no question, as I said just now, of not helping Greece, but surely there was a question of studying the Balkan situation. When I lived in Constantinople, I was always told that the policy of this country should be wherever a war broke out to go straight to the Balkans, or wherever a war was foreseen to go straight to the Balkans. We had by the Treaty of Trianon left the States in the Balkans in a state of dissatisfaction, concern and animosity with their neighbours. We ought to have been there earlier, not just lately when Yugoslavia went, or when Bulgaria was going, but earlier when Hungary was still nursing grievances. They were met by no doubt pernicious but very effective propaganda on the part of the Nazis. They were all bought over.

What our Foreign Office was doing, what our directors were doing, I do not know. There was some attempt, but it was too late, to co-ordinate the efforts within the different States by meetings be- tween the various diplomatists. I am not saying that this is not a most difficult part of the world, I am not saying that the element of Oriental diplomacy does not come in to contuse our rather blunt and obtuse minds, but it is of supreme importance that our influence should be felt and that our influence should carry with the various States. We made a mistake in the last war. In the last war it was quite possible to have got Bulgaria on to our side, and to have shortened the war by at least two years. This time we seem to have blundered more hopelessly in our negotiations with all these States. The result was that a great highroad was opened for the German Army with its tanks to pour down the valleys of Greece and to overcome the valiant, magnificent, heroic, desperate resistance of a British force and of an aeroic Greek Army.

It is no good sacrificing valuable lives in enterprises that have shown neglect and inefficiency on the part of the authorities at home. We should be first in the field. I have heard many times, in conversation with people who do not agree with my views, that we are always "too late." That expression has been used and should be corrected, and a certain self-complacency that is rather attacking those who are in the supreme command at home—civil command—should be corrected. Not quite so much faith should be put on the oratory by which we are all enchanted but misled. People are asking when is the time coming that these eloquent phrases are going to be implemented by action, and we always come back to the one phrase, the one policy, which is that bombing is going to increase as time goes on, and that there is going to be much more of it—or as the announcement from Downing Street said: The policy will be continued to the end of the war, it is hoped on an ever-increasing scale, irrespective of whether any further attacks are made on the British islands or not. That is a message to London and Bristol and Plymouth and Sheffield and Coventry, to Birmingham, Manchester and Belfast, which is not very encouraging.

That this great country of which we are all so proud should in so short a time by man's ingenuity have been reduced to taking refuge in the lowest and most barbarous and cruel method of warfare that humanity has ever depicted, is a thought which is making people pause. A stranger the other day while talking to me got on to the war, and he said: "We are told that man is descended from the apes; I think it is the greatest possible insult to the apes." My Lords, may we not stop and consider for a moment what this continued policy of bombing is going to bring? Retaliation every time. I have been told in debates in your Lordships' House before now, that we need not fear bombing very much in this war, because people would be frightened of retaliation. It is no good going to the towns which have been bombed and praising the poor people who have managed to survive and have not been hit, in order that they may stand up to still more. That is a false sentimentality, a desecration of patriotism. I want to see my country taking the lead and taking other methods—methods much more likely to break the Nazi régime and Hitler than playing into his hands by playing his game always and stooping to his barbarous methods. No, my Lords, people are beginning to think; they give every tribute possible to what has been done because it was ordered to be done, but they are wondering whether there is a mind behind this which is thinking out things on rather broader lines, on lines which take into account the fact that man is not a brute but a spiritual human being who wants, as soon as possible, to rise from the chaos and confusion of to-day

VISCOUNT WOLMER

My Lords, in addressing your Lordships' House for the first time, I hope you will extend to me that generosity which you have constantly shown to those who are about to forfeit their oratorical virginity. I only rise for a few moments to support this Motion most heartily. I am very glad that the Government did table this Motion in both Houses so as to give both the opportunity of showing the solidarity of support that there is behind His Majesty's Government in this crisis in our history. There can be, and there has been here, no question but that there was no other alternative open to this country than to give Greece every possible aid we could. Herr Hitler has declared that he regards it as the greatest blunder of the war. We can quite understand that considerations of honour would not appeal to him. No, my Lords, the nation will not regret the action of the Government in sending that assistance, nor do I think that the nation will be unduly depressed by what has happened. As has already been pointed out here and elsewhere, there have been very solid advantages gained besides the losses that we have suffered. We can look back on this incident as one of those incidents that the country had to go through and in which it was fulfilling its responsibilities to the utmost of its ability, as an incident of which, as a nation, we have no reason to be ashamed.

