Lords Sitting of 21 October 1937

Preamble
Reassembling after the Summer Recess, the House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Marquess Townshend—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his kinsman.

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.
LORD SNELL LORD SNELL had given Notice that he would ask His Majesty's Government whether they are in a position to make a statement on the international situation, with special reference to affairs in the Far East; and move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands on the Order Paper in my name, and to move for Papers.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH): My Lords, I should like in the first place to thank the noble Lord opposite for giving me an opportunity of making a short statement on the developments in the foreign situation which have occurred since Parliament adjourned. In view of the fact that his Question specifically refers to the situation in the Far East, I think it would perhaps be more convenient for me to deal with that first. When Parliament adjourned, although without a doubt the Far Eastern situation presented a very dark and threatening picture, there was at the same time a constant hope that the dispute might be settled by peaceful means before the situation developed further and got out of hand. Unfortunately, after this interval of time we find ourselves confronted with a situation that is not only in itself extremely serious and full of dangerous possibilities but is also deeply tragic in its character. I think it can, be described s one of those terrible situations which, however hard you strive and struggle to avoid it, doses in around you with a relentless inevitability.
His Majesty's Government have, in conjunction with those other Pouters which
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are most closely interested, done everything in their power to bring to an end the tragic state of affairs in China, but, it must be frankly admitted, so far without success. I need hardly emphasise that His Majesty's Government's policy in China, as indeed in every other part of the world, is imbued primarily with the desire to see peace maintained and to do everything to establish a sense of security. Your Lordships will recall that up to the middle of this year they were engaged with the Japanese Government in conversations with regard to matters of common interest to our respective Governments in the Far East. If these conversations had turned out satisfactorily, if they had gone well, they might have led to agreement on the policy of co-operation—including, of course (and I want to make this perfectly plain), co-operation with China itself—for the establishment of peace and security in the Far East and the development of China. These conversations were interrupted by the breaking-out of hostilities in Northern China, and the events which have followed that occurrence have made it impossible to resume these conversations.
I will not attempt to give your Lordships a detailed account of the original incidents which gave rise to hostilities both in Northern China and around Shanghai. Those details are still somewhat obscure, and I do not think that I could throw any new light upon them on this occasion. But in any case, whatever the facts are, whatever the truth of what occurred, these facts cannot in my view be of an overriding importance in forming one's judgment of the events that followed, nor can they constitute, in any shape or form, a justification for having allowed the situation to develop as it actually has done. My Lords, it is a depressing and deplorable thought that, at a time when all Governments profess to subscribe to a policy of the settlement of international disputes by consultation and by pacific means, no such way has been found, so far, to deal with the position in China, but that, on the other hand, a resort was had to arms in the very early stages.
The actual position in China has been stated very clearly in that excellent Report of the Advisory Committee of the League, which I recommend those of your Lordships who are interested in this

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matter to read. Indeed, the salient facts of the situation are only too obvious. There has been heavy fighting going on both around Shanghai and in the North of China. Powerful Japanese Armies have invaded Chinese territory, and are indeed in control of large areas of Northern China, including Peking itself. War, though not actually in name, is being carried on in China with the most modern material and equipment, accompanied by the horrors that inevitably result from the use and employment of such equipment. Furthermore, as your Lordships know, the methods of aerial warfare which have been adopted at times by the Japanese have evoked widespread protest in this country and in other countries. They have been condemned, and I think quite rightly condemned, in a resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations.
But, my Lords, I should prefer, if I may, to say a word or two with regard to the efforts which have been made by His Majesty's Government in order to try and avert, or put an end to, the present state of affairs. Ever since the outbreak of fighting in China His Majesty's Government have made repeated attempts to persuade the parties to enter into negotiations, in order to try and arrive at a settlement, without, as I have said, allowing the situation to develop further and to get out of hand. We have constantly indicated that if we could help in any way we would gladly listen to any suggestions that were made to us. When hostilities in Shanghai, and near Shanghai, appeared to be likely, and when they had broken out, we made repeated attempts first of all to prevent them and in the second case to stop them. His Majesty's Government first of all urged that the Japanese forces at Shanghai should be withdrawn, under a guarantee from the Chinese Government that there would be no attack upon Japanese residents, and they followed this proposal up with an offer that if both Governments would withdraw all their forces, including warships, from the Shanghai area, and agree that the protection of Japanese nationals should be entrusted to foreign authorities, His Majesty's Government were prepared to accept this responsibility if other Governments would join in with them in doing
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so. The Chinese Government accepted this proposal in principle, provided it was also accepted by the Japanese Government. Unfortunately it failed to commend itself to the Japanese Government.
In all these efforts to bring about peace His Majesty's Government have acted in the very closest touch with the Governments of those other countries principally concerned and interested in the situation in the Far East, and especially with the Government of the United States. In fact, the views of those Governments, and the action taken by them vis-à-vis the Governments of China and Japan, were generally speaking substantially the same as those of His Majesty's Government. Then, early in September, the Chinese Government referred their difficulties to the Council of the League of Nations. The Council, in turn, decided to refer the matter to the Advisory Committee which had been set up in 1933 in connection with Far Eastern affairs. In the case of this particular dispute the Committee—I think very wisely—concluded that a body of Powers chiefly interested which did not meet under the auspices of the League was the most likely kind of body to find a way out of the difficulties with which we were confronted. And the reason for that, I think, is very simple—namely, that some of the Powers most closely interested in the Far Eastern situation are not Members of the League. It was consequently proposed that the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty should initiate consultations under this Treaty with regard to the Far Eastern situation as they then found it.
As the result of these consultations, the details of which it is not necessary for me to enter into, the Belgian Government, having received assurances that any invitation of such a kind would be favourably received, issued invitations to all the parties to the Nine-Power Treaty to meet in conference at Brussels on the 30th of the month. President Roosevelt's speech, which had been made some little time earlier, and which had been so warmly welcomed not only in this country but in most parts of the world, led us quite naturally to believe that the United States Government would receive such an invitation with favour, and it is satisfactory to know that that Government has already consented to be represented at the Conference.

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We greatly hope that all those who signed and acceded to the Nine-Power Treaty will accept this invitation. It is clearly of the utmost importance that all Powers that have an interest in the developments out in the Far East should be represented at this Conference and should be in a position to state their respective cases. The, question of inviting Powers who are neither signatories of nor have acceded to the Nine-Power Treaty, but at the same time are closely concerned with affairs in the Far East, is under consideration at the present moment, but no decision is likely until after the Conference meets as to which Governments are to be invited. His Majesty's Government for their part, I can say without the slightest hesitation, most warmly welcome this development. In their view the Conference of the Nine Powers, particularly in the capital of a country which is not perhaps vitally interested in the Far East, affords the best hope of putting an end to an unhappy and distressing conflict by pacific means.
I want to make one or two points in connection with the Conference clear to your Lordships in case there is any misunderstanding with regard to it. First of all, as I have said, this Conference will not be held under the auspices of the League; consequently it will not follow League procedure, and it will not, naturally, be bound by the language of the Covenant. The Conference will be perfectly free to explore any road that might afford a prospect of leading to success. And above everything I want to emphasise this fact, that the primary object of the Conference is to find a way of restoring peace by general agreement. That is the main object of the Conference, and I hope that all those Powers that are invited to send representatives to the Conference will realise that fact, and that it will be an inducement to them all to go and sit round the table with a view to finding a solution of the difficulties that exist by means of personal discussion and understanding. I only want to say this, that in view of that situation it seems to me to be not only premature but undesirable as well that I should attempt to discuss what might occur in the event of this Conference failing. I sincerely hope that this Conference will succeed, and we ought to enter into it in that spirit—a spirit of conciliation and a desire to achieve practical results. I therefore hope
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that the Conference will be allowed to get to grips with its formidable task—and I admit that it is a formidable task—in an atmosphere of good will and co-operation.
I do not think that there is anything further that I have to say in regard to the situation in the Far East. If your Lordships will allow me, I will therefore turn for a moment to the situation in Spain, which I have no doubt is the other international problem which is most greatly exercising your Lordships. I need hardly say that the situation in Spain is continuing to cause very grave anxiety. As your Lordships know, His Majesty's Government have given their support to the policy of non-intervention in the Spanish conflict from the very commencement of that conflict, and I want to make it perfectly clear that they continue to believe that that policy is the right policy if it is effectively operated, as it ought to be. But in spite of the efforts that have been made—and I do not think that anybody could justifiably deny that we have done everything on our part that we can to make non-intervention an effective and a real policy—there is no gainsaying the fact that foreign intervention continues in Spain on both sides on a considerable scale, with all the disturbing repercussions that a situation of that kind must have upon affairs generally and the general international position. It seems to me that it is quite obvious that the longer that situation exists the more dangerous it becomes—that is the real point—and the chance of some untoward incident occurring is naturally greater. His Majesty's Government consider, and they have made it abundantly clear on a number of occasions, that the presence of large numbers of foreigners taking part in the conflict in Spain is not only one of the most serious features of the situation there, but in our view is proving the greatest obstacle to a general liquidation of that question and a general appeasement or détente throughout Europe.
It is quite obvious that whilst these foreigners remain in Spain there remains the whole time an inducement to send further arms and war material to assist them, and it is difficult to believe that a country whose nationals are serving on either side in Spain can dissociate itself entirely from the war in that country. That is the real basic point. Are these countries which have subscribed to the Non-Intervention Agreement prepared

