HL Deb 07 July 1938 vol 110 cc619-28

Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly:

[The EARL OF ONSLOW in the Chair.]

Clauses 1 to 6 agreed to.

Clause 7:

Special provisions in case of settled land and land held on trust for sale.

7.—(1) Where any person is entitled in possession—

  1. (a) to a beneficial interest in settled land the legal estate in which is vested in a statutory owner, or
  2. (b) to an interest in the proceeds of the sale of land held upon trust for sale,
a right of action to recover the land shall, for the purposes of this Act but not otherwise, be deemed to accrue to him in the like manner and circumstances and on the same date as it would accrue if his interest were a legal estate in the land.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD MAUGHAM) moved, in subsection (1), to leave out all words down to the end of paragraph (b) and insert: Subject to the provisions of subsection (1) of Section nineteen of this Act, the provisions of this Act shall apply to equitable interests in land, including interests in the proceeds of the sale of land held upon trust for sale, in like manner as they apply to legal estates, and accordingly. The noble and learned Lord said: This is a most distressing topic, but I am afraid it is my duty to give some explanation of this particular Amendment and some six or seven consequential Amendments in order that the topic may be intelligible to lawyers. The general purpose of this Amendment and the group of Amendments to which I have referred is to extend the provisions of the first four subsections of the clause, which at present only apply to settlements within the meaning of the Settled Land Act, 1925, and to trusts for sale, to particular cases where land is held on trust—for instance, a case where land is vested in trustees to hold for a person or an estate in fee simple. It may be desirable to explain why this is necessary, the fact being that Clause 7 as it exists is a new provision designed to clear up difficulties in the operation of the law of limitation in relation to what are called equitable interests in land.

Subsection (1) of the clause makes it plain that a beneficial interest in settled land, or in land held upon trust for sale, is to be treated for the purposes of the Bill as an independent interest in relation to which the Bill operates as if it were a legal estate. This provision will secure that a person entitled to such an interest will have the benefit of Clause 6 of the Bill, which postpones the operation of the Bill until his interest falls into possession, and of Clause 22 which has a somewhat similar operation in the case of a disability. Except for this provision it is probable that the interest of a beneficiary would always be barred after twelve years adverse possession, even though his interest had not yet vested in possession, because the estate of the trustee would then be extinguished and the beneficial interests would fall with it. Accordingly it is desirable for the sake of clarity to make this Amendment, and to make subsection (1) extend to all equitable interests falling within the definition of "land" in Clause 31 of the Bill. This result is effected by this Amendment and the next Amendment, on page 6. I do not think I need further explain the object of the Amendments, or at least the general nature of them and indeed I feel that I almost ought to apologise for taking up the time of your Lordships with so distressing a subject.

Amendment moved— Page 5, leave out lines 36 to 41 and insert the said new words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The next Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 6, line 2, leave out ("him") and insert ("a person entitled to such an equitable interest").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The next Amendment also is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 6, line 17, after ("Where") insert ("any land is held upon trust including a trust for sale, and").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The next Amendment, too, is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 6, line 18, leave out ("land by trustees for the sale of the land") and insert ("the land by the trustees").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The next Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 6, line 22, after ("interest") insert ("in the land or").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The next Amendment is conseqential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 6, line 27, after ("trust") insert ("including a trust").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The next Amendment is also consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 6, line 29, leave out ("for sale").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

There is another consequential Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 6, line 33, leave out ("for sale").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 8 to 21 agreed to.

Clause 22:

Extension of limitation period in case of disability.

22. If on the date when any right of action accrued for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, the person to whom it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of six years, or in the case of actions to which the last foregoing section applies, one year from the date when the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred, notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired:

Provided that …

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL had given Notice of two Amendments—namely, after "Act," to insert "other than the period of limitation prescribed by the last foregoing section," and to leave out "or in the case of actions to which the last foregoing section applies, one year." The noble Earl said: The two Amendments standing on the Paper in my name have been put down on behalf of the London County Council, and as they both have exactly the same purpose I will state my arguments in full on the first Amendment. I should like to make it perfectly plain that we are in entire agreement with the proposal to extend the time limit within which any civil action can be brought for damages. We regard that as a very fair and reasonable proposal both as it affects local authorities and ordinary private citizens. What we take exception to is the special treatment that would be meted out to those who are suffering under what is legally termed a disability, the disability of infancy, lunacy or mental deficiency.

