§ LORD STRABOLGI had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His Majesty's Government what information 1009 they can give the House regarding the Sino-Japanese War with particular reference to events in South China; what steps His Majesty's Government are taking to safeguard British trading rights and interests in Hong Kong; what is the position with regard to the Japanese invasion of Hainan Island; and whether any joint policy with the other interested Powers for bringing this struggle to an end is being pursued; and to move for Papers.
§ The noble Lord said: My Lords, though the Motion which stands in my name was put down in consultation with my noble friends, nevertheless it is not intended in any spirit of hostility to His Majesty's Government. Indeed, on the last occasion on which the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, stated Government policy in your Lordships' House, in the debate before Christmas, in answer to the Motion of the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, he adopted, if I may say so, an unexpected but nevertheless welcome attitude of firmness on this vital question of British interests in China. So far as his official statement could go, his words—at any rate to me and my noble friends—appeared to contain a clear warning that our patience is not inexhaustible.
§
Since then certain events of great importance have taken place in China. As your Lordships are aware, the Island of Hainan has been invaded by the Japanese. Following the fall of Canton, the great port and colony of Hong Kong is practically blockaded. Threats have been levelled at the authorities of the International Settlement in Shanghai. I see in to-day's newspapers that there is a modification of the Japanese attitude, and I am very glad to see that, but I must remind your Lordships that the so-called Government of Nanking—which, of course, is completely under Japanese control—has used extraordinary language towards our nationals and the French nationals in the International Settlement. I will trouble your Lordships, if I may, by reading out the exact words. It is a Reuter's report of February 26 last:
The Nanking Government says 'it will not hesitate to brand British and French vessels and the International Settlement as an enemy unless Britain and France reconsider and change their attitude of assisting the Chiang Kai-shek régime, which is the public enemy of the Chinese nation.'
That is very strong language to be used
1010
by a Government which is supposed to speak for any section of the Chinese people, but which, as we know, does not represent anybody but themselves.
§ In addition, Japanese troops have erected barricades and electrically-controlled cables round the British Concession at Tientsin. There is no military objective in invading Hainan Island, so far as the Japanese war on the Chinese Central Government is concerned. It is deliberately provocative of the French and also of ourselves. Hainan Island is of great strategic importance to us, because it flanks the line of communications between Singapore and Hong Kong. I understand that the Indo-French authorities in French Indo-China had stopped the trade in arms to China, and even in Red Cross materials, medical stores, and so on, in return for a promise from the Japanese that Hainan was recognised as in the French sphere of influence, and would not be attacked. We see what has happened and I suggest that this is a practical example of the uselessness of a policy of so-called appeasement where the Japanese are concerned. I have recently been in the East myself. I was very glad to hear when I was in Burma that the motor road from that British Dominion to North-West China is now completed, and is being heavily used for the transport of all sorts of goods, including munitions. I suggest that that is the only language which the Japanese militarists understand.
§ I am also glad to note, as I am sure that your Lordships will be, that the United States Government have granted a substantial loan to China, and that we have also granted a small credit. I trust that further financial assistance will be forthcoming. The reason why I say that is that if we look at the situation broadly, the Chinese to-day are fighting our battles for us. Supposing the Japanese had succeeded, as two years ago they boasted they would, in breaking Chinese resistance in ninety days, how long would it have been before there would have been a direct threat to Hong Kong, and then to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies? Suppose that Japan had succeeded in subjugating all China, and recovering her economic and military strength, and suppose we were involved in more difficulties in Europe, does anyone suppose that 1011 British interests in the Pacific would have been left untouched?
§ The next observation that I wish to make is this. This war against China is not an old-fashioned war of conquest. It is being waged with the utmost cruelty and bestiality. In the occupied territories, as in Manchukuo, the Japanese are deliberately debauching the Chinese with opium and other harmful drugs. This has been admitted at Geneva in the antiopium conference, and I think that knowledge of it is common property. There has been systematic destruction everywhere of the Chinese Universities and seats of learning. There has been introduced in the occupied territories a corrupt and dishonest régime, and a shutting out of all European and American commerce. I believe that the Foreign Office is painfully aware of the horrible excesses which have taken place and are taking place, particularly in Nanking. In this connection, with regard to Nanking, I would like to take the opportunity of saying this. I have said many hard things about the German Nazi régime, but on this occasion the Nazi German officials behaved very well indeed at Nanking. They behaved with great firmness and courage in helping to defend the Chinese refugees under their care from slaughter and violation by brutal and apparently undisciplined Japanese soldiers.
