Lords Sitting of 2 August 1939

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
WAR RISKS INSURANCE BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.
HAMILTON BURGH ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; to be printed; and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1936) deemed to have been read 2a and reported from the Committee.
LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (IMPROVEMENTS) BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with Amendments: the said Amendments considered and agreed to.
METROPOLITAN WATER BOARD BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with Amendments: the said Amendments considered and agreed to.
FOLKESTONE WATER BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with Amendments: the said Amendments considered and agreed to.

SUBMARINES.
3.7 p.m.
LORD MOTTISTONE LORD MOTTISTONE rose to move to resolve, That in the opinion of this House, immediate steps should be taken, in the interests of humanity, to bring about the abolition of submarines. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have often heard speakers in this House apologising to your Lordships for intervening in the business at a late hour. I must apologise for intervening at this early hour, for so far as my experience of this House goes never has the mover of a Motion risen
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at five minutes past three in the afternoon to move it. I hope your Lordships will bear with me for a moment while I advance a proposition which, as I shall presently show, has been urged by His Majesty's Government again and again, and which is now more than ever desirable in view of the situation in which we stand.
I know that certain foreign Governments would welcome the opportunity of adhering to the policy to which they have been pledged. Others may not be so ready, but, in the concluding part of what I shall say, I hope I may give reasons showing why it would be wise to choose this moment to do what we have all long desired to do—namely, bring about the total abolition of submarines. On the moral side of the question, on the side of humanity, I wish to dispel an illusion, and later on I wish to dispel another illusion. The first illusion is that nations do not care at all for any promise that they make, and that they will adopt any method of warfare that seems to them to be the most brutal if only they can win. I hope to show that that is not true. The second illusion, the one which comes later, is that the submarine is the weapon of the weaker Power. I think I can show that that is not only not true, but that it is the reverse of the truth, because of the advance in modern science. I observe that the Lord Chancellor, who presides over our deliberations, said in a speech two days ago that modern science may well prevent war. I am sure that the Lord Chancellor is right, and of nothing is that more true than it is in the case of submarines, as I shall try to show.
Now about the first point. I must acknowledge the courtesy of the First Lord and the Financial Secretary of the Admiralty for giving me the particulars of the past history of this matter. I have here a list of the speeches and the proposals made by successive First Lords of the Admiralty in which they denounce submarine warfare and propose its total abolition. I am going to ask the First Lord if he will say, as I am sure he will, that the British Government adhere to their view that never in any circumstances will they break the law of the sea which I will now try to describe. At the Washington Conference in 1921, Lord Lee

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of Fareham, then First Lord of the Admiralty, said:
"The view of the British Government and the British Empire Delegation is that what is required is not merely the restriction of submarines but their total and final abolition."
He said that he wished to make it clear that he spoke not only for his Government but for the Empire Delegation as a whole. Lord Lee then took a point which I am going to develop, because science has moved forward very swiftly since he then spoke. That was, that it was not true to say that we were only advancing this view because the submarine was the weapon of the weaker Power. He said we did it in the cause of humanity. It is on that ground that I make this proposal.
Another First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Balfour, as always, was more clear than any other person who spoke on any subject. That is putting it high, but I am sure it is true. Lord Balfour said:
"Surely if the Powers represented in this room set themselves resolutely to the task the submarine could be banned. I believe the conscience of mankind would help us. I believe that the public opinion of the world would be on our side and the result of our labours would be approved."
I hope your Lordships will note these words:
"… and if the possibility of war must be admitted we shall have done something to make it more humane."
Lord Bridgeman (then Mr. Bridgeman) said the same thing at the next Naval Conference, and Mr. Alexander, speaking for the Labour Party at the London Naval Conference in 1930, said:
"I count it both an honour and a heavy responsibility to be entrusted with the task of introducing the proposal of my colleagues that the use of submarines for the purposes of war should be totally abolished. It is of course in no way a surprise proposal. It has been consistently urged by successive Governments of His Britannic Majesty and it will be remembered was specially pressed at the 1921 Conference at Washington"
LORD STRABOLGI: He was speaking for the Government, not the Labour Party.
