Lords Sitting of 16 October 1940

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

BILLINGSHURST GAS ORDER, 1940.
ENNERDALE GAS ORDER, 1940.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Templemore, I beg to move that these Special Orders be approved.
Moved, That the Special Orders, as reported from the Special Orders Committee, be approved.—(Lord Snell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932:
RURAL DISTRICT OF AMPTHILL (PARISH OF CRANFIELD) ORDER.
COUNTY BOROUGH OF EALING ORDER.
BOROUGH OF HERTFORD ORDER.
COUNTY BOROUGH OF HUDDERS-FIELD ORDER.
CITY OF MANCHESTER ORDER.
BOROUGH OF TORQUAY ORDER.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Croft, I beg to move that these Special Orders be approved.
Moved, That the Orders made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department under the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, and laid before the House on the 8th instant, be approved.—(Lord Snell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.
LORD DAVIES LORD DAVIES rose to ask His Majesty's Government if, with the object
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of facilitating the closest co-operation in the prosecution of the war between the members of the British Commonwealth, they will consider the formation of a Supreme War Council upon which the Governments of the Dominions and India would be represented; and whether these Governments have been consulted regarding the creation and composition of such a Council; and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name. Early in August I ventured to ask the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs whether it was proposed to invite Dominion Ministers to participate more directly in the conduct of the war. The answer I received on that occasion was an extremely nebulous one, because the noble Viscount said:
"The Government do not regard the present moment as opportune for inviting Dominion Ministers to visit London for an Imperial War Conference or other discussions, but they will certainly welcome such discussion if occasion offers."
Your Lordships will remember that in the debate last week the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, raised the question again and he received very much the same reply. I cannot help feeling that it was a most unsatisfactory reply, and that is the reason why I have ventured to put this Motion on the Order Paper to-day.
We are told that something is going to be done when occasion offers, but that in the opinion of the Government the present time is inopportune. That can only mean that the present arrangements are to continue until something happens, and the creation of the Imperial War Council is to be left to chance. Who is going to decide when the time is opportune? One would have imagined that in a time like this, when the very existence of our Empire is threatened as it has never been before, one of the first steps would be the creation of machinery for the closest collaboration and co-operation between the Mother Country and the Dominions. Before the collapse of France there was the Supreme Allied War Council directing the Allied war effort, but when the Vichy Government capitulated these proceedings of course came to an end and the British Commonwealth was left to carry on the struggle alone. One would have thought that at that moment, or at any rate immediately afterwards, the time was opportune, and that our self-governing

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Dominions and India would be invited to participate directly in the prosecution of the war and in formulating our policy and strategy. If we are incapable of devising machinery at this critical juncture how can we ever bring about the growth and the consolidation of the British Commonwealth so that in future it may always speak with one voice and always pursue a common policy?
I do not propose to travel over the ground covered by the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, in his speech last week. There is no need to remind the House of the wonderful response of the Dominions, the magnificent assistance in men and resources which they have already contributed to our war effort. But whilst we express to them our gratitude and appreciation for all they have done and are doing for the common cause, I am sure we also want them to feel that in this great enterprise they are regarded by us as partners who not only contribute men and money, but actively assist our leaders in this country in formulating the strategy and policy which are essential to the winning of the war. We want them to feel that they are just as much responsible as the Mother Country and the members of our own Government for the momentous decisions which must be taken from time to time. I submit that the present arrangements are totally inadequate and that the haphazard and unbusinesslike methods described by the noble Lord, Lord Snell, last week do not suffice to ensure that close collaboration which is imperative for the avoidance of misunderstanding and for the successful prosecution of the war.
I also believe that public opinion, both in this country and in the Dominions, is apprehensive in regard to this matter. People cannot understand why it is that representatives of our Dominions do not sit alongside representatives of this country in the Supreme Council or War Cabinet, which is responsible, not only to the people of Britain but also to the democracies in our Dominions, for the efficient conduct of this great struggle. As an example of the present unsatisfactory way of dealing with matters of common concern, may I refer to one instance—namely, the closing of the Burma Road, a decision which has now happily been reversed? I read an account the other day of a debate in the Canadian
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Parliament at Ottawa in which a Canadian Member of Parliament asked a question of the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King. This is taken from the Canadian Official Report. Mr. Coldwell said:
"A few days ago I asked the Prime Minister whether we had been consulted with regard to the closing of the Burma Road. He replied that he had not been asked for advice, had given no advice, and had made no comment. That is exactly the answer which was given in this House a year ago in April when the right honourable gentleman was asked if he had been consulted in connection with the Polish guarantee, the giving of which resulted in our being involved in war a few months later."
This is the question that was asked by the same Member, Mr. Coldwell, on July 19:
"I should like to direct a question to the Prime Minister, notice of which I sent this morning. According to to-day's papers, Lord Halifax, replying yesterday to a question in the House of Lords, said that Canada had been kept fully informed of what His Majesty's Government had in mind when considering the closing of the Burma Road. Are we to infer from this statement that the advice of the Government of Canada was sought and given with regard to this situation, which may profoundly affect future relations in the Pacific? If so, what advice was given to His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Dominion?"
The answer of the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, was as follows:
"The Government was informed of the views of the British Government with respect to the closing of the Burma Road, but no advice was tendered by the Canadian Government to the Government of the United Kingdom.
Mr. HANSON: Was any asked for? That is part of the question.
Mr. MACKENZIE KING: No. There is usually opportunity for comment on any communications that come from the United Kingdom Government and there was in this case. If the Government of Canada had felt at the time that it was advisable to comment, it could have been done, but no comment was needed."
It appears from these questions and answers which I have just read to the House, that the Canadian Government was kept informed of the action that the British Government proposed to take; but surely this was a decision which should not only have been communicated to our Dominions, but which should have been taken by a Supreme War Council after the fullest discussion and investigation of the whole problem. I only mention this as one instance of the necessity for such

