Lords Sitting of 2 March 1937

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Several Lords—Took the Oath.

BRITISH SHIPPING (CONTINUANCE OF SUBSIDY) BILL.
Brought from the Commons, endorsed with the Certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill within the meaning of the Parliament Act, 1911; read 1a; and to be printed.
MERCHANT SHIPPING BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.
GENEVA CONVENTION BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
REGENCY BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.
LANCASHIRE ELECTRIC POWER BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and referred to the Examiners.
LIVERPOOL EXCHANGE BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and referred to the Examiners.
MARGATE, BROADSTAIRS AND DISTRICT ELECTRICITY BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
RICKMANSWORTH AND UXBRIDGE VALLEY WATER BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS (SCOTLAND) BILL. [H.L.]
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL): My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to consolidate in their application to Scotland certain enactments relating to persons under the age of eighteen years; and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

RESERVE FORCES BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ACT (AMENDMENT) BILL. [H.L.]
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion of Lord Arnold, made on Wednesday last, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to British foreign policy and to the need for a change therein which will bring it more into accord with the realities of the existing situation.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, the noble Earl who replied for the Government at the end of the debate last week made an eloquent and, I think, a valid plea that we should not, because the League of Nations was in difficulties, really abuse it. I very much share that view, all the more because he admitted that the League in its present form did require a very great deal of critical examination. The League was a noble and, in the end, an irresistible ideal but, as the experience we have already had shows, there are certain very definite limitations upon its power, and I venture to suggest that it is essential that those limitations should be recognised and obeyed. The first is, as the noble Earl put it, that it is not universal; the second that in its present form it has no power to alter the status quo. And there are
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two other difficulties. The first is that in Europe to-day there is no homogeneity in the political institutions among the nations themselves. There are Communist States, there are Fascist States, there are Democracies. I think there are really seven or eight dictatorships in Europe to-day, and the attempt to make the League of Nations work coherently in those circumstances is obviously extremely difficult. Finally, the League has no power to diminish what in my view is by far the greatest cause of international discord to-day—namely, the extravagancies of economic nationalism.
It is really going to take a long time before the League of Nations can assume that position, influence and power in the world which everybody hoped it would assume when it was founded in 1920, and I think we have got to face the problem of how we are going to deal with the Contemporary world, a world in which the League of Nations itself is not a very powerful force. Why is it that Europe is so constantly the cause of trouble and war in the world? I venture to think that if Europe could become normal the chances of world war would be extremely small. It is Europe which is the main focus, the main centre from which the threat of war throughout the world now springs; and the fundamental reason for that is not the ambition or the malignity of any particular race or people, it is the fact that to-day it is divided into twenty-six sovereign States. The difficulties of Europe are far greater to-day than they were in 1914. Then there were seventeen sovereign States, now there are twenty-six, and I do not think in considering the problem of Europe you should ever lose sight of the fact that anarchy lies at the root of its troubles. And among those troubles the economic frontiers are far more serious than the political. I think there is no nation in Europe to-day which would dream of going to war merely about territorial frontiers. It is the stresses, the unemployment, the dictatorships which spring out of the division of Europe into twenty-six economic watertight compartments, not one of which except Russia can live on the resources within its own boundaries, that are the main reason for its troubles to-day. Economic frontiers rather than political frontiers are the most serious problems we have to deal with.
That being so, I venture to think that the real problem we have got to face is not

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so much the prevention of war, desirable as that may be, as to consider whether there are any means whereby, if a war does break out—and nobody in present conditions can say that that is a risk which must not be faced—it can be prevented from spreading into a world war. The real problem which confronts the statesmanship of this country and all other great countries of the world to-day is whether we can avoid a repetition of what happened prior to the outbreak of war in 1914—the position in which we gradually got integrated into a state of alliance systems which staggered from one power crisis to another till finally the accident of the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, or the mistakes made by Foreign Secretaries afterwards, precipitated the whole world into war. That is by far the greatest problem which confronts mankind to-day.
There are three solutions which have been or may be propounded for that situation. There is, first, the solution which is now generally known as collective security. And I would like to differentiate, if I may, between collective security in the form in which it is now advocated and the ideals of the League of Nations. The very essence of the League of Nations system was a peace system embracing all nations in the world within which there should be no alliances, endeavouring by peaceful means to remove the causes of war, and, if a nation refused to deal with its questions by pacific means, then bringing, in the last resort, absolutely universal economic pressure to bear upon it in order to force it to continue to resort to pacific means. But the very essence of the system of collective security as it is preached from many platforms at this moment is that it should be an armed alliance to resist armed aggression; the essence of it is militarisation. Those aspects of it which are concerned with removing the causes of war are, so far as the public are concerned, largely in abeyance.
It seems to me that the recent argument for collective security—that is, the argument that the nations who are satisfied with the status quo, the nations which want to prevent any alterations, should enter into something like a military alliance in order that they may be overwhelmingly and collectively stronger than any nation that seeks to alter the status quo—is nothing else than the
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modernisation of what in my view has been the fatal policy which has been maintained by the French Government ever since 1920. That is a policy which in the first fifteen years of peace concentrated on keeping Germany without arms and encircled, and which is now concerned in building up a system of armed alliances about it, a policy, I may add, for which we and the United States of America must bear our full share of blame, because we were unwilling to ratify that treaty of guarantees to France against unprovoked aggression which is now often lost sight of, but which, from my own experience, I can say was one of the vital elements in the settlement which emerged from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. This new alliance system, now ennobled by the phrase "collective security," began with the military alliances between France and the Little Entente and Poland. It has now been extended to Russia by the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between France and Russia, a Treaty which has its duplicate or its parallel in the Treaty between Czechoslovakia and Russia. That is one side of the alliance system. Inevitably, as has always happened in the past and as under any system in which alliances are involved between sovereign States always will happen in the future, that system has begun to produce an alliance system on the other side. It produced what is called the Rome-Berlin axis, it produced the Anti-Comintern Agreement between Germany and Japan.
We already see in outline the fatal vertebras of the alliance system in an even more terrible form than began to emerge in 1904 in Europe. That is in effect, as I see it, the policy now advocated by a large number of those—by no means all—who stand for the principle of collective security. Collective security is supported by three groups of people. First, there are the genuine believers in peace who are hypnotised by the beauty of the phrase, who do not realise that there is no such thing as collective security in a world of sovereign States, but who believe that if they give their adherence to it, or if this country gives its loyal adherence to it and makes the necessary agreement so freely recommended by the Left and by nobody more enthusiastically than by Lord Strabolgi who spoke last week, and that if there is agreement between Russia

