§ 4.5 p.m.
§ LORD SNELLMy Lords, I beg to ask His Majesty's Government whether they have any statement to make on international affairs.
§ THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (Lord HANKEY)My Lords, I should like first to thank your Lordships for your indulgence in not pressing His Majesty's Government to make a statement earlier in the week on the operations in Norway. I know how many must have been longing for news even of the most meagre description. But noble Lords have realised the difficulty of making any such statement without disclosing information which would be of value to the enemy, and they have refrained from asking those questions to which they and the country have naturally been anxious to have an answer. We are afraid we must ask them to exercise their patience a little longer before we can give a full story, for it is impossible to make public as yet plans and movements which are not complete. We can therefore only make an interim statement to-day, but we hope that we may be able to say a good deal more early next week when no doubt the House will desire to debate the whole subject in the light of the information before them.
Your Lordships will remember that some three months ago we had made 229 preparations for the dispatch of an Allied force to the assistance of Finland. The possibility of reaching Finland was dependent upon the collaboration of the Governments of Norway and Sweden. Realising that even their acquiescence in the passage of Allied troops might involve them in an invasion by Germany, we prepared other forces to go to their assistance in that contingency. It did not escape our attention that in such a case Trondheim and other western ports of Norway, as well as the aerodrome at Stavanger, might well be the object of attack by Germany. Accordingly further forces again were made ready to occupy those places. I should, however, make it clear that the instructions to the commanders of these forces provided that they were only to proceed to the occupation in one of two conditions: either that they were invited to do so by the Norwegian Government, or that Norwegian neutrality had already been violated. Your Lordships are aware that permission to send troops to Finland through Norway and Sweden was refused and after a certain period the greater part of the forces which had been accumulated were dispersed, since both they and the ships which were allocated for their transport were wanted elsewhere.
About a month ago, however, it was decided that certain small forces should be kept in readiness to occupy Norwegian western ports at short notice in case of an act of aggression by Germany against South Norway. It will be noted again that any action contemplated by us on Norwegian soil was conditional upon prior violation of Norwegian neutrality by Germany. It has been asked how it was that in spite of these preparations Germany was able to forestall us. The answer is simple. It was by long planned carefully elaborated treachery against an unsuspecting and almost unarmed people. We had been aware for many months that the Germans were accumulating transports and troops in Baltic ports and that these troops were constantly being practised in embarkation and disembarkation. It was evident that some act of aggression was in contemplation but these enemy forces were equally available for attack upon Finland, Sweden, Norway, Holland, or this country, and it was impossible to tell beforehand where the blow would fall. Even if we had known that 230 Denmark and Norway were to be the victims we could not have prevented what happened without the co-operation of those countries. But in the belief that their neutrality would save them they took no precautions and they gave us no warning of an attack, which indeed they never suspected.
It will be remembered that in the early days of April, His Majesty's Government decided that they could no longer tolerate the continued use of Norwegian territorial waters as a long communication trench by which Germany could obtain constant supplies of iron ore and other contraband, and they had decided that on April 8 minefields would be laid at three points within Norwegian territorial waters which would force this traffic out on to the high seas where it could be intercepted. This date of April 8, decided upon by His Majesty's Government for this minor operation, coincided almost exactly with that chosen by the German Government for their long prepared invasion of Norway. The Norwegian campaign opened on Sunday, April 7, when we got information that a large German naval force was moving towards and along the west coast of Norway. That evening the main Battle Fleet and the Second Cruiser Squadron sailed from Scapa and Rosyth in the hope of engaging the enemy. On Monday, April 8, the First Cruiser Squadron sailed to join in the operations. On the morning of April 9, German land forces entered Denmark and, aided by internal treachery prepared long beforehand, naval forces seized and landed troops at Oslo, Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim.
On the same day His Majesty's ship "Renown," which was accompanying the destroyers watching over the minefield near Narvik, engaged the German Battle Cruiser "Scharnhorst" off the northern coast of Norway opposite Narvik in extremely bad weather conditions and low visibility, inflicting considerable damage, although full reports of this were not available until the 11th. In the meantime, our destroyers had discovered a number of enemy vessels which had entered the Narvik Fjord under cover of a snowstorm and on the next day they fought the action in which their gallant Commander, Captain Warburton-Lee lost his life and other losses were sustained, but in which heavy damage 231 was inflicted on the German destroyers and the merchant vessels in the fjord. In view of the obscurity of the situation in Central Norway and the importance of securing Narvik our first military forces which we had promptly assembled sailed direct to the Narvik area arriving there on the night of the 14th–15th, and I think actually on April 15. In the meantime, the very successful naval attack on April 13 completely destroyed the enemy's naval forces at that port and made it unnecessary to utilise for the capture of Narvik all the forces originally earmarked for that operation.
