Lords Sitting of 17 June 1941

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

TRUSTEE (WAR DAMAGE INSURANCE) BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT SIMON): My Lords, I move the Second Reading of this Bill, the full title of which is "An Act to remove doubts as to, and to supplement, the powers of trustees in relation to insurance against war damage." As I briefly explained to the House when the Bill was introduced, there is some doubt under the law of England, though there is none, I understand, under the law of Scotland, as to whether trustees have the power to insure against war damage. It seems curious that it should be so, for I suppose a trustee undoubtedly has the duty, in respect of chattels which he holds in trust, to behave himself as a prudent citizen would behave in the case of his own chattels; but the difficulty does exist both in a variety of judicial dicta and, perhaps, because the Trustee Act specifically authorises trustees to insure in the case of fire. There can be no doubt that trustees ought to have the same power as other people who have chattels to look after, and the object of this Bill is to make that plain, and to declare that such a trustee always had that power, for in a number of cases trustees have already taken the risk and insured.
The only other matter with which I need trouble your Lordships concerns subsection (1) of Clause 1, paragraph (b), in which there are some provisions of a rather technical nature arising from the circumstance that, according to Section 82 of the War Damage Act, premiums paid under policies issued under Part II of the Act—these chattel policies would be of that sort—are to be treated for all purposes as outgoings of a capital nature. Any of your Lordships interested in the detail of the subject will see how that is worked out in the subsection to which I have referred. My only other observation will be this.
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There is very great urgency for carrying this Bill into law, because the Board of Trade scheme for voluntary insurance fixed a date which has just passed. However, I am able to inform your Lordships that the Board of Trade do not intend to take any objection if trustees act promptly under this Bill as soon as it is passed. I hope, therefore, that after the Second Reading is given to-day, the House at the next sitting will think fit to suspend the Standing Order to enable us to take the remaining stages of the Bill at once. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, my noble friend on the Woolsack has introduced a Bill which is likely to have the full support of your Lordships; it certainly has my full support. I think it is a good Bill and necessary, intended, as my noble friend has said, to remove doubts. There may, however, be two doubts in the Bill to which I will ask your Lordships to allow me to draw your attention. I trespassed a little when this Bill was introduced last week and I ask pardon for having done so. I did not realise then that it was only the First Reading of the Bill. The point I then raised, which was mentioned also by the noble Earl, Lord Clanwilliam, seems to me to need further elaboration.
In the first place, let me say this. I know well that the provision in Part II of the War Damage Act of 1941, dealing with chattels, is a voluntary provision. I know also that this Bill, so far as trustees are concerned, is also non-obligatory, and that a voluntary option is given to trustees to insure or not, as they may like to do. Let me draw your Lordships' attention to one of the points which I think ought to be cleared up. I make these observations from my own personal experience. Let me be allowed to assume this: There are chattels in a private house in a part of England which has not been affected by the war so far, and which, so far as human knowledge can foresee, is likely to be a safe area. The trustees wish to insure. The cestui que trust opposes. Under this Bill the trustees can disregard the wishes of the cestui que trust. That is quite clear to me. But the trustees are under no obligation whatever to insure.

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It does not matter what the tenant for life or the remainder men may say. The trustee is not under an obligation to insure.
But my noble friend on the Woolsack drew attention to paragraph (b) which says:
"to apply any capital money … and, pending"—
the word "pending" raises a doubt—
"the making of provision for such application as aforesaid, to apply the income of any property subject to those trusts, without obtaining the consent of any person entitled wholly or partly to such money, securities or property or to the income thereof."
That is not clear to me. "Pending" confuses me. The money for the premium can be obtained by applying capital. Docs this paragraph operate only when capital assets have been sold and the capital money is used, or does it mean that if income is ultimately used and not capital the income is not freed from the provision put in this paragraph? The word "pending" makes the meaning doubtful by giving a temporary meaning to the source of the premium. I therefore draw my noble friend's attention to that and ask him if this paragraph should be stated to apply where income as well as capital is used alternatively.
Now, let me make a case of another kind. In a part of England with which I am closely acquainted, some areas are in the heart of the country and may be regarded as likely to be free from bombing risk. A man lives, there. He has his own house and his own chattels. He insures under Part II of the 1941 War Damage Act. In the next parish is a house for which he is trustee, with chattels in that house of which he is also trustee for the tenant for life and onwards. If he is himself insured under Part II of the Act of 1941, he may say to himself, "Well, my trust chattels in the next parish are almost out of danger; I do not think I should put my cestui que trust and the remainder men to the expense of insuring, and the tenant for life is not anxious that I should insure. He is quite willing I should not insure." One day the house is bombed; the trust chattels are destroyed, and the tenant for life is killed. Then come along some remote beneficiaries—it may be a hospital or they may be remote descendants of the settlor—and if the trustee has not insured the chattels, they
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say: "You were prudent enough to insure your own chattels in the next parish, but not prudent enough to insure our chattels." I remember roughly what the late Lord Lindley said about the duty of trustees—that in the matter of a trust you not only must be as prudent as you would be with your own possessions but you must be more prudent as a trustee than you would in your own case. It seems to me, therefore, that if a trustee insures his own chattels and does not insure trust chattels, he is not more prudent but less prudent than he was in his own case.
I think there is something that must be cleared up here, because if a remainder man, after the death of a tenant for life, should attack the trustee and say he was imprudent and bring the matter into Court, the Judge would be likely to say that instead of being prudent he had been less prudent and that he must pay what those uninsured chattels were worth, if they were destroyed. I therefore make the suggestion to my noble and learned friend that he should make it more clear in this Bill that a trustee has complete and full discretion to do what he thinks best; that what he does in accordance with his own unfettered decision should not put him in peril of being called upon to make good anything which might be lost if he had not insured against war damage of chattels. I bear in mind that he is not compelled to insure, but the Bill does not say that he shall not be held liable if he has not thought proper to insure against war damage under the powers of this Bill. A trustee should be given in this Bill the definite right to decide whether to insure or not and he should come within no mischef if he does not insure. My noble friend the Earl of Clanwilliam has written me to say that he would have been here to support my plea if he were not compelled to be in Ireland. As your Lordships may have seen in the Official Report, the noble Earl raised a similar point last week.
The noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, put last week a question as to the relation of insurance premiums and Income Tax. I know that under Section 82 of the War Damage Act, 1941, a man who pays a war damage premium is not allowed to debit that premium against his Income Tax return. That seems to me an unjust and a wrong thing, and for this reason

