BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY.

HL Deb 16 February 1938 vol 107 cc684-742

LORD ARNOLD rose to call attention to British foreign policy and to the dangers inherent therein, particularly in regard to the League of Nations; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the two main features of British foreign policy are that it is based, first, upon the League of Nations, which means, so we are told, that we will be faithful to our obligations under the Covenant; and, secondly, upon the commitments to defend France and Belgium if they are attacked. If all these commitments are taken into account, and if those of the League are interpreted in the manner in which League supporters interpret League obligations, the outlook is more than disquieting, more particularly—I need hardly remind your Lordships of this—as the League of Nations is now less than half a League. Of the seven great nations of the world—the other sixty countries or so do not really count for this purpose—only three are in the League—Great Britain, France, and Russia. It would be rash to rely upon Russia as a valuable military ally, even if the people of Great Britain were willing to have her as an ally at all. The plain truth is that, for practical purposes, the League of Nations consists of Great Britain and France, and that when we are told that British policy is based upon the League of Nations it means in practice that there is an Anglo-French alliance. This is confirmed by the reciprocal obligation entered into by those countries to come to each other's assistance if either of them is attacked.

Now this commitment is an exceedingly serious one for Great Britain, more especially in view of France's Eastern alliances. Probably these alliances constitute the greatest danger to Great Britain. This is all the more so when what are regarded by League supporters as the obligations of the Covenant are taken into account. It would almost seem as if it was the chief aim in life of some League supporters to drag this country into war on behalf of Czechoslovakia. As matters stand at present Great Britain might get involved in war if Germany took action in support of the grievances from which Germans suffer in Czechoslovakia. In that event France would seek render assistance to Czechoslovakia and war would come between France and Germany. France would then seek to draw Great Britain in. It would be a matter of ease for France so to manipulate the situation that she could claim that an act of aggression had been committed against her by Germany.

It is not always a simple matter to define "aggression." In 1900 the late Lord Lansdowne, when he was Foreign Secretary, said this: Action of a technically offensive character may be resorted to for a purpose which is unquestionably defensive. Hence, France, assisted by the usual appeals to honour and so forth, could soon make a case for us coming to her aid; and there will be all the more pressure in this direction because, as I have indicated, of the obligations of the Covenant which League supporters hold impose upon Great Britain the onus of going to the assistance of a country like Czechoslovakio if she is attacked. Thus it may be that we shall become involved in another great European war, although no real British interest is at stake. Leaving Czechoslovakia aside, many League supporters envisage what apparently they regard as a League war between Great Britain, France and Russia on the one side and Germany, Italy and Japan on the other. It is almost incredible that the combination of Great Britain, France and Russia should be called collective security, but so it is, though actually there could scarcely be a worse example of the balance of power.

The tragedy of the League is that it has been largely responsible for recreating in a dangerous form the balance of power which it was designed to prevent. Therefore, when we are told, as we are told again and again, that there is no alternative between the League of Nations and the pre-War condition of things, the reply is that we have the pre-War condition of things now and worse, and that it is the League which is largely responsible for that.

It is an astonishing circumstance that British foreign policy continues to be based upon the present Covenant of the League of Nations, having regard to the failures of the League in nearly everything which it set out to do for the cause of peace. Its failures are so manifest and so well known that I will not take up time by dwelling upon them. It is, however, quite certain that if in 1919 the failures of the League could have been foreseen no British statesman, however reckless, would have committed this country to the obligations of the Covenant under Article 16. We shall no doubt be told that in the last resort under League procedure it is Great Britain which will decide what its military obligations are under Article 16. It is also the case that great authorities like Sir John Fischer Williams have laid it down that as matters have developed there is now no obligation upon this country to use force under the Covenant. Nevertheless, the position is unsatisfactory, ambiguous and dangerous.

League commitments either mean something or they mean nothing. If they mean nothing let us say so; it is the only honest thing to do. If they mean something we ought to recognise and realise fully the liabilities and the dangers involved. It becomes more and more clear that a League of Nations with. Article 16 in the Covenant will not work. I am not arguing this matter to-day on pacifist grounds, strong though I hold them to be. But leaving that aside, surely the time has come to recognise that a League of Nations based on force will not work. A large and increasing number of people who are not pacifists at all are coming to that conclusion. It is not many months since The Times, in a powerful leading article, came to the conclusion that the policy of a League of Nations not based on force should be supported on the ground that there is no practicable alternative. The more Article 16 is examined the more apparent it becomes that it is utterly unsuitable for the purpose for which it was designed. The next war, if there is another war, will come without notice. It will simply come, and the slow and cumbersome machinery of the League of Nations will be quite unable to cope with the situation.

The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, has told us that in the event of another war it is the first ten weeks that will matter most and that in his opinion the war will, in effect, be decided in that time. If that is so, the issue will be determined long before the League at Geneva has even appointed its innumerable sub-committees. It is, in fact, scarcely possible to overstate the incapacity of the League of Nations as at present constituted to deal with a European war. For instance, the League has given no real consideration to the vital problem of how much force is to be contributed by the individual nations composing the League for the purpose of implementing collective security. If the League ever did proceed to draw up plans for collective security, how is Great Britain to avoid having conscription? Other nations in the League have conscription, and how in common fairness can we escape? If we expect other nations to help us they will naturally expect us to help them. How can we effectively do that without conscription? Our Navy is almost entirely for the defence of this country and of the British Empire. As regards the Air Force, that again would be required for ourselves in view of the huge size and the vulnerability of London. Hence, if there is to be a pooling of forces under some scheme of collective security, Great Britain will have to adopt conscription. I wonder how many of those who signed the so-called Peace Ballot would have done so if they had realised that it meant conscription for Great Britain?

It cannot be emphasized too often that the principles on which the League of Nations was founded have not been sufficiently thought out. The underlying principle of the League was that its Members, banded together against an aggressor, would keep the peace somewhat in the same way as the police do. This analogy with the power of the police, which is so often quoted to us, has no real basis. In a civilised country like Great Britain the criminal has no chance whatever against the police unless he escapes capture, and that contingency does not obtain as between nations. The point is that the power of the police, backed by public opinion, is so overwhelming that a criminal cannot put up any fight against it at all. No such overwhelming force is possible as between nations. It would never come about that all the nations would be united against Germany, for instance. There are too many cross-interests. In every quarrel there are two sides, and there will always be two groups in every international quarrel, though the groups may be of varying sizes. Again—I think this is most important—it is certain that some of the smaller nations contiguous to or near Germany would never be willing to go to war with her because they would know that if they did so their countries would be devastated owing to their geographical position. This geographical difficulty, or the peril arising through being contiguous, will always make impossible what is called collective security. This geographical difficulty will always mean that some of the countries bordering on a powerful aggressor either will be neutral or will side with that State.

It is largely because of these considerations that some of the smaller countries in Europe are drawing away from Great Britain and France. Yugoslavia, Rumania and, of course, Switzerland cannot be counted upon to fight on the side of Great Britain and France in another war, and there is no question that the same may be said of Austria and Hungary. Even Belgium has left Great Britain and France and is determined to be neutral. Leaving all these considerations aside, however, it is perfectly obvious that no union of countries against Germany would have anything like the overwhelming force which the police have against a criminal. It simply cannot be done. In the last War Germany, with very little help, fought nearly the whole of Europe, and she almost won. There is no guarantee that the League of Nations would keep the peace as against Germany or some other very powerful country. Germany would know that some countries would not fight against her and that some would side with her, and it might be that she would decide to chance a war. That is all the more true because of two considerations. In the first place, the next war will be very largely an air war—that is, a war of incalculable possibilities in which anything may happen. The second consideration is that we are living in an era of dictators, and a dictator might decide on a war however great the force ranged against him. He might do that as the only way out of insuperable internal difficulties. When the Covenant of the League of Nations was signed in 1919 the statesmen of that time do not appear to have thought of the advent of dictators.

I repeat that the more the whole problem is considered the plainer it becomes that Article 16 ought to be taken out of the Covenant. If Article 16 were taken out of the Covenant, League supporters ask again and again, what will happen to the rule of law? In these strange days many people seem to think that there is some definite code of law between nations, and that if it is adhered to all will be well. In reality, there is no such code. According to many supporters of the League of Nations any infraction of the Treaty of Versailles is an offence against the rule of law. Indeed, presumably any breach of any treaty is an offence against the rule of law. This doctrine is really quite unsustainable. Take the Treaty of Versailles. Not only was it signed under duress, but apart from that, many of its provisions were unjust and indefensible. Any defeated nation would have broken most of them. The time has come to recognise that treaties will only be kept if they are just and right, and if the conditions which obtained when they were made remain more or less the same. It should be remembered also that there have been breaches of the Treaty of Versailles by the Allies. Notably Article 8 of the Covenant has not been implemented. Germany was disarmed on the understanding that the Allies, the other nations, would carry out a large measure of disarmament. That has never been done, particularly by France. The more the whole matter is examined, the plainer it becomes that there is no rule of law in the sense in which League of Nations' supporters use that term.

The main causes of war are not to be found in breaches of law. Under present conditions they are largely economic and territorial. About two-thirds of the territory of the world is owned by the British and French Empires, Russia, the United States, China and Brazil, leaving about one-third to the remaining sixty or so countries, which include Germany, Italy and Japan. Is that fair? The British Empire and the United States own between them about two-thirds of the economic mineral wealth of the world. Is that fair? Of the twenty-five commodities judged essential for modern life, the British Empire has adequate supplies in no fewer than eighteen. Germany has adequate supplies in four, Italy in four, and Japan in three. Is that fair? It is this gross inequality in the ownership of the wealth and territory of the world which has more than anything else to do with international unrest. What has the rule of law got to do with this gross inequality? If all the treaties in the world are kept, that will not redress economic grievances. It will not make matters better; it will make them worse—especially the Treaty of Versailles, which aggravated and created economic difficulties.

I emphasise that if all treaties in the world were kept sacrosanct, some of the chief causes of war would not be touched. They are outside the area of what is called the rule of law. We are repeatedly being told that it is the democratic countries which are keeping this rule of law and the Fascist countries which are not keeping it. That is because democratic countries have, for the most part, got all they want. I have shown what a vast proportion of the wealth and territories of the world they have got. Also, they were the victors in the last War and made the Treaty of Versailles, and naturally they keep it, or most of it. They do not keep Article 8 of the League Covenant, because that does not suit them. When the matter is analysed, this talk about the rule of law will be found to be mostly rhetoric and to have little relation to realities. I am afraid the same must be said about a good many speeches made by League supporters about the League in general. It is devoutly to be wished that League supporters would face facts and realise that what they call collective security can never be established. Unless they will do that, Great Britain is faced with a dangerous state of things. Unless they will do that, we have before us a vista of war after war—assuming that the nations survive another world war.

Is it not reckless and perilous in the last degree to commit this country to a policy which may pledge us to take part in a series of wars in which no real British interest is at stake? I should like to compare all this with the attitude of the late Lord Salisbury. He was opposed to entangling Great Britain with Continental commitments. He did not consider—I quote now from an historic memorandum—that in common honesty we could invite other nations to rely upon our aid in a struggle when we did not know what might be the humour of our people in circumstances which cannot be foreseen. Contrast this attitude with the present state of things, when we have obligations, defined and undefined, all over Europe and, indeed, all over the world. Yet our population is only 45,000,000 and we are not a military nation. It is obviously physically impossible for us to undertake the obligations of what is called the "full League policy." Let me give an illustration of the risks we run if we are to be ready at all times to fulfil our obligations under the Covenant. Many League supporters hold that the League should have taken action under the Covenant when Japan entered Manchuria. What was the date of that? The date was September 18, 1931, and that was the very day that Great Britain went off the gold standard. It would have been little short of madness for any Government—the country was in a ferment—to embark on a war in the Far East in those circumstances. I will say in passing that the record of the League of Nations in the Far East has been a particularly unfortunate one, and throughout the doctrine of collective security has proved to be a complete myth.