In deciding upon our further action the objectives which we had in view were: (1) To give all the support and assistance in our power to the Norwegians; (2) to resist or delay the German advance from the south; (3) to facilitate the rescue and protection of the Norwegian King and Government. It was obvious that these objectives could be most speedily attained if it were possible to capture Trondheim and, in spite of the hazardous nature of the operation with the Germans in possession of the place and in occupation of the only really efficient aerodrome in South-West Norway at Stavanger, we resolved to make the effort. Since any landing would probably be opposed, it was essential that the first contingents should go as light as possible to secure bases to which the heavier equipment could subsequently be transported, and two landing places were selected, respectively north and south of Trondheim. At Namsos in the north, naval forces landed on April 14, and were followed by British troops on the 16th–18th. A few days later the French Chasseurs Alpins landed, and the arrival of these staunch and experienced troops was a welcome support to our men. Part of this force advanced rapidly to the neighbourhood of Stenkjer to support the Norwegians who were known to be holding that place. South of Trondheim the naval party landed at Andalsnes on April 17, followed by troops on April 18 and 19. These advanced to the important railway junction of Dombaas, and a contingent went on to the south and joined the Norwegians who were opposing at Lillehammer the main German advance from the south.
I cannot to-day give any details of the fighting which has taken place on both 232 fronts since the landing took place. All that can be said at present is that our troops fought with gallantry and determination and inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy. Nevertheless, the Allied forces in these regions were faced, as we had realised that they would be faced, with serious difficulties. Foremost amongst these was the fact that the available aerodromes were already in enemy hands. The most effective defence against air attack—the use of fighter aircraft—was thus largely denied to us, and any noble Lords who have suffered the experience of being bombed from the air by low-flying aeroplanes will know how greatly the supply and movement of troops are hampered. In the circumstances, it became evident to us some days ago that it would be impossible, owing to the German local air superiority, to land the artillery and tanks which would be necessary in order to enable our troops to withstand the enemy drive from the south. It must be remembered that in spite of the magnificent work by British submarines and a French flotilla in the Skaggerak and the unceasing efforts of the R.A.F. particularly in bombing the aerodromes at Aalborg in Denmark the starting point, and Oslo the landing place of German troop carriers, it has always been possible for the Germans with their usual disregard of life, even of their own people, to send reinforcements to Norway at a much greater rate than would be open to us with the inadequate landing places we have to rely on.
Accordingly, we decided last week that we must abandon any idea of taking Trondheim from the south and that we must therefore withdraw our troops from that area and transfer them elsewhere. The operation of withdrawal in face of the enemy is one which has always been recognised as among the most delicate and difficult of military operations and the action of Sir John Moore at Corunna, though accompanied by heavy loss of life including the Commander, has taken its place among the classic examples of British military skill. In the present instance, we have been more fortunate. Thanks to the powerful forces which the Navy was able to bring to bear and the determination and skilful dispositions of General Paget in command of the British land forces in the area, backed by the splendid courage and tenacity of the 233 troops, we have now withdrawn the whole of our forces from Andalsnes under the very noses of the German aeroplanes, without, as far as we are at present aware, losing a single man in this operation, though of course our information is not yet complete. His Majesty's Government would like to express their profound admiration for the manner in which all ranks have performed their tasks in the area south of Trondheim. We cannot yet give the House particulars of the casualties which our forces have sustained in the various operations, but we hope and we have some reason to believe that they have not been heavy in proportion to the scale of operations. We expect that we shall be able to get more detailed reports before long and we trust that this most distressing but inevitable period of uncertainty may not be prolonged. Although, in face of the overwhelming difficulties of the situation, it has not been possible to effect the capture of the town we are satisfied that the balance of advantage lies up to the present with the Allied forces.
It may be useful to examine this point in somewhat greater detail. We have no doubt that the Germans expected a walk-over in Norway, as in Denmark. That expectation has been frustrated by the courage of the Norwegian people and by the efforts of the Allies. After three weeks of war in which heavy losses have been sustained by the enemy on the sea, on land and in the air, Norway is not conquered, while the considerable supplies of ore which Germany was formerly obtaining from Narvik have been indefinitely suspended. During the period of just over three weeks the German naval losses amount to a serious figure. They include two capital ships damaged; certainly three, possibly four, cruisers sunk; eleven destroyers sunk, and five U-boats sunk. Thirty transports and store ships have been sunk, scuttled, or set on fire, with a loss of several thousands of lives. A further ten transport or store ships have been struck by our torpedoes and probably sunk. The losses sustained by the Royal Navy in the same period are: Four destroyers, three submarines, one sloop and five trawlers sunk. Five other warships have been damaged by air attack. One store-ship has also been sunk by U-boat torpedo.
234 It will be seen from these figures that, whereas the strength and efficiency of the Royal Navy has been little, if at all, affected, the injury to the Germany Navy has been so substantial as to alter the entire balance of naval power, and to permit an important redistribution of the main Allied fleets. In this connection I might mention that it has been thought possible to revert to the more normal distribution of ships in the Mediterranean which has for some time been affected by our requirements in the North Sea. A British and French battle fleet with cruisers and ancillary craft is already in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean on its way to Alexandria. Returning to the Norway campaign, the German losses in men, whether from the sinking of war vessels, from the destruction of transports or in the course of the fighting in Norway itself on land and in the air, cannot be estimated with any accuracy, but they must have amounted to many thousands. At this moment, I would say to any who may be drawing hasty conclusions from the fact that for the present we have not succeeded in taking Trondheim, "It is far too soon to strike the Norwegian balance sheet yet, for the campaign has merely concluded a single phase in which it is safe to say that if we have not obtained our objective, neither have the Germans achieved theirs, while their losses are far greater than ours."
