Lords Sitting of 2 May 1939

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Lord Selsdon—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

CONWAY GAS BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
NORTH METROPOLITAN ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY BILL.
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

WILD BIRDS (DUCK AND GEESE) PROTECTION BILL. [H.L.]
4.16 p.m.
Order of the Day for the consideration of Commons Amendments read.
VISCOUNT MERSEY: My Lords, in moving that the Commons Amendments be now considered, it will be convenient, perhaps, if I remind your Lordships of the object and the history of this Bill. It came before the House last year as a Bill agreed between the different societies connected with the protection of wild birds and it was backed by the Home Secretary's Advisory Committee. It went through your Lordships' House very quickly and we hoped that it would have an equally easy passage in another place, but other interests which arose there delayed it. There were some who wished to extend and others to diminish the close season. However, an agreement has now been arrived at, owing largely to the ability of Sir Thomas Moore backed by the powerful support of Sir Samuel Hoare.
The Amendments which I shall ask your Lordships to agree to are, in the opinion of the Home Secretary's Advisory Committee, a strengthening of the Bill. They will have effect in two ways. One is to extend the close season by setting it back from February 15 to February 1, and I may say that February 1
826
was in the original Bill as it was drafted before it came to your Lordships' House. The other is to allow a rather longer period for the shooting of wild duck and geese along the seashore, and in that case power is given to the Secretary of State, on application, to allow that period to be extended up to February 21. That really is the sense of the Commons Amendments. I beg to move that they be now considered.
Moved, That the Commons Amendments be now considered.—(Viscount Mersey.)
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, while I am in complete agreement with the noble Viscount's statement that this measure has returned to your Lordships' House in a stronger and therefore better form than that in which it left, I feel very regretful that we had not the opportunity of discussing it in detail here, because, as those of your Lordships who were present at the time will remember, those of us who had Amendments on the Paper were dissuaded by the plea—which unfortunately was not justified by events—that we should get the Bill through in time for it to become effective in February this year. It is now half promised by the Home Secretary that a further Bill to consolidate, and I hope to clarify, the present very unsatisfactory condition of the law regarding wild bird protection will be introduced before very long. When that is done I hope opportunity will be taken to remedy certain anomalies in the present Bill with which I will not trouble your Lordships now. I would like to make a further suggestion that if such legislation is introduced there will be two Bills, one to deal with the shooting season of such wild birds as may receive legal protection, and the other to deal with the general and very thorny question of wild bird protection. I entirely agree with the noble Viscount that this Bill is now a better measure.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION (EARL DE LA WARR): My Lords, I do not think it necessary to add anything on behalf of the Government, except to confirm what the noble Viscount, Lord Mersey, has said, that the Home Office are strongly in favour of the Bill and regard the Commons Amendments as a definite improvement.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, as

827
I am Chairman of the Advisory Committee I will only add a word to what the noble Viscount has said about the Commons Amendments. I hope your Lordships will accept the Amendments, because I think that on the whole they improve the Bill, and it is very desirable that it should be passed into law as early as possible.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT.
[The references are to Bill No. 6.]
Clause 1, page 1, line 16, leave out ("fifteenth") and insert ("first").
VISCOUNT MERSEY: My Lords, this Amendment will extend the close season by taking it back from February 15 to February 1. I beg to move that it be agreed to.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment—.(Viscount Mersey.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT.
Page 2, line 1, leave out subsection (3) and insert:
("(3) After the commencement of this Act—

(a) no order shall be made under the power conferred by Section eight of the principal Act making any provision whereby the time during which the killing and taking of wild duck or wild geese or any kind thereof is prohibited is to begin with, any date later than the first day of February or end with any date earlier than the eleventh day of August, and

(b) no order shall be made under the power conferred by Section nine of the principal Act exempting any county or any part or parts thereof from the operation of that Act as respects wild duck or wild geese or any kind thereof,

and any order made under the said sections before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect if and in so far as it makes any such provision or exemption as aforesaid:
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the making after the commencement of this Act of any such order as is mentioned in the next following subsection.
(4) The power of the Secretary of State under Section eight of the principal Act shall include power to make an order, in pursuance of an application made under the said section after the commencement of this Act, providing that the time during which the killing and taking of wild duck and wild geese is prohibited shall begin with such date not later than the twenty-first day of February as may be specified in the order in such
828
parts of the county or county borough to which the application relates, being parts contiguous to the low water mark of ordinary tides, as may be so specified.")
VISCOUNT MERSEY: My Lords, the first two paragraphs of the new subsection (3) are really a redrafting of the original subsection and are considered clearer. The new subsection (4) gives the Secretary of State power to allow the shooting of wild duck and geese along the seashore in marshy and sandy places up to February 21 on application by the local authority. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Viscount Mersey.)
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, I hope that when the bird protection measures are consolidated, something will be done to remedy the slightly ridiculous position brought about by this Bill; for, whereas in the past it was possible to shoot wild fowl for a month after the close of the normal shooting season, it will now be illegal to shoot them inland on February 1, although partridges and pheasants can be shot on that day. This is an anomaly which I think should be put right at a later date.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT.
Clause 3, page 2, line 36, leave out ("fifteenth") and insert ("first").
VISCOUNT MERSEY: My Lords, this Amendment is to bring the dates into line as regards the importation of wild duck and geese from the Continent. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Viscount Mersey.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT.
Clause 5, page 3, line 31, at end insert:
("(2) This Act shall come into operation on the first day of August nineteen hundred and thirty-nine.")
VISCOUNT MERSEY: My Lords, this is consequential on the Bill having been delayed in another place. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Viscount Mersey.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

REORGANISATION OF OFFICES (SCOTLAND) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.