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a Council which is able to assume full and undivided responsibility for these decisions. There are, of course, many other questions which deserve to be treated in the same way so as to avoid misapprehensions, misunderstandings and delays.
Lastly, may I point out that in the Great War it was found necessary to create some machinery of this kind? If it were necessary then, surely it is much more necessary now. May I read to your Lordships an official statement which was issued by the Government at that time, on August 18, 1918? This is what the statement said:
"During the past two and a half months, the Imperial War Cabinet have been in continuous session. Every aspect of policy affecting the conduct of the war and the question of peace has been examined by the Prime Ministers of the Empire and other members representative of all its parts. These meetings have proved of such value that the Imperial War Cabinet have thought it essential that certain modifications should be made in the existing channels of communications so as to make consultation between the various Governments of the Empire in regard to Imperial policy as continuous and intimate as possible. It has therefore been decided that for the future the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, as members of the Imperial War Cabinet, shall have the right to communicate on matters of Cabinet importance direct with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom whenever they see fit to do so. It has also been decided that each Dominion shall have the right to nominate a visiting or a resident Minister in London to be a member of the Imperial War Cabinet at meetings other than those attended by the Prime Ministers. These meetings will be held at regular intervals. Arrangements will also be made for the representation of India at these meetings."
One realises, of course, that it may be inopportune that the Dominion Prime Ministers should always be present in London, but there is no reason why there should not be what is described in this document as a resident Minister here who would take his seat on the Supreme War Council and be able to express there the views of his Government. It should not surpass the wit of man to devise some means of securing a much closer collaboration than there is under our present haphazard system. The British Empire cannot stand still. Either it must grow into a political organism capable of expressing the common policy and united effort of its peoples or it runs the danger of disintegration. I submit that the
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Statute of Westminster was not the last word in this development, and despite any obstacles there may be, I implore His Majesty's Government to suggest to the Dominions the creation of a Supreme War Council which the present critical situation so urgently demands. I beg to move.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, you will remember that last Tuesday the question which the noble Lord has brought before your Lordships to-day was raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, in the course of a general debate on the Government's statement. While I have no quarrel with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for raising this question again, especially considering that he was good enough to postpone a Motion on the subject at the Government's request a fortnight or so ago, neither he nor the House will expect me to give any other reply than that which I gave last Tuesday on this very important subject. The only answer that I can give to the noble Lord is to refer him to the terms of that reply. I can, however, assure the noble Lord that the points which he has raised so ably this morning will be fully considered by His Majesty's Government, and I have no doubt also by the Dominion Governments. The question is one of surpassing importance. Hasty remarks concerning it are inadvisable, and I think we had better wait for the Government to consider the matter in more detail.
LORD DAVIES: My Lords, I am sorry the noble Lord opposite has not been able to give your Lordships a more reassuring reply. Of course we all realise the importance of not doing anything in a hurry, but I venture once again to draw the noble Lord's attention to the fact that I first brought forward this question as long ago as last August. Everything that has occurred since suggests that it is a matter of such vital importance that no time should be lost in exploring the whole position and endeavouring to find some means whereby the policy and the strategy of this country and the Dominions can be focussed, and some machinery devised whereby the Dominions may be able to express their views much more effectively than they are able to do at present. I beg to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD VISCOUNT TRENCHARD had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His Majesty's Government, as it is universally admitted the power of the Royal Air Force for withstanding the assaults of the enemy and to carry the offensive into Germany is of the first importance, whether they have information which could be given to the public with regard to maintaining the present organisation so as to enable the results so far achieved to be continued and increased; and to move for Papers.
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I put down the Motion standing in my name in view of certain articles I have seen recently in the Press with regard to altering the organisation of the Royal Air Force. This is a matter of supreme importance, and I am perfectly certain that if the nation knew of it in detail they also would think it of supreme importance. Will your Lordships excuse me if for a few moments I refer to my connection with the Royal Air Force? Because of this connection I have received many congratulations from a very great number and variety of people upon the wonderful work of the Royal Air Force, and in these congratulations were included not only the work of the pilots and crews but the work of the whole of the organisation—the Fighter, Bomber and the Coastal Commands, the Air Forces in the Middle East and all over the world, as well as the work of the maintenance crews, and, last but by no means least, the instruction that is given at all the schools.
I have been congratulated again on the foundations we laid in those days long ago when I was allowed to work with one of the Under-Secretaries of State, Lord Londonderry. We laid those foundations years ago, and nobody knows better than I do that many of the remarks contained in the letters that I have received have been much too laudatory as it was not my work but the work of the pilots, the crews, and all the officers and men of the Royal Air Force in all the different branches which made this Air Force in the way it was made. I was really only the means, so to speak, of helping to put together and embodying into one whole the ideas of all those who knew what was needed, and I feel that what our people thought was copied by
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Germany, who thought the same, after their experience of our Air Force in the last war. The basis of the whole conception of the Air Force as we know it and as those who have really studied it know it, is unity—unity and the offensive. Those two principles are the whole basis of it. I am not dealing with the offensive policy to-day, I am dealing with the organisation side. It is unity that is the basis of the spirit that has made the Air Force what it is to-day.
All through the long years from 1914 to 1930, when I retired, it was that spirit of unity which made possible the success of to-day. And now what do we see beginning to arise at the height of the Air Force's glory? In certain newspapers and elsewhere we see a demand to break the Force down into three separate Air Services. And why? I ask. Why destroy the organisation that has done so much in this war up to now? Surely your Lordships will agree that the one department which has so far shown that its organisation is able to stand up to the strain is the Royal Air Force. Surely it is the one department that has done its job far better than anyone ever dreamed possible with the strain upon it, small as it was. Surely the organisation has stood up to the strain that has been put upon it. Though there have been mistakes of detail here and there, the broad basis of the organisation surely was well planned or it could not have stood up to what it has, with no help, or very little help, in the long years that have gone by. I am glad to see two noble Lords here who have both been secretaries of State for Air. I refer to the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, and the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton. Both know—one in the early days and one later when the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, was Secretary of State for Air—the value of organisation. The noble Viscount knew the value of unity and he knew the value of efficiency over quantity. I think we owe to those Secretaries of State, who helped to mould that organisation which has stood the strain in these days so well, a very great deal indeed.
In the first days of the war I was asked by one of the leaders of the nation, "How will the war in the air develop?" I refused to prophesy, but I said I was quite sure there was going to be, in this war as in the last, great argument about the right use and the right organisation. This is what has happened, and what went on

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up to the time of the French collapse; but the Air Force, broadly speaking, has been allowed to carry our air warfare on the proper lines since then in the light of the experience and knowledge of those who know the power of the air, though still much hampered by diversity of opinion and therefore by want of decision as to what are really the right targets to hit.
I do not want to weary your Lordships by speaking of this matter at length, but it is really important. One of the reasons for this discussion of the right use and organisation of the Air Force is that there are no books of great authority and reputation written by great men on this subject. All have read Mahon on Sea Power and other great naval books; all have read Marlborough, Wellington, Napoleon and Storewall Jackson. But are there many who can say that they have read anything about the air more than a few letters in the Press from time to time? The few authorities who have written on the air are not yet accepted as great authorities. I feel that there is a real danger in these articles which I have seen in the Press saying that we need an Army Air Arm. Not only that, but I gather that there has been in the last two years an agitation among a small coterie of leading people advocating making an Army Air Force. There has been a similar movement in Germany also.
One of the dangers of this situation is that a certain number of people who advocate this have flown, and weight is given to their arguments on that account. But flying does not teach you the art of air warfare any more than walking teaches you the art of land warfare. It does not follow that people who have flown necessarily know all about it. I do not know anyone who was in any position to take an active part in aerial warfare in the last war, or who was in a position of responsibilty for the policy of the operations of that war, who does not agree with what I call "our" conceptions of the organisation of the Royal Air Force. I will not go into technical details; they have been discussed exhaustively, and no amount of using phrases like "The man who flies an aeroplane to aid land forces must be half a soldier" will ever disprove the technical arguments.
What are the relevant facts as we see them to-day? First, the Prime Minister has, by many of his speeches in another
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place and elsewhere, recognised that the air is one of the chief instruments, if not the chief instrument, for victory. At any rate, up to the present it has been the chief instrument in avoiding defeat, and it will be the chief instrument for victory. All the Commands and the pilots have been congratulated time and time again by him for what they have done in this war. Secondly, the prestige of the Royal Air Force with the people of this country, who do not know about this discussion on altering the organisation, is exceedingly high. In the quality of its personnel—I should like to say this in view of criticisms that used to be made before this war and are now made no longer—of its equipment, for which we owe a debt of gratitude to the noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, who sits on the Cross Benches, and of its standards of training, it is believed by the public at large to have a clear superiority over the enemy to a degree which we rarely believed ourselves to possess during the last war.
Thirdly, we have been bringing down a far greater proportion of the German machines which they send over to this country than the Germans bring down of ours. I should expect this, because a good many people have said that a more efficient Air Force will go through a less efficient one like a hot knife through butter. But that means, of course, keeping up our technical improvements—and these must, be watched, as I had to watch them in the last war. I hope they are being watched to-day. It is not only numbers; in fact I always say that numbers do not count in the air.
Now I come to what all this is about. It is said that the Army are uneasy, that they will not get the short-range or dive-bomber support they want. There is and was, I feel, reason for this, and I think everyone was impressed by the German bombing force in Poland, Holland, Belgium and France. It was used in intimate co-operation with the Army, and I feel that one may even go so far as to say that one, though not the whole, of the reasons for the rapid overrun of all those countries was the dive bomber, but more by its moral than by its material effect. One has heard from many sources that the casualties from the dive bomber were negligible; one has also heard from many sources of the demoralising effect it has. We started it, and we know. The bombing that we now call dive bombing was

