THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

HL Deb 13 April 1939 vol 112 cc603-48

3.7 p.m.

LORD SNELL

had the following Notice on the Paper: To invite His Majesty's Government to make a statement on the international situation in Europe, with particular regard to the Mediterranean area; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to ask His Majesty's Government the Question which stands in my name.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (VISCOUNT HALIFAX)

My Lords, in answering the question put to me by the noble Lord it would perhaps be convenient if I reminded your Lordships as shortly as I may of the historical sequence of events that have taken place since we last met and which have occasioned widespread disquiet and un- easiness in Europe, and in the Eastern Mediterranean in particular. It is just a week since my right honourable friend the Prime Minister made a statement in another place on the subject of Albania. In that statement he said that, two days before, His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome had drawn the attention of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to rumours concerning the concentration of Italian ships and Italian transport at Bari and Brindisi. He then mentioned the suggestion which, according to Count Ciano, the King of Albania had made on March 8 regarding the strengthening of the existing Treaty of Alliance between Italy and Albania and the difficulties which had taken place in the ensuing discussions, the nature of which was not quite plain, and the Prime Minister added that, according to Count Ciano, Italian interests had been threatened.

Italian warships appeared off the Albanian coast early on April 6, and Italian residents were taken on board. The same evening Italian troops left Bari and Brindisi for Albania. Your Lordships will appreciate that communications with Albania have been difficult, and His Majesty's Government are still awaiting a full report on the recent events from His Majesty's Minister at Durazzo. In the meantime we have received Italian and Albanian accounts of the earlier events of April 7, but, as regards the latter part of that day and subsequent happenings, there is little but the official Italian news. The occupation of Albania began in the early hours of April 7, when Italian ships disembarked at Santi Quaranta, Valona, Durazzo and San Giovanni di Medua—and, if I might interject, I would say that no one act in this business can have more shocked religious sentiment everywhere than the fact that it should have been initiated on the day which to most Christians is the most sacred day of the year. The accounts vary of the amount of resistance offered, but it seems clear that by the afternoon of Good Friday the four coast towns had been occupied by Italian forces. King Zog and apparently the Albanian Government left Tirana during the night of April 6–7 and, according to Italian sources, their departure was the signal for an outbreak of disorders in the capital. Italian troops seem to have entered Tirana on April 8 (Saturday), and the town was visited that day by Count Ciano. During the same day King Zog and Queen Geraldine, who was, as the House knows, only able to be moved in circumstances of extreme difficulty, arrived on Greek territory where they were hospitably received by the Greek Government.

Those, my Lords, are the bare facts of the Italian occupation of Albania so far as they can be disentangled from conflicting accounts. A similar divergence of testimony is also evident when we come to examine the circumstances of the occupation. On April 4 Count Ciano informed His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome that on March 8 King Zog had suggested to the Italian Government the strengthening of the Italo-Albanian Alliance. On March 20, Count Ciano said, the King had asked that troops should be sent to Albania for use, it was alleged, against Yugoslavia. This proposal the Italians had refused, and, shortly afterwards, had submitted a scheme for a reinforced alliance in accordance with King Zog's earlier suggestion. The scheme put forward did not, according to Count Ciano, modify the existing juridical status of Albania, and was not accompanied by an ultimatum, Count Ciano stated that it was then that King Zog had started mobilising and to display a hostile attitude towards Italian interests. It was not the Italian wish to change the status quo in Albania, but their interests the Italian Government felt bound to protect. In another communication made to the Foreign Office on April 5, it was stated that the Albanian authorities had begun to organise anti-Italian demonstrations by organised bands which threatened Italian residents throughout the country. Reports indeed from His Majesty's Minister at Durazzo went to confirm the fact that some demonstrations of an anti-Italian character had taken place in the early days of April.

That is in substance the Italian account of the circumstances of those weeks and days. The Albanian account is different. On April 8 I received the Albanian Minister, who stated that the Italian Government, having endeavoured to force upon the Albanian Government the acceptance of proposals incompatible with the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the country, attempted to impose their will by an ultimatum. To this ultimatum, which was unanimously rejected by the Chamber of Deputies, the Albanian Gov ernment replied with a clear-cut refusal, whereupon, according to the Albanian communication, Italian troops, under cover of an intense bombardment by the Navy and Air Force, made an attack on the four Albanian ports early on April 7. The Albanian Minister stated that he had as yet no details of the Italian proposals, but, according to reports which His Majesty's Minister at Durazzo said were current at the time in Albania, they appeared to have included Italian administrative control on a very extended scale and an occupation by Italian troops of certain strategic points of importance, and it seems probable that these proposals might have opened the door to extensive Italian immigration. A representative of King Zog confirmed this view in conversation with His Majesty's Minister and the Ministers of France and the Balkan Entente. He added that a Commission which had been appointed to study the proposals had reported that the proposals were intended to establish a virtual protectorate, damaging alike to the independence, the sovereignty and the integrity of Albania, and when the King had inquired of the Italian Minister what would be the result if he refused to entertain these proposals, he had been informed that that would entail real danger to Albania. None the less, His Majesty had rejected the proposals and declared that if necessary he would resist by force, and the Albanian Minister, when I saw him on April 8, concluded by appealing to His Majesty's Government to do their utmost in aid of a small nation desperately trying to defend its own territory.

These accounts of course differ very greatly from one another, and it is doubtful, I think, whether even now we are in full possession of all the facts. It was in these circumstances that on April 7 the British Ambassador in Rome was instructed to state to Count Ciano, whilst I myself on the same day used the same language to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, that on the information then at my disposal it seemed to me that the situation was likely to raise in an acute form the whole question of the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean which formed, in our opinion, so important an element in the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16 last year. The Adriatic was certainly a part of the Mediterranean area and the Italian Government could not therefore claim that His Majesty's Gov- ernment were not concerned. On the same day, April 7, Lord Perth had seen Count Ciano, who said that the Italian Government fully intended to respect the independence and integrity of Albania and the status quo in the Mediterranean area.

On April 9, Easter Day, the Ambassador again saw him and said that, although His Majesty's Government had taken note of these assurances, they were deeply concerned at the reports which had reached them of the sudden invasion of Albania. They could hardly believe that if the situation between Italy and Albania was as had been described, the differences between the two Governments were incapable of solution by negotiation. Nor could they easily understand how it was possible to reconcile the Italian landing on the Albanian coast with the maintenance of that country's independence and the integrity of her frontiers. Lord Perth reminded Count Ciano that both Governments were pledged under the Anglo-Italian Agreement to the status quo in the Mediterranean area, and informed him that His Majesty's Government felt themselves to be entitled to the frankest and fullest explanation not only of the present developments in the immediate Albanian situation and their previous history, but also of the future intentions of the Italian Government. Lord Perth was also instructed to add that the explanations proffered up to date had caused His Majesty's Government profound misgivings and that they would in no way satisfy public opinion in this country.

When pressed by Lord Perth as to what were Italian intentions in regard to the future, bearing in mind the definite assurances which the Italian Government had already given, Count Ciano said that that would depend upon the wishes of the Albanian people. It would appear from the latest news that the Albanian Provisional Administrative Council has now offered the Crown of Albania to the King of Italy. We must no doubt await the answer of the Italian Government to this offer, but whatever may be the technicalities of the position I must frankly state that His Majesty's Government find extreme difficulty in reconciling what has happened in Albania with the preservation of the national sovereignty of Albania as contemplated by the Anglo-Italian Agreement.

But it is not only the future of Albania which is at stake. As was natural and inevitable, unmistakable signs of disquiet and uneasiness have been manifested not only in the adjacent areas but in other countries bordering on the Mediterranean or included in the Balkan Peninsula. On Easter Eve I received the Italian Chargé d'Affaires after dinner, when he made me a communication from Signor Mussolini to the effect in part that the neighbouring countries, Yugoslavia and Greece, were perfectly calm and that therefore it was clear that Italy was not intending to cause trouble in neighbouring countries. Later in the course of our interview, Signor Crolla drew attention to reports that, according to his information, the English Sunday Press was likely to make various suggestions as to possible courses of British action, including British occupation of Corfu. On this point he assured me that the Italian Government were certainly not going to threaten Greek independence, and that any British occupation of Corfu would create the most dangerous reactions. I at once told Signor Crolla that he could dismiss from his mind, and his Government could dismiss from theirs, the idea that the British Government had any intention of occupying Corfu. That was not the sort of thing we did, but the British Government, I said, would certainly take a very grave view if anybody else occupied it.