Let me make it plain that my criticism of the League of Nations is of the present League, a League based on force. If that ceased to be the basis, if Article 16 were taken out of the Covenant, the League, I hold—and many other people take the same view, both pacifists and nonpacifists—would gain enormously in influence and power. Probably, as time went on, all the nations would join the League, and it would become a world conciliation court, exercising great moral authority, and would do far better work for the cause of peace than any League based on sanctions. Whatever differences of opinion may exist on that question, it will, I am sure, be agreed that there are great objections to a League which arouses expectations like those which led to the tragedy of Abyssinia. Is that tragedy going to be repeated? Some of the smaller countries—and I again cite Czechoslovakia—are relying upon the League for help. Will that help be forth-coming? I would call attention to some words of the Swedish Foreign Minister. In a speech which he made last month he said that Sweden did not approve of alliances and that he had little respect for the heroism which found its expression in the saying "We must fight to the last Englishman."

I go on to say that certainly Great Britain has no sufficiently vital interest in Czechoslovakia to involve this country in war; and in general what are called German designs in Eastern Europe should in no circumstances, I contend, be made a casus belli for this country. The present population of Germany is about 70,000,000, and if she should actually unite with all the Germans in Austria and also with all the Germans in Czechoslovakia, her population would be increased only to about 80,000,000. It is most extraordinary to argue that Germany, with a population of 80,000,000 instead of one of 70,000,000, would be so dangerous that we must go to war to prevent that coming about—even if we could prevent it. If we are to go to war for such causes as that; if we are to go to war because of happenings in Eastern or Middle Europe, then the prospect before us is dark indeed.

I maintain that all these problems should be faced now, and that it is the negation of statesmanship to leave them over for decision in some heated crisis which may suddenly surge up. Now is the time honestly, fully and fairly to review the situation. If that is done, there ought to be a radical change in the policy of this country towards the League of Nations. Surely, even ardent supporters of the League must recognise that there is no likelihood of the League, as at present constituted, attracting back to membership Germany, Italy and Japan. Germany has said that she will not return to the League. Very well, let the facts be faced. It is no good going on as if they did not exist. In the maze and tangle of European affairs one thing which is certain is that there can be no permanent peace in Europe unless there is a better understanding between Germany and Great Britain, unless there is an understanding between these two great countries which will keep the peace between them. Unfortunately there seems to be little recognition of this fact by France. If Great Britain draws a little closer to Germany, France appears to intervene to try to stop the process. Unhappily there are strong pro-French influences at work in British official circles upon which France relies to get her own way.

Now one of the chief difficulties in bringing about a better understanding between Great Britain and Germany is the Franco-Soviet Pact, which Germany has strongly objected to from the start. It would be very interesting to know how far Great Britain was consulted by France when that Pact was entered into, and it is not only interesting but urgently important to know what degree of danger exists for Great Britain because of that Pact. Last year Mr. George Lambert asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Whether any commitment exists whereby under the Franco-Russian Pact Great Britain could be involved in a European war; and if none does exist, has this fact been made clear to the French and Russian Governments? Lord Cranborne's reply was as follows: The answer to the first part of the question is 'No, Sir.' As regards the second part of the question, I think the French and Soviet Governments are fully aware of the position. I ask, what does that reply to the second part of the question mean? Nobody knows. It is alarmingly similar to pre-War replies regarding obligations and commitments abroad. Lord Grey in his book Twenty-Five Years has admitted that one of his replies to a question, also about whether there were commitments between Great Britain and Russia, was open to the criticism that it did not answer the question on the Paper. He also said that questions in the pre-War years about military arrangements had been put aside by the Prime Minister with a similar answer. Is not this reply to Mr. George Lambert open to the same criticism? The reply really does nothing to dispel the fear that Great Britain may again be taken into a Continental war because France has this commitment with Russia.

Next I want to deal very briefly with the question of German Colonies, a settlement of which is essential if there is to be that better understanding between Germany and Great Britain which is the pre-requisite of peace in Europe. On a fair view of the facts, there is one over-riding consideration in this matter which ought to govern it, because it is a moral consideration. The Armistice was concluded on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, No. 5 of which promised "a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all Colonial claims." In view of those words it is impossible to justify the taking away of all the German Colonies. If we were in her position we should feel exactly as she does about this matter. It must be intolerable to Germany to be told that she is not fit to have Colonies and that France, Belgium and Portugal are fit. There does not seem any ground for saying that the treatment of natives by France, Belgium and Portugal has been any better than the treatment of the natives was by Germany. A special responsibility rests upon Great Britain in this matter of the German Colonies, because it was Great Britain and the British Empire, in spite of the fact that the British Empire already comprised about a quarter of the world's territory, which got most of the German Colonies. Therefore I say that Great Britain ought to take the initiative in this matter, and take it now.

Presumably this matter of the German Colonies was one of those matters discussed when the noble Viscount, Lord Halifax, went to Germany on his momentous mission, now three months ago. It is devoutly to be hoped that the expectations aroused three months ago are not once again to be wrecked by procrastination. The great vice of British foreign policy in recent years has been procrastination and a fatal tendency to let things drift and drift. Successive British statesmen seem to have thought that there is unlimited time. In the last few years Herr Hitler has made offer after offer to Europe, but nothing has been done in any effective way about any of those offers except the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. Time passes on and nothing happens, and the peril is that the situation hardens, and it hardens in the wrong direction. Unhappily the time may come when the situation will have got out of hand and it will be too late for helpful negotiations. But there is still time to negotiate and settle this matter of the German Colonies. Herr Hitler has not yet formally asked for Colonies. He may do so and if they are not conceded we might perhaps be precipitated into a war. What will posterity say if war should come about the transfer or non-transfer of some unimportant piece of tropical territory which not one Englishman in ten thousand could accurately locate on the map? Yet that is what may happen unless our statesmen will show more expedition and vigour in getting things done than they have shown in the past. If there could be a settlement of the Colonial problem with Germany and a change in regard to the Franco-Soviet Pact the prospects of peace in Europe would be vastly improved.

Nevertheless, it is vital to recognise that the Franco-Soviet Pact is only one of the dangers for Great Britain inherent in the alliance between Great Britain and France. We have also to take account of France's other Eastern commitments. In fact, the more the Franco-British alliance is considered the more manifest it becomes that the liabilities involved much outweigh any advantages in it for Great Britain. It is certain that no material help can be expected from France in the defence of Great Britain or of the British Empire. This is due to the obvious fact that if Great Britain is at war France will be at war also and she will be fighting for her life. She will need all her resources for the defence of her own country and of her Empire which is not a small one. I urge strongly that the whole question of the alliance with France and also of our commitment to Belgium should be reviewed afresh in relation to the dangers involved in them. The dangers have increased to an extent which no one could have thought possible when the commitments were first made. Then, war was a comparatively small affair. Now, it may mean the end of our civilisation. The alliance with France has never been specifically sanctioned by the British people, and if a ballot were held on the subject I believe it would be rejected by a large majority. That would appear to be confirmed by a ballot taken in a London suburb in 1934, in which 24,000 persons voted. The truth is that whereas there is an alliance between the Governments of Great Britain and France, there is not an alliance between the peoples of Great Britain and France.

For my part I have no doubt that the best policy for Great Britain is one of complete freedom from all Continental entanglements. I know there is an important school of thought which holds that under all circumstances we must stand by France. This has become so much our traditional policy that it seems to be accepted without question and without regard to the changed circumstances of to-day. There has not yet been sufficient recognition of the tremendous revolution made by the coming of air warfare. The sea no longer gives security to Great Britain; and air warfare is more dangerous for this country than for any other country, owing to the huge size and vulnerability of London. All this ought to be taken into account, and should in my view lead to a revision of some accepted and traditional strategic theories. It has, for instance, for a long time been one of the cardinal principles of our foreign policy that the Channel ports must be in their present hands. The underlying idea of course is that Great Britain must not be within striking distance of an enemy Power; but in fact any security of that kind has now largely disappeared. The next war, if it comes, will be mainly an air war, and aeroplanes could be over London from Germany in a little over an hour. It therefore seems idle to talk about the supreme importance of the Channel ports, and about the Rhine being our frontier. Surely, the time has come to recognise that our frontier is much nearer than the Rhine; it is at Ilford or perhaps even at Kensington.

These considerations go a great deal further than simply to destroy the Rhine frontier theory and the Channel ports theory; they affect, I submit, the whole question of the Anglo-French alliance. France can no longer give to Great Britain the security of former years. If the alliance with France were brought to an end the cause of peace in Europe, I contend, so far from being jeopardised, would be helped. France is not likely to go down; on the contrary she will be much more tractable. I believe that France would have made a settlement with Germany long ago if it had not been that ever since the War she felt that she had got Great Britain behind her. But for that M. Barthou, for instance, would never have rejected Herr Hitler's offer to limit the German army to 300,000 men. I again emphasise that France, if she felt that she had not got Great Britain behind her, would be much more disposed to compose her differences with Germany. Indeed, it may be that France will as years go on become Fascist. On the other hand, it may be—though this is less likely—that she will become Communist. But whether she became Fascist or Communist the British people would not be willing to fight for her. Those considerations in themselves show how unwise, how speculative, our alliance with France is.

So far as Great Britain is concerned, the chief difficulties in the way of a better understanding with Germany would disappear if the alliance with France were brought to an end. The last country that Germany wishes to fight is Great Britain, and any outstanding questions between the two countries could be amicably settled. If Great Britain freed herself not only from the French alliance but from all Continental commitments it would be a great gain to the security of this country and of the British Empire. If Great Britain stands aside in the event of another European war, she will be in an extremely strong position at the end of that war. Other European Powers will be weak and broken; all will be more or less vanquished; there will be no victors in the ordinary sense of the word. In those circumstances it is really a fantastic nightmare to suppose that Germany, or any other Power, will be likely to make war upon Great Britain. Moreover, taking a fair view of the probabilities, if Great Britain stood aside in the next war and should subsequently be attacked and be in danger, I suggest that the United States would not be likely to see this country and the British Empire go down. The United States are not in the League; they are standing aside from European affairs; but that does not preclude them from taking part in another war if they think it right to do so. If Great Britain stood aside and was in danger I think that the United States would intervene; but there is no such assurance that she would intervene in another general European war in which Great Britain was involved. That would be too much like the last War.

Summing it all up, my submission is that the risks to Great Britain and the Empire in this policy, if I may so call it, which I am outlining to your Lordships are small compared to the risks of the policy we are at present pursuing, under which it seems too likely that Great Britain will be involved in another Continental war, although no real British interest is at stake. It is a question of balancing one policy against another. The chief duty of British statesmen is to keep this country out of war, and it far transcends any other duty; and the best way of doing that, in my submission, is in her ending all her Continental commitments, after of course giving due notice. There is unmistakable evidence that there is a large body of opinion in the country in favour of this policy—call it isolation or what you like. Let me say this. The policy of isolation does not mean that Great Britain would stand aside from measures of economic appeasement and so forth. In all such work she should take a leading part, and she can afford to be generous. I know it is said that isolation does not guarantee that Great Britain can keep out of the next war. The reply to that is that under isolation there is a very good chance of keeping out of the next war, whereas under League policy there is no such chance at all. Under League policy whenever war comes, wherever it is or whatever it is about, Great Britain is bound to be in it—and not only in the next European war, but in all European wars. I find it difficult myself within the limits of temperate language to find the right adjective for such a policy, especially bearing in mind, as Lord Baldwin has told us, that the next European war is likely to end in complete, barbarous anarchy from one end of Europe to the other. Can any fate be worse than that?