LORD MOTTISTONE: I am sure he was speaking for both, because in this matter I think all Governments and all Parties without exception are entirely agreed. He said he proposed it in the
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general interests of humanity and on various other grounds, and he added:
"In consideration of the conditions of service and personnel and the undue risks which can be abolished."
In 1932 we again proposed it, and at the Naval Conference in 1936 Lord Monsell, the First Lord of the Admiralty, said that the desire of the United Kingdom and the Dominions was that the submarine should be entirely abolished.
That is the history of the thing, and I think your Lordships will wish to know what is the law of the sea. I have consulted a great many books on International Law, and I am quite sure, as I shall show in a moment, that it would be unwise to disregard International Law. First I think I had better quote the Washington Treaty. The signatory Powers—that is, our own country, the United States, Japan, France, Italy—committed themselves to this statement:
"The signatory Powers recognise the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating … the requirements universally accepted by civilised nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants; and to the end that the use of submarines as commerce destroyers and their prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations, they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite other nations to adhere thereto."
Your Lordships will observe that the people who signed this Treaty besides ourselves were the United States, France, Italy and Japan, and that they have never renounced their signatures. I take it that in the view of any court of law, international or national, we are all bound.
The first point which I will put to my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty is to ask him in his reply to say that the British Government stand by that declaration and that in no circumstances will we jeopardise the lives of women and children and neutrals by submarine warfare in circumstances when they cannot be reasonably expected to be saved. The declaration made by Sir Edward Grey I need not quote at length. It was made on March 1, 1915, and he laid it down as an axiom that this was the law of the sea and the law of nations, and that if any submarine found it could not give a reasonable chance of survival to women and children and neutral people the submarine should desist from its

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operations. I may be told that all that was disregarded after 1915, and that the argument I am venturing to address to your Lordships is of no particular moment, because nations have ceased to pay attention to the pledged word. I am sure that that is a false view.
I was told by an eminent German doctor only a few years ago—long after the present régime had appeared—that what hurt the German people most of all, far more than the loss of Colonies, far more than the other injustices they thought they were suffering, was the statement that they were compelled to sign admitting war guilt. He said: "I know that all my countrymen will agree with me when I say that it is this statement, that we were guilty of the terrible catastrophe of the Great War costing all those millions of lives, which hurt us most." He added: "It is not true, and after all the German people have souls, although you may not remember it." "Well," I said, "it is quite true you have cured a great many Englishmen of all classes and ranks of terrible sufferings which they thought were permanent. I know what you say. Are you sure that the soul of Germany is more hurt by the allegation of war guilt than anything else?" He said: "Yes, I am sure, and our Chancellor will say the same." I know I speak what is true when I say that the Chancellor of Germany does say the same. He feels that the allegation of war guilt is worse for the German people than anything else.
Now, after what I have just read, would it not be desirable that we in this House, the most impartial assembly, I take it, in the whole world, should here record that anyone who indulges from henceforth in unrestricted submarine warfare and does not desist from attack when the result of that attack will mean the drowning of innocent women and children, is himself branded with war guilt; that here, in the House of Lords to-day, August 2, we should say that whatever nation does what was done under stress of war more than twenty years ago—breaks the law of the sea and drowns women and children—is branded with war guilt, and branded for ever at the bar of history, which never forgets? Along the north coast of Europe and on our own coasts there are nations who are prepared to devote any amount of money, as they
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do, and any amount of courage and determination, to save people from drowning by their lifeboat services. This is a subject of which I know something, because I have been concerned with it all my life, and I hope my noble friend Viscount Runciman, who is also with me on that committee, will agree with me in that and in a subsequent thing that I would say. We all want, and try, to maintain the humane law of the sea.
How strange it is that at the same time as we are doing this we should be making plans by our submarines to use a weapon which can only be effective when it denies the law of the sea and brands us with war guilt. Perhaps the result of this debate may well be that not only the nations I have named—Japan, Italy, the United States, France and ourselves—will proclaim that we will never do that again, but that others—and I have reason to know that there are many others who would be glad to do so—will say, "Yes, we give the same pledge." It would not be unilateral. But whatever others do, however many merchant ships they sink with women and children on board, we will not be guilty of this outrageous crime against the law of the sea and the law of humanity. Of course, it was added by Lord Lee of Fareham, when he made his impassioned appeal on this subject, and was referred to again by Mr. Alexander, that the advantage of making such a declaration would be the total abolition of submarines.
