§ LORD ADDISONMy Lords, may I ask the Foreign Secretary whether His Majesty's Government are in a position to make any statement on the war situation with especial reference to the French warships?
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (VISCOUNT HALIFAX)My Lords, I have no doubt that it is a principal desire of your Lordships, as it is implicit in the question that the noble Lord has just put to me, that I should give information as full as possible with regard to the action which His Majesty's Government have found it necessary to take in regard to certain units of the French Navy, and I would apologise for the necessity under which I am of making a statement perhaps rather longer than your Lordships might naturally demand. As soon as the French Government informed us that they might be unable to continue the war, your Lordships will appreciate that the future of the French Fleet at once became a matter of direct and vital concern to His Majesty's Government. On June 15, your Lordships will remember, the French Government formally asked from His Majesty's Government authorisation to inquire what Armistice terms would be offered to France by the German and Italian Governments, and if such authorisation was obtained the French Government declared among other things that the surrender of the French Fleet to Germany would be considered an unacceptable condition. His Majesty's Government replied to the effect that although the Anglo-French Agreement forbidding separate peace negotiations, whether for armistice or peace, involved the honour of France, His Majesty's Government nevertheless gave their full consent to an inquiry by the French Government to ascertain the terms of an Armistice for France, provided, but only provided, that the French 777 Fleet was sailed forthwith for British harbours pending negotiations. His Majesty's Government also stated that they expected to be consulted as soon as the Armistice terms were received.
In returning this reply His Majesty's Government felt that, the military situation being what it was, it was impossible for them to return a blank negative to an appeal put forward by their Ally at a moment of the greatest difficulty and stress. On June 17, however, Marshal Pétain formed a new French Government and immediately asked for terms of Armistice. The French Fleet was not sailed for British ports, but the new French Minister for Foreign Affairs gave a formal assurance that the most dishonouring condition of an Armistice would be the surrender of the Fleet and that that would in no circumstances be accepted. I will not here recapitulate formal and explicit assurances which were received in the ensuing days that on no conditions and in no circumstances would any unit of the French Fleet be handed over to the enemy. These assurances were received not only from the French Government as a whole but also individually from Marshal Pétain, from Admiral Darlan, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and from other Ministers and leading personalities at Bordeaux.
But, my Lords, the Armistice terms, when conveyed to us and made public, finally contained a provision concerning the French Fleet which was in direct conflict with these assurances. The Armistice provided for the demilitarisation of the Fleet under German and Italian control and, except for a part of the Fleet destined for the protection of Colonial interests, all French ships were to be recalled to France. And, with the important exception of "units necessary for coast surveillance and mine-sweeping"—an exception that in our view was capable of expansion under German interpretation—there was only an assurance from the German Government that they would not during the war use the French Fleet stationed in ports under German control. After the Armistice was signed His Majesty's Government continued to rely upon the solemn promises, both collective and individual, which they had received from the French Government and its members, but it was all too plain that by accepting the Armistice terms the 778 French Government had put themselves in an equivocal position and they had become wholly dependent on the good faith of the German Government for their own ability to carry out the promises made to His Majesty's Government. Moreover, the Armistice terms provided that they could be denounced at any moment, with the consequence that the German Government would be absolved from any undertaking given if the French Government, in the view of the German Government, did not fulfil all their obligations under the terms.
As the period for the completion of the Armistice conditions drew near all the dangers implicit in them became immediate. It was clear that the units of the French Fleet were preparing to submit to demilitarisation under German and Italian control, and a formal request was made to His Majesty's Government to allow units of the French Fleet in British ports to put to sea. His Majesty's Government thus found themselves in a hideous dilemma. It was impossible for them to rely on the unsupported word of the German Government that the French Fleet would not be used against us, and thus acquiesce in the handing over of this formidable naval force into German hands. But if on the other hand they were unwilling to accept that situation, they were faced with the grim alternative of preventing the handing over of the French ships, and therefore in the last resort of using force against their former comrades in arms. In the event His Majesty's Government decided that, determined as they were to prosecute the war to a victorious conclusion, they had no option but to do what they could to ensure that the best ships of the French Navy should not be used against this country and Empire by their enemy.
The Vice-Admiral commanding British Forces in the Western Mediterranean was accordingly ordered to approach the French Admiral commanding at Oran and to demand that the French Fleet under his orders should act in accordance with one of the following alternatives:—Firstly, to sail with the British Fleet and to continue to fight for victory against the Germans and Italians; secondly, to sail with reduced crews to a British port, the crews to be repatriated at the earliest moment. If either of these courses were adopted His Majesty's Government under- 779 took to restore the ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they were damaged meanwhile. Alternatively, if the French Admiral felt bound to stipulate that his ships should not be used against the Germans and Italians unless they broke the Armistice, the French ships should be sailed with reduced crews to a French port in the West Indies or, if the United States Government agreed, be entrusted to the United States in order that they might be demilitarised and remain safe until the end of the war; the crews being repatriated. If these offers were refused, the French Admiral was required to sink his ships within six hours. Finally, if the French Admiral refused to agree to any of these conditions he was informed that whatever force might be necessary would be used to prevent his ships from falling into German or Italian hands.
