Lords Sitting of 10 December 1940

Preamble
The House met, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

FINANCIAL HELP FOR CHINA.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Addison, I beg leave to ask His Majesty's Government a question of which he has given private notice—namely, whether their attention has been drawn to the financial assistance which the United States Government propose to give to China, and whether His Majesty's Government have under consideration the grant of similar assistance for China's sterling needs.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS(VISCOUNT HALIFAX): My Lords, the United States Government announced on November 30 their intention of extending to the Government of China large credits for strengthening the United States dollar resources available to the Chinese monetary authorities and for other purposes. His Majesty's Government, for their part, having regard to the importance of their financial and economic relations with China, have now decided to grant further financial assistance to that country. It is, of course, necessary for His Majesty's Government to conserve their gold and dollar assets for the essential war needs of the sterling area, and they cannot offer to China United States dollars or sterling which is convertible into United States dollars. Provided, however, that suitable arrangements can be made to ensure that sterling held in China is available only for use in the sterling area, His Majesty's Government are prepared in principle to make an advance of £5,000,000 to the Chinese Stabilisation Fund, and, with the concurrence of the Dominion Governments concerned, to grant credits which will be available for purchases in any part of the sterling area within a maximum of a further £5,000,000. This decision has been communicated to the Chinese Government with a request that they will make arrangements for the early negotiation of the preliminary technical agreement on which the possibility of these further sterling credits depends.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend, I should like to thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement. It was not clear what is the total amount involved. Is it £10,000,000?
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: Yes.
LORD STRABOLGI: On behalf of my noble friend and my Party—we have already discussed this matter—may I say that the statement of His Majesty's Government is very welcome?

OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, my noble friend has also given private notice of another question addressed to His Majesty's Government. I regret that he has been delayed and on his behalf I wish to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give any information about the operations in the Western Desert.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: My Lords, as I told the House some months ago, the collapse of France seriously endangered our position in the Mediterranean, and made the task of defending Egypt from an Italian invasion one of extreme difficulty, the more so as we were compelled to face the menace of invasion ourselves at home. However, by the time my right honourable friend the Secretary of State paid his important visit to the Middle East in October, sufficient reinforcements of men and material had reached Sir Archibald Wavell, commanding the British and Imperial Army of the Nile—sufficient not only to give a greater feeling of security, but to open the possibility of an assumption of the offensive. At this moment, however, the Italian invasion of Greece made it necessary for us to send a considerable part of our Air Force from Egypt to aid the Greek Army in their heroic defence of their native land. As the House knows, the part played by the Royal Air Force in the Greek victories has been most important, and we have received the warmest expressions of gratitude from the Greek King and Government for the aid we were able to give.
The serious temporary diminution of our Air Force in Egypt made it necessary somewhat to delay the execution of the offensive plans which had been matured,