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invented by the Royal Flying Corps and the Air Service in 1914 and 1915, chiefly, and was used at the Battle of the Somme. It was later used in France by Sir John Salmond, who was commanding the Royal Air Force during our retreat in 1918, to stem the Germans' advance and break up their attack. Dive bombing was then done chiefly by fighters. It was as easy for us to do it to them, when the Germans had nothing to counter it, as it was for the Germans to do it in Poland, Holland, Belgium and France, when we could not use the counter we know we ought to have had—namely, a superior Air Force.
I think, though, that history will prove definitely that it was not the shortage of our air support only which brought about the disaster in France. It was the shortage of all our equipment—tanks, guns, the French Air Force and our own Air Force We were not only short of dive bombers and short-range bombers; we were short of fighters, bombers and everything. The people who are clamouring for these things now are those who were responsible for the shortage of bombers, whether of dive bombers or of long-range bombers. There is no black magic about the design or operation of the dive bomber. It is a short-range bomber with one or two mechanical devices to slow up its speed in diving, and one or two other things; it is an inferior machine against a well-led fighter force, but it has its use for bombing, as we found in the last war and in this war.
As I said, the Army are uneasy that they will not get the short-range and dive-bomber support that they want, and that they will not get the necessary close cooperation between their mechanical force and the Air Force. But need the Army be uneasy that they will not get the immediate support in the future that they have lacked in the past? I do not believe this is so. When the time comes, and come it will, that the land operations become once more of first importance, or anyhow of equal importance, in breaking down the enemy's resistance, I have no doubt whatever that the Air Force will play its part in furthering and supporting the success of the Army. I am sure the Air Force of to-day feel and fully realise the necessity of giving all the support to the Army that the Army consider necessary. I feel it is
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almost impertinent to doubt that the Staffs of the Army and the Air Force have already many times closely studied and evolved tactics based on the lessons learnt from the operations that have already taken place in this war. And, of course, no one knows better than the Air Force the vital importance of the closest and most intimate co-operation with the Army. The Air Force have been fully aware of the great power that the air plays in ground operations—far more aware than the Army were twenty years ago.
I understand what I might almost call the Army being dissatisfied until recently. I like dissatisfied people myself; what I dislike is self-satisfied people, having always been rather dissatisfied myself. I often used to say that I would rather have a dissatisfied man at the head of a Service than a satisfied one. But how can there be any ground for suspicion or mistrust on this head? I know quite well that there was a feeling in former days that the Air Force was not whole-heartedly determined to exert itself to the utmost. I say quite frankly that that was in my day. The reason—and I can understand and sympathise with that reason—was that nobody realised what the Air Force realised, that the air was vitally necessary for the Army and Navy, and that they would both be useless if they did not have a sufficient Air Force to play its part, as it is playing it now so well. Even so, when the time came in this war the Air Force was as good as its word, and indeed better. Did it not in France spend itself unsparingly and regardless of loss to support the British and French Armies against the invader? Day after day every effort of every bomber squadron in France and from England was directed against the advancing enemy, his communications and reserves.
It is true that the sacrifices made were largely in vain, and that it was not possible to do more than effect temporary delays on the enemy's advance; but it must not be forgotten that the Royal Air Force placed itself unreservedly at the disposal of the High Command of the Allied Armies, of which, be it remembered, the British Expeditionary Force formed but a very small fraction. It took its orders from the French High Command, and its objectives were those selected by that High Command. Although in theory the French Air Force

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was a separate Service, in point of practical fact it was completely subservient to the French Army, and the High Command repeatedly showed that it had little or no conception of the use of air power, either in conjunction with a land battle or independently. No Army to-day can hope to succeed without the fullest and most effective support from the air; but that support can be secured only by full and free collaboration.
The next point to be remembered is that if you have dive bombers as an Army Air Service you must have fighters to protect them; without lighters they will be wiped out in hundreds, as they have been whenever the Germans have attempted to use then, here or at Dunkirk. You must have as many fighters as bombers, if not more, when bombers are used with the Army. Are we going to have the fighters, too, as part of the new Army Air Service? That would mean not only fighters but a great wireless organisation, which is very complicated and difficult. Are you going to have a separate organisation to do this? Is that one of your ideas? Did the Germans? Were their bombers, their fighters, their observers and their wireless all separate? No: they were all part of one Service. With a separate Service you will have competition and duplication. I do not want to worry you, my Lords, with that technical side of the matter, but any one of you who has seen the operation of the Air Force to-day and the complications which are inherent in its operation will be appalled at the idea of a seperate Service.
I cannot help feeling—and this is one of the principal points that I want to make—that in these days, when anything is found not to be quite right, the cry is to put in a new big man with a separate department under him. That makes co-operation more difficult than it is today. You will not get proper organisation by continually putting in new men of equal authority. The whole essence of the Air Force has been its unity; that is why it has been so efficient up to now. If you are to have new men and new departments you will have disorganisation, and surely that is what we are suffering from to-day.
As I said at the beginning of my speech, it is unity which has made the Air Force. It is unity which is the back-
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bone of its morale; this very delicate instrument has built itself up from within on the basis of unity. Does the nation as a whole understand this? Do our leaders understand it? Is this decision likely to be made without the nation realising that it is going to alter the organisation of the Royal Air Force? I feel that there is one thing that the nation does understand, and that is what the Air Force has done in this war up to now. I should like to say here, so that all who may read it shall know, that the Air Force has done what it has done because of unity. The breaking up of the present organisation would be disastrous to its efficiency and to the confidence in itself which the Royal Air Force as at present constituted feels. Part of its inspiration comes from its being one. By common consent the Air Force is doing its work brilliantly; and, when the day comes for it to work as an ancillary to the Army, I am quite sure that it will do that work just as brilliantly. The Royal Air Force to-day is the Air Force that I knew in the past; it has the same spirit, the same keenness and the same traditions, strengthened by accomplishments in the present war. I beg the powers that be to consider what effect it would have on the Service if, in spite of all that it has done, it were to be told that it could not be trusted to do the air work for the Army, and that a separate Air Service must be set up for that purpose. I beg to move.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: My Lords, I venture to trespass on your indulgence for two minutes in order to give my full support, if I may do so, to the speech which has just been delivered by the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. He has made a very weighty speech, and I am quite sure that his words have not fallen upon barren ground. I sincerely hope, at the same time, that the fears which are in his mind are not likely to be realised. I am sure that he is quite right in mentioning this subject in your Lordships' House, because it is quite true that in many irresponsible quarters there have been criticisms of the manner in which the Air Force assisted the Army at Dunkirk. I have had the privilege and the honour of being associated with Lord Trenchard officially and privately for a great number of years, and I have found very few people in public life who have been so accurate as has Lord

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Trenchard in their prophecies with regard to the future. I am very sorry indeed that the advice which he gave at the beginning of the war was not followed in its entirety. However, on these occasions it is unwise, and indeed wrong, to go back; we must look to the future; but, with my recollection of the past, I do most sincerely hope that the advice which Lord Trenchard has given now will be followed throughout.
Lord Trenchard and I were associated together at a very difficult time for the Air Force. The Air Force had very few friends in those days. Yet it is thanks to his inspiration, thanks to the foundations which he laid and to the successor whom he appointed to follow him, that the Air Force has carried this war on its shoulders and is leading us on to the time when we shall go forward to achieve the victory which we are determined to win. But in furtherance of the suggestions which the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, has made, I would only remark that all the Secretaries of State and Chiefs of Staff have always found themselves in a very difficult position. My noble friend who sits beside me now (Lord Swinton) knows exactly all those difficulties which we went through, and he faced many difficulties of the same kind when he became Secretary of State. But I would venture to say that it is entirely due to the unfaltering persistence of Sir John Salmond and Sir Edward Ellington that the Air Force stands on its present firm basis. They supported me when I was Secretary of State and they were supported from below by those splendid airmen trained by my noble friend here who are responsible for the efficiency of the Air Force as we have seen it during the whole war. I do feel that when my noble friend Lord Trenchard gives us his advice it is a matter to which the Government should direct their fullest attention and I have every reason to hope that they will do so.
Those of us who have been associated with the air for many years know that there has always been this tendency, or rather this endeavour, to break up the Air Force. I remember that in the early days the noble Viscount's great conception was an independent Air Force, something which very few laymen understood at all. He was anxious lest the continual demand from the Navy and the not so
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persistent demand from the Army would break up the Air Force into two wings, and they would become the subsidiary elements of the Army and the Navy; but thanks to his persistence, thanks to his drive and determination, the independent Air Force was established, and the independent Air Force is what we see to-day, fighting the battle on all fronts, achieving success, and paving the way to final victory. That is why, when these writers speak of difficulties between the Air Force and the Army—the Army Cooperation Squadrons—I am quite sure, and I believe that the noble Viscount thinks so too, that it is merely a matter of liaison between the two Services. There are big enough men on either side to carry this matter to a successful conclusion, and I hope that the advice will not be taken which would tend to break up the Air Force, or rather to separate it into component parts and render its work even more difficult than it is at the present moment.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I should like, in common with my noble friends, to give most unqualified support to the plea put forward by the noble Viscount. I do not profess to have any inside or technical knowledge of Air Force matters, but I have some intimate and personal acquaintance with the business of government and with certain Staff questions, and I am filled with absolute consternation by the suggestion, which I know has been authoritatively made, which would result in fact in the duplication of Staff work, in overlapping, and in placing a considerable section of our Air Service under Army command as separate from the independent Air Force. The one thing, I think, which has impressed every one of us in this war has been the freshness of spirit and high quality of the Staff work of the Air Force, and I attribute it myself—and I think a good many others do—to the fact that it was not hidebound by tradition. Of course, tradition has its value but the Air Force was looking out, without being hampered by tradition, for the best and freshest and brightest spirits in the Force, and there was the chance for them to get rapid advancement, which would not have been, and was not, the case in Army Staff circles.
The high quality of the Staff work of the Air Force has, I think, impressed itself upon everybody who can understand what