I conveyed to the Greek Minister on Easter Sunday morning the assurance given by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires the night before—namely, that Greece and Yugoslavia were calm, and it was therefore clear that Italy meant to give no trouble to neighbouring countries, and that the Italian Government had no intention of threatening Greek independence. I also told the Greek Minister the exact terms of my reply to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires the night before on this subject of the rumoured occupation of Corfu. I saw the Italian Chargé d'Affaires again the next morning, on Easter Sunday, and with him I reverted to the statement that he had made to me the previous evening regarding the calm existing in neighbouring countries, and I said that according to my information, in view of reports that were in circulation, there was anxiety that the Italian Government intended to occupy Corfu. Signor Crolla said that this was the first time he had ever heard a hint of such action, and he had no hesitation in saying that in his view it was absolutely impossible that it should be correct since it would be a flagrant contradiction of what on the authority of Signor Mussolini he had told me the night before. On his own responsibility, therefore, Signor Crolla gave me an assurance that this was not the Italian intention. Corfu, he said, was a vital strategical point for the Italians, and the Italian Government could not allow foreign occupation other than Greek of the island. In his own opinion the rumours that might have been disturbing Greece or ourselves must be the reaction to the rumours that it was the British intention to occupy the island.

I told the Italian Chargé d'Affaires that I naturally welcomed this personal assurance on his part, but it was right to leave him in no doubt that, if any Italian action of the sort were ever in contemplation, it must be a matter of the greatest concern to His Majesty's Government; that it was vital that there should be no misunderstanding between our two Governments on this point, and I should be very glad to know that the Italian Government had made their own the assurance which on his own responsibility he had given to me. I added that it would be of even more value if the same assurance could at once be repeated by the Italian Government to the Greek Government. Accordingly, the same evening, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires called upon me with a further message from Signor Mussolini to the effect, among other things, that he had already given the most ample assurance to the Greek Government confirming that the Italian Government intended to base their relations with Greece on a cordial and solid friendship; that he had sent new instructions to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Athens to assure the Greek Government that all rumours concerning the Italian hostile intentions to Greece were false, inasmuch as Italy intended to respect in the most absolute manner the territorial and insular integrity of Greece. That information was at once telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister in Athens, who was instructed to impart it without delay to the Greek Government. I subsequently learned that the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Athens conveyed to the Greek Government on April 10 the assurances promised by Signor Mussolini.

I shall refer to that in one moment, for a reason that will become plain. Apart from other considerations—to which, as I say, I shall recur—one question which I think will be present to your Lordships' mind is the relation that all these events hold, and ought to hold, towards the Anglo-Italian Agreement. I am very well aware that there are those who say that the Anglo-Italian Agreement has now clearly proved valueless and that accordingly, in whatever may be the appropriate form, it should be denounced. They would argue, I think, that inasmuch as the spirit of the Anglo-Italian Agreement had been broken, there was no purpose in attempting by something like artificial respiration, to keep alive a body from which the spirit had departed. My Lords, I can very readily understand that attitude and that argument, but I take a somewhat different view. As we are all very well aware, the ground covered by the Anglo-Italian Agreement was a wide one and included many very diverse questions. It certainly was the idea of His Majesty's Government that it should be a contribution to peace, and I do not suppose that there is any one of your Lordships who would not feel that no one should say a word to make the preservation of peace if the state in which we are living can rightly be described by that name—more difficult. We should therefore, I think, weigh carefully all the considerations that are involved.

It is quite obvious that assurances have only the value of the good faith by which they are inspired and of the faith which they command in those to whom they are given. Everybody can form his own judgment in regard to this or that point connected with these assurances. For myself, I cannot doubt that the great mass of thinking opinion in this country and the world over will be greatly influenced in their final judgment of the worth of the Anglo-Italian Agreement by the test of its operation in the matter of the withdrawal of Italian troops from Spain. Accordingly, in the course of the recent communications made in Rome Lord Perth was instructed to inquire the intention of the Italian Government in this connection; and Signor Mussolini caused the Ambassador to be informed, and sent the same information to myself through the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, that the evacuation of Italian troops was being arranged and would be effected as soon as the victory parade in Madrid had taken place. In reply to a further inquiry, Count Ciano informed Lord Perth on April 9 that when the troops went, Italian aeroplanes and pilots would go also. His Majesty's Government have taken due note of these fresh assurances, which, of course, confirm those which they had received before. I need only add that the Government have always regarded the evacuation of Italian volunteers from Spain as a vital element in the Agreement, and they look forward accordingly to its early fulfilment.

I need not emphasize to your Lordships the disturbing effects of such events as I have described on international confidence. There is, of course, no dispute about the special position and the special interests that Italy has enjoyed in Albania. These things were expressly recognised by the Council of Ambassadors many years ago, and, so far I know, they have never been challenged. But, whatever may be said as to that, there can be no doubt as to the general effect produced in all quarters by Italian action. It is not necessary for me to take up your Lordships' time by stating at length what must be the judgment of His Majesty's Government on these events. That judgment has been shared by the overwhelming mass of opinion in this country, by most of the States of Europe, and by the United States of America. By its effect of weakening confidence in the pledged word, such action as that recently taken by Italy encourages, for one thing, the circulation of wild rumours and helps to keep the world in a state of continual disturbance and anxiety, a state in which the conduct of peaceful commerce and industry and the development of ordinary life become impossible.

A few minutes ago I gave your Lordships a somewhat detailed account of the reports connected with and arising out of Corfu. Those reports of Italian intentions may well have been just as unfounded as the reports attributing similar intentions to ourselves. The fact, however, that they should have gained currency and caused real anxiety is the measure of the extent to which confidence has again been shaken and faith in the former value in international undertakings again undermined. It is quite impossible for the plant of confidence to flourish if its roots are suffering perpetual violence. I know very well that some rumours at these times are put into deliberate circulation. Others are the natural product of the atmosphere of suspicion and fear which these events are bound to create; but in the last twelve months many reports have come true, and it must therefore be the duty of law-loving peoples, who desire to see international engagements respected, to prepare themselves for all events. If those who occupy the position of Dictators are at times disposed to gird at the indecision and divisions of others, I venture to think that they themselves have done more than anyone else to provide the cure. They have, I think, done for us, and, if we may believe a general report, for the French also, what it seemed difficult for us to achieve for ourselves—namely, national unity.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government feel that they have both a duty and a service to perform, by leaving no doubt in the mind of anyone as to their own position. I therefore take this opportunity of saying, on their behalf, that His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to the avoidance of disturbance by force or threats of force of the status quo in the Mediterranean and the Baltic Peninsula. Consequently they have come to the conclusion that in the event of any action being taken which clearly threatened the independence of Greece or Rumania, and which the Greek or Rumanian Government respectively considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Greek or Rumanian Government, as the case might he, all support in their power. We are communicating this declaration to the Governments directly concerned, and to others, especially Turkey, whose close relations with the Greek Government are known. I understand that the French Government are making a similar declaration this afternoon.

In authorising those who speak for them to make this declaration to-day, as also to make a corresponding declaration a week or so ago concerning Poland, His Majesty's Government are fully aware of the gravity of the decisions thus recorded. But they have taken this course after full reflection and consideration, in the belief that as things stand, to-day, a perfectly clear definition of their attitude in certain events, from which in no case could we probably stand aside, would render these events less likely.

3.45 p.m.

LORD SNELL

My Lords, you will desire me to thank the noble Viscount for the statement which he has made to the House, and in doing so I would like to express my personal sympathy with him in the strain of the last few days. Whilst we have been able to enjoy a very welcome respite from the tyranny of committees and meetings, the noble Viscount and His Majesty's Ministers have had imposed upon them exceptional labour and responsibilities, which most of your Lordships will be glad not to have had to share. I hope that the opportunity will come to the noble Viscount to get a much needed rest, and I am sure that this side of the House will co-operate in making that possible in time. There is a very great disadvantage in having immediately to follow a statement of the supreme gravity of that which has just been made to the House. This is not an occasion for ill-informed or irresponsible words, and wisdom is very rarely dissociated from knowledge. I have no information on these events beyond that which I have picked up from the Press, and therefore the question arises, what should be the attitude of a responsible speaker for the Opposition in the British Parliament at this date.

May I say at once that my remarks will be directed rather to clarification of the issues than to mere argument concerning them? At the same time the situation is so urgent, and it affects all of us in such a very keen way, that honest speech as well as calm thought is required. I should like to preface what I have to say by asking your Lordships not to pay too much attention to the word "agreement." Do not let us make a fetish of it. That is to say, there is no virtue, no wisdom, in all of us saying the same thing, unless the thing that we say is the right thing. Unanimous assent to a wrong policy only quickens the pace to disaster. What, therefore, is the right thing to say on an occasion of this kind? The duty of an Opposition is not indolently to accept what it is told, but to try to find out what are the facts, and if it does that in a spirit of responsibility it may make a greater contribution to the end sought than any mere silent acquiescence.

Am I right, my Lords, in making certain deductions from the statement that we have just heard? The first is this. It is recognised that the Anglo-Italian Agreement has been violated, and that its future must rest upon a continuance of that good faith which ought to subsist at all times between gentlemen. I have not clearly gathered from the noble Viscount whether that Agreement is now suspended, or whether it continues to operate in that wider sphere to which the noble Viscount referred. It seems quite certain that the spirit of the Agreement was violated by the assault upon Albania, and to those of us in my position it seems almost incomprehensible that any future reliance should be placed upon the value of that Agreement. I am glad of course to hear that both Greece and Rumania have received the assurance for which for some time they have been waiting. I did not gather—I may have missed that point—that any such assurance had been given to Turkey. It may be that such an assurance is not thought to be necessary, but this matter of Greek independence appears again to rest upon the value which is attached to the Italian word.