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If the chattels are destroyed and they are not insured no values in chattels or money are there upon which Estate Duty or other duty will at intervals accrue to the State. After all, in all our private possessions the State is a partner of the private person and at the present time a very big partner. It seems, therefore, that if a person has to find out of capital or income money to pay a premium to preserve assets, the State, which is at any rate a partner in the benefits, should allow the premium to be debited against Income Tax returns of the person who provides the premium.
There is a precedent for that. I think there is a form called Form 99 under Schedule A of the Income Tax system on which a man can claim allowance or credit in relation to his extra maintenance expenditure on his taxed Schedule A property. Among other things he is allowed to debit a fire insurance premium because it protects the capital value upon which the State ultimately takes tax and duty benefits. For that reason I think that Section 82 of the War Damage Act should be reconsidered. It is an injustice that it puts all the burden of protective insurance expenditure on the taxpayer, although part of the benefit arising from preservation of the value of property which may be destroyed will eventually accrue to the State. I have tried to explain what is in my mind on the various points and perhaps my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack will guide me as to whether my doubts are ill-founded.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, perhaps I may say just a word in reply to my noble friend. On one of the points about which he has spoken he may wish to raise the matter on the Committee stage, but I will give him this preliminary answer. It has to be remembered that the object of this Bill, and the sole object of this Bill, is to confer upon trustees the same powers under the same conditions as are enjoyed by any other owners of chattels. This Bill does not seek to extend those powers further or to cut them down. The question whether or not a trustee having got these powers should exercise them or not is not dealt with by the Bill, any more than any other part of the law of trusts is dealt with by the Bill. It is not, I think, quite correct to say that in these matters a trustee can do exactly as he
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likes and that nobody can attack his decision. It would, I think, be possible, if there were thought to be a plain case where a trustee ought to exercise the power to insure, to make a proper application to the Chancery Court and have the matter discussed, and there certainly might be cases in which, if the Court thought it proved that out of callousness and want of consideration of the matter he neglected to do his obvious duty, he would become liable if there was a loss. But all that is part of the general law of trusts, and that is not what this Bill is dealing with. This Bill deals simply and solely with conferring a power on trustees which many people think they do not at present possess.
As regards the paragraph to which my noble friend referred, it is, of course, required because the existing Statute Law—not this Bill, but the existing Statute Law—declares that any premium paid in respect of the insurance of chattels against war damage shall be regarded as a charge upon capital. If trustees, as is not infrequently the case, have in their hands money which is the proceeds of a capital sale, it would be perfectly proper for them to use that money to pay the premium. It may be, however, that the trustees have no such money in their hands, no money in the nature of capital money. As a matter of convenience it is provided that trustees, if they find it convenient, may use money in their hands even though it is not capital money but income of the trust. That is the meaning of the words in Clause 1 (1) (b):
pending the nature of provision for such application as aforesaid, to apply the income of any property subject to those trusts, without obtaining the consent of any person entitled wholly or partly to such money, securities or property or to the income thereof."
Then the trustees would be under the duty of replacing that money which they have, so to say, borrowed by a proper capital transaction—it may be by mortgage or pledge of chattels, or even by the sale of a chattel, but of course the Bill does not prescribe the details. That is the answer to my noble friend's very natural difficulty. The premium has to be paid out of capital moneys.
It is a little late to criticise the provisions of the War Damage Act because it is on the Statute Book and your Lord-ships

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and the other House passed it unanimously. There is this amount of reason—let us take comfort in it—that whereas an insurance against fire may be expected to go on year after year, and for all I know as long as the world lasts, we may hope that the particular danger against which this insurance is provided is entirely of a temporary character. It may last this year and next year—we do not know—but it will cease when the war ceases. It was felt, therefore, on the whole to be just to treat it as capital expenditure. It is to be regarded as something in the nature of placing an extra shelter over your property, an extra layer of concrete, rather than as a recurring annual charge which will go on for ever. "I have given my noble friend such answer as I can at the moment and I hope that it will satisfy him. I will be very willing to deal more in detail with the matter on the Committee stage, if my noble friend should desire me to do so, but I hope that what I have said will be sufficient.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, may I have the permission of the House to ask a question not to make a speech? If my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack tells me that the interpretation of "prudence" as laid down by Lord Lindley is covered by the Trustee Act of 1925—that is to say, that a trustee is so defended by that Statute that he cannot be penalized on the grounds of imprudence—then I have nothing more to say. All that I wished to do was to see that a trustee was protected from being attacked by a beneficiary for not insuring and using the powers provided by this Bill.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I would only say that I think that the duties of a trustee in this matter are very well defined. I am not prepared to say that there are no circumstances in which a trustee can be held liable for what would be gross negligence, but I think that as a matter of practice it would require a very strong case to hold a trustee liable if he said that he had considered the matter thoroughly and did not consider insurance necessary.
LORD MANCROFT: That satisfies me.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the whole House.

NAVAL DISCIPLINE (AMENDMENT) BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, this Bill is very short, quite simple, and, I think, non-controversial, yet a few words of explanation may be required as to why it is brought before Parliament at the present time. The object of the Bill is to facilitate the trial of naval officers under war conditions for offences rendering a formal trial desirable, but in respect of which the interference with service operations caused by the convening of a full Naval Court Martial can hardly be justified, especially under present conditions. A Naval Court Martial has always been a very formal affair, and perhaps rightly so, because it is empowered to inflict heavy penalties and, in the case of mutiny, to inflict the penalty of death without reference to and without the confirmation of a higher authority such as is required by Military Courts Martial.
Under the present law, which is mainly comprised of the Naval Discipline Act of 1866, a Naval Court Martial is composed of from five to nine officers. The President must be at least of Captain's rank and the members of the Court must be those officers present at the place where the Court Martial is summoned immediately junior to the President. They must all be officers of the executive branch of the Royal Navy, of the rank of Lieutenant or above, and there are provisions limiting the minimum rank of the officers composing a Court when the President is an officer of Commander's rank or above. Naval Courts Martial can only be summoned at places where at least two of His Majesty's ships are present. The old rule that such a Court could sit only on board a man-of-war has now been modified to the extent that a Court Martial may sit on shore under special circumstances. It was found during the last war that grave inconvenience was caused by summoning a Court Martial of what I may call a major character when it was desired only to try a junior officer for a comparatively minor offence, and the Naval Discipline Act of 1915 was therefore passed which introduced a new section—No. 57A—into the main Act.

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This section provides as a war-time measure for what is known as a Disciplinary Court. This Court, while retaining all the formality of the Court-Martial procedure, does not involve anything near the same inconvenience to the Service. Its constitution is simpler and less rigid, but it can only deal with a limited class of offences and its powers are very limited. The present Bill, therefore, merely introduces a fresh type of offence into those which can, at the present time, be dealt with by Disciplinary Courts of this description. At present the offences are disobedience or using violent language to a superior officer, quarrelling or using provoking speech or gestures, desertion, improperly leaving a ship or place of duty, absence without leave, profane swearing, drunkenness, etc., and acts to the prejudice of good order and naval discipline. The offences which it is now proposed to include amongst those which can be dealt with by a Disciplinary Court are those falling under Section 9 of the Act which reads as follows:
" Every person subject to this Act who shall desert his post or sleep upon his watch or neglect to perform the duties imposed upon him shall be dismissed from His Majesty's Service with disgrace or shall suffer such other punishment as is hereinafter mentioned."
This section quite obviously contains some very serious offences as well as some comparatively minor ones. The object of this Bill is to bring the minor offences of Section 9 into the Disciplinary Courts procedure. It is at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief or Flag Officer who directs a Court to be convened whether he shall order a full Court Martial or a Disciplinary Court, but for any very serious offence he would, of course, be most likely to choose a Naval Court Martial.
The type of case which has been in mind in asking for this change to be made is where a junior officer has been negligent in the performance of his duties. Among cases which have actually occurred have been those where small vessels of war have been lost or damaged owing to such negligence, and where procedure under the proposed Bill would clearly be most appropriate. The Disciplinary Court procedure is only applicable to officers. The reason for this is that a rating can be punished by the summary procedure provided
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by Section 56 of the Act without a Court Martial at all. It will thus be seen that the very small change proposed will enable offences of the nature mentioned by junior officers to be dealt with quickly and effectively; and it will no doubt be appreciated that the promptness with which a Court can be convened is a matter of vital importance under present conditions. Having regard to past experience and also to the urgency of the requirements of these times, the proposals in this Bill appear to me to be quite reasonable and desirable. I therefore invite your Lordships to give the Bill a Second Reading. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Snell.)
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I should like to be permitted to say a few words about this Bill. When I read it, which was only yesterday, certain suspicions were raised in my mind, but they have been largely dispelled by the very full explanation which my noble friend opposite has been good enough to give. Nevertheless, this Bill originates in your Lordships' House and deals with an important principle affecting naval discipline. The Court Martial is the safeguard of the officer, and of the rating in certain cases, and I submit to your Lordships that there are strong reasons why we should be careful about abrogating those rights. In recent years, dating, as my noble friend said, from 1915, there has been a steady whittling away of the practice of holding Courts Martial. The present Bill represents only a small slice, but in the last war the same reasons were put forward for abandoning the old principle of court-martialling the survivors of any of His Majesty's ships lost in war. The Court Martial in that case was not necessary for purposes of punishment. Cases have occurred where only one able seaman has survived from a man-of-war, and he has been put on trial, the reason being to ascertain the causes of the loss and to apportion praise or blame as the case may be. In the last war that old custom and rule, which had many advantages and many sanctions, was abandoned.
Then, as my noble friend also reminded your Lordships, certain rights of officers to Court Martial were taken away by the establishment of these Disciplinary Courts. We are now still further taking