Following that, they hoped that there would be a stop to the horrible catastrophes which happen to these vessels when they fail to rise to the surface. My noble friend Lord Strabolgi will be interested to hear that. I hope that when he follows me he will not dispute what I say: that within the last brief period every one of the great northern nations has suffered the catastrophic loss of a submarine. There is no official confirmation as yet of the disaster to the German submarine, but one fears that there can be no hope and that the vessel was lost with all hands. All I can say is that, for myself, and I have no doubt that I speak for everyone in this House, it does not matter to what nation these brave men belong who have to do this desperate deed of submarine warfare: we sympathise to the full with them in the losses they sustain, but we hope and pray that a time may

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come when in a more humane world these dreadful losses may no longer be necessary. So much for that aspect of it. Is it not possible—I am sure it is—to get all the seagoing nations in the world to agree to abandon the attempt to destroy commerce by submarine methods in spite of the fact that, if it is to be done to the best advantage, you must go on drowning women and children?
Now comes the question, naturally enough: what about the submarine as a weapon against the enemy warship? How can you hope to ask other nations to agree to a plan which they think is an advantage to them because they are weaker Powers? I indicated in a few remarks that I ventured to address to your Lordships some time ago that not only is the statement that the submarine is the weapon of the weaker Power not the truth, but it is the reverse of the truth. I have been concerned in this matter for many years, and have been in touch with those who have been advising the Admiralty on it. Science has made great advances, so much so that I think it is possible to say that the chances of the submarine surviving against our methods of detection and hunting have been reduced by 30 per cent. in the last six months. Far from the weaker Power being able usefully to employ the submarine, I think it is true to say—one must not put these things too high—that only the Power which has surface superiority has any chance of employing the submarine weapon with success against enemy warships.
I observe that the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, who with all the Board of Admiralty and the noble Earl opposite has given me great assistance in preparing the short speech I am addressing to you, said in another place that the result of the submarine-hunting which he had witnessed was surprisingly effective; and that Mr. Churchill, an ex-First Lord of the Admiralty, who had been present at some of these demonstrations, had also been so impressed that he was almost inclined to agree with the statement made by a man of European reputation whom I quoted before, whose name I have given to the Government but which he does not wish to be given publicly—that, given the money, the submarine is as dead as the dodo. I am sure that is true. I believe that the noble and gallant Lord,
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Lord Chatfield, who is now the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, and who has witnessed many of these experiments, is also of opinion that the advance made has been remarkable. Indeed, from what I have been able to learn, to see and to know, I rather think that the submarine in the near future will be like the unfortunate mole in rather hard ground with cruel men with spade and pickaxe watching while it disturbs the surface of the ground; the poor mole, blind as the submarine, goes inevitably to its doom.
I am going to make an appeal to the Government before I sit down. It is very extraordinary that this great nation and the Empire, which only a short time ago was nearly brought to its knees by this weapon, should have been the first, and far away the first, to find the method of coping with this problem, but that, owing to the excellent financial methods which prevent a waste of money, we should still be subject to its menace. I am not making any indictment against the present Government. I am only pointing out that the same method of finance which has prevented peculations in the past, and now is applied, as we know, in minor instances to-day—this method of checking everything has stopped the continuation of submarine hunting. Our submarine destruction, had it been pursued a few years ago, would have made the submarine menace nugatory, for be it remembered—the matter is familiar to naval officers in this House and to those who are scientifically minded, though forgotten by most people—that the difficulty of the submarine is almost overwhelming, by reason of one simple fact which no amount of science will alter: water is non-compressible, and as Lord Kelvin said it is true to say that whatever will sink to the bottom of a glass of water will sink to the bottom of the ocean.