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and France and ourselves then we shall have in some way exorcised the spectre of war. It does not do anything of the kind. It produces a counter-alliance, and in the end we go from one crisis to another, like the Algeciras crisis, the Agadir crisis, the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, the Balkan crisis until finally we get to a state of tension in a world knit by alliances, so that by accident a fool or a knave presses the button which lets off a world war in its most violent, totalitarian and savage form. That is the first group which supports it.
The second group consists of those who frankly want an Anti-Fascist Alliance, people who are much more preoccupied with the dangers of Fascism than the dangers of Communism, people who feel that Fascism is a menace to their own ideals, a menace in particular to trade unionism and so on, and who, therefore, frankly want this country to become part of an Anti-Fascist Alliance. I see myself no fundamental difference between the two systems of government. They are both wholly unfriendly to and completely contradictory of the institutions in which we ourselves believe. They are both based on the idea that peace is going to come to the world by the democracies allying themselves with each other. Really if you took sides in that ideological conflict, as it is called, which is rising in Europe, the only result would be that if we ever did become involved in such a conflict we should be split inside this country from top to bottom. I think that argument for collective security can only produce as the inevitable result both war and confusion at home.
Finally, there are those people whose ideas are based upon fear of Germany. There are people, old diplomats, high officials, public men, who seem to be convinced that because Germany is largely isolated, with a population of more than 70,000,000 people, because it has a totalitarian Government—that Government itself the product of the policy of its neighbours, including ourselves, in great measure—with a country to the East whose armaments are at least three times as great as those of Germany, Germany is considering an attack on the peace of Europe and the liberty of its neighbours. I confess that when you consider that Germany occupies the most dangerous position in Europe, that she
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has no natural frontiers, that modern air services mean that she is more liable to be destroyed than any other nation, infinitely more liable than ourselves, I think the German fear is to a large extent a bogey. I do not say that Germany is easy to deal with—I do not think she is—but that we should drift into a policy which, in effect, says that the only way of dealing with Germany is to surround her in such a way, both economically and politically, that an internal explosion is inevitable, is to condemn ourselves and the world to world war. It is the most fatal policy of all.
While that policy is seldom publicly avowed, you have not to go very far before you find that it exists in the minds of a considerable number of people in this country. As I see it, if we attempt a system of collective security, which I would differentiate from the League of Nations, that system is bound in the very nature of things to be put to a practical and dangerous test, a test which is inevitable in a crisis between sovereign States with no over-ruling authority, a test which, if it ever comes, would lead to the still more terrible test of war. I think we have to consider very carefully the lessons of the Abyssinian crisis. We entered upon that venture in September, 1935, as I ventured to point out in your Lordships' House, without really having considered the inevitable consequences of threatening to use force against a sovereign State. At the end of it we found ourselves imprisoned between the alternatives of having to yield, or to run at any rate the very grave risk of war which might become world war. That alternative, that dilemma, is inherent in any system of power politics as between sovereign nations. In every crisis in Europe to-day that is a serious crisis you are inevitably going to the edge of the question of power. The Foreign Secretary, I thought, made a very wise and statesmanlike speech at Leamington, in November last, in which, after dealing with the way in which we had deceived ourselves as to the realities of the world during the whole Abyssinian crisis, he stated, and stated quite clearly, those matters about which he believed that this country would be willing to face war, and those matters about which it probably would not, and certainly would not be prepared automatically to use military weapons, but about which it would

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naturally feel grave concern. The defence of the British Commonwealth, the defence of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression, the defence of Egypt and the defence of Iraq were matters about which he gave notice to the world that this country would feel that it would have in the last resort to go to war.
Since that time the clarity of ideas involved in that speech seems to me to have been a little dimmed, and we hear speeches such as that made by the noble Lord who opened this debate—a very remarkable speech, if I may say so—in which he said that the Foreign Secretary of Czechoslovakia and, I think, the President of that great Republic indicated that in their belief Great Britain was prepared to defend the status quo in Eastern Europe in the last resort by arms. The noble Lord who spoke for the Labour Party specifically invited the British Government to endorse that policy and, implicitly, to go to war to prevent any alteration in the status quo in Eastern Europe by forcible means, for it is admitted that there is no other means by which in present circumstances any alteration could be made.
Now I will ask your Lordships to consider some of the facts which are implicit in the situation. First of all the Franco-Russian Treaty of Mutual Assistance, if it becomes a military alliance, which I understand it is not yet, makes it inevitable that if a crisis develops into war fie German Army must strike westward. I will not develop that argument here; I endeavoured to do so in a speech I made some time ago. Nobody who traces the history of the pre-War era will fail to realise that Germany, being in a central position, if it has to face a war on both fronts, will inevitably be driven to the same conclusion as that to which General Schlieffen was driven: that if it is to get a quick decision it must strike first at the most vulnerable enemy and the enemy which is most easily within reach. Therefore the Franco-Russian Treaty of Mutual Assistance has the inevitable effect that, if a war breaks out, it tends to make certain that the war shall be in the West and directed at the West and will not be concerned in the first instance with Eastern Europe.
May I press the question a little further? Let us suppose that a crisis arises in Eastern Europe, arises not be-
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cause any nation proposes to march across the frontiers of its neighbour with flags flying and aeroplanes overhead, with destruction in every one of its acts, but arises, as it may well arise, through economic trouble, through conflict between local Fascists and Communists or conflict started by irredentist minorities, or through the bitter feelings, for instance, in a country like Hungary, where nothing has yet been done to remedy those grave defects in her frontiers. A crisis arises in which serious disturbance begins to appear in Eastern Europe. You are liable then to have common action by the Little Entente against Hungary. You are almost certainly going to have a strong attitude by the German Government, possibly a move by Russia, ending up in threats of action by France. How is that crisis going to develop? If it comes near to the real crisis of war, are Poland and Rumania going to invite the Russian army on to their soil? I think it is extremely unlikely. Is Italy going to intervene? She may; on the other hand, she may have decided that she can do better by making terms and keeping out.
What will be the position which will confront this country? for that is the question I want to examine. The question is whether this country will intervene, either economically or in a military way, in some form of coercion. The first question it will ask is whether it is going to use the Navy. The Navy, I hope and believe, is in a first-class condition, but the central experience of the last War was that naval action took four years to have a decisive effect, and that under conditions during which the blockade round Germany was about as complete as it is ever likely to be in history. I understand—or certainly it appears to be the fact—that it is not our intention to intervene in Europe with an Army. It is the official policy of the Labour Party, as set forth by my noble friend last week, that in no circumstances ought we to undertake to send any troops to the Continent of Europe, and indeed I think it is almost certain that such troops as we have will be required in Palestine or some other part of the British Commonwealth.
You are therefore left with the question of the use of the air arm. So long as this country is a democracy—and I hope it will long remain one—the decision