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away these rights, and in theory that is a matter which I suggest that your Lordships should regard with some jealousy, although in practice I am certain that these Courts function well and that justice is done. The fact remains, however, that the Court Martial is independent of the Board of Admiralty, while the Disciplinary Court or the Court of Inquiry set up in cases of loss of ships—and my noble friend referred to the loss of small ships—is, without being offensive at all, a packed body, a nominated body. Whereas, as my noble friend says, Court Martial sentences can be revised by the Board, the findings cannot, and for future purposes the findings are sometimes of importance.
I think it necessary to make these remarks because, although this Bill seems to be altogether unobjectionable, it is nevertheless in principle one more departure from the surviving rights of officers, and of men in certain cases. The appeal to the Court Martial is one of the surviving lights of the officers of the Royal Navy against the Board. It is an appeal to the Service. I trust that the Commander-in-Chief will in all serious cases, as my noble friend suggested that he would, rely always on the old, tried and trusted procedure of Court Martial.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

AIR-RAID SHELTERS.
THE LORD BISHOF OF BIRMINGHAM THE LORD BISHOF OF BIRMINGHAM had the following Notice on the Paper: To call attention to the continued lack of adequate air-raid shelters; to inquire as to the relations between His Majesty's Government and the cement companies; and to move for Pipers. The right reverend Prelate said: My Lords, it will be within the recollection of some of your Lordships that on December 18 last, almost exactly six months ago, I drew attention to the then provision of air-raid shelters. Speaking in part from personal observation and basing my words in larger measure upon information received from social workers, clergy and ministers in Birmingham and the adjacent area, I described the misery caused by shelters which gave inadequate protection and which were too often damp, insanitary and even verminous. I asked for a change in Government policy, for the building of
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so-called Haldane bomb-proof surface shelters, which should be, so far as possible, safe, sanitary and dry. At the close of the debate, which was relatively brief, I expressed a disappointment which I think subsequently became widespread, inasmuch as the Duke of Devonshire, replying for the Government, held out no hope that what he described as "the enormous quantity of cement" required to provide really safe shelters for the whole of the population in bombed areas would be forthcoming.
The expectation remained, however, that in certain industrial areas which were especially exposed to heavy bombing Haldane-type shelters would be built, but I regret to say that, so far as I can learn, the state of affairs which still exists, especially in our provincial cities and towns, is lamentable. In the autumn the rains will come, and—we have this on the authority of such members of the Government as Mr. Bevin—the long night raids will come too; and then it seems certain that in large measure the miseries of last winter will be renewed. Mr. Lloyd George, speaking in another place on May 7 last, said truly:
"You have got to do more for the shelter and protection of people against air-raids. I do not believe that the problem has been considered on a sufficiently large scale. There is a limit to the morale of human nature. With proper shelter accommodation you can defy these raids for the year or two that we may not have supremacy."
The truth of these words cannot, I think, be contested. The Germans are asserting in the leaflets which they have been dropping recently that by November we shall be starving. We need not accept such propaganda, but it may well be that food will not then be as plentiful as it was a year previously; and if in addition, through long nights of terror, many people are compelled to go to damp shelters, the safety of which they rightly doubt, even our people, with their matchless endurance, may give way to despair.
I do not ignore the worth of the far too restricted efforts of the Government, but equally the failures of official policy must not be forgotten. The Anderson shelters have proved their value. They afford a high degree of protection, but often enough when placed in unsuitable earth, they are damp. An extensive programme of water-proofing has been carried out which has been only partially successful.

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Trench shelters were, when I last spoke, far too often damp and insanitary. They have been improved by the use of tarmac and cement. Some are now heated, and the sanitation is often less primitive than it was, but in few trench shelters are water closets possible. In fact the trench shelter continues to be a primitive makeshift affair, wholly unsuited to occupation by a large number of persons for hours on end.
The so-called Morrison indoor steel shelters, sometimes called the table shelters, are of comparatively recent introduction. They are open to obvious objections. Because of their size they would be quite unsuited to small workers' dwellings in congested areas—and the inhabitants of such dwellings we must have carefully in mind. Moreover, under the air-raid technique in which incendiaries are mixed with high explosive bombs, these table shelters may be death traps, for if a house were to collapse on to the shelter and then were to catch fire, the occupants would be in a horrible position, and that such shelters should be issued according to official policy for especially dangerous areas is surely a mistake.
Public discontent as to the provision of air-raid shelters has grown during the last six months for two reasons. In the first place, owing to the lack of cement during the latter half of last year, local authorities were forced to build surface shelters which proved hopelessly inadequate. In the second place, an increasing desire for the erection of steel and concrete bomb-proof surface shelters has, to say the least, not been met by active Government co-operation. Your Lordships cannot understand the distrust and often indignant anger with which local authorities view the Government's air-raid policy unless you realise what happened to surface shelters last autumn and winter. In the late summer and throughout the autumn of 1940 there was a disastrous lack of cement. Orders were consequently given by the Ministry that surface shelters should be built with lime mortar instead of cement mortar. The results I can best indicate by some newspaper quotations.
On March 5 last—I quote from the Birmingham Gazette of March 6 last—it was announced at a West Bromwich Town Council meeting by Councillor John
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Lees that 170 West Bromwich shelters were to be pulled down and rebuilt with cement. They were, he added, built with a mixture of lime when cement was scarce. On March 6 last—I quote from the Birmingham Mail of that date—the Chairman of the Birmingham Air-Raid Precautions Committee was questioned with regard to brick surface shelters built in the churchyard of my own Cathedral at Birmingham. Therefore I know something of these shelters. They were begun in October of last year. The Chairman said "Cement could not be obtained at the time and mortar of an inferior kind had to be employed." In February last, their demolition began.
On April 8 last the Bristol Air-Raid Precautions Committee stated, in a report submitted to the City Council, that a considerable number of brick shelters constructed during the period when cement was not available had been demolished on the instructions of the Ministry of Home Security, and that Bristol had thus lost 21,000 shelter places. Councillor F. C. Williams—I quote from the Manchester Guardian of April 9 last—commenting on these facts said:
"The common people were exposed to frightful danger by what I can only describe as a great Government scandal. It is not merely a Bristol question. The total rebuilding costs must run into several million pounds, because I understand it is common throughout the country."
A detailed report from a special committee which inquired into the collapse of brick-built shelters at Coventry came before the City Council on April 29 last. Among the causes of the collapse was—I quote from the Birmingham Mail of April 25 last—" the use of lime mortar instead of cement mortar." The Ministry, it was stated, had decided to put out of action all brick shelters built with lime mortar and to pay the whole cost of demolition and rebuilding. One other quotation, from the London Evening News of May 16 last, just a month ago. It was announced in that paper that 560 street surface shelters—not shelter places, but no less than 560 street surface shelters—in Harrow, were to be closed owing to their unsafe condition. Inquiries of the local urban authority were referred to the Ministry of Home Security, and I learn from Miss Ellen Wilkinson (whose humanity and capacity in this connection