As the Bill now stands an action can be brought by a person who has been suffering under any of these disabilities up to a year after the disability is removed. The consequence to the London County Council is roughly this. The London County Council has about half a million children in its schools and a very large number of inmates of its mental hospitals. Under this Bill, if it becomes law, any of those people may bring a civil action for damages, possibly for a very considerable sum of money, possibly fifteen, or twenty or twenty-five years after the event occurred which gave rise to the litigation. That is to say, the child will be able to take action after it has grown up and the lunatic after he or she has been restored to normal mental health. That is a very serious matter for the largest local authority in the country. We have every year three or four hundred actions brought against us in the courts on the ground of accidents that happen to children on the premises of our schools. Suppose some of those cases were deferred for a very considerable time. If ten or fifteen years passed it might be quite impossible to trace the principal witness for the defence. The school teacher who might have observed what transpired might be dead or might have gone abroad.

This provision puts us in very serious difficulty from the point of view of our legitimate interests. What we hope is that any person suffering a disability may be able to make a claim through the instrumentality of a parent or next friend or some other representative. That is the present position and we hope it will continue. We profoundly desire that the noble and learned Lord should take notice of this injustice which local authorities will suffer if an alteration of this kind in the law is effected.

Amendment moved— Page 13, line 14, after ("Act") insert ("(other than the period of limitation prescribed by the last foregoing section)").—(The Earl of Listowel.)

LORD RITCHIE OF DUNDEE

I would like to support the noble Earl's Amendment. I speak not on behalf of municipal authorities but on behalf of the dock and harbour authorities throughout the country and on behalf of the Port of London Authority in particular. Like municipal authorities, dock and harbour authorities are changing bodies. Their composition varies every few years, and their staffs, too, are of course constantly varying. After a lapse of twenty years many of the more important members of the staff will have gone into retirement. It is obvious that after the lapse of twenty years or more it would be extremely difficult to produce evidence necessary to rebut a claim made for damages sustained at so great a distance in the past. Everyone knows that public authorities are often thought to be fair game for what are sometimes unreasonable claims, and I suggest that it is undesirable that their vulnerability should be increased by their exposure to claims which may be made, not perhaps on good grounds, so many years after damage may or may not have been suffered. The Bill as it stands has given those for whom I speak very great concern, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord may see his way to accept the Amendment.

LORD AMULREE

I am speaking this afternoon on behalf of the Association of Municipal Corporations who take a very deep interest in this Amendment and also in regard to the Bill to which the Amendment relates. Protection is given by the Bill to local authorities generally in respect of actions for breach of contract or in connection with the sale of goods. All that is dealt with by the law of limitation, and this Amendment only relates to cases of negligence. Negligence is the chief cause of many actions and, as the two noble Lords who have spoken have said, unless steps are taken in such cases within a limited time all evidence is lost. I do not think I can emphasize the argument more than by simply repeating what they have said. Another point with regard to limitation of actions against local authorities is that the old idea was that the burden of any one year on local authorities should be discharged by the ratepayers of that year. In an action for negligence there is a good deal of burden in the matter of damages which might be recovered and the expenses of litigation, which would fall, not upon the ratepayers of to-day, but on the ratepayers of some subsequent year.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I must admit, and I do frankly admit, that there are strong primâ facie arguments in favour of the present Amendment, and it is quite natural to see that public authorities have, so to speak, mustered together, quite rightly, in defence of the interests of those people for whom they are concerned. But I should not like your Lordships to think that there is nothing to be said on the other side. This Bill was prepared by the Statute Laws Amendment Committee. While they were considering the matter, or shortly after they had first reported, these considerations on the other side were submitted to them, and they continued to hold the view that something of this sort was necessary in regard to infants, and other persons under disability, who might have a claim against public authorities.

What I feel about it is this. It may be quite true that if an infant, or other person under disability, is possessed of a parent who can bring an action on his or her behalf, there is strong ground for thinking that that action should be brought within the limited time prescribed by Section 21—namely, within a year; but I am rather concerned to hesitate in relation to infants and lunatics who may have nobody who can bring an action on their behalf. It does seem to me that in regard to public authorities, who have so many advantages, and a very short period of limitation—namely, one year instead of the six years limitation that applies to other similar causes of action—it is too much to ask the Committee to accept the view that they should go scot free, if there are infants who may have suffered very serious injury, by reason of the negligence, we will say, of people who have been in charge of that child, merely because there is no one to bring an action. It is a serious thing to bring an action on behalf of a child. It not only very often involves expense of a considerable character, but it also means a great deal of trouble and worry, and although I can quite concede that a parent ought to be willing to bring such an action on behalf of his or her child. I do not for a moment see how we are going to protect the many infants to whom the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has referred, who are under the charge, for instance, of the county council and a number of other organisations throughout the country, and who have nobody to speak up for them.