I must draw to a close. I am speaking of course for myself; I do not think it is necessary to emphasize that I am not speaking for the Party to which I belong. Also, if it should be any satisfaction to the Government I would tell them that I am by no means wholly opposed to their foreign policy. They are obviously, according to their lights, doing their best to keep this country out of war. Indeed, Mr. Eden has said that his policy is one of peace at almost any price; and I think, too, the Government are entitled to credit for standing outside the Spanish quarrel and for their persistence in connection with the Non-Intervention Committee. But unfortunately the achievements of the Government in foreign affairs are very largely of a negative character; there is very little that is positive to their credit. They have made very little progress with a better understanding between Great Britain and Germany, or with bringing about better relations with Italy. New hopes have been aroused since the advent of Mr. Neville Chamberlain. He appears, as I read it, to be a realist in foreign affairs. I think it is clear that he has not very much use for the League of Nations or collective security. In June, 1936, when the League of Nations Union was pressing that sanctions against Italy should be not only continued but intensified, Mr. Neville Chamberlain described that as the very midsummer of madness. It would be indeed extremely interesting to know, despite what Mr. Eden may say at Geneva, what the members of the Cabinet really think about the League of Nations and collective security. My own opinion is that if there could be a secret ballot of the Cabinet the League would stand a poor chance. Of course, the simple truth is that, despite rhetoric at Geneva, British foreign policy is changing, it is moving away from collectve security. The danger is that it is not moving away fast enough.

I have spoken plainly, and I have tried to avoid what I regard as the prevailing habit of make-believe. I have availed myself fully of the scope afforded by the procedure of your Lordships' House for the expression of independent views, and I think it is only right to acknowledge that I have found that such views are listened to in your Lordships' House with more than tolerance. So I felt that I really had no excuse for failing to discharge what I deem to be a duty, because I hold, rightly or wrongly, that there is a considerable section of public opinion which is in favour of views more or less like those which I have endeavoured to put before your Lordships this afternoon, and, therefore, I think it is right that views of this kind should find expression in Parliament. I firmly believe that both the Government and the Opposition are mistaken in their estimate of public opinion about foreign policy. I think one evidence of that is to be found in the by-elections, where very often the polls are extremely low. I judge that to be partly because there are a good many electors who will not vote for the foreign policy either of the Government, or of the Labour Party, or of the Liberal Party.

If another so-called Peace Ballot could be held, can it be doubted that the result would be very different from that of the last one? I would remind your Lordships that in the last Peace Ballot only 58½per cent. of those voting voted for military sanctions, and that was before the Abyssinian War, before the collapse of the League. Can it be doubted that the percentage to-day would be much less than that? Yet for another Continental war a Government must have the support of well over 90 per cent. of the British people, and also, as the noble Viscount, Lord Halifax, has pointed out, the support of the whole Empire. The Dominions do not like Continental commitments. They refused to be parties to Locarno and, personally, I think it would be unwise to rely upon them in enforcing what is called collective security. It is, indeed, safe to say that the support of the Dominions and of over 90 per cent. of the British people will only be forthcoming for a war in which Great Britain herself is attacked. Nevertheless, League supporters never seem to give a thought to the appalling position which would arise if a Government endeavoured to take Great Britain into a Continental war about which public opinion in the country and throughout the Empire was sharply divided. Summing it all up, my view is that the dangers of the present position ought to be faced fully and fairly, and that Great Britain ought to retrace its steps and reverse its foreign policy while there is still time. I beg to move for Papers.

Moved, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to British foreign policy, particularly in regard to the League of Nations. —[Lord Arnold.]

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

My Lords, we are indebted to my noble friend Lord Arnold for having taken the opportunity to get from His Majesty's Government some clear idea of their views about the foreign situation at the present moment. He is perhaps rather more sanguine than I am that he will get the information he wants. I agree with him that it would be interesting to know what the present Cabinet think about collective security. We shall not be told. The Government have a very ingenious way of bringing in the League of Nations and saying that they support the League, but at the same time they are fully aware that collective security is quite impracticable. They hope therefore that any desire for it will not arise and that, should it arise, its impracticability will be so demonstrated that they will not have to participate in any such policy. I think that is what they are relying on while abstaining at the same moment from saying that Article 16 should be taken out of the Covenant. They will get away with that, but at the same time it would be more courageous, for the sake of strengthening the authority of the League, were they really to expose to the world the fallacy of supposing that collective security can really effect any useful purpose.

I am very glad my noble friend emphasized the chief point about collective security and leaving Article 16 in the Covenant, which is that it raises the hopes of the smaller nations. That is very unfair. I have heard it said by citizens of these nations that they may be able to hold out for a short time, but that they know in the long run the British Fleet will come to their assistance. It is very unfortunate and wrong that hopes of that description should be raised. But I do not want to waste any of your Lordships' time in emphasizing the points which my noble friend placed so clearly before the House, more especially the need of an initiative on our part to deal with the question of the German Colonies, because our Empire and its vast magnitude suggest that we should take the initiative in that matter, in order to prevent what is at present a sore place from becoming a gaping wound which it may be extremely difficult to heal.

I want to draw your Lordships' attention to a point which has been rather ignored in the various public discussions on foreign affairs in recent times. It may seem a detail, but it is a detail of some importance. It concerns the organisation of our foreign affairs as administered in this country. I refer to the creation of a new post which has recently been made, and I want to make it quite clear that any criticisms I have to make do not arise from any personal considerations whatever. The post I refer to is that of Chief Diplomatic Adviser. I well know that Sir Robert Vansittart is not only a very popular but a very able official, but the creation of a new post to deal with the extremely delicate and difficult matters concerning our foreign relations appears to me of such importance that some elucidation of the duties connected with the position is a fit subject for questions and, if need be, criticisms in Parliament. To begin with, I am not very clear what the title of this official is to be, or is. He is Chief Diplomatic Adviser. So far I think I am accurate. I have seen the post described as Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I have seen it also as Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Government. I have seen it also as Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Cabinet. I have also seen it as Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister, and I am sure that I shall be corrected in order that I may get that right, anyhow.

What exactly are to be the duties of this official? The position of Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is one of enormous responsibility. Hitherto he has been the chief diplomatic adviser to the Secretary of State, although no such title has been added after his name. A series of extremely able and eminent men filled that important post. My experience goes back to Sir Thomas Sanderson, afterwards Lord Sanderson, who was in charge of the Foreign Office when I entered it many years ago. He was succeeded by Sir Charles Hardinge, now Lord Hardinge, a distinguished member of your Lordships' House, by Sir Arthur Nicholson, who was afterwards made Lord Carnock, by Sir Eyre Crowe, Lord Tyrrell, Sir Robert Vansittart and now Sir Alexander Cadogan, who fills the post with an eminent record and is known to be an extremely able official. Now the duty of this official is to advise the Foreign Secretary, and one of the necessary functions, as I would call it, of a Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs is to sit in a chair in the Foreign Office and to interview people, and to have all the threads in his hands of the detailed work of the Foreign Office, which makes him, more than anybody else should be, a very safe adviser. I remember Sir Eyre Crowe very vividly. I served in the Foreign Office while he was there. He would spend his day interviewing people and seeing foreign representatives. Late at night, after everybody was leaving the office, he was surrounded by a wall of despatch boxes, and he had to see all the papers that went through the office and minute them and comment upon them. He was an adviser—whether his advice was good or bad has nothing to do with it—whose advice was founded on complete knowledge.

There were some of those I have mentioned who depended rather on their tongue than on their pen, but I believe that the pen is the most useful instrument in the Foreign Office. Now what is going to be the relationship of this Chief Diplomatic Adviser with the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs? Is the Chief Diplomatic Adviser in the Foreign Office or is he in some other building? Will not the circulation of papers, a necessary part of the procedure of the Foreign Office, necessitate all the important papers being sent to him, and if not, how will he be aware of the latest information? Is he going to divide his responsibility with the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs? If so, there may be some confusion which will be very unhelpful to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Nobody realises better than I do how in the course of these years the work of the Foreign Office has increased. The correspondence that has to be dealt with compared with what it was forty years ago is simply colossal. That would excuse the staff being augmented and officials of minor rank being introduced, but nothing is more fatal than to duplicate the senior officials, to divide the responsibility, to confuse the mind of the Foreign Secretary, and to have an adviser flitting in from I do not quite know where with imperfect knowledge, making suggestions with which the Permanent Under-Secretary may not agree.

If he is going to be adviser to the Government, or the Prime Minister, or the Cabinet, that may involve him having an office elsewhere, perhaps on the other side of the street in Downing Street, and we should have a repetition then of what occurred between 1918 and 1922, when there was a sort of duplicate Foreign Office set up in the Prime Minister's residence with continued friction going on in the Foreign Office and the Foreign Office staff. That again is most undesirable. Then I want to know what particular qualifications as an adviser Sir Robert Vansittart has? I know of his abilities, but advice on foreign affairs in these days is a matter of such acute importance that it seems to me that his qualifications should be made known to us. I seem to remember the crisis of the Hoare-Laval proposals which ended in the Foreign Secretary himself having to be scrapped, and whatever we may think of the Hoare-Laval proposals—and some of us may think it was rather a pity they were not adopted—we all of us agree that they were badly mismanaged, clumsily launched and very inaptly handled. Whether the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in these days was responsible for this I do not know, but anyhow it would not seem that it was checked sufficiently in order to prevent the lamentable consequences that ensued.

I notice that the Chief Diplomatic Adviser, to whatever Department he is attached, has been made Chairman of a Co-ordinating Committee for broadcasting, I think, information with regard to the policy of His Majesty's Government. This looks to me rather as if the Government were conscripting the Civil Service to make propaganda for their own support, which I think is rather undesirable. I am not in a position to deprecate the use of broadcasting, but I do feel that it is an extremely delicate weapon to use in international affairs, especially if the Government are going to be responsible for what is broadcasted. Now, is the Chief Diplomatic Adviser going to draft these bits of information for distribution abroad? Is he going to be solely responsible for them? Is it going to pass through the Cabinet? Is the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to have some voice in it and is the Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs to have his former functions as adviser obliterated altogether? We are creating these new posts in a sphere where they matter very considerably, because if one thing is necessary in foreign affairs it is that there should be a single individual with unfettered discretion, taking advice, obtaining Cabinet sanction, and declaring his policy to the House of Commons. You want one chief. It seems to me that this new appointment is going to be an embarrassment. I am not at all sure that he will be a help. I rather think he will be a nuisance in the Foreign Office.

I hope very much that the Government are not going further and make an A.A.L. In case some of your Lordships do not know what that means, I will explain that it means "Ambassador at large," which is a new form of appointment that we are not unlikely to copy as we copy so many things from European countries now. An Ambassador at large is an official who has an aeroplane at his disposal and is never to be found where he is wanted. I foresee that this is imminent and I foresee the possibility that the unfortunate Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, having received advice from the proper source, which is his Permanent Under-Secretary, may suddenly hear a knock at the door and the Ambassador at large will enter breathless, having returned from Timbuktu with the very latest information which upsets the entire policy of the Government. I think many of your Lordships may have come across individuals who frequent foreign capitals arid have always got the latest information and embarrass people by their didactic laying down of the law as to what is going on in foreign countries. They are as a rule entirely mischievous. We have got our Ambassadors and Ministers abroad; we have got them in close touch with the Foreign Office, their functions are carried out quietly and silently, without sometimes even their names being generally known. They give their full information to their Chief at the Foreign Office, and with their information and with the advice of his Permanent Under-Secretary he is fully equipped to make what judgment he considers right.