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deserve high praise) that "Harrow were unfortunate in that they constructed a large number of surface shelters at the time of the most severe cement shortage last summer."
I may, I fear, have wearied your Lordships with these detailed instances of failure, but they could be vastly multiplied, for they are typical of a general failure of the policy which was adopted when cement was virtually unobtainable. They are worth emphasizing because the recently issued Report of the Committee on Cement Production (Cmd. 6282)—I think it was issued last week—accepts the view that in the second half of 1940 only local shortages of cement occurred. The Report says that ample supplies existed in the south-east of England. I can only comment that Harrow at all events is not far removed from the south-east of England. Naturally there is grave misgiving among local authorities wherever they have been exposed to such blundering as I have specified. Owing to the use of lime mortar instead of cement mortar millions of public money have been wasted. A Ministry responsible for such a policy does not command confidence. Furthermore, the surface shelters now being rebuilt, as in the churchyard of my own Cathedral, give inadequate protection. They no longer let in the rain, and children at play no longer push out the bricks of which they are made, but they are not proof against a bomb of moderate size, nor have they adequate amenities for a stay of many hours. So local authorities, under popular pressure, are asking for bomb-proof shelters.
I shall give only two examples of this demand, lest I weary your Lordships. I quote from the Birmingham Post of May 2:
"The Birmingham Air-Raid Precautions Committee last month presented a report to the City Council in the course of which it was stated: 'The Committee has come to the conclusion that the sub-soil in Birmingham is suitable for the construction of deep shelters only in certain districts where there is an outcrop of sandstone rock—'"
—that I suppose is a truism—
"and that the most suitable type of bomb-resisting shelter so far as Birmingham is concerned is the heavy reinforced concrete surface shelter."
One other example, only a fortnight ago. I quote from the Birmingham Post of June 5:
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"West Bromwich Town Council was informed of the Government's revised shelter policy for the borough. As a result it was stated that the Emergency Committee"—
that is, of the Town Council—
"has made representations to the Regional Commissioner that semi-buried, reinforced concrete shelters should be erected instead of surface shelters. The Committee believes that this type of shelter creates a greater feeling of confidence in the minds of the public.
The Ministries concerned are of course not unaware that the demand for bombproof shelters is widespread, but if the Government wish to build such shelters there would at the moment not be enough cement available.
I understand that the Government deny the existence of a shortage of cement. They can only make this denial because their policy is accommodated to it. They decline to authorise adequate numbers of bomb-proof shelters, and then say that there is cement enough for all present requirements. In the words of the Report of the Committee on Cement Production, to which I have already referred—the Report issued last week:
"In framing our estimates we have not made any provision for the quantities of cement that might be needed if a policy of constructing bomb-proof shelters on a large scale were to be adopted."
This is not the occasion when I should embark on a technical discussion of the nature of the best bomb-proof shelters and of the possibility of supplying materials and labour. I shall content myself with referring to a carefully-written and well-illustrated pamphlet entitled Safe Shelters—Now ! It is one of a series of such pamphlets which have been issued during the war. It was published last month by the Association of Architects, Surveyors, and Technical Assistants.
I have read it and analogous documents, and it seems to me certain that the Government could so reorganise the cement industry, in particular by the use of blast-furnace slag, as to provide sufficient additional cement to build bombproof shelters for some 700,000 people per month—that is to say, if a vigorous policy were adopted between now and November, safety could be given to nearly 4,000,000 people in the most heavily-raided munition areas. I understand that the amount of steel required in the first stage of a large bomb-proof shelter is about 2 cwts. per person sheltered—roughly the same as that required for a

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Morrison table shelter. The second stage of a bomb-proof shelter can, I believe, be constructed without reinforcement. Labour to make the bomb-proof shelters could "be taken from the building of the present unsatisfactory surface shelters. That building is still going on in the churchyard of my Cathedral. Of course, additional labour would be needed, and would have to be transferred from less important work, but I have already indicated that the adequate protection of our people next winter is one of our primary needs.
From what I have already said it is clear that the problem of adequate air-raid protection is inseparable from that of the supply of cement. In the public mind the lack of cement in the year 1940 and the virtual refusal of the Government to force the cement companies to increase the supply have been the main causes of our present unhappy position. Your Lordships will not be unaware that the supply of cement in this country is in the hands of a "ring." The term was used by the Director of Army Contracts in his evidence before the Select Committee on the Estimates for the year 1938. It is accepted by the Cement Makers' Federation. How far that body has acquired a complete monopoly of the industry I do not know. I believe it to be true that, as late as the year 1939, one of the sixteen companies of the '' ring '' bought up a rival works and closed it. There is general agreement that the "ring" controls at least 90 per cent. of the output of the industry.
Obviously, the relations between this powerful monopoly—for it is virtually a monopoly—and the Government during the last eighteen months are a matter of legitimate public interest. Economists and historians tell us much of the dangers of monopolies. They warn us that, whenever the tendency to monopoly manifests itself, involving as it does restriction of competition for the sake of profits, control in the interests of the public is obviously needed. In the light of such warnings, the policy and propaganda of the Cement Makers' Federation are of much interest. The Federation, in an advertisement entitled "Pounds and Propaganda," which appeared in The Times of March 11 last, and elsewhere, boasted that it spent, pre-war, something like £100,000 a year
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"in spreading information and technical instruction." When criticism arose owing to the lack of cement for air-raid shelters in the second half of last year, the monopolists replied with a veritable spate of advertisements which extended even to Punch. These advertisements never once, so far as I have seen, referred to the miseries of those forced to use shelters which were condemned because lime mortar was used when cement was not available. In fact, throughout all the controversy caused by the lack of cement, no expression of sympathy with the sufferings of the people has, so far as I know, come from the cement "ring."
The propaganda of the monopolists has been, as might be expected, able; it has not always been marked by complete can-dour. For instance, there appeared on January 15 last, an advertisement showing the way in which the "ring" had lowered the price of cement. In this advertisement the cement industry was described as—I will have you note carefully the words—" a great weapon now wielded by the Government itself through the Ministry of Works and Buildings." The advertisement—January 15, 1941—carried the price of cement down to the end of 1939. It had then risen from 39s. to 42s. per ton, having been reduced from 51s. in 1930. A paragraph added that the industry would not make "colossal war profits: the Excess Profits Tax would see to that." There was, however, in the advertisement, no indication that early in 1940 the price of cement had been raised to 45s. per ton, including paper bags, and that there were further increases in May and June, 1940. Nor was there any indication that a mere fortnight before the advertisement appeared the price of cement, with bags, had been raised to 55s. 6d. per ton, an increase of 5s. per ton for cement and of is. per ton bag. There is, I think, no doubt as to the accuracy of my figures which refer to the prices per ton in four-ton lots delivered London; but such is the atmosphere that surrounds the supply of cement that I have been specially asked not to give the name of my informant.
We have then this position. In the middle of January last, the "ring" advertised that up to the end of 1939 it had reduced the price of cement to 42s. per ton, with bags. Actually, when the advertisement appeared, the price with