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to clear out lock, stock, and barrel from that country and to leave the two parties there to fight it out amongst themselves if all other countries are equally prepared to do so? That is the really fundamental question that has to be answered. Your Lordships will remember that on July 14 His Majesty's Government submitted to the Non-Intervention Committee certain proposals for dealing with the Spanish situation and for making the execution of the policy of non-intervention a really effective one. These proposals were laid before Parliament in a Command Paper, and they were briefly as follows: —Firstly, the restoration of the system of supervision by land and sea; secondly, the withdrawal of all foreign volunteers from Spain, and certain measures for extending and stiffening the supervision scheme including the granting of belligerent rights. This last was to become effective when the arrangements for the withdrawal of foreign nationals was working satisfactorily, and when the withdrawal had, in fact, made substantial progress; these are the very words of our proposals. These proposals were discussed at considerable length on several occasions in the Committee during July and August, but unfortunately it became quite clear that it would not be possible then to reach agreement, and the Committee was compelled to adjourn without having achieved any definite results.
About this time the attacks upon merchant ships and other ships in the Mediterranean, which, as a matter of fact, had until then only occurred spasmodically, were, as your Lordships will remember, very greatly intensified, and this naturally made what was an already serious situation infinitely more grave. His Majesty's Government considered that it was intolerable that innocent merchant ships should be subjected to such attacks which were contrary entirely to all International Law, and they felt that immediate action was necessary to put a stop to the state of affairs that had arisen. In conjunction therefore with the French Government they invited the interested Powers to a Conference at Nyon, which very soon produced results in the shape of the Agreement of September 14, which was followed a few days later by a supplementary agreement dealing with other aspects of the situation. In accordance with this
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Agreement, the Mediterranean was divided into zones, and it was arranged that shipping should follow certain definite routes. In each of these the Navies of France and this country—and subsequently of Italy—were to take measures to protect shipping on these recognised trade routes from unlawful attack.
Unfortunately, for reasons into which I do not think it is necessary for me to enter, the Italian Government had not been able to see their way to be represented at that Conference in the first place. They were, however, kept very closely informed of what was going on, and the final Agreement was communicated to them almost as soon as it was arrived at. When we communicated the Agreement to them, we expressed our hope that they would agree to co-operate themselves. After some negotiations His Majesty's Government were glad to receive an acceptance from the Italian Government of an invitation to a conference of technicians in regard to this matter. Your Lordships will recall that naval experts of France, Italy, and the United Kingdom met in Paris to make the necessary practical adjustments to the scheme which was then operating. The result of these Paris discussions has now been communicated to the other signatories of the Nyon Agreement, and we very much hope that they will prove acceptable to all of them and that the revised arrangements may be put into operation in the very near future. Meanwhile, I am sure it is a source of satisfaction to all that the measures decided on at Nyon have already proved extremely effective and that attacks on shipping have, to all intents and purposes, ceased in the Mediterranean.
His Majesty's Government regarded this collaboration on the part of the Italian Government in the work of putting an end to piratical activities in the Mediterranean as a sign that the general atmosphere was favourable for a further attempt to settle the question of foreign nationals taking part in the Spanish conflict and, indeed, other germane questions arising out of the struggle in Spain. Since it had not been found possible to find a solution of these problems in the Non-Intervention Committee, His Majesty's Government, who were working in the closest collaboration with the French Government, invited the Italian Government to a frank exchange of views in the hope that such conversations

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would lead to results which, when communicated to the Non-Intervention Committee, would enable that body to reach some final agreement. The Italian Government, as your Lordships know, could not see their way to enter into these tripartite conversations, but, at the same time, they expressed their complete willingness to examine the problem afresh in the Non-Intervention Committee. I want to emphasise this, that His Majesty's Government and the French Government, in issuing their invitation to the Italian Government, had been inspired solely by the desire to achieve practical results; and although their proposals were not acceptable to the Italian Government they still remained not only willing but anxious to explore every course that might produce results and thus make it possible for the policy of non-intervention to be maintained. They therefore concurred in the Italian Government's suggestion and agreed to invite the Non-Intervention Committee to undertake a fresh examination of the problem. In agreeing to the procedure, however, they made it clear that a decision must be quickly reached, and that the present situation could not be allowed to last.
Your Lordships are aware that the Chairman's Sub-Committee of the Nonintervention Committee assembled on October 16, and the French representative laid before it certain proposals on behalf of his Government. These proposals, which were as a matter of fact based on the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government in July, were briefly these: The withdrawal of all foreign volunteers from Spain as soon as possible; the granting of belligerent rights as soon as this withdrawal was being effectively carried out; an immediate preliminary withdrawal taking into account the disproportion in the number of foreigners serving on either side; and time re-introduction of a strengthened form of supervision on the Spanish frontier, land and sea. In giving these proposals their full support His Majesty's Government appealed to all other Governments to cooperate in a spirit of good will and cordial co-operation with a view to finding a solution to these problems, but they declared at the same time that if it were not possible for the Committee to reach an agreement within a short space of time they
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must reserve to themselves the right to resume full freedom of action.
After some discussion the Committee agreed that these proposals, together with certain further suggestions that were made by other representatives, should be submitted to the various Governments for their immediate consideration. As your Lordships are now aware, the Sub-Committee held further meetings on Tuesday and again yesterday as a result of which I am glad to say that substantial and satisfactory progress was made. And I would like here to acknowledge the contribution which the Italian Government have now made towards this result. The problem that has hitherto presented the greatest difficulty has been the time at which belligerent rights are to be granted to the Spanish parties in relation to the progress made with withdrawal of volunteers. His Majesty's Government have always considered, as I have said, that the greatest obstacle to a complete and loyal execution of the policy to which we all subscribe is the presence of these foreign nationals in Spain and, consequently, they did not feel justified in agreeing to grant belligerent rights until convinced by some concrete results that all foreigners would in fact be withdrawn from Spain. That did not happen to be the view of certain other Governments concerned; but the contribution which the Italian Government have made to the solution of the problem is this: they have now accepted this principle that the withdrawal must start and be in progress before belligerent rights are actually granted.
I do not want the House to think that as the result of yesterday's discussions and the developments which took place all our difficulties have disappeared, and that we are out of the wood, but the progress which has been made does, I think, represent a real step forward, and not only do I feel that there is no reason, with good will on all sides, why this could not take place, but I think and believe it will. I believe that with good will on all sides the remaining problems with which we are faced are all susceptible of solution, and that we can look forward to the future with greater hope and greater confidence. I have dealt, at some length I fear, with those questions in the foreign situation which I imagined were of the greatest interest to your Lordships. All, or almost all other matters