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efficiency really means and what it must require in terms of the Staff. As I said the other day in this House on another Motion, a misgiving which I have, and which I know is shared by a good many people, is as to whether the same high quality of Staff work is to be found in the Army as in the Air Force. We did not see it in the anticipation and the programme of equipment of the British Expeditionary Force. The planning of the equipment of that Force showed a lack of vision which if it were continued—and I do not think it will be, because I believe that some of the people who were responsible for it are no longer there—would be highly dangerous. What I think we need to-day is to see that efficient Staff work is ruthlessly required throughout the Army. As things stand, I think that people would be filled with consternation if the suggestion which has been made were given any substantial effect to.
We are greatly indebted to the noble Viscount, with his high authority, for bringing this Motion before us to-day. Surely what is realty wanted is joint Staff work of an efficient kind. There should be no more difficulty in getting efficient Staff co-operation in these matters than there is and has been on multitudes of occasions between the Army and the Navy. We have had numberless instances in our history, and several in this war, where co-operation between the Navy and the Army has been well obtained by joint Staff work, and the same, I am quite sure, could and ought to be obtained with regard to the use of our Air Force. But whilst not meaning to express any opinion on technical matters, on which the noble Viscount is a high authority, I do want with all the emphasis which I can command to give the most hearty support to the general case that he has made.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, you heard with most alert attention the weighty speech which was delivered by the noble Viscount in introducing his Motion to the House. The Air Force, which he has done so much to build up, is, as your Lordships know, doing magnificent work. The noble Viscount was one of its founders and one of its great architects. He very naturally has a pride in what it is doing, and very naturally he is jealous lest it should be restrained and hampered by wrong or unnecessary machinery. It is therefore a matter of great concern to
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him to see that efforts are being made in certain quarters to split it up. Your Lordships will be aware that some time ago the Fleet Air Arm was split off from the rest of the R.A.F., and that was not a decision which ought to be repeated. The basic problem to-day, I suggest, is not to get different or, perhaps, perfect machinery, but to obtain air superiority. If this is done the question of air support for the Army will tend to solve itself.
No one is better qualified to speak of the development of the Royal Air Force than the noble Viscount. Apart from his distinguished services during the last war he is, as I have said, the architect of the modern Royal Air Force. It was he who founded the basic organisation of the Force, and to him, more than to anyone else, the country is indebted for the high standard of training which has proved so valuable in recent critical months. The Royal Air Force is therefore, in great part, the child of his mind and, if I may say so, it is not unworthy of its parent. The experience of the last five months has led us to believe that our proved British aptitude for the sea is being supplemented by an equally unmatched aptitude in the air. We owe these young people a great debt of gratitude. It was Buddha, I think, who said, "Do not flatter your benefactors." That is perhaps right, but it cannot be right either to forget or to ignore them, and we should pay that passing tribute to them on this occasion. The work that it has been doing in recent critical months shows that its foundations were well and truly laid. I should personally be most reluctant to reject, or even question, any remarks of Lord Trenchard concerning our future air policy, because what he says must command the greatest respect. Fortunately, however, there is little that, it is necessary for me to say in any sense different from what he stated.
The achievements of the Royal Air Force, in face of an enemy greatly superior in numbers of all types of aircraft, have been so impressive as to make any suggestion for reorganising it on a different basis somewhat superfluous. There can be no doubt, after the stern test of the last five months, that the basic conception of the development of British air power was on thoroughly sound lines. This conception, it may be recalled, was developed in the last war, and replaced

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a system of divided control which had resulted in a conflict of demands on the available resources and a lack of unified direction in our air effort. The Air Force of to-day, it is right to recall, owes much to the genius of General Smuts, upon whose advice the separate Air Service was created and whose report to the War Cabinet in August, 1917, revealed an almost prophetic insight into air war as it is being waged to-day. The emphasis that Lord Trenchard places on the vital need for developing our air power is fully accepted by His Majesty's Government. The establishment of general air superiority is one of our primary aims. We started the war, as is well known, with a serious numerical deficiency. The greatest efforts are being directed to closing this gap, and it is vital that we should employ our available resources in the most economical fashion.
The need for ensuring a full scale of air support for the Army is fully appreciated by the Air Ministry and the War Office, and is engaging their continuous attention. Air support for a modern Army is admittedly vital. It is required both to shield the Army from attack and to assist in removing obstacles in its path when it moves forward. The view has been expressed in certain quarters that this need can best be met by the creation of a separate Air Force to be at the exclusive disposal of the Army. This is not the view cither of the Air Staff or of the General Staff. Some of the objections to the creation of an Army Air Arm may be mentioned. It should be repeated that, since our available resources are limited, any exclusive allocation of Air Forces to a particular role must diminish to that extent the resources available for the main air war against Germany, upon the results of which all our other efforts admittedly depend. If that exclusive allocation were too small, the Army would suffer, and, if too large, our air effort against the sources of the enemy's strength in Germany would suffer, and with it our efforts to obtain that air superiority which is a pre-requisite of successful military operations. Nor is there a happy mean which could be decided upon in advance. The fact is that the air requirements of the Army will vary with the prevailing tactical and strategic positions. Cases will certainly
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occur, as they have done in the past, when nothing less than the support of all available Air Forces will suffice. At other times the needs of the Army will be very much smaller. Clearly, therefore, the requirements of the Army must be met by an organisation which permits of the necessary flexibility and allows the maximum bomber force to be employed to assist the Army when required in a particular strategical situation, without detriment at other times to the primary task of the Royal Air Force—namely, the destruction of the enemy's war potential.
Both in offence and defence the air requirements of the Army should be treated, not in isolation, but as part of the air situation as a whole. In particular, it would be most imprudent to lock up a high proportion of our resources in a form which precludes their being exercised at the decisive time and in the decisive direction. The problem, therefore, is to meet the air requirements of the Army in a way that gives them the full support which they undoubtedly require without detracting from our air effort as a whole. The way in which this commitment is met depends on the theatre of operations. It will not be necessary to weary your Lordships with a detailed account of the differing organisations in the various theatres. It will be sufficient to say that the general solution consists in placing a certain number of squadrons under the direct orders of the Army Commanders, and relying upon the main Air Force for the general support which the Army requires in addition, the magnitude of which, as has been previously explained, will vary between very wide limits. This method, which ensures the maximum economy of force, necessitates the training of a number of units in close support methods. The air protection required starts with the factory in this country and extends to the ports of embarkation and the sea routes to the ports of disembarkation and the lines of communication in the theatre of operations. It is far more than a question of support in the area of battle. It is a question of winning the war in the air.
This, then, is our main task at the moment. It is certainly a formidable one, and is made more difficult by the enemy exploitation of the plant and labour in captive countries. However, with the aid of the Empire and of the United States