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and it was not until the beginning of this month that our Air Force in Egypt was once again in a position to afford the necessary support to a forward movement. Accordingly, on the night of December 7, a strong detachment from the Army of the Nile under Sir Maitland Wilson, comprising British and Imperial troops and a detachment from the Free French Forces, advanced towards the positions which the Italians had fortified since their incursion across the Egyptian frontier three months ago. It will be realised that the operation of advancing almost in a single bound across seventy-five miles of desert is one which is by no means free from hazard and complexity when considerable forces are employed. It was with satisfaction that His Majesty's Government learnt that this long and rapid approach had been successfully accomplished. Yesterday morning, the 9th, our forces came into contact with the enemy at various points over a wide front stretching from Sidi Barrani on the coast into the desert.
An attack was delivered against the positions of the Italian centre to the southward of Sidi Barrani. In the first defended area which was assaulted and overrun, 500 prisoners and some war material fell into our hands, the Italian General in command was killed, and his second in command was captured. Later in the day, a further advance was made into a second and stronger and more important position nearer to the coast, and more prisoners and materials were taken. Other British forces also reached the coast between Sidi Barrani and Buq-Buq, making further captures of transport and prisoners. It is too soon to attempt to forecast either the scope or the result of the considerable operations which are in progress. But we can at any rate say that the preliminary phase has been successful.
The British Mediterranean Fleet and the Royal Air Force are of course co-operating closely with the Army. British warships have bombarded the various coastal positions involved in the fighting, including particularly Maktila and Sidi Barrani. Some details of the Air action have been received. On the 8th a heavy attack was made by our bombers on the enemy aerodrome at Benghazi where about 25 tons of bombs were dropped effectively on hangars and among aircraft. On the same night Air
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attacks were made on the Italian advanced aerodromes in prelude to the morning's action; and throughout yesterday our bombers continuously harassed the Italian advanced aerodromes, while our fighter aircraft, in which Hurricane squadrons arc conspicuous, made low-flying machine-gun attacks on enemy troops and motor transport, causing substantial loss. We shall no doubt receive further news shortly.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932:
BOROUGH OF GRANTHAM ORDER.
COUNTY BOROUGH OF BOURNEMOUTH ORDER.
CITY OF NORWICH ORDER.
COUNTY BOROUGH OF DONCASTER ORDER.
URBAN DISTRICT OF NEWMARKET ORDER.
URBAN DISTRICT OF SUTTON-lN-ASHFIELD (WEST WARD) ORDER.
COUNTY BOROUGH OF GRIMSBY ORDER.
BOROUGH OF RYDE ORDER.
RURAL DISTRICT OF WAYLAND (PARISH OF ATTLEBOROUGH) ORDER.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND BURMA (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE): My Lords, I beg to more that the Orders made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department under the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, and laid before the House on the 27th November last, be approved.
Moved, That the Orders made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department under the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, and laid before the House on the 27th of November last, be approved.—(The Duke of Devonshire.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: My Lords, I beg to move that the sitting of the House to debate the Motion on the Paper this day in the name of my noble friend Lord Trenchard be held in secret.
Moved, That the sitting of the House to debate the Motion on the Paper this day in the name of Viscount Trenchard be secret.—(Viscount Halifax.)
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD VISCOUNT TRENCHARD, who had given Notice that he would ask His Majesty's Government whether they stand by their declaration of the 16th of October last on the organisation of the Royal Air Force; and move for Papers, said: My Lords, I feel I must oppose with great diffidence the Motion that the House go into Secret Session. I am speaking on my own behalf on this subject. This is an agitation which I did not start; it was started in a small section of the Press and I cannot see that there is anything in the remarks I was going to make upon the subject that would in any way endanger the interests of the country. I feel that when an agitation like that which I have indicated is started, there should be some answer to it, and the only means I have of getting an answer is to raise the matter in your Lordships' House. Therefore I would oppose the Motion that the House go into Secret Session. I do not know if there is any other way out of the difficulty—whether it is not possible, for instance, to allow the opening speeches to be made in public and for the Government to make their statement in Secret Session, if that is desired. The drawback to a Secret Session is that nothing is recorded and one cannot convey to the public the remarks that one makes to the Government. What is said through a third person from memory alone cannot convey to the country the importance of the subject. Therefore I must, with all diffidence, oppose this Motion.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Trenchard asked me to raise this question. I was not quite sure whether I should be able to be present and he put it down in his name. I would make an appeal to the Leader of the House to accept the view, if that is at all possible, that at least the opening speech and a few words from me in agreement should be made in public, for what we shall say is only upon the general problem whether you should maintain the integrity of the Royal Air Force with which the noble Lord and I desire to deal. We want to emphasize that, and we want the Government, as we think they will do,
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to say that, by and large, they agree with the view I have indicated. We feel this matter very acutely. My noble friend Lord Trenchard and I started the Royal Flying Corps at the beginning, and we would like the public to be given a reason, perhaps, why we were justified in those far-away days, and why ever since it has been considered desirable to maintain the essential integrity of the Royal Air Force. If the House and the country were to hear what the noble Air Marshal has to say, I think the result would be to the public advantage. But that is, of course, for the Leader of the House to decide.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, there are two points arising out of this discussion which I desire to submit to your Lordships. First, I would like to say that the practice of going into Secret Session is being too much resorted to. I do not refer of course to the occasions when we discuss our procedure; that is different. What I have in mind are important matters of public interest. I venture to warn your Lordships that it is like a man who takes to drugs. He begins in a small way, and then takes more and more until it becomes an extremely bad habit. On behalf of my noble friend I want to support the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, in resisting this Motion that the matter be discussed to-day in secret.
My second point is this. Here you have a noble Viscount with unique experience and knowledge, and what he says must, whether it is agreed with or not, be of value to Ministers themselves. Now if we go into Secret Session there is no record kept at all of the debate. The second point I rose to make therefore—and I have made this point before to the Government through the usual channels and also publicly—was that when we have a Secret Session, especially on technical matters, there should be a record taken. There can be no objection to that. The most Secret Sessions of the Committee of Imperial Defence are put on record, and the great conferences that take place at the Foreign Office are also put on record. The statements we shall hear from the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, should be available for Ministers. I suggest to your Lordships that this is not simply a matter of machinery, but is an important matter, and I hope it will receive consideration. In any case

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I hope your Lordships will resist the present Motion.
VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN: My Lords, there is another point. If you look at the terms of my noble friend's Motion, it is to ask whether His Majesty's Government adhere to their statement of October 16 last on the organisation of the Royal Air Force. If we have a Secret Session the inference can hardly be otherwise than that they do not adhere to that policy. If they are going to adhere to that policy, as everybody wants them to do, nothing is simpler than to say so; but if they will not make that perfectly plain statement it stands to reason that people will imagine they have altered their policy.
There is another point which I would venture most respectfully to submit to my noble friend the Leader of the House. It is less than two months since my noble friend raised this question in your Lordships' House. He then received a most satisfactory answer from the noble Lord, Lord Snell Everybody was quite satisfied. My noble friend is the last man to raise a question unnecessarily. Indeed I thing it is true to say that he does not really enjoy making speeches either in your Lordships' House or anywhere else. Therefore he must have something very grave to submit to your Lordships. I suggest that the Government would be wise to reconsider this. Otherwise they will inevitably expose themselves to the charge that they could not give a plain answer: "Yes, we do adhere to the policy," that they have changed that policy and that we do not know what the change is. Nothing could be more deplorable in the middle of the war than that that notion should get abroad. The Prime Minister reminded us in a glorious phrase that "never did so many owe so much to so few." It looks as if there are a, few who are trying to interfere with the Air Force, a vital thing in our present situation. I beg my noble friend to reconsider the matter and let us have a straightforward question.
VISCOUNT SWINTON: My Lords, I would venture to make an appeal to my noble friend. It is very difficult to resist—indeed I think it is impossible to resist—a considered Motion by the Government to go into Secret Session, but that is based on the assumption that the Govern-
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ment have a statement to make in which they wish to take Parliament into their confidence and which would include matters which, while Parliament should be made acquainted with them, it would be injurious to make known outside. In such a case obviously your Lordships would, with unanimity, accept the Motion and gratefully receive such information as was to be imparted to you. My noble friend ought to be, and indeed must be, the judge as to whether anything he wishes to say should be communicated to your Lordships' House in Secret Session. But observe what the Motion is here. It is a Motion by my noble friend referring to a matter which, with the full consent of the Government, was debated in public on the last occasion. In the debate then not a thing was said by any speaker which could possibly be injurious if it was said outside. The debate then, the individual speeches which were made and the considered reply of the Government were all in public and were very fully reported in the Press.
The issue to-day is whether that statement of Government policy is adhered to, and I would venture to suggest to my noble friend that so far as that part at any rate of the discussion is concerned the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, should be made in public. Certainly he can be trusted, as I think all of us can be trusted in this House, not to say one word which would be injurious to any operation or to any Government plan. I suggest, too, that the considered reply of the Government on a question of organisation on which they spoke publicly only six weeks ago should be made public. Then if there be matter either for debate by any of your Lordships or for a statement by my noble friend the Leader of the House which he thinks should be made in secret, we can perfectly well do what has often been done—namely, take the first part of the debate in open Session and then, on the Motion of my noble friend the Leader of the House, go into Secret Session, in which we can be informed of secret matters. I beg my noble friend to consider whether that is not the wiser course.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I apologise for intervening late, but owing to a difficulty in transport which I cannot control it was inevitable. I have, however,