This new appointment is adding some confusion, and I think that if the opinion of those closely concerned in the management of our foreign affairs was taken, they would look very much askance at this new, unstable, unexplained element that has been introduced into the Foreign Office. I have thought it right to bring this matter forward because no one else has done so. I consider it more important than the public seem to imagine. I do not know whether the appointment was made with the full and enthusiastic consent of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I do not know what the necessity for this appointment was considered to be, and I should have thought that Sir Robert Vansittart, having gained a well-earned retirement, might have spent his time in a sphere in which he excels—namely, that of literature. I see he wrote a book called The Cap and Bells. I do not at all understand why the appointment was made, and it has never been explained, but we may perhaps hear what is the title of his appointment and what are his precise functions.

We live in a time in which I, for one, think war very unlikely. I think the general horizon is better than it has been. I have expressed my appreciation before now of the conduct of foreign affairs by the present Secretary of State in extremely difficult, puzzling and intricate circumstances. I do not want him to be embarrassed. I think that full advantage must be taken in the present situation, however confused it may appear to us, in Europe, for the Government to go forward with constructive initiative. That is where I agree very much with my noble friend Lord Arnold. This reluctance to take the initiative has been carried too far. When it is necessary to get consent to any united action or representation of many foreign countries the Government cannot be expected to go further forward than others, but there are several points upon which the world does look to this country for an initiative. This matter of calming German opinion with regard to the vindictive Treaty of Versailles on the subject of the Colonies, I think, is certainly one in which His Majesty's Government should go forward first. I think the world does look to this country, and I wish it could look to it for the real appeasement that is necessary. Although I do not want to embark on this major subject now, but to confine my remarks more or less to what I have already said, I do feel that the fact that instead of taking the initiative we are following others whom we so often condemn in this question of rearmament, has vitiated the policy of the Government.

On the one hand they are trying appeasement and conciliation and on the other hand they are building up these gigantic armaments. With their voice they are declaring the barbarity of air warfare as it has been used abroad, and yet they are building weapons of destruction from the air which are very much more colossal and destructive than those which other nations are producing. It is that contradiction that I think is deplorable. If the Government had turned in the opposite direction in a world of turmoil, and had said to the world: "We do not believe in this barbarity of attempting to settle international disputes by modern methods of war, and we shall abandon that idea completely," the effect throughout the world would have been magical. I firmly believe that others would have followed our example, because that would voice not only the opinion of the Government but the opinion of the people in this country and in other countries. In that respect I do deplore the Government's policy, but I do not want to enlarge further on that. It was more the point of the conduct of foreign affairs to-day to which I wanted to draw your Lordships' special attention.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

My Lords, I find myself most unfortunately unable to agree with the concluding observations of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, because I had hoped, after listening to a good deal of his speech, that I should have been able, on one occasion at any rate, to express my adhesion to the views he uttered. However, that is not to be. On his main discussion of the position of Chief Diplomatic Adviser I do not express any opinion, but I agree with him—and I hope the Government will agree with him also—that some fuller explanation than has yet been given to the public would be reasonable and desirable. It is a new office altogether, and I think it is only reasonable for us to ask for some account of its creation.

I wish I could give even that measure of adhesion to the speech of my noble friend Lord Arnold. I am afraid he will not be at all surprised to hear that there was scarcely an observation in it from beginning to end with which I was not in profound disagreement. He made a very formal and elaborate attack on the League of Nations. It is quite true that he ended by saying that all he meant was that Article 16 should be removed from the Covenant. I am quite sure that when he comes to think of it he will agree that that is not what he meant at all, because he would certainly have to remove other Articles if he takes that view. Articles 10 and 11, for instance, would also have to go, and indeed the whole group of Articles, broadly speaking, from 10 to 17—what are ordinarily called the peace-keeping Articles—would either have to go altogether or be completely remodelled. He quoted with great approval an article in The Times. I hope he has been reading recent articles in The Times. If he has, he will remember an article in which the writer concluded by observing that the Government were perfectly right in resisting all proposals for amendment of the League, because they were quite sure that any amendment of a searching character would kill the League dead. That is, of course, the truth, as everyone who knows anything at all about Geneva, or indeed about international affairs, must be perfectly aware.

My noble friend indulged in a great many observations on the "failure" of the League. I venture to commend to him a very recent speech in which—I am quoting from memory—the Foreign Secretary said that it was a great pity that people concentrated on the two or three failures of the League and forgot its many successes. That is the truth, and those who say that the League has been a complete failure, and all the rest of it, have entirely lost sight of the fact that unquestionably the League has been instrumental in preventing quite a number of smaller wars, and one great disturbance in which a great Power was an active party and which did seem at one time to threaten a very considerable disturbance to the peace of Europe. I will not go into the details of what he said about all that, except just to remark that he said, and I was sorry to hear my noble friend Lord Ponsonby repeat, that of course the League was quite impracticable; it could not work; there was no chance of it. I have already pointed out that in a number of cases it has worked, and I think that people who use that language should at any rate remember the very recent example of what was done at Nyon.

It was quite true that that was not technically a League matter. It was, however, done in the immediate neighbourhood of Geneva and I do not quite know on what ground it was not done at Geneva. It was in fact entirely League in its atmosphere, and I believe that the secretariat was provided by the Secretariat of the League. The conception of it was entirely in accordance with this much-abused Article 16. It provided quite simply that if there were any further attempts at what was called shortly— though I see that learned writers in The Times say wrongly—"piracy" in the Mediterranean, then all the Powers there assembled, eight or ten of them, would agree to take the strongest measures. These were military measures, I am afraid, as my noble friend will perhaps remember; not merely economic pressure, but just a crude, brutal attack on the wrongdoer, which seems to shock my noble friend very much! Not only was that done, but it was a complete success, without any reservation whatever. It is quite true that some months afterwards one further attack has been made, but that has been instantly followed up by more stringent orders to the forces of the Powers concerned, and I feel quite certain that no serious infraction of the Nyon rule will be attempted.

That is all I have time to say this evening, and all, I am sure, that your Lordships have time to listen to, on the destructive part of the noble Lord's speech. He then began to explain the kind of policy that he would recommend. He said that in no circumstances must we protect Czechoslovakia. Put in that way, I do not suppose that there is anybody who would say that it was our duty to protect Czechoslovakia. That is a point of view which it seems impossible for the opponents of the League to appreciate. Nobody wants to say that it is our duty to protect Czechoslovakia. I think it is our duty, and I am quite certain that it is in our interest, to do our utmost to establish a new rule of law—if my noble friend will forgive me for repeating the phrase—in international affairs which will preclude the use of violence in order to secure political objects—in effect to make the provisions of the Kellogg Pact, which everybody has agreed to accept, a reality; that war ought not to be used in the pursuit of national policy. That is the principle. It is a principle of vast importance. I quite agree that it is undoubtedly a great change. It is, in my judgment at any rate, the greatest reform that could possibly be carried through, not only in national but also in international methods, because it would really strike a blow at the institution of war.

The noble Lord went on to explain how reasonable he thought it was for Germany to try to reacquire the German populations in Austria and Czechoslovakia. He said that, after all, it would only mean an addition of another 10,000,000 to the existing 70,000,000 of the Germans. That, he said, would be a great appeasement for Europe. It was not the only appeasement he recommended. He recommended that the French should abandon—should be forced to abandon, I suppose, or at any rate persuaded to abandon—their alliance with Russia; and at the same time that we should abandon—I will not say our alliance, because I do not think that any alliance with regard to the Eastern frontier of France exists at present, but our entente with France. I do not know what arguments we are going to use to induce her to abandon her alliance with Russia if we are going to say that in any case she is not to expect any help from England. When we have done that, the noble Lord thinks that Germany might be more peacefully inclined.

He did, however, in an earlier part of his speech explain how very legitimate the discontent of Germany and others was if you took the general distribution of wealth and territory in the world. I forget his figures, but they were very considerable, and showed that we had a certain proportion of the whole surface of the world and Germany had a very much smaller one. I do not know what all that argument meant, unless it was to say to the Germans: "You have a perfect right to have a very considerable proportion of the British Empire handed over to you, because that would make a greater equality between the two countries." Indeed, both he and Lord Ponsonby said that in their view very considerable concessions in Colonial matters ought immediately to be made. I cannot conceive a more mischievous doctrine to be preached than that. It is an invitation to the German Government, who do not seem to require any encouragement in that direction, to put forward demands of an altogether extravagant character to this country, knowing quite well, as I think both noble Lords must know, that those demands will be quite incapable of concession, and leading, as Lord Arnold himself said, to the possibility of war between Germany and us. I confess that that form of peace policy does not appeal to me in the least. I will not trouble your Lordships with any further observations on my noble friend's speech, because I disagreed so completely with it that really there is no common ground between us.

I do not suppose it is at all possible for the Government to tell us anything about the Austrian situation. I imagine that it is quite impossible for them to do so, but it is disquieting, as anybody who has read the newspapers must see. Let us hope that a good deal of what is stated in the newspapers will turn out to be exaggeration. I do not know, but it does look as if something in the nature of an ultimatum has been given by Germany to Austria, to say either that Austria must put her police, and the administration of what we should call her home affairs, under the control of a Minister known to be favourable to the Nazi system, or there would be, as it is variously stated, some steps taken by Germany against Austria—some say actual occupation by armed forces, and others say the creation of a state of things such as was created in Spain, as one newspaper puts it. It is, I think a very dangerous feature in our existing conditions that there seems to be growing up a new technique of aggression, not consisting in direct invasion of the territory, but in assisting some elements in that territory which are hostile to the Government of that territory, so that you get in effect an invasion while pretending, more or less plausibly, that you are doing nothing except allowing some of your citizens, as they have always been allowed, to take part in local national disturbances. I do not know whether anything can be said about that, nor do I know whether His Majesty's Government have any policy to announce or any statement to make, as to what they think would be the action of this country in events which appear to be not impossible of accomplishment in the near future.

My Lords, I cannot help feeling that, whether it is the fault of the Government or not, and I am quite ready to admit that in many respects it is not, we are in the presence of the fact—and that is why a discussion in this House is so desirable—that British policy has failed almost completely in the last few years. There is no doubt that our policy has been always—in the very unfortunate phrase sometimes used—to "keep out of war," but that is only a very imperfect statement of what should be the object of our policy, to promote peace. War everywhere is a danger to us, and war everywhere is a disadvantage to us, and in my judgment we have just as much a bounden duty to do our utmost to keep the peace of the world, so far as we can do so reasonably, as an individual is bound not only to keep him self free from attack but to keep peace among his fellow subjects and citizens. Judged by that kind of standard—and I do not think it is a too exacting standard —I do not think we can doubt that the situation is very much worse than it was six years ago. There are two wars waging and vast numbers of people are being slaughtered, while almost every minute horrors and outrages are being committed. I do not know whether any of your Lordships have read the account in the Daily Telegraph of the sack of Nanking. If you have it must have been to your Lordships reminiscent of the great military crimes of past years, such as the sack of Magdeburg and Badajos. Long after the military occupation of Nanking had been achieved outrage and destruction were allowed to go on. And in Europe we see these continual feuds and new acts of aggression.

As Lord Ponsonby has said, the situation in very far worse than that which existed in 1931. On the whole the world was then free from disturbance, and was about to enter upon a very serious effort to accomplish disarmament. The League was powerful and respected, Germany, Italy and Japan were all Members of the League, and there did seem to be a prospect of entering upon a new phase in international history, where the danger of war if not actually prevented would have been very much lessened. That is not so now, and, as Lord Ponsonby reminded us, that barometer of unrest, the amount of armaments in the country, has shown a great warning of the condition we are in. I cannot, of course, agree with him that in the circumstances His Majesty's Government were wrong to increase the armaments of this country. I agree, not only with him but with the present Prime Minister and his predecessor, that the increase of armaments is a grave evil and a horrible waste of money—it delays and obstructs social progress—but I also agree that if the other countries of Europe insist upon increasing their armaments, it is impossible to say to this country that we can remain the only unarmed or partially unarmed State in Europe.

