§ 3.35 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGIMy Lords, I desire to ask His Majesty's Government a question of which I have given private notice—namely, whether they have any further statement to make about the loss of H.M.S. "Royal Oak."
§ THE MINISTER FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF DEFENCE (LORD CHATFIELD)My Lords, I will make on behalf of His Majesty's Government what I hope you will consider a frank, if necessarily in some respects a restrained, statement upon this matter. It is now established that the "Royal Oak" was sunk in the early hours of October 14 by a German submarine which penetrated the defences of the land-locked anchorage of Scapa Flow. These defences were of 1741 two kinds: first, the physical obstructions by nets, booms and blockships; and secondly, by small patrolling craft upon the approaches to the various entrances or sounds, which are seven in number. Neither the physical obstructions nor the patrolling craft were in that state of strength and efficiency required to make the anchorage absolutely proof, as it should have been, against the attack of a submarine on the surface or partly submerged at high water. Measures had been taken, and were being taken, to improve the physical obstructions, and indeed the last blockship required reached Scapa Flow only on the day after the disaster had occurred. All the more was it necessary, while these defences were incomplete, that the patrolling craft should have been particularly numerous. But from a variety of causes connected with the movements of the Fleet, which was not at that time using the anchorage, these patrolling craft were reduced below what was necessary.
It will be appreciated, I am sure, that I am unable to enter into details, because a full explanation—and no explanation is worth giving unless it is full—would reveal to the enemy matters which would throw a light upon our methods of defence. This light would illuminate for them not only the past but also the future. It would not be right to discuss in public, in time of war, these intimate matters of naval defence, and I ask the House with confidence to support the Government in that decision. I must content myself, therefore, by saying that the long and famed immunity which Scapa Flow, with its currents and defences, had gained in the last war, had led to a too easy valuation of the dangers which were present. An undue degree of risk was accepted both at the Admiralty and in the Fleet. At the same time I must point out that many risks are being accepted continually by the Fleets and by the Admiralty as part of the regular routine of keeping the seas, and these risks which were unadvisedly run at Scapa Flow seemed to highly competent persons to be no greater than many others. No more striking measure of the strong sense of security against submarine attack which existed at Scapa Flow at the time can be found than in the fact that, after one torpedo from the first volley had struck the "Royal Oak," none of the vigilant and experienced 1742 officers conceived that it could be a torpedo. The danger from the air was the one first apprehended, and large numbers of the crew took up their air-raid stations under armour, and were thereby doomed, while at the same time the Captain and Admiral were examining the alternative possibilities of an internal explosion. It was in these conditions that the second volley of torpedoes was discharged. Thus the forfeit has been claimed, and we mourn the loss of 800 gallant officers and men and of a ship which, although very old, was of undoubted military value.
The inquiries, which have been completed, have brought out all the knowable facts. The Admiralty, upon whom the broad responsibility rests, are resolved to learn this bitter lesson—namely, that in this new war, with its many novel complications, nothing must be taken for granted; and that every joint in our harness must be tested and strengthened so far as our resources and ingenuity allow. Having most carefully considered all the issues involved in this particular case, the Admiralty intend to take such steps within the Service as are proper and necessary, but the Government do not propose to embark upon a judicial inquiry with a view to assigning blame to individuals. Such a course would, they consider, impose an additional burden upon those who, afloat and ashore, are engaged in an intense and deadly, and as many may well think, not wholly unsuccessful struggle. It is on this that all our thought and strength must, I submit, be concentrated.
§ 3.42 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGIMy Lords, after the very frank statement by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, my noble friends and myself do not desire to probe this matter further. We accept what has been said, and join in the regrets for the loss of life, as we did on the earlier occasion. The only matter I would just like to refer to is the remark of the noble and gallant Lord about having no further Court-Martial or other inquiry. It used to be the custom always to have a Court-Martial, which did not mean any stigma on anyone in many cases, whenever any of His Majesty's ships were lost, and it was a very healthy practice, as the noble and gallant Lord, I know, will agree. This does not mean, I hope, that this 1743 ancient and well-established rule of a Court-Martial on the loss of a ship, with all the value that comes from this custom, is going to be permanently put on one side in the present war.
§ 3.43 p.m.
§ LORD CHATFIELDNo, that is by no means the intention of His Majesty's Government, nor of the Admiralty. There are times when a Court-Martial is considered by the Board of Admiralty to be essential, and there are times when in their discretion they can fulfil all the necessary steps without a Court-Martial. This is one of those cases where, in their judgment, a Court-Martial is unnecessary, as also it would be, in their opinion, undesirable.