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gathered from my noble friend beside me the subject matter of the discussion and I should like to support the plea of the noble Viscount. It was my duty last week to protest from this Bench because for the fifth time in succession we had been asked not to take some particular discussion. I am sure that nobody in the whole Empire can better be trusted than the noble Viscount in charge of the Motion on the Paper not to say anything which would be injurious to the public interest, and I am sure that that would apply also to any other member of your Lordships' House. If the suggestion which the noble Viscount has just made can possibly be accepted—as I think it ought to be—I cannot see why we should not discuss the subject matter of the Motion on the Paper in public. It is a matter on which the Government made a statement only a short time ago. It was made by my noble friend the Deputy Leader of the House. I was not clear as to what it all meant in some respects, but, whatever it did mean, if there has been any change of policy then it is a matter of public interest that the reasons for the policy so far as they can be stated should be understood. I sincerely hope that we shall not have another case of suppression of the proper duty of Parliament to discuss in public and openly with due regard to national interests vital matters of this kind.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: My Lords, I am extremely sorry to disturb the unanimity of this debate which has expressed itself through those who addressed appeals to me as Leader of the House either to withdraw or to vary the Motion that I have made that we should sit in Secret Session. I confess that I find myself in a certain difficulty about placing myself in opposition to appeals made from all parts of the House by noble Lords with whom on ordinary occasions I am accustomed to find myself in complete agreement. Certainly the last thing I should wish to do would be to run counter to any sentiment of this House generally expressed. At the same time in this particular matter I am merely the spokesman of His Majesty's Government on one particular side of it over which presides my right honourable friend the Prime Minister as Minister for Defence. I am bound to
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have great regard, as no doubt your Lordships would be willing to have regard, to his strong feeling and plea that this matter did impinge so closely, and indeed is bound to impinge so closely, on matters of vital defence that he very earnestly begged the House to debate in secret. That, then, is the difficulty in which I find myself and naturally I have, while the discussion was proceeding, been revolving in my mind whether it was possible to meet the difficulty by one or another of the suggestions that have been made.
I naturally agree that it is of great value to the public that anything which the noble Viscount says on a matter of which he is so completely master should be heard by as wide an audience as possible. At the same time I do not think it is a very convenient arrangement to have half a debate in public and half in private, and I think that that would tend perhaps to aggravate the difficulty of which my noble friend Viscount Stonehaven spoke, of the public outside drawing unwarrantable deductions from the debate as a whole. It may be, as he says—though I hope that he exaggerates the danger—that the public would tend to draw conclusions that were in no sense warranted by the facts. I do not think that that is necessarily the case, and I certainly hope that it would not be the result. I do not myself like, and I could not for my part recommend the House-to adopt the plan of the bisection of the debate in the fashion proposed.
The only other alternative that I can suggest—and I realise that it is one which is not likely to be satisfactory to those of your Lordships who have spoken—is that the debate should be postponed for a few days, in order to see whether means can be found to adjust the two points of view. I fully realise, of course, the inconvenience that that would be likely to involve for your Lordships; none the less, if that were thought to be convenient I should raise no objection to it. I am afraid that I am bound, with whatever reluctance, to make my position plain to your Lordships; and it is that in view of the responsibilities in this matter which fall on the Executive, and in view of the fact that those responsibilities cannot be delegated to any members or body other than themselves, I am

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bound to maintain the position of asking your Lordships to sit in secret. I do so with the utmost reluctance. I should be most reluctant to ask your Lordships to support me against others who wish to debate this matter in public, and it may be that, on balance, the more convenient course may be for some postponement to be arranged, during which the matter, which is obviously one of great interest both to your Lordships and to the public at large, may be further considered.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: My Lords, I feel that I cannot ask your Lordships to go to a Division against the Government on a matter like this. Your Lordships will remember, however, that this matter was postponed for a week at the last moment at the request of the Government, only a week ago; but, in view of the statement made by the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, I on my part am quite willing to postpone this question for a day or two.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, as seconder of the Motion I entirely agree. I only hope that it may be possible to hold the debate in a day or two.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Viscount and to the noble Lord, and I will certainly represent in the proper quarter what has been said by so many members of your Lordships' House. I shall do my best to find a solution which will be agreeable, although your Lordships will understand that I am, not in a position to give any undertaking.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, while accepting, of course, what has now been suggested, I should like to ask the noble Viscount whether it will be understood that in accepting the postponement those of us who take the view which has been expressed are not committing ourselves in any way to agreeing to the discussion being held in secret.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: Certainly.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I also hope that it will be possible before the House ad odjourns to say when this Motion will be taken, either in secret or openly. It is getting near Christmas, and we do not want a long and indefinite postponement. We ought to know whether it will
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be taken to-day week or on some other suitable day, which ought to be reasonably soon, because the matter has already been postponed once.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion that the debate be held in secret.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
VISCOUNT TRENCHARD: My Lords, in the circumstances, I will postpone my Motion until a later date.