Without going farther into the details of that, it seems to me that we cannot deny—even the most zealous friend of the Government cannot deny—that the situation to-day is very much worse than it was in 1931, and that the principles and policy which are often so admirably stated by the present Foreign Minister have not been accomplished. That may not be the fault of the Government, it may be the extraordinary perversity of the other countries; but there it is. And I must say frankly that in my judgment —I dare say I am quite wrong—the Government have committed very serious errors in their foreign policy. I think their conduct of the Disarmament Conference was most unfortunate. I think the speeches made by the then Foreign. Secretary about the Manchukuo incident were absolutely deplorable, and they led —I agree most fully with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, on the subject yesterday—directly, as I think, to this aggression on China by Japan.

And of course there is the supreme instance of the conduct of the Abyssinian affair, which really it is impossible to exaggerate. I do not believe there is anybody in the world now who defends what actually was done—first the rather flamboyant declaration of policy in September, and then the abject retreat from that policy two months later in the Hoare-Laval agreement, with the most deleterious consequences in every country in the world. I do not believe any one defends that now. I have recently been in America, and I was startled to find how that incident is still remembered, and how the conclusion drawn by many people there is that, whereas we set out to say that we were going to interfere in this matter because we desired to enforce the rule of law and the principles of peace, yet in point of fact, for reasons not yet fully explained, we abandoned that effort when we had gone half way through it. There is undoubtedly a bitterness in some quarters over the fact that the American Government expressed themselves in a most friendly way in regard to our efforts, and were apparently prepared to second them to the utmost of their power, and at that moment we abandoned them in the very crisis of the question.

What I feel is that though there have been very frequent statements by Government speakers of acceptance of the new principle of International Law embodied in the Covenant of the League they have not carried that policy out with any steadiness or vigour. What is the principle?— and this is really where I think it is vital that we and the people of this country and of other countries should realise what is at stake. What is the principle for which we contend? It is this, that peace is not the interest only of the immediate combatants, it is the concern of everybody, as I think the words of the Covenant put it, and all have a duty to combine to keep it. I believe that in spite of what the noble Lord, Lord Arnold, has said, that principle is accepted by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of the world. I do not think it is the least true to say that this is a fallacy attempted to be imposed by the League of Nations on the peoples of the world. On the contrary, my experience—and I have had some opportunity of testing the truth of my opinions on the subject—is that in every country people not only desire peace but accept the view that peace is the interest of everybody, that it is not the interest of the countries involved only, but it is the interest of everybody, and that everybody should combine to keep it. As far as I understand the statements of the Government, they also take that view.

And what is the rival principle, the principle recommended by Lord Arnold? It really is this—and one must never forget, in judging what Lord Arnold says, that fundamentally his view is that there ought to be total disarmament and no fighting under any circumstances by anybody, for anything. That, of course, gives a colour to what he says, and when you see that the proposals he actually makes lead to absurd results it may be that that is what he desires. But his principle is that everybody should be for himself and the devil take the hindmost. Those are the two principles—either that peace is a general interest or that each country just fights for its own immediate success and leaves all the other countries to look after themselves. I believe that if we adopt the first policy, and adopt it frankly and openly, we shall sweep away sooner or later the opposition to it. It only exists in my judgment among a comparatively small number of people, not in any case, as far as I can judge, in the great mass of the population. If you can once get that principle established, then you can really make progress in international civilisation. But in order to do it there must be clear, unambiguous statements.

I have heard people say that the Government are perfectly right not to say exactly what they are going to do in particular events that may occur, that the great thing is to keep the foreigner guessing. I venture respectively to think that is the worst policy that you could possibly adopt. They will guess, and guess wrong, and guess what they would wish to be true. That is the ordinary frame of mind of the human being. They may say, "We are quite sure they will not intervene, we shall go on with our policy," and then at the last moment it will turn out to be such a policy as in no circumstances this country could admit. Those are exactly the circumstances in which war takes place. It is far better to say definitely what your policy is. Then everybody knows what it is, and they will formulate their conduct accordingly. But the most dangerous thing is to leave it doubtful as to what you will do and what you will not do in any particular case.

The second corollary to this principle is the necessity for going back to the old practice of the League and promoting open discussion. I noticed the other day an angry reference made by the Polish Government. They said, "How can you expect us to support"—I think it was a resolution with reference to China; "it was just got up by three or four Powers in a back parlour, and they put it before the Council of the League who are required to accept it. You cannot expect us to accept a policy on those lines." There is a great deal of truth in that. The world is entitled to know not only what is actually decided but the reasons which induced the Powers to put the policy forward so that they can judge as to what is right in the circumstances and what is wrong. In the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, yesterday, he drew a very terrible picture, very shortly but very vividly, of the conditions in China and the widespread destruction. He said that this was disapproved of not only by us but by the whole world, and he could not believe that the public opinion of the world would not have some effect on Japan. I am not very sanguine about that myself, but I do say with him that public opinion is, broadly and generally, a most important factor in keeping the peace of the world, and, broadly speaking, you will always find public opinion on the side of peace. Therefore the only thing you have to do is to mobilise that public opinion, and for that purpose you must have open diplomacy, and not secret diplomacy. You cannot get public opinion to come along unless the people know all the facts of the case. For that reason I should like to see that change made in the Government's policy. I should like to see them bring their proposals quite frankly before the Council or Assembly of the League. I do not think, myself, it matters so much if they are not able to carry their proposals. They put them forward, if necessary there is a vote, and the world at large knows which side the different countries have taken. I think there is some advantage in that even if the result is that the Government are unable to carry any particular proposal.

Finally, we must do what I have urged already in the observations I have made: we must put forward the view that our principle of policy is the maintenance of peace. This talk that we will interfere only if British interests are involved is, in my judgment, most pernicious. It is fatal for the protection of these very interests. The only real protection for British interests and, indeed, for the interests of the world is to avoid war. Wherever any serious war breaks out, British interests are more or less involved, and owing to the immense extent of our interests that is more true perhaps of us than of any other country in the world. The only solitary way of protecting British interests is to preserve peace. When I and others press the Government to act up to their obligations under the Covenant, in spite of the observations of my noble friends, we do so not because we have any visionary and extravagant view of the duties of this country. Not at all. We believe that in this matter it is true that there is a great moral duty on this country to use its whole influence to prevent the horrors and wickedness of war; but in addition to that we hold that it is not only our duty but it is emphatically our interest to do so, and that it is worth almost any risk, almost any sacrifice, if we can get rid of this horrible institution which does us and so many other people infinite harm.

I said a word just now about America. I am quite sure there is no opinion which is more generally held in this country than that close collaboration between this country and America is, if not vital, at any rate in the highest degree desirable. It is an opinion I hold myself, but I only hold it as one of an innumerable multitude in this country. I am quite certain of this, that if you say your policy is directed to the protection of British interests, you have no ground for asking for the support of the United States. They will say, "We have not the least objection to your protecting your interests. Why should you not, but why should we interfere?" There is a book which I have already quoted in public, I believe, published in America and which has had an immense circulation, with the title England expects that every American will do his duty. That is the common guide urged against any suggestion that there should be co-operation between England and America. "You do not want our co-operation," they say, "really for peace or for any large view of that kind. You want it in order to save your dividends, the£150,000,000 you have got invested in Shanghai or wherever it may be." And they say with great force, "Why should we interfere in a matter of that kind?"

My noble friend Lord Arnold is impressed with the possibility that his policy of isolation might lead to a position when we alone should have to face the attack of some militaristic combination on the Continent of Europe, and his only answer is: "We might rely on the United States to come and save us." Not, I think, a very glorious reply for any British Peer to make; but, apart from that, I believe it to be a most unsafe conclusion. I am quite sure that the United States would see with the greatest grief and reluctance the destruction of this Empire or the serious injury of this Empire. I am not in the least a believer in the theory of Anglo-American hostility in America. It only exists, if it exists, in quite insignificant measure. But if we are to set out with the policy of my noble friend that we are never to interfere to save anybody, that the only thing that matters for us is to save our own interests, and we proceed on that strictly self-regarding policy always in our conduct of foreign affairs, I say it is fantastic to think that if the result of that policy is to leave us in complete danger we can then go and say to the United States: "That policy which we have always rejected, and which we do not even now think is right for us to pursue, is the very policy we are invoking to receive assistance from you." I feel sure that is a fantastic conception of international affairs.

I am sorry to have delayed your Lordships so long. I have only one or two words to say in conclusion. When views of this kind are put forward we are told they are visionary or Utopian or, nowadays, that they are ideological. I do not know in the least why people are so fond of that exceedingly cumbrous word. But that is what is always said. If that means they are unpractical, that they are not likely to receive support from other countries, then I say, simply, that I disagree. Every time that this country has gone to the League of Nations or elsewhere with a bold statement of what it desires in the general interests of the world, it has always received—I say so boldly—ample support from other countries. Take that very speech of September 11. Why, it was hailed with enthusiasm by all the other countries practically, with some quite insignificant exceptions. And it has always been so, It was just the same at Nyon. We had the complete support of all the countries there. It is not that. It is that we are afraid of our own greatness. We are not bold enough to state clearly and definitely what our policy is and call for assistance. Whenever we have done that we have had ample support.

If that is what is meant by Utopian, visionary, and the rest of it, I say simply I do not believe that is right. But if it means that our foreign policy must be based on definite principles, then I say of course that is true. All policies worthy of the name are in that sense visionary and Utopian and ideological. That is true. We ought to have a principle at the back of our policy, and our principle is that we stand not only for the protection of our property and dividends, but we stand also for the establishment of right in international affairs, and we stand' against the doctrine, now unfortunately so common, that the only thing that counts is force and that might is right.

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY

My Lords, I only ask for a few minutes of your Lordships' time to speak a word about the present position of the League of Nations. I fear that my modest contribution to the discussion will come very flat after the very forcible and noble sentiments which have just been expressed by my noble friend Lord Cecil. I have been so long an ardent and admiring disciple of that valiant apostle of the League that I greatly regret to have even a seeming difference with him. I think he will see that my difference is only seeming. But there are many who are as unswerving in their allegiance to the principles of the League of Nations as my noble friend who are being driven by the pressure of hard facts to the conclusion that it is not really possible for the League at the present time to fulfil all the purposes for which it was designed.

Facts are facts, and the consequences will be what they will be, and there are some facts that it is very difficult to resist. I do not speak now of the patent fact of the greatly altered position of the League through the defection of the United States and, more recently, of Germany, Italy and Japan. My noble friend spoke eloquently about the difference between the state of affairs in the world in 1931 and now, but of course since 1931 this defection from the League has altered its character and, inevitably, its power. But the three facts which impress me most are these. First of all, that it has come to pass, through circumstances for which we are not responsible, that the League has the appearance of being an alliance of one set of great Powers in contrast to another set; Great Britain, France and possibly Russia on the one side, Germany, Italy and Japan upon the other. And this, to some at least, seems to embody that very principle of a system of rival alliances which the League was intended to supplant. In the second place, apparently as a result of this, it is beyond doubt that many States Members of the League find themselves increasingly unwilling to undertake obligations which might mean the risk of war in places and for purposes which are far remote from their vital or obvious interests. My noble friend did indeed mention as an instance of what he calls the success of the League the arrangements made at Nyon, but of course the whole point of that was that it was an arrangement made by Powers who were vitally and immediately concerned with the area in which these operations were to take place. The third fact is that I am afraid even I, with all my zeal for the League, must admit that the efforts of the League to restrain aggression by the use of collective force in the way of sanctions under Article 16, whether economic or military, have not succeeded.