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of America, we have every reason for sober confidence in the outcome of this vital struggle. A considerable development of the offensive and defensive strength of the Royal Air Force has been possible during the last five months despite the most intense operations. We may confidently look forward to far greater developments in future months. In these developments the noble Viscount may feel assured, I think, that the strengthening of the offensive arm will receive a full share of attention.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, I think you will all have heard with profound satisfaction the speech which has just been delivered by the Deputy Leader of the House, and be grateful to my noble friend Lord Trenchard for having given the occasion for making it. It was highly desirable that this question should be raised, and nothing could be more satisfactory than the definite and categorical answer which we have received from His Majesty's Government. It was an answer which showed that the whole policy of the Government in this matter is not a sectional policy or a policy of self-sufficiency, but a real General Staff policy of the three General Stan's working together, and working together, thank God, under one single Minister of Defence, and we could not have a better Minister of Defence than the one we have in the present Prime Minister. As one who has always fought the battle of co-operation against self-sufficiency I rejoice to think that that is going to be carried out to the full in the spirit which my noble friend has indicated. It is not only that there would be hopeless overlapping if any change such as that suggested were made. There is really much more to it even than that. If we could have a superfluity of manufacturing capacity, which, even with all the resources across the seas at our disposal, we have not get, it would still be wrong, because the air can bring to this co-operation with the Army something which the Army can never give, just as the Army can bring something to its co-operation with the air.
The ideal thing where you have a military operation is the strategic command and the strategic policy and conception in the Commander-in-Chief who has charge of operations, and an Air Force supporting him with all the skill and the technical knowledge that an Air Commander work-
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ing with him and for that purpose subordinate to him can give. But it is not only that, as my noble friend has very well pointed out. One of the tremendous values of air power—and it increases with every development—is its mobility. It is inconceivable that we should divide it up, because if you have a great military operation, or if you have a great naval operation being conducted, it is not merely the squadrons which are for the time being attached to the Army or the Fleet that are required in that action; it is the whole force of the air thrown in miles and miles behind the lines, co-operating with the troops in the attack, bombing lines of communication. Every ounce of air power can be thrown in at the critical moment and at the right spot, and I do indeed rejoice to think that that conception of combined strategy holds the field and will hold the field until victory is won.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: My Lords, I would like to thank the noble Lord who gave the Government answer unreservedly. I think it will do a lot of good in the Royal Air Force when they are able to read the noble Lord's statement. There is indeed one thing I would like to say. The noble Lord talked a good deal about the necessity of getting air superiority. I would again emphasize that air superiority depends upon organisation. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

DR. VLADIMIR CLEMENTIS.
LORD FARINGDON LORD FARINGDON had given Notice that he would call attention to the case of Dr. Vladimir Clementis, and ask His Majesty's Government the reason for his internment. The noble Lord said: My Lords, owing to the vagaries of the post it appears that this question, though posted last week, only arrived last night, and it has been represented to me that a more satisfactory answer could be given were I to postpone my question until your Lordships' next sitting day. This I have, therefore, consented to do, but in doing so I have to register a protest which I believe your Lordships would wish me to register. This question concerns a matter which, amongst others, I raised before the Recess, and to-day, as yet, I have received no answer whatsoever, though

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the noble Duke who replied for the Home Office promised me that all these points should be answered by the Department. I think your Lordships will agree with me that it is an intolerable situation if a Government Department is to be permitted to ignore subjects that are raised in Parliament.
LORD SNELL: I think this would be a convenient time for the House to adjourn during pleasure.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

GREATER LONDON'S WAR PROBLEMS.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL THE EARL OF LISTOWEL rose to draw attention to certain problems arising out of enemy attacks on Greater London; and move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I should like to begin by offering extremely sincere apology to any noble Lords who may have been inconvenienced by the postponement of this Motion from yesterday until to-day. It is one of the main difficulties of serving two masters, of having a civilian as well as a military occupation, that at certain times they are bound to conflict. I very much regret if any noble Lords came yesterday intending to speak and have been unable to return to the fray this afternoon. But I do not think your Lordships would require me to make any apology for raising this particular problem at this particular moment in your Lordships' House. I think it is generally admitted that existing facilities for the protection of the civilian population of London from air attack have been and are still inadequate, and that much remains to be done in the way of assistance for the homeless and destitute. There is a more personal reason for my raising this matter and that is that I represent on the London County Council one of the hardest hit areas in the south-eastern part of London, but while my thoughts are largely with my own people I hope that my observations will apply equally to all Londoners who are exposed to air attack.
I fear there has been a remarkable lack of foresight when envisaging the sort of onslaught that would be launched by the Luftwaffe on the London area, and we
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have to remedy our unpreparedness as speedily as possible. We have let many months pass by in which what we have to do now could well have been completed. The main error seems to have been to over-estimate the number of casualties which we should sustain and the amount of material damage that would be inflicted, and at the same time not to have foreseen the long night raids and their potential effect on health and nerves.
The two main measures of what we in the Army call "passive air defence" in London have been the provision of shelters and the arrangements that have been made for evacuating part at least of the civilian population. I am not a protagonist of any special type of shelter, and I do not believe that this is the moment to introduce any extensive innovation. If the deep underground shelter was regarded as unpracticable before the war surely the arguments which were used at that time are even more valid at the present moment. The essential thing seems to be, to my mind, that there should be a shelter of some sort, whether an Anderson shelter, an underground communal shelter or a reinforced basement, for all men, women and children living in the London area and carrying on their work from day to day. Furthermore, these shelters—and this is the immediate need—should be made sufficiently comfortable for people to spend nights in them without loss of sleep, without impairment of health and without any loss of efficiency when they go to their work on the following morning.
The Government have announced their intention, and we are exceedingly grateful for this announcement, of providing bunks, lighting, heating and proper sanitation throughout the London area. I venture to hope that the noble Duke will deal fully with these matters in the course of his reply. But the vital thing about these prospective measures is that they should be put into operation forthwith and after the minimum possible delay. The winter is already upon us, and the nights are getting longer and even more bitterly cold than they were during the early autumn. I know from experience—an experience that several of your Lordships no doubt share—what it is like to spend many hours on a frosty night in