EVACUATION PROBLEMS.
The LORD BISHOP OF WINCHESTER The LORD BISHOP OF WINCHESTER rose to call attention to problems arising out of the evacuation of the homeless and others after air raids, and to move for Papers. The right reverend Prelate said: My Lords, I venture to draw the attention of your Lordships' House to some of the problems which arise in connection with the evacuation of large numbers of people who have been living in areas which have recently been the subject of enemy attack. Large numbers have been rendered homeless, and there are large numbers of others who for other reasons have left their homes. This movement away from the towns in question raises a number of difficult problems. Some of these problems have been faced with considerable success, and I should be very sorry if it were thought that because I introduced this subject I regarded the arrangements which have been made for the homeless as entirely unsatisfactory. I think that a great deal has been done, both by officials who are already often overpressed with all kinds of other problems and also by a great army of voluntary workers, who have been ready to give time and service to alleviate the lot of those who have so suddenly been made homeless. Notwithstanding this, however, there are problems which are of real gravity and which ought to be faced.
I think that most of these problems arise from lack of co-ordination between the various authorities concerned—sometimes between the Ministry of Health and the local authorities, and sometimes between the local authorities themselves. Perhaps I can make this clearer if I give in outline what usually happens to those who have been bombed from their houses. They are removed at once to shelters

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where they spend a night or two, and they are there provided with food and warmth. Often the buildings to which they are moved are not very satisfactory, and that cannot always be helped, because in an emergency it is not always possible to choose the most suitable buildings for the purpose. There are two things that I would say about these buildings in which temporary shelter is provided. I think it is of great importance that if possible the buildings should be some distance from the area which was actually raided; and secondly, they should be provided with air-raid shelters. I say this because in London at any rate there have been two or three cases in which the unhappy people were moved to schools or halls which a few hours afterwards were bombed. It is not, of course, always possible to remove people some distance away, but that should be done wherever it is possible, and in every case there should be some adequate shelter against an unexpected raid.
Then there starts at once the work of registering those who desire to be evacuated and sending them out. This work, of course, is done by the borough or city in which the raid took place, and on the whole has been done excellently, both by the officials concerned and also by voluntary organisations. But even here there have been various difficulties which, I think, might easily have been avoided. For instance, time is sometimes wasted by people who are applying for evacuation being sent from one authority to another. A mother comes with her children and asks if they may be evacuated, and in some cases she is sent to the headquarters of the education authority some way off; or time has sometimes been wasted in finding the right person who has to sign the railway voucher. And I have actually known cases in which cars to take people away were all collected, and it was impossible for some hours to find the person who would give the necessary authority for their transport.
All these are minor matters, but they add to confusion and difficulty. But more serious difficulties arise when these people are moving away from the place at which they were bombed to towns or villages elsewhere. They then come into contact with a number of different authorities—with the public assistance authorities, with
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the urban councils, and with the rural district councils; and unless there is the closest co-ordination between these various bodies all sorts of difficulties inevitably arise. Some time ago a number of people, I think 1,500, were moved and, without any previous announcement, came to a town which was already overcrowded. Quite recently I have known of a case in which 500 people who were being moved to a large country village arrived there quite unexpectedly. There was no suitable accommodation for them, and it was almost impossible for them to obtain it until midday the next day. That kind of thing perhaps does not happen to a large extent, but one hears from time to time of cases where a number of evacuees suddenly arrive at some place where no preparation has been made for them. Then as a rule when the evacuees arrive at a reception area they have to go to a hall or school for a night or two before being sent to more permanent dwellings.
Difficulties also often arise as to who is responsible for the sanitary arrangements of these halls. Occasionally the sanitary arrangements of the halls, though quite sufficient for the ordinary use to which these halls are put, are quite inadequate when there are a hundred or more people living and sleeping in the hall for two or three days, and the condition of some of these refugees has really been almost deplorable when they have been put to sleep night after night in these halls before arrangements can be made for their removal. The difficulty arises as to who is responsible for these sanitary arrangements. The public assistance authority occasionally, I believe, have told the city council that they are the people who are responsible. The city authorities who own the hall say, "This is only for temporary use; we are not responsible." 1 have known definite instances where there has been friction in these matters. I believe the real answer is that the public assistance authority are responsible, but they are not allowed by the Treasury to spend any money in these respects previous to the use of these halls. Only after they have been used is public money allowed to be spent on additional sanitary accommodation.
In some towns difficulties arise between the various authorities on small irritating points. In one town suddenly, late at night, voluntary workers were told that