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bags had been raised—and was the last increase, I ask, by Government order?—to 55s. 6d. per ton; and the companies were gaily talking of their liability to Excess Profits Tax. I would ask the Minister of Works and Buildings—is he here to-day? I think not. The noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire, is replying for the Government, I would ask the noble Duke to tell us who gave permission for this increase in the price of a commodity needed by every local authority in the country constructing surface shelters? Why should costs of public works be raised to such an extent that the monopolists expected to find themselves in the position of paying Excess Profits Tax?
Further, I would ask whether it is true that neither the money spent on propaganda by the monopolists nor their expenses in connection with any legal actions which they may bring are submitted to Excess Profits Tax. If there is such an escape from liability to taxation, we witness a most interesting development, only possible, I would suggest, in war-time; when public attention is deflected elsewhere. A Government Department takes over and wields, "as a great weapon"—I thank the "ring" for this modest metaphor—a largely monopolist industry. At the public expense this Government Department supplies the industry lavishly with funds so that, by means of widespread advertisements and threats of legal proceedings, indignant criticism can be stifled. I hold in my hands a pamphlet, Break the Cement Ring, which is an ably written plea for bomb-proof shelters, widely circulated in the closing months of last year. Such shelters would, as we have seen, only be possible if there were a large increase in the output of cement, and the reluctance of the monopolists last year to make this increase is documented in the pamphlet by quotations from such newspapers as The Times and the Financial News.
The printers of this pamphlet, I understand, early in December, 1940, received a letter from the solicitors of the Cement Makers' Federation stating that they had been instructed to issue a writ for "gross and unfounded libels." Publication of the pamphlet has ceased. A similar threat against Professor J. B. S. Haldane,
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Fellow of the Royal Society and Chairman of the National A.R.P. Co-ordinating Committee, was not followed up. It is probable, I understand, that he and his associates would have vigorously defended any legal action taken against them. The extent of the work which he and his friends have done in connection with the provision of bomb-proof shelters must be recognised by all who have studied the careful pamphlets issued by the experts associated with his group. He himself has, during the past eighteen months, constantly risked his life in experiments designed to mitigate consequences of disasters to submarines. That a man engaged on such work should have been so threatened by the Cement Makers' Federation calls for an inquiry as to the nature of the association between the Federation and the Government.
This association has been the subject of much speculation and of not a few demands for information. But the position has not yet been made wholly clear in answer to questions in another place. Of the answers I will try to give you a précis so that if in any respect my own interpretation of the position is wrong, the noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire, may subsequently correct me. On December 3 last Mr. Hicks, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Works and Buildings, said that with the formation of his Ministry the cement industry was controlled, the Controller being Mr. Hugh Beaver "who was giving his services voluntarily to the industry." This statement must, however, be associated with the fact that the noble Viscount, Lord Wolmer, whom I see here to-day, giving evidence on May 9 last, said that no Order in Council controlling the cement industry had ever been actually passed. There was, he said, a voluntary control. He himself was Director of Cement, sitting in a Government building and giving instructions to the industry, taking his instructions from the Minister of Works and Buildings and from the Controller of Building Materials. Those engaged in the industry took his instructions just as though he were their master.
Then, on May 14 last, Mr. Hicks, in answer to inquiries in another place, said that the only responsible post in his Ministry connected with cement was that of Director of Cement. The holder of this office was the noble Viscount, Lord

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Wolmer, and he ceased to act as Chairman of the Cement Makers' Federation when appointed Director. In answer to a further inquiry as to whether the effective Controller, usually in attendance with the Director, his immediate chief, was not known as the Danish Quisling, Mr. Hicks, according to the Official Report, replied that the noble Viscount, Lord Wolmer, no longer had any effective control of the cement industry. He added that the noble Lord was working voluntarily and followed up this statement with the not too flamboyant testimonial that "he is supposed to understand—and I think he does understand—the industry." Mr. Hicks said that he could not answer an inquiry as to whether the noble Lord was still being paid by the Federation. On May 20 last, in answer to further questions, Mr. Hicks said that the noble Lord, as Director of Cement, was under the control of a Director-General, then apparently mentioned for the first time. He added the remarkable information that the noble Viscount, Lord Wolmer, continued to be paid by the Federation of which he ceased to act as Chairman when appointed Director of Cement. It was suggested in a question that this payment amounted to the substantial sum of £5,000 a year, together with another £1,000 when the noble Lord became a member of this House. I am sure that, if the facts be correct—which are rather surprising—we should all agree that the additional payment was a fitting recognition of the dignity of this House.
I do not profess wholly to understand the position described in the official information which I have just summarised. But surely the position as revealed is highly improper. Ought a Government officer, sitting in a Government building and giving instructions, to be paid by monopolists whom he may have in the national interest to coerce? The few cement producers who remain independent of the "ring" should not be subject to a man who is paid by the "ring." Moreover, the noble Lord has shown himself determined to fight any who might attempt to break the "ring." I would remind your Lordships that at the end of 1938 outside firms proposed to erect two new factories. The noble Viscount, Lord Wolmer, as Chairman of the Cement Makers' Federation, warned them off.
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According to a report in the Economist for December 3, 1938, he publicly pointed to the tendency of newcomers to enter the industry as "a dangerous development likely to lead to indiscriminate price-cutting." With such a record the noble Lord, still paid by the Federation, is the Government Director of Cement. Surely such an appointment should be ended.
My Lords, I will sum up. The grave shortage of cement in the latter half of last year led to the existence of unhealthy, damp shelters and, in consequence, vast numbers of our poorer fellow-citizens for months on end suffered horrible discomfort. Owing to conditions in the shelters, I ought to add, infectious disease increased. In less than the first five months of this year, there were—I give approximate figures—112,000 cases of measles as against 40,000 in the corresponding period of 1940. There were 37,000 cases of whooping cough compared with under 4,000 in the corresponding period of 1940. I have told your Lordships how the shelters erected when the use of lime mortar was not available have either fallen down or have had to be pulled down. Millions of public money have consequently been wasted. At the present time there is a demand throughout the country for the building of bombproof shelters. It is, I submit, a reasonable demand. The Germans, we have been allowed to know, have been building such shelters in Berlin: if Berlin has them, why not Birmingham? But bombproof shelters in adequate numbers are impossible unless the output of cement be greatly increased. Surely these facts make it imperative that the present so-called control of the cement industry should be changed. At present it is impossible to say where the Government ends and the cement "ring" begins. Do the Government really control the "ring," or do the "ring" dictate Government policy?
May I conclude with a concrete case? The well-known left wing publisher, Mr. Victor Gollancz, has recently published a little book bearing the opprobious title Rats. On pages 60 to 66 of that book there is, in connection with air-raid shelters, an attack on the Cement Makers' Federation which lacks nothing in definiteness. Here is one sentence:

