§ LORD DAVIES had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His Majesty's Government to issue as a White Paper an explanatory statement relating to the defensive agreement recently concluded between His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the French Republic; and to move to resolve, That His Majesty's Government be urged to do its utmost to secure the extension of the agreement so as to bring within its 1163 scope all those nations who are prepared to pool their military resources in a collective force for their common defence and to undertake to secure the settlement of such disputes as may arise between them by recourse to impartial third-party judgment.
§ The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands in my name, and in doing so I think I need not offer any apology, because I do not believe that this matter has yet been debated in your Lordships' House. I feel sure that your Lordships will agree that a matter of this importance—the Anglo-French agreement made last April—deserves at any rate the consideration of your Lordships. During the past few days there has been a great demonstration of friendship between the two nations. I am sure your Lordships will rejoice at the enthusiasm which has attended the visit of their Majesties to France, and has thus cemented the bond of friendship which unites the two great democracies of Europe. Before I deal with the Motion on the Paper, may I very briefly allude to Anglo-French relations since the War? During the last twenty years we have witnessed many changes in those relations. Your Lordships will remember that at the conclusion of the War an effort was made to conclude a defensive alliance between France, the United States and Great Britain, which would guarantee the eastern frontier of France against invasion in the future. Your Lordships will also remember that that treaty was not ratified by the United States Congress, and that afterwards the Government of this country also refused to ratify it; and that of course produced at the time a feeling of great disappointment in France.
§ After that came a period of very strained relations between the two countries following upon the occupation of the Ruhr which, I think your Lordships will agree, was most unpopular in this country. Then came a new phase which culminated in the Geneva Protocol of 1924, when the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of this country collaborated with M. Herriot and others in drafting the Protocol which was passed by the Assembly at Geneva. Unfortunately that Protocol died a premature death, and the Treaty of Locarno was substituted for it. I venture 1164 to suggest that Locarno was not a real substitute for the 1924 Protocol which, if it had been ratified, would have brought about a great development not only in the structure but in the machinery of the League. The next phase was that which was associated with the Disarmament Conference, which lasted a very long time. At that Conference the French Government on two occasions submitted plans for the constitution of an International Police Force under the auspices and under the control of the League. Both those plans were unfortunately rejected by the Government of this country, and were not proceeded with. I cannot help feeling that as a result of that unfortunate occurrence the people of France, and especially French Ministers, began to wonder whether we really intended to carry out our obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant. They remembered, naturally, the fate of the proposed treaty of alliance at the conclusion of the War, and when they also realised that this country had launched upon a policy of unilateral disarmament they, I think quite naturally, looked to other quarters and endeavoured to secure a policy of reinsurance. With that object in view they made arrangements, or tentative arrangements, with Rome and with Moscow which had a very disastrous effect on French policy at a later date.
§ With that we come to the Abyssinian crisis, and the partial—only the partial—application of Article 16. I believe that the main reason why Article 16 was only partially enforced was the commitments which M. Laval had made in Rome. As a result, instead of France and this country being solidly in support of the provisions of Article 16, the French Government reversed their traditional policy of sanctions, departed from the proposals which they had put up to the Disarmament Conference, and were mainly responsible for the failure of the policy which we and other countries advocated of putting Article 16 into operation, not only as regards certain economic and financial measures, but in its entirety. After all the vicissitudes which I have mentioned, to-day it seems to me that we find ourselves back in the position in which we were in 1914. After having gone through all these changes and having tried all these experiments, we are once again in the position of having 1165 to conclude what is, in effect, a defensive alliance with France—a policy which we absolutely refused to entertain during the whole of this period.
§ Had we supported the moral authority of the League and developed Articles 16 and 19, to-day we might have had twenty, thirty, or forty nations solidly behind the system of collective security. Instead of pinning our faith to the League, we unfortunately missed all these opportunities, and now, whether we like it or not, we are compelled to enter into this new agreement with our French neighbours. What is this agreement? We had a statement on April 29 from the Government but that statement, unfortunately, did not tell us very much about this agreement. That has been followed by statements appearing in the Press. As to how much credence we are to attach to these statements, none of us knows. Therefore I should like to appeal, if I may, to the Government to give us an explanatory statement, in the form possibly of a White Paper, in order that the country and your Lordships' House may be made aware of the terms and the general principles upon which this agreement is based.