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100 evacuees were arriving and blankets were required for them. The civic authorities said, "We have not got the blankets, the blankets are owned by the county authorities and kept in a storehouse only a few yards away." They tried to get these blankets. The county authorities did not know late in the evening the address of the man who had the key of the storehouse where there were a thousand blankets. This is only a trifling illustration of the kind of difficulty which may arise through lack of co-operation.
Then there comes a much more serious difficulty. The moment arrives when these people are to be removed from these halls. Sometimes, your Lordships should note, they are in these halls for quite a long period, not only for a few days. I notice that not long ago a correspondent in The Times stated that there was a cinema which for several weeks had at first a thousand people living in it and latterly 600 people making it their home. But the difficulty of finding these people accommodation elsewhere is very great because, through lack of co-operation between the various authorities, all the available houses have been taken over for various purposes. Sometimes they have been taken over by the military, sometimes by great firms which have removed from the cities, sometimes by education authorities or by private schools. This is very well brought out in a letter from a chief reception officer which appeared in The Times of November 25. He says, referring to a leading article in that newspaper:
"You mention in your leading article only such contingents as refugees (billetable evacuees), soldiers, and civilian workers (war factory expansion and dispersal) as competing for accommodation without co-ordination. This very much understates the case as regards this reception area, and I expect as regards others. Other heavy contingents 'in this scramble' are Government Departments, non-war industrial concerns, educational establishments, Service trainees and non-billetable evacuees from all parts, some from other reception areas who think our district, may be 'healthier.' No check is placed on these movements into reception areas or the absorption by this personnel of billets into which we should like to put the pitiful, billetable bombed and homeless. In some cases the billeting authority has no knowledge of these immigrations until they are arranged without reference to any co-ordinating authority."
That is, I think, a very real difficulty.
Here in passing I should like to, ask the noble Lord who is replying whether there is any large number of vacant houses which might be used for this purpose. From time to time I am told there are large numbers of vacant large houses which might be taken over. I do not know of them myself, but there is a general impression that there are such houses and, if so—certainly if they are suitable—they ought to be taken over. Personally I am inclined to think that most of them have been already taken over for other purposes, but it is quite clear that a good deal more co-operation is needed between the various authorities if evacuation is to work smoothly.
Then there is another point on which I should like to know the views of the Government. What has been done in the way of providing community centres for these people? This is a matter of real importance. A number of these people are accustomed to town life and get extremely bored with the country. It would make a great deal of difference to them if they could find some place in which they could meet together for recreation and for rest, and incidentally it would be a rest for the people on whom they are billeted. It is specially important that there should be some community meals arranged which these people would have in common at one of these centres. I find that one of the most irksome things felt by those who have these people living with them is the fact that they have to provide hot meals for them. It is the hot meals in the middle of the day which are difficult. I heard quite recently of a large modern housing estate the tenants of which had welcomed the evacuees and shown every kind of good will towards them, but they found the providing of a mid-day meal a real difficulty. It would solve their difficulty if, in all these places, centres could be formed where the mid-day meal could be had in common. Equally important is the provision of emergency nurseries for the children under five years of age. In January of this year the Ministry of Health and the Board of Education issued a circular in which they held out every hope that in the near future there would be established a number of emergency nursery schools. I am not sure how many of these have already been established, but I hear frequently of the need

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for them, and I do know of cases where houses have been taken over for use as hostels in connection with these schools. This is one of the ways in which real relief could be given to these people.
These are some of the problems—there are many others—which arise in connection with these people who are homeless. There is the greatest sympathy for them, the greatest desire to help them everywhere. Both in official and voluntary circles there is real keenness to do everything that can be done for these unhappy people who often have lost all they possessed and sometimes are suffering from shock. I am convinced that, though much has been done, a good deal more can be done to make their way smooth. It is important not only for their own sake that things should be made as tolerable as possible for them, but also so as to encourage further evacuation from the towns. If any of these people find themselves unhappy in their new surroundings and return to the towns, with no doubt exaggerated accounts of the hardships they have had to endure, it discourages others from coming out. A special correspondent of The Times who has been investigating these matters says:
"Something more than appeals to go, however persuasively phrased and put, is needed if London is to be more satisfactorily cleared of children, together with many mothers, and aged and infirm people. … The chief need is for the Ministry of Health to show as much concern for adequate arrangements in safer areas as it has shown about exhortations to leave the Capital. As long as the Ministry contents itself with such appeals and fails to supervise what is being done in the reception areas, so long will hundreds of children continue to sleep fitfully in the Tubes and the old and infirm spend uncomfortable nights in water-logged trenches. And the new drift back to the Capital, already begun, will rapidly grow larger."
It is for these reasons that I hope the Ministry may set itself to solve the problems which still remain. It does seem to me that what you really require in every one of these districts is some one person who is expert in these matters and who is armed with authority to deal with these various questions. If you have one person with authority, helped, of course, by others around him, it will make all the difference. That is what you so often find in these districts. You go from one person to another to find who is respon-
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sible. That sometimes happens even in the halls to which these people have been evacuated. You find people responsible for the cooking, for the entertainment, and so on, but it is most difficult to find the person who is really responsible for running the whole organisation and who can, if necessary, give directions. That is what you want on the larger scale as well as on the small scale in all these areas to which evacuation has taken place. I cannot see how this problem of lack of co-ordination will be solved unless in each area—possibly under the Regional Commissioner—there is someone who has the authority to act and who knows how to deal with the situation. I beg to move for Papers.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, before the Government reply, I desire to say something which I know your Lordships will be very glad to hear and which the right reverend Prelate could not, of course, say himself. He does speak with unrivalled knowledge in these matters. I can tell your Lordships that in the Diocese of Winchester, where I hold an official position, I know that on all these occasions of bombardment, notably of Southampton, the right reverend Prelate has been the first on the scene regardless of all danger, regardless of convenience, giving up all his time to these unfortunate people, in order to secure that co-operation for which to-day he pleads. I can only tell him in the presence of your Lordships that every man in Hampshire is grateful to the Lord Bishop for the wonderful example he has set and the services he has rendered. It is only for me to add, following a long way behind him in the course of my duties trying to see what could be done, that it is the fact that Southampton was in some ways the most grievous of these attacks, comparable with Coventry—not so bad in some ways, but worse in others, because of the difficulty of finding alternative accommodation.
I am glad to see that the representative of the War Office is here, and I presume he will reply. There is one word I would respectfully say to him, and I would urge it with all the force I can. Take the case of Southampton. When the thing was very acute the military were soon on the scene and rendered invaluable service, especially when all communications were