INDIA AND BURMA (MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS) BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Marquess of Zetland.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The EARL OF ONSLOW in the Chair.]
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2:
Amendments as to certain items in Legislative Lists.
(2) After paragraph 48 of the Provincial Legislative List, there shall be inserted the following paragraphs:
"48A. Taxes on vehicles suitable for use on roads, whether mechanically propelled or not.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND)THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND) moved, in subsection (2), at the end of paragraph 48A, to insert "including tram-cars." The noble Marquess said: The purpose of this small Amendment which stands in my name is to include tram-cars as a subject of taxation by the Provincial Governments in the appropriate Schedule of the original Act. By an oversight this item was omitted when the Bill was drafted. As a result of representations, to which I have been able to give further consideration, from the Government of Bengal, I have now put down this Amendment. It appears that tram-cars are already a subject of taxation in one at least of the Provinces of India, and it is therefore desirable that no doubts as to the power of Provincial Governments to levy these taxes should be allowed to remain. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 38, at end insert ("including tram-cars").—(The Marquess of Zetland.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Schedule agreed to.

THE GOVERNMENT: BASIS AND POLICY.
4.28 p.m.
LORD DAVIES LORD DAVIES moved to resolve, That, with a view to restoring confidence abroad and ensuring unity at home, it is the opinion of this House that steps should at once be taken to broaden the basis of His Majesty's Government in order that all sections of opinion may be given adequate representation during the present emergency.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have put down this Motion entirely on my own responsibility and am speaking only for myself. I hope, however, that your Lordships will believe that I move it in no partisan spirit and with no desire to introduce any Party politics into the discussion. Firstly, I am sure your Lordships will agree that in these difficult times, whatever may be our views in regard to a problem, we are all of one mind that the liberty of our country and its institutions, which have been handed down to us by our forefathers, should be preserved at all costs. Secondly, I think we should also agree that our liberty can only be preserved on the basis of justice, which is the one true and lasting foundation of peace. Thirdly, I believe your Lordships will support the principle that whatever policy is decided upon should be carried out with the utmost vigour and promptitude and should have the whole weight of a united country solidly behind it, if possible to avert the calamity of war, or, if that is impossible and war is forced upon us and our friends, that we may win it in the shortest possible space of time.
I imagine there are few of your Lordships who will not subscribe to these general principles. They are, after all, the common stock of all Parties and of all sections of the community. If we differ, it is with regard to the most effective methods of carrying them out. That is why I suggest that, irrespective of Party and of personal allegiances, we should dispassionately consider the facts, with the object of arriving at an unbiased conclusion as to whether we are proceeding on the right lines, and whether everything possible is being done to prevent the catastrophe. I believe there are few members of this House who are not troubled with an uneasy feeling at the back of their minds that our policy still leaves much to be desired, that it is not

831
clear-cut and unequivocal. Moreover, we cannot help being perturbed about the state of our national defences and our preparations to meet an emergency, which like a thief in the night may come upon us at any moment. I agree that recriminations at this stage are of no purpose. It is no use bemoaning wasted opportunities or deploring years which the locusts have eaten. On the other hand, if we want to be constructive, I suggest that we are bound to criticise. Unless we are clear as to what mistakes have been made, and who are responsible for them, I fail to see how we are going to remedy them. It is in this spirit, and with this object, that I propose to offer some criticism this afternoon.
I rather gather that the Government resent criticism. I hope I may be wrong. I listened carefully last week to the speech of the Foreign Secretary. It was a thoroughly self-satisfied and complacent speech. There is an old maxim that the King can do no wrong, and the impression left upon my mind, after listening to that speech, was that the Government could do no wrong. Of course, that may be the view of Ministers, but I think it is not the view which is shared by many people in the country, nor is it shared by our friends in other countries. We have been told, for instance, that to criticise is to foul our own nest. Well, I deny that honest and constructive criticism fouls any nest. Your Lordships will recollect that on some of the most critical occasions in the last War Parliament did not hesitate to criticise the Government in office, often with excellent results. Even in those great moments, when we stood with our backs to the wall, very few people—some, no doubt, but few—suggested that Parliamentary criticism and discussion should be discontinued. On the contrary, I think it helped us on the road to victory, and placed power and responsibility on the shoulders of those who were best fitted to bear them.
Why, therefore, I ask, should criticism be stifled to-day? Surely it is the lifeblood of any democratic community. Yet only a few months ago a Member of Parliament was taken to task by the Minister for War, and even threatened with proceedings, because he had drawn attention to the shortage of guns—surely a most meritorious and courageous act. Then a
832
short time ago, your Lordships will remember, there was a revolt amongst the Under-Secretaries, which apparently was quashed without any casualties. This incident, I think, was an indication at any rate that complete harmony did not exist even amongst the Government's own supporters. Our dissatisfaction with and censure of the Government may be summarised under two headings, which are interdependent and cannot be separated. The first is the inconsistency and vacillation of our foreign policy during the last ten or twelve years, which has resulted, especially during the last three years, in a series of unprecedented diplomatic defeats, and diminished our prestige and authority in every part of the world. The second is the state of our military and naval unpreparedness to meet any attack, which has characterised all our Administrations during this period.
It is obvious, I think, that without adequate military, naval and air power to defend our country and the British Commonwealth, and also to play a part commensurate with our resources in any system of collective security, our foreign policy was bound to suffer. I suggest that the converse is equally true, that if we deserted the collective system, or failed to develop and organise it on the basis of mutual protection against aggression, we should be compelled once more to build up colossal national armaments and military alliances, which in the past have always, sooner or later, ended in war. That is the position which we have now, unfortunately, reached. In the old days the motto of the Foreign Office was continuity of policy, and after the War, your Lordships will remember, successive Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers assured us that the League was to be the keystone in future of our foreign policy. That was the formula until the so-called policy of appeasement was announced by the Prime Minister, in his midsummer madness speech of June 11, 1936. A weak-kneed and vacillating policy, devoid of any moral principle, has at last brought us to the brink of war. We have helped to destroy the only institution which, under the leadership of this country and through the co-operation of its members, might have established the rule of law, and by substituting peaceful for violent methods of settling international disputes, backed by a superiority of policing power, could