The noble Viscount said that the Agreement might operate over a wider area than that of Albania, and that the test in the matter would be the future rather than the past. That displays a faith which facts seem not to be able to disturb. I was alarmed, not a little shocked, but also not really surprised, to hear the references to Spain. I do not like to assume that we are making Albania pay the price for our deplorable policy in regard to Spain and that we are buying the Italians out of Spain by making no noise about Albania. If the Italians are to come out of Spain I should like to ask, does that include the island of Majorca? Does it include all the munitions and equipment that have been accumulated there? And then, in the matter of the general repudiation which the noble Viscount has given to these events, he has, I am sure, behind him the sympathy and the assent of the whole House. There are, however, one or two things that I would like to say in a general way on this most vital matter.

As I see the issue to-day, collective security is, as it always has been the end to be desired. Now was this attack upon Albania not foreseen by His Majesty's Government? We have a Secret Service. We spend a vast amount of money on this Intelligence Service. Do we get no return whatever from it? I should like the opportunity of examining the accounts of that expenditure to see what we really pay for. The noble Viscount has expressed the common feeling of us all that the day chosen for this assault upon Albania was a mere defiance of the feeling of men in regard to that matter. There were in Albania ail the well-known characteristics of this kind of assault. All the technique of defamation was employed: the virtues of the Albanian Government were hidden, its faults exaggerated or other faults invented, and the King himself was accused of pocketing the money which a kind Italy had sent for the poor of Albania. This kind of defamation is getting rather wearisome. To be a king or to be a president of a small nation is a poor business in these days. They might as well be members of the British Labour Party, who are accustomed to that kind of treatment. Your Lordships will note of course that Spain has rushed to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. That seems to me as important a matter as has happened in our time, and it is one that we at least on this side of the House foresaw a long time ago.

The only other matter I will trouble your Lordships with—because I do not want to speak at length—is that, so far as I could understand the noble Viscount, there was absolutely no word respecting our relationship with Russia. What precisely is the position in regard to Russia in this matter? One can understand the reticence on the part of Russia. I can only hope that she does not remember too acutely the long and silly campaign of slander that was waged against her, but she is bound to be suspicious of us. The very first act of the first Labour Government of this country was to recognise Russia, and we are entitled to look back upon that event with some satisfaction. The key to this situation seems to us to be an Anglo-French-Soviet declaration of peace and intention to resist aggression. If that were made, it would not only secure the good will of the people of the United States of America, but it would give new hope and inspiration to small and severely tried nations.

The Rumanian people were gettting extremely anxious, and I can only hope that the statement which has now been made will do something to comfort them. But it is on the whole deplorable that after the Czecho-Slovakian tragedy, a month should have passed and nothing has happened except a guarantee to Poland until this day. The small countries do not know where the Government stand, and we do not know what the Government are doing. Speaking for my noble friends on this side, we have always wanted a policy pursued with vigour, which would unite the peace-loving nations in their resistance to wicked aggression. His Majesty's Government seems not to have known precisely what they wanted— Wandering between two worlds—one dead, The other powerless to be born. The Labour view on this matter has been consistent, it has been constructive, it has been essentially correct: to build up collective security on a wide basis, and then we should be able to talk with the enemy within the gates. We welcome, as I have stated, His Majesty's Government's new conversion to a policy that we have long preached, but we want that conversion to be associated with acts and with keen prosecution of the end sought. As we see it now, the absence of Russia from these matters may be fatal. There is not only Europe to think of, there is what is to happen in the Far East if Russia remains isolated as she is at the present time.

I have tried not to be provocative in what I have had to say, and I should just like to conclude by saying that His Majesty's Government, as they know, and as we have many times assured them, have behind them, for certain agreed ends, a united people. There are certain things for which we stand, every man and woman in this country—the right of free speech and free assembly, the right of a man to worship in his own way or not to worship at all if that seems to him right—and a people united for these ends call upon His Majesty's Government to see that they are not further imperilled.

4.2 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

My Lords, at the outset I would like to echo the sympathy expressed by the noble Lord who has just sat down with the Foreign Secretary in the arduous and difficult work he has had to do during the last few weeks. I shall endeavour in no way to make his task more difficult in anything I propose to say to-day. On the other hand it is not an occasion on which, having heard the very grave commitments this country has made in the last few weeks, not to ask some questions and not to call the attention of your Lordships to some of the very far-reaching consequences that spring from those commitments. I do not think it is any use disguising from ourselves any longer that we live to-day in an era of quite unrestricted power politics. There are certain Powers which, from their point of view, for good or bad reasons, have openly proclaimed for many years their intention to alter profoundly the status quo in the world, and by the only means they felt was in their power, which was the accumulation of quite overwhelming superiority in armed force and the ruthless use of it. When you look at the picture which certain great Powers present of rearmament in the last few years, and read the declarations of their statesmen and their Press, I do not think there is any possibility of not realising that that is the world we live in.

In that world agreements in the ordinary sense of the word are not of the importance which under more peaceful conditions we could reasonably expect. They register, and do little more than register, the changes brought about in the international structure by the use of violence by power politics and war. The only way in which you can limit this is by presenting to those Powers which seek to alter the status quo by violence a superior power. There is no other way by which you can do it; and if I may criticise at all some of the observations which have fallen from my noble friend who has just spoken it is that in the past his Party have been too inclined to think you can make bricks without straw. They have not been willing to create that armed power which alone would give effect to the policy of resistance to change for which they, quite rightly, stand.

Let us consider for one moment the principles which probably underlie the policy of the Leader of the Italian people. It has often been described as Machiavellian. But those who read Machiavelli deeply realise that the essence of Machiavelli is not the kind of cheap diplomacy which one ordinarily finds quoted. It is the argument that in great times, with great issues, it is impossible for nations or statesmen to regard themselves as being bound by the ordinary canons of morality. That is the essence of the Machiavellian doctrine; and in these days the Powers we have mentioned believe that they are living in great days, that they mean to revise the international structure, that Italy in particular means to re-create, as far as possible, the old structure of the Roman Empire, and that in these circumstances any method which secures that result is justifiable. That is the essence of the doctrine. It is the old doctrine that the end justifies the means. I am glad to think that all history proves that in the end that doctrine is fatal, but it very often succeeds for a time with very painful, dangerous, and deplorable results to those who are the victims of it.

Similarly you have a Leader in Germany. I have only for the first time read the whole unexpurgated edition of Mein Kampf during the Easter holidays. It is one of the most deplorable things that the edition in English which has been issued of that book is less than one-third of the original and gives no effective indication of the spirit of the very remarkable contents of that book. There is not the slightest doubt that Herr Hitler has set out first of all to create a nation, disciplined, armed, toughened, hardened, with the object of remaking a large part of the world by the method of force, and every bit of the creation of the Party he leads is based on that.

That is what we are up against—the proposal to alter profoundly, mainly at the expense of the British Empire, the whole structure of the international position as we have known it. I do not think it is any use whatever disguising these facts from our mind. One of Herr Hitler's great advantages has been that, for very long, what he sought a great many people all over the world felt was not unreasonable, whatever they may have thought of his methods. But that justification has completely and absolutely disappeared in the last three months. It began to disappear in my mind at the Godesberg Conference. Everything that has happened since then proves that what we are confronted with is the most ruthless use of the most ruthless power to remake the world according to the plans which are set forth in Mein Kampf and which have since been modified by Herr Hitler. I do not think in these circumstances there is the slightest prospect of dividing the two Dictators, especially since the last event. It may have been possible at one time. I do not say that the Prime Minister was wrong in making the attempt; but to-day they are absolutely and utterly committed to remaking the Eastern Mediterranean by power politics if they possibly can. It is a pure delusion to think that they mean to do anything else, or that we can do anything else, except by superior power to stop it.

We have been largely deceived since the War into thinking, though my noble friend (Viscount Cecil) will not agree with me, that the contract known as the Covenant of the League of Nations in some way alters the fundamental principles inherent in the relations between sovereign States; but as between sovereign States it is an old rule of diplomacy that your diplomatic commitments should be based absolutely and strictly on what your real power is. If you go beyond that you are either going to let down your friends or you are going to be forced to retreat. I think the right answer to the situation is what Mr. Churchill has advocated elsewhere, a grand alliance of all those nations whose interest is paramountly concerned with the maintenance of their own status quo. But in my view if you are going to do that you have got to have a grand alliance which will function not only in the West of Europe but also in the East. I agree with what my noble friend Lord Snell has just said that in that Eastern alliance Russia may be absolutely vital.

Look at the situation in which we now find ourselves. We have entered into very great commitments to Poland, to Greece and to Rumania. Yet our own power and that of France is largely limited to what you can do with sea power and also with air power, in which we have certainly not got a superiority. The military resources which we can bring to bear upon the situation are extremely small, and those which France can bring to bear outside her own territory must also be very small. Suppose, as I think is inevitable, the Axis Powers one by one confront these Powers with the issue that they have to choose between Germany and Russia, what are they going to do unless they know that if they want it they can rely upon Russian support? We, by ourselves, cannot give them in such a crisis any effective military help. What frightens me, now that Yugoslavia is practically isolated, now that Germany is reported to be encouraging both the Bulgarians and the Hungarians to satisfy their ancient aspirations at the expense of Rumania, is that I can see no adequate balance of force to be found in Eastern Europe to oppose aggression unless that balance of force is provided by Russia.