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an unheated air-raid shelter. Can the Government—and I should like to address this question to the noble Duke—give us some idea of how soon they believe that the majority, at any rate, of the shelters of all kinds in the London area will be equipped with these elementary necessities?
An unsatisfactory feature of shelter policy has been the use hitherto made of the reinforced basements provided out of private funds by business firms under their premises. It is true that local authorities have been given the power to commandeer these shelters at night, when they are not being made use of by employees, for any household living in the immediate vicinity; but it is generally recognised that in very many cases this power has not been exercised by the borough council concerned. Speaking only last week in another place, the Home Secretary said—and I should like to quote his words:
"I have under consideration getting powers for myself to step in side by side with the local authorities and say 'Either you take that basement or I take it'".
Another question I would venture to address to the noble Duke is whether the Home Secretary has by now—and it is about a week since that statement was made—had the opportunity to give full consideration to the problem; and whether, as I hope, he has decided to exercise this power himself or through his representatives in all cases where it is not being exercised by the local authority on the spot.
The other aspect of defence against air attack is, of course, evacuation. It is obviously necessary that all civilians who are not compelled by their work and by their present usefulness to remain in a danger zone should be removed as soon as possible to a safer spot. It is gratifying to know that the evacuation of women and children from the London area is proceeding more and more rapidly from week to week. The figures are mounting steadily, but—and this indeed is a matter of grave concern to all of us—there are still nearly 200,000 children in the London area, and it has been estimated that not more than about 15 per cent of them are receiving any education at all. The only alternative to compulsory evacuation is for the Government to make voluntary evacuation more interesting and attractive. They should, I venture to suggest, intensify
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their evacuation propaganda among parents, pointing out the educational advantages as well as the greater safety of the children. I hope that they will take the further step of providing hostels for old people and for children who are above school age and who are at work in London, who have to be there, who have to be looked after, and for whom such comforts as can be provided should be made available.
It is also to be hoped that provision will be made for the married men who are left behind, so that wives and mothers will not feel that they are neglecting their family duties by taking their small children away into the country; and that is certainly, I think, the biggest obstacle at the moment to voluntary evacuation. The Government could do much to remove it by enhancing the attractiveness of moving out into less dangerous areas and lessening the inconveniences that will, I fear, be inevitably experienced by those members of the family who are left behind. Although the view is entertained in many quarters, I do not myself consider that compulsory evacuation would be justified unless and until the voluntary method has been tried to the uttermost.
Let me now turn for a moment to another aspect of this great problem, the plight of those who have lost their homes in the course of the night raids. Much has been done to alleviate their tragic lot, but much more remains to be done. For most of the East-Enders—and I am thinking principally of them—whose homes have been destroyed by air attacks, the most grievous loss is probably the destruction of their furniture and household and personal effects; because these they naturally regard as their own property, accumulated, it may be, over many years, whereas the house in which they live belongs to their landlord, to whom they pay their weekly rent. I share the view expressed last week by, I believe, my noble friend Lord Nathan, that not enough is being done to rescue whatever can be saved from these damaged homes. The local authorities have the power to remove the contents of derelict houses if their owners are unable to do so, but in fact they find these things extremely difficult to arrange. Household effects have therefore deteriorated by exposure to the weather. It is to be hoped that in this instance also

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the Government will be able to discharge this function wherever local authorities are unwilling or unable to discharge it.
In addition to those who have lost their personal effects and who are being compensated in a very small way by the Public Assistance authorities at the moment, there are thousands of families who have lost everything; and it is cold comfort to them to be told that after the war they will be fully compensated by the Government. We are extremely thankful that the Government intend to introduce a scheme for the compensation of the victims of air attacks, and no one maintains that all claims can be met as soon as the damage is done; but I should like to see some sort of provision in the Bill for payment to be made at the earliest possible moment to wage-earners who have lost their household effects. It will not help them at all, however, if they have to pay a premium under the voluntary insurance system, which I understand is part of the scheme proposed by the Government. I do not believe that the lower-paid wage-earners can afford even an exceedingly small premium. What is needed is for the voluntary compensation scheme to apply to the better paid wage-earners and to those with larger incomes, and a scheme of compensation which will cover the household effects as well as the house property, if any, of wage-earners who earn a weekly sum below a certain limit. I sincerely trust that if such a scheme is considered desirable by the Government they will not wait until the end of the war—which, as everyone fears, may be a very long way off—to put it into effect. It ought to be possible to arrange for some degree of priority under the compensation scheme, so that the lower-paid wage-earners receive what will, after all, amount to a very small sum, to provide for the losses which they sustain in the way of personal effects and household property, before the more well-to-do section of the community is compensated for its losses.
There is one comment which I should like to make on the broad question of the administration of civilian defence in the London area. It has been said in many quarters that the administrative authorities are far too numerous and varied and that they should be superseded by some sort of regional officer with dictatorial powers. I do not altogether share this
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view, and it seems to me that those who offer this criticism tend to over-simplify the immensely complicated administrative problem involved and its solution. There can be no doubt, of course, that something is seriously wrong. Only last week—if I may venture to quote an instance—I heard of several hundred homeless people in some tenements off the Commercial Road who were wandering about for a long time without knowing where to go. Ultimately, they were told by a policeman to find their way to a rest centre at a distance of about half an hour from their homes and, when they arrived there, they were told that there was another rest centre for them just a few streets away from where they lived. Much unnecessary hardship has been caused to these unfortunate people by ignorance of where to go and of what to do when they reach their destination. The Minister of Health announced last week that information officers will be appointed, and that in every borough representatives of all the different agencies which assist the homeless will be assembled under a single roof. That is an admirable instruction, if it can be carried out; but I should like to ask the noble Duke how many London boroughs have already acted upon the advice of the Ministry in this respect.
My main criticism of the existing administrative machinery in London is not so much of the existence of a multiplicity of authorities, which seems to be really inevitable when so many different aspects of the social organisation are involved, but rather the lack of co-ordination between them in the discharge of their separate functions. Furthermore, I cannot escape the conclusion that too great a burden of responsibility has been laid upon the borough councils, the local authorities on the spot. In addition to running their normal services under extraordinarily difficult circumstances they are now expected to undertake a vast amount of relief and A.R.P. work. The Minister of Health admitted last week in another place that one of the worst mistakes had been to throw too much work on the local authorities. I am convinced that this error has not as yet, whatever the intentions of the Government may be, been rectified. Finally, I should not like to pass from this topic without paying a very humble tribute to the spirit of our Londoners. They are suffering extreme and extraordinary hard-

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ships, they are making the heaviest sacrifices with a steadfastness and a cheerfulness that are, I believe, an example to the whole country. Their stubborn endurance, I venture to believe, will be a really memorable page in our British history. I beg to move for Papers.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE): My Lords, I think the House is indebted to the noble Earl opposite for having raised the subject and for the very carefully considered and studiously moderate speech which he has made. It covered a great deal of ground and the questions extend to other Departments than that for which I answer in this House, the Home Office. I hope my noble friend will realise that even though I may not be able to give him an answer on every point he has raised, every point will be carefully considered by the appropriate Department, and that though he may not get an answer this afternoon his speech will nevertheless bear fruit and will have been very well worth making.
He said, with I think some justice, that the mistake which the Government seem to have made was that of overestimating the casualties and underestimating the damage to property and the numbers of those who would be rendered homeless, and I am afraid I must admit that that is indeed the case. Our policy in regard to air-raid shelters was laid down as the result of a report made in April, 1939, not very long before the outbreak of war, by the Lord Privy Seal's Conference over which Lord Hailey presided and which was an exceedingly able, representative and authoritative body. It foresaw, I think, many of the difficulties, but did not foresee what has now become the principal difficulty with which the Government have to deal, and that is that the public, very naturally, desire a shelter which not only provides temporary shelter but also permanent living accommodation—a dormitory. I think the example of Barcelona, which was very carefully studied, may have done a good deal of damage in this respect. There raids occurred, and I think that, although it is very easy to be wise after the event, we might well have foreseen that what would occur in the event of a great war with Germany would not be occasional raids but a per-
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manent state of raid conditions, under which the public would very naturally desire shelter, and provision was made for raids. Shelters of all kinds have been provided—the local shelter, affording a very considerable degree of safety, and some deep shelters, not very many. I will not dwell on that point because the noble Earl opposite, I think quite rightly, said he did not stress it, and if deep shelters presented insuperable, or almost insuperable, difficulties before the war they present greater difficulties now.
But shelters of various kinds were provided—the Anderson, which has provided a very great measure of security indeed and has fully justified the hopes placed in it, and the local community street shelter, which has not been used so much as it should have been. These shelters are uninviting in appearance and any damage to them can be plainly seen, and for that and other reasons the public have not used them. Actually they have stood up to the tests extremely well. Your Lordships can have an opportunity not many minutes' walk from this House of seeing where a bomb has fallen not more than five yards from one of the brick surface shelters in which, I think, if it had been full certainly not more than two or three people would have been injured, I think none killed and the overwhelming majority of the people in that shelter would have been completely secure. Most shelters, I regret to say, have not been used as fully as is desirable. Companionship is always agreeable, and still more agreeable in times of stress and danger, and there has been a very understandable tendency on the part of the public to seek for communal shelters where companionship, always dear to the Londoner, is available.
My right honourable friend the Home Secretary referred in another place to the very real apprehension which he feels about this tendency to get together. He is new to his tremendous responsibility and is still engaged on a study of the facts and figures available, and on sizing up the situation. But I think without being indiscreet I can reasonably say that he will come down on the side of the policy of dispersal so far as possible, which was the policy of his predecessor in office, rather than on the policy of concentration. It is extremely hard to provide anything approaching 100 per cent, safety—one