I have heard in some places—not I am glad to think in your Lordships' House, but in another place and outside Parliament—a slight tendency to criticise the Government for not having sent more troops, or for not sending them earlier, or for not having given greater assistance in other ways earlier. I ask myself: Do these critics really think that our Government did not give every assistance that was in their power? Have they forgotten that the whole situation is limited and circumscribed by the amount of shipping available, by the number of tanks available, by the number of aeroplanes available, and that these facts are ever present in the minds of those directing out policy? If men and machines were not sent in greater numbers, how can we doubt that it was not physically possible? And we can reflect that our great Prime Minister has no share of responsibility for any inadequacy of armaments that may exist. It was not his fault, and it does not lie in the mouths of people such as Mr. Hore-Belisha to criticise the Government—as he was doing an hour or two ago—for not having sent greater assistance earlier to Greece. Seeing that Mr. Hore-Belisha was the Secretary of State for War responsible for the condition of the Army when we went to war, I should have thought that he would have found it wise to keep silent at the present juncture.

I think we may also reflect that in spite of recent reverses which we have suffered, this country is in an immeasurably stronger position than it was a year ago. We have only to consider the immense change that has taken place. A year ago, after the collapse of France, England was thought by many to be practically defenceless. Now we have an immense and mighty Army waiting to receive any invader; an Army which is now very much better equipped than anything that then existed. Though Hitler may overrun all Europe and dominate fifteen or sixteen countries, he has not yet ventured to invade these islands. The sands are running out; he knows that the time of his mechanical dominance is drawing shorter every day, and it will not be many weeks before the output of munitions on the part of the lovers and upholders of liberty will greatly exceed what the tyrant nations can produce.

I do not think we need be fearful of the future. It seems to me that there are three things necessary to win a world war. The first is to have a just cause; the second is to have the men; and the third is to have the munitions. We have a just cause; we have the men now in great numbers and ever-improving in their training; and the production of the munitions of air, land and sea is growing at an ever-increasing pace. It is the output of munitions which is the crux of the war, and, therefore, the whole energies of the nation should be bent, as I believe they are being bent, to the production of food and munitions in every form. Let the carping critics be silent, let those only speak who have useful suggestions and constructive criticisms to make. Let all others give their support to the Government in the task in which they are leading us.

VISCOUNT ELIBANK

My Lords, it is customary after a noble Lord has made a maiden speech for the next speaker to refer to it, and I should like to utter a word of praise for the speech delivered by the noble Lord, in which he has said he has broken his virginity of words in your Lordships' House, although in another House I have often listened to words from the noble Lord which were of equal value and of equal eloquence. Now, turning to the Motion, I would first of all congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Moyne, upon the speech which he has delivered this afternoon. He has given us the clearest and most lucid exposition of the conditions under which we entered and supported Greece. He has also given us, as far as he is able under the conditions which exist, an account of the general conditions which have led to Government action in other parts of the world.

I believe that the Government were quite right in bringing up this Motion this afternoon. There have been certain criticisms in the country—there is no doubt about that—and I think the Government were right to bring in this Motion, couched in these terms, and to ask for the confidence of your Lordship's House and of the other House in what they were doing. I for one feel that the Government could have taken no other action but what they did in entering and supporting Greece. As the noble Lord said, if we had broken our word we could not have held up our heads again for shame; we could not have met the Greeks or any free people if we had not gone to their aid. So far as the Middle East is concerned and the conduct of the war in the different theatres, I do not think any one can cavil or cast any criticism upon the general conduct of the wax. We have in the Prime Minister to-day an individual who is gifted with powers which are not equalled in this country, or I might say in any other country, and it is for all of us to give him and his Government all the support that we can in this terrible struggle in which we are engaged. It is, however, true that when this Motion was raised the Prime Minister issued, in a sense, a general invitation to both Houses of Parliament to make such suggestions as they could which might help in the conduct of the war. There are, therefore, two or three suggestions which I want to make to the Government this afternoon, and I may say that they are not made in any sense of criticism but by way of help.