Water differs from air. Unlike the child's balloon, the submarine has either got to have its engines going to go up or down by means of its propulsion, or it has got to stop and sit down on the bottom or come up to the top. For any vessel to attempt to maintain its equilibrium at the appropriate depth for a submarine, which is a very narrow belt in that vast depth of sea—for any vessel of any substance to remain suspended at the appropriate depth of one hundred feet is an insoluble problem, and must remain so. Were it not so, we should have

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no ship whatever on the sea. These things, pointed out to me by my scientific friends, are limiting factors to the submarine which make it the most vulnerable vessel in the world. In deep waters, even with the modest equipment of which the First Lord has control, the unfortunate submarine is doomed. If you come to the shallow waters of the North Sea or elsewhere again the problem of the submarine is most difficult, because once you sit down on the bottom and the water clears, from a height above the thing can be discerned. All these things I gather not from secret sources but from debates this year, and other public sources. I will not venture to say one word which discloses the particular methods which we employ, for the very good reason that I do not know them, and do not want to know them, but I do know what the results have been and the impression which was created upon the Lords of the Admiralty.
There is not only that factor in the submarine that water is not compressible and is extraordinarily dense. One of my scientific friends said to me not long ago that so great is the increased resistance of an under-water vessel that it is far more difficult to produce a submarine vessel to go a hundred miles an hour than it is to bridge the Channel by a single span; and another man, of great scientific attainments, added "or even the Atlantic." The thing is impossible, so far as we can see, for thousands of years. You cannot devise a submarine vessel to go a hundred miles an hour under water. These limitations explain why it is that it is possible completely to defeat the submarine menace.
I ask in this Resolution which I propose that immediate steps should be taken to abolish submarines. I invite my noble friend to say that he will ask all the Powers which are still bound, and others as indicated in our different conferences, to say that they are bound by the rule of humanity not to employ submarines. It would be well, I think, to ask them whether they would agree to the total abolition of submarines. In view of what I have said, and the fact that since the declaration was made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on this subject science has moved further forward, they may well reply: "Well, you have caught us up and overtaken us, and after all perhaps the women
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and children will be happy. You have won this race." I think they may say this. Some I know would do so, but others might not. However that may be, I now invite the First Lord of the Admiralty to say that if he cannot get an agreement for the abolition of submarines, he will say that he is prepared on behalf of the Board of Admiralty, and on behalf of the Government, to adopt all methods at whatever cost, in order to abolish enemy submarines by our own aggressive action.
I know that my scientific advisers will say that that is perfectly possible, and can be done. We should have to increase very greatly, as we are doing now, our anti-submarine methods. We might have to postpone other things in order to have more and more fast vessels which are not restricted by that other law of the sea, the increasing resistance of water in proportion to speed, because they would skim over the surface of the water—these new fifty-knot boats of which we have so many and which are a further terror to the submarine. There is one other point. During the War we were fortunate enough to destroy many submarines, while saving the gallant men who were pursuing this terribly dangerous vocation, as our own people were doing in submarine warfare against enemy warships. It so happened after the War when I was at the Air Ministry that I traveled frequently in those little non-rigid airships which made a patrol right round our coasts and along the coasts of France. I was told at the time by the people who conducted this patrol and by Lord Jellicoe that the German submarine commanders said that of all the things they had to contend with this patrol of little non-rigid airships, which people looked upon at the start as rather a joke, was the thing that they dreaded the most. Indeed, Lord Jellicoe told me that one of the German submarine commanders said that when he saw one of these horrid little airships the only thing to do was to go away. Well, that is putting it very high, but I can add to that that in a conversation I had not very long ago with a distinguished sailor in the Polish Navy, who was in the German submarine service during the War, he confirmed absolutely what the others had said.
I would ask the noble Earl to say that he will restore all these anti-submarine

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methods at once if we cannot get agreement on the abandonment of the submarine for all forms of war. Why not? Why not do it quickly? Only a few years ago we were almost defeated by the submarine. Well, why not begin now at once? Incidentally, I may say that in this watch of the coasts around Britain, where an immense tonnage was sunk in the last War, we had the assistance of the lifeboat service in rescuing women and children. Women and children were drowned by thousands by unrestricted submarine warfare. I am able to say on behalf of the Lifeboat Institution, and I know that the noble Viscount, Lord Runciman, will agree with me, that the whole of those engaged in the lifeboat service, which is a very important service round our coasts, in touch as it is with the coast watchers of the Board of Trade and the Admiralty, will give their whole efforts in helping in the re-establishment of the coast watch by every means, and notably by these small airships. If only he will give me the command of one—and I have no doubt a number of my noble friends would rejoice to join with me—we will go up in one of these little craft which are so effective against the submarine.