Nobody will suspect me of any ideological sympathy with Russia or Communism. I have even less ideological sympathy with Soviet Russia than I had with the Czarist Russia. But in resisting aggression it is power alone that counts and if you are going to create a grand alliance of resistance against anticipated aggression you must be able to produce a clear superiority of force both in the East and West of Europe. Therefore I would urge His Majesty's Government to think very hard about this problem. I recognise and I realise that the ideological differences between certain Powers in the East of Europe and Russia are very great, but I think we have got to make them realise that they have got to choose in the long run between independence with Russian as well as British and French help and domination by Germany. I do not want to go further into that matter to-day. But I think it is of vital importance that the House should realise the kind of problems which are going to arise, and may arise more rapidly than some expect, in giving effect to the policy of Great Britain in trying to build a grand alliance between nations very far apart but who are united by a common desire to resist aggression. In saying this I do not want to suggest that our position is in any way desperate. I think we have enormous resources at our disposal, but I do not think any time should be lost.

There is one other point which the noble Lord did not stress in his speech, to which I desire to refer. I think it is very much in the minds of other noble Lords also. I mean the immediate problem which confronts us in the Eastern Mediterranean. Personally, I do not attach so much importance to the withdrawal of the Italian or German troops from Spain because I think that is going to happen in any event. No ruler in Spain in my view would be able to rule if he had to rely manifestly on foreign troops of the kind now in Spain. But what is far more serious and far more dangerous is the kind of commitment which General Franco may have entered into with his associates under the Anti-Comintern Pact in the event of a general war. He could mount guns which would command on the one hand Gibraltar and on the other side the passage between Europe and Africa. He could also afford to his associates facilities for submarines and for aerodromes of various kinds on the coasts of Spain. That seems to me by far the most serious problem at present. I should have thought that the resources of diplomacy have not yet been exhausted in order to bring home to General Franco the very serious consequences to Spain of any such reply to cur own long policy of neutrality during the Spanish civil war. I do not believe the Spanish people are anxious to enter into war with France or ourselves or anybody else after two and a half years of bitter and bloody civil war.

There is one other declaration which I personally would like to see the Government make. If you foresee the problems which are going to arise I think you are bound to realise that the shortage of our own military forces may be the greatest of the dangers we have to face. We have got an invincible and highly-efficient Navy and from all the evidence I get our Air Force is rapidly increasing in power and efficiency. I may be wrong, but I am inclined to think that the old picture of the possibility of a knock-out blow on Great Britain has now disappeared from the military calculations altogether. But if you foresee the situation that may develop in the future from the commitments we have now entered upon, we may find that we ought to reinforce the Maginot line, to reinforce the Egyptian garrison, and it is not beyond possibility that we may be called upon to back our ancient alliance with Portugal with armed forces.

I personally—and I have said so for more than a year—think that the Government ought to invite the country to agree to some form of National Service. The precise system of compulsory National Service which is appropriate is a matter upon which admittedly there is great dispute. But that some system of universal training is essential to the policy we are now following I personally have long been convinced. I think that you could do nothing which would do more to stabilise the position in Europe within a relatively short time as well as to enable us to bring superior forces to bear at a critical point which is decisive, than for His Majesty's Government to invite the country to give them the necessary power by legislation to mobilise whatever forces are deemed to be necessary to carry out the enormous obligations that they have entered into. That is primarily a matter for the Government. But I venture to appeal to my noble friend on my left that if the Government asked for these powers they will not resist them.

In conclusion may I say that while I think the situation is grave and extremely difficult, there are enormous advantages on our side? We have not only sea power and powerful allies, but I believe we can count on being able to obtain from the United States facilities for bringing the enormous industrial resources of that country behind the Democracies, to help in any way that is possible. Again we now have right on our side. Up to Godesberg I doubt if that was the case, so far as Germany was concerned. But to-day it is clear to everybody that the Axis stands for the destruction of national liberty and independence. On the other hand the Dictators are running into increasing difficulties. The nations are increasingly afraid of them. The moment they are confronted by effective resistance there will be a stampede from their side. They are trying to reverse the whole tendency of modern civilisation based on national self-government—a hard task—and their own Governments are increasingly dependent on that most hideous of all things, the Gestapo, or secret police, which denies with the utmost brutality any independence in their own countries.

To my mind what matters to-day is that we should show to the whole world, friends and foes, that we have made up our minds and mean at whatever sacrifice, to try to end further aggression. This country has, I think, made up its mind, if necessary, to face war and if that is realised I think the situation will improve. I believe that the Prime Minister was right in going to the extreme in order to prove to the rest of the world that we wanted appeasement and not war. But to-day if we want to be sure of support from the Dominions and of sympathy and assistance from the United States—and I have visited both recently—it is absolutely essential that we should prove to the world that we are capable of giving an effective resistance to aggression.

4.21 p.m.

VISCOUNT SANKEY

My Lords, I should first of all like to thank the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues for all that they have done for us and are continuing to do. They have had to meet an unprecedented situation, and they are meeting it cautiously and well. But at the present moment, the first essential is that, whatever our creed or whatever our Party, we should be united on the policy that we ought to pursue. The Dictators within the last few years have been encouraged by our apparent disagreements, hesitations and vacillations. There have been, and no doubt there are still, many of us who think that Germany was badly treated at Versailles and who have sympathised with her efforts to obtain justice. Recent events have made us begin to ask, is there any difference between the Germany of to-day and the Germany of 1914? There are others who have been attracted by the discipline and the sacrifices made by Fascism, who have admired the Fascist system and have toyed with the idea of introducing it into this country. Is the Fascism which led to the rape of Albania an example to follow or a thing to be proud of? There are yet others who, remembering the horrors of the Russian revolution and the persecution of religion, dislike any idea of joining up with the Soviet Republic for any purpose whatever. With this it is possible to have considerable sympathy; but if I were shipwrecked in the Baltic I should not refuse an offer of help from a Soviet lifeboat.

I said that our disagreements have encouraged the Dictators. Rather would I say that they may have misled them. But the rape of Albania has done more to unite us than all the speeches of all our statesmen. In peace we have our political Parties, but they cease to exist when the safety and honour of Britain are at stake. What, then, should be our policy? First of all, bygones are bygones all the world over. There must be no reproaches and no recriminations on the past. We may learn from experience what these mistakes have been and that they must not be repeated. Many of us would welcome a return to the Cabinet of its former Ministers and critics. The abuse which has been showered upon them by the German Press is their chief recommendation, and I should value their closer collaboration and their share in the responsibilities of Government. Secondly, common prudence compels us to defend our Empire, to resist any interference with our ways of communication. The Mediterranean is an international highway, not yet an Italian lake. Further we must resist any attack or acts of aggression calculated to threaten or weaken our safety. In such conditions offence may be the best form of defence, and we must be ready not merely to defend ourselves but to strike back.

But whilst we take precautions against war or to enable us to win a war, let us still continue to make endeavours for peace. We shall never get peace as long as injustice prevails. Let us therefore ask for an alliance of peace-loving nations whose policy shall be responsibility for world order and international justice. Peace with honour does not necessarily mean peace without concessions, and I do not exclude bringing Germany and Italy into such an alliance, but great care will have to be taken about making promises and entering into agreements. At present there is no machinery in International Law for claiming for breach of agreements. You have to rely on the good faith of those who make them. It is impossible for us to deal with men that we cannot trust. It is further to be hoped that future negotiations will be conducted through the usual diplomatic channels, and some limit placed beyond which negotiations will not be continued. You cannot go on for ever treating a man as a first offender and merely warning him as to what will happen the next time he offends. Details must be left to the Government at a time when the situation changes from hour to hour, but the tension in many countries would be lessened if Germany and Italy discontinued the campaign of abuse in their daily Press against their opponents and their threats against small nations, and if Italy immediately withdrew her troops from Spain. My Lords, there is no reason for any of us to be fearful or indeed nervous. If the worst does happen Great Britain will make the best of it.

4.29 p.m.

VISCOUNT ASTOR

My Lords, any private member must take part in such a debate as this with some feeling of misgiving, but each of us has his duty and his personal responsibility, and I think it would probably help His Majesty's Government if members of your Lordships' House state what in their opinion are the feelings of the country. I hope that the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary realises that he has not only the sympathy and the support but the prayers of millions of people in this country and throughout the whole world. Terrific responsibility was quite unexpectedly placed upon his shoulders almost single-handed. The noble Viscount at the opening of our proceedings this afternoon made a very grave statement, a statement which indicated the tremendous changes which are taking place in the world, and it is because of that that I think we should all be big enough to admit that during the past year or two each of us and all of us as individuals and as parties have probably made some mistakes. I do not think it would be possible to find anybody whose record, whose forecast, whose foresight had been completely correct.