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in foreign affairs are related in some degree or another to the two questions with which I have dealt, and I hope that in those circumstances you will not think it necessary for me to say anything further at the present stage. I feel certain, if there are other aspects of the situation of which I have said nothing, that when he comes to reply my noble friend the Leader of the House will do his best to answer any questions that are put to him.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, I placed upon the Order Paper the Question to which the Government have now replied because I was very deeply concerned about the tragic situation in the Far East, and also because I felt that your Lordships would welcome a statement from the Government before the Session ended which might relieve our anxieties somewhat and provide us with full information and some hope for future development. I beg to acknowledge the courtesy of the Government in making the statement which your Lordships have just heard. It is a reversal of the usual practice of allowing a person to ask a Question without the information which the Government naturally possess, when the man who is unfortunate enough to start the discussion witnesses the silent resentment and injured dignity of the Government Bench whilst it considers how much information the "lesser breeds" outside the Government should be allowed to possess. Inevitably, when the reply is made, they say in effect: "See what ignorant louts these Labour politicians are." They would not, of course, say that about my august friends above the gangway, but that feeling is generally prevalent. To-clay that has been altered to the extent that we have heard by the careful and very cautious speech of the noble Earl who has just spoken.
I propose to limit what I have to say this afternoon to the Far Eastern question, and to reserve my right to intervene at some early date on the Spanish matter when it becomes a little clearer, but I wish to say at once that I have no desire to make more difficult any conversations that may be taking place, and, consistent with my duty to the Party for which I speak and to my own conscience, I will try to address your Lordships with reasonable restraint. At
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the same time the moral conscience of the world has undoubtedly been shocked, and we are bound to express our indignation at a most shameful thing that is happening in our time. Two countries with whom we have had long and friendly relations, whose welfare was our constant desire, are engaged in a ruthless war which has touched levels of barbarity that have not been equalled probably since mediæval times. Japan, in spite of what the noble Earl opposite indicated, made it perfectly clear that she would not listen to mediation. She declared that her intention and purpose was to subdue China until China pleaded for peace. We have had from Japanese sources condemnation of Chinese conduct and an attempt at self-justification. China has been accused of fostering anti-Japanese feeling as an instrument of internal policy. She has encouraged, it is said, anti-Japanese films, and many anti-Japanese incidents have taken place. Assuming that all that is true, there is no excuse for war. The excuse does not carry and the entrance of Japan into war is inexcusable. China never injured Japan on the soil of Japan. The very reverse has taken place. All the attacks, all the slaughter and destruction have taken place on Chinese territory. The Japanese people have invaded China and China very naturally resists.
What is happening really is that Japan is treating the North of China as though the territory were her own. In these circumstances my own sympathies are very deeply and constantly with China. Fortune has dealt very harshly with this great and friendly people. They have had to meet every sort of disaster—drought, drug poisoning, internal dissension and so on—and then they had the final humiliation of seeing their country dismembered by a people who had no equal claim to the regard of civilisation. The whole of the world is indebted to Chinese civilisation. China was old in the arts of civilisation before Europe was young. Her contributions to art, philosophy and religion make her indeed one of the mother sources of all that we most cherish. What, on the other hand, has been the contribution that Japan has made to the art of civilisation? She has endowed it with no equal cultural achievement nor any great moral example, and it has probably been given to no other

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people in so short a time to mobilise the conscience of mankind against it. She has thrown away the sympathy of the nations for her needs which was very strong. Her economic needs were acknowledged. Many of us have laboured in an endeavour to help her. She lacked room for growth, her shortage of essential raw materials was grave, and her human cup was full to overflowing. Every year some nine hundred thousand Japanese babies were born, as many as the whole of the population in the City of Manchester. All that was understood and Japan had our sympathy. Much thought has been given as to how to help her without injuring the standards of other peoples throughout the world; but Japan could not wait. She had to take what she wanted regardless, of the rights of other people. She saw that force had succeeded in Europe and she determined to copy its worst examples. The things that she has done in pursuit of her policy have turned the heart of the world to stone. But in this universal condemnation she had at least one admirer. Mussolini telegraphed his congratulations. Like called unto like, and the great Italian people, heirs to the noble legacy of Cavour and Mazzini, have to have their names for ever associated with a most inexcusable episode in modern history.
I will not go into the question as to who is responsible, but I feel sure it is not the whole of the Japanese people. There is a growing Labour Party in Japan, there is a pacific Farmers' Party, there is a suffering peasant class, and they no more wanted war with the Chinese than the Chinese peasants desired war with the Japanese. The war is made by the military party in Japan which gives strength to a belief of mine that an officer class constitutes a far greater danger to the people of its own country than it does to the people of any other. What is the position to-day? There has been a carefully prepared war from which a quick triumph was expected, but the war has not gone according to plan. The resistance of the Chinese to the aggression against their country has been as wonderful as it was unexpected and already the invader finds that the whole of China cannot be subdued. What has happened has been that China has been unified and henceforth the Chinese people will stand as a strong human wall against any future
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aggression. But taking the short view of the situation Japan is almost certain to win and her military leaders will return in a blaze of glory. What they will leave behind them will mean that the Japanese people will sink into deeper economic misery, China will have to undergo dreadful suffering and pass through the dark vale of militarism, the world, especially America and ourselves, will be called upon to bear very serious economic loss, and another festering sore will be open in the world.
The Japanese Army is in control in Japan. There may be some differences between the merchant class and the military party which cannot be really estimated. There is a possibility of a peasant rising in Japan because of growing economic distress, and there is already some internal anxiety as to the end of this war and what is to follow it. In China herself in all probability the hope is to exhaust Japan financially. The North will probably fall to Japan and become a kind of puppet State after the example of Manchukuo; but if Japan is to garrison China it will be a tremendous strain upon her resources. In any case the unity of China will have received an unexpected stimulus and our thoughts must pass to how British interests are to be affected. I noticed that the noble Earl, in his careful speech, did not mention that at all. There was, indeed, in his speech no criticism of the Japanese people; there was no condemnation for any event that had taken place. No information was given to your Lordships of how British interests in the Far East were affected. That, I hope, is an omission which will be remedied at a later stage in this discussion. British interests, however, must be affected to a very considerable extent. The strategic position will be altered, probably for the worse. I should like to know what is going to be the reaction upon Hong Kong and upon other interests that we have on that side of the world. If the struggle is allowed to go on, by a process of attrition there will be no trade for anybody in the Far East, either in Japan or China, for many years to come.
In these circumstances, what ought we to do? I regret that we have been given no lead from the Government in the speech that has been made. We have been told their difficulties, and those we I can understand, and we can quite realise