To sum up, we should say to all nations, "First, if you do not desist from attacking by submarines and putting the lives of women and children and neutrals in jeopardy, you are branded with war guilt"—there is no doubt about that—"secondly, will you not come in and say 'No more submarines,' as we have suggested on five different occasions since the War? and, finally, if you do not, in all good humour and without any desire to use menaces, we think we have a plan, and we are nearly sure that if you, whoever you may be"—I name no nation—"will not come in, we can guarantee, if you find yourselves our enemy, that we will abolish your submarines." I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That in the opinion of this House, immediate steps should be taken, in the interests of humanity, to bring about the abolition of submarines.—(Lord Mottistone.)
3.46 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, my noble friends have asked me to say that the Labour Party support this Motion
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and have supported the policy for several years. We have passed special resolutions in favour of the abolition of the submarine, and most strongly in favour are the National Union of Seamen who are affiliated with my Party One of the reasons why the National Union of Seamen are so strong about it is to be found in their experiences of the last War, and they also seek to re-establish the fact that in International Law—and I know the Lord Chancellor will support me here if necessary—merchant seamen are non-combatants. That has been the case for hundreds of years up to the last War. The noble Lord, whose eloquence I envy, has spoken of the neutrals and the women and children, but he knows also, I am well aware, that all seamen have the same rights to humane treatment in the case of capture of their vessels at sea, and to destroy a vessel without putting the crew into a place of safety is contrary to the law of war and the law of the sea, which is much older.
If I might be so bold as to agree with the noble Lord in another of the main arguments he put forward it is not true to say that all International Law has gone by the board, and that no one pays any attention to it any more. That is really not the case, certainly not the case with European nations. The Japanese alone have spurned all international conventions and International Law in China, but I do not think that is true with regard to Germany. The Germans adhered to the Submarine Protocol of the Five-Power Naval Treaty and they were careful to maintain their adherence to it when they abrogated the Anglo-German Naval Treaty itself. It may be said: "Oh well, the Germans are prepared to deceive." That may be the case, but it is an old saying that hypocrisy is the tribute paid by vice to virtue, and the fact that they recognise that they ought to be adherents to a law of the sea of this kind is of great importance. I do not believe that even the present rulers of Germany are deaf and blind to world opinion, and they will be neither deaf nor blind to world opinion in case of war. At any rate they would always say in case of breaches of law that the other side started first, as they did in the case of poison gas in the last War.
Might I just say a word about the salvage of submarines, and the inherent

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physical difficulties of such an operation once an accident has happened to a submarine? I believe I am right in saying that there is only one known case of salvage of a sunken submarine in deep waters. I am sure that when the noble Lord was speaking we all had in our minds the terrible tragedy of the "Thetis." I do hope that the Admiralty are going to salve the "Thetis," otherwise it would be a reflection, I suggest, on our seamanship and technical skill. I believe it is possible with modern methods, using compressed-air plant, to salve any vessel from the bottom at considerable depths. That, I think, was shown in Scapa Flow, when the tremendous task was undertaken of salving the great German warships which were sunk there in fairly deep water.
The noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, referred to the Admiralty attitude and I shall not be surprised to hear the present First Lord say that that attitude remains the same—namely, that they are in favour of the all-round abolition of the submarine by international agreement, not unilateral abolition. When I said the Labour Party supported the Motion, I took it to mean that it involved agreed multi-lateral abolition. With regard to what the noble Lord has said about the use of submarines against merchant ships, I believe it will be admitted that it is impossible to use submarines as cruisers against commerce efficiently and yet have regard to International Law and the laws of the sea. You have not room on board to accommodate prisoners, for example. Again the submarine has to expose her-self in order to examine ships' papers, manifests and so on as required by law and usage. I believe that is admitted now in all Navies. I would also respectfully agree with Lord Mottistone that the threat of the submarine to a well-found fleet of warships has been very largely removed. Nevertheless—and this is the case against unilateral abolition—I understand that the best naval opinion still places some defensive value on the submarine where the command of the sea is disputed—for example, in the Pacific, in certain circumstances. Supposing we were heavily engaged in Europe as well as in the Pacific, and the command of the sea was disputed in the Pacific, in these circumstances, I understand, it is considered that the submarine would have a definite defensive value.