Some thought that you could take the words and the pledges of the Dictators as you could the pledges of others. They now realise that you cannot do that. They now realise that when the Dictators swear that they are going to keep their word, in fact they are contemplating breaking it; that their method is to say that black is white in the hope that the world may somehow believe them. That makes the conduct of foreign affairs exceedingly difficult. It adds to the responsibility of the Government. But there are others who have made mistakes of a different sort. They have believed that passing a resolution, whether of sympathy for a nation that is threatened or of condemnation against a potential aggressor, carried some weight. Words unless supported by action, resolutions unless supported by adequate power, are a snare and a delusion, as we now see. You cannot answer power politics by diplomacy; you can only answer them by the willingness and the ability to exercise similar or superior power.

His Majesty's Government have announced to-day that we have undertaken additional commitments. It was quite obvious that that statement received the complete, full and whole-hearted support of all the members of your Lordships' House. But, my Lords, when we give these additional undertakings and make these additional commitments, we have to see, as the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, said just now, that we are in a position to give effect to our pledges of support and to carry out our commitments. I hope that the Government will be able to indicate to us the steps which they mean to take to increase the marl-power which we should be able to bring to bear, both our own and that in other countries. I should like to associate myself entirely and whole-heartedly with the noble Lord in his opinion that it is vital to get the support, when we can, of the Soviet now that we have taken on these commitments.

I had hoped that the noble Viscount and the Prime Minister in another place were going to announce that to-day, or, if not to-day, at the very earliest date, they would ask both Houses of Parliament to grant them additional powers—powers to mobilise the whole industry, the whole man-power and the whole wealth of this country. When we are in a crisis such as this, what is at stake is not our material possessions or the physical welfare of our bodies. There is something far greater at stake, and that is liberty of conscience and of reason. That is what is being challenged at the present moment, as I see it, in the world. I believe that a declaration by His Majesty's Government in the near future that it was their intention to call upon this country to give the whole of that which we possess, the whole of that which industry possesses, the whole of the manpower and the wealth of this country, would have an enormous psychological effect, and would possibly be the last chance, or one of the last chances, of preventing the outbreak of that war which day by day seems to be drifting closer.

I should like to say one thing more before sitting down, and that is about the so-called Axis. I do not know whether there are any people, either in your Lordships' House or outside, who still believe that we can by soft words divide the two Dictators. Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler have proclaimed more than once that the Axis is indivisible. The only possibility of breaking or weakening the Axis is not by soft words but by being in a position to bring strong action to bear upon them. I hope that His Majesty's Government will make it clear to each one of the Dictators that any act of aggression by one member of the Axis will be taken to be an act of aggression by both members; that if one Dictator acts against Poland or Holland, we shall take that as an act of aggression by the Axis as a whole and deal at once with all the members of the Axis. Unless we do that, we may find the same procedure going on as we have witnessed in the last few weeks and months: of the Dictators acting alternately against small Powers and thinking that they can get away with it. I do not believe that anybody in this country has any quarrel with either the German or the Italian people as such. From everything I have heard from people who have travelled in Italy, her people do not want war to-day, any more than the people of Germany wanted war at the time of Munich, as was quite evident from the reception they gave to the Prime Minister. I am equally convinced that the Italian public is not anti-British and that it is not pro-German. But the only way to make the Italian public opinion operate is to make the Italian public realise that Herr Hitler is taking them into war with Signor Mussolini's agreement. That is the danger.

People are wondering whether we are going to have war. I am asking myself whether the first shot was not fired on Good Friday in Albania. I do not know what the Government feel about it, but there seems to me that there are grave dangers on the West of the Mediterranean. We are told to wait until after some victory parade, at some date which has already, I understand, been postponed, before the withdrawal of the Italian troops from Spain. I am wondering what is going to happen during the interval before that parade: whether we may not be losing vital days or weeks during which fresh fortifications closing or endangering the passage of the Western end of the Mediterranean may not be coming into existence. I am wondering whether the Dictators are not playing for time, for a few weeks' delay. We read in the papers that General Keitel and General Pariani, the Chiefs of Staff of the German and Italian Armies, met early in April in Innsbruck. I find it difficult to believe that those two Generals, occupying those important positions, met at Innsbrück merely to discuss with one another the steps they were to take to overcome King Zog's Army. I think they discussed further-reaching and more serious steps, which have not yet been disclosed.

But I agree with what other speakers have said: I am convinced from my knowledge of the people of this country that they are as ready to-day for big deeds as they ever were, and ready for far bigger deeds than are forthcoming as yet, and that all classes and both sexes will be prepared to respond to any appeal which the Government may feel ready to make to them. And I am convinced of this, that they need a more vitalizing, encouraging and unifying appeal than has yet been made. If such an appeal is made, I am sure that His Majesty's Government can count upon the necessary response.

4.40 p.m.

THE EARL OF DARNLEY

My Lords, I have listened with great interest and attention to the description of the Government's foreign policy, which we have been given by the noble Viscount, the Foreign Secretary, and I hope he will consider me as trying to be helpful rather than critical if I say that it seems to me a very sad message to give to the world. It seems to me to be entirely a statement as to the course of the disease and nothing to do with the possible cure. It seems to me that we are but playing some ghastly game of chance in which the counters are human lives and in which there is no possible benefit to be gained by anybody. I would like to explain a little what I mean. The position is that an anti-aggression camp is being formed against aggressors. If the anti-aggressors succeed in frightening the aggressors into peace by a display of armed force, will it be a good peace? I say it cannot be a lasting peace because the causes of unfriendliness between nations will still be there and possibly increased. If it brings war it is even worse, for war is by now known to confer no benefits on victor or vanquished.

Is there not something better? Cannot we go a little deeper into the cause of this disease? I am sure I am in a minority if I say that I think the only possible solution is to continue the gallant policy of discussion and conciliation inaugurated by the Prime Minister last September, in spite of the fact that everybody thinks that, because it has failed, or apparently failed, once, it is of no use trying it again. I think that that policy has suffered from the use of the word "appeasement," which implies giving up something for the cause of peace, whereas the principle should consist of the statement by all parties equally with the idea of dispersing grievances by discussion.

Let us take a simple analogy from human life. If human beings or groups of human beings have a quarrel, they know perfectly well that until they meet and talk it over there can be no way of finding out the real cause of the trouble, which may perhaps be buried long in the past, nor of dispersing the ill feelings. That is usually considered the best way of settling a quarrel, far better than blows or expensive litigation. Is it not the same with nations? This crisis, like other crises, is not the result of a few weeks or even months. They owe their origin to old sores, which are buried in the past, perhaps ten years or even fifty years old, together with their children, jealousy, fear, resentment and repression, which are well known to be the parents of aggression. Until nations come together in a proper spirit of give and take, these old sores cannot be uncovered and healed, nor can the causes of unfriendliness and grievances be ventilated and dispersed.

But whatever happens at the conference table, if the nations do meet together it is absolutely certain that much can be done to allay these ill-feelings, because there is a personal element introduced when the heads of nations come and discuss matters with their enemies, the heads of other nations, and the position must be bettered for the future. The present position must make matters worse. Every day there are daily hatreds blared in the newspapers and on the wireless. There are daily statements of grievances, daily defiances, daily statements of increased armaments. These go on increasing until at last the feelings of the nations get inflamed to bursting point, and common or garden citizens who have no wish except to live at peace with others, have their minds hardened and the hair trigger is set. The policy I am advocating is not a policy of pacifism or idealism, nor is it a vision of Utopia. Heaven knows there are plenty of problems in the human machine to be solved in peace time. But I do claim that it would be a wonderful thing for England to do, to-day, to continue this policy, to put aside her own fears and grievances, to disregard entirely the differences and dangers and apparent futility, because of an ardent desire for the betterment of the lot not only of our own people, but of all the men, women and children of the civilised world—to persevere until success comes, for come it would, because the policy would have behind it the whole weight of Christianity, which, whether believed in or not, is acknowledged to be the finest set of rules for the guidance of human conduct.

4.48 p.m.

Lone CROMWELL

My Lords, it falls to my lot, as the next speaker, to congratulate the last speaker on having spoken to us, as I understand, for the first time. I would like, if I might, without being presumptuous, for I am not so very old a member myself, to congratulate him and to say how much we hope to hear him on many occasions in the future. I do not think any of us would wish to say anything which would in any way embarrass the Government at this present juncture, but I agree with the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, that it is the duty of one and all of us, if we think we have any contribution or constructive criticism to offer, to give it at this stage. History, as you know, is full of examples of this country entering into alliances to maintain the balance of power in Europe, and in fact throughout the whole of the civilised world, and in every case up to now, where any dragon which is tempted to rear its head in domination of the world has risen up, we have collected those other nations together to resist it, and in the past we have always managed to resist it successfully. In between these occasions, which have come from time to time, our policy seems to have been that of semi-isolation, and rarely if ever, I think, have we committed ourselves to support of one country or group of countries in such a manner as would be quite impossible for us to make up our minds, when the alarm arises, as to what definite action we will have to take in the particular circumstances as we find them at that time. It has already been frequently said that the guarantee which we gave Poland is a complete departure from this country's policy in the past, and I think that perhaps this guarantee and the guarantees for Rumania and Greece, of which we have heard to-day, will entail more momentous consequences than are perhaps realised even by those who, after due deliberation, considered them necessary.