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"The cement industry is a typical example of how the profit-making system can run counter to public good and of the need for energetic Government direction and control."
These pages have doubtless been carefully considered by the Ministry and by the Cement Makers' Federation. Do these bodies; consider them libellous, or do they accept the statements in them as true? Is judgment on such an issue made by the noble Viscount, Lord Wolmer, the Government Director of Cement, whose instructions the industry take just as though he were their master but who is paid by the "ring," or will the judgment be made by, say, Sir Malcolm Stewart, President of the "ring," and presumably also paid by it? I would put it to the Minister of Works and Buildings and to the noble Duke who replies on behalf of that Ministry that the existing situation is impossible. I beg to move for Papers.
VISCOUNT WOLMER: My Lords, I am not responsible for the Government's air-raid shelter policy and therefore I do not propose to deal with that part of the speech of the right reverend Prelate who has just sat down. My noble friend will reply on behalf of the Government in regard to that matter. I am, however, very much concerned to correct, at this my first opportunity, some of the misstatements that the right reverend Prelate has made about the cement industry and about myself. If I am longer than I intended to be it is because the right reverend Prelate has made so many accusations and so many statements which are untrue that it necessarily takes some little time to correct them.
May I first deal with the whole attitude from which the right reverend Prelate has approached this question? He has spoken of the Cement Makers' Federation, of which I was chairman for six years until 1940 as a "ring" and a "monopoly." There is no monopoly about the manufacture of cement. Cement is made of chalk and clay or limestone and clay which are in abundance all over the country. In normal times anyone can erect works and make and sell cement just as much as he likes. There are about fifty works in the country, and the companies to whom these works belong have a Federation which the right reverend Prelate calls a "ring," but which is, in fact, a trade union, and is
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simply an effort on the part of the industry to organise and rationalise itself in accordance with what I venture to think are modern ideas. I have heard other great industries, such as the steel industry and the coal industry, very much criticised by "advanced" thinkers on the ground that they had not organised or rationalised themselves, and, in fact, Parliament has intervened and has forced organisation and rationalisation on those two great and other industries. The cement industry, however, has done for itself what Parliament has forced upon other great industries. There is nothing contrary to the public interest in that action. On the contrary, as in the cases that I have mentioned, it is in the public interest that these great industries should be properly organised so that there are adequate supplies of cement, or whatever the commodities may be, in every part of the country, and so that wages and prices should be on a fair level. That is the first point which I desire to make.
My second point is in regard to the extraordinary hypothesis with which the right reverend Prelate started. This was that it is the object of the Cement Makers' Federation and the cement industry generally to prevent anybody getting any cement! On the contrary their whole interest, their whole object, their whole purpose is to make as much cement as possible and to sell to everyone who is willing to buy. The record of the industry in this respect is one of which it has every reason to be proud. At the time of the last war the productive capacity of the cement industry was in the neighbourhood of 3,000,000 tons a year. At the beginning of this war the productive capacity was in the neighbourhood of 9,000,000 tons a year. In other words, in the period between the two wars the industry had trebled its productive capacity. The price of cement at the end of the last war was £6 a ton. Now in London it is less than £3 a ton. So with the trebling of the productive capacity you have the price brought down to less than half. The industry has doubled its productive capacity in the last fifteen years, and during the whole of that period wages have been steadily increased. Wages in the industry at the outbreak of the war were 22s. a week better than when the industry was only half the size. Therefore,

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you have an industry which is progressive, which has treated its employees well, which has never had a strike or a lock-out, which has enormously increased its productive capacity and which has consistently lowered the price of cement.
The right reverend Prelate gave some figures which, I think, were accurate so far as they went, but I will give him some more which put the matter in a fairer light. In 1925 the price of cement in London was 64s. a ton. This was consistently lowered every few years till it was 39s. in 1937. Increased cost of coal necessitated a slight rise, but at the outbreak of war it was only 41s. Then the right reverend Prelate asked: Why has the price been put up since the war started? I can answer that question for him now. It has been put up because the costs of cement manufacture have been increased, and it has only been put up in so far as the accountants of the Government have permitted. Right from the commencement of the war, when there was no Government control, I, as Chairman of the Cement Makers' Federation, went to the Minister of Supply and gave him an undertaking that the price of cement would not be raised without his permission. Whenever the costs of the manufacture of cement were increased—as they frequently were by war causes—and it became necessary to raise the price, I submitted all the accounts of the cement makers to the accountants of the Ministry of Supply, and it was not until the accountants were satisfied that a rise in the price of cement was necessary that any rise took place. There was no legal compulsion behind that. It was done in pursuance of a gentlemen's agreement between the Minister of Supply and myself.
The right reverend Prelate launches a great attack on the cement industry as if they were the people who were preventing the public from getting air-raid shelters. I would venture to suggest that every reinforced concrete shelter that is now in use stands witness to a service that the cement industry has rendered to the community, and I think that the industry is entitled to some recognition of that fact. When I speak of the industry, I speak not only of the capitalists but also of the wage earners in the industry. I venture to tell the right reverend Prelate that his unjust attacks on the
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industry have caused most bitter resentment among the men who earn their daily bread in its service. Since the war started, the industry has delivered something like 12,500,000 tons of cement and that has made something like 80,000,000 tons of concrete. That, I would submit, is no mean contribution for any one industry to make towards winning the war. Far from it being just that the industry should be attacked by the right reverend Prelate for not having made more cement, I suggest that to have tripled productive capacity between the two wars, and at the same time to have improved wages and lowered prices is a record such as few other industries—look in whatever direction you like—can point to.
Then the right reverend Prelate mentioned my position, and I would like to inform him exactly how matters stand with regard to that. Until November, 1940, I, as Chairman of the Cement Makers' Federation, was taking my instructions on a voluntary basis; simply on the basis of a gentlemen's agreement, from the Minister of Supply in regard to what he wanted. It mainly amounted in those days to working to capacity and to not charging more than the figures to which the accountants had agreed. In November, 1940, the Ministry of Works and Buildings was set up, and I was appointed Director of Cement, working under the Controller of Building Materials, who was responsible to the Minister. When I accepted that position, I stipulated that I should have nothing to do with the price of cement. I have nothing to do with the price of cement; the price of cement is regulated to-day as it was before. The cement companies send in their accounts to accountants appointed by the Minister of Works and Buildings. I never see or discuss those accounts; the accountants decide what rise or fall in the price of cement is warranted by the changing circumstances. It would, of course, be very wrong for me to have anything to do with the price of cement, but in all other respects there is no conflict of interest at all between the cement industry and the Government.
One extraordinary obsession in the right reverend Prelate's mind is that there is some sort of secret war going on between the cement industry and the Government, some sort of conflict. The cement industry is at any rate composed of Englishmen,