§ As we are speaking of these excesses, I must, as one who was at sea for many years myself, make a protest against the attacks at sea by samurai on defenceless Chinese fishing junks. There is a freemasonry of the sea and these junk seamen and fishermen are a very fine race indeed. They are always ready to come to the help of others in the ordinary accidents of the sea. They take their wives and children on very long voyages. The attack on these helpless fishermen, as a policy of terrorism, was a most abominable act for which words sufficiently condemnatory are difficult to find. There is no military objective in destroying these junks and fishermen, and as these attacks were near our own territorial waters, I suggest that some protest should be made. I am not accusing the Government of being blind to these terrible events. I believe the Foreign Office are well aware of them and deplore them as much as I do.
1012§ I have already mentioned the action of the German Nazi officials in Nanking. My information is that German merchants are just as alarmed and disturbed by what is happening in China as our own merchants. It is the German officials who have to adopt an attitude of support and comfort for the Japanese authorities. I should like to take this opportunity of repeating what I have said before, that here is a tremendous chance for the German Government to show their good faith, humanity and will for peace, by joining with ourselves and with other interested Powers to bring pressure to bear—diplomatic and, if necessary, economic pressure—to stop this mad adventure of the Japanese militarists in China. I ventured to make the suggestion before, in case my words might reach anyone who could pass on the proposal, that if Germany really wishes to make some return for the great advantages that the present Prime Minister has conferred upon her by his policy of appeasement, there is her chance in China, where her interests are identical with ours. We recently heard the German Chancellor proclaim that Germany must export or die. There is an immense market in China, where the Germans will have no chance whatever of trading if this Japanese policy is continued to success.
§ But other particularly interested Powers in this matter are the United States of America, the French, the Dutch and the Russians. All those Powers have interests of one kind or another in the Pacific, all of them have great interests there, and all are interested in peace in that part of Asia. At this time, after two years of this tremendous struggle, it is common knowledge that Japan, as a country, is economically vulnerable, and would be particularly vulnerable at the present time to economic pressure. Our friends in China and our fellow citizens of Chinese race, of whom we have some millions in our Eastern possessions—very good citizens and as loyal subjects of His Majesty as any other of our fellow citizens abroad—are puzzled and disturbed to know why we have not been more active in seeking means to bring this horrible struggle to an end. When I was in the East recently, I heard, on fairly good authority, that one reason why Canton was not more strongly 1013 defended was that the Chinese could not imagine that this mighty country would allow an invasion of that part of China.
§ As I have said, the interests of these countries which I have mentioned, including Germany, are really identical. They want a prosperous China, with whom we can all trade and where we can help in the peaceful development of that great country. The Japanese merchants had every opportunity to trade and help in the peaceful development of China, and they were making very great strides before this adventure; but the Japanese militarists do not apparently want a peaceful, united and strong China, and that I think is the secret of their policy. They appear to want indeed more than hegemony over China. The forward school among the Japanese militarists, who seem to be able to control the policy of the Japanese Government, make no secret of their aim. It is the dominance of the whole Pacific. If they succeed, they will undoubtedly threaten Australia, and this is well-known in Australia. I had the advantage recently of meeting Australians of all political Parties, and they have no delusions on this subject. And Russia's interests are the same as our own in the Pacific.
§ Surely the time has come when the causes of justice and decency and fair dealing should prevail. These Christian and humane causes have suffered grievously in Europe and Asia Minor during the last six months. The wicked flourish and civilised ethics and morality are flouted. Cannot we begin to redress the balance by making these great causes prevail in Asia? We can rely—and here I am sure the noble Earl will support me—on the wholehearted help of India, Australia and New Zealand, and I believe also of the United States of America, Russia, France and Holland. The policy that I am advocating is not my own. It is the policy that my Party has been putting forward for a long time now, and we believe that it is a peaceful policy which can be accomplished without a shot being tired. This task, we believe, should have been undertaken by the League of Nations more than two years ago. But in any case, if the Government would seek means of bringing collective pressure to bear, first of all diplomatic, then, if necessary, economic and financial, we believe that that will be enough. A lesson to the 1014 aggressors is long overdue—the lesson that brute force, terrorism and bestial cruelty do not pay, and bring sure punishment. With these observations, I beg to move the Motion that stands in my name.
§ THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH)My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for once again having informed me of the special points to which he intended to allude to-day. The whole Chinese question is such a vast one that it would really be impossible to deal with every aspect of the situation out there. Therefore I will confine my remarks to the points that have been specifically raised by the noble Lord. The difficulty in approaching this question is to give practical effect to any desires or feelings that one may have, and although with much that the noble Lord said I agree, at the same time I doubt whether he can have given very much thought to the actual practicability of some of his suggestions.
Before I refer to the general situation, I should like to give him some information which he has asked for relating in particular to recent events in South China and in other parts of China. The House will remember that apart from the occupation of Amoy by the Japanese Navy on May 13 last, the Sino-Japanese hostilities were not extended to South China till October last, when the Japanese landed at Bias Bay and began their advance on Canton. The City was occupied ten days later after slight resistance on the part of the Chinese. Since then the Japanese forces have not advanced into the interior but have contented themselves almost entirely with consolidating their position in Canton, where they set up a local administration entitled the Kwangtung Self-Preservation Committee on December 20, and in conducting mopping up operations in the Delta of the Pearl River.
Two of these operations have taken place in close proximity to the boundary of the Hong Kong leased territory. On the first occasion, towards the end of November last, two small parties of Japanese soldiers crossed the frontier into British territory, but retired when their error was pointed out to them. On February 21 last a more serious incident 1015 occurred. Six Japanese aeroplanes engaged in these mopping-up operations flew at a low altitude over the Hong Kong border near Shamchun, and dropped six bombs in British leased territory, killing one Sikh policeman and six Chinese and causing considerable damage to a train. Machine gun fire was also opened on the British railway station, and two Chinese were killed and a number of people, which we have not been able exactly to ascertain, were wounded. On that very same day Sir Robert Craigie, our Ambassador at Tokyo, made a preliminary protest to the Japanese Government, who replied on February 23 expressing profound regret at the incident and promising to pay full compensation for the damage done. Assurances have also been received that disciplinary measures would be taken against those who were shown to be guilty after a thorough investigation of the facts, and that adequate measures would be taken to ensure that there would be no repetition of such an incident. These assurances have now been embodied in a formal Note handed on February 27 to our Ambassador, who, on the instructions of my noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informed the Japanese Government that His Majesty's Government regarded the incident as having been settled on those terms.
The noble Lord opposite then asked in his Question what action we are taking to protect British interests in that part of China, and particularly our interests at Hong Kong. I should therefore like to say a word about the position in regard to the Pearl River, because the Pearl River is of supreme importance in connection with the trade of Hong Kong. The opening of this river to British trade is provided for in the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1842. It was first closed to navigation by the Chinese authorities on October 13, and a protest was at once made to them by His Majesty's Consul-General at Canton. Since their occupation the Japanese have maintained the closure of the river, and His Majesty's Government have for some time past been actively engaged in endeavouring to secure its reopening. I am sorry to say that these efforts have not so far been effective. The possibility of taking further 1016 steps towards this objective is at present under consideration, and in any event I can assure the House that His Majesty's Government propose to continue, as at present, to do all that is possible to secure British trade and shipping in the occupied areas of China from discrimination in favour of Japanese or any other interests.
So far as the Customs in that area are concerned, the latest available information indicates that the Customs at Canton, while they have not actually been brought under Japanese control, have been subjected to a certain measure of control by the Japanese, as in the case of the Shanghai Customs, and a number of Japanese nationals are being added to the staff. The Customs at Hoihow, in the island of Hainan, have been treated in the same way. I should like to add this, that it was largely due to the courage and tenacity of Mr. Hooper, the Deputy Commissioner at that time in charge of the Customs at Canton, who is a British subject, that the Customs administration at that port was held intact throughout the attack on Canton and its capture by the Japanese.
I should like to say something about Hainan, to which the noble Lord has referred. Japanese troops landed in the island on the 10th of last month, and on the 14th His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo, who had been instructed to make representations to the Japanese Government, was informed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs that the object of the occupation was to render effective the blockade of the south coast of China. Mr. Arita further said that its duration would not exceed the period required by military needs, and that its character would, similarly, be dictated purely by military considerations as Japan had no territorial designs there. Similar assurances were received by the French and United States Ambassadors. I understand that the United States Government have despatched a destroyer to safeguard United States interests on Hainan and that the French Government are intending to take similar action. Although I am fully aware of the strategic or tactical considerations involved, as a matter of fact it cannot be said that there are any important British interests on that island.