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The argument against the abolition of the submarine by mutual agreement—as I shall try to express in a moment, we should have to give something in exchange—is that they can be built in secret by some treaty-breaking Power, and when war comes we suddenly find there is a fleet of submarines, the existence of which we had never suspected. To put it quite bluntly, that is nonsense. It might be possible to build submarines in secret. I believe that all the Admiralties have been taken by surprise by the immense submarine fleet the Russians have established in the Pacific, the existence of which has only recently become known; but unless you exercise and train your crews at sea, submarines are useless. Although you may build them in secret, you cannot exercise them in secret. They would be recognised at sea and their existence would be reported. It takes four years at least to make an efficient submarine commander, and two years to train a submarine crew by constant exercise. That is your safeguard. The submarine may be built in secret, but it cannot be exercised in secret. It would be an advantage all round if we could get this reform adopted. The submarine is very costly in upkeep. I believe, for its size and displacement, it is the most costly warship of all. I am not sure it is not also the most costly to build for its size. Great expense is involved, as the noble Lord pointed out, in anti-submarine organisation and the submarine ships themselves are unhealthy, especially in the Tropics; and in peacetime they will be always dangerous to their crews.
This is a part of the whole question of the limitation of naval armaments, and the line we were working upon in 1931, when the Labour Government were in office—and I believe (I speak with great diffidence in this matter in the presence of the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil) the same line was being followed at Geneva—was that there should be an all-round, mutual abolition, not only of submarines but of battleships as well. There are Powers who say: "The submarine is a weapon of the proletariat, of the poor people, against the wealthy nations with their mighty battleships which we cannot afford to build"—that is all nonsense, I agree, but that is the argument—"therefore abolish the battleship as well, by mutual agreement, and also abolish by mutual all-round agreement naval and

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military aircraft." That is the line we were working upon in the Labour Government—abolition all round—and I think my noble friend Lord Cecil will agree that that is the line they were following at Geneva when the Labour Government were displaced from office by the noble Viscount, Lord Runciman, and others; they know all about that, so I need not enlarge upon it. The abolition of the submarine, the battleship, and military and naval aircraft by all-round mutual agreement is a policy which I believe my Party would still support, but we are against the unilateral abolition of the submarine for the reasons I have ventured to state.
3.56 p.m.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (EARL STANHOPE): My Lords, I find myself in almost complete agreement with the noble Lord opposite except in regard to his concluding sentences. He remarked that the Labour Party were in favour of the abolition of submarines, battleships, and aircraft, both naval and military. No doubt a great many of us are; but what he failed to say was the amount of support they succeeded in getting at Geneva for their policy. There, I am afraid, a very different story is to be told. So too, unfortunately, is it true in regard to the cases to which my noble friend Lord Mottistone referred. I shall not again quote the speeches that were made by various predecessors of mine at various Naval Conferences, but I would like to point out that the Washington rules never in point of fact came into effect at all. Particular submarine rules were opposed at that time by the United States, France, Italy, and Japan, for rather different reasons in each case. None the less they formed the foundation for the rules referred to in the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which the Labour Party succeeded in bringing into effect, and for what is now called the Submarine Protocol.
Consistently, without respect to Party, every British Government has on every conceivable occasion pressed for the abolition of the submarine. We did it at the 1921 Washington Conference and again, as my noble friend reminded us, at the 1927 Conference at Geneva. There we got no support whatever. We did it again at the time of the London Naval Treaty,
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and on that occasion the United States came round to our view and also proposed the abolition of submarines. So too did Italy, provided capital ships were also abolished. France and Japan opposed. They were the only other Powers in that Conference in opposition. Again, at the Disarmament Conference of 1932, we and the United States both proposed the abolition of the submarine. So, too, did Germany, Austria and China, while Italy recommended their abolition, but only if capital ships were also abolished. But several nations desired the retention of the submarine in one form or another, and a number of others desired to retain small submarines. In 1936 only the United States supported our proposal for abolition. Your Lordships will see that in spite of every effort that has been made by successive British Governments we have so far failed to achieve even a modicum of agreement with the view consistently held in this country.