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whether it will take so fearful an action as that will obviously have to rest with Parliament, and you will in effect have a debate on whether the Air Force is to be used to bomb some other country whose Air Force can certainly reach this country, in the knowledge that, if the debate seems likely to go against that country, London will be bombed before we can bomb that country. I venture to predict that if we got to a crisis in South-Eastern Europe that is the form in which the decision would undoubtedly come to this country. I think in those circumstances that the policy enunciated at Leamington is infinitely wiser and safer for this country than the universal commitments which we are so continually being pressed to adopt in the name of collective security, whereby we undertake to guarantee all the frontiers, bad as many of them are, in Eastern Europe.
And if we did get embroiled, what should we be fighting for, generally speaking? The only possible cause we could be fighting for would be to insist on the maintenance of the anarchy of Europe; that Europe should remain divided into twenty-six States each with tariffs to the skies and armed to the teeth. I venture to think that that is not a cause for which it is worth laying down the lives of British men. So I reject, not the League in the only form in which I think it can begin to grow again, but the system of collective security in the form of the military alliances which it is now beginning to make.
The second policy is the policy which was put forward by Lord Russell last week and may again be put forward by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby to-day: the pacifist policy. Lord Russell used, I thought, a very striking phrase, and I am not sure that it was not a true phrase, when he said that if we did become involved in another general European war, after the war had gone on for a little while there would be a universal rebellion by the peoples against their Governments, for they would refuse to participate any longer in the senseless brutalities of modern war. To my mind that does not solve the problem of what happens when peoples tear down their Governments, because peace only springs from government. And if what happens is that the peoples tear down their Governments, the
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end will be the picture so brilliantly described by Mr. H. G. Wells in his book and his film called "The shape of things to come." I do not think pacifism can solve the problem, for the reason that it does not create the conditions upon which alone peace is possible, which is the maintenance of government.
I venture to ask whether there is not a third policy, directed, I confess, mainly to the supreme question of deciding whether it is not possible to create a system which, in the conditions of to-day, may not end all war but can prevent local wars spreading into world wars—which is the real calamity which besets mankind; whether it is not possible to do more than we are now thinking of doing to isolate wars instead of spreading them into universal wars, as I think the system of collective security would inevitably do. That does not mean isolation. Isolation in the ser se that you can make yourself indifferent to the rest of the world is obviously quite impracticable. The question is whether you cannot apply the system which we have adopted with considerable success in the case of Spain to Europe and if necessary to the Far East—non-commitment to either side, and non-intervention.
I venture to think that we ought to pay a good deal more attention than we have vet done to the policy which is now being pursued by the United States. In the first place it is going to have very considerable consequences for ourselves if we do become involved in war. It is going to be impossible for us under the neutrality legislation which is now in existence, and which will almost certainly be renewed, to buy arms or any form of implements of war in the United States. It will be impossible for us to raise loans in any shape or form. And it will be possible for a President, either under the pressure of public opinion or because he is not as friendly to this country as I think the present President is, to deny us raw materials and foodstuffs as well. That would be a very serious change from the position we were in in the last War when, I venture to say, without the ass stance which we derived from the United States, both before the entry of the United States into the War and afterwards, we certainly could not have attained victory.
But there is more also to be said for the American attitude to Europe. I spent

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some time there, and I found that the fundamental problem is this. The root of the trouble in Europe is the fact that in an area no larger than the United States it is trying still to live as twenty-six States. We found in this country that until we united the Crowns and the Parliaments there was no order, no prosperity, no peace. Canada found that, until it united its ten Provinces, it could get no order and no peace. So did Australia, so did South Africa, and so of course—in the greatest instance of all—did the great American Commonwealth. All the English peoples have realised in practice as well as in theory that until we overcame the boundary created by sovereignty we could have neither order, prosperity nor peace, and they say in America that that is the fundamental problem which confronts Europe. They say: "Did our intervention solve the European problem last time? No. We may have been to some extent to blame for not joining the League of Nations, but the League of Nations itself could not solve Europe's problems. They can only be solved by Europe itself." The United States will only intervene if Europe breaks out into the rest of the world so as to threaten the interests at any rate of the Monroe system.
It is a very striking fact that during the nineteenth century—or rather, I should say from 1815 to 1914—there was no world war. There were continuous world wars in the eighteenth century and in the seventeenth century, and there was another world war in the beginning of the twentieth century. Why was it that the nineteenth century—or from 1815 to 1914—was a period without world wars, a period in which humanity made perhaps the greatest advance in all its history? There were several wars in Europe, there were several wars in the Far East, but none of them became world wars, whereas earlier wars had done so. The reason was fundamentally twofold. It is developed in a brilliant essay by that well known American publicist, Walter Lippmann. The first reason is that Great Britain kept out of the alliance system of Europe; and the second is that it had a paramount Navy. He asked: What is a world war? and replied that a world war is any war in which Great Britain is wholly involved because the British Empire is world-wide, and any war in which Britain is wholly involved inevit-
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ably forces the United States to come in, either with her or against her.
But during the whole of that century as long as we kept detached from the alliance system of Europe—the alliance system which is beginning to reappear in the name of collective security—and as long as we had a paramount Navy, there was no world war. It was only when we joined the alliance system of Europe and Germany began to re-create a Navy—a thing which she has specifically renounced the intention of doing to-day—that once more the danger of a world war reappeared. To-day it is impossible for us to create that condition by ourselves. We are not strong enough. But it is possible for the United States and ourselves to do it together. And if it is true, and I believe it to be true, that the policy of neutrality on the part of the United States cannot be made effective unless Great Britain also adopts that policy, it is not inconceivable that the United States would be willing to extend her Monroe doctrine sufficiently to make possible co-operation between the United States Navy and ours to prevent an explosion either in the Far East or of Europe across the seas.
If you can get such a combination as the democracies of the Monroe doctrine system and the democracies of the British Commonwealth sufficiently closely integrated as to be invulnerable from external attack, and sufficiently integrated to be able to stand outside the vortex of a European war, you will create a centre of stability and strength and peace in the world which may exorcise for ever the spectre of another world war. It is sometimes said that this is impossible because of the air. The air, of course, makes it more difficult, but I have yet to learn that any nation voluntarily invites addition to the numbers of its own enemies. In Spain we have been able to prevent the extension of that dangerous conflict, and I do not think that the experience in Spain in the least proves that because of the air every war must inevitably become a world war. There is not a vestige of foundation for that belief.
The second argument is that if we withdraw to that extent from Europe—and I do not suggest that we should withdraw from our Locarno obligations—I do not see why this should drag us into war, any more than the obligation we sustained