833
have placed insuperable obstacles in the path of the aggressors.
If your Lordships will bear with me for a few moments I will produce some of the skeletons front the diplomatic cupboard. Exhibit Number One is labelled "Manchukuo." Your Lordships will remember how the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, was cold-shouldered by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer when he suggested some form of co-operation between this country and America in resisting Japanese aggression in Manchuria. On another occasion, despite the unanimous Report of the Lytton Commission, we refused to exert any financial or economic pressure upon Japan; in fact, we repudiated our obligations under the Covenant. On the contrary, we threw China overboard and allowed the Japanese militarists to secure a foothold in Northern China. This has been followed by the invasion of China which, if it is successful, will not only pulverise what remains of British prestige and authority in the Far East, and close that vast country to British trade and enterprise, but will also menace our position in the Pacific and endanger the safety of Australia and New Zealand. That is the price that we may have to pay for our cowardice, shortcomings and shortsightedness when the first act of aggression took place in 1931.
THE EARL OF GLASGOW: The noble Lord will pardon me for interrupting him, but may I ask what this has to do with the broadening of the basis of the Government?
LORD DAVIES: I am trying to demonstrate to the House the shortcomings of the present Administration, in the hope that that will induce them to broaden the basis of the Government. To resume my argument, if we are saved from the perils that I have indicated it will be due not to any exertions on our part, but to the courage and heroism of the Chinese people in their grim determination, despite their unpreparedness and lack of armaments, to thrust back the invaders of their country.
Exhibit Number Two is Abyssinia. Your Lordships will remember that Mussolini was so impressed with the diplomacy of Sir John Simon over Manchuria that for nine months he openly proclaimed his intention of conquering
834
Abyssinia. During this period we did nothing to prevent him from massing troops and munitions in vast quantities in Africa. Sir John Simon met Mussolini at Stresa, but so far as we know there was not a word of remonstrance and not a single protest. I am sure your Lordships will agree that, to say the least of it, it was unfortunate that during his term of office the seed of disintegration should have been sown at Geneva and the system of collective security undermined.
Now I come to his successor, the present Home Secretary and another member of the Inner Cabinet. Your Lordships will remember that at Geneva he proclaimed to the world our fidelity to the Covenant and loyalty to the League. This is what he said on that occasion. It is just as well that we should remind ourselves of the declarations which have been made from time to time by the members of the present Government. This is what he said:
"It is to the principles of the League and not to any Party manifestation that the British nation has demonstrated its adherence. Any other view is at once an underestimate of our good faith and an imputation on our sincerity. In conformity with its precise and explicit obligations, the League stands, and my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression."
Well, I think your Lordships will agree that this speech was of vital importance. In the first place, it is not too much to say that it won the last Election for the Government. It was their trump card. And, secondly, it led the Emperor and people of Abyssinia to anticipate that the League, under the leadership of Great Britain, would protect them against the onslaught of Mussolini. With that assurance they decided to fight. We know the sequel. They were badly let down and the League suffered a terrible blow.
The third exhibit is the Anglo-German Naval Agreement concluded at the moment when we had joined France and Italy at Stresa in denouncing Hitler's unilateral repudiation of Part 5 of the Treaty of Versailles. This Agreement, which really meant nothing to us, only served to wreck the collective system by alienating France and sending her off in search of compensation to Moscow and to Rome. To-day it is a corpse not a

835
skeleton since it was only on Friday that Hitler proceeded to knock it on the head. Exhibit No. Four is Austria. The death of Austria and the brutal imprisonment of Dr. Schuschnigg evoked protests—nothing more. The policy of appeasement was now in full swing. Exhibit No. Five is the resignation of Mr. Anthony Eden because he refused to abandon his principles and to take his orders from Rome and Berlin. Exhibit No. Six is the Anglo-Italian Agreement for which the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary must take his share of the responsibility. I could never have believed that he would have become a party to a treaty which dishonoured this country by endeavouring to derive profit and advantage for ourselves out of the misery and sufferings of the brave Ethiopean people. That is the naked truth which will haunt us all to our dying day.
Exhibit No. Seven is Spain, where, under the cloak of non-intervention, we have tamely acquiesced in the veiled conquest of that country by the Axis Powers. And now I come to the last skeleton in this gruesome cupboard—the conquest and subjugation of a young and democratic Republic in Eastern Europe which we and our allies had sponsored at the conclusion of the War, and which we had led to believe almost up to the last moment that we should support in its struggle for existence. Munich will go down to history as a betrayal of our friends and the most glaring example of our repudiation of the Covenant which we signed in the blood of our comrades and fellow countrymen who made the supreme sacrifice in the World War. In his speech on Friday Hitler gloated over our discomfiture and recounted the booty which he had acquired at the expense of our safety and prestige.
Those are the diplomatic skeletons which grin at us from behind the curtain. Has any Government in so short a time ever collected such a grisly array? These are the stark facts. Whatever pretexts or reasons we may adduce in support of our policy or our actions, the results are apparent for all to see. We are nearer war to-day than we have ever been since the Armistice was signed. Nations, Governments and leaders must in the long run be judged by results. Good intentions are all very well; but if the results are such as to endanger the
836
safety of our country and to shatter the confidence of others in our good faith, then, I suggest, it is time to reconstruct our policy, to unite our people and our friends under a Government which will command their allegiance and respect. I protest against the new methods of carrying on our diplomacy which have characterised the present Administration. Will the noble Viscount, the Foreign Secretary, tell us—he is not here to-day, but perhaps he will tell us on some other occasion—whether he concurs in these arrangements which helped to bring about the resignation of his predecessor? Will be tell us why it was that in the negotiations at Munich, for example, the Foreign Office was not represented? Why was it that the Prime Minister carried out his task without the assistance of Foreign Office experts? Why were Sir Robert Vansittart and Sir Alexander Cadogan left at home when momentous decisions affecting the safety, security, and vital interests of the British Commonwealth were being taken 700 miles away? Surely the time has arrived when amateur diplomacy of this description should come to an end.
Of course, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet have the last word in these matters, but if the Foreign Secretary is not allowed to run his own Department without interference from outside, then he ought seriously to consider whether he should not resign. The fact is that our foreign policy has been characterised by equivocation and vacillation—blowing hot to-day and cold to-morrow. The latest example, of course, is the sudden recall of our Ambassador from Berlin, followed by his speedy return. Yesterday he banged the door and walked out, to-day he sits on the doorstep awaiting the pleasure of Herr von Ribbentrop. Is it really necessary, even in the sacred cause of peace, to undergo all these humiliations and suffer all these indignities, or do they arise from stupidity and divided counsels? Your Lordships will recollect that after Munich our peace envoys returned waving a scrap of paper bearing the signatures of the Prime Minister and Herr Hitler which, we were assured, would ensure a lasting peace between ourselves and Germany. This innocent gesture was almost an insult to our intelligence. It was a lamentable exhibition of wishful thinking without parallel in the history of our diplomacy. The truth is