The position of the French Government is undoubtedly somewhat different from our own in connection with this matter. 1017 The treaty position of the French Government in respect of the island is based, firstly, on the Chinese assurance of 1897 to them regarding the non-alienation of the island and, in the second place, on the Franco-Japanese Agreement of 1907. We actually have no similar agreement with Japan, and the only treaty bearing upon the situation is the Washington Nine-Power Treaty. The noble Lord has contended that this action on the part of the Japanese cannot have been taken with a view to threatening the position of the Chinese Government, but rather that it must have been taken with the intention of (shall I say?) threatening or giving anxiety to the French Government and ourselves. It is difficult to pass judgment on that. I can only say that the actual reason given to us by the Japanese authorities was that which I have already quoted—namely, to render effective the blockade of the South China coast, and, as I have said, we have been told that the period of occupation will not exceed the period required by the military needs of the situation—a very vague phrase I admit, but still that is the position as it has been explained to us by the Japanese Government.
Then the noble Lord alluded to certain events which had occurred further North in China, and recently at Shanghai and at Tientsin, and perhaps he would wish to hear me give some account of the development of events there recently. Following on a recrudescence of terrorists' acts in Shanghai and the vicinity, the Japanese authorities have put forward certain suggestions to the Shanghai Municipal Council for the more effective maintenance of law and order at Shanghai, and these suggestions are now under consideration by the Council. His Majesty's Government are continuing to watch the situation closely and are prepared to afford to the Council such advice and support as may from time to time be possible. They have already drawn the attention of the Japanese Government to the fact that they are interested in the discussions now proceeding between the Council and the Japanese authorities at Shanghai, and I understand that the United States Ambassador has made similar representations.
I may add that the extra-Settlement roads inside the defence perimeter are policed by the Shanghai Municipal Council, but that certain of these roads 1018 surround enclaves which are controlled by the local Chinese Municipal administration. It was in one of these areas that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Nanking Reform Government was assassinated on February 19. One other recent outrage, the murder of Marquis Li, took place within the International Settlement itself. The Shanghai Municipal Council contend that the headquarters of the terrorists concerned are in the enclaves which I have already described. I think I need not add that His Majesty's Government do deplore the occurrences of these outrages, but I cannot give your Lordships any further information than to say that the matter is now in discussion between the local Japanese authorities and the Shanghai Municipal Council.
I am perfectly well aware, of course, of the report to which the noble Lord has alluded, and which has appeared in the Press—namely, that the Reform Government of Nanking have been compelled to announce what they call a silent declaration of war against the International Settlement and British and French ships for aiding General Chiang Kai-shek. We have not yet received any confirmation of this from our Ambassador, and I think that we should await this before considering the question of making representations at Tokyo. I think it should be remembered in this connection that His Majesty's Government do not, any more than the Japanese Government themselves, recognise the Reform Government of Nanking, and any pronouncement made by that Government, therefore, I do not think need be taken too seriously.
Then in regard to Tientsin the position is, broadly speaking, as the noble Lord described it. It was in December last that barriers were placed by the Japanese military authorities in Tientsin at all exits from the British and French Concessions, and movements of persons and merchandise were subjected to considerable restrictions. The reason given for these measures was the necessity for taking precautions against the activities of anti-Japanese elements who were alleged to have their headquarters in the Concessions. On February 8 last a slight improvement in the situation did occur, and the search of traffic ceased as from that date. The barriers and sentries, however, remained, heavy barbed wire entangle- 1019 ments with a live wire fence have been constructed along the south and west sides of the British Concession, and I regret to say that there are indications that the former restrictions are about to be imposed and intensified. One of His Majesty's ships was sent to Tientsin on December 19 and will remain there until the situation improves.
His Majesty's Consul-General and his French colleague on December 20 protested to the Japanese Consul-General against measures taken by the Japanese authorities and representations have also been made to the Japanese Government by the British, French and United States Ambassadors. His Majesty's Government have made it clear to the Japanese that there is no lack of co-operation on the part of the Concession authorities, who have said they are prepared to arrest and to hand over any persons guilty of terrorism or other criminal act provided always that adequate evidence of identification is produced and a prima facie case established. There have been certain events in connection with that situation, but I really do not think that I need delay your Lordships by recounting them.