We had hoped that one or other of the alternatives which we presented would have been accepted without the necessity of using the terrible force of a British battle squadron which arrived before Oran in the course of yesterday. This battle squadron was commanded by Vice-Admiral Somerville, who distinguished himself only a short time ago in bringing off 100,000 Frenchmen during the evacuation of Dunkirk, and who was further provided with a cruiser force and strong flotillas. All day the parleys continued and we hoped, until the afternoon, that our terms would be accepted without bloodshed. However, probably under orders dictated by the Germans from Wiesbaden, where the Franco-German Armistice Commission is in session, the French Admiral Gensoul refused 10 comply and announced his intention of fighting. Admiral Somerville was therefore ordered to complete his mission before darkness fell, and at 5.53 p.m. he opened fire upon this powerful French Fleet, which was also protected by its shore batteries. At 6 p.m. he reported that he was heavily engaged. The action lasted some twenty minutes and was followed by heavy attacks from our naval aircraft carried in the "Ark Royal." At 7.20 p.m. Admiral Somerville forwarded a further report, which stated that a battle cruiser of the "Strasbourg" class was damaged and ashore, that a battleship of the "Bretagne" class had been sunk, and that another of the same class 780 had been heavily damaged. Two French destroyers and the seaplane carrier "Commandant Teste" were also sunk or burned.
While this melancholy action was being fought, the other battle cruiser of the "Strasbourg" class managed to slip out of harbour in a gallant effort to reach Toulon or a North African port and place herself under German control. She was pursued by the aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm and hit by at least one torpedo. She may, however, have been joined by some other French vessels from Algiers, as she was well placed for the purpose, and may even have reached Toulon before we were able to overtake her. She will, at any rate, be out of action for a considerable time. I fear that the loss of life among the French and in the harbour must have been heavy, as His Majesty's ships were compelled to use a very severe measure of force. None of the British ships taking part in the action was in any way affected in gunpower or mobility by the heavy fire directed upon them. We have not yet received any reports of our casualties, but I am advised that Admiral Somerville's Fleet is, in all military respects, intact and ready for action.
At Alexandria, where a strong British battle fleet is lying, there are four French cruisers, of which two are modern, and a number of smaller vessels. These have been informed that they cannot be permitted to leave harbour and thus fall within the power of the Germans. Protracted negotiations, with the details of which I shall not trouble the House, have been going on for several days and measures have now been taken to ensure that these ships, which are commanded by a very gallant Admiral, shall be sunk or otherwise made to comply with our wishes. We shall, of course, offer the fullest facilities to all French officers and men at Alexandria who wish to continue the war and will provide for them and maintain them during the conflict. We have also promised to repatriate all the rest and every care in our power will be taken, if they allow it, for their safety and comfort.
In home ports, two battleships, two light cruisers, some submarines, including a very large one the "Surcouf," eight destroyers and approximately 200 smaller but extremely useful mine-sweeping and anti-submarine craft, which lay, for the most part, in Portsmouth and 781 Plymouth, were boarded by superior forces after brief notice had been given wherever possible to their Captains. This operation, I am glad to say, was successfully carried out without resistance or bloodshed, except in one instance. Through a misunderstanding a scuffle arose in the submarine "Surcouf" in which one British leading seaman was killed and two British officers and one rating wounded; and one French officer was also killed and one wounded.
For the rest, the French sailors accepted the end of a period of uncertainty. A considerable number—800 or 900—expressed a desire to continue the war and some have asked for British nationality. This we are ready to grant without prejudice to other Frenchmen, numbered by thousands, who prefer to fight with us as Frenchmen. All the rest of the crews will be immediately repatriated to French ports, if the French Government are able to make arrangements for their reception. We are also repatriating all the French troops who were in this country, with the exception of those who, of their own free will, have volunteered to follow General de Gaulle and enlist in the French Forces of liberation of which he is chief. Several French submarines have also joined us independently and we have accepted their services. A large proportion of the French Fleet has therefore passed into our hands, been put out of action or otherwise withheld from Germany by yesterday's events. The House will not expect me to say anything about other French ships which are still at large, except that it is the inflexible resolve of His Majesty's Government to do everything that is possible in order to prevent them falling into the German grip.
That is the plain narrative of the action which His Majesty's Government, after full consideration, thought it right to take; but while we have thought it right, as it was in my view also inevitable, there will be no one I think in this House, or indeed in any quarter in this country, who will not share the distress and sorrow of His Majesty's Government for these events. It is melancholy to reflect that the magnificent ships of the French Navy should have been prevented by their Government from continuing the struggle with their comrades in arms against the common foe, but should rather have been ordered to resist their former comrades 782 in order that they might place themselves under enemy control. The officers and men of the French Navy were placed in a position which must have seemed to them well-nigh intolerable. As regards the Government of Marshal Pétain, I am bound to observe that they placed the redemption of a promise to the enemy before the fulfilment of a solemn pledge to an Ally and this, your Lordships will appreciate, brought to a point the cruel dilemma in which, as I said just now, His Majesty's Government were placed by the acceptance by the French Government of the Armistice terms.