That is my trouble. I know that the arguments that he has put before your Lordships are powerful, but there are arguments on the other side which relate at any rate to a special class of infants and other persons under disability, whom. I am concerned to protect by something in this clause. I do not know whether it would be possible to make some sort of agreement or compromise between us, and to safeguard the public authorities in every case where the infant is in charge of a parent. For my part I should be quite willing to accept that, but I have a doubt whether you may not be doing very grave injustice, and putting great hardship on some of the infants who have nobody in a position, or who can properly be expected, to bring an action on the infant's behalf. That is, as far as I can see it, the whole case

There are arguments on one side of great strength, and there are arguments on the other side which do apply to some of these infants. Where there is anybody who can bring an action on behalf of an infant who has suffered wrong the action will undoubtedly be brought at once, for the reason, as Lord Ritchie pointed out, that evidence disappears in the course of time. If you have such a cause of action and if you have the witnesses, you would not wait, if you were truly interested in the infant's injuries, until the infant attained the age of twenty-one, but you would bring your action at once. Limited in the way that I suggest, I think this clause would really not hurt any public authority except to a very minor extent. I do not know if any arrangement can be made on that footing, but, if not, it think noble Lords should indicate their own views on which side of the scale the balance lies. It is not a matter on which I can say any more, nor will I, so to speak, exercise any powers that I may have to induce people to vote one way or the other. I want them to take the matter as it stands, and to do what they think is right and fair.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Lord for the careful consideration which he has evidently given to the Amendment, and I am sure your Lordships are indebted to him for stating what might not inappropriately be called the other side of the case. I think the noble and learned Lord has appreciated the weight of the arguments that have been supported by Lord Amulree, speaking for the Association of Municipal Corporations, by Lord Ritchie, speaking for the dock and harbour authorities throughout the country, and by me, as representative of the London County Council, and I think that the way in which he indicated that the case was a good one was that he suggested a compromise. If I understood him rightly, his proposal was that some Amendment might be framed to exclude all actions from being brought at a later date, provided that there was a parent or next-of-kin who would be in a position to bring the action within a reasonable time of the event from which it arises.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Within a year. I did not mean next-of-kin, because that might go too far. I said a parent.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

A parent, who would be in a position to bring an action within the year, which is the time allowed as a general rule for an action of that kind against a local authority. If I might take advantage of that proposal, and enter into negotiations between now and the Report stage, it might be possible to produce an agreed Amendment to cover at any rate a large part of the really legitimate grievances which these local authorities have voiced this afternoon. In view of that, I beg to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 22 agreed to.

Clauses 23 to 30 agreed to.

Clause 31:

Interpretation.

31.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them:— Duty" includes an instalment of an annuity within the meaning of the Tithe Act, 1936, and a royalties welfare levy within the meaning of Part III of the Mining Industry Act, 1926; Land" includes corporeal hereditaments, tithes (except tithes belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole) and rentcharges, and any legal or equitable estate or interest therein, but save as aforesaid does not include any incorporeal hereditament;

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in the definition of "Duty," to leave out "an instalment of an annuity within the meaning" and insert "any debt due to His Majesty under Section sixteen." The noble and learned Lord said: This Amendment cures a slight defect in the present definition of the word "duty." The definition is intended to include the liabilities into which tithe rentcharges were converted by the comparatively recent Tithe Act of 1936. I need not go into that with any particularity, but the Amendment brings the actual payment which has now become payable, as well as the payments of annuity, within the definition of "duty." I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 19, line 36, leave out from ("includes") to ("of") in line 37, and insert ("any debt due to His Majesty under Section sixteen").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The next Amendment is consequential on that which I moved first.

Amendment moved— Page 20, line 9, after ("therein") insert ("including an interest in the proceeds of the sale of land held upon trust for sale").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 31, as amended, agreed to.

Remaining clauses agreed to.

Schedule agreed to.