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broken—telephone, telegraph, and other. After a short time, when sappers and dispatch riders had found their way, it was a great help and would, I think, have saved a good deal but for the most unfortunate misunderstanding which caused all these people, or most of them, to be withdrawn and others put in their place who did not know their way about. If an invasion had been impending nobody would have minded, but—it would be almost laughable if it were not pathetic—they were withdrawn because of a "peace exercise." Imagine leaving a real house burning and real people who had to be rescued in order to carry out a sham fight! Everyone who has been through the hard school of war, as so many of your Lordships have been, including myself, would agree that even from the point of view of training for war it is infinitely more valuable to the soldier of all ranks to shore up a real roof and rescue real women and children out of a really burning house than to go through a hundred sham fights where the one real element—imminent danger—is entirely lacking. Men who have seen their officers leading them the right way to save a town would be far better equipped for a real fight than they would be by any number of sham fights.
I know my noble friend shares my view, but an unfortunate misunderstanding has arisen owing largely, I think, to a speech made by the Prime Minister in which, in passing, he said it would be ridiculous to think that the Army would abandon all its training in order to do work that others can do. May I suggest that there is a real distinction to be made, and that if the War Office or the Secretary of State issued instructions it would help greatly in places like Southampton, and might be a cause of saving thousands of lives and millions of pounds worth of property? Instructions should be given—and all soldiers want to receive these instructions—that in moments of great emergency the whole Army that is available and can give real help must do so. When it comes to prolonged assistance such as that required in London by Sir Warren Fisher to clear up all the débris and restore the roads to a better state, that of course must be done by special people, by absorbing the unemployed
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possibly, and not by using the Army for what may be called a permanent job.
In the name of all those who have suffered I do urge that instructions should be given, which every soldier wishes to receive, that he must go at once and use every power he has to assist. I refer not only to the engineers but to the infantry, to the Service Corps with their lorries, and to every available dispatch rider. If instructions are given to these people thousands of lives and millions of pounds worth of property might be saved. As a noble friend reminds me, the Navy has always in every part of the world where there has been an earthquake or some other great catastrophe given its help. That would always be the rule, but owing to this misunderstanding our soldiers do not quite know if they are entitled to do what they are only too anxious to do. Having said that I would reinforce the plea of the right reverend Prelate to get some man to grip the whole machine. The lack of co-ordination in the town of Winchester and over the greater part of the county in which it is situated has caused much avoidable suffering, and I suggest that if we could get someone in authority to concentrate upon this matter we should get things done in a shorter time.
LORD JESSEL: My Lords, I should not have intervened in this debate but for the concluding portion of the speech of my noble friend opposite. I cannot hold the view that soldiers are not to be used for demolition purposes. To clear the roads is most important for transport, and it is vital to the life of the nation that the main roads in particular should be kept clear. We have had in London an instance of the kind of thing that occurs. At the beginning I personally went to try to get some men to help. As the noble Lord says, in every other country the Army helps at once. At last we got some soldiers, but very few, and we only got them with grudging consent. Finally, however, there was a change of scene. Sir Warren Fisher and other Commissioners were appointed, and we were then promised 5,000 men, and ultimately got 12,000, who are now doing the work in London, while other troops are assisting in other parts of the country. But when the noble Lord (Lord Mottistone)

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said that you can get other help he is under a gross misapprehension. Every effort was made by the London authorities to get other labour and they could not get it.
LORD MOTTISTONE: Will my noble friend forgive me for intervening? I do not wish to misrepresent the needs of London, which I know. What I was emphasizing was that the Army should act in a case of real emergency. If a road that is damaged represents a case of real emergency then soldiers should go and clear it. It is only because it is being said "You ought to endeavour to get other labour," that I made the remark I did. My meaning was that you should get other labour as soon as you can in order to free the Army.
LORD JESSEL: I do not know anything about Southampton. I quite agree with the general tenor of what the noble Lord has said about obtaining help from the Army. As he rightly pointed out, the Navy do what they can when anything of a catastrophic nature occurs in any part of the world in which they happen to be. As to Southampton there may have been some special reason for what occurred. Perhaps the noble Lord who represents the War Office may make a proper defence of what happened on that unhappy occasion. I do not want to detain your Lordships; indeed I would not have spoken but for what was said by the noble Lord opposite in regard to obtaining other labour. I should like to conclude by saying how much we are all indebted to the speech of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Winchester. The work he has done in London is well known to every Londoner, and the great See of Winchester must be only too thankful he has come there and set such a splendid example.
LORD ADDISON: My Lords, I should like in a few sentences to support the plea which the right reverend Prelate has brought before us. I join with my noble friend in paying a tribute to the work which everyone knows he has led in the diocese to which he is attached and in connection with the disastrous events in Southampton. Like all of us who live in a reception area, he has been confronted
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at first hand by the numerous difficulties, sometimes of an entirely homely kind, which are met with, but which all the same are difficulties that stand in the way of the proper disposition and reception of these unfortunate people. In the little area in which I live we have had the same kind of thing to contend with but in a different form. I remember that one night hundreds of people had to sit for hours outside a place because nobody knew who was the custodian entitled to open the door.
We all know that this kind of accident cannot be avoided altogether. Exactly the same case some of us made in connection with the health provisions for shelters in London on the discussion of Lord Horder's Report. The weakness is the absence of an authority with power to see that all concerned receive the necessary instructions. That is what is wanted. It is wanted in London and it is wanted in the country. The Minister of Health, unfortunately, has adopted a sort of semi-paralytic attitude right through the whole of this period. His Department has addressed circulars to local authorities and hoped something would happen. With many authorities it does happen. In many cases the local authorities are in front of the Ministry, but it is unfortunately the case that a great many are not, and every one who has taken any interest in this matter knows at first hand cases where the Ministry's circulars have been laid on the table or have gone into the waste paper basket and nothing has happened. What is really wanted, I am quite sure, is that someone should deal with the whole matter. Whether it is the Regional Commissioner or someone else does not matter as far as we are concerned. It does not matter who is appointed so long as he is competent to deal with the whole case. That is what is wanted.
Persistent reliance by the Minister of Health upon the project of sending out circulars is largely responsible for the muddle that has occurred. Once more I would make the plea—I think this is the third time—that the Ministry of Health should have someone—I do not mind who he is—who has been given adequate power both in regard to dealing with shelters in our cities and other matters.