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and they are working, like all other Englishmen, for their country in this great crisis. The cement industry, like every other organisation in this country, is doing its best to win victory. The Government give their orders to the cement industry and the cement industry carry them out. I am the vehicle through which these orders are given. The policy is decided by the Minister of Works and Buildings. He says that he wants so much cement, that he wants cement stored in such-and-such places, that he wants certain steps taken; and I see that those steps are taken. Whether I am the right person to do that is a matter not for me but for the Minister who made the appointment. I can assure the right reverend Prelate that I did not appoint myself!
In regard to payment, the position of all these war-time Controllers is that they are lent by the industry concerned to the Government. Not only in the case of cement but in the cases of iron and steel, paper, timber, and other commodities, the policy has been for the Government to get people who know something about it to run the business. That is, I think, a not altogether unreasonable policy. What has happened, then, is that these gentlemen, like myself, have been lent by the industries to the Government. We do not draw any salary from the Government; we continue to receive our income from the industry; and, as long as I have nothing to do with the price of cement, it does not seem to me that there is anything dishonourable or improper in such an arrangement. There has never been any secret about it.
There are one or two other points made by the right reverend Prelate to which I feel it necessary to reply. Take the question of blast-furnace cement. It is astonishing how people who know nothing about a subject will dogmatise about it with the greatest confidence, and it is equally astonishing how easy it seems to be to get other people to believe them. The right reverend Prelate has spoken as if there was some sinister or wicked reason why more blast-furnace cement has not been made in this country. I can assure him that there is none at all. Blast-furnace cement has been made for years in Scotland and on the Continent, but the reason why it has been made in many places on the Continent is that in
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those places the iron works and the cement works happen to be close together, whereas in England the great bulk of our cement works are on the mouth of the Thames and the great bulk of our iron works are in far-distant parts of the country. That is one reason why blastfurnace cement was not made to a greater extent in this country. Another reason is that the particular ores used in the iron industry in England are not as suitable for the purpose as some of the ores used on the Continent. A third, and perhaps the most important, reason is that there has always been an ample supply of Portland cement in this country, and for most purposes Portland cement is definitely a superior article. Those are the simple reasons why blast-furnace cement was not manufactured before in England. There was nothing to prevent its being so manufactured. Anyone could make it who wanted to, for, as I have already pointed out, there has been no monopoly in the matter. A certain amount of blastfurnace cement was imported from abroad, but there was not a very great demand for it, because there were always ample supplies of Portland cement available.
Now let me say a word about the so-called shortage last year. I can assure the right reverend Prelate that the statements which he made this afternoon, as well as on other occasions, were in that respect grossly inaccurate. There never was a time when there was a complete shortage of cement. Up to May, 1940, both in war and in peace production greatly exceeded demand. Then came Dunkirk; and quite suddenly, all within a fortnight or three weeks, the English public realised that they would have to endure bombing which they had never anticipated, and that they would have to erect the shelters which months previously they had been advised by the Government to erect, but which they had neglected to erect. They wanted, therefore, suddenly to put up a large number of shelters. At the same time the War Office realised that all the coasts of England would have to be protected in a way in which they have never been protected before, and vast works, such as the road blocks with which your Lordships are acquainted, were undertaken hurriedly. Moreover, the workers engaged in the building industry, and those employed in making the runways of aerodromes and so on, worked

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during the summer of 1940 with patriotic fervour, and the amount of cement which was used in the building programme was colossal. Your Lordships will remember that there was wonderful building weather during the whole of that period.
That meant an unexampled drain on the cement industry. It was just as if suddenly on one winter's day everybody wanted twice as much coal as they had been accustomed to use before. It might cause a temporary shortage, but it would not necessarily mean that the supplies of coal in this country were inadequate. As a matter of fact, however, never at any time were there less than 300,000 tons of ground and unground cement in stock, but the difficulty was to get it to the proper places in time. The right reverend Prelate has stated that there was at one moment a shortage of cement at Harrow, and he asked how that could be if it was in the south-east of England. I can explain that to him very easily. This period of tightness began to manifest itself only in July, and it lasted only during August and September of 1940. In August the Ministry of Supply became anxious lest the demands by the War Office and the Air Ministry should prevent people getting cement for their air-raid shelters, and so they instituted the coupon system. It was a mistake, but I am not criticising the Ministry of Supply at all, because it was a very difficult decision to make. They did not really know what the demands would be and they had to make a decision hurriedly. They instituted the coupon system against the advice of the industry, and that coupon system was carried out loyally by the industry. How did the coupon system work? It meant that every Government Department had so many coupons; they divided them up among their contractors, and inevitably, the thing being done in a hurry, some contractors got too many coupons, and some too few; some Government Departments got too many, and some got too few. So actually, that system during the few weeks it was in operation, caused little shortages at certain places where there would not have been a shortage otherwise. That is undoubtedly what must have happened in a case like that of Harrow.
I feel I have already trespassed too long on your Lordships' patience, but
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there have been so many attacks made by the right reverend Prelate on the cement industry, which I have been proud to serve, that I felt it my duty to remove some of the misconceptions that are apparently in his mind. May I say this in conclusion? I have had the honour of a slight acquaintance with the right reverend Prelate for a number of years, and if he had only come to me or to any other person in the cement industry he could have got the facts without the slightest difficulty, instead of which he has launched the gravest charges on the most flimsy evidence. He has had in fact a complete lack of evidence. He brandished every sort of pamphlet issued by the Communists in front of your Lordships' faces this afternoon as if they were authoritative documents. He has swallowed all this Communist propaganda without making any proper inquiry from those who could have given him the facts. I regret the attack and the statements that he has made very much indeed. I venture to say that it is not a righteous or a Christian act to accuse your fellow-countrymen of lack of patriotism when you have not got the slightest evidence in support of any charge of that sort.
LORD GAINFORD: My Lords, I only want to say one word. Having some little knowledge of the cement trade I know what the difficulties have been and how they have endeavoured to do their utmost to meet the circumstances of the case. Another remark I would like to make is that I think the right reverend Prelate was rather ill-advised in bringing a matter of this kind before your Lordships' House, having regard to the case which has recently been before the Courts.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE): My Lords, my noble friend dealt very admirably indeed with the case brought by the right reverend Prelate. It remains for me to say comparatively little. The main charge which the right reverend Prelate made against the Government was that they had neglected to provide the type of shelter known as the Haldane shelter for those parts of the country which have been subject to heavy bombing. He went on to allege that the failure to provide this type of shelter

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was due to the fact that there was not enough cement available and that this was due to some sinister operations on the part of the cement industry. It is quite true that there is not enough cement and there could not be enough cement available for a period of many years to provide Haldane shelters for everyone. It is also true there is not enough steel available, and there is not enough labour available. But none of these are reasons why the Government have not adopted the Haldane shelter. The reason is that they do not believe it is the soundest of this type of shelter.
The work of providing air-raid shelters has gone ahead steadily. I cannot pretend that this position is entirely satisfactory. It varies from place to place. Many local authorities had neglected the advice which the Government gave them to erect shelters, and then had to act hurriedly and under war conditions which were obviously unfavourable. There was also an unfortunate misunderstanding over the use of lime mortar to which the right reverend Prelate referred. There was this temporary shortage, due in the main to the demands of the Army and difficulties of distribution. As regards any actual shortage of cement, as my noble friend said, at no time was there less than 300,000 tons of cement in stock even during the worst of the crisis last year. There was this shortage in many districts and orders were subsequently given to local authorities that a certain proportion of lime mortar might be employed. There was, unfortunately, a certain looseness of wording in this instruction, due, I think, to some of the people not being accustomed to the phrases used in the building trade. It is the case that certain local authorities used mortar containing no cement at all, consisting entirely of lime, with very unfortunate results.
I have a great deal of technical detailed information about this question of lime mortar, but I do not propose to detain your Lordships with it. Properly used and with the right type of brick, lime mortar can be quite satisfactory, and it is also the case that the majority of shelters made with lime mortar have in practice proved satisfactory. It is however the case that during a temporary period unsatisfactory materials were used by some local authorities, and that: has led to a waste of public money. The right
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reverend Prelate is entirely mistaken in believing that the unfortunate state of affairs is due to the operations of the cement industry. It is a very interesting example, on the contrary, of how wrong national and municipal enterprises can go, and how easily it is for orders issued by the Government to be misunderstood. I do not think that many of your Lordships will agree with the right reverend Prelate in his attack upon the Morrison shelter. I believe the Morrison shelter, especially for winter conditions, is a very sound shelter which will be found increasingly satisfactory.
The shelter policy is going ahead steadily. Shelters of one sort or another have already been provided for something over 18,000,000 of the population. Those are individual shelters of one sort or another. There are also public shelters for something over 3,250,000 of the population. At present, whilst work on new shelters is by no means excluded, priority of materials and labour where available are being given to the bringing of existing shelters into satisfactory condition. I do not say that no new work is proceeding—it is proceeding—but on the whole a great deal of attention is being paid to the improvement of existing shelters. I do not say that everything will be satisfactory when winter time comes and we get, as we shall get, prolonged night raids. Many people will go through a horrible time, as last winter, but conditions will be substantially better than last winter. I believe the local authorities have learned their lesson. The Government are giving every help in their power, and we shall see a very substantial improvement as compared with last winter.
I venture to say that the right reverend Prelate, in putting it into the minds of the people who are facing a very difficult and disagreeable time, as we all are, that their sufferings are aggravated by the carelessness of the Government or by the rapacity of the cement industry, is doing no service whatever. He asked two definite questions. He called attention to the "continued lack of adequate air-raid shelters." I have told your Lordships that air-raid shelters for over 21,000,000 people, all told, have been provided, and that work is going ahead steadily as far as conditions of labour and materials make it possible. He also