§
If I may just refer to one or two of the statements which have appeared in the Press, here is one from The Times, in which it says:
It was agreed that there should be immediate purchases of armaments and raw materials with a certain amount of pooling of financial resources It was recognised that these measures have given practical definition to the post-Locarno undertakings, particularly in the air. The details of the co-operation and of the purchases are to be worked out by 'the competent experts'—that is, by officers of the two General Staffs.
A further measure of joint defence would ensure the co-operation of both Air Forces under the command of a British officer, and the co-operation of the Armies under a French officer.
Another statement appeared in the News Chronicle, which says:
But it appears that the British will pay special attention to the building of heavy bombers and the French to that of pursuit 'planes. Also, there will be far more interchanges of British and French officers so as to spread knowledge of each other's methods.
Then from the New York Times we get this:
The principle of a unified command, which took three and a half years to be accepted in the stress of the last World War, will be brought into instant operation in the
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next. A French General will command the combined Army of the two countries, a British Admiral will direct the allied Navies, and a British air officer will have charge of the combined Air Forces from the time an attack on either country is launched.
§ As I have already pointed out to your Lordships, we do not know how far these statements which have appeared in the Press are really true, and I suggest to the Government that they might dispel doubts and clarify the whole position if they gave us some more information as to the nature of this agreement. I do not wish to suggest for a moment that they should impart to the public—or to anybody else—facts or information which might be detrimental to the public interest, but I do feel—and your Lordships probably feel too—that more information should be vouchsafed to us than we have hitherto received. What are our commitments under this agreement? I suggest that it would be very disastrous if we are to be left in a position resembling the one in which we found ourselves in 1914. We do not want, surely, to have a repetition of what happened then as regards our precise commitments—whether, for instance, the fact that the military staffs of both countries are working together really means that we are committed in advance to certain military operations.
§ I also suggest in this connection that there is nothing worse from the public point of view than a feeling of uncertainty, and that it would be far better for us to depart from what in the past has sometimes been described as the traditional policy of this country—sitting on the fence. Let us make known to our own people and to the world precisely where we stand so that, when the day of crisis comes, there may be no misunderstandings or misapprehensions, and so that the course of this country will be quite clear.
§ The next point to which I would like to draw your Lordships' attention is this. It is said, and has been often said in the past, that it is quite impossible for two sovereign nations to pool their military, their financial, and their economic resources in such a way as to provide for their mutual defence. The technical difficulties, we are told, are so enormous that it is impossible to do so. The technical difficulties for instance of a united command, of munitions, and of finance are supposed to be so immense and so 1167 insuperable that it is quite impossible to bring about any defensive arrangement in advance of a crisis. If one may believe statements that have been made in the newspapers those difficulties are not insuperable. The fact is they have been surmounted in the case, for instance, of the command of military forces. We know that during the War we were able to secure close co-operation between all the Allied and Associated Powers, and, though it took three and a half years to bring it about, to see the appointment of Marshal Foch as Generalissimo. When that is pointed out people say: "Yes, it is quite possible to do that under the stress and strain of war, but it is quite impossible to do it in peace time." If what the newspapers suggest is correct, then I submit it is possible even in time of peace to organise defensive arrangements and to constitute some kind of international peace.
§ If that is possible for two sovereign countries, why not for three or four or any number who are willing to pool their resources and join in a scheme of this kind? Why is it not possible for Members of the League to join in an arrangement of this kind? I want to suggest to your Lordships this afternoon that the scope of the Anglo-French agreement should be extended, and that we should invite other law-abiding countries, and other countries who are also menaced, to join in constituting a collective force in order to deter any other country from engaging in war. I know it is often said that the small nations are really of very little account, that their military and other resources are so slender that they should not be brought into the picture at all. As a matter of fact that is not so. The twenty-two European small nations, for contributions towards the maintenance of the League, were assessed at 301 units, while the four great Powers, Germany, France, Italy and ourselves were assessed at 337 units, so that your Lordships will observe that so far as potential resources go in men, in wealth and so on, the four great Powers are only just a little ahead of the twenty-two small Powers in Europe.
§ It will be asked: "But what about their military resources?" I believe that during the past few years all the small nations in Europe have joined in the rearmament race, and they have already spent a considerable 1168 amount of money in increasing their military forces. From 1932 to 1937 their expenditure increased by 43.9 per cent., and so far as one arm is concerned, the air arm, the number of aeroplanes under the control of fifteen European countries amounts to somewhere between 5,000 and 6,000 fighting aircraft. The point I wish to make is that we cannot regard the resources of the smaller nations as negligible. In fact those nations constitute at this moment the balance of power in Europe. A great deal depends on how they throw their resources into the scale and whether they are willing to do so before and not after a crisis arises in order to increase the deterrent effect and to endeavour to prevent war from breaking out at all. We remember that during the Great War many of these small Powers were dragged in on one side or the other. We did our best to get as many of them as possible to come in on our side, and the Central Powers did the same. Those who were not dragged in remained in a state of neutrality, and they had to undergo very great hardships in consequence of the War. Therefore, it would appear that the best policy for these twenty-two smaller nations is to make up their minds now and not wait till the crisis comes; to try and act in unison in order to assist in preventing another war from breaking out.