With regard to what my noble friend opposite said as to the temptation to use the submarine illegitimately and contrary to all the rules of naval warfare, I agree that that temptation is exceptionally strong in the event of war, and there is always the fear that these rules may be broken. But I am certainly not going to follow one suggestion he made, and that is that I should go round and ask various nations whether they intend to obey the rules they themselves have accepted, for that would be either merely encouraging them to say they have changed their minds or throwing doubts on whether, in fact, they can be trusted to observe them. Actually in the Submarine Protocol I think all the greater nations agreed to abide by the rules which were then proposed. I do not know if your Lordships would allow me to read them. They are not very long, and they are part of the London Naval Treaty. The first rule is this:
"In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law, to which surface vessels are subject."
And the second one is:
"In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose

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the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board."
I think your Lordships will see that is a wide and a satisfactory rule, and provided that it is fulfilled in any future war in which we may be engaged, I think we shall have very little to complain of.
LORD MOTTISTONE: Would my noble friend inform the House—of course I accept what he says—of the names of the nations who agreed to that London Treaty?
EARL STANHOPE: I am afraid I cannot remember them all offhand, but certainly the United States is one. I am not certain about Japan, but I think Japan was, and also France and Russia and Italy, and later Germany acceded, with, I think, most of the major naval Powers, because when they extended that Treaty to other people and asked them to join in it they all accepted that part of it. As my noble friend will remember, when Germany refused to continue the British-German Naval Agreement she did none the less say she would abide by that part of it. It is, of course, not true to say that there are no other uses for a submarine in legitimate warfare. If that were true, obviously this nation would not build submarines at all, or have any in our possession. They have their uses, perfectly legitimate uses, where, as the noble Lord opposite suggested, the command of the sea is disputed. In that case they can possibly take up positions which would be very dangerous for surface vessels. But my noble friend is quite right in saying that the countermeasures against submarines which have developed since the last War are now extraordinary.
I saw them when I was at the Admiralty some ten years ago, and I can tell my noble friend that since that time the development which has taken place has been very considerable indeed. I have again had an opportunity of seeing them. I think the naval authorities feel that under ordinary conditions they can hunt out the submarine, when we have this particular apparatus which I will not specify further, and make a certainty of finding it. I think that is the view of other nations. I do not think they have this apparatus, or anything like it, but when it was announced that this country,
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if the submarine attacks in the Mediterranean were continued, would feel justified in sinking any submarine submerged in that area the attacks of submarines promptly stopped. I think that is a recognition that this country can deal with that question. There are, of course, dangers because not all merchant ships are fitted with this apparatus, but where they are under proper escort I think the dangers are very much reduced.
My noble friend suggested "If you cannot abolish the submarine why not take action now so that you have measures to counteract it?" My noble friend is too late with his suggestion. We have already in the Navy begun to take action; we are taking action; and if he will look at the Naval Estimates for the present year he will see that there is a very large number of small craft which are to be built for the Navy, and are now being built. I think the total number of craft in the Naval Estimates comes to 58 for this year, ranging from enormous capital ships down to small motor vessels, the small motor-torpedo boats, but amongst them are a very large number of vessels to deal both with submarines and mines. We have not been satisfied with that, because since the Naval Estimates we have made an addition of 107 trawlers for mine-sweeping and anti-submarine duties, of which 20 are being specially built for the purpose, while 87 are being purchased and are being converted. We are also about to construct 56 vessels of the whale-catcher type, some for service as patrol vessels and some for anti-submarine duties. The total number of vessels, apart from those which appeared in the Estimates this year, which we have in hand either by purchase or building is no less than 180. These are mostly to deal with submarine or air attack, and sometimes for mine sweeping.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked me about the salvage of the "Thetis." Certainly we intend to proceed with that salvage, and I see no reason why it should not be successful. The noble Lord knows, of course, that to salve any vessel from deep water is a difficult matter, but it is much more difficult in regard to a submarine than in regard to any other vessel, which I am afraid is not widely recognised, even by some of the experts. A submarine is, of course, a long narrow

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vessel, and therefore if you pump air in, as is suggested, almost inevitably the result is that it comes up bow or stern first, and does not come up level, as happened in the case of the great capital ships of the German Fleet which have been salved at Scapa Flow. It happened when they tried that method in the case of the M2 some ten or twelve years ago, and it happened again, I think, recently in the unfortunate disaster to a submarine of the United States Navy. There the bows shot up to the surface, and the ship then sank once more to the bottom. Therefore we think the present method by which we are attempting to salve the submarine is probably the right one. But, as the noble Lord opposite knows, submarines are built with a particularly smooth surface so that, if a submarine is known to be in a locality and the enemy should try to sweep for it, the wire for the sweep will pass over the submarine and not find it. For that reason it is particularly difficult to get the wires passed round and to keep them in exactly the position in which you wish them to remain so that they may not slip off or move and in that way make difficulties. We are, however, more than hopeful of being able to salve the submarine provided that we have reasonable luck and reasonable weather. That, of course, is essential.