There could be no clearer instance, I suppose, of what aggression means than the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy and yet the effort made to apply Article 16. as we know, failed. I do not think it is any use now attempting to apportion blame. My noble friend said that the whole world was with us when the Secretary of State made that famous September speech, but very shortly afterwards those who are most closely allied to us seemed most unwilling to carry these words into effect. Nor, I suppose, can it be denied that the present operations of Japan in China are what the League has always regarded as aggression, and yet who is there that thinks that the League at this moment can interfere to bring these operations to an end? In those circumstances I must say I feel that it is difficult to expect the League to proceed, at least upon the basis of Article 16, to fulfil the purposes for which that Article was intended. …'tis true: 'tis true 'tis pity; And pity 'tis 'tis true. But, my Lords, I remember what Lord Grey of Fallodon said on one occasion, that it is not an act of service but an act of disservice to the League to attempt to lay upon it obligations which it cannot meet and tasks which it cannot fulfil.

But—as this is my main point and where I entirely differ from the noble Lord, Lord Arnold, in his very comprehensive and able speech—this does not seem to me any reason why the main structure of the Covenant should be changed, or even that Article 16 should be scrapped. This would be a formal, public, deliberate abandonment of the ideals for which the League stands and the purpose for which it was brought into being. It is true that the noble Lord, Lord Arnold, said he could not conceive the time coming when it ever would be possible to apply the principle of collective action for the maintenance of peace. I do not know what powers of prophecy he has, but I should have thought it was very conceivable that in the kaleidoscope of international affairs the time might very well come when these provisions might be brought into being. Certainly one of those principles which have just been so eloquently expounded by my noble friend Lord Cecil remains, that our interest is not merely to keep the peace for ourselves but to keep the peace for the world, and that in order that that should be done we ought to keep it as the principal thought of those who are concerned in the preservation of the peace of the world that they should be ready to combine when that peace is threatened. Therefore, because these difficulties occur at the present time—and I fully admit their force in the way of bringing Article 16 into operation—I can see no reason why the Covenant should be changed or even why that particular Article should be scrapped.

May I use an illustration which is perhaps more natural to me than to some of your Lordships? Some of us are committed to the ideal of one visible union of all branches of the Christian Church throughout the world. We know that there are obstacles at present and in any future that we can foresee, which are insuperable, and we know it would be the greatest folly to act as if that ideal were already abandoned; that would be the very surest way of preventing its ultimate attainment. But for that reason we do not abandon the ideal itself. We do not haul down the flag. We rather say that even if it is impracticable for the moment it is a line of purpose which we have steadily to follow with patience and with hope. Or I might use a simpler illustration. In everything that has been said recently by His Majesty's Government, by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, there is frank recognition that, unfortunately, we must increase our armaments and increase them with the greatest possible zeal, and yet they have never allowed that to interfere with their upholding the ideal to which we must move with steadiness of purpose, that there should be general disarmament throughout the world. Therefore I do not see that it follows in the least that because of these present difficulties we should make any fundamental change in the character, purpose and ideals of the League.

Rather I would say—and here I find myself in agreement with what was recently written by Lord Allen of Hurtwood in a letter to The Times—that for the present, because of these difficulties, we should keep Article 16 in the background and bring Article 11 into the foreground. May I remind your Lordships of the effect of that Article? Any war or threat of war, whether it immediately affects any Members of the League or not, is declared to be a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. Under that Article there would still be opportunities, as the noble Viscount said, for what may be of great importance, a declaration of world opinion, which, even if it could not be complete and must be partial, might yet be very weighty and effective. There would be opportunities of promoting efforts at conciliation. There would be opportunities of dealing with cases of dispute that were expressly referred to the League and of promoting arbitration. There would still be opportunities of carrying on the work which the League has shown it can do.

It provides a neutral meeting ground of statesmen for conference. It has shown its care of minorities and of mandated territories. It is able to take action in regard to those economic conditions which, as has been rightly pointed out, are fertile causes of war or the desire of war. It has done noble work in promoting international health, social morality and standards of life. I believe that if the League will continue to make the utmost of Article 11 then it may gradually reassert its position, and a time may come when it will be able to fulfil all the principles that are involved in Article 16. My Lords, I still profess myself to be a League of Nations man, even although it is not capable at present of fulfilling all its purposes. I may put it in this way. I think the League is obviously encountering very rough weather, but taking in some of its sail may be its best chance of coming through and of resuming its course under clearer skies.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

My Lords, before any reply is made from the Front Bench opposite I desire to touch on one or two points arising out of this debate. In the first instance, in sequel to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I should like to ask a question regarding the new appointment of Adviser to the Foreign Office, a Department with which my acquaintance goes back for an even longer time than that of Lord Ponsonby. I do not want to adopt the somewhat subacid tone, if I may be allowed so to describe it, in which he touched on the actual choice of the Adviser, but there is one particular matter on which I should desire to be informed. What will be in the future the precise relations of this new Adviser to the Government with the Secretary of State as compared with the relations between the Secretary of State and the Permanent Under-Secretary? It fell to me for two considerable periods to be in charge of the Foreign Office through the absence of Sir Edward Grey, as he then was, through illness. I realised then, as I had realised during my earlier experience as a private secretary there, that the practically daily conferences of the Secretary of State and the Permanent Under-Secretary were of paramount importance. The question which I wish to ask is, how far will the Permanent Under-Secretary and the new Adviser both have personal access to the Secretary of State? It seems obvious that their advice on particular subjects may not be identical, and therefore the position of the unhappy Minister, instead of being eased by the fresh appointment, may become somewhat confused. I have no doubt that the noble Earl opposite will give me a satisfactory reply on that point.

I listened with great attention to the powerful and interesting speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Arnold, in opening the debate. One point that struck me was that in one sense he has over-proved his case. If it be true that there is no objection whatever from the point of view of Europe or the world to a dominating Pan-Germanism—that is to say, the union of the 80,000,000 Germans of whom the noble Lord spoke, with, one must presume, considerable control over some of their neighbours, because what exactly would be the lot of Poland in that case is not quite easy to foresee—if there is no objection to that now, why was there any objection to a precisely similar claim of Germany in 1914? If there was none then, the War or at any rate our participation in the War was a complete error, and from the tone in which the noble Lord spoke of the entente with France I do not feel certain that he himself does not hold that view. Surely if then it was undesirable from our point of view that Germany should obtain complete control over Central Europe, and presumably in a considerable degree over Belgium and Holland, it would appear to be not less undesirable now. The noble Lord forcibly stated that the situation was greatly altered in that respect by the position which the Air Force has taken in comparison with the sea and land forces which then predominated, but I can hardly suppose that your Lordships would agree that that offers a complete explanation. We should undoubtedly be in an extremely precarious position, and one which would only be safeguarded by arming ourselves to an even greater extent than that which is now proposed by His Majesty's Government.

Then the noble Lord spoke of the German Colonies. I have never concealed my view, I have stated it freely in the House and often outside, that the complete taking over of the German Colonies by this country and to some extent by others was a radical error of judgment. From my point of view it was a practical mistake, because it would have been far wiser to leave Germany in a position natural for so great a Power; and it might even be argued from a lower point of view that a country with a Colonial empire, and with the kind of naval force which is required in connection with that empire, is in some respects in a weaker state than a country which is entirely concentrated on its own territory. That, of course, is altogether apart from the argument which is so freely used in Germany, that the abstraction of all those Colonies was an injustice. I think it was an injustice in this sense: that the argument that those Colonies had been misgoverned was greatly exaggerated. I had better means than many people of knowing what the government of some of those German Colonies was; and though it was conducted on lines different from those which we favour, it is a gross exaggeration to speak of the government of those German Colonies as having been altogether bad. But when it comes to questions of restoration, it must be obvious to everybody that nobody is going to propose to hand back those Colonies to Germany sans phrase. I think, however, that there is a very strong case for an examination by all the parties concerned and, if you will, by other parties who are willing to lend a hand, to look into the whole question of Colonial possessions and see whether it is not possible to give some satisfaction to Germany in that respect.

I only want to add one word, arising from what has just fallen from the most reverend Primate, on the matter of the League of Nations. I find myself in complete concurrence with practically everything he said about the retention of Article 16; that is to say, that any revision or re-examination of the provisions of the Covenant should not involve any material change in the structure. It is quite true—in fact, it has been stressed over and over again—that little or no use has been made of the provisions of Article 16. But, as the most reverend Primate pointed out, many ideals are held enthusiastically which it is quite impossible to fulfil in their entirety. I think one may go even further than that, and say that there are many rules of law which it is often impossible to enforce but which at the same time are far better left on the Statute Book than removed from it. I feel sure that the effect of tampering with the structure of the League, in a way which might easily be understood as causing its reduction to a mere pleasant and sometimes useful debating society, would be a gross error. I feel fairly certain, from the speeches which have been made by the Foreign Secretary and from what I know of the general views of His Majesty's Government, that the view which they take will not be very different from that which has been expressed by the most reverend Primate.

LORD NOEL-BUXTON

My Lords, we all want to hear the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, who represents the Government, and I shall only bring before your Lordships one point. The Motion before the House deals with dangers arising from the policy of the Government. I do not think that those dangers lie in the wording of the Covenant, nor does the Labour Party despair of the system of collective security, which I must regard as the ideal to be pursued. The danger that impresses itself on me arises from friction between this county and Germany. I desire to bring before your Lordships one special point in regard to that matter. We understand that his Majesty's Government, now since many months, definitely wish to get to terms with Germany, if that be possible, and I am very glad to be able to support the policy of the Government as declared in that form. The Prime Minister took an early occasion to say friendly things, and he was followed at not too long a distance by the visit of Viscount Halifax, which the public generally hopes will be followed up. The most reverend Primate has said similar things, representing as he does a vast body of public opinion.

But I think that the change of policy, which is fully realised here, has not been sufficiently proved to the minds of Germans on the other side. The bad impression of previous policy years ago requires to be removed. What you must call the anti-German record of previous years has not been definitely repudiated, as seen from the other side of the German Ocean. If we want to get straight with Germany we can never sufficiently recall what is the German outlook, and we must realise that there still rankle in the German mind the memories of many bitter events since the Peace of Versailles: the humiliation of 1919, the Versailles Treaty, the impression that they were tricked by the Fourteen Points, which induced them to lay down their arms. The declaration of war guilt was imposed upon them; they saw their country severed from East Prussia, as we might regard Scotland severed from England, by a band of enemy territory; they saw the Ruhr invaded, and worst of all, perhaps, they saw their people governed by negro troops. They felt that they were being kicked when they were down. Even more recent events up to 1935 have given a similar impression. Lord Cecil has already alluded to the mistake of 1933, when the Foreign Secretary declared that Germany must go through a period of probation. Then, in 1931, we had the question of the tariff union with Austria, and the final proof that the Allies at that time were not in favour of a genuine equality of status for Germany. After that we had the offers of the German Government, even since the Hitler régime, rejected. We had M. Barthou's famous "No, Never." We look now with something like longing to the German offer to keep their forces to 300,000 men, with a limited Air Force.

All these things left a deep impression on the minds of Germany which it is difficult to remove. We ourselves did not think very much of those events because we did not regard the policy as ours. It was the policy of our friends across the Channel, but in Germany we had to share the responsibility which that policy naturally indicated, and along with us the League, naturally, appeared to the German mind to be responsible. We seemed to be definite supporters of the policy of M. Poincaré. We appeared to be docile, tame, subservient, complaisant and non-protesting against that line of conduct. The reasons may have been partly personal, probably temperamental, because of the English idea of true loyalty. That loyalty was weakly and sentimental and was not really loyalty to French interests, for pleasing is not necessarily serving. M. Poincaréhad an excuse in the menace which then appeared so clearly to the French mind. The policy also was not loyal to the League spirit, which implies a general appeasement and equal justice. Germany was therefore driven to hate the League and all its works and to believe even this country to be hostile.