§
In this connection perhaps your Lordships will allow me to quote from a speech which Mr. Churchill made a short time ago in Manchester and in which he dealt with this particular point. This is what he said:
Britain and France are now united. Together they are an enormous force, which few countries would dare to challenge. I should like to see these two countries go to all the smaller States that are menaced, and say to them bluntly: 'We are not going to help you if you are not going to help yourselves. What are you going to do about it? What are you going to contribute? Are you prepared to take special service in defence of the Covenant? If you are willing to do so and prove it by actions as well as words, then we will join together in active military association with you.'
The first thing I venture to suggest to the Government is that they should try to enlarge the scope of this agreement with France so as to include as many of the small countries as are willing to join in a defensive agreement of this kind.
§ But I do not suggest that we should stop merely at a defensive alliance. What 1169 I think your Lordships desire, and what I think the vast majority of the people in this country desire, is to see the rule of law established in Europe. We want to see a new system, one which is not exclusive as a military alliance is exclusive, but one which is open to every country to join. Then it is quite clear that any country which does join in an attempt to establish the rule of law must be willing to do two things. First of all, it must be willing to submit itself to a procedure for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which cannot be settled by negotiation and conciliation and through the existing machinery of the League. It must also be willing to pool its resources and to join in setting up some definite organisation which will enable it to uphold the rule of law. Surely these two things are vital, because in the first place unless we have a watertight procedure for the settlement of disputes it is impossible to brand the aggressor. Obviously the system is not directed against any country or any group of countries. It is only directed against the aggressor and in order to make sure who the aggressor really is we must have some body, some tribunal, some procedure which can settle all disputes. It is quite clear also that any country which ignores that procedure and resorts to war and attacks its neighbour is the aggressor. That is the simple test which is applied in our own country in our own Common Law, and I venture to suggest that it is also the test which should be applied to nations.
§ Therefore it means that Article 19 should be supplemented, should be extended and should be implemented. Some of us suggest for want of something better an Equity Tribunal, which is the hall mark, or one of the hall marks, of the new system. Would it not be possible—I venture to make this suggestion in all sincerity to the Government—to include in the Anglo-French agreement the setting up of some tribunal of this kind, or of some peaceful procedure so that any dispute which might arise between us and France in the future would be automatically sent to such tribunal if we could not settle it by negotiation round the table? Probably many of us are old enough to remember the Fashoda incident which very nearly landed us in a war with France. Things have changed vastly since those days, but I cannot help feeling that at this 1170 moment, when there is this wonderful feeling of friendship with our neighbour across the Channel, we should supplement this Anglo-French agreement by substituting some definite procedure and setting up if necessary the actual tribunal for the settlement of disputes. If we do that, then France and ourselves become the pioneers of what I have tried to describe as the rule of law. We can then with all confidence invite all countries to participate in the extension of this agreement.
§ I should not despair that ultimately—not at the moment—Germany and Italy might be willing to participate in such a system. Once a tribunal has been established there is the appropriate machinery for remedying the grievances under which we understand Germany thinks she is suffering. I think we might also anticipate that a number of what I have tried to describe as the smaller Powers would come in at the outset. Many of them of course are very sore and many are very suspicious after all the events which have happened at Geneva during the last two years, but even at the outset I believe a number of these smaller countries might be willing to come into an arrangement of that kind, although they would be very chary of coming into any defensive alliance. After all, there were fifty-eight nations at Geneva which joined in the imposition of sanctions and five Mediterranean countries, when a questionnaire was sent out asking whether they would come to the assistance of this country if it were attacked, answered in the affirmative.