But His Majesty's Government would take this opportunity of addressing a warning both to this House and to the country. We have no intention of allowing Norway to become merely a side show, but neither are we going to be trapped into such a dispersal of our forces as would leave us dangerously weak at the vital centre. We know that our enemy hold a central position. They have immense forces always mounted ready for attack and the attack can be launched with lightning rapidity in any one of many fields. We know that they are prepared, and would not scruple, to invade Holland or Belgium or both. Or it may be that their savage hordes will be hurled against their innocent neighbours in the South-East of Europe. They might well do more than one of these things in preparation for an attempt at a large-scale attack on the Western Front or even a lightning swoop on this country. It would be foolish indeed to reveal 235 to the enemy our conception of the strategy best calculated to secure their defeat. But this can be said—for it is obvious—that we must not so disperse or tie up our forces as to weaken our freedom of action in vital emergencies which may at any moment arise. We must seize every chance, as we have done and shall continue to do in Norway, to inflict damage upon the enemy, but we must not allow ourselves to forget the long-term strategy which will win the war.
Let me repeat, my Lords, that what I have said is only an interim statement. Certain operations are in progress, and we must do nothing which might jeopardise the lives of those engaged in them. My statement has been necessarily somewhat lengthy, I fear, and I cannot expect that your Lordships will have been able to familiarise yourselves with this account of those difficult and intricate naval, military and aerial operations from simply listening to my record of them. I have no doubt, therefore, that your Lordships will wish to consider this statement in its printed form in the OFFICIAL REPORT, and to decide thereafter as to whether it is desirable to raise these matters in debate. I understand that a debate on the Government statement is being arranged in another place next week, and the Government will be pleased to arrange for similar opportunities for a debate in this House, if it so please your Lordships, before we rise for the Whitsuntide adjournment. I am aware that Tuesday and Wednesday afternoons are already taken up with important matters for debate, but at present there is no business on the Paper for Thursday next, and it might be convenient therefore, if there is to be a debate, if the noble Lord who sits opposite would be good enough to put down a Motion for that afternoon. He was good enough at my request to take a Motion off the Paper which would have allowed discussion of these matters this afternoon, and so I am particularly anxious to consult his convenience in every way so far as the business already on the Paper makes this possible.
§ 4.30 p.m.
§ LORD SNELLMy Lords, first of all, I beg to thank the noble Lord for the statement which he has made to the House, a statement which is very important and perhaps even in its 236 character. It appears to cover a period of crisis in the history of our country and it deals with events which may seriously affect its future. His Majesty's Government have made an urgent request that the matters contained in this statement shall not be the subject of debate to-day and we shall comply with that request. At the same time I ought to say that we are, as a Party, far from happy concerning certain events and concerning the preparations made to deal with them. Before the House rises for the Recess many questions must be asked which, because of Parliament's responsibility to the nation, we shall ask. The Government have suggested that Thursday of next week will be a convenient time for such a discussion to take place and through the usual channels—if those channels flow in your Lordships' House—the day and hour can be arranged.
§ 4.32 p.m.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, I should only like to say that of course the gravity of the statement made by my noble friend is appreciated not only by the Opposition but by all your Lordships. I do not desire to call in question the arrangement under which the debate upon it may take place next Thursday, but I understood my noble friend to say just now that the only reason for not taking it earlier was that there was important business on Tuesday and Wednesday. There can be no business so important as this and I can assure the Government—I am sure your Lordships will agree—that if it were thought well to take the debate earlier, any noble Lord who is in charge of business on Tuesday or Wednesday would be only too proud to give way to the general convenience of your Lordships' House.
§ 4.33 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGIMy Lords, as I had a little to do with the proposed arrangement for a debate—although of course the arrangement depends on your Lordships' approval—may I be allowed to point out one consideration which affected my noble friend and noble Lords opposite as well as noble Lords in the Liberal Party? It was that we understood that a debate would take place in another place on Tuesday next and that by Thursday the situation might be clarified. Therefore, if the debate in your Lordships' house took place on 237 Thursday, instead of going over the same ground as members in another place we might perhaps explore fresh territory. In settling this matter, of course, your Lordships must have the final word.
§ 4.34 p.m.
§ LORD HANKEYMy Lords, as your Lordships know, I am not very familiar with these questions of procedure, but if the suggestion made by my noble friend the Marquess of Salisbury appeals to those noble Lords who have put Motions on the Paper for Tuesday or Wednesday, it would be perfectly convenient to have an earlier debate so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned. Perhaps the matter could be arranged, as the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition said, through the usual channels.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThat will be the better plan, to arrange it through the usual channels.