One of the reasons, we were told, why we did not go to the aid of Czecho-Slovakia was that we could not get there. I am wondering myself whether it would be any easier for us to get to Poland. It is true we have learnt to-day that the integrity of Greece and Rumania has been guaranteed by this country, and I should like to ask this question. Suppose Poland is attacked, have we an arrangement with Greece and other countries whereby we could get at Poland if those other countries themselves are not attacked? And will those two additional countries, as I believe is the case with Poland, guarantee us also against attack? The guarantee to Poland has been frequently described as a cover note issued before a complete insurance policy has been agreed to, bringing in all those peace-loving nations who are determined, if possible, to resist aggression. Like the Leader of the Opposition, I can only gain my information from the Press, and I do not know whether the Government have entered into any private arrangement with other countries—Turkey was mentioned—whereby they can also come to our assistance and help us against the aggressor nations.

Russia has been frequently mentioned, and it certainly would appear to me that, without Russia no guarantee in that sphere is really very much worth while. We are credibly informed, however, that the Poles are not prepared to welcome the presence of Russian troops in their country. I do not know whether it will be possible for His Majesty's Government to make that position clearer. I am sure your Lordships will agree with me that, if other countries think fit to bluff, we certainly are not in a position to take such a risk, and that we ought to be able to carry out effectively and honourably any arrangements to assist to which we come. I would go so far as to say that all small countries must either cease to exist as independent States or must come into a combination against aggression. I would suggest that if His Majesty's Government have not already done so, they should consult with all countries which in their opinion might possibly be brought into such a combination, and tell them quite frankly that, if they are not prepared to come in, then we are not prepared to guarantee their safety and they must fight their own battles alone. There were many mistakes made, as all are agreed, in the Versailles Treaty, but I suppose the greatest mistakes of all were when we allowed buffer States to be set up as a guarantee against two large countries on either side of them. One thing which the world cannot stand is uncertainty, and the very fact of putting a small buffer State between two great nations creates the position that neither country knows exactly where its frontier is.

The Minister for War in another place made a very momentous pronouncement the other day when he described the type and size of the Expeditionary Force which this country might have to send to the Continent. Many of us were under the impression that one, two, three, or perhaps four divisions of the Army were the only contribution which the Army would make to any such force on the Continent, and that we should rely on other Powers to provide the land forces, while our chief contribution would come from the Navy and the Air Force. Even before the Minister for War made that tremendous pronouncement—which might almost be described as a departure from the principles we have followed in the past—some of us were in favour of some form of compulsory service. Some were content with a complete National Register, while others went as far as to advocate conscription in the fullest sense. I personally took the view that every citizen of this country should be allotted in advance the task which he or she was most qualified to perform, and that all should be trained so that, if emergency arose, they would be able at once to carry out their parts most effectively. I do not think there is any other way in which that can be done unless you have training in peace time for the service which each individual is most qualified to perform in the essential tasks of our own defence.

In spite of that I was prepared to accept a complete register. We have not got it. I was prepared to accept it because I thought it was absolutely bound to come. And I accepted it on the assumption that when the country was again consulted at a General Election, it would be absolutely essential for any Party which wished to have the full confidence of the country to include a form of compulsory service in its programme. It is true that the Territorial Force has been allotted a much larger share in the defence of this country, and of this country's interests outside, but I would point out—perhaps a very obvious fact—that the trebling of the peace-time establishment of the Territorial Army on paper does not produce the numbers required to complete the establishments overnight. I myself have come to the conclusion that, with the commitments we have entered into, with the statement which the War Minister made the other day as to the type of Army which we should require to send overseas as an Expeditionary Force, conscription of the manhood and of the industry of the country is the only possible solution. It is a solution to which we must eventually come, and the sooner the better.

The opposing arguments which I have heard used in this House and elsewhere are, firstly, that this will dislocate supply, although it is admitted that both a Ministry of Supply or something of that sort and conscription of the manhood of the country will be brought in immediately hostilities break out. Secondly, it is said that even if the men were called out there would be no equipment for them, not even sufficient to train them. Personally I do not accept either of those arguments. Surely, if the control of industry is going to cause dislocation, it is better for it to take place now than at the outbreak of hostilities. Turning to the individual, surely some such method as I understand the French are adopting could be adopted here. We could call up people individually, the type of people we want, as they are wanted, for the particular jobs they are required to fill. There is no necessity to call them up by classes. I would urge upon the Government as solemnly as I possibly can not to think that their hands are tied against any form of compulsion in peace-time. What in my view the country is looking for is a lead, and I am quite convinced that the country as a whole will gladly follow it. I beseech then not to wait for every step, every detail, to be approved by the country as a whole—to be put out piecemeal for discussion and to be passed by a vote. Give the country a lead!

We are told that there is a pledge that no compulsion will be brought in in peacetime. I would ask the same question as has been mentioned by the Foreign Secretary to-day: Are we at peace? There seems to be a doubt in the mind of my noble friend; there is no doubt in mine. You could not describe the present situation of the world as one of peace. The days when war was declared appear to be finished. We are nominally at peace one day, and next day we read in our newspapers that the war has been going on for twenty-four hours. I would add that in my view, for whatever it is worth, if democracy is to survive, the machinery of democracy must be quickened if it is to compete fairly with the methods employed by other countries. Finally, I would urge the Government immediately to organise both manhood and industry in a compatible way so that we may honourably carry out all our obligations.

5.3 p.m.

LORD AILWYN

My Lords, as one of those who criticised the Munich Agreement I should like, if your Lordships will allow me, to take this opportunity of expressing in a few sentences my wholehearted support of the action now being taken by His Majesty's Government. Whatever good or ill may have emerged from Munich, one outstanding fact, shining forth like a beacon for all the peoples and Governments of the world to behold, is that the British Prime Minister is a man of peace, and that any suggestion of the word "aggression" connected with his name is utterly unthinkable. That being so, it is perfectly clear that any assertion that a policy of encirclement is being initiated by His Majesty's Government is manifestly and demonstrably untrue. The policy now being pursued has been forced upon this country in the interests of self-preservation and in defence of morality and decency in international relations. We can no longer remain inactive in face of such incontrovertible evidence that faith can no longer be placed in the spoken word nor confidence reposed in the pledge solemnly given.

Who can doubt that we are faced with something evil, sinister, unpredictable—a force that, to borrow the words used in a different connection by the late Lord Fisher, is "ruthless, relentless, remorseless"? Is there an antidote to this pestilence that is sweeping through Europe and bids fair to engulf the world? I suggest that it certainly is not "Business as usual." It is surely to take every possible precautionary step for our own safety and that of the smaller, weaker nations who are anxious to enter into reciprocal agreements—those nations that lie to-day under a dark shadow of haunting fear. No stone should be left unturned, I submit, in order to build up a solid bloc of resistance to any further aggression. In the course of the foreign affairs debate of March 20 the most reverend Primate was taken to task by two noble Lords for urging "the massing of Might on the side of Right" in order to counteract the opposing blast of "Might is Right." Another noble Lord told your Lordships that he was "shocked almost into unconsciousness" at the very idea of co-operation with Russia. Such views, if I may say so with great respect, show a strange inability to grasp the realities and dangers of the present situation.

We are frequently told in your Lordships' House that it is no business of ours what form of government there may be in Germany, and that attacks on the Nazi régime are to be deprecated. If this be true, then I suggest to your Lordships that to adopt a pharisaical attitude towards Soviet Russia" and sanctimoniously to draw our skirts aside for fear of contamination by her, is equally deplorable and is, of course, at a time like this, a highly dangerous and unwise policy. On that account I warmly welcome the assurance of the Prime Minister in another place to the effect that no question of ideological differences shall stand in the way of conversations between these two countries. I am thankful to see reports of the close contact that is being made and continued between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government, for I am convinced that active co-operation with Russia at the present time is indispensable.

I would like, before I sit down, to urge upon His Majesty's Government what has already been urged from one or two quarters of the House, and that is the supreme importance of initiating a measure of compulsory National Service. I believe that no other single gesture by this country would have such an inspiring and galvanising effect on other countries. The very fact that this great democracy, for the first time in her history, should depart from her traditional custom of voluntary service would give convincing proof that we really were in earnest, and in my humble opinion would buttress and encourage those countries who may still be hesitating and doubtful. Moreover, I am of the opinion that this country as a whole is ready and waiting for some such action. I do not know what the experience of your Lordships may have been in the course of these last few days and weeks. For my part I have found bewilderment and apathy among the men in the villages in the country. They have not been brought up to think for themselves, initiative is foreign to them. They want telling and leading and directing, and this can only come, I submit, from the Government. There is much indignation and impatience at the lack of direction and the need for co-ordination and orderliness.