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Every case which the right reverend Prelate has mentioned only emphasizes the justice of his plea. I do not know what my noble friend from the War Office will say with respect to the points raised by my noble friend below the Gangway. He is not the Minister of Health. I am inclined to wish he were because I am sure he would not be satisfied with what has been done. However, I support with all earnestness and from first-hand knowledge the validity of the plea put before us by the right reverend Prelate.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LOUD CROFT): My Lords, I am sure all your Lordships will agree that we are very much indebted to the right reverend Prelate for his speech to-day and for the suggestions that he has put before us. If I may, I would also like to say, as I am a Hampshire man myself, that when visiting Southampton shortly after this calamity, I heard on all hands of the wonderful example of the right reverend Prelate in that area and of the comfort given by his presence. May I deal very briefly with the suggestions of the noble Lord opposite with regard to the Army? I think it is quite an hallucination for anybody to imagine that the Army has not been ready to help on these occasions. Sometimes it has been suggested that we have been reluctant to lend a hand. I can assure any who have any doubt, that the Army has been very ready to give help wherever possible. With regard to the specific case mentioned, I have not been able to get details, but I happen to know that the military authorities came directly they were called. I am not sure that they did not volunteer.
LORD MOTTISTONE: Yes, I mentioned that.
LORD CROFT: In the sort of earthquake conditions that were referred to they helped all they could. My noble friend mentioned that they were replaced. I would like to say in explanation that the great peril and danger had been removed with regard to fire and rescue.
LORD MOTTISTONE: No.
LORD CROFT: I was under that impression, but I safeguarded myself a moment ago by saying that I had no details.
LORD MOTTISTONE: The reservoirs were running dry, and did run dry.
LORD CROFT: But I would remind my noble friend that it was not an ordinary peace manœuvre in which the military were engaged. It was a very vital war exercise of a character such as we have not been able to have before. For obvious reasons I must not go into that. It would have made a fundamental difference to that exercise and I will leave the matter there. I can assure your Lordships that we are ready to co-operate in every way possible. Various speakers have dealt with the need for a coordination of authorities in each area, and I have no doubt that the suggestions made will be studied by the Ministry of Health; but I want to point out that in fact the Ministry of Health's senior Regional Officer in a case like this is responsible generally, and the Ministry's inspector was on the spot in Southampton the very day after the raid. He has since then been daily operating in that area from Winchester.
I am afraid I must detain your Lordships for a few minutes in order to state the general outline of plans. It is true that the Ministry of Health has had to send out many circulars, but until we have completely abandoned our democratic machinery by which we send out requests to various local authorities, and until we have fallen under a series of minor dictators throughout the country, I think that is the only way we can proceed at the present time. May I just explain that the arrangements for the relief of persons driven out of their homes by air bombardments, which were made just before the outbreak of war, always envisaged that there would be two stages? The first was immediate assistance in the shape of shelter, food and rest for all who had been driven out, and the second was the provision of fresh housing accommodation of a more or less permanent kind for those of the original victims who, after a short stay in the rest centres, could not either return home or make their own arrangements for finding quarters with relatives or friends.
The first of these stages—immediate shelter, rest and food—was made the responsibility of the county and county borough councils. That is not, I think, always understood. These authorities have earmarked buildings such as schools