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may say, I think, it is impossible. One big bomb may do damage even in the deepest shelter. It is quite impossible to provide deep shelter, and there is a very-real danger that roomy basements, tube stations, and places of that kind, which have the great attraction of comparative immunity from noise, may attract large numbers of people, and that the idea of safety which the silence gives may prove to be no more than an illusion.
It is possible, I think, to provide something like 100 per cent, of safety if you ignore some of the other factors which ought to be considered. A proper zigzag slip tunnel, with very little head cover to provide against falling splinter, affords a very large measure indeed of safety—the kind of shelter which we have provided for soldiers, for instance, which provides a very large measure indeed of safety, but it provides, of course, no comfort at all, and it is quite impossible and unreasonable to expect the population of London to spend its nights in trenches of that type. It is out of the question. As you increase the comfort, and therefore the space requiring to be covered, your danger increases very rapidly; and, as your Lordships may be aware, there have been some very regrettable cases of heavy-casualties having occurred in shelters which, because of their quietness, had earned the confidence of the public but which, in fact, had not proved to be safe.
I can assure the noble Earl that the Government are pressing on with great rapidity, in meeting this demand, which had not been foreseen, for what is called dormitory accommodation—that is, making a shelter not merely a temporary refuge for the duration of an air raid, but a place in which the family will spend its nights during the coming months. More than one million bunks are on order, and their installation will begin next week. That is a beginning, and a beginning only, of the Government's programme of bunks. The question of warming these shelters presents very great difficulty. My noble friend Lord Horder, as your Lordships will be aware, is Chairman of a Committee which is investigating this difficult subject. He had hoped to be here and to speak this afternoon, but I can well imagine that the demands upon him are very heavy, and it may well be that the
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events of last night have prevented his being here. I am sorry to say I do not see him, and therefore I shall not get his advice and he will not be able to inform your Lordships himself.
The problem of heating does present great difficulties. Almost all forms of stoves tend to set up poisonous fumes. You have the problem of limited space occupied by a very large number of people, and it is one of which it is very hard to see the solution. I can only tell your Lordships that it is being gone into by the men the Government thought best qualified to advise upon it, and it is under very active consideration at the present time. The question of lighting is also under consideration. There, again, there are great difficulties. Some people want to sleep, some do not. You cannot really have a light on in the shelter for some and out for others, and it is a question of very great difficulty.
I should like to emphasize the point that while the Anderson shelter cannot be used everywhere—there are many houses, flats, and so on where the Anderson shelter is quite impossible—it does provide, on the whole, the greatest measure of security it is possible to attain. It can under certain circumstances be heated, you do secure dispersal, and though a particular individual may be no safer in his Anderson shelter than elsewhere, the use of Anderson shelters by the public as a whole does provide a greater measure of security for a greater number of persons than any other form which has yet been devised. There have been most regrettable cases of people leaving their Anderson shelters for the greater companionship, greater quiet, and greater sense of security—though not real security—provided by a communal shelter, who would have been alive to-day if they had stayed in their Anderson shelters.
My noble friend paid a well-deserved tribute to the courage and endurance of the Londoner, and it has indeed been beyond all praise; but I ought also to say that he has in some cases not shown so much ability to self-help as would have been desirable. There have been cases—not many, but some—of individuals and families being killed in their Anderson shelters owing to the shelters not having been erected in a proper manner. The Anderson shelter does not set up to be itself entirely splinter or blast proof. It

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is designed to carry the weight of a certain amount of earth which will render it very largely proof against anything except what we call a very near miss. Some people have erected their shelters, taken the trouble to cover them with the right amount of earth, and have enjoyed immunity. Others have left their shelters with scarcely any earth protection, and shelters in that condition are still to be seen. I hope it will go out that the citizen who possesses a garden can, without very great difficulty to himself, so cover his Anderson shelter as to make it very much safer than the shelter itself, which is merely a tin hut and nothing else.
The noble Earl raised the question of evacuation. The figures are perhaps not entirely satisfactory, but evacuation is proceeding apace. About two thousand children are leaving London every week unaccompanied under evacuation schemes, and, accompanied by their mothers, between twenty thousand and twenty-four thousand are leaving weekly. That is making very substantial inroads on the number of children who are left in London. One of the astonishing features of the period through which we are passing is the great reluctance of the Londoner to leave not only London, but his own district of London. There is a very strong attachment to the life of the district to which the family belongs—to their neighbours, their circle of friends, and so on. I had anticipated there would be some criticism of the failure to find accommodation for the homeless. Actually there is no dearth of accommodation for the homeless. There are substantially more places available in reasonably safe basements, commandeered premises, shelters, and so forth than there are people willing to go into them. With regard to this question of the homeless there are eighty-five First Line Centres open in the County of London, all of which have their full complement of staff on duty day and night and a large majority of which have a nurse on duty every night. There is an information officer on duty at every rest centre in London.
Reverting for a moment to the question of shelters, my right honourable friend has in draft powers to take over privately-owned shelters which are not required by the firms at night, but so far it is believed that the local authorities are
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making full use of their powers to requisition these shelters. Though my right honourable friend is taking these powers, he has at present no evidence that he will have to use them. To go back to evacuation, I am sure my noble friend's remarks about further steps which may be taken to make evacuation more attractive will be very carefully considered. He is, so far as my study of the subjects leads me to believe, entirely correct in saying that one of the major difficulties in the way of the evacuation of women and children is that the woman is unwilling to leave her husband, who may be engaged on some vital task which he cannot leave. She does not know who will cook for him and mind his house, and therefore she is reluctant to leave him. That question is deserving of and will receive the most careful study.
The noble Lord also dealt with the question of compensation for the loss of furniture. I will bring to the attention of the proper authorities what he said. The whole subject is one of enormous complexity. What is being done at present is that those under a certain standard of income are being given immediately the wherewithal to make good the most pressing necessities. There is also coming into being a comprehensive insurance scheme which will enable those who have had the misfortune to lose all their possessions to be compensated at the expense of those who have not—a general fund on ordinary insurance principles. I am not quite clear whether the Government will, in fact, find it possible while hostilities last to compensate those who have lost their furniture beyond any immediate necessities either in cash or in kind, but it seems to me likely that the necessity will not arise, because, after all, a family which has been evacuated to other premises does not immediately require furniture.
Though I am not really in a position to speak for the Government on this subject it seems to me that if people are still living in London normally their furniture can be replaced, but, if they are being evacuated to the country, are being passed through rest centres and evacuated to other premises in the country, then compensation for the loss of furniture is not a pressing matter, because they will not require compensation until their home is rebuilt and they are in a position to occupy it again. While