837
that the Government have no long-range policy. Ever since they repudiated the Covenant, they have abandoned the moral plane to which, for many years, they at least paid lip-service, and have descended to the level of the Dictators—rank opportunism and sheer expediency. Consequently, as it seems to me, they have lost the esteem of their friends and become the butt of their enemies.
I have dwelt on the bankruptcy of our foreign policy. Let me now turn to our home front. Here again the Government have shown a remarkable inability to appreciate the trend of events and to rehabilitate our defences. Broadly speaking, there are three distinct periods. There was the demobilisation and general disarmament which occurred immediately after the War, when, in the natural reaction, we stripped ourselves of these encumbrances. Then there was the period of unilateral disarmament—a noble example which we gave to all other countries, but I fancy, though I have no very substantial grounds for saying it, that financial stringency had also something to do with it. This phase came to an end with the Abyssinian crisis, when we were brought up with an unpleasant jerk. Lastly, there is the period of the last three years when the rearmament programme is supposed to have been in operation. I do not know how long it takes a country to rearm itself, but it is clear that there have been interminable delays, and a complete inability to deal with the problem of national defence as a whole and to co-ordinate it with similar preparations on the part of our friends designed to resist any acts of aggression.
Where is the Ministry of National Defence which should have been created, surely, not only to co-ordinate the activities of the Fighting Services, but also the measures for the safety of the civilian population? I submit that offensive and defensive preparations are both part of the same problem. Where is the Ministry of Munitions, to speed up rearmament and mobilise the resources of the country before, not after an emergency arises? The measure proposed by the Government a few days ago is, as I suggest, a caricature of the Ministry created by Mr. Lloyd George in the last War. Why all this hesitancy and procrastination? Is it merely the reverse side of the policy of appeasement? Every Department—War Office, Admiralty, Air
838
Ministry, Board of Education, Lord Privy Seal, Board of Trade, the Ministries of Health and Transport, Home Office, even the local authorities—is involved in this problem of defence. Every man and woman is being invited to help. But where is the co-ordinating authority to ensure that all these Departments are not working at cross purposes? Why is each person not told how, and in what job, he or she can best serve the country in an emergency? Are we once more, in far more strained and agonising circumstances, to go through the period of muddle and improvisation which we encountered in the first two years of the World War? No doubt it is a very difficult and herculean task, but it must be faced now. We cannot afford to run away from it.
I submit, therefore, that in the grave and perilous conditions in which we find ourselves, it is our duty to insist upon two essential things. The first is a constructive and consistent foreign policy, based not upon what is usually described as national interest, but upon the rule of law; in other words, upon justice. The second is a reconstituted Government which will include not only the Leaders of the Labour and Liberal Parties, but also what I may describe as our elder statesmen, who passed through the fiery furnace of the last conflagration, and whose experience in tackling the problems and emergencies of war is unique and unrivalled. Such a Government is absolutely necessary in order to unite our nation at home and to restore confidence abroad. These are the two constructive propositions which I venture to submit to your Lordships this afternoon.
What do we mean by the rule of law? Well, I suggest at least two things—a peaceful procedure for the settlement of all disputes, negotiation and conciliation, or, if they fail, arbitration by an impartial and disinterested third party, supported by a pre-organised system of financial, economic and military sanctions. There is no other way. These are the only foundations, I suggest, of any durable and lasting peace. But the immediate problem is the mobilisation of all those nations who are prepared jointly to resist aggression. This involves not merely the signing of treaties and the issue of blank cheques, which may or may not be dishonoured, but the preparation of specific plans in advance in which all the

839
co-operating States are prepared to play their part if an emergency should arise. Do we again propose to repeat the disastrous policy of improvisation, of hap-hazard arrangements, which was pursued during the first three years of the last War? It would be madness and foolishness to do so. Obviously, the first step is to appoint a commission of experts, financial, economic and military, to mobilise the resources and to co-ordinate the activities of all the non-aggressive nations in a comprehensive plan of mutual defence.
But I submit that such a plan by itself is not enough. If the nations who join the defensive combination are to be imbued with the highest morale—and, after all, it is morale that accounts in the end—an appeal must also be made to their idealistic feelings. They must realise that beyond a peradventure they are fighting in a just cause. For many years past, not merely after reading Herr Hitler's contradictory speech, in which he extolled the virtues of British Imperialism in one breath and asked for the return of the German Colonies in the next, some of us, I am sure, have had an uneasy feeling at the back of our minds that the existing distribution of non-self-governing Colonial territories is scarcely compatible with the idea of justice. Why should some countries control vast territories in Africa and elsewhere, whilst others who arrived late on the scene, or were vanquished in war, have none at all? I do not think that other countries are going to help us in the hour of adversity merely to enable us to retain all our territories and possessions. After all, these were acquired by conquest and this constitutes our sole title. Therefore, I ask, what is the Government going to do about it?
I do not suggest for a moment that any of these territories should be handed over to Germany. That would be only to perpetuate an unjust and inequitable system. But merely to say "No" and adopt a negative attitude is not a solution. After all, there are other countries besides Germany who have put forward their claims. Poland, for example, who is now one of our allies. How do we propose to satisfy them all? On what principle is any new distribution to be made? Is the situation to be allowed to develop into a casus belli? I believe that there is a much more
840
satisfactory and equitable solution, and that is to put these territories under the control of an International Commission and an international civil service recruited from all the co-operating States. Let us suppose that such a plan was applied in the first instance to Equatorial Africa, and that all the States who possess non-self-governing territories in that area handed them over to an International Commission. Such a body would be charged with the duty of administering these regions, primarily in the interests of the native populations. It would recruit its own police force and ensure equality of treatment, of economic opportunity, and of access to raw materials to the nationals of all the countries who joined together for the purpose.
I submit that here is a constructive and co-operative plan which would eventually pave the way for a United States of Europe. I know, of course, that there are objections. Herr Hitler would no doubt reject it. He prefers Imperialism and threats of war, but it does not follow that the German people would also reject it. If they secured equality of status with everyone else, their grievance would have been removed. Secondly, we shall be told that it is impracticable and will not work. What right have we to assume that this will be the case? An International Commission administered the Saar territory with conspicuous success for fifteen years. The Chinese Customs Service was another example of international administration, as also is the work of the humanitarian sections of the League and the International Labour Office at Geneva. Thirdly, it will be said that the other countries will refuse to join in the plan. But the point we have to consider is whether we are prepared to make the offer. There is no evidence, as far as I know, to prove that the other countries would turn it down. May I also allude to the attitude of our friends in America? They have always been very critical of our Imperialism, and I think they are right. If we want to win their approval and esteem we must make some offer on these lines. What it means is that we abandon the policy of Imperialism, so dear to Hitler and Mussolini, and substitute for it a commonwealth of nations based upon co-operation, equality and justice.