First of all, I think we may say that in the country there is considerable cause for anxiety with regard to our Intelligence Service; it is thought in many circles that our intelligence is net what it ought to be. There have been cases in this war when we do not seem to have had adequate anticipatory knowledge of what was going to happen. There was the initial attack on Norway. This was followed shortly after by the rape of Holland and Belgium. Then came the Dakar incident which, in its after results, has been very harmful to our cause. Still more recently we have had the case of the withdrawal from Benghazi. I do not know whether that was due to faulty intelligence; I cannot say. I was glad to have the answer which the noble Lord gave in this House only two weeks ago stating that they had the utmost confidence in General Wavell's directionary powers in the war in the Middle East. General Wavell, in all his actions in his command so far, has shown that he is able to size up his enemy, whether German or Italian. Therefore, if that is the case, one is apt to feel that perhaps there again it was a case of faulty intelligence.

Now we come to the case of Iraq. I was not clear from what the noble Lord said whether he admitted that the Government were aware that there was likely to be trouble in Iraq as long ago as last December. I may say that it was well known in certain circles in this country as long ago as last December that there was likely to be trouble in Iraq. I know that in Turkey, from certain sources, it was well known that there was likely to be trouble in Iraq. What is the reason—I ask this in no sense of criticism—why we did not take steps earlier under the Anglo-Iraqian Treaty to send troops into Iraq in order to make sure that our oilfields near Basra were properly guarded at least, to make sure that the oilfields at Mosul were properly guarded, and, indeed, to make sure that this outbreak on the part of Rashid Ali should not take place? Whether that was due to faulty intelligence or not I do not know, but the feeling in the country is that our intelligence is not as good as it ought to be.

The noble Lord, Lord Addison, referred to the question of propaganda I venture to suggest that propaganda and intelligence arc twin brothers, which go together, and that your intelligence in this war is very little good without good propaganda. Here in our own territory, so to speak, of Iraq, is Nazi propaganda getting right ahead of us. It must be so, otherwise we should not find the conditions in Iraq which we find to-day. Consequently I am going to recommend to His Majesty's Government that the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, who has shown himself possessed of such drive and capacity in his administration of the Department of Aircraft Production, should be placed in charge—from the War Cabinet point of view—of these two questions of intelligence and propaganda.

There is one other point which I wish to mention, and that is the question of the evacuation or the retention of children in vulnerable towns, the coastal towns in this country, vulnerable to invasion from the coast of Norway down to Brest. There are still numbers of children in certain very vulnerable towns who have not been evacuated, and I would urge upon the Government the importance of having those children evacuated, by compulsion if necessary, from those places. It is all very well to say that that can be accomplished when it is known that invasion is coming. If invasion comes, it will probably come like a thief in the night, and we shall not have two, three or four days in which to collect these children, and possibly some of their parents or guardians, and get them away from places where the hard fighting on the beaches will take place. I venture to suggest to the Government that that is another matter which requires drive.

It is obvious that the Prime Minister cannot look after all these questions personally. He must have his hands full in looking after the defences of the country, and these other matters must be left to other members of the War Cabinet. I feel that I have said nothing in the course of my brief remarks which can be of any use to the enemy, but I hope that my remarks may be of some use to the Government and to the country if effect is given to them. I hope that this Motion will not go to a Division, and I do not see why it should. I am sure that everyone in this House is in favour of it. If, however, such an untoward thing should happen on this occasion as that this Motion should go to a Division, I should have very great pleasure in supporting it in the Lobby.

LORD RENNELL

My Lords, what I have to say will not take more than a few minutes, but I do wish to have an opportunity, as both Chairman and President of the Anglo-Hellenic League, and also as one who has been all over Greece and who has known the Greeks for fifty years, to say something of the wonderful people that the Greeks have always been in their relations with us. Of the many nations among whom I have lived, they are the one who never forget. We were able to do valuable service to the Greeks in the past, and the Greeks believed then, and have retained that belief ever since as an article of faith, in our sense of fair play and equity. As His Majesty's Government had given a pledge, we could not do otherwise than abide by that pledge, in my opinion; but I go further than that and say that in considering this matter we must go further back. Were we or were we not bound to give that pledge? I hold that we were bound to give it; and, even had we not given it, I think that if ever there was an occasion in the history of the world where Britain in her power and might should have stood by a little nation, aggressively attacked without provocation, that occasion arose then.