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that His Majesty's Government have not been able to have their way in this matter. On the other hand, we feel that the House ought to be put into possession of what the idea of the Government is in regard to the future. I do not feel that it is any good uttering verbal reproaches, because they will have very little influence. There is for us only the possibility, it seems to me, of economic pressure, and that is a weapon which can be used immediately. There has, however, been no indication this afternoon of any such intention. Japan's internal economy depends almost entirely upon foreign trade. Twenty-eight per cent. of the exports of Japan go to the British Empire, 22 per cent. go to the United States of America. These two nations together control, as it were, 50 per cent. of the exports of Japan. That ought to provide an opportunity for saying to Japan that she really must listen to the reason and conscience of the world or this kind of pressure will be applied to her. But I have not any hope, my Lords, that the Government will move in that direction. I do not think that Big Business would allow them to do so. Capitalism has no sort of morals, and, so far as we have heard from commercial circles in this matter, the voice has been "Profits as usual." Whatever the Government may do or fail to do, there remains one's own individual conscience, and the Government cannot control that. So far as the Labour party and the trade union movement in many countries are concerned, we see no alternative to bringing, whether the Government will or no, such moral pressure upon Japan as we individually are able to do. There is also the opportunity of diplomatic pressure, but we should have to wait for that.
In closing I venture to hope, with the noble Lord, that the Nine-Power Conference will indeed be successful and that out of its deliberations there will come some way to peace. I do not feel able to suggest anything myself except that I have wondered whether an International Commission on the lines of the Lytton Commission could arrange some kind of solution based upon the principle of the open door. Those, however, are things for the diplomatists to reason out very carefully. I have completed my purpose, my Lords, in asking you to consider seriously the issues which are now being fought out in
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the Far East, and in expressing my disappointment that the Government's explanation has not been more satisfactory and that they have given us no lead out of a very terrible situation.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, I desire to say a very few words on this subject, feeling all the responsibility—a feeling which the noble Lord who has just sat clown has also expressed—which rests upon anybody who touches the delicate question of foreign affairs at this moment. The noble Lord confined his observations altogether to the Japanese-Chinese conflict, and I will begin by saying one word on that. I do not know how most of your Lordships may feel, but those of us who have been in public affairs for many years feel the deepest disappointment and distress at the recent conduct of the Japanese. We look back to the immemorial history of that country and its wonderful achievements in art, to the love of nature which exists there (so many of your Lordships' gardens are full of Japanese trees and plants), to the sense of national and personal honour which so distinguished that chivalrous nation. We look back also to the events of later years, to the remarkable achievement of Japan in overcoming the almost countless hosts which the Russian Empire might have sent against her. When we look at those things, it is surely a matter for deep disappointment that on this occasion Japan has, as the noble Lord pointed out, deliberately thrown away all that good will.
To my mind a marked distinction is to be drawn between the action of Japan in Manchuria, which was generally condemned, and her recent aggression upon China. Manchuria, as it was then called, was in a condition of well-known disorder. The writ of the Nanking Government, so to speak, did not really run there, and the action of Japan was in many respects, it had to be admitted, much of a piece with the kind of action which most of the great Powers had taken in the course of past history. What was then condemned was that a more excellent way had been found through the League of Nations with the agreement and approbation of Japan, and it did not follow that more excellent way. But this, surely, is an infinitely worse way, because it is the way of pure aggression. The noble Earl opposite avoided, and I think quite wisely avoided, going into the merits or demerits

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of the so-called provocation of Japan by China. These matters will in the future, no doubt, all be cleared up, but, as has been stated already, whatever happened then cannot possibly be taken as a reason, or even as an excuse, for the form of warfare in which Japan has engaged. All the resources of science, now, alas, so freely at the disposal of those who go to war, have been used for the slaughter of harmless individuals, almost without parallel, and certainly without parallel in any modern history with which we are acquainted.
As the noble Lord, Lord Snell, has pointed out, the noble Earl opposite, bearing in mind, no doubt, the forthcoming proceedings of the Brussels Conference, did not express any very marked condemnation of Japanese action, and still less did he attempt to suggest any method by which the moral indignation which is felt all over the world could be developed as a penalty, or in modern phrase a sanction, for the conduct of Japan. Lord Snell pointed out the possibilities of an economic boycott. How far that can be made really effective I do not pretend to know. The figures mentioned by the noble Lord seemed to point to its probably having a very considerable effect. I confess I should not have expected His Majesty's Government to come forward at once with a proposal to refuse to trade with Japan, but it would be interesting to know whether, in conjunct ion with other countries interested, and most of all with the United States, they have indicated a possibility of any economic pressure of that kind. Meanwhile, the noble Lord has expressed the generous feelings of his Party, as individuals, in refusing to deal with Japanese goods. I believe that the Federation of Labour in the United States has taken somewhat similar action. There again I do not pretend to have any notion of what its effect on the combatant might be, but I am quite sure that everybody will be disposed to sympathise with the feelings by which such action is inspired.
I pass for just one moment to the question of Spain, as the noble Earl said a few words about it. We all, I am sure, felt profound relief in reading the statement made by the Italian representative at the Committee. It certainly seems as though what I think somebody called unilateral non-intervention is likely
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to be brought to a close. At the same time it is possible, though perhaps one ought not to dwell too much upon them, that, as the noble Earl pointed out, there are difficulties which still exist. I confess that I do not envy the task of the individuals who set out upon their enterprise on the Commission of Inquiry in Spain, but it is, I am sure, very important that men, not merely of great, reputation but of strong will and character, should go as the representatives on that Commission. The withdrawal of foreign troops cannot, of course, be an easy matter. Even the so-called "token" withdrawal is not a simple affair, because it clearly must be qualitative as well as quantitative. As we shall all agree, a dozen skilled airmen, with fighting machines, might be of far more powerful assistance to one side or the other than two or three regiments of half-trained infantry. I have no doubt that the Commission will be able to deal with those difficult matters in a satisfactory manner.
There is one other point which appears to me to present considerable difficulty, and that is, in the absence of naval observation, the possible influx of munitions of war as distinct from volunteers or any form of troops, because it must be such a far easier matter to smuggle material in than to smuggle in men. That, however, is a point with which the Commission will deal. I will say no more, except to congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, on the point which this matter has reached. He has, I know, through out played his part on the Non-Intervention Committee with a capacity and a degree of dignity which everybody has recognised, and I am quite sure that your Lordships would wish to join in that recognition.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I am surer that every member of this House will recognise at the present moment the need for caution and reserve in any utterances that are made here, because this House meets immediately before a Conference, the objects and aims of which have just been so carefully, thoughtfully and patiently explained to your Lordships House. The noble Earl, Lord Plymouth outlined very frankly the past history and the future intentions of the Government with regard to this Conference, and I am sure your Lordships are grateful for

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the manner in which the matter was explained. The noble Lord, Lord Snell, in the course of his speech regretted that the noble Earl had not indicated more clearly the intentions of the Government's action with regard to this Conference, but surely the suggestions he made are of such a character that it is fortunate that they could not have been referred to in this House at the present moment. The noble Earl did emphasise how the project for this Conference had been assisted by the speech which was made by the President of the United States. I had the good fortune to be in Chicago on the day the speech was made. I witnessed the immediate reaction to that speech and had the opportunity of reading the Press comments and of hearing the views upon it held by those with whom I came into contact. One is at least glad that the speech should have had the effect in Europe which it did have. But it is also to be hoped that there will be a full recognition in Europe of the difficulties which a President of the United States has in dealing with a matter of external policy in view of the political position at home. It would be ungenerous to refer to any forebodings that may be entertained that this initiative should prove to be less fruitful than we all hope.
I had the good fortune with others to go to East Asia three years ago on a mission of industrial good will. We went there in the hope of developing and cementing the cordial relations between the two countries and of doing what might be possible to promote co-operation in the friendly and helpful development of East Asia as a whole. Well, events since the time when we returned and made a report on our observations have been continuous in that direction. It is perhaps not unnatural that there should be regret that from a commercial point of view the prospects then held out of cooperative assistance to the mainland have to so small an extent been realised. But I would like to say how much I appreciate the line taken by the noble Marquess who spoke last, when he reminded your Lordships' House of the cultural background of Japanese history. Coming from one so familiar with that historical position, his views are of great interest, and I am glad that the House should have been reminded of the cultural history of Japan, because it would be unfortunate if the speech of
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the noble Lord, Lord Snell, passed without comment, at least with regard to certain phrases which he employed. It was perhaps not unnatural, feeling as he does—a feeling which we have good grounds for respecting—that he should have employed terms which perhaps went a little further than he contemplated.
In connection with the major operations which are being conducted at the present moment he stated that no military operations had been carried out by China on the soil of Japan. If we went through the history of this country it would be a parallel to suggest that because no operations have ever been carried out by other nations on British soil, therefore our own armed forces ought never in the past to have engaged in military operations on the soil of other countries. But surely the statement he made in connection with what is occurring at the present moment, that Japan had no equal claim with China for the regard of civilisation, is hardly a fortunate one. Those of your Lordships who have ever visited Japan and East Asia will be under no delusion as to the relative positions of Japan and China, historically speaking. Japan has the advantage of being a homogeneous country because of its monarchical Constitution, which is a link of sympathy with ourselves; whilst China, on the other hand, is a vast area where necessarily there is a lack of cohesive government. It is a country where there is very little literacy, whilst in Japan there is a very high degree of literacy; for example, one newspaper has a circulation of over three millions.
But it would be out of place at this moment to make a historical survey of the relative positions of the two countries from a cultural point of view, and while emphasising my disagreement with the noble Lord, Lord Snell, on that point, and dissenting from the eulogy of the antiquity and the culture of China in contrast with those of Japan—which of course is factually not correct—I should like to refer to what he said about the subject of a boycott and economic pressure. Having been out of the country, I am not completely familiar with what has been printed in the Press here but, to judge by what appeared in the American Press and the reports of speeches by responsible people, it is regrettable that such emphasis should have been laid on the suggestion of a boycott