I think I have answered most of the questions which have been asked by the two noble Lords. I can only say that no one would be more glad than His Majesty's Government to obtain agreement for the abolition of submarines, but I could not accept the Motion which my noble friend has placed upon the Paper for the reason that I think if we made an attempt at this moment I see no chance whatever of it succeeding, and it might make it rather more difficult later on when the prospects are better to obtain the agreement which we all so much desire.
LORD MOTTISTONE: Before my noble friend sits down will he say something about the air patrol?
EARL STANHOPE: The dirigible is really not the answer to that question that it was in the days of the last War, because the danger from air attack then was comparatively small. Now, of
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course, the danger from air attack is much greater, and the dirigible is an extraordinarily easy target. Therefore we have to rely to a large extent on the ordinary reconnaissance machines of the Royal Air Force which can cover a very large area. When weather conditions are bad and a patrol is unlikely to see a submarine under the surface, and unable to drop bombs upon it herself, she can direct other naval vessels to go out and hunt for the submarine, which, with our own protection in the Navy, will enable us to find it and deal with it satisfactorily from our point of view.
4.10 p.m.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I can only say that I am most grateful to the noble Earl for what he has said. He has announced that we have the measure of the submarine. That no doubt is true, but I think it would be wrong for me to part with this Motion—if I may use a House of Commons phrase—without saying that I think he will find when he gets back to the Admiralty that I represent a view widely held that, while we have the measure of the submarine, we have nothing like enough of the units to which he referred.
EARL STANHOPE: May I just interrupt to say that I do not dispute that for one moment? The point is whether we can get agreement with other nations.
LORD MOTTISTONE: If it is a matter of getting rid of enemy submarines by destruction, I would suggest that instead of having 180 vessels the number should be something like 1,800.
LORD STRABOLGI: We had 4,000 in the last War.
LORD MOTTISTONE: I am grateful to the noble Earl, but he has not gone far enough. I am afraid that the Board of Admiralty are so busy that they sometimes do not see the forest for the trees. Here we have this great discovery in which we are ahead of everybody else. Let him take his courage in his hands and let us have the greatest force of antisubmarine units which he can get. On a particular technical detail I think I must challenge him, and that is about detecting submarines in the Channel or the narrow waters of the North Sea. Anyone who knows the air will know that for fast-moving aeroplanes—they move

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faster and faster—going at 200 miles an hour to try and locate a vessel which cannot ever go more than about fifteen, is a most foolish thing to do. Everyone who has been in a submarine knows what it means to have a little dirigible hovering above. Let the noble Earl ask some of the submarine commanders in the last War. Sir John Reith can introduce him to one who is going to broadcast here. He will tell the noble Earl all about what the little dirigible did. Do not let him ride off in that way. It is not true. Everyone who knows the subject will agree that submarines can be reduced to
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complete destruction by proper methods, but let him multiply the units if that is to be done. I thank your Lordships for having listened to me, I thank the noble Earl, and I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

RIDING ESTABLISHMENTS BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.
House adjourned at a quarter past four o'clock.