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during the whole of the last century to defend the independence of Belgium. What matters is that we should not be drawn into any form of alliance system or counter-alliance system. I venture to think that if we withdraw from Europe, it is the best contribution we can possibly make to the peace of Europe to-day. Anybody who has any familiarity with what is going on in Europe knows that the central question in European diplomacy to-day is whether Great Britain can be drawn in on either side. I think the day we make it perfectly clear that in no circumstances will we be drawn into the conflict between Fascism and Communism, or any of the other domestic conflicts of Europe, we shall take the greatest step we can take to induce the nations of Europe to come to terms, to reduce their tariffs, and to make a lasting peace.
I would, therefore, urge the Government to pay rather more attention than I think they have yet done to the possibilities of more intimate association with the United States. I greatly hope that the journey recently taken by Mr. Runciman will lead to a more active co-operation between this country and the United States and with Mr. Hull in his policy in trying to remove the economic causes of war. I think there is room for co-operation very much more if immediate effects in diminishing international tension are to be achieved. I venture to think it is worth while considering whether, by a closer approximation to the policy of the United States, it is not possible to build up effective insurances against any European war which may break out spreading into a world war. If we do that we shall have done well by mankind and well by ourselves, because democracy itself will not be able to stand another world war. To fight it you will have to abandon your Parliamentary system and the financial needs could not be met by ordinary democratic methods. I venture most earnestly to suggest to the Government that they should give more attention to this method of preventing world war than perhaps they have hitherto done.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My Lords, I am afraid I am going to disappoint the noble Marquess who has just sat down because I do not intend to weary your Lordships with a further description
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of what is called my policy. My intention this afternoon is to speak about Government policy. I spent the week-end with midnight oil analysing the speeches of the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, who concluded the debate last Thursday, and a speech of the noble Viscount the Leader of the House, and I was somewhat surprised to find that the two noble Lords had said the same thing, which in the Government of to-day is somewhat unusual. If I may take some remarks of the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, at the conclusion of his speech, I would like to say that when he threw his bouquets at the Government, with remarkably little applause from the Benches behind him, I felt inclined to add one myself because I trunk great credit is due to the Government for having helped to settle the Dardanelles question and the Alexandretta dispute, and for having concluded the Treaty with Egypt, in regard to which I think they acknowledge a debt also to the Labour Government that was in power five or six years ago. I would add also that I support their policy with regard to non-intervention in Spain. I think it was a wise policy, extraordinarily difficult to carry out. It must go further to be effective, but I think the endeavour itself has been in the right direction.
It is, however, rather to the Government's general policy and the result of that policy in their rearmament programme that I want to draw your Lordships' attention to to-night. To begin with, the League of Nations. All who hay e faith of any sort, although it may be waning, in the League of Nations, desire to see that body strengthened, and I think that everyone of that frame of mind wants to see the League of Nations all-inclusive because unless that is the case there is no possibility of getting its authority listened to. As the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, told us, there are two schools, one saying that the League's military force should be strengthened and the other saying that its coercive force should be abolished. He said that "His Majesty's Government do not favour either of these extreme courses," and the noble Viscount, Lord Halifax, in his speech at Southampton, said that "the truth probably lies between these two extremes." You can see that they said very much the same thing. This via media policy sounds the height of wisdom; but it is not choosing between