§ LORD DAVIESFive answered in the affirmative at that time. Therefore, I imagine, there are some—I do not suggest all at the moment—of the smaller nations in Europe who might be willing to join in an agreement of that kind if it were established on the basis of the rule of law. What are the alternatives? May I suggest to your Lordships that really we are living internationally in a complete state of anarchy. Each country in fact is a law unto itself. We cannot emancipate ourselves from that anarchical state until we have in some way brought the armaments race to an end. So long as the armaments race continues we are always in danger of being precipitated into war. Rearmament, I suggest, is no remedy of itself. I have supported, as I 1171 imagine most of your Lordships have supported, the policy of rearmament. I always felt that unilateral disarmament was a complete failure and would never give us any security. And I do not think we can place any great reliance upon defensive alliances. I grant that they are better than nothing, but defensive alliances did not prevent us from being hurled into war in 1914 and I do not believe they will do so in the future.
I gather that in some quarters it is suggested that there should be a Four-Power Pact. That reminds me of the Holy Alliance and of Castlereagh's Quadruple Alliance after the Napoleonic Wars. I imagine that a Four-Power Pact would really not help us very much. It would probably be directed towards plundering the smaller countries of the world, and that reminds me of a quotation from William Penn, who, when he was discoursing on this theme two or three hundred years ago, said the national sovereignties
are as they were, for none of them now have any sovereignty over one another "—we have proposed a United States of Europe—and if this be called a lessening of their power, it must be only because the great fish can no longer eat up the little ones, and that each sovereignty is equally defended from injuries, and disabled from committing them.That, surely, is what we all desire to do, and I cannot help feeling that to suggest that a Four-Power Pact is going to be a substitute for the League of Nations is an entirely wrong policy and one that can only lead in the end straight to war.After all, your Lordships will remember that at the last Election the Government were returned to office because they had assured the people of this country that they stood solidly behind the Covenant. At Geneva Sir Samuel Hoare, who was then our Foreign Secretary, said: "We have stood behind the Covenant in its entirety." That was the slogan that the Conservative Party launched at the last Election. I appeal to those of your Lordships who represent the Government in this matter that they should be true to their principles and not go back on the mandate which they received from the people of this country. We should endeavour, instead of concluding bilateral agreements and departing from the principle of the Covenant, to 1172 go back to the League and endeavour to carry out our responsibilities and obligations under it.
I am sorry that I have detained your Lordships much longer than I had intended, and therefore I must bring my remarks to a close. But before I sit down, may I venture to remind your Lordships that, after all, the great problem which we have to face, and which every country in Europe has to face, at this moment is whether we are going to try to develop the principle of federalism—because, after all, the League is an experiment in federalism—and whether we are going to endeavour to promote a policy which has been reiterated by every Foreign Minister and every Prime Minister since the War? What was that policy? That the League was the keystone of our foreign policy. I have always understood that we endeavoured in this country to maintain a continuity in our foreign policy. I venture to suggest that the continuity at which we ought to aim is that we should make the League, not only in our speeches but also in our acts and in our policy, the great objective, without which we cannot expect to have peace in Europe. If we do that, I believe that we shall have the moral support of the people of the United States, which in the day of trouble would be very valuable for us. We should also probably receive the benevolent neutrality, if not the armed assistance, of the Russian Republic. Therefore I would once more plead with the Government that we should endeavour so to develop that agreement which they have concluded with our friends and neighbours that it may become a steppingstone to the re-establishment of the prestige and authority of the League of Nations. I beg to move.
§ Moved to resolve, That His Majesty's Government be urged to do its utmost to secure the extension of the defensive agreement recently concluded between Hi-Britannic Majesty and the Government of the French Republic, so as to bring within its scope all those nations who are prepared to pool their military resources in a collective force for their common defence, and to undertake to secure the settlement of such disputes as may arise between them by recourse to impartial third-party judgment.—(Lord Davies.)
§ LORD NOEL-BUXTONMy Lords, my noble friend Lord Davies has introduced a Motion which comes at a very appro- 1173 priate moment, when there are urgent problems for which his policy should provide. No doubt he would welcome a little discussion on the application of his plans to an urgent problem. I think the public will see in his proposal a policy for the extremely urgent question at the moment, the Czechoslovak question. His Motion raises that question in another way than by its general policy. It deals with our agreement with France, and the importance to us of that agreement with France arises specially from the French alliance with Czechoslovakia. It seems to me relevant and important to test the policy by its application to a practical case. How does the plan meet the urgent case that is in all our minds? It is a policy of collective defence and of third-party settlement, and that is the principle of the Covenant to which we all adhere. It is unquestionably sound, if the case is a clear enough case to which it can be applied.