841
I must apologise for the length of my remarks, but I am almost drawing to a close. There is one other proposal which, I am afraid, as the noble Earl opposite said a few moments ago, is not very germane to the Motion, but it is made with the object of trying to suggest some sort of constructive policy in lieu of the non-constructive policy which the Government have hitherto been pursuing. The second proposal I would suggest is that there can be no real peace in Europe so long as the armament race continues. Sooner or later it is bound to end in war, unless some miracle happens, or the United States throws all her weight into the balance against the aggressor now—before, not after, the crisis occurs. Herr Hitler in his speech the other day declared that he wants peace—peace, of course, at his own price, by which he means that he will not make war if he can get what he wants without it. But let us not forget that he is also in this dilemma; if he slows down the tempo of his armament factories and his warlike preparations, he immediately throws out of employment millions of his people. The same thing, of course, is true in perhaps lesser degree of other countries. Governments here and in France, as well as the Dictators, will be faced with the same problem of how to avert an economic catastrophe should a substantial measure of disarmament ever be agreed to.
I suggest that something should be done to finance the transition period from a war to a peace footing. I am not competent to suggest the details of any scheme, but would it not be possible to create an international fund to which many countries, if not all, would subscribe, and which would enable the wealthier communities to assist not only themselves but also the dictator States? in dealing with this difficult matter? Your Lordships, will agree, I am sure, that scarcely any price in cash is too high to pay to avoid a war which would probably destroy life and property on an unprecedented scale and plunge every country in Europe into complete bankruptcy. I confess that I am not very sanguine, but if agreement about disarmament could be reached, and that agreement was backed by undoubted and unimpeachable guarantees, then I suggest participation in such a fund would be a sound investment. Hitler and Mussolini would probably reject it with scorn, but at any rate its significance
842
would not be lost upon the German and Italian peoples.
I have only one more matter to mention. I have said that not only must we revise our policy, but we must also restore confidence at home and abroad. I suggest that this can be done by constituting a truly National Government. We have reached a stage, I think, somewhat similar to the crisis in 1915, when, as you will recollect, Mr. Asquith formed his first Coalition. Surely the time has come when we cannot afford to be deprived of the services of our elder statesmen who bore the burden and the heat of the day twenty years ago, and whose experience of war administration and problems of mobilisation is unrivalled. Unfortunately, most of them have passed away, but a few still remain. Their advice and counsel at this juncture would be invaluable.
May I mention a few? First there is Mr. Lloyd George. In spite of his age he is as virile and alert as ever. Like every politician he has made mistakes, but we must all agree that his indomitable pluck, his drive and his vision—to say nothing of his inspiring speeches—helped perhaps more than anything else to pull the country and the allies through the last War. And there is Mr. Winston Churchill, whose brilliant achievements and patriotic fervour I need not enlarge upon. For years he has never ceased to warn us. Why are these two men, of undoubted ability, energy and experience, cold-shouldered and excluded from the inner counsels of the nation in this time of peril and anxiety? There is also my noble friend Viscount Cecil, who played a conspicuous part in the organisation of the blockade and afterwards at the Peace Conference. Of course there are many others whom it would be invidious for me to mention, but surely at this time of crisis their experience gained in a somewhat similar emergency can be utilised with advantage to the State. Then there is Mr. Eden. Why is he left out in the cold, when so many backsliders have been reinstated in the present Government? Now that the Government have reverted to the policy which he so ably advocated why is he left out of the team?
Lastly, there is the question of national unity. If we are to march forward as a united nation into the dangerous times ahead of us, is it not of vital importance