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they are occupying billets, or are in hostels or other accommodation, the necessity that they should receive furniture is not pressing. Though I have not had an opportunity of discussing that particular question with my right honourable friend, it seems to me unlikely that the Government can put that matter high in the priority list, but what I would like to emphasize is that there are these eighty-five centres open, every one with its nurses and staff and information officer on duty.
The Government have also in mind the whole question of hostels, and are considering setting up a special body which will work in close co-operation with special commissioners to establish hostels for members of families who might be left behind. The aged and infirm are being looked after at First Line Centres from which they are gradually being evacuated into hostels on the fringe of Greater London, and into special institutions which are being set up for them in the county of Surrey. It can be said that the London County Council now have the running of the rest centres well in hand. The fourteen boroughs who were asked to requisition and to equip accommodation in advance for homeless people have taken over 2,438 properties with accommodation for 20,375 people, and 5,699 places are already in occupation which provide accommodation for between 14,000 and 15,000 people. It is estimated that about 30,000 homeless people have been billeted in the London region. The numbers of the homeless vary night by night, but, speaking generally, it can be said that in the last weeks there have been no homeless for whom, if they are willing to leave the district, accommodation could not be found.
The problem is a very serious one, and will become more serious as the winter goes on with the nights becoming longer and the weather more severe; but it can be said that London has stood up quite magnificently to a very heavy ordeal. The spirit of one people is not only unbroken but not even to the smallest degree dented or bent. London is carrying on and London will carry on, but as one goes about and sees the wanton and wicked damage that has been done I think one realises that the evil men who are responsible for it are making an entirely new chapter in history. Attila had a very bad
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name and it lasted a very long time, but Attila was a little plaster saint compared with the men with whom we are now dealing. I believe when this lamentable chapter of history is finished they will go down not for hundreds but for thousands of years to come as having been guilty of the greatest barbarity known in our history up to now. That barbarity will not win the war. The spirit of the Londoner and of the citizens of the other towns who are going through this horrible time wil defeat him. We shall come through and we shall achieve victory.
LORD STRABOLGI: Mr Lords, before my noble friend replies to the very interesting and sympathetic speech of the noble Duke, will your Lordships forgive me if I make two constructive suggestions upon this great problem? There is a great need now of looking ahead. My noble friend Lord Listowel in his admirable speech, if he will allow me to say so, dealt with the main picture of Greater London under fire, and the noble Duke in his sympathetic reply showed that every one of the points my noble friend referred to is being dealt with as quickly as possible. So far so good. But now it is very necessary to look ahead. The noble Duke spoke of a long winter and of the ordeal arising from the weather and longer nights. The two suggestions I make are the following.
The first is easily done and quickly. From my own observations there are not enough mobile canteens. I particularly have this from the Auxiliary Fire Services. They are frequently employed all night and they have no means, in spite of the good will of the inhabitants of the district, of getting even a cup of tea or a sandwich. They take out something with them, and are given biscuits, but that is about all. I have spoken to my noble friend Lord Woolton, the Food Controller, and he has ordered more canteens, but my impression is that many more are required. Wherever there is a big fire you ought to have a mobile canteen. You can extemporise them. You can have them fitted up on any commercial vehicle. They would be a splendid help to these people doing this great work.
The other matter is a much bigger one. I think you have to visualise the possibility of a long winter of attacks on Greater London and other cities. With regard to Greater London particularly, I

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think you will have to organise a wider system of reliefs. If people who are doing essential work can get a few nights of quiet rest in the country they will be much better fitted to withstand the ordeal. There are certain people, such as caretakers in large buildings, whose duty it is to stay in them and be ready to act in case of fire. These people, with broken nights and so on, ought to have something done for them. This is a matter which will require great organisation, but it can be done. These essential people have to be regarded as soldiers. Soldiers are only kept in the front line for a certain period and then they are given leave. You must, I suggest, do the same thing in this case. This is an aspect of the problem which I suggest should be given particular attention now. If you can bring people from the less battered towns to London and exchange places for a few days—I am sure they would be willing to do it—hard pressed people would get a much needed rest. I put forward the suggestion in a friendly spirit and with a desire to be helpful.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, with your permission may I say that I know that the question of mobile canteens is engaging the very careful attention of my noble friend the Minister of Food? He had hoped to be here this afternoon to take part in the debate with reference to this particular question. He has very many pressing calls on him at present, but I know that he is giving attention to the question. I will bring to the notice of the proper authorities the other questions which have been raised and I think they will be regarded as valuable.
VISCOUNT FITZALAN OF DERWENT: My Lords, I should like to put one point. I am not sure that it is in order, but with your Lordships' permission I will risk it. What I want to know is whether it is necessary, when we are told in the Press that a hospital in a certain district has been bombed, that we should not be told exactly what hospital has been bombed. The result is that every nurse and most of the patients in hospitals in the area are overwhelmed with inquiries from their relatives as to what has happened. Is it necessary to suppress the name of the hospital? I know the argument that it is better not to let the enemy know—I do not think much of it myself,
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but I understand it—but if that is so, why give the information at all? Why cannot the information be held back until it is possible to say definitely where the hospital is? That would not only relieve the telephone service but would relieve the anxiety of a great number of people.
LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, I rise for a moment only to deal with what seems to me a misapprehension under which the noble Duke labours. He has said that the replacement immediately of furniture is not necessary owing to the fact that people who have been rendered homeless and are evacuated will not require furniture until they return to their homes. I can assure the noble Duke from considerable experience in reception areas that one of the things that is threatening the success of any evacuation scheme is just this lack of furniture. Large numbers of people have been accommodated, and probably in the future more people will be accommodated, in requisitioned houses. Just before the recent intensification of the war in London there was a most undesirable return of evacuees to London and I believe you will get—and are probably getting already—even in the present appalling circumstances a return of evacuees to London.
I myself in the last two days have met three families in a rural area who have been put into requisitioned quarters. They came from Stepney and they told me that if they had enough money in their pockets they would return at once because the houses into which they had been put were completely without furniture. These people find anyhow the conditions in remote areas in the country unfamiliar and more or less disagreeable, but I think they might find them tolerable if the houses into which they were moved were adequately furnished. Local authorities have not the furniture, and although neighbours supply what they can they probably have evacuees in their own houses and have not much spare furniture. I do impress upon the noble Duke the desirability of reconsidering this question of the need of furniture. I assure him that to make evacuation successful furniture is one of the first essentials.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I think the noble Lord has rather misunderstood the position. Before I went on to deal with the general question of insurance and compensation I said that

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the weekly wage-earner who lost his furniture was compensated forthwith and given the wherewithal to replace immediate necessities. He does get immediately, through various organisations, the things that are immediately necessary, and it was after I said that these immediate necessities were being dealt with that I went on to speak of general insurance and replacement of furniture. I do not want to leave the noble Lord or any of your Lordships under any misapprehension. The people are receiving, with a minimum of delay, the wherewithal to replace the minimum furniture without which you cannot live in a house. I do not want your Lordships to be under a misapprehension that the Government do not think this is a necessity and an immediate priority necessity.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I should like to express my thanks to the noble Duke for the friendly and serious consideration of the points that I raised and his assurance that he would bring to the attention of the various Government Departments concerned my remarks. I was particularly pleased to hear that the installation of bunks in shelters will begin as early as next week and that the whole process of providing essential amenities is being speeded up. I do not wish to enter at this moment into a controversy about furniture, but I think there is perhaps a certain degree of misunderstanding on both sides of the House. What my noble friend Lord Faringdon meant was that furniture provided by the Public Assistance authorities was insufficient in an unoccupied and unfurnished house to make a comfortable home, while the Duke was concerned to point out that none of the evacuees are left without the indispensable necessities for sleeping and for the daily occupation of the house to which they are sent. But the point I endeavoured to make was that in fact they require the replacement of the furniture they have lost in order to make a comfortable home, and it would not cost the Government a great deal under any insurance scheme to cover the cost of replacement in these extremely hard cases. I sincerely hope that the Government will not expect the lower-paid wage earners to pay out premiums from their meager income in order to recover the whole value of the furniture they have lost after hostilities have ceased. On the whole, I am ex-
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tremely pleased, and I am sure anyone reading this debate will be equally gratified, by the assurances that the noble Duke has given on behalf of the Government. With those assurances in mind, I will ask your Lordships' permission to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (DETERMINATION OF NEED AND ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS) (AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS, 1940.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Moyne I beg to move that this draft Order be approved.
Moved, That the draft Order, as reported from the Special Orders Committee, be approved.—(Lord Snell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

NEWHAVEN (SUSSEX) PROHIBITORY ORDER, 1940.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lloyd I beg to move that this draft Order be approved.
Moved, That the draft Order, as reported from the Special Orders Committee, be approved.—(Lord Snell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932.
Orders made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, extending Section 1 of the Act to—

The Borough of Cheltenham;

The Borough of Stafford;

The Urban District of Saltburn and Marske-by-the-Sea;

The Rural District of Eton (Parish of Iver):

Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) for affirmative Resolution and ordered to lie on the Table.

SECRET SESSION.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, I beg to move that the further sitting of the House this day be secret.
Moved, That the further sitting of the House this day be secret—(Lord Snell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to and ordered accordingly.
The Official Reporter then withdrew.
House in Secret Session.
House adjourned.