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against Japan. That is followed up by a suggestion of economic pressure. One does not know exactly what is intended by "economic pressure"—the phrase covers a wide field of possibilities—but "boycott" is a term we know. It is a weapon which was used very energetically by China within recent years, when there was a boycott of British goods by the Chinese which did grave harm to British commercial interests on the mainland of East Asia. Boycott is a weapon which, if it is unfortunately applied to anybody, generally redounds to the disadvantage of those who use it.
If I may be permitted a digression regarding a parallel case, I happened two years ago to be in Australia at the time when this country saw fit to apply sanctions against Italy because of another set of circumstances. Moving around Australia then, I know well how much that was unsatisfactory to public opinion in Australia. From that distance it looked as if it was a policy foredoomed to failure, and certainly it was pregnant with grave disadvantage to Australia and other parts of the Empire. Those of us who, for commercial reasons, have recently visited Italy, have seen how the implementation of that policy resulted in this country losing a large part of trade which we had for many years with Italy; and When I say "trade" I do not refer to consumer goods, which class of trade can always be recovered, but to the replacement of machinery and the purchase of capital goods, which contribute so much to employment in this country and the production of which in Italy we have now stimulated. As far as production in this country is concerned, we have probably lost this trade, to the great disadvantage of the working men of this country. It is to be hoped that a line may be taken by the Press of this country to soft-pedal very much any suggestions of boycott, because we should only exasperate another friend as we exasperated Italy by our action then.
Is it improper to remind your Lordships' House that until 1922 we were allied to Japan, and that since then the younger generation of Japan have had a feeling of great regret that the traditional association between our two countries is no longer to be continued? I realise there are those who will say it is just as well we are not in any way allied to Japan now, or we
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should probably be drawn into a situation the occurrence of which we all deplore. Surely, in view of this Conference, in which reserve and patience and caution of expression are desired, we should keep in mind that our main object is friendship with both Japan and China, and that, after all, we wish to assure the possibility of the peaceful development of East Asia. It is only right to say that among the industrial leaders of Japan there is a ready recognition that their interests would probably have been achieved more rapidly and completely by peaceful penetration than by the application of the sword. Anyhow, the area of East Asia is large enough. We were reminded by the Finance Minister of China not long ago that the population is now nearly four hundred millions. There is field enough for the employment of capital and for the co-operation of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. There is an area which gives promise for the employment of the products of our people. So it seems to me most emphatically desirable that nothing should be said here, and as little as possible said in the country, which would handicap in any way the representatives of His Majesty's Government who will go to that Conference, or that any loose phrase should occur in this House which, by repetition in the Press, may convey a wrong feeling to either side in East Asia, and particularly to that country with which we have been traditionally allied.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, I will not detain your Lordships more than a few moments, but there are one or two things I am particularly anxious to question His Majesty's Government about. I would at the outset like to join with the noble Marquess in the tribute he has paid to the noble Earl who has presided with such distinguished ability, and to the admiration of us all, over the deliberations of the Non-Intervention Committee. The subject I particularly want to question His Majesty's Government about is with regard to Italy. Like the noble Lord who spoke last, I am profoundly anxious about our relations with Italy. I have had the opportunity during recent years of visiting Italy a great many times and of meeting every sort of person in that country. I have had the honour of being presented to the very highest in the land. It is deplorable, to those of us who are fond of that country, to see the way in which

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our relations with Italy have appeared to go from bad to worse.
It is idle to discuss what is the cause of all that, but if there is anything we can do now to make matters better, would it not be extremely important, from the international point of view, to take that step? What do we see to-day? Large armies going to Tripoli. Those of us who have wireless sets listen to the deplorable broadcasts in Arabic and Hindustani which go out from the great wireless station at Bari. These are all symptoms of bad relations with a country which has been our traditional friend. It all seems to go back to the trouble in Abyssinia, and the question I wish to ask particularly is how long are we going to allow the present situation in Abyssinia to go unrecognised. It seems to me that every day we fail to recognise the facts in Abyssinia makes things worse. It is quite clear to everybody, and I am sure it must be clear to His Majesty's Government, that the Italians have actually taken possession of Abyssinia, and there is no question of going back on that. The fact is that the Empire of Abyssinia, if it ever was an Empire, no longer exists, and Italy is now responsible for it. Would it not make for betterment in the relations between Italy and this country if that fact could be recognised? I have reason to believe that great importance is attached to it in Italy itself, and it is felt, even by great friends of ours in Italy, that we really might make yet another gesture of friendship to Italy in this matter.
Things did seem to get better when there was the well-known letter from the Prime Minister to Signor Mussolini. I happened to be in Italy at the time, and I remember well how many of my friends in Italy said to me that at long last a really effective step seemed apparently to have been taken to try to improve relations between that country and this. Unfortunately, things have seemed to go back. I do not know whether by itself any recognition of the state of affairs in Abyssinia would charm away all the feeling that at present exists, but I am perfectly certain that it would make things very much better. I would like the Leader of the House, when he comes to reply, to address a word to us about that if he can possibly do so. I would not ask him to do so if it is in any way
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inconvenient or against the public interest that anything should be said, but I do plead with His Majesty's Government that, if recognition of the conquest of Abyssinia would do good, that might well be considered. I have only ventured to address these few remarks because I speak as a lover of Italy and one who admires the freedom of that country, and very much deplores the present state of affairs.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, may I make a few observations before the noble Viscount replies for the Government, especially as my noble friend Lord Snell has asked me to put forward our point of view more particularly with regard to Spain, though I shall also venture to add a little to his cogent remarks on the situation in China. There is about to happen in the North of Spain what I fear will be a very terrible tragedy. The information we have is that the advancing rebel forces intend to perpetrate another massacre. Particularly do they intend, I understand, to wreak vengeance on the Asturian miners who have made themselves famous by their gallantry in former troubles in Spain and again in this horrible tragedy that is now wracking that beautiful but unhappy country. The question which is in our minds, and to which I particularly wish to ask the Leader of the House to reply—and I believe the Foreign Office have had cognisance of this matter being raised—is whether His Majesty's Government intend to continue in the North of Spain at the present time the humanitarian efforts which so covered the Royal Navy with glory at the beginning of these troubles in Spain. In other words, in the Asturias, is any effort being made to save the lives of civilians and non-combatants and to prevent another slaughter?
There are, I understand, about 2,000 rebel prisoners held by the Asturians in the North, and it should surely be possible to save their lives also, because they may be slaughtered before the final fall of the last strongholds of the Northern Loyalists. Would it not be possible to arrange for these rebel prisoners to be released safely in exchange for safe conduct for civilians? Speaking for my noble friends with whom I work in this House, and for my Party, we think that questions of humanity in this case should override all questions of legal punctilio, and that the three-mile