843
that the Government of our country should represent all sections of opinion in the community? I can only express the hope that the Leaders of both the Labour and Liberal Parties will be invited to join the Administration, and that they will respond to their country's call in the hour of need. My Lords, I end where I began. I appeal to the rank and file of the Conservative Party. We on these Benches, of course, are powerless. But if in the light of all that has happened noble Lords feel that there is need for change, that leadership must be strengthened and the morale of the country fortified, I implore them to use their influence and to make it felt in the inner councils of their Party. United we stand, divided we fall. Our country cannot be saved through the exertions of any one man or any single Party. It can only weather the storm through the exertions and the sacrifices of all.
Moved to resolve, That, with a view to restoring confidence abroad and ensuring unity at home, it is the opinion of this House that steps should at once be taken to broaden the basis of His Majesty's Government in order that all sections of opinion may be given adequate representation during the present emergency.—(Lord Davies.)
5.19 p.m.
LORD HARMSWORTH: My Lords, I rise with great diffidence to address you for the first time, but I am reinforced by the knowledge that you will extend to me the indulgence you extend to all maiden speakers in your Lordships' House. I cannot hope to traverse the whole area of my noble friend's speech. I have not come down to this House this afternoon with any intention or with any preparation for so extensive a survey. Indeed, I was slightly doubtful at times, if my noble friend will permit me to say so, what relation considerable portions of his speech bore to the Motion which he has presented to us.
I was disappointed to hear him repeat in this House the old stage clichés and platitudes about the defaults of His Majesty's Government. He was pleased to bring out from that cupboard certain very familiar diplomatic skeletons: Manchuria, Austria, Spain and others. If my noble friend will in private explain to me how the Government of this country
844
could have effectively intervened in the Sino-Japanese War, I shall be exceedingly grateful to him. He referred to Austria. What sort of action could His Majesty's Government have taken with any prospect of success or, I will say, with any propriety, in the Anschluss between Germany and Austria? Then, again, it is to the greatest credit of His Majesty's Government that they succeeded, in spite of criticism from quarters whence I think they need not have expected it, in maintaining throughout that struggle in Spain the policy of non-intervention. If I were in a mood to prophesy, I would say that their policy in that matter, very difficult in its pursuit, will redound in history very greatly to the credit of His Majesty's Government and of the people of this country.
My noble friend repeated here an opinion that has been expressed ad nauseam in both Houses of Parliament, on the platform and in the Press: that His Majesty's Government, and this country, in fact, are mainly responsible for the enfeeblement of the League of Nations. My noble friend knows that the League of Nations was crippled from the outset by the defection of the United States of America. He knows that since then two of the most powerful States in the world have seceded from the League, and one of them, at a time when it was a Member of the League, was in active opposition to every principle of the Covenant. No, my Lords, in my experience—and I have had the honour of representing this country at the Council of the League of Nations—no country in the world tried harder to do its best for, or more generously supported, the League of Nations than this country. The noble Lord spoke of the loss of prestige of this great country. I have heard that charge made against successive Governments in this country throughout the whole of my life. Indeed, it has been made, as we all know, in every year of English government. In point of fact, unless, since I was a member of a British Government and was enabled to survey the world from the Foreign Office, things have changed materially and disastrously, I would say that the prestige of this country is now and has been throughout my life at least equal to that of any of the great nations of the world.
But perhaps I may be permitted to come to the Motion on the Order Paper.

845
In time of peace our democratic system requires that there should be an Opposition, that there should be a play of political forces in Parliament, in the Press and on the platform. A few years ago we used to look to the Opposition to provide the alternative Government. I have always thought that in time of peace the stronger the Opposition the better, provided always that the Government of the day had an adequate and not too large a majority. I think it is a good thing that we have at present a partially National Government. In war-time I would agree with my noble friend that it is essential that we should have a fully National Government. I venture to submit, however, that a war Government must not only be a National Government but must also be a united Government. It should, indeed, as my noble friend has suggested, comprise the leaders of all considerable sections of opinion, but they should and must be ready to accept the policy of the Government and to sink minor differences and prejudices for the time being.
I would ask your Lordships, do those conditions exist at this moment? I have very grave doubts, not on account of the ability of the statesmen who would be called to join a united Government, but because of the sentiments they have expressed and continue to express, and which have been expressed in your Lordships' House this afternoon by my noble friend. No Prime Minister of my time has been more relentlessly assailed or more continually misjudged and misrepresented than the present Prime Minister. His policy of conciliation was, and is, derided in quarters where one would least expect derision, and by statesmen who would become his colleagues if Lord Davies's proposal were accepted. I am old-fashioned enough to stand by Munich, and I trust that the Prime Minister and his colleagues will lose no opportunity of returning to that attitude. I do not regard his heroic effort at Munich as a gailure. At least he profoundly impressed the German nation, if he did not convert their Leader.
There is a minor consideration which I hope your Lordships will not regard as a purely frivolous one, and which affects your Lordships' House. Under the proposals of my noble friend, are we to be deprived altogether in this House of our
846
major and minor Oppositions? I foresee in that case a sensible loss in the interest and usefulness of your Lordships' debates. My imagination is not lively enough to picture a situation in which the Leader of the major Opposition and Lords Addison and Strabolgi would be wedged in and muzzled on the sometimes congested Front Bench below me. And then, thinking of my noble friend—if I may still so describe him—Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, I am wholly unable to imagine him being wedged in or muzzled in this House—or outside.
Undoubtedly, in the case of the supreme emergency of war, some such proposals as those that have been presented by my noble friend would be realised. I trust, if that should happen, that we shall have a Government devoted to all preparations for war and—this I regard as equally important—not bitterly estranged from any consideration of appeasement or conciliation. For, war or no war, appeasement and conciliation must be the ultimate policy in Europe. It is infinitely better, I would venture to say, that that policy should be tried out to the uttermost before war rather than after var. I believe myself—it is a bold statement, I dare say, to make—that the raw materials for a better, a more human understanding are to be found, if they are looked for, in the wide expanse of Herr Hitler's speech the other day. But I must not enlarge upon that opinion this afternoon. I should trespass too far on your Lordships' indulgence, and find myself probably outside what seem to me to be the very generous limits of law which are observed in your Lordships' House.
5.32 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND: My Lords, by far the pleasantest of my tasks this afternoon is to express my own pleasure, and I am sure the pleasure of all your Lordships, wherever you sit, at the speech to which we have just listened from the noble Lord who has addressed your Lordships for the first time. He spoke with a knowledge which study and experience of the past have given him, of the great problems of foreign policy which have been brought before your Lordships' notice this afternoon, and we may well look forward, with feelings both of pleasure and of interest, to the future occasions on which we hope that the noble Lord will contribute to our discussions.