We are no longer living in the days when there was ample time for preparation, when there were warning periods, and so on. We know the technique of the aggressors to-day. War now comes without warning, without declaration, with a shattering suddenness. May I beg His Majesty's Government at least to institute forthwith a register for universal National Service to include the marshalling of our entire man-power, and perhaps our woman-power too? Nothing less, I am persuaded, is sufficient in this time of dire peril to ourselves and imminent danger to the civilised world.

5.13 p.m.

THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

My Lords, I regret I must begin my few remarks this afternoon by crossing swords with my noble friend Lord Ailwyn, who has elaborated to a positively dangerous extent what I can only regard as the heresy mentioned by several others of your Lordships—that is, that no system of security at the present time can be complete without the collaboration of Soviet Russia. My reason for saying that is not one which is concerned with ideological differences; it comes from plain practical politics. Firstly, no one knows what is the value of Soviet military assistance. Many tales of great armed forces leak out from Russia but no one has yet discovered whether those stories have any basis in fact. Moreover, an army which has been deprived of the majority of its staff officers by the method of summary execution is not one whose plans are likely to be in a very forward state of preparation, and it must be remembered that these executions were occasioned by the undoubted treachery of the officers concerned, who were in communication with Germany with a view to bringing about some form of military alliance between those countries whose systems of dictatorship differ very little except in name.

Moreover, what would be the effect of any agreement formally concluded with the Soviet? In the first place, it would undoubtedly finally stampede into the Axis camp countries such as Hungary and Spain, while it would also certainly weaken our influence with Poland and Rumania, both of which countries, if they bad to choose between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, would undoubtedly choose the former, the lesser of the two evils from their point of view. Lastly, as far as the Soviet is concerned, let it be borne in mind that their Government have never at any time openly repudiated their original aim of achieving world revolution. When the Government of Russia announce that they have departed from those ideals once and for all and are willing to mind their own business if they are left to look after their own affairs—then, my Lords, and only then, I submit, will the time have come when we can take Russia very seriously and regard her as other than at least as much a potential enemy as a potential ally.

This afternoon the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary has announced to us that we have undertaken new and formidable commitments in the east of Europe: I hasten to say that I do not wish your Lordships to imagine for a moment that I am in any way opposed to those commitments, but they do throw an additional and very grave strain upon our resources, which, great as they are, as the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, said this afternoon, are still almost entirely unmobilised for war, and if we are going to be faced with defending small nations in various parts of Europe as well as having to send the assistance which may be required to our ally France, then I think it is obvious we are going to require armed land forces on a very much greater scale than is even contemplated by the latest increase in our Territorial Army. I would most earnestly support all the other noble Lords who have spoken to-day in urging His Majesty's Government to consider the adoption as soon as possible of some form of compulsory National Service, partial let it be but still one which enables us to have in say, nine months time, a minimum of a quarter of a million, or better still half a million at least partially trained troops, so that we will be able to honour our commitments with deeds as well as with words if the worst should come to the worst.

Furthermore, the adoption of a policy of compulsory National Service in this country would have a most extraordinary and vitalising effect on other countries all over the world, including the United States of America. There is no doubt it would strengthen the determination of France, it would strengthen the will to resist of the small countries in the east of Europe, and it would certainly cause the Axis Powers to think twice before engaging on any further scheme of aggression which would be likely to bring about general hostilities. According to my information, while the great bulk of the German people do not want war, they have now come to believe that they are never going to have war, because they have only got to formulate their demands sufficiently violently and back them up with sufficient force ruthlessly employed to get exactly what they want without this country or France ever daring to intervene with more than words. The statement as to the position of Greece and Rumania which was made in your Lordships' House this afternoon should go some way to check aggression, but it will not go anything like so far as would a statement in this House that His Majesty's Government were resolved to introduce some form of compulsory National Service, and I do beseech them to consider this before it is too late.

The position of the Axis countries is not a very comfortable one. It is Germany which of course controls both. I think Italy cannot be regarded as her ally any more than the front wheels of a motor car. The simile is not a very good one, because not only the engine is at the back but because in this case the front wheels do not have even the consolation of steering the car of Juggernaut. Italy is being pushed by Germany and if she realises that the end of the pressure is going to be a war with a fully prepared Britain, then I think her enthusiasm for the Axis is likely to become even less than it is at present. After all, that Axis was brought into existence by the blunders which were committed over Abyssinia, that destroyed even the theory of collective security and lost us an old and natural ally. Such an Axis cannot be regarded as being forged of very good material.

Now to conclude. I supported the Munich Agreement, and have never seen any reason to consider that the Government were wrong in what they did then, admitting that that Agreement was not ideal by any manner of means. It was merely making the best of an admittedly very bad business. His Majesty's Government went on with the policy of appeasement and I am sure that the whole country was with them, but it is unfortunately impossible to continue indefinitely with such a policy unless there are some signs of willingness to co-operate from the other parties. Such signs to-day are hardly visible and the time has come when we must prepare to check aggression. That we are prepared to do so, has I think been indicated very clearly here to-day. I am sure that once it is realised that Britain does mean business and is prepared by force of arms if necessary to prevent further disintegration of the small countries of Europe, the time w ill come when the policy of violence will be brought to a close. But such a time will come very much sooner if we have compulsory National Service. Without it, it will be difficult to make France, let alone other countries, believe that we are really in earnest in our determination to stop aggression.

5.22 p.m.

LORD MOTTISTONE

My Lords, we have listened to a fateful speech from the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary, and one cannot but rejoice that every member of the House is in agreement with the Government's policy. There are many of us who devoutly hoped that we should be able to retain the ancient friendship of this country with the Italian people, and many more felt that they could not believe that we were doomed to permanent hostility toward the German people. Nevertheless, those who have pleaded the cause of friendship with Italy—it was my duty and I thought my privilege to do so—now see that the position is such that the Government could not do less than they have done, and we are all on their side. My noble friend the Marquess of Lothian, speaking for the Liberal Peers in this House, has summed up the position in a speech which I think I may describe as brilliant. The promises to Rumania, Greece and Poland, and of course to Portugal, combined with our commitments elsewhere, mean a new beginning which must have a wonderful new effect.

When one reflects, as has been pointed out to me since I came into the House this afternoon, that whereas in 1914 we had a Debt of only £640,000,000, we now have a Debt of £8,000,000,000, it will be seen at once how terrific is the obligation that Great Britain has undertaken. How can we face up to it? I have mentioned the figures of the Debt because they are vital in our consideration. Unfortunately they make all sorts of things more difficult. The burden of Debt is now twelve times as great as it was when we last meditated war, or feared that war was bound to come. There are two things that we can do. In saying that, I think I speak for all the neutral peoples whose cause we are espousing, and having recently returned from abroad I know that not one of them would dispute what I say. "It is not so much," they say to me, "what you say as what you do that affects our minds." What can we do? We can speed up much more, I am sure, the production of those dreadful instruments of war which we are now producing in great volume. If we were now to set up a Ministry of Supply—I would urge the noble Viscount to consider this—that would make a great difference. If he were to inform us, and the Prime Minister were to announce to the country, that a Ministry of Supply would be set up it would have a great effect. The reason given a few months ago for not setting up such a Ministry was that it was not necessary and that it would mean a great dislocation of ordinary peace machinery. If the Government were to say that we have got beyond that now, and that we will have a Ministry of Supply, it would have an immense effect abroad.

That relates to material. The other thing that we can do—it has been referred to by almost every speaker—has relation to the men of this country. My noble friend the Marquess of Lothian said fearlessly—and I have reason to believe that he spoke for every man on this Bench—that he was sure the time had come when the Government should say, and we would support them in so saying, that there must be universal ser- vice in this emergency. To have general Liberal agreement to that in this House is a formidable new fact, and a fortunate one, but I do not think that my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition can yet say the same. May I plead with him here that he will join with the Liberal Party—of course while in this House we are slightly more numerous I admit that outside the preponderance may be a little the other way—in saying that he will support the Government in that?

There is an argument which I have not seen used, but which appeals to me very much, and which I think will appeal to him. It may help him to convert trade unionism. It is a new kind of war against which we are preparing. As the Prime Minister has said, it is hateful to think of a war in which women and children are likely to be killed before we soldiers, sailors or airmen have a chance of shooting at each other. In this new kind of war the chief danger is panic. It has been proved quite recently on several occasions. What causes panic? I have seen two panics, one on a great scale. Panics are caused by people without a job to do. So I approach this problem from a new angle, which I commend to His Majesty's Government. So far what the Government have done is to say that so many soldiers, sailors, airmen and air-raid precautions people are wanted, and then try to fill the ranks by voluntary enlistment. I have gone about it the other way. I have got the Parliamentary list of voters—and I acknowledge the assistance the Ministry of Labour have given me—and I have found out approximately how many in a given area belong to any of those forces I have named. Then I found out how many were in reserved occupations. What is the residue left who have never been taught to obey, men who many of my Labour friends say are the despair of trade unionism, men who have never been taught to be obedient to whoever it may be? There is an enormous number, millions. I cannot disentangle them from the figures I have here, but I will send them to my noble friend and I hope he will pursue the inquiry. I should think that no less than one-fourth of those fitted to serve are absolutely under no obligation of any sort, and in the event of an air raid they would be the first without doubt to crowd into the shelters and leave the women and children outside. Now I appeal to the Labour Party—

LORD STRABOLGI

Why do you say that?