But I would suggest that my noble friend's policy requires qualification, because there are peculiar cases in which something further is required, and we are, I think, in the presence of such a case. My noble friend advances an Equity Tribunal, but no such court is in existence to meet the needs of the hour, and an ad hoc court would have to be founded. Again, his policy is one of utilising the machinery of the League. Unfortunately, League procedure is rejected by one State closely concerned with the problem of the moment. Germany has no confidence in any machinery of the League. That is a great disaster, but events have made it inevitable. The League has been used partially, as a tool of the Allies, on many occasions, in such a way that we cannot contemplate the reference to the League, which is provided under the Covenant already without any such new machinery as my noble friend suggests. It is not available, definitely, at the moment.
There is another peculiar feature which I think would require further machinery. The Czechoslovak question is an extremely delicate one. It is not a legal dispute. Germany is not claiming under the Minority Treaties; that would be a proper case for legal decision. Nor is she asking for any revision of frontiers; that would arise under Article 19. Ill-feeling has arisen from an internal question of the Czechoslovak State, and legally that is entirely a matter for the sovereignty of 1174 Czechoslovakia. But equitably the Sudeten Germans deserve redress, and on political grounds peace is endangered by the situation. That again is not a case for a court of equity. Therefore the case is not met in this particular instance by Lord Davies's proposal.
There is another reason why I would urge that something else is required. The case we are thinking of is one of extreme urgency. Mediation under an equity system might take months, and it would be very dangerous to emuloy a prolonged procedure. Unpremeditated incidents might produce violence. Indeed we are in constant danger of such an incident from day to day, and it would be monstrous to allow events to drift into war when conditions are there which make a settlement possible. For instance, Germany is not asking for an Anschluss or for a plebiscite. Czechoslovakia is not denying that great changes are needed. Neither side wants war, and Germany knows that England and France are firmly opposed to violence. All the time delay is very dangerous, and therefore I welcome the news that we have to-day, that His Majesty's Government are taking action, as we understand, in the way of sending Lord Runciman to act as special adviser to the Czechoslovak Government. It seems to me better than third-party treatment of the question. The policy that we suppose lies behind Lord Runciman's visit commends itself very much to me. If such a policy should fail, then still I do not think that third-party treatment would be the most appropriate. I think that diplomatic negotiation would be the next desirable step—negotiations between ourselves and France, and also Germany. An equity court might be brought in in the final resort, but it is better, surely, if the case never comes into court.
The policy associated with Lord Runciman's visit—perhaps one might call it a policy of direct assistance—is the better way of avoiding war, but if we are to have war at all there are two particular facts that I would bring to your Lordships'attention. A large part of the public has not reflected on them. The first is that if such a catastrophe occurred the British public could not be given any clear moral appeal for support and intervention. The defence of Belgium was a straightforward and simple call of honour, which the public perfectly under- 1175 stood, but if Czechoslovakia had refused adequate autonomy, and war followed, opinion in this country would certainly be divided as to where the blame for aggression lay. The Dean of St. Paul's voiced a very large section of public opinion the other day when, in a letter to The Times, he said that we have fought one war for the cause of self-determination, and he could not understand that we might be called upon to fight another to prevent it. That is a fact which would arise.
Another point, which I had not thought of, was brought to my notice by an old diplomatist. It is this: if we won such a war, after the ruin of half the world, what sort of settlement should we make? We should have the power to restore Czechoslovakia to her present state. If we restored it we should create a position such as exists at present, from which another war would follow. If we decided not to restore it, but made such a settlement as most people wish we had made in 1919, not involving a race of disaffected people within the frontiers of that State, but giving an autonomous system to those people, we should be doing exactly what we had fought the war to prevent. If such an insane war were to occur it is we and the French and other nations who would have to pay the piper. I suggest that in this case, without waiting for the third-party treatment which the noble Lord desires, the principle to follow is that it is we who should call the tune.
§ THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH)My Lords, as the Leader of the House explained yesterday evening, my noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has been in correspondence with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and has reached an understanding with him under which it was agreed that my noble friend should reply to Lord Davies's speech during the course of a comprehensive statement that he hopes to make tomorrow on the general situation in foreign affairs on the Motion of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition. By that time he will have had the opportunity of studying the observations of the noble Lord, and those of Lord Noel-Buxton. In those circumstances I 1176 shall refrain from saying anything with regard to the subject matter that has been discussed this afternoon. I hope that that arrangement will he agreeable to your Lordships, and that consequently my noble friend opposite will be prepared to withdraw his Resolution.
§ LORD DAVIESMy Lords, I beg to thank the noble Earl for his remarks, and I ask leave to withdraw my Motion, in view of the discussion which is to take place to-morrow.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.