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limit, which, after all, is the territorial limit of the Spanish Government and not of the rebel administration, should not be allowed to prevent an act of humanity if it is possible to carry one out. As for the fighting men in the North of Spain, if they were next to a land frontier, by all international usage they could cross that land frontier and be interned after being disarmed. I would have thought that in this case, the sea being the frontier, they might be allowed to be evacuated without arms and interned in the same way.
My noble friend Lord Howe, who has just addressed your Lordships, will remember with me what happened when part of our Naval Brigade in Belgium at the beginning of the War found their way by mistake over the Dutch frontier. They were interned and there they remained. The same thing happened to certain parties of our Naval Divisions who were cut off and retreated deliberately into Holland. They were disarmed and interned. That is the usual custom of warfare. The fact that this is a civil war in Spain should not, in the view of my Party, prevent an effort being made in the direction I have indicated. Furthermore, I am given to understand from usually well-informed quarters, that the French Government are perfectly willing in this case to play their part; but as usual the French Government are waiting for the British Government, and we are waiting for the French Government. We suggest that His Majesty's Government should take the initiative.
Generally with regard to the Spanish situation and its latest developments, we think that the non-intervention proposals recently published should be regarded with some reserve—indeed with some suspicion. We hope that they are not one more device to gain time. Particularly I would ask the noble Viscount, if he is in a position to inform your Lordships whether any guarantees have been received that, during the time that will inevitably elapse while Commissions are appointed and these conversations go on, with references back to Governments, more men and more arms will not be sent to Spain. From a careful reacting of the courteous and guarded speech of Count Grandi—a similar speech to that just made by the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, himself, if he will
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allow me to say so—we can find no evidence that it contains a promise that more men will not be sent. We can imagine the Italians evacuating a few thousand cripples and possibly sending in, as they have done in the past, a very much greater number of fit warriors. I would remind your Lordships that, after all, it was on February 18 last that a solemn undertaking was given that no more troops would be sent to Spain, and since then it is notorious that organised troops have been landed there in great numbers. That is a specific question, and I am sorry that there has not been the opportunity of giving definite notice of it beforehand. What I desire to ask is this: Is there a guarantee that more arms and men will not be sent in the meantime? We regard this as the very essence of the problem.
As for the Non-Intervention Committee, I cannot conceal my admiration of the tranquillity and the faith of the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, in this Committee over which he has presided. I should think that in the long history of diplomacy—and here, of course, I naturally omit the noble Earl—there has been no more chicanery, trickery and hard lying, to put the matter plainly, than there has been on this Committee; in fact I should think that the famous Al Capone would refuse to sit in that Committee. If I might use an Americanism he would find it "too crooked" for him. Now, after all these months of delay and equivocation and trickery, we are told everything is for the best, and that at last engagements solemnly undertaken are to be kept. We still look upon the situation with great reserve.
That brings me to the few observations that I desire to make about the specific matter raised by my noble friend. My noble friend's speech makes it unnecessary for me to detain your Lordships at great length, in spite of the tremendous and overriding importance, as I venture to say it has, of the situation in Asia. I ought perhaps to take the opportunity of making our position clear as a Party. We do not propose unilateral action. We are united as nearly as we can be—as united in our deliberations as any great Party can be united in a matter of this kind. Our resolution was passed unanimously

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at our Conference at Bournemouth. There was no dissentient voice. We are united in believing that the time has come when the rule of law should be reasserted in the world and that one more effort should be made at this forthcoming Conference at Brussels on October 30 to cause respect once more to be paid to the law of nations. We consider that we should stand by that law and be prepared to enforce it. We realise, as my noble friend Lord Snell pointed out, that the Japanese economic situation is very weak, whereas the economic situation of ourselves, of the United States of America, of Holland and of many of the other Powers concerned intimately in what is going on in the Pacific, is very strong. We consider, therefore, that this is a case where economic action should be effective. We are encouraged in believing that something could be arranged multilaterally by the speech of President Roosevelt, to which I was very happy to hear the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, refer in such friendly terms.
The reason why we take this matter so very seriously is that we have seen since the present Government came into office—we do not say because the present Government came into office—that there has been a progressive deterioration in the respect that certain heavily armed nations show and have shown for solemn treaties and undertakings. This respect must be re-established if we are to be able to continue a civilised existence on this planet. We consider the situation is going from bad to worse and that the time has come—in fact has long passed—when those States and Governments which hold international obligations and International Law in respect should make a stand. I was a little disappointed, but not surprised, that the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, did not give us any indication of what would be His Majesty's Government's attitude at Brussels. The time is very short and I should have thought that some suggestion of what is to be their standpoint should now be made. We consider that the next move, if I may use that expression, should be taken from our side in answer to the now famous speech of the President of the United States at Chicago recently. The situation in America, as your Lordships are well aware, is such that it is difficult for the
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Federal Government to take any overt steps to enforce regard for international treaties and obligations, on its own initiative, but it is not so difficult for us to take the initiative. I believe it is much easier for this country in a matter of this kind to give a lead and that then the United States Government would not find it so difficult to follow.
When we hear the noble Earl speak about the spirit of conciliation, while we respect his sentiments and his enduring faith in diplomatic nature, we cannot help feeling that when you are dealing with a tiger conciliation by itself is rather a dangerous game to play. The situation in Asia is such that it should give pause, I should have thought, to every European State and indeed every other civilized State in the world. Speaking in your Lordships' House some months ago I ventured to make the observation that the time had come when the rival States in Europe, apparently re-arming against each other and dividing themselves into hostile camps, should look over their shoulders towards the East, towards what is happening in Asia. All their interests are affected there. I am sorry to say that the prophecies I then made of trouble in Asia have all too soon been fulfilled. What is going on on the mainland of Asia, in China, if it is allowed to continue, and if the Japanese military party succeed in their present policy, will have the most appalling effect on the future peace of the world. Everyone of your Lordships knows that. To put off action now when the opportunity for it is favourable would, we believe, be a fatal mistake. On the other hand, although we do not know even now that the Japanese Government are coming to the Brussels Conference, we do know that the United States Government are going to be represented and I see in the Press to-day that the Italian Government are going to be represented. I think if that Conference is properly handled it may be a turning point.
We in the Labour party share the horror expressed by Government spokesmen at atrocities, whether they are the massacre of civilians by air action or the sinking of harmless fishing vessels off the Chinese coast. We share the expressions of horror that have fallen from leading members of His Majesty's Government and also from the most reverend Primate, if I may use his name in this case. But even more serious from our point of view