847
I cannot help thinking that it would have been for the greater convenience of your Lordships if the noble Lord who introduced this Motion had composed his speech first and then drafted his Motion to fit the speech, for the Motion would certainly have read in very different terms if he had followed that procedure. A Motion to fit his speech is not really a Motion for broadening the basis of the Government. It is a Motion for the removal of His Majesty's present Ministers, and the substitution of others in their place. The noble Lord spoke of vacillating and weak-kneed foreign policy, which had been pursued by the Government, as he said, for the last ten or twelve years. I am happy to think that His Majesty's present advisers, or at any rate the majority of them, can hardly be held responsible for what happened at the beginning of that period. Then he took exception to the fact that one day last week my noble friend the Foreign Secretary put up a defence against certain criticisms which had been levelled against the foreign policy of the present Government. He described my noble friend as displaying an attitude of complacency and self-satisfaction. If I may say so in passing, I know of no one who ever gives me less idea of complacency and self-satisfaction than my noble friend the Foreign Secretary. I really think it was rather an exaggeration of critcism on the part of the noble Lord to attribute these characteristics to my noble friend.
LORD DAVIES: May I interrupt the noble Marquess for a moment? I applied it not to the Foreign Secretary but to his speech. I would not presume to suggest that the Foreign Secretary was either self-satisfied or complacent.
THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND: That is a refinement of distinction which I admit that I myself am wholly unable to follow. I hope the noble Lord will forgive me if I do not follow him over the very wide territory over which he himself travelled—from Spain to China, from China to America, and from America back again. Indeed the noble Lord did not come to the actual substance of his Motion until five o'clock, and at two minutes past five he drifted away from it again, and said: What about the Colonies? He asked me a direct question. He asked: What are the Government going to do about the
848
Colonies? I can hardly believe that he would expect an answer to a categorical question of that kind, submitted without notice of any sort, and I really feel disposed to suggest to him that he should accept the answer given by a very distinguished member of his own Party, who is no longer with us, many years ago, in answer to many questions put to him—namely, that he had better "wait and see."
Towards the close of his speech the noble Lord perhaps felt he should talk once more for a few moments on his Motion, and he put to me certain suggestions with regard to a reconstitution of the Government. He asked why various persons were not included in the Government. For example, he asked why Mr. Eden was not a member of His Majesty's Government. I should have thought that the answer to that question was obvious. Mr. Eden had been a member of the Government and had resigned from it, and that seems to me to be the answer to the noble Lord's question with regard to Mr. Eden.
Now, to deal in rather more general terms with the Motion of the noble Lord, I hope that he will feel that his purpose in putting this Motion on the Order Paper will have been achieved by the publicity which has thereby been given to his views, and I hope that he will not expect from me any pontifical pronouncement upon a matter which I should have thought was universally, or at any rate very widely, accepted to lie within the prerogative of the Prime Minister. Surely the usual constitutional practice in this country is for the Prime Minister to select his colleagues, and to recommend their names for the approval of His Majesty. I do not for a moment pretend to be in the confidence of the Prime Minister with regard to the subject matter of the noble Lord's Motion. Nevertheless it may not be inappropriate perhaps that I should contribute one or two considerations to the discussion of this matter which the noble Lord has initiated. The first observation which I would make would be this, that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has shown that he is more than willing to make use of talent which is to be found within the ranks of Parties other than the one to which he himself belongs, as witness his recent appointment of the

849
noble Marquess my noble friend Lord Lothian to represent His Majesty's Government in the United States of America. And may I take this opportunity of congratulating the noble Marquess, on his appointment, on his willingness to accept what is an office of the very highest importance in the circumstances of to-day? May I at the same time take this opportunity of congratulating the Government and the country upon the fact that he has accepted this office, and that he will represent the interests of this country in the United States of America?
Then again, in the matter of appointments to the Government itself, I submit that the Prime Minister has shown that he is not hidebound by Party considerations, as witness the recent appointment of my noble friend Lord Chatfield to a post of the highest responsibility and importance in the Government. What Lord Chatfield's politics may be I have no idea. He was certainly never appointed on any political or Party grounds. He was appointed because he was recognised by the Prime Minister, and I think by general consent, to be the man best qualified at the moment to fill the particular post to which he was appointed. If I pass for a moment from the question of individuals to the question of the representation of Parties in the Government I should be a little bit inclined to doubt whether at the present moment an invitation to the Leaders of Parties at present outside the Government would necessarily be conducive to unity at home. I am, I admit, basing my present thoughts upon the experience of the past. It will be within the recollection of your Lordships that in the early days of the National Government representatives, and indeed members, of the Party which are at present sitting on the Liberal Benches were included in the Government; but, as a result of certain fissiparous tendencies which were apparently inherent in the Liberal Party at that time, and by a process of what I believe the biologists call spontaneous generation, the Liberal Party broke in two, and there was one portion of it left within the Government and another portion left, and still to be found, outside. That does not seem to me to suggest the idea of unity. And if we come to the Labour Party, if I may say so a similar fissiparous tendency displayed
850
itself before even the National Government came into existene.
LORD STRABOLGI: No.
THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND: Well, unless my recollection of history is sadly at sea it was largely a break in the Labour Party which resulted in the formation of the National Government. A distinguished Leader of the Labour Party, who was then Prime Minister, in fact formed the National Government—the late Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. And if the Labour Party which is habitually seated on the Benches—well, perhaps I should not say habitually seated, because not many of them are habitually seated there; but if the Labour Party who are represented in this House may be regarded as a microcosm of the Labour Party outside I should rather fear, after having watched various movements in its ranks during the past few years, that the process of fragmentation might go even further in the case of the Labour Party than it has done in the case of the other great historical Parties.
Moreover, I am bound to say that I doubt whether if at this moment an invitation were given to the Leaders of the Labour Party who are at present outside the Government to join its ranks it would restore, or at any rate establish, that confidence abroad which the noble Lord is so anxious to see. And I say that because, for reasons which are honourable to the noble Lord (Lord Snell), reasons which are sincerely held by him, he does at the present moment differ fundamentally from the Government on an important principle of policy—namely, the question whether in preparation for war a measure of compulsory training for our people is wise and desirable. It will not have escaped the notice of your Lordships that a prominent member of the Labour Party in France, M. Blum, has taken a view which is diametrically opposed to the view which is taken by my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition on that question. M. Blum seems to regret profoundly this apparent lack of unity in the country upon this important question. I can hardly believe, therefore, in view of that, that to invite my noble friend at the moment to join the Government would be likely to re-establish the confidence of men like M. Blum and the members of the French Government in the policy of His Majesty's Government.