Happily we can recall that since 1935 a definite change has taken place in our policy. We did not give a blank cheque to another Power in 1936, when others felt inclined to resist the German move into the Rhineland by force. Our change of policy must, however, be proved to the German mind, and our policy therefore needs to be a very active policy. The policy indicated by Lord Halifax's visit was a good beginning, and the communiquéof our Government which followed it showed that it was to be followed up. Time and definition are important factors. Now the way is open and the French Government have come to a definite change of front. It is for us to co-operate with France in making the attempt to come to terms a definite and vigorous one. The last debate in this House showed how wide is the support for a strong attempt to reach a real agreement. The responsibility for a wrong impression enjoins an extra vigour on the part of His Majesty's Government to correct it.

Let me attempt to define what I feel to be the directions in which such definition can be made. We want clearly to show by our actions, especially at Geneva, that we are definitely in favour of the fullest equality of status. We must show that we do not despair of a general agreement. We must pursue the policy which the Foreign Secretary has laid down with full vigour. The Foreign Secretary said at Geneva that he was all in favour of the separation of the Covenant from the Treaty of Versailles; but no definite steps have been taken. That should be pushed with greater vigour, and it is within our power to push it through. It is the same with regard to the War Guilt Clause, which long ago should have been dealt with. So also, if we are to make concessions, with regard to Colonies. As Mr. Eden said, there must be reciprocity, and that not we alone should make the sacrifice. Is it not also possible to raise again the question of disarmament? When Germany was feeble was not the time to attempt an agreement; now is the time, when she has taken a position of equality in regard to armaments.

Also we could show that we are definitely in favour of better machinery for revision, which is provided in the Covenant but has not been pursued. We have talked of collective security all the time, but we have been negative about revision. The questions of Austria and Czechoslovakia have already been dealt with this afternoon, but these also show opportunities of indicating that the one-sided policy of the past is no longer supported by us. When we come to the question of Colonies, we are to believe that the Government are discussing with the Governments of France and, I hope, of Belgium, what can be done in that matter. In Germany the emphasis is laid upon the point which Lord Arnold mentioned, of the obligation arising from No. 5 of the Fourteen Points. It is not for us to charge the German Government too readily with breaking faith, when we must be conscious that to them it must appear that we have not kept our word with regard to the Fourteen Points. The communiquéissued after the visit of Lord Halifax spoke definitely of the study of the Colonial question that would be proceeded with. I hope the noble Earl may be able to tell us something of progress that has been made in that matter. An article in The Times the day before yesterday spoke very firmly of the avowed action that must be proceeding in regard to Colonial preparations. The reason for deprivation of Colonies, which was the incapacity and inhumanity of the German Government— on which I agree very strongly with the noble Marquess who has just spoken—we ourselves retracted when, at the time of Locarno, Sir Austen Chamberlain stated that we saw no reason now to stand in the way of the acquisition of Colonies by Germany if she could secure them. That deprivation, again, was false to the spirit of the League. The War was not fought to seize territories, but to end war.

It is surely not too late to uproot the seeds of war that were sown by the Versailles Treaty. To summarise my point in a word, the Prime Minister desires to make the most of the opportunity of direct talks with the German Government, and I would appeal to the noble Earl to show us that the Government are carefully avoiding the charge that our action is in any way supine, or lethargic, or procrastinating. Undoubtedly difficulties arise which tend to delay—Spain and the changes in the French Government—but I trust that His Majesty's Government will not be deterred by them from the greatest feasible activity. The visit of Lord Halifax proved that the Government had put their hand to the plough, and I trust that the intention is very firm not to look back.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH)

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Arnold, in introducing this discussion has as usual made a very powerful and critical speech, but I must confess that I am still left in considerable doubt as to what constitutes his constructive suggestions for dealing with the difficulties with which Europe, and indeed the whole world, are to-day confronted. Let me say a word first with regard to his criticisms of the position in which we have been placed in relation to the League of Nations—and parenthetically I would say that I cannot agree with his verdict on the past performances of the League. It is easy enough, arid it; is the general inclination, to draw attention to failures and to lay no emphasis whatever on successes. But that is in parenthesis. In what he said about the League I was again in some doubt as to what exactly he had in mind. The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, said that what he proposed amounted more or less to the elimination of what are known as the peace-keeping clauses of the Covenant. But whether that be a proper interpretation of the noble Lord's intentions or not, in any case I was unable to trace in his remarks any constructive suggestions as to what should take the place of the League and as to what general policy on the wide matters with which the League deals ought to be pursued.

I should like to ask him this question, whether he is really satisfied to go back once again to the state of affairs that existed before the war. It seems to me that if he is prepared and satisfied to do so, he is adopting nothing more nor less than a policy of despair. It must be remembered that the League was brought into existence as the result of the spontaneous desire of all nations to bring about a greater measure of international co-operation and to find a better way of settling international disputes than by means of a resort to arms. Are we prepared now, because the League has not worked as effectively as we should have liked it to do, and as a result of its partial failure, to abandon all that the League stands for and the principles of international co-operation which are the very core of the Covenant? I venture to say that that would not be the view of the great mass of people in this country, nor do I think it would be that of the mass of people in other countries.

I should like to define the position of the Government in regard to this matter and to refer to the speech which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made last month at the meeting of the Council of the League. He referred first to the difficulties with which the League is undoubtedly and admittedly confronted at the moment, and he said: By the defection of some of its more important Members, the League is now faced with the fact that the area of co-operation is restricted and that its ability to fulfil all the functions originally contemplated by it is thereby reduced. I think the reasons for this are quite obvious. The most reverend Primate referred to them and pointed out that its lack of universality and recent defections from the League had undoubtedly modified the position and to a considerable extent affected the possibilities that were before it of fulfilling the objects with which it was brought into existence. Then the Secretary of State went on to say this: The principles on which the League was founded are laid down in the Preamble to the Covenant. They are the promotion of international co-operation and the achievement of international peace and security on the basis of respect for International Law. To those principles His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hold fast, and they believe that true peace and orderly progress cannot be looked for in the world unless all nations co-operate in some system based upon those principles. For that reason and others it seems to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom essential in these difficult times to retain what still exists. They consider that the League, despite its existing limitations, is the best instrument which has yet been devised for giving effect to the principles of international co-operation, and they-are therefore determined to keep it in existence, to give it their full support, and to make use of its machinery and procedure to the fullest extent that circumstances permit. Within the limits which they have to recognise they intend to make it as efficient an instrument as possible. I know that it will be argued that if it is admitted—and I think it is generally admitted—that the League is not working as originally intended and hoped, there is consequently an overwhelming reason for proceeding to the reform of the League and to its adaptation to the new circumstances which now exist. I would therefore like to say one or two short words of explanation as to how the position stands with regard to the question of the reform of the League. As your Lordships know, in October, 1936, a Committee was set up to examine the whole question of the application of the principles of the Covenant, and that work was subsequently divided up and Rapporteurs were appointed for different subjects. At the third session of that Committee, which took place only a fortnight or so ago, important declarations were made by a number of States. These declarations were of such a character that the Committee, which, as your Lordships know, is only an Advisory Committee, thought it essential to report them to the League as a whole without attempting any assessment of the views that had been expressed. These declarations were mainly concerned with the application of the coercive clauses of the Covenant.

Widely differing views were held in the Committee on the advisability or otherwise of amending the Covenant or of codifying the attitude assumed by certain States. The Committee accordingly decided to adjourn until it received directions from the Assembly governing the future progress of its work. There, for the moment, the matter rests, and pending a decision by the Assembly I do not think it would be advisable for His Majesty's Government to make any further pronouncement upon it. I would particularly like to emphasize this point, that everybody, even those members of the Committee who were most anxious in regard to their position in relation to Article 16 of the Covenant, agreed that this was not the time to start tinkering with the Covenant. I maintain that the position which was revealed at that meeting of the Committee was not a discouraging one. Indeed, on all sides there was evidence of continued attachment to the principles on which the League is founded and a continued belief in the vital importance of preserving the collective system.

I know it is argued that this is all very well, but the process is a very long-drawn-out one indeed; that in the meantime the dangers are always increasing; that nations are left in a state of uncertainty as to what their position exactly is and as to what their exact commitments might be; and that this is leading to a feeling of general insecurity and unsettlement throughout Europe. There are risks inherent in any situation that you might conceive. Indeed there is no reason to think that the present state of uncertainty would not have existed even if there had been no League of Nations, and it might, and probably would, have been much greater. You have only to look at the state of affairs which obtained before the War, and in this I am afraid I cannot agree with the noble Lord who initiated the debate that that state of affairs was preferable to the one which exists now. I do not think that that position can possibly be maintained, for it seems to me that the state which existed before the War was fraught with every kind of danger, with no compensating safeguards whatsoever.

There is no denying that we have undertaken certain commitments as the result of our membership of the League. Of course we have. But I must repeat once again that the Covenant certainly does not impose upon us any automatic obligations to take up arms on behalf of others. In this matter we retain our complete sovereignty. The noble Lord holds the view—he explained it quite clearly this afternoon—that the automatic obligations which do exist under the Covenant, such as the imposition of sanctions in certain circumstances, may lead this country against its will into a state of war with another country. As I have already pointed out, risks clearly exist in any situation, but the Government view is that the risks of the present situation are greatly outweighed by the advantages afforded by the existence of a system of co-operation between nations which the League of Nations provides. It seems to me that the dangers of the present situation have been, and can be, easily exaggerated. After all, there are considerable safeguards in the machinery of the League. We know that in the first place the machinery of Article 16 can only be brought into operation as the result of a unanimous vote on the part of the Council, and, in the second place, a further process has to be gone through. In all probability a Co-ordination Committee would subsequently have to be set up to examine the extent and manner in which sanctions might actually be applied in practice, and other allied questions of that kind.

Consequently I hold the view strongly that it is unlikely in the highest degree that any Government would allow itself to be drawn into a war such as the noble Lord had in mind by adopting a policy which had not the overwhelming support of the people of its country. But these and all cognate questions are now in suspense pending a decision by the Assembly, and I am therefore unable to say anything further on that point. But I should like to make one observation, and that is that I think all wise people will agree it would be an act of supreme folly seriously to impair or, indeed, as some people suggest, to sweep away the structure of the League without the fullest thought and without the most careful and responsible consideration. This is the position. We still believe in the principles of the League. We believe that that organisation, or an organisation modelled on the lines of the League, can provide the best instrument for international co-operation and for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Therefore we ought to think not once only but many, many times before we destroy what we should find it very difficult and indeed entirely impossible to rebuild.

The noble Lord, Lord Arnold, said that British foreign policy was moving away from collective security. I do not think that that is a fair way of putting the position. The policy of His Majesty's Government is still based on the principles of the Covenant, but in this matter we are realists as well as idealists and we do realise that limitations have been enforced upon us and upon the League by the present situation. Consequently, in any practical application in future of these principles, past experience must be taken into consideration and must naturally influence us in our actions. But that is no reason why we should abandon the principles of international co-operation. We do not intend to abandon them. On the other hand, it is, I think, a reason why we should put ourselves in a position to protect our country and fulfil our other responsibilities, and this, as your Lordships know, we are proceeding to do at this time.

The noble Lord has particularly stressed the dangers which in his view arise out of our commitments to France, with particular regard to the Franco-Soviet Pact and France's commitments to Czechoslovakia. He did in fact, as was pointed out by the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cecil of Chelwood), argue in favour of a policy of isolation. With all respect to him I must repeat what I have already said on a number of occasions—namely, that the view of His Majesty's Government is that such a policy is quite impracticable in these clays. Apart from the principles involved, we believe it to be from the purely material point of view or practical point of view an impossible thing. As the noble Lord himself will admit, this country throughout its history has found it impossible to disinterest itself from events which take place on that part of the Continent opposite our own shores, and to suggest that we should do so now would, to my mind, not only be a complete revolution in policy but would be quite unsound and illogical as well. The noble Lord has argued that the invention of aircraft has made a very great difference; in fact, has made the whole difference. I quite honestly fail to follow his line of argument when he says that the presence of aircraft has made it less objectionable for us to have a potential enemy outside our shores. Indeed, I should have thought on the other hand that it was a state of affairs which supported the view that is held by His Majesty's Government in this matter, that it is impossible for them to dissociate themselves from what occurs on the Continent opposite our own shores.