LORD MOTTISTONE

I say that because that is what has happened elsewhere. My noble friend interrupts me, and I am glad he has done so. Experience shows that in every panic—he has perhaps been more fortunate and has not seen them—the people who have nothing to do are the people who flee for shelter and push out those who have a prior right to be there. There can be no doubt that, if you have those vast numbers of people who are under no kind of obligation, who have no job to do, and there is no power in the Mayor or the Chief Constable to tell them what to do—other than the Common Law—you will have chaos, and people crowding into shelters and keeping the women and children outside. That is the reason why this country must not be the only one in the whole of Europe to refuse to do what the others have found necessary. Is it not a rather comical thing that this country, great and powerful though she be, should be saying in a magnificent way: "Don't you worry, you little people, we will look after you when the day comes," while they have every single man, in some form or another, trained to discipline and we refuse to take that elementary and necessary step? Therefore I appeal with all the force at my command to my noble friends on my left to see if they cannot support us in this.

I opposed compulsory service when I was the Liberal Secretary of State for War before the War of 1914, believing that that was then no time to form such a compulsory scheme. But this is quite a different thing. We want to bring the whole population under some form of discipline, and I commend to them the idea that that form of discipline might well be found in these civil defence bodies presided over by the Lord Mayor, with the police, who have had the statutory power all along and are the people principally concerned, to bring them into some form of discipline and to show to the whole world and to the little nations whom we have promised to protect, that not only will we do our utmost with our armed forces and with all our financial power, but that the whole nation is ready and willing to help.

5.32 p.m.

VISCOUNT HALIFAX

My Lords, I do not know whether your Lordships will be good enough to permit me to say a few words in reply to the speeches that have been made. But I should like to say first of all that, whatever may have been the differences between some of your Lordships according to the quarter of the House in which we sit, I think this debate has been on the whole remarkable for the substantial unanimity of judgment on the main, large issues which it has exhibited. I need not say that I, more perhaps than any other member of His Majesty's Government, am extremely grateful to every one of your Lordships who has taken part for the restraint and the discretion with which you have used that liberty. It is naturally gratifying to His Majesty's Government that, charged with these responsibilities, they should have acted in a fashion which, as I think the noble Viscount, Lord Sankey, said, commanded the general approval of your Lordships in all parts of the House. All that I would do or attempt to do would be to answer some of the points that have been raised; and if I do not answer them all, your Lordships will forgive me for not speaking, without greater preparation, on some of the matters that are at present the subject of diplomatic negotiations and upon which silence would perhaps be more golden than speech.

The noble Lord who commenced the debate, who followed myself, asked whether he was to understand that the Anglo-Italian Agreement was suspended. To that I would say that I am afraid he misunderstood my speech in that respect if it left that impression on his mind, because I was at pains to point out that the Anglo-Italian Agreement covered a very wide field, and that it had particular relation to Spain and the withdrawal of Italian troops from Spain, and that it was by that ultimate test that I thought a great deal of opinion the world over would form a judgment as to its ultimate worth. While I am on that point I should like to add this. The noble Marquess who spoke from the Liberal Benches spoke with great gravity of what he anticipated might be the existing commitments into which General Franco had entered in favour of the Axis Powers. On that, my Lords, I only permit myself one comment, and that is that I am quite certain that we should run the risk of making a profound and dangerous miscalculation of Spanish policy in future if we were to start from the basic assumption that it was likely to be dictated by consideration for anything but purely Spanish interests. I have never believed, and I do not believe to-day, that it is in the least likely that whoever is responsible for the Government of Spain will fail to pursue a purely Spanish policy independent of any outside foreign influence. The noble Lord opposite asked me whether the assurances in regard to Spain covered the case of aeroplanes in the Balearic Islands. They undoubtedly do.

LORD ADDISON

Including the Balearic Islands themselves—the evacuation of Majorca?

VISCOUNT HALIFAX

The Italians cannot remove the Balearic Islands!

LORD ADDISON

I never suggested they could. I said the evacuation of Italians from the Balearic Islands: that is the point.

VISCOUNT HALIFAX

I am sorry. The position is perfectly plain. The Ambassador secured an assurance from Count Ciano that Italian troops, wherever they were, would be removed; and to that he said "What about the aeroplanes in the Balearics?" To that the answer was "When the troops go, the aeroplanes go." I think, therefore, that that answer covers that ground fairly well. I might have been tempted, but I resist the temptation, to enter into a slight controversial argument with the noble Lord on one point: whether His Majesty's Government have been converted to what he called the Labour Party policy, or whether, as I should put it, the Labour Party had come along to join the policy of His Majesty's Government!

The noble Marquess who spoke from the Liberal Benches made what was to me an interesting balance-sheet between the advantages and disadvantages at present enjoyed by Dictators in comparison with other people. He left out one item that I always think is desirable to bring into such an account—and this is relevant to something that fell from the noble Lord opposite in regard to the Secret Service. I do not think that we always sufficiently remember the great contrast of conditions under which the Dictator countries work and we work. I have no doubt that in those other countries there are plans carefully worked out for almost every conceivable contingency, and a decision can be taken quite rapidly by one man, in effect, to put any or all or none of those plans into operation. Our problem is much less simple, because while we are making plans the noble Lord opposite, though with great discretion, and those he represents, are constantly asking us—if not in Parliament, in the Press and in public—for a precise declaration as to our intentions, our ideas and our judgment, and therefore it is quite impossible for any Government functioning under the conditions in which we have to function in this country, to move with anything like the secrecy or celerity which is available to others elsewhere. That should be borne in mind, irrespective of what Party has the responsibility.

Lord Astor gave us a review of some of the considerations that have operated in different minds during the last months and years, and arising from that, and in commenting on the new commitments that we have assumed, he expressed with great force his views upon what should be done in regard to what I might call the organisation of the Home Front. In that he was followed by several of your Lordships who have taken part in the debate. Indeed I think most of your Lordships who have spoken have made observations in that sense. There is, of course, a wide range of possible action in all that field. It might be that it should be as wide as I think Lord Astor himself said when he talked about the mobilisation—if that was his phrase—of men, industry and wealth. It might be something very much more circumscribed, as suggested by some noble friends behind me. But I think of almost all those proposals one thing is true, and that is that, at a moment when you are concentrating every effort which you can make upon the intensive production of things urgently required, you might easily do more harm than good to the general sum of national effort within this country if you were to embark upon policies that would have the effect of destroying the element of national unity upon which you depend.

I do not underestimate any of the arguments that have been employed about the effect that action of that sort would have in other countries abroad, or, I would add, of how good it might be for the fibre of our own people here, but I would ask noble Lords, when weighing those considerations, not to leave out of account the other element to which I have referred—namely, the possible effect of certain of those proposals at the present moment—I am not prejudging them beyond that—upon the state of national unity which is, I think, vital to the immediate concentration of national effort.

That brings me, I think, to the last main subject on which I wish to say a word or two, and that is the question of Russia, to which the noble Lord made reference. He made the comment that in my speech, for the length of which I owed your Lordships an apology, I had not mentioned Russia. I might have retorted upon him that in his speech, which was indeed not so long as mine, he never mentioned the United States.

LORD STRABOLGI

He did mention it.

VISCOUNT HALIFAX

He mentioned the name, perhaps. If I am wrong, I apologise to the noble Lord, and will not pursue the argument further. If I had pursued it, it would have been to say that if all the premises had been correct he would have been wrong to draw any deduction from my accidental omission, as I would have been wrong to draw any deduction from his speech if there had been any actual omission.

On Russia itself I wish to make this observation in a more serious vein. I fully recognise, of course, the importance of everything that has been said by those who have emphasized the importance of that great nation, but there are real difficulties that have to be met in this matter, and those difficulties most certainly are not of our making. I have throughout these anxious weeks done my best to keep the Soviet Ambassador closely informed of what was in our own thoughts, and I have also kept him closely informed, so far as I could with a just regard to the confidence of others, of the difficulties that might be in other quarters felt. It will be no fault of His Majesty's Government if those difficulties are not overcome, and I can assure your Lordships of this, that certainly nothing would be farther from the thought of His Majesty's Government than themselves to interpose any, if I might so call it, ideological difference in the way of their determination to use their best efforts to bring together all whom they may on the side of respect for international relations and those things which we desire to safeguard and buttress.

I do not think I can say more than that at this moment, but perhaps it will be enough to show the noble Lord opposite, and others, that the subject is by no means absent from the thought of myself or the thoughts of His Majesty's Government, and that we shall do everything in our power to remove the difficulties to which I have referred. I think I have, if I have not answered all the questions, answered those which I can answer and I hope that we may continue, therefore, to count upon the co-operation and the goodwill and assistance of your Lordships' House, as I am confident we may, in doing our best to discharge the not light responsibility that these anxious days impose upon us.

LORD SNELL

My Lords, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion standing in my name.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

House adjourned at ten minutes before six o'clock.