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inquired what were the relations between the Government and the cement companies. I can assure him, speaking on behalf of the Government, that the relations between the cement companies and the Government are close and Cordial, and that the Government feel every gratitude to the cement companies for the way in which they have increased output and reduced prices wherever possible, until the recent disastrous rise of coal prices made it impossible. At all times they have shown the utmost willingness to cooperate with the Government.
THE LORD BISHOP OF BIRMINGHAM: My Lords, I have to thank the noble Duke for his reply, but I confess that the knowledge that the Government will not embark upon an extensive programme of steel and concrete bomb-proof surface shelters will be received with grave anxiety by many throughout the country who are responsible for the safety of their poorer fellow citizens. I must take strong exception to the statement by the noble Viscount, Lord Wolmer, that I made statements which were untrue. He did not give any concrete instance that any of my statements which have been accumulated with great care were not, in fact, true.
VISCOUNT WOLMER: May I say that the right reverend Prelate was given the opportunity of proving their truth in a Court of Law the other day; and he preferred to pay £1,600 rather than go into the witness box to do so?
THE LORD BISHOP OF BIRMINGHAM: I shall refer in a moment or two to that particular case inasmuch as the noble Viscount has mentioned it in your Lordships' House. I did not wish to introduce any personal considerations into this debate. May I just comment on one or two things which the noble Viscount, Lord Wolmer, stated? He objected to my referring to the Cement Makers' Federation as a "ring." I said that that term was used and justified in the evidence given by the Director of Army Contracts on the Estimates of 1938, and also that in advertisements issued by the Cement Makers' Federation they had accepted the title. The noble Viscount told us that the output of cement since the war had been adequate—that, in fact, 12,500,000 tons had been produced since the war began.
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If he will work the simple computation, that is at the rate of 7,000,000 tons a year from the industry; but during the year 1939 the industry produced, as he himself said, 9,000,000 tons.
VISCOUNT WOLMER: May I correct the right reverend Prelate on that? I did not say the industry produced 9,000,000 tons. The production that year was in the neighbourhood of 8,250,000 tons. I have got the figures here with me. What I said was that the productive capacity at the outbreak of war was 9,000,000 tons. The right reverend Prelate perhaps wonders why the productive capacity is not the same in war-time. I can assure him it is not so easy to produce up to your full capacity in time of war as in time of peace. Things like the black-out, bombing, delays in shipping, and delays in getting repairs all tend to reduce maximum output.
THE LORD BISHOP OF BIRMINGHAM: The noble Viscount, in fact, admits that the output for 1939 was greater than the average output since the war began. We learnt from the noble Duke that the reserve of cement in the country never fell below 300,000 tons. That only represents about one-thirtieth of the pre-war output—less, in fact, than twelve days' supply. That is surely a totally inadequate reserve. With regard to the action of the cement companies during the summer of the year 1940, may I remind your Lordships that The Times, in a leading article on August 25 of last year, said that
"either the Ministry of Home Security or some other body should see at once whether cement production is at the maximum, and not merely at the maximum of the plant in present production.
On October 3, 1940, the Industrial Correspondent of the Financial News interviewed spokesmen of the ring and commented:
"The assurance that cement production is' at the maximum possible requires some further explanation. On inquiry, the Financial News learnt that the Federation has made no allowance for potentialities for producing blastfurnace cement in England and Wales. It is readily understandable that the Portland Cement interests, which have to take into consideration the long-term welfare of the industry, should be divided about sponsoring any suggested emergency measure likely to prejudice this welfare."
VISCOUNT WOLMER: Will the right reverend Prelate give the name of the gentleman responsible for that statement?.
THE LORD BISHOP OF BIRMINGHAM: May I continue?.
"Indeed the spokesmen of the industry made that aspect of the problem quite clear when speaking to the Financial News,"
Do I understand that that interview is repudiated?.
VISCOUNT WOLMER: Utterly repudiated.
THE LORD BISHOP OF BIRMINGHAM: Has legal action been taken against the Financial News to cause the withdrawal of that statement? I gather not. I shall make no further detailed comments on the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Wolmer, but he has thought fit to introduce the question of the recent action brought against me by the Cement Makers' Federation. He seemed to think that because I did not defend that action I did not feel that what I had said was substantially justifiable. Surely the noble Viscount is not ignorant that the use by big business of actions for slander or libel to ensure the suppression of criticism has become an accepted technique. Any defence entered is made the occasion of elaborate and expensive inquiries. Costs mount rapidly. Thousands of pounds and even tens of thousands of pounds, which are a mere nothing to a multi-millionaire "ring," become the stake in a gamble which ruins the ordinary individual, if he loses, and lose he well may, for developments during the last century have made our libel laws—I suggest to the Lord Chancellor that I am not exaggerating—the most severe in the world. They are now such that fair criticism in a book review is almost impossible, and the position has been reached when any organisation or individual protesting against even injurious anti-social activities of any big business is exposed to ruin. American big business chiefs are reported to speak enviously of our "lovely law of libel." Equally, it is well known that if and when a strong Left-Wing Government in this country
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come into power the revision of the laws relating to libel and slander will probably be undertaken.
My one desire in this unhappy business has been to get better air-raid protection for the poor. I saw that if I refused to defend the action brought by the Cement Makers' Federation and firmly declined to make the withdrawal demanded by the "ring" I should, with no little advertisement, draw attention to the scandal which I desired to see ended. I wished to bear the whole cost of my policy as an offering to the welfare of the poor of my own city, by whose sufferings last winter I was deeply moved; but, against my publicly-expressed wish, friends unknown to me got together a fund, and at my Diocesan Conference last week, nominally as a silver wedding gift, announced that nearly £1,100 had been collected. My Lords, deeply embedded in early Christian history is the practice of non-resistance. This practice will play its parts in the great struggle of the future when democracy must save itself by conquering the individual and corporate aggrandisement which now threatens our social freedom. I beg to withdraw.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932:
BOROUGH OF LYDD ORDER.
URBAN DISTRICT OF WILMSLOW ORDER.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That the Orders made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department under the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, and laid before the House on Tuesday last, be approved.—(The Duke of Devonshire.)
On Question, Motion agreed to. House adjourned.