I know that everyone in this country speaks with enthusiasm of the recent action of the Greeks, but the attitude of the Greeks goes back much further than that. During the South African war, we seemed not to have a friend in the world. I was in Egypt at the time, where there is a large Greek colony; and, as our five regiments of the Army of Occupation were sent one after the other to take part in the war, and were replaced by Militia, the Greeks of Cairo marched with the troops to the station, cheering them and loading them with cigarettes and other gifts. I have mentioned this before, but I cannot say it often enough. We organised a bazaar for the wounded, to which we knew that none of the members of the foreign colonies would come, except perhaps the Greeks and the Egyptians. In the course of the afternoon, the five principal members of the Greek colony walked in with a bag and deposited it on the counter. Their leader said: "We have not come to buy at your bazaar, because you will have so many people here who will buy your things, but we have brought in this bag what we might have spent if we had been going to buy." They then walked out, and, when we opened the bag, we found that it contained £500 in gold.

I could quote numberless instances of the generous, ungrasping spirit of the Greeks—the Greeks of Greece and of the Islands. All over the Levant there is a large Greek-speaking population, the outcome of the Byzantine Empire, who are not real Greeks at all. The Greeks themselves, however, are the most friendly and kindly people among whom I have ever lived, and with my whole heart I support the action of the Government in giving them help in their hour of need, when they were aggressively attacked. I should like what I have said to-day to go out to them, so that they may know that not only their action at the present time but their constant devotion to this country and their belief in us for so many years are appreciated here.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON)

My Lords, the debate was opened by a full, careful and informing speech by the Leader of the House, and all that I can do as it reaches its close is to make a few observations on some of the matters which have been raised in the course of the discussion. The discussion, if I may presume to say so, has been, I think, useful and of real public benefit. It is not surprising to find that in this House there is no dissenting voice raised to the main proposition contained in the Motion.

Let me refer in a sentence or two to what was said just now by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. It appeared to me that the main proposition which he wanted to urge was, that at this time of day it world be wise—and if he had his way it would be done—that we should "take the lead" in announcing to the world that we abandoned finally and unequivocally the use of bombing for the rest of the war. I share with the noble Lord, and I should think with everyone else, horror and detestation of this method of warfare. Great efforts were made before the war to get rid of it or to limit it. Efforts were made at the Disarmament Conference by the British Government. Efforts were made by the Foreign Office in endeavouring to initiate an agreement between the four great countries of Western Europe, at any rate—France, Germany, Italy and ourselves—that there should be no bombing as between ourselves. Why did those efforts fail? It is perfectly obvious, if one looks, at the situation in the light thrown on it to-day, that one of the principal reasons for their failure was that those responsible for the policy of Germany would have none of it. On the contrary, they were preparing to use this horrible instrument to an extent and with a power never dreamed of before. I do not think the noble Lord can possibly suppose that if we followed his advice and announced to-day that we abandoned altogether the use of bombing, Hitler would say: "Very well, if that is the case, I shall drop it too." And if the noble Lord says, as he said just now, that he thought it poor comfort to the people of Bristol and other places to be told that bombing would go on to the end of the war, what sort of comfort would be given to those poor people if we told them we were going to drop bombing but to leave them exposed to the end of the war to that form of attack?

As regards the immediate subject of debate, it is not surprising, as I have said, that there should be a united view in favour of the Resolution approving the policy of sending help to Greece. Much has been said, and very eloquently said, in support of that view to-day. One quotation has not been made which I venture to add, and that is the declaration made by Mr. Menzies at a time when it had become clear that the forces sent to Greece were being driven back, and that not only British troops but Australian and New Zealand troops might well be in a position, if not of difficulty, at any rate of retreat. Let me remind the House of the language used by Mr. Menzies speaking on behalf of Australia. He said: I say quite bluntly that whatever criticism may arise in relation to our assistance to Greece, it is nothing to the criticism we should justly have encountered all over the world if, having cheered on Greece for months and encouraged her in her epic struggle, we had then shrugged our shoulders and said that against Germany we would give her no aid. We have heard with great pleasure from the noble Viscount, Lord Galway, a similar declaration of the determined and stubborn attitude of New Zealand. If New Zealand and Australia who contributed a substantial share of the forces in Greece take that view in the hour of difficulty, there is no doubt whatever of the attitude of the British Parliament and people as regards that part of the forces that came from this island. Let us be entirely plain on one or two other facts in this connection, which are of very deep interest and significance. We have never made a treaty with Greece by which in return for promises on her part we undertook to help her. Our assurance to Greece was unilateral. A pedantic or ingenious mind might find a distinction in that, but I do not think a plain and honest man would seek to rely on such a distinction. Notice this further. Greece never took the line that if we did not help her she would have to give up. She made it absolutely clear that she would go on fighting whatever happened, if necessary alone, and whether we helped her or not. There has been on the part of Greece no repining and no recrimination, and, as has been pointed out by the Leader of the House, whatever loss has resulted, Hitler has been made to fight his way to the Balkans—losing time, losing munitions and losing men.