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two extremes, it is sitting between two stools, which is not an enviable position for anyone to adopt, and it really means indecision on the part of the Government. They cannot make up their minds. Now, I cannot believe that there can be any question that if you could withhold from the League of Nations all power to use force and could eliminate Article 16 from the Covenant, one of the first results would be that the United States and, I believe, Germany would join the League. By that means you would get what is desired by us all, a very much more all-inclusive League. The Lord Chief justice recently, in an article referring to the League of Nations, said "Inasmuch as its ends are pacific its means ought to be pacific also," and I entirely endorse that sentiment.
Let me now pass to the subject which has been so admirably and clearly dealt with by the noble Marquess who has just sat down—collective security, which he says is a phrase which has hypnotised people. I should like to make a plea for plain English. I really think it would be a great advantage, because my noble friend who was here a moment ago—Lord Strabolgi—said that 75 per cent. of the Labour Party were in favour of collective security. I wonder how many of the 75 per cent. understand what collective security means. I try to understand it, but it is one of those vague phrases which has caught hold of the popular imagination and this use of phrase and metaphor is really very misleading. The most reverend Primate, whom I see in his place, used one of these phrases the other day. He said "Christians are entitled to draw the sword for a righteous cause," and one sees a man in armour brandishing a sword and standing on a monster—
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I do not think I said that.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I think I am correct in saying that the most reverend Primate used the expression—"the sword."
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I think it is St. Paul.
LORD PONSON BY OF SHULBREDE: Well, my Lords, the moat reverend Primate ought to have brought St. Paul's words up to date. Instead of saying the
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sword, he should have said chlorine, phosgene, mustard gas, lewisite, and thermite, and then asked his fellow Christians whether they were justified in using these in defence of any cause at all. I want plain English. I know these gases are not plain English. They are very far from being English, and they are very much objected to by more than 90 per cent. of our population. My noble friend Lord Strabolgi said that the Labour Party believe in collective security. I believe that is so. That is their official policy, but what I think is amazing is that they should think that the Government believe in collective security. That is the surprising thing. The Government do not believe in collective security. They always evade the issue. The Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons last week only used the term in a quotation; and I carefully listened to the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, and noticed that he did make one reference to it in a sort of "Oh, I must not forget to mention that" voice. I did not see a full report of the speech by the Leader of the House at Southampton, but I believe he just mentioned it.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT HALIFAX): More than that.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: The report I saw was not a full one, and it did not give any of the noble Viscount's oratorical trimmings. But at any rate the Government do not believe in it. They did not believe in sanctions—the mistake they made was ever saying that they did—and sanctions really are a form of collective security. Their policy of today means that they do not believe in collective security, otherwise why should they be arming in this way, with this vast programme of armaments? It means that they do not believe that anybody will come to our assistance should we be attacked; and, as the noble Marquess has well pointed out, there is considerable opposition in this country to the idea of our going to the assistance of anybody and everybody should they find themselves in danger in various parts of the world. The noble Marquess who has just sat down has demolished collective security. I think other speeches have demolished collective security too, and the Government will feel strengthened in what is their secret opposition to collective security. But we have got a new phrase

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now. It has cropped up just recently, and it is that of "regional pacts." Both the noble Viscount, Lord Halifax, and the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, emphasised regional pacts. The noble Earl spoke of pre-war alliances. He wanted to dismiss them; he said that policy was a failure. The noble Viscount referred to exclusive alliances as a policy that must be dropped. But regional pacts were all right.
Let us get down to the definition more closely. What is the difference between exclusive alliances and regional pacts? Probably I shall be told by the noble Viscount the Leader of the House that regional pacts are drawn up and an invitation is given to others to join so that they should not be what is called exclusive. That is to say, if you have a regional pact with A, B, and C you invite D. E, and F to join, and therefore it is all right. But when your regional pact with A, B, and C is drawn up because you fear the aggressive tendencies of D, E, and F, it is not likely that D, E, and F are going to join. It is just that insincere type of diplomacy which is disastrous. Regional pacts are not going to solve this very difficult problem, and I thoroughly endorse what was said by my noble friend in the admirable speech he made in opening this debate with regard to the renewal of Locarno. I would ask whether, in replying to this debate, as we are expecting the Leader of the House to do, he can now tell us what the attitude of Belgium is with regard to the renewal of Locarno. I do not believe that the renewal of that or any other regional pact will be anything more than a return to the exclusive alliances which were so disastrous in former times.
May I make another criticism? I cannot believe that the new method of shouting across Europe is a good one. We have a well-paid Diplomatic Service, and I really believe it would be a good thing to use it. It is true that if one person shouts you have got to shout back, but we ask questions when we shout and they are not answered, and we hesitate as to whether we should shout again. And with certain Powers we always use the tone of the schoolmaster. I do not know why we should do that. Really these Governments of great populations and
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great historical units must be allowed to manage their own affairs for themselves, and it is not in the hectoring schoolmaster tone that we are likely to get agreement and an amelioration of any tension that we have with them. I agree that there may be disputes, but do let the leading statesmen of Europe quarrel privately. I am not asking for secret diplomacy. Parliament and the people should know all the real decisions that are made or any agreements that are come to; but there is a great gap between that and this new method of shouting.
I do not think we are helping the Foreign Secretary. The Foreign Secretary has got a very difficult task in his negotiations with other Powers just now. Dictators are a nuisance. I do not want to interfere with the internal affairs of any country, but I cannot have any sympathy myself with dictators. If I were living under the Nazi régime in Germany I should be in a concentration camp as a pacifist and Socialist; and if I were living under the Soviet régime I should have been shot long ago—although I should not have made any confession! The Government have given Mr. Eden, in these very delicate negotiations with Governments that are so very far removed from our method of governing, a bludgeon. I do not believe that Mr. Eden in his heart of hearts is thankful to the Government for being given a bludgeon. He has now gone into his conferences with the menace of armaments, and I do not believe that improves the atmosphere in a conference. In fact, anybody who has read the negotiations that took place in the various disputes before 1914 can see that amicable settlements were reached in the most crucial questions until the moment arrived when the Powers thought that they had their people behind them and their armaments equipped; then the war card was played and you got war.
The Government pretend that they have not gone in for competition, that they have no desire to compete, that they have no desire to go in for an armaments race. But undoubtedly they have done so. A runner cannot enter into a race with a firm determination to be abreast of those in the forefront without speeding up all those who are in the race. We see the way it has been done in certain parts of Europe, and only this afternoon, as recorded in our newspapers, Signor Mussolini thinks it necessary to go a

