INFANTICIDE BILL. [H.L.] (Hansard, 7 April 1938)

HL Deb 07 April 1938 vol 108 cc599-606 599

§ Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

§ VISCOUNT DAWSON OF PENN
My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill. In speaking on this Motion I think I shall in the end economise the time of the House. Your Lordships were good enough to give a unanimous approval to the Second Reading of this Bill. As I interpret that manifestation of opinion it means that this House is in favour of removing, wherever possible, any stigma attaching to the unfortunate group of people affected by the Bill; in other words, if it were once proved in Court that a defendant was not responsible for her actions by reason of the then state of her mind at the time of the committal of the offence, this House is in favour of removing any possibility of that defendant being exposed to a possible charge of murder, to a verdict of "Guilty" of murder, or as an alternative of "Guilty, but insane." Either of those verdicts, if it comes to pass, is a denial of the principle of the Bill, and I take it that everybody would wish that such a stigma should cease to exist. One only has to imagine what may occur. Quite briefly it may be put in this way. Take any 600 happy home you like, perhaps that of a newly-married couple with all the happiness it gives, and consider the additional happiness of an expected first-born child. Suddenly, out of the blue, without any warning at all, the mother destroys her child. It is difficult to imagine anything which would cloud the skies of life more blackly than that. Supposing that is an indictable offence, and it must be an indictable offence otherwise the purposes of justice will not be served, then when it is once proved that a defendant is not guilty of a criminal intent but is a person afflicted with sickness, I take it that the object of all people is to remove once and for all a stigma about which public opinion has been disturbed for sixty years. It is time that it was removed, and I had hoped to put the question beyond all doubt by two simple Amendments in Committee.
If I may classify the considerable amount of correspondence which has reached me I would divide the recommendations and desires of these people into two groups. There is a strong body of opinion that the magistrates should have discretion in obvious cases of this kind, when remanding defendants or committing them for trial, to send them to homes or hospitals and not necessarily to prison. Magistrates had all thought up to now that they had not that discretion except in the case of children to which this offence does not apply. I was under that impression. As a result, however, of studying the law as an amateur since bringing in this Bill, I found to my surprise that magistrates can grant bail in cases in murder. It is true that in practice they do not do so—and no doubt that is proper—but there is the power. There is only one offence for which magistrates cannot grant bail and that is the crime of treason. I consulted some of my legal friends both in this House and outside and they assured me that that view is correct. It seems to me therefore that it is not necessary to move an Amendment to give magistrates this discretion, which undoubtedly they ought to exercise, because they have already the power. If there is any doubt I suggest that it is only necessary for the Home Office to issue a circular to that effect. We wish to avoid sending people to prison and the magistrates have only to grant bail and send the defendants to a home or hospital or, if neither is available 601 in some parts of the country, then to the infirmary.
Another matter about which I am very deeply concerned is the verdict of "Guilty, but insane." Lord Atkin's Committee fifteen years ago, a very strong Committee, made a unanimous Report on that subject. I had hoped that we should be able in this Bill to make it clear that when once a Court of Assize had satisfied itself that a defendant was irresponsible by reason of the then state of her mind, it would be possible to return a verdict of "Insane at the time, therefore not responsible, therefore not guilty." That was a form of verdict which was in vogue down to 1883. The law of 1883 was passed largely because Queen Victoria had been shot at by a lunatic. It was recommended strongly and unanimously by Lord Atkin's Committee, which contained some of the best criminal lawyers in the country, that we should revert to the old verdict in cases of irresponsibility. I had hoped to propose an Amendment permitting that form of verdict in the case of this particular unfortunate group of people, but when I consulted my legal friends they said that there would be objections to that. Although they were in favour of altering the law in this respect, they said that it would not be wise or desirable to alter it for this particular group only, and that it must be applied to the broader group which Lord Atkin's Committee had in mind. In many other cases of irresponsibility they would wish to go back to the verdict of "Insane at the time, therefore not guilty."
The word "guilt" connotes criminal intent, but in these cases you cannot charge criminal intent with proper regard to humane instincts. Although my legal friends are in favour of the principle of the Amendment which I thought of proposing, they are firmly of opinion that it would not do to apply it to this narrow class of case alone and that it would be better to bring in a separate Bill. I asked them if they would be favourable to such a Bill and they informed me that they would be favourable. Being a professional man, and as this subject concerns the border territory between medicine and law, I am greatly impressed by what my colleagues on the other side of the territory say. I feel that I must bow to their opinion in this matter because it is something on their side of the wall. 602 I belong to a profession which suffers considerably from a number of people coming in from outside and telling us how to conduct our business. Therefore I want to show a good example by bowing in this instance to my colleagues of the law, although I do it with very great regret. There are many people who are very much in earnest about this matter and the public conscience no doubt is much moved. For sixty years Parliament has failed to put this matter right and in this Bill I am not able to make it impossible that an unfortunate woman may be found "Guilty" of murder or found "Guilty, but insane." Still, I hope I shall have the assistance of my colleagues in the law and I must try to persuade them to bring in a general Bill, which would be undoubtedely logical and also more humane, to provide that in any case where it is once proved that a defendant was irresponsible at the time on account of insanity—however temporary that insanity may be—the verdict of "Guilty, but insane" should be replaced by a verdict of "Insane, therefore not guilty."

§ Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Viscount Dawson of Penn.)

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY
My Lords, I have no wish to prolong discussion at this stage, but I would like in a sentence to say how cordially I share the disappointment expressed by my noble friend in finding that it is not possible to introduce an Amendment to this Bill which would remove from the list of possible verdicts in these cases of infanticide the verdict of "Guilty, but insane." I fully recognize that for the reasons he has given the question of this particular verdict has a far wider application than to cases of infanticide and ought to be dealt with by legislation dealing with all the cases concerned. I cannot but feel that your Lordships will agree that it would be well that at an early date legislation should be brought in to give effect to the recommendations of Lord Atkin's Committee to which my noble friend has referred, so that where it is clearly proved that a defendant was not responsible for the act committed, in the sense that he or she was unaware of the character of the act or of its wrongness, he or she should be not regarded as "Guilty, but 603 insane," but that the proper verdict should be that, though the act was committed, the defendant, owing to the state of his or her mind at the time, cannot be regarded as guilty. I cannot help thinking that it is wrong that a person who, by the evidence, has been proved to be not in any real sense responsible for the act, should by the verdict be declared guilty.

§ LORD ARNOLD
My Lords, I should like to take the opportunity of this Motion to say a word or two, but I will not detain your Lordships, because I know that time is precious this afternoon. I have refrained from putting down any Amendments for the Committee stage, because I should be very reluctant to do anything which might perhaps make less easy the passage of this Bill. I did indicate on Second Reading that I should have desired the Bill to be rather wider, and I think that is the view of a considerable number of people in the country. I should like the time-limit to be longer, and I should also like the causes which can justify a verdict of infanticide to be extended so as to cover mental disturbance due to distress and despair arising from solicitude for the child and extreme poverty, or either of these. I have refrained from putting these Amendments down, because I know the difficulty of passing a Bill of this kind, not a Government measure. The Bill itself is a good Bill. It is a useful Bill, and each step forward is to the good and makes the next one easier.

§ THE EARL OF MUNSTER
My Lords, I rise only to say on behalf of His Majesty's Government that I will certainly convey to my right honourable friend the Home Secretary the views which have been expressed by noble Lords during this discussion this afternoon. I might also at the same time say that I understand that the Amendments which stand in the name of my noble friend have been agreed between him and the Home Secretary, and therefore I would suggest that, to save your Lordships' time, my noble friend should merely formally move them —unless, of course, some other noble Lord desires to discuss them.

§ On Question, Motion agreed to.

§ House in Committee accordingly.

§ [The EARL OF ONSLOW in the Chair.]

604

§ Clause 1 [Offence of infanticide]:

§ VISCOUNT DAWSON OF PENN
I beg to move.

§ Amendment moved— Page 1, line 7, after ("child") insert ("being a child under the age of twelve months").—(Viscount Dawson of Penn.)