The other day, in his wonderful broadcast, the Prime Minister ended by quoting some lines of Clough which most people know. It happens to be the last poem in the book. I do not know if your Lordships observed that immediately in front of that poem "Say not the struggle nought availeth," there is another poem written by Clough describing the feelings of a body of men who had fought for their country and who had been beaten back, in which the poet introduces the phrase, borrowed of course from Tennyson, "It is better to have fought and lost than never to have fought at all." That is a very appropriate motto for the action of the Greeks and ourselves in the effort to resist the Germans in the Balkans.

There is one other reference I wish to make. The other day, when things appeared in that part of the world to be at their worst, the House of Commons, through the Foreign Secretary, sent to the Greek Government, which was already in Crete, a message expressing our deep gratitude for the magnificent courage and endurance which the Greek Army had shown and for their loyalty as Allies. The Greek Prime Minister, the President of the Council, sent an answer, and I shall read two sentences of that answer, because in human experience it does not often happen that people whom you have tried to help, and who might regard your help as not having led to success, express much gratitude for what you have done. This was the answer of the Greek Prime Minister: We will never forget the loyal and courageous help which the British and Imperial troops gave to our soldiers in defence of their native land. … I desire once again to assure you that we will continue the struggle at the side of our great Allies, the noble peoples of the British Commonwealth, until final victory is won and the triumph of the ideals of liberty, morality, and international justice is achieved. These are very remarkable words, and my noble friend Lord Samuel was surely quite right when he said just now that we had no other honourable course. We must leave it to other people to make promises galore as to the way in which they are going to act in reference to other countries. We gain far more in the respect—aye and in the support—of the world because we kept our promise than we could ever have hoped to retain by any other course.

I should like to say, in conclusion, how greatly I appreciated and enjoyed the speech which the noble Viscount, Lord Wolmer, made just now. It seems to me very difficult to strike the right balance and, if I may say so respectfully, I thought he struck it admirably. Nobody wants to speak in the language of complacency, and certainly our Prime Minister sets us an excellent example to the contrary. On the other hand, nobody wants to allow a series of setbacks, however anxious and however serious, to upset our calm judgment or our fixed determination. Let me therefore conclude by reminding your Lordships of two recent observations made by the Prime Minister himself. It seems to me that these two observations, put together, strike the true note both for Parliament and the country.

First, I would recall the Prime Minister's observation in reference to these grave events: "Let us keep our sense of proportion." Noble Lords who were here when Lord Samuel spoke will remember how, in a passage of that brilliant speech, he set out the contrast of gains and losses, the pros and cons, so that we might justly judge the ebb and flow of fortune. We were not unduly elated when the fresh news of the day was the Battle of the Plate or the Battle of Cape Matapan. It was pride and gratitude, but not elation, which was the prevailing feeling when our airmen won the Battle of Britain in the autumn of last year, and in the same way this setback, which is more than a setback in Greece, because it is a setback in the Balkans as a whole, and has the possibility of developments of a serious kind hereafter, is not going to cause the spirit of the British people to be depressed or to falter.

The other expression of the Prime Minister which seems to me so appropriate now, is the remark he made when he addressed the Polish people the other day. He said then that the road we had to follow together was undoubtedly a long road and a hard road, but he went on to say that in the end, if we played our worthy parts, it would be a road that led to victory. I think most Englishmen who have studied this situation with care and with the full application of their minds, must feel that there is still in the world enough of democratic resources which, if fully and unsparingly used, are sufficient to assure us of the victory of liberty and the overthrow of the foulest tyranny that has ever threatened to ruin the world.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House adjourned.