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little further in his rearmament. And this disastrous position of an armed Europe is surpassing anything that the world has ever seen. The noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, said we were not going to be aggressors. He said this was all for peace and for defence. When has anything else ever been said by any nation that has armed? That has always been the pretext. As my noble friend Lord Russell, in his admirable maiden speech, said last Thursday, that has been the pretext for rearming on the part of all nations time after time.
We have had impressive speeches from Prime Ministers about the dangers in front of us and I need not quote them, because they have been quoted times without number. But I should like to quote some phrases with which I am in absolute and complete agreement. They are very short and they are these:
"The truth is that so long as we have armies whatever the justification we plead for them, we shall have wars. The kind of army will not determine how it is to be used. If we admit that force is necessary for national defence then every other militarist evil follows. … The ground we hold is that the problem of defence is not how to protect ourselves by force against enmity but how to remove enmity."
It could not be better put. They are the words of the Lord President of the Council some years ago before he fell. Now he is in favour of expenditure on armaments going on and on and up and up!
This armament policy which is being undertaken is a result of the vacillating decision of the Government with regard to the main international questions which are now before the world. They give no lead with regard 1o the revision of the Covenant. They say nothing at all with regard to a conference on the causes, economic and territorial, of the complaints that there may be between nations. I hope—and I do not see that there is any prospect of it—that anyhow we shall not embark on another Disarmament Conference. It is complained that we should not talk of war. Who is to blame? I do not want to talk about war, and the vast majority of the people do not want to talk about war. It is the Government who insist on us talking about war and talking about nothing else. I find all classes of people are talking about it. When they are not talking about the test match or the Coronation, both of which
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will soon be over, they talk about war. They are forced to do it. In every village ladies who have nothing else to do are having classes in gas and anti-air-raid drill. Taxation reminds us of it. The countryside is being desecrated by aerodromes placed in many of our most beautiful spots, and it is a new form of patriotism to approve of that. We have got this war complex forced on us by the Government. As a working man said to me the other day, if they would not go on talking about it we might get through, but if they go on talking about it they will have it, and the Government are solely responsible for that.
May I ask the Government, envisaging this world war and making all these preparations for it, have they drafted their propaganda, because everybody knows nowadays that propaganda is the most important thing after arms and munitions? You have got to inflame the population against the enemy. Now the people of this country will be very reluctant even against a proved enemy to bomb their towns and centres of population and to destroy thousands of lives of men, women, and children. You will want very strong propaganda. I dare say the Government have got it ready. The usual sort of thing will be forthcoming, the leaflets and pamphlets and paragraphs that are usually drawn up in wartime. Any of them will do, and they can leave a blank so as to put in the name of the enemy at the last moment when they know who it is. They will want very strong propaganda to make the peaceful, peace-loving, sensible people of this country eager, and they will have to make them eager before they will consent to destroy the men, women, and children of another country by hundreds of thousands, whatever that other country may have done.
I really think that this policy of the Government is not defence for security but preparation for attack, an aggravation of the danger. We want national defence, but real national defence is in the opposite direction. Money by the hundred millions can be ear-marked by means of hysterical warnings and the creation of some panic—that is what the Government are doing at the present time—against some indefinite enemy abroad when we have a very definite enemy here at home We want national defence for the unemployed against idleness and demoralisation, we

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want defence for children against inadequate education, malnutrition, and ill-equipped accommodation. I fancy that if a very few millions were proposed by the Government for that there would be an outcry that it was waste. We want defence for mothers against the tragic losses of infantile mortality. We want defence for our cities against the cancerous growth of slums, we want defence for the sick against disease, we want defence for those who die for want of hospital accommodation. The voluntary hospital system is breaking down. You can see it a hundred yards from here or at Hyde Park Corner. They cannot get money for equipment or to build hospitals sufficiently large.
Need, ignorance, crime, disease, exploitation—these are the enemies against which we ought to spend all our money, all our enterprise, all our genius and the whole force of our youth. Reconstruction of that sort would not cost one quarter of what this programme is going to demand of us. Rearmament is antagonistic to reconstruction. The Government pursue reconstruction tentatively, half-heartedly, cheaply, but they pursue this expansion of armaments with an enthusiasm with which they try to infect the whole country and with reckless extravagance. The Government have been confronted with a direct choice at a tremendously important moment in the history of the world's civilisation. Instead of taking the remunerative road towards real national defence such as I have described they have chosen the downhill course which leads to death, destruction, devastation, ruin, and the crumbling of such civilisation as we have reached. It is for these reasons, my Lords, that I support my noble friend Lord Arnold in his demand that the Government policy should be based on the realities of the situation.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, my noble friend who has just sat down indulged, as he was fully entitled to, of course, in some rather entertaining criticism of His Majesty's Government, and he said some of the things which have always been said of every Government that has ever existed during my lifetime. His speech, if he will allow me to say so—it is not usual with his speeches—was almost entirely negative.
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As I understood him, he was against various suggestions, but he was most against rearmament. That was the thing that really moved his indignation. I suppose everybody in the world, certainly everybody in this country, is against rearmament. The Government themselves have used language almost as forcible as that which has just fallen from my noble friend, but they do not see how they can possibly go on, in the position they now are, without some strengthening of the armaments of this country.
May I venture to make this suggestion to my noble friend? There seem to me to be the proverbial three possible courses. You may have red hot rearmament, red hot increase of armaments, everybody standing by themselves. He and I would agree, I think, that that is an impossible policy. You may have complete pacifism, the abandonment of all armaments. I think he would agree that whether that policy is right or wrong it is a quite impracticable policy; there is not the slightest chance of its being adopted in this or in any other country. If you do not have that, then I submit that you must come to the system which he so eloquently sneered at, the system of collective security. It is the only other plan. Either you must have some system by which all the nations of the world will unite to keep the peace, or you must have either red hot rearmament or complete pacifism. I will come in a moment to what my noble friend Lord Lothian said, because I do not think his system is substantially different. He wants a different League of Nations; that is all.
Before I go on with the rest of what I want to say I would like to ask a question. My noble friend who will reply for the Government is not in his place at the moment, but I hope some other member of the Government will take a note of my question and pass it on to him. I am glad that our efforts at non-intervention in Spain have reached at any rate a relative success, and if my noble friend Lord Plymouth will allow me, I should like to offer my humble congratulations to him on the great tenacity and the great patience with which he has conducted negotiations which must have been very trying. What I want to understand is how the scheme which has been evolved is going to work, and I should be glad of any information which can be