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and halls as rest centres for the homeless and have been empowered, if necessary, to requisition suitable buildings for the purpose. They have been instructed to fit up these buildings with equipment for the preparation and service of food. I was sorry to hear a difficulty with regard to blankets mentioned in a specific case. I do not think the Ministry can be blamed for that, because very large stocks of blankets have been issued throughout the country and are held against emergency. Large issues of equipment of various kinds have been made from Government supplies. I may say also that the county and county borough councils have accumulated stocks of food and have made definite arrangements with the Ministry of Food's organisation for securing additional supplies at short notice if these stocks become exhausted.
Here I would say with regard to communal feeding that a circular has been issued to all local authorities urging the establishment of feeding centres where possible, and in many cases that advice has actually been followed. I think that the right reverend Prelate when he goes into the matter, however, will see that there is a very great difficulty owing to the extraordinarily limited number of halls available for that purpose, as I have found in my more normal walk of life at the War Office. Rest centres are staffed mainly by voluntary workers, and instructions have recently been issued that in every rest centre there is to be a trained nurse and also someone made specially responsible for giving information to the homeless about the various forms of assistance which are available to them. For instance, a circular was distributed in Southampton giving, as far as possible, exact advice to all those unhappy people who required it as to what steps they should take. Air raid wardens and police have been instructed to direct homeless people in all these areas to the rest centres.
The great majority of the rest centres throughout the country have at present little or no air-raid protection, I am sorry to say, but that was almost inevitable. Instructions have recently been issued, however, that protection should be provided in target areas, and in many places that work is already in hand. It has also been found that whenever a concentrated attack occurs a fairly high proportion of
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the rest centres in the area are put out of action—that again is almost inevitable—either by direct damage or by the presence of unexploded bombs. There are, or should be, in all large towns buildings which are not used as rest centres but which are earmarked as reserve centres in case of emergency. It is obvious, however, that the extent and success of the improvisation which is necessary in these cases depend very largely on the initiative of the public assistance officer, or whoever is responsible for operating the scheme.
The scheme was designed with a comparatively short raid in mind, and it was intended that the homeless people should go to the rest centres as soon as the "All Clear" was sounded. What in fact happens is that in these night-long raids very large numbers of people go to their normal shelter, which is their way of life at night now, and the consequence is that they come to the rest centre in the morning, when they are in a much better condition to be able to find out what the organisation is and to make arrangements for themselves than they would have been in the middle of the night, as was originally contemplated. This, in fact, tends to reduce the number of people accommodated at the rest centres in towns which are subjected to heavy and prolonged attack.
The point was raised as to what happens thereafter. In addition to the rest centres in the towns, there are large numbers of centres in the county areas surrounding nearly all the big towns in this country, and these are prepared similarly to those in the towns themselves. The recent raid on Southampton affords, I think, a good example of the use to which they have been put. Where particularly intense and concentrated raids have occurred, it has sometimes been found that the accommodation both in rest centres and in houses in the towns attacked is, in fact, not sufficient, at any rate for the time being, for the people who have been made homeless. Transport is, therefore, arranged in these cases, as far as possible and subject to the conditions in which the towns find themselves when these raids are taking place. I think that on the whole, although I was sorry to hear of one hitch mentioned by the right reverend Prelate, this scheme has worked well. The system of transporting

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the homeless out of their home towns is an innovation which has been made necessary by the enemy's recent concentrated attacks upon provincial towns, and steps have been taken to ensure that the provision in the county areas surrounding the larger towns is adequate.
It is when the people reach the rest centres that the second stage—more permanent accommodation—begins. This work has been entrusted to the authorities who are most familiar both with housing and with billeting arrangements—namely, the borough (including county borough and metropolitan borough) councils and the urban and rural district councils. The billeting powers of these authorities were at the outbreak of war extended to cover homeless people, and in addition the authorities have been empowered to requisition unoccupied houses for the accommodation of the homeless. I was asked whether there were many unoccupied houses in Southampton.
THE LORD BISHOP OF WINCHESTER: I did not mean Southampton, but the country generally.
LORD CROFT: The position varies very much, but the right reverend Prelate was absolutely accurate in saying that many houses have already been requisitioned for special purposes, and this does limit the number. It may interest him to know that in the case in point some 5,000 houses have already been found. He will probably be glad to hear that according to the information which we had on Friday evening last with regard to Southampton, of the 3,800 people who had been received in county rest centres, 1,900 had already been billeted, 600 had made their own arrangements, and 1,300 remained to be billeted. By yesterday we were pleased to hear that only a few hundred remained, and that all the centres in Winchester, except one where there are 200 people, had in fact been cleared. I think that your Lordships will agree that, in view of the extraordinary stress which exists in these cases where there is this new form of attack, on the whole the plan was good, although the great disturbance caused in civic life must, of course, have made it very difficult to apply that plan in the special conditions which existed in Southampton.
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The whole scheme with regard to vouchers for travel and for billeting has been worked out, and information ought to be conveyed to these people when they seek advice. I am glad to say that from the grievous lessons we have had—we are learning from experience every day—it has been possible to work very quickly now in the matter of giving general advice to air-raid victims. I shall not detain your Lordships any longer, important though this question is. I will only say in conclusion that all the various points brought forward by the originator of the debate and by those who followed will be very carefully considered. We live, as I have said, in times when we are gaining experience every day. We have had terrible calamities in two or three centres in this country, but on the whole I must say, in justification of the plans which were made, that the recovery of the morale of the people concerned is so great that I think that they realise that big steps have been taken to provide for the emergency.
THE LORD BISHOP OF WINCHESTER: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for the reply which he has made. In putting this Motion down, I had not mainly Southampton in mind; I had in-tended to bring this matter up long before the Southampton question arose. But, as Southampton has been mentioned, I think it is only right that I should bear testimony to the very able way in which the civic authorities rose to a quite unprecedented occasion, and also to the really magnificent work which was done by the Home Defence Services. I thank the noble Lord for his reply, and beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE.
LORD TEMPLEMORE: My Lords, I beg to move that leave be given to the noble Earl, Lord Donoughmore, to vote in the House for the remainder of the Session.
Moved, That leave be given to the noble Earl, Lord Donoughmore, to vote in the House for the remainder of the Session.—(Lord Templemore.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and leave given accordingly.

SECRET SESSION.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, I beg to move that the further sitting of the House this day be secret.
Moved, That the further sitting of the House this day be secret.—(Lord Snell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.
The Official Reporter then withdrew.
House in Secret Session.
House adjourned.