But, my Lords, it is not on reproaches or on recriminations that His Majesty's Government would rest their case. It is, I suppose, inevitable that what has passed, distorted as it will be by enemy propaganda, must create sharp resentment in France, where already the distress of war and the harsh conditions of the Armistice have strained public feeling almost to breaking point, and it is not difficult to realise what is likely to be the feeling among the officers and men of the French Navy, among the members of the French Government, and among the French people. Nor is it necessary to translate into words the feelings which are uppermost in the minds of all those here who have felt that on a close union of the United Kingdom and France depended the victory of our common cause, and who still feel that the relations of our two countries must, for good or for ill, be powerful upon the future of the world. But it is also true, and it is on this fact that His Majesty's Government have based their action, that it is only through a victory of British arms that the liberation of France herself can be achieved, and therefore we in this country, who are determined to resist to the end and at whatever cost the German attempt to dominate Europe, must rely upon the power of the French nation sooner or later to appreciate the final purpose of the British people and to judge fairly of the cruel choice which the French Government, under German pressure, had so unhappily forced upon us.
§ 4.25 p.m.
§ LORD ADDISONMy Lords, I am sure it will not be our wish to discuss now that dramatic and terrible statement of the Foreign Secretary. I believe that every-one of us in his heart believes that no other course in the circumstances was 783 possible, terrible as it is, and one cannot help feeling that there must be many French sailors who were alongside us in rescuing their comrades from death at Dunkirk who will feel the same. It was unthinkable, not only to us, but, I cannot help feeling, to every Frenchman, that their Navy, having been alongside us in battle and in rescue so recently, should become an instrument of our common enemy. The noble Viscount said that he had in mind other French ships, and I think that in that he included many of the merchant ships which would be capable of conversion into cruisers. I think everyone of us in his heart believes that this courageous action, forced upon His Majesty's Government by the cruel circumstances of the time, was indispensable to the achievement of victory and for the preservation of our liberty.
§ 4.27 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEMy Lords, I have very little to add to what has fallen from the noble Lord, Lord Addison. Your Lordships will understand that my own experiences make this grievous event more painful to me even than it will be to all of your Lordships in some degree. I feel that the course which His Majesty's Government have taken was the only possible one in the circumstances. It is almost incredible that any French Government should have thought it possible to accept the German engagement to make no use of the French ships when they had fallen into German hands. No child would accept their statement as being of the faintest value. Therefore, the course which His Majesty's Government had to take was the only course; but it is a bitter disappointment that it had to be carried out in the necessarily extreme form of which the noble Viscount has given us an account. One would have hoped that the Chiefs of the French Navy, almost to a man, would have refused to accept the decision of the present French Government to allow France to become something not very far removed from a German Protectorate. I cannot help believing that in the hearts of the great majority of French sailors that feeling is predominant.
It is, of course, true as the noble Viscount said, that the French seamen were placed in a terrible dilemma. It is the first instinct of every sailor to obey orders, and when those orders came from 784 the French Government they were faced with the terrible alternative of disobeying Government orders or of deserting their Allies. As this special commander chose to take the line of senseless obedience rather than of patriotic duty, he and his men have had to pay the penalty. I am sure that, however much the whole tale may be distorted, as it will be, all over the world it will be recognised that His Majesty's Government could take no other course. One is irresistibly reminded of what happened more than a hundred years ago when the Danish Fleet was seized when Napoleon was endeavouring to fix the Continental System on Europe and to starve us out. But this is a harder case than that. England had not then the same sentiment for the Danes which we have so long been feeling for France. We cannot forget that in these recent months the French Navy has played a splendid part in assisting convoys, in working with submarines, and only the other day in helping in the escape from Dunkirk. We bear these matters in mind and certainly we feel no resentment towards the French Navy whatever we may feel towards the present French Government, on which I should prefer not to speak. I therefore merely once more register what I am sure is the feeling of all your Lordships, that His Majesty's Government had no choice in undertaking a most painful duty.
§ 4.34 p.m.
§ LORD CHATFIELDMy Lords, as one who had a considerable amount to do with bringing about the comradeship between the British and French Navies I should like to augment what the noble Marquess has just said, in that, despite this most unpleasant and unfortunate affair, I do not think that any British sailor will be hasty to criticise or to condemn the unfortunate French Admiral and his officers who were driven—by force possibly beyond their control—to refuse the reasonable and very proper alternatives which were offered him by the British Government. We have not heard of course a great deal from the noble Viscount as to the conditions under which this action was fought—no doubt that will appear in due course in the newspapers—whether the French Fleet was at anchor and whether the loss of even one ship from Oran was due to skilful handling or in some other way. I am sure that Admiral Somerville must 785 have greatly regretted that he did not bag every ship that was in Oran harbour. We are also unaware of the proportion of the French Fleet that still remains to be utilised by the Germans, especially her submarines and destroyers, but I understand that we have got a very considerable number of those vessels in our possession. I should like to say how I sympathise with the British Navy in having had to carry out this painful operation, and at the same time most heartily to congratulate the Government on their determined action, which I am sure has the support not only of your Lordships' House but of everyone in this country.