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than these crimes committed against harmless people is the contempt shown for solemn treaties and undertakings. International Law has been built up over centuries by careful, industrious men with many setbacks. It had become established. There was a concert of the nations which did at any rate pay lip service to the keeping of treaties and the observance of law. If that is allowed to go, what is there but anarchy in front of the world? What is there but government by force, which can only lead to more terrible wars? To think that we can avoid trouble by winking or conniving at actions which transgress International Law is a foolish delusion.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VISCOUNT HALIFAX): My Lords, I do not know whether before I try to reply to the speeches that have been made on the Question on the Paper your Lordships will allow me to divert your attention from that subject for one moment in order that I may say a few words in memory of one who has died since we were here last. It is the first opportunity that I have had as Leader of the House and I think your Lordships perhaps will allow me to say one or two words about the noble Earl, Lord Peel, who played so very distinguished a part in this House and in our debates. All of us in this House knew him and some of us have known him intimately for many years as colleagues of his in another place. I myself had particular opportunity of establishing relations with him most intimate, because while he twice filled the office of Secretary of State for India during one of those occupancies of that office it fell to be my lot to be the representative of His Majesty in India. Naturally, therefore, my relations with Lord Peel were constantly close.
I can bear tribute, perhaps as well as anyone, to the invaluable help that he gave to one in my position who had to serve with him and to his close and intimate interest in Indian affairs. That interest, as we were reminded by the most reverend Primate on another occasion, he exhibited unremittingly during the long sessions of the Round-Table Conference in all its most difficult tasks of examination. Lord Peel did indeed most ungrudgingly accept the obligations of public life and many of us were sensible I think of the great physical
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strain under which he did the last and greatest service of all, perhaps—namely; to accept the Chairmanship of the Royal Commission to inquire into affairs in Palestine. In this House we knew him, I think, as one who was singularly well equipped to propound or debate a case, who approached all his responsibilities with great industry and brought to them a very wise and most robust judgment, and who added to that a shrewd appreciation of men and things which made him most valuable in counsel. He brought great honour to a name already honoured, and I am quite sure that all your Lordships feel that by his death both this House and the nation have suffered a real loss.
NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: May I now turn to the debate in which we have participated, and to which it falls to me to endeavour to make some reply? During its course, as those who have been here throughout have noted, there has at times been employed considerable liberty of language—stronger language that I have often heard in this House. I am not at liberty to imitate completely those who have used that language, and must endeavour to speak with somewhat more restraint. My noble friend the Earl of Plymouth gave your Lordships a recital, which I think will not have been other than valuable to us all, of the recent course of events on the two topics on which he mainly touched. The first one on which I would propose to say a word is that of Spain, which is immediately nearest home. Ever since the civil strife in Spain started, the policy of His Majesty's Government has been directed to three objectives that I might perhaps state quite simply: first of all, to try to induce Spaniards not to fight one another in Spain; secondly, to try to induce foreigners not to fight one another anywhere because of the fact that Spaniards were fighting one another in Spain; and thirdly, to try to secure that the issue of the Spanish civil war should not be permitted materially to affect the relations of Mediterranean Powers and their position in the Mediterranean.
I have no doubt whatever in my own mind that the country generally has steadily approved of the non-intervention policy that His Majesty's Government have sought to pursue. That is not to

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say that the country has had any illusions, either that that non-intervention policy would work perfectly or that it has worked perfectly. But I think your Lordships will agree that that policy has had, and to-day still has—and this is its great justification and merit, I think—this quality: that so long as nations continue to accept the policy of non-intervention officially, that fact is a protection against incidents assuming proportions of a menacing international character. We are all aware, of course, how greatly recent events have strained both the theory and the practice of non-intervention. We have done our best to make the practice effective and to maintain the theory. The whole House, I think, appreciated the generous tributes that were paid, first by the noble Marquess opposite and also, I think, by the noble Lord who spoke last, and by others, to my noble friend the Earl of Plymouth for his part in that work.
It is not necessary for me to remind your Lordships again of the actual accomplishment which we have seen bearing fruit in the time that has elapsed since the Conference that was held at Nyon. I only remark at this point that I think the willingness of His Majesty's Government and of the French Government to see the matters on which they had thought of a Three-Power Conference again remitted to the Non-Intervention Committee at the suggestion of the Italian Government was a proof of the genuineness of His Majesty's Government's desire to reach a settlement upon them. It is quite true that at that time His Majesty's Government and the French Government were doubtful whether that would in fact be the most fruitful measure of procedure, but I think it is permissible to say that that course has been so far justified by results. With my noble friend and with others, I most warmly welcome the Italian initiative which has made further progress possible. It has been, as some of your Lordships have said, a real contribution to the relief of international strain and a great encouragement to those who wish to see that strain removed.
I would ask your Lordships not to underrate the great psychological value of even a token withdrawal of volunteers, if that could be secured. The noble Marquess opposite directed your Lordships' attention quite properly, if I may
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say so, to the importance of other questions of control that ought not, in his judgment, to be lost sight of, and the noble Lord who spoke last asked me this specific question: whether it was in mind that there would be precise guarantees against more troops being sent during the interval that must elapse while these matters were being investigated by the Committee. I think perhaps the best answer to both those questions is that, as I understand it, the Italian representative himself, at the meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee, was concerned to lay great stress upon the perfecting of a system of control as part of a general improvement in the checking of intervention on one side or the other. Both the noble Lord who spoke last and the noble Marquess can rest well assured that those matters are very fully in the minds of my noble friend the Chairman of the Non-Intervention Sub-Committee and of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary.
The noble Lord who spoke last asked me another specific question, which perhaps I might take at this point, with regard to what the attitude of His Majesty's Government was towards a continuance of the humanitarian effort in which, as he generously said, the Royal Navy had so greatly distinguished itself during recent months. As I am informed, the position about the specific inquiry which he made is that His Majesty's Government have been in touch with the French Government in regard to it, and that the two Governments were in agreement that they would wish to take joint action with regard to it, but whether or not that joint action would be possible would in fact, for obvious reasons, depend upon whether they could secure the co-operation of General Franco in any joint action to be taken. Accordingly approaches have been made, so I am informed, to General Franco, and at this moment his reply has not yet been received. That matter is also in train, and is very present to my right honourable friend's mind.
I think that if this new situation can be developed, it is not unreasonable to hope that it may make it possible to clear up a great many misunderstandings that have arisen out of the difficulties of the Spanish problem, and I can myself look forward—I do not want to be unduly optimistic—to the gradual establishment of a new and healthier atmosphere, in

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which perhaps it would be possible to reach the position where the Anglo-Italian conversations of which the noble Earl, Lord Howe, spoke might be held. If that stage can be reached, I should myself hope that a great many of the misunderstandings that at present are damaging the relations of what used to be two friendly nations—and the mass of whose people, I think, want to be on friendly terms again—might be removed, to the great advantage of both, and I think to the great advantage of the peace of Europe in which both those great nations have a great and constructive part to play.
I turn now to deal with matters that have been raised in connection with the situation in the Far East. My noble friend Lord Barnby made one very wise observation, I thought, which was that he hoped that all who took part in the debate would remember that the main object of all our efforts must be to restore peace in the Far East. That seemed to me to be profoundly true, although more present to the minds of some than to the minds of others, and therefore, although I share to the full the moral distress that was in the mind of the noble Lord, Lord Snell, as he spoke, I could not myself employ, and should not wish to employ, all the language that he found of service. We must all view the situation with the deepest anxiety and the deepest distress. We must all deplore this appeal to force, with all its consequences of suffering and the like, and it is particularly grievous to those of us, and I imagine all of us, who are able and who like to look back to the traditional feelings of friendship between our two nations.
Therefore upon every ground we must be anxious to do whatever may be in our power to bring this unhappy strife to an end. Of course we deplore the pursuit of policy, by Japan or any other nation, by military means and the recourse to force, which are contrary to the spirit of a new relationship between nation and nation to which the noble Marquess referred, and indeed to the whole order of ideas expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations, ideas, it is relevant to remember, which were brought into practical politics and sponsored by our great sister nation, the United States, and which were wholeheartedly and sincerely adopted by our own country. The noble Lord, Lord
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Snell, can rest quite assured that His Majesty's Government are not unmindful of either the economic or the strategic interests involved in this Far East problem, and I think he was unconsciously a little less than just to my noble friend Lord Plymouth, because all those things are implicit in the Resolution of the Advisory Committee, submitted at Geneva, and on which Lord Plymouth had a good deal to say.
Therefore for all those reasons His Majesty's Government wholeheartedly welcome the speech of President Roosevelt at Chicago. So far as I can judge there is no divergence of view between the Government in this country and the Government of the United States as expressed in that speech, and we look forward now to this conference under the Nine-Power Treaty, set in motion indeed by but not held under the League, and meeting tinder the inspiration of the President of the United States. It is quite impossible, with all respect to the noble Lord who spoke last, for my noble friend Lord Plymouth to anticipate what that Conference will do. It is, however, quite possible, I think, to form a clear idea of what methods that Conference will adopt, and what will be its outlook, from the wording of the League Resolution which was responsible for the initiative in the matter. Your Lordships will remember that the League Resolution expressed the hope that the States concerned (that is, the signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty)
"will be able to associate with their work other States which have special interest in the Far East to seek a method of putting an end to the conflict by agreement."
I would emphasise those last words "by agreement," because that seemed to me to be the spirit which pervaded the speech of the President of the United States—not an extension of war, but an endeavour to find an end of war.
Therefore it is that we enter the Conference in a simple fulfilment of our Treaty obligation. We have no intention of putting one party or the other in the dock, but we do intend to proceed in the spirit of Article 7 of the Treaty, that laid down that in such a situation as this there should be "full and frank communication between the contracting Powers concerned." It is just that that we hope to achieve, and I earnestly hope that Japan will see her way to be represented there.