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given me without disadvantage. I understand that there are to be British and French ships on the west of Spain, German and Italian ships on the east of Spain, This is the question which has been put to me by those who are interested in the sending of relief: Suppose a food ship goes to assist what is now called the Government part of Spain; what security is there that it will not be arrested by the German and Italian ships? Or, if that does not happen, what security is there that they will not "tip the wink" to the nearest rebel cruiser? I do not know whether that is a real danger or not, but those who are actively engaged in this work think that it is a real danger. I shall be glad to know whether it is part of the scheme that there will be officers of other nations on board these blockading ships who will be able to watch whether they are really doing their duty in stopping arms and soldiers and not going beyond their duties.
I desire to say a few words now about the argument initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Arnold. His suggestion is isolation—he said he was not afraid of the word—not as a final or complete policy, if I understood him rightly, but as a step towards complete pacifism. That policy, to my immense surprise, was warmly greeted and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Mount Temple, only he wants isolation as a step towards increased armaments. That is a curious alliance which has gone on for some time now between pacifists and die-hards. I confess that it does not appeal to me very much. I have known instances of that kind of alliance more than once in my political life, but I cannot remember any case in which such an alliance has been successful for both parties. Indeed, I cannot see how it can ever be so. Sometimes one party has done the other and sometimes the other has done the one, but one or the other is bound to be done in an association of that kind. I venture to warn my noble diehard friends that they are up against pretty hot customers when they are dealing with my noble friends on my right.
What is this policy of isolation? Put into the rigidly plain language that my noble friend Lord Ponsonby prefers, it is the abandonment of our present alliances. That is what it means. You are to abandon your alliance or your undertakings under the League Covenant with
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all the other Powers in the League of Nations and the Locarno arrangements with France and Belgium, and if there are any others they are to be abandoned, too. If that is not what is meant, then I should be glad to have an explanation of what is meant. I cannot say that that is to me a very attractive proposal. My noble friend Lord Lothian said that he was not exactly in favour of isolation, but in favour of non-commitment and non-intervention. The distinction is not very clear in my mind; I do not see how exactly the two differ. Even Lord Arnold does not propose never to have any relations with foreign countries; all he proposes is not to enter into any kind of obligation to defend them if they are attacked, or any agreement which will oblige them to defend us if we are attacked. But my noble friend Lord Lothian's proposal is, to my mind, at any rate, an entirely novel one. I never heard it put forward before. Indeed, it is one of the great charms of his speaking that every time he speaks he has a new prescription for dealing with the new situation in which we find ourselves. But this particular novelty seems to me, I must say, more ingenious than plausible. He says that the right thing is to have an Anglo-American alliance.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: No, I never said anything of the kind, and I do not believe in it at all.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: I have used the wrong word. It is an Anglo-American understanding by which the two countries shall act together. Will that do?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: If I may say so, that we should not form part of the European alliance system and that America should not form part of it either, or of an Oriental alliance system, and that we should keep outside either of the two alliance systems. That is the essence of it.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Surely there is more than that, otherwise it does not come to anything at all. Surely it was an undertaking that we should, with America, keep the peace of the world. That is the basis of the idea, or otherwise it would not be worth while.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: The idea is to avoid being drawn into a world war because a war starts in Europe or the

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Far East. It is avoiding ever being drawn into a world war, not trying to keep the peace of the world.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: How are you going to prevent a world war at all unless you take action of some kind or another to prevent it extending itself? I know the ingenious phrase that the noble Lord quoted from Mr. Lippmann, that a world war necessarily involves the engagement of this country; but it is not true. A world war might well take place without the engagement of this country, though if we kept out of it the war would not be a world war, as far as we were concerned. In that sense you must admit that to be true of any country in the world.
Now I venture to think that any system which is going to be based on Anglo-American co-operation in any practical sense is really not a thing that is worth considering. Feeling in America—my noble friend, I know, knows a great deal about that, and I know a little—against any such a proposal would be overwhelming, and it would be still more overwhelming if you told them that we proposed to maintain one part of our European obligations—namely, the obligation to defend France and Belgium. That seems to me to be a perfectly impossible combination of ideas. More than that, I am very doubtful—but I shall come to this later on—whether you can have an obligation to defend France and Belgium and yet maintain anything that can possibly be regarded as a non-intervention policy. To that extent I find myself in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Arnold. Putting that addition to the non-intervention policy aside for one moment, it does essentially mean this: that we are to stand alone. That means that we are necessarily to abandon our obligations to France and other people. France will have to look elsewhere. I do not think that some noble Lords ever really make allowance for the extreme difficulty and danger of France. Her position is that she has only a population of forty million and her hereditary enemy—it is no use blinking the fact—with a population of seventy million at least and possibly more, is just across her frontier. She is in constant fear, and no one who has talked to the
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French people can doubt it, of the possibility of invasion, and if she is deprived of any assistance from us she will have to look elsewhere. She will have to make some other arrangements if she can.
There is one conceivable possibility of arrangement: she might come to terms with Germany on the footing that they should agree to divide up the British Empire. I wonder whether that has ever been considered. It may seem to some noble Lords a very extravagant proposition, but I was rather interested to observe the other day, in reading an extraordinarily interesting book that has just come out, "The Life of Lord Grey," by Professor Trevelyan, a passage quoted from Lord Grey as having been uttered by him in 1911. He then thought there was no immediate danger of war, and he said that there would be no danger unless some Power had ambitions for what he called a Napoleonic policy. Then he proceeds to describe what he means by that policy:
"That would be a policy of first of all separating the other Powers from one another, taking them in detail, crushing them if need be, and forcing them into the orbit of the policy of the strongest Power. The result would be—"
this is what he says; he was dealing with the proposal of isolation—
"one great combination in Europe, outside which we should be left without a friend."
These were the words of a statesman who, I see, was described by Sir Austen Chamberlain, perhaps not with any exaggeration, as the greatest Foreign Minister since the days of Castlereagh. He was certainly a man of the most temperate judgment, as anyone who knew him will agree, yet he thought quite deliberately that there was an appreciable danger that if we tried to stand out of Europe altogether we might find ourselves faced with a combination of the whole of Europe against us. My Lords, that may be a danger which you say you do not believe in and are prepared to risk, but it seems to me a terrible danger to run, and I at any rate would not recommend any policy which made it even a possibility.
I heard with great interest the kind of eulogy of Germany which I have often heard in certain quarters of this House. The most striking was that of Lord Mount Temple, in which he read a