I would like to point out that our commitments to France and to Belgium arise out of the Treaty of Locarno, and that these were reaffirmed by the proposals of March, 1936, after the reoccupation of the Rhineland. The obligations that we undertook were in general terms to go to the immediate assistance of France and Belgium in the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany. It should be remembered that the Treaty of Locarno was not an alliance but a treaty of nonaggression and guarantee concluded within the framework of the Covenant. That guarantee still has this character. Since then an assurance, as your Lordships are aware, was given by the French Foreign Minister to the effect that all French forces would be immediately used in defence of this country against unprovoked aggression. But what I wanted specially to point out to the House was that the only new element in fact since the time of the Treaty of Locarno was the Franco-Soviet Pact. As a matter of fact the Franco-Czechoslovakian Treaty was part of the whole Locarno settlement, and the Franco-Polish Treaty was as well. Therefore the only new element—the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, shakes his head, but I am led to understand that that is so.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

I do not think any British Government ever took cognisance of any Franco-Czechoslovakian military alliance. It never entered into the discussions I think.

THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH

I will look into that point; perhaps I have been misled on the matter. However that may he it seems to me that the greatest emphasis has been laid upon the Franco-Soviet Pact. I must repeat that His Majesty's Government hold that the existence of that Pact has not in any way increased our legal obligations towards France. The noble Lord referred to a question put in the House of Commons in February of last year by Mr. George Lambert, who asked whether any commitment existed whereby under the Franco-Russian Pact Great Britain could be involved in a European war. That question was answered by Viscount Cranborne, who said: The answer to the first part of the question is: 'No, Sir.' As regards the second part of the question, I think the French and Soviet Governments are fully aware of the position. I do not think that answer can be swept away as if it had no significance whatsoever. I may say that the same thing is true of the French Treaty with Czechoslovakia as well. I think that it puts the position as clearly as it could be put in present circumstances. But the real point is this, that if war broke out and France became involved in hostilities, it is perfectly obvious that the action which His Majesty's Government would take would have to depend on the circumstances of the case in which those hostilities had arisen.

Now I pass to another subject. The noble Lord has pleaded for a better understanding with Germany, and I do not think that any one could fail to sympathise with the object which he had in mind. I have no doubt that some of your Lordships have noticed that during the course of his speech at Birmingham on Saturday the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs used these words: We offer friendship to all, but on equal terms. What His Majesty's Government have in mind is the desirability of holding a discussion on the possible contribution of all parties concerned towards a general appeasement in Europe. We feel that all must help, and it is quite clear that it is only in a spirit of reasonableness and in an atmosphere of real conciliation that we can hope for success. The noble Lord, as well as the noble Marquess, suggested that a solution of the Colonial question would make a valuable contribution towards that appeasement. My Lords, I must frankly say that I am not in a position to discuss this question in detail, and I think the best thing I can do is to refer your Lordships to the communiquéwhich was issued at the end of November after the visit of French Ministers to London. That communiquéstated that a preliminary examination had been made of the Colonial question in all its aspects and that it was recognised that this question was not one that could be considered in isolation and moreover would involve a number of other countries. It was agreed that the subject would require much more extended study. I want to make it quite clear at this stage that on the general question of an understanding with Germany there is of course no question of dropping the matter and ceasing our efforts to reach that understanding. On the other hand, we intend to pursue those efforts and we are pursuing them. But for the moment I am afraid I cannot do more than draw the attention of your Lordships' House to the question which Mr. Mander asked the Prime Minister in another place on February 1 and the Prime Minister's reply. He was asked: Whether he has any statement to make with reference to the general European negotiations started by the visit of Lord Halifax to Berlin? The answer was: The matter is under the active consideration of His Majesty's Government, but I have no statement to make at present. I am afraid I cannot add to that to-day, but I would like to say that of course the same offer made by the Secretary of State in Birmingham applies to Italy as well. It is made to all countries. But we do feel that any agreement that we make with Italy must be a complete and comprehensive one. We feel that efforts to approach matters piecemeal are not likely to be of any avail. As your Lordships will remember, in January last year we attempted a limited solution of the difficulties which existed between us, and I am afraid it is quite clear that that attempt was not very successful. I do not want to add anything further except that I am hopeful that it will be possible to eliminate any difficulties that at present stand in the way as a result of good will on both sides.

Now I want to pass, if I may, to the specific matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, this afternoon, which was referred to also by other speakers, including the noble Marquess the Leader of the Liberal Party. Before I do so, however, I would like if I may to refer to a matter which I am certain will not be controversial in your Lordships' House. This is the noble Lord's birthday and I would like to take the opportunity on behalf not only of noble Lords on these Benches but of the whole House of offering him warmest congratulations and wishing him many happy returns of the day. In reference to the question of the appointment of a Chief Diplomatic Adviser, I would like to make the following remarks: The reasons for the appointment of Sir Robert Vansittart as Chief Diplomatic Adviser were fully set out in the communiquéissued to the Press on January 1 last. It is perhaps needless for me to say that the wording of that communiquéwas most carefully chosen. I should like further to state that the communiquéimplies no more and no less than it says. It is, I should have thought, obvious that the rapidly growing pressure of work on the officials in the Foreign Office has, in the actual words of the statement, seriously reduced the time available for the prolonged and careful consideration of questions of broad policy by those in the positions of greatest responsibility. If this is so, then the need for some official who would have time to devote to such consideration, and ability to place the results of his reflection before the man bearing the greatest responsibility of all —namely, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—is at once apparent.

I should have thought that there would have been general agreement that no better person could have been found to perform this technical and highly responsible task than Sir Robert Vansittart. It seems to me that his career and his obvious qualifications speak for themselves and require no emphasizing on my part. I would, however, here observe that there is no question of his advising any other person than the Secretary of State, still less His Majesty's Government as a whole. I think that answers the question which the noble Lord asked. He is Diplomatic Adviser to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and he does have a room in the Foreign Office. Like any other civil servant, he will be subordinate to his chief, and responsibility for his advice, if adopted, will be assumed by the Foreign Secretary. The noble Lord has foreshadowed all sorts of confusion and complications which he thinks may arise as a result of the new régime. I see no reason to fear these complications at all. It is not possible for me to go into the administrative arrangements which have been made as a result of this new appointment. They are matters for the Secretary of State, and it is quite clear that it is within the prerogative of the Secretary of State to seek the advice at any time of any member of his staff or indeed outside. I can only tell your Lordships that the necessary arrangements have been made within the office and that they have presented no difficulty whatever and are working very smoothly indeed.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

Would the noble Earl say whether the new officer will be subordinate to the Permanent Under-Secretary or will he be placed above him?

THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH

I should have said it was not a question of being superior or subordinate; that they work on parallel lines rather than on the same track with one in front of the other.

VISCOUNT CECIL of CHELWOOD

I am very anxious to understand what the position will be. A set of papers comes in relating to some matter, and these papers are sent to the official immediately in charge of the subject. Then they go through the hierarchy to the Permanent Under-Secretary and from the Permanent Under-Secretary straight to the Secretary of State, unless they are sent to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary. I wish merely to ascertain the position: will that procedure still be enforced, or will the papers go to the Diplomatic Adviser before they go to the Secretary of State?

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

May I put the same question in other words? Who will be the principal adviser to the Secretary of State? Will it be, as in the past, the Permanent Under-Secretary, or will it be the new official?

THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH

I was going to refer to that point at the conclusion of my remarks, but I wanted to say that that was the very thing which I thought difficult and unsuitable for me to deal with in detail. These arrangements are rather difficult to explain, but I only wanted to say that they have been made and in practice are working very well and giving rise to no difficulty. Perhaps I could continue my statement, which deals with another aspect of the proposed work of the Chief Diplomatic Adviser. Your Lordships will remember that the Prime Minister recently announced that he was to preside over a Committee whose function will be to co-ordinate and advise upon the work being done by various bodies engaged on British publicity abroad. Many misconceptions seem to exist regarding this Committee, which incidentally has not yet met. It will not, for instance, possess any executive functions, and will limit its activities to advice. Moreover, the fact that it will be composed of the heads of all those bodies, such as the B.B.C. and the British Council, which are all working with one purpose—to explain this country to the world—should result in a profitable interchange of ideas and an elimination of overlapping.

I will not attempt at this stage to lay down what the Committee hopes to achieve, because it is clear that experience alone can show how wide the scope may be, and I am sure that nobody would wish to tie down its activities within narrow limitations. I can, however, say most emphatically what it will not set out to do. The Chairman of the Committee will in no sense be a propaganda dictator wielding mysterious powers, nor will the Committee exercise any kind of Press control. It will proceed along the lines already indicated—namely, act as a centre where representatives of Government Departments specially interested in various forms of publicity abroad can meet and consult with representatives of those private or semi-official bodies which are actively engaged on this kind of work. The main object is to stimulate the energies of these bodies and provide for closer co-operation, in the hope that by frequent contact they may be able to produce a co-ordination of effort and programme and extend the work already being done.

Finally, the Chief Diplomatic Adviser may, if the Secretary of State so desires, represent the Foreign Office at conferences abroad; and it is well that a man of his international reputation should be available for this purpose. But there is no intention (as has been suggested this afternoon) of transforming him into a kind of Ambassador at large, or, indeed, of conferring any special mission upon him.

With regard to the position of Sir Alexander Cadogan there is nothing I need say except this: that Sir Alexander will be Permanent Under-Secretary in as full a sense as any of his predecessors.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

I gather that he will not retain his room, and that it is going to be given to the Chief Adviser.

THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH

I thought the noble Lord was unaware of where the Chief Adviser was going to be, but perhaps he has gleaned some information since he made his speech. There are one or two further matters to which I wish to refer. The noble Viscount asked me if I could make any kind of statement with regard to the situation which has arisen in Austria. I am afraid there is very little that I can say, but it might perhaps be of some interest to the House to hear the answer which the Secretary of State made to a Question put to him in another place this afternoon. He said: I understand that the working of the Austro-German Agreement of July, 1936, has for some time past Seen under consideration by the German and Austrian Governments. A meeting was eventually held at Berchtesgaden on Saturday last between the Austrian and German Chancellors, and as a result a new Agreement has been reached between the Austrian and German Governments. This new Agreement has not yet been published, but a communiquéwas issued early this morning outlining what passed, and the reorganisation of the Austrian Government has been announced, in accordance, so I understand, with the undertakings reached at Berchtesgaden. There is reason to believe that other provisions of the Agreement contain undertakings by both Governments on a variety of subjects, but until the actual text of the Agreement is published I am not in a position to make any detailed statement. His Majesty's Government, however, are meanwhile closely following developments, since, as I stated in the debate in this House on June 25 last, they desire in Central Europe as elsewhere peace and good understanding. I am afraid I cannot say more than that.

With regard to the more general remarks of the noble Viscount I can only say this: that I feel difficulty in being able to reply to his more general remarks and statements; but it goes without saying that what he said on these matters commands widespread attention and will naturally be carefully studied, and if there is any particular point on which he would like a specific reply I feel certain that the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, would do his best to provide that reply when he comes to wind up the debate to-morrow.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

My Lords, I beg to move the adjournment of the debate until to-morrow.

Moved, That the debate be now adjourned.—(The Marquess of Lothian.)

On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.

House adjourned at twelve minutes before seven o'clock.