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Even if she is not, I can conceive great influence being exercised by combined co-operation on these lines by the Powers there gathered. I am quite convinced that it is only that attitude of mind which can give any chance, or the best chance at all events, of the Conference securing success. It is really no good going to such a Conference as this with the anticipation of failure in your mind. If you go there with failure in your mind you will soon have failure to record, and I would entirely decline on every ground at this stage to attempt to answer questions, in this House or anywhere else, as to what I should do or should not do if that Conference failed to secure the result that I desire.
I only make this observation. The noble Lord opposite who spoke first would make a great mistake, and would be labouring under the most unhappy delusion, were he to think that if and when questions of economic pressure, as he termed it, fell to be considered the principal matter to be considered would be the interests of Big Business. I happened to be a member of a Government that for many months was actually concerned in economic sanctions, and I do not think I ever heard the interests of Big Business mentioned or brought into consideration. Let me therefore reassure him on that point. The other observation I would make is this, that I was glad to hear the noble Lord who spoke last say that if and when that question ever had to be considered, he himself—and I think he said his Party was united on this point—was of the view that there would be no support for unilateral action by this country alone. Therefore my conclusion on that point is that I hope that this Conference will decide to proceed in the spirit of the League Resolution—but do not let any of us at this stage think that it is necessary to be more royalist than the King—employing whatever methods of peaceful persuasion and conciliation the Conference may deem most useful. And that, with all respect for the noble Lord who spoke first, I think would be as good a form of moral pressure, which he desires, as any other form which he can himself suggest. And obviously, should the Conference fail and should the result that we look for show no promise of being achieved, no nation
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participating has forfeited any of its liberty of action.
May I say one or two general words before I sit down? This is the first debate that we have had on foreign affairs for some months, and we shall no doubt have several more as a new Session proceeds. At the present moment the world is very sadly disordered and awry. As I see it, the tempers of human beings and of Governments and of peoples are all so strained, and are affected by so many conflicting influences and emotions, that less than ever to-day is it possible in my view to rest on short and easy generalisations. There is really no simple, positive, short-cut answer to the dangerous and complex political problems by which the world to-day is beset; and if anybody attempts to give a short-cut and a simple answer you may be almost certain that the answer is misleading and wrong.
There is another reflection that I would, with diffidence, offer, and it is this. I think it is always extremely difficult for one nation to be quite sure that it appreciates truly all the forces by which another nation is moved. Whatever the appearances of any question, it may well be that in fact improper allowances are being made for the causes and influences from which the action of other nations flows. At the present moment no doubt all of us look with wistful longing to the League of Nations, and we are all too often and all too sadly conscious of the great gulf that exists between what I may call the spirit of the League and the spirit of man in many parts of the world. And when people here talk about amendment of the Covenant many people naturally feel that what is more needed is the more fundamental amendment of the spirit of man to bring that spirit into closer harmony. It is indeed not the letter of the Covenant but the spirit in which it is sought to be applied that cries out for change.
But while that is all true, and strong as is the desire for peace among our people, and I believe among all the peoples, or most of the peoples, of the world, the desire to strengthen the League is itself based upon the desire for peace; and I venture to think that the condemnation of those who were responsible for getting them into a war which in the broad judgment of the nation

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might rightly have been avoided, and of which no man could foretell the end, would not be any less severe because it had resulted from some policy which could claim the support of the letter of the Covenant, drawn up under conditions totally different from those which prevail to-day. And therefore my last observation is this. The burden that rests today upon those who direct the foreign policy of this country, and who wish to have regard both to this country's obligations as a loyal Member of the League and also this country's real desire for peace, is not an easy one. And yet that double obligation to the best of our ability we have so far sought faithfully to discharge, and we shall continue to do so. And I have not much doubt that along the lines on which we have sought and are seeking to discharge it, we do enjoy, and I hope shall continue to enjoy, the support of the overwhelming majority of the country.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, may I make one very brief comment on the speech which has fallen from the Leader of the House? It is in relation to what he has said about the Far East. I think there are few members of the House who are more impressed than I am with the necessity that our diplomacy should be related to our real strength, and with the danger of thinking that moral feeling can be made the basis of a foreign policy when there is no equivalent practical superiority in the physical strength behind it. I am aware of the extraordinary difficulties in the Far East of bringing any physical pressure to bear on the situation. I do not think it requires any words from me to elaborate the immense practical difficulties which arise in that field. But in view of what has fallen from the Labour Benches, together with what has fallen from the noble Viscount the Leader of the House tonight, I do want to raise the question whether the argument that the main purpose of the Brussels Conference is to make peace is the true approach. When I was recently in the United States a certain man said to me: "I wonder whether the Brussels Conference is not going to Hoare-Laval China." Because Japan is in occupation of nearly half of China, merely to make peace on the basis of the military status quo is to repeat in the Far East what happened in Abyssinia. I do not want to add to the difficulties of
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His Majesty's Government, but the use of the word "peace" may very often be the most confusing word that can be used in a practical military situation. The problem of the Conference is clearly to see whether, if possible by agreement, there is any way of strengthening China with the object of bringing about a solution in the Far East which would conform both to justice and treaty as well as to the real facts. If we go to that Conference saying our only object is peace, to stop the fight, the end of it will be that we shall betray China.
LORD SNELL: My Lords, first of all I should like to thank the noble Earl and the noble Viscount for the general courtesy of their speeches in reply to the Question I have on the Paper. I hope your Lordships will agree that the discussion justified the putting of such a Question on the Paper. It is a matter that arouses our very deepest feelings and emotions, and I am sorry if my restraint of language has not been so strong as that of the noble Viscount on the other side; but if he only knew how much restraint I did put on myself, he would forgive me. Before I ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw my Motion, I ask your permission, on behalf of my noble friends on this side, to associate ourselves with everything the Leader of the House said about the late Lord Peel. It was in answer to a speech of his that I was called upon to make my first speech in your Lordships' House on the very important matter of India when I assumed the position of Under-Secretary of State. Throughout my acquaintance with him, as a colleague in this House and as a fellow member of the Joint Select Committee and elsewhere, I found him kindly, courteous, and considerate, a generous-minded friend and, even more, a generous-minded critic and opponent. With great sincerity my friends wish to be associated with what has fallen from the noble Viscount. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, before the Motion is withdrawn, perhaps I may be permitted, as Lord Snell was enabled to say a word with reference to Lord Peel, to join in the words of regret which the Leader of the House so well expressed. I had known Lord Peel for a great number of years, and as a former Secretary of State for India I was one

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of those who realised the important part which he played in the affairs of the Indian Empire. It is true, as the noble Viscount the Leader of the House said, that he added fresh honour to one of the most honourable names in our history, and I think there was no man who was more obviously or clearly actuated by a sense of duty than Lord Peel. On behalf of my noble friends on these Benches, I join cordially in the expression of regret the Leader of the House has uttered.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

TATTON ESTATE BILL. [H.L.]
The CHAIRNIAN OF COMMITTEES informed the House that the Promoters do not intend to proceed further with the Bill. Ordered, That the Bill be not further proceeded with.
House adjourned at a quarter before seven o'clock.