I think I have now dealt with the specific points which the noble Lord raised during the course of his speech, but I should like to take this opportunity of saying a word or two about the general situation. When we last debated the Chinese question, before Christmas I took the opportunity of explaining, in some detail I think, the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the problem, and, therefore, I can do little more than repeat what I said on that occasion. In general, the Far-Eastern policy of His Majesty's Government is based on the Nine-Power Treaty, the main provisions of which I outlined when we last had a debate on this question. His Majesty's Government were, therefore, at some pains to make clear to the Japanese Government in the Note which they addressed to them on January 14 that they cannot recognise changes involving infringements of or derogations from the provisions of this Treaty which are brought about by force or by the unilateral modification of its terms. They cannot agree that the Treaty is obsolete or that its provisions no longer meet the situation, except in 1020 so far as that situation has been altered by Japan in contravention of its terms.
But this is not to say that His Majesty's Government contend that this Treaty or any other Treaty is eternal. If the Japanese or any other signatory has any constructive suggestions to make regarding points on which it is thought that the Treaty might be improved, His Majesty's Government for their part would be ready to consider them and enter into negotiations with all the other signatories regarding the modifications suggested. Similarly, His Majesty's Government are always ready to resume negotiations with the Chinese Government on the subject of extra-territoriality and other similar questions when peace has been restored. As I say, a Note embodying those points was addressed to the Japanese Government on January 14, but so far the Japanese Government has not sent any reply.
The noble Lord has suggested certain ways in which he thinks that we should deal with the situation. When I have been explaining the position of His Majesty's Government with regard to this matter, I have always pointed out that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, no measures such as some of those which the noble Lord described will really be of any use in solving this difficulty or helping the situation unless they are going to be effective measures. Clearly, for measures of the kind which he described, such as economic sanctions of various kinds, it is absolutely essential that action should be taken by all interested parties at the same time. Although I cannot say more than that on that particular subject, I want to draw the attention of your Lordships' House to the various ways in which His Majesty's Government have assisted the Chinese Government in the extremely difficult position in which they now are. As your Lordships know, we have from the beginning of the war kept Kong Kong open as a means of communication for China. Of course that channel could no longer be made use of when Canton fell, but in addition to that we have, as the noble Lord pointed out, built a road through Burma to the Chinese border to join up with the Chinese Yunnan-Fu Road. More recently, we have taken powers, as your Lordships know, under the Export Guarantees Act, which will enable us to 1021 give credits to China more easily than has been possible up to now. In addition to that, I can assure the noble Lord that the general position in regard to this aspect of the question is constantly under consideration and is never lost sight of.
Further than that, I am afraid I am unable to go this afternoon, but I would like finally to say this. The noble Lord has asked whether there is no possibility of the Powers jointly bringing pressure to bear upon the Japanese Government with a view to bringing the war in China to a speedy end. It would be difficult to say, and erroneous to say, that I thought there were prospects of being able to achieve that objective, but I can say that His Majesty's Government are in close and constant consultation with the other Powers concerned on matters which affect their common interests. With a view to securing a settlement which will be fair and just to both sides and take all proper account of the interests of third parties, His Majesty's Government have indicated to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they are ready at all times to use their good offices, and they will not hesitate to take all necessary steps as soon as the moment appears to be appropriate. But, as I say once again, I am afraid I must admit that at present the situation does not appear to have changed in this respect since I addressed your Lordships' House in December last, and I cannot look upon the prospects as good. I have endeavoured to the best of my ability to deal with the questions which the noble Lord raised in the course of his speech, and I hope that, although I may not have entirely satisfied him, at any rate my remarks may have given a limited satisfaction to him and others in your Lordships' House.
LORD STRABOLGIMy Lords, I have only to thank the noble Earl for his very full reply to the Question I put on the Paper. I quite understand that it is not possible for him at this stage to give greater satisfaction. If I may say so, I think he has said all he could under the circumstances. I understand that the matter is under review, that the possi- 1022 bility of joint action has not been lost sight of, and that His Majesty's Government are with us in deploring these appalling events in China and in wishing to bring them to an end. Perhaps I may be permitted to remark on what the noble Earl said with regard to the Chinese Customs, that your Lordships are aware that very substantial international loans have been secured on the Chinese Customs, and that the revenue depends on the Customs being properly and honestly administered. We surely have very strong ground for protesting against any infringement there, especially—this is the extraordinary part of it—since there has been no declaration of war by the Japanese Government on China. The whole of this ghastly campaign is referred to as an incident. They cannot have it both ways. They have no legal right whatever to interfere with the Chinese Customs on which important loans are secured. But as I say, I am obliged to the noble Earl and I quite appreciate that he could not say more at the present time. In these circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
§ Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.