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great part of the last speech of Herr Hitler to show what a wonderful and reasonable man he was. I will not make the obvious reply—or perhaps I will make the obvious reply—that those words, however noble they may be, must be controlled by the actual facts of German policy. Nobody can really seriously doubt that, when the present German Government say they are so much in favour of peace, what they mean is this: "We desire to get certain things, we should much prefer to get them peacefully, but if we cannot get them peacefully, we will get them somehow." That is no unfair reading of what they say. In this morning's newspapers you will see that this, in almost as many words, is what the German Ambassador to this country, speaking at Leipzig, said about the German Colonies only yesterday. He said practically in so many words: "We want these Colonies; we think we ought to have them, and if you don't give them to us we shall have to take them." That is really what he said.
That is really the underlying idea, as I venture to suggest, of a great deal of the so-called peace talk that you hear from German statesmen. When they have shown a genuine desire to co-operate with other nations, when they come back to the League of Nations, when they come back to the International Labour Office, when they are prepared genuinely to enter upon serious negotiations for the reduction of armaments, when they abandon their perpetual periodical onslaughts through their newspapers on this country and on that country—then I shall listen with much more attention to the pacific speeches which are occasionally made, I think for consumption in this country and elsewhere. I feel very strongly that a policy which is based on isolation, generally coupled with reliance on the certainty of peaceful action by Germany, is not a policy which it is safe to recommend to this country, and I doubt very much whether my noble friend Lord Arnold believes in that policy at all. He thinks it is a first step. But he does not really believe that you can stop at a policy of isolation and not go any further. Nobody can. If you are going to have armed isolation you are inviting attack. You are cutting yourselves off from all help from other people, yet you remain armed—it is an invitation to every other country to attack us.
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What the noble Earl, Lord Russell, thinks—because he said so in the most specific and definite terms—is that the only policy is complete pacificism. He has published a little book, a very able book, as everything he writes is, and he explained most clearly what it is he wants. I will read a passage partly for the benefit of some of my diehard friends. This is what he says:
"Every argument … is in favour of the policy of gradually disarming the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, disposing"—
a very cunningly chosen word—
"of India and the Crown Colonies, and announcing that we intend never to fight another war. This policy is simple, straight-forward and intelligible: it gives hope for our own country"—
not very much I should have thought—
"and an example which others may follow."
If I were a betting man I should be very glad to offer a hundred to one against any other country following such a policy. That evidently is not the whole consequence of the policy, and Lord Russell, with admirable lucidity and candour, states, in another passage:
"If we had no armed forces we might have to obey the orders of a foreign Government which we should feel to be humiliating, and we should have to take a back seat in international affairs."
It is not only humiliating, but just consider what it means. We are absolutely disarmed. An armed Power on the Continent says: "We require you to make a contribution to the great cost we have been put to in keeping up an Army in order to keep you in order." We should have to do it. We should have no resource except to pay. I really do not understand how anyone who reasons on the subject can be in favour of a complete pacifist policy. Of course, I understand, and I respect, those who say, "Whether it is right or wrong, whether it is going to produce disaster or not, we believe that war is wrong; we will not contemplate it, and, whatever the consequences to our country, we are prepared to risk those consequences on purely conscientious grounds." But those grounds are not the grounds on which that policy is put forward in this House, or in the book which I have quoted.
There is another objection to the policy of isolation, which brings me to the question of disarmament. I do not see how if you are going to have a policy of isola-

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tion, and a policy consequently of taking from the League of Nations all the coercive part of it, you can ever hope for a policy of general disarmament by international agreement. No one who has had anything to do with that controversy will contradict me, I am satisfied, when I say that the great difficulty has always been to know what you are to do when Country A says: "We are not prepared to disarm unless we are sure that we shall not be utterly destroyed by doing so." You say: "But everybody disarms." "Yes," they say, "but suppose our neighbour does not disarm and only pretends to. What then? If we made ourselves perfectly powerless to resist, how are we to defend ourselves?" The only possible answer is: "Then all the other countries will come in and defend you." If you have a policy which rejects that answer, then you can have no general disarmament.
Indeed that seems to me, if I may say so to the Government, the only point on which I feel dissatisfaction with their more recent declarations. I am very grateful both to the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, and the Leader of the House for their recent speeches. If it is not impertinent for me to say so, I think they were admirable and of great value. But there is one difficulty which I found even in Lord Plymouth's speech. It is the old difficulty. He says, that "we will never fight unless our vital interests are involved." That seems to me a very difficult saying. What are vital interests? I know it is said we are vitally interested in France and Belgium—our frontier is on the Rhine, and all the rest of it. But why is that said? What is our special interest as to the ownership of Alsace-Lorraine, for instance? In itself does it really matter to us whether it belongs to Germany or France? I cannot see that it does. Our only vital interest is peace, and that seems to be an essential to any sound League policy. You must be clear that you are not fighting for particular countries but for the maintenance of a new international system of order, the destruction of that anarchy which the noble Marquess so justly deplores, or else you have no defence for your system, and you have no advantage in it. I know people say to me: "Would you have fought for the independence of Abyssinia?" Put in that way I say No.
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"Would you fight for the independence of Czechoslovakia?" Put in that way I say No. "Would you fight for the possession by France of Alsace-Lorraine?" Put it that way I say No. But I would fight to prevent a breach of the peace, because I think that of far greater importance than anything else—any other conceivable interest that we may have. That is the only serious difficulty I feel about the Government's statement. I do not say anything about their past policy.
I do very earnestly press upon them that to suggest to the world that there are some interests which are vital apart from peace is to say what is not really true, and what is very pernicious, and it means that we shall fight for some things and we shall not fight for others. It means therefore that you are not going to give a real guarantee to any of those countries and that therefore you cannot expect them to disarm. It means an end of all hope of international disarmament. You must give your general guarantee if you are to have general disarmament. That is the contention I venture to put to the Government. And I want to add just this. Any of these discussions that take place, the kind of argument that passes to and fro as to whether we can with such and such a force meet the possibility of such and such a force coming against us, and things of that kind, belong to a past age. The thing that matters to us now is not victory but peace. I agree with my noble friend, we have got to secure peace if we can. I do not think you can secure it by pacifism or arguments; I believe that in spite of our difficulties, in spite of so called failures that have taken place, you can secure it by international co-operation, and I believe it is the only possibility by which it can be secured.
For that reason I have never been able to vote against the armament policy of the Government. I still find myself utterly unable to oppose it. It is said that it is very lavish. So it is, but there may be advantages in that. If the idea is that we want to show the