851
I am not, of course, going to be so indiscreet as to ask the noble Lord whether in the event of an invitation being extended to him he would be likely to accept it. I do not know whether the noble Lord who is responsible for this Motion has made inquiries on that point.
LORD DAVIES: No.
THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND: He has not, and therefore it would not be fair for me to put what would be a purely hypothetical question to the noble Lord. Nor am I going to be so indiscreet as to ask the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, whether he is in complete agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Snell, on all questions of policy, including the question of compulsory training. I do not know, but it seems to me quite conceivable that their views may not be identical on a question of that kind. That being so, I hope that the noble Lord who moved this Motion will, as I said, feel that his purpose has been achieved by the publicity which has been given to the matter. So far as I am concerned, of course, I am in no position to give him a direct answer to the question which he put to your Lordships. It is said of the pronouncements of the Pythian priestess whose headquarters were at Delphi that they were so framed that the real meaning of them was difficult to decide. If my remarks this afternoon have to some extent shared that characteristic of the ancient priestess, I feel your Lordships will realise that in the circumstances of the case it was inevitable that that should be so.
5.52 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, it was not convenient to interrupt the noble Marquess with a correction at the time. I waited to let him develop that part of his remarks, and I rise only to deal very briefly with one part of his most entertaining speech: that is his misrepresentation of the history of the formation of the National Government and the part played in it by the Labour Party. For historical purposes I just want to correct his account. He was fulfilling the very honourable duty of a Governor of an Indian Province at the time, and he therefore had an alibi. I was a member of another place, and with my noble friend I was behind the scenes and fully aware
852
of everything that happened. The noble Marquess will, I am sure, allow me to tell him that his account of it is quite wrong. The Labour Party on that occasion did not split. It remained intact, and no section of it joined or helped to form the National Government. I do not want to say anything against the memory of the late Mr. MacDonald who formed that Government, but he formed it as an individual with two or three of his colleagues, and in the subsequent proceedings not one constituent part of the Labour Party, not one trade union, not one co-operative body, or any other part of the machinery that makes up the great Labour movement which polled eight or nine million votes, declared for the National Government. The position of the Liberal Party was quite different. Quite honourably they decided to support the Government, and, equally honourably, the Labour Party decided to have nothing to do with the National Government. We have been abundantly justified!
THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND: My Lords, may I be permitted to say, in reply, that the answer to that is that the vote of the labouring people of this country at the subsequent General Election was overwhelmingly in support of Mr. MacDonald's Government, which contained, as the noble Lord admits, distinguished members of the Labour movement, Philip Snowden and others.
LORD STRABOLGI: There was a very small difference in the Labour poll.
THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND: The noble Lord was good enough to correct an historical mistake on my part. May I also correct an historical mistake he made, though it is absolutely of no importance? He is quite wrong in supposing that when the National Government was formed I was Governor of an Indian Province. I was in this country.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, if I may be allowed, I am very sorry I got my dates wrong. The great services of the noble Marquess in India were so present in my mind that I fell into error. But he also has fallen into error. Even under all the circumstances of the 1931 Election, the figures show that our Labour vote fell very little—a matter of perhaps ten per cent. The figures are on record. What happened was that the noble Marquess and his friends attracted

853
the large body of non-voters and those misguided working men who still vote Conservative.
5.57 p.m.
LORD DAVIES: My Lords, before I ask leave to withdraw my Motion, I wish to say two things. In the first place I wish to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Harmsworth, on his maiden speech. I am sure we all listened to it with the greatest pleasure and interest, though perhaps some of us did not agree with everything he said. I remember when he represented us on the Council at Geneva. That was long before the matters of which I have complained this afternoon actually took place. But I hope he did not think that I attributed all the blame to the Government of this country. Far from it. One realises that the rot began when America first of all dissociated herself from the League and refused to send her representative to Geneva. Nevertheless, as I endeavoured to point out to your Lordships, we have also a great responsibility for all that has, unfortunately, happened during the last ten or twelve years.
The second thing I wish to do is to thank the noble Marquess for his very interesting and courteous reply. I ought really to apologise to your Lordships for having introduced extraneous matters into the Motion, and I thank your Lordships for your indulgence. I shall certainly endeavour to remember the advice which the noble Marquess gave me a few moments ago that, before drafting a Motion, I should prepare my speech. That is excellent advice which I shall try to live up to. I quite understand that the noble Marquess is not in a position to reply to some of the questions which I put to the Government, but I would like to thank them for their appointment of my noble friend Lord Lothian to the Embassy at Washington. That appointment has given the greatest satisfaction to all Parties in the country, and I hope it will be regarded, perhaps, as a precedent and as a happy augury of similar appointments in the near future. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

PEERS AND THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS.
5.59 p.m.
LORD SNELLhad the following Notice on the Paper:—To ask His Majesty's
854
Government whether, in view of the findings of the Select Committee appointed by the House of Commons in December last "to inquire into the applicability of the Official Secrets Acts" to members of that House, they are prepared to make any statement as to the applicability of those Acts in equal degree, and in comparable circumstances, to members of the House of Peers; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to ask His Majesty's Government the Question that stands in my name on the Order Paper, and to move for papers.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD MAUGHAM): My Lords, I have been in communication with the Leader of the House and the Chairman of Committees, and if the House approves I think the best course to adopt with reference to the subject of the Motion before the House is that I should put upon the Paper a Motion that a Select Committee he appointed to consider the matter. If, therefore, the House approves of this course, I will take steps to place such a Motion upon the Order Paper at an early date.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, if the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack thinks that a Select Committee is required I do not apprehend that we should disagree to that course being adopted, but the matter seeems to my mind to be perfectly simple. I think that we ought to be able to claim the same privileges of immunity in this House that are accorded to members in another place. If that is so, I should hope that there is another way of arriving at a decision rather than by an inquiry by a Select Committee which might be prolonged.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, in reply to the noble Lord, I may say that I do not think it is necessary to have a very long inquiry, and it seems to me a little difficult to say that the matter should rest simply upon the decision of the few noble Lords who may happen to be present on a particular day. There may be some questions of considerable importance to consider in connection with the privileges of Peers of Parliament, and I submit that the course I have suggested—and it is the view of the Leader of the House—is the best one to take in the circumstances.
VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships will agree to the course suggested by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack. My noble friend Lord Snell has already said he would in the circumstances be prepared not to disagree, and I trust that the suggestion will be unanimously adopted, and that the matter may be adequately considered in a formal fashion before this House comes to a decision which would have lasting consequences.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND: My Lords, perhaps I might remind your Lordships that it is proposed to meet at three o'clock to-morrow.
House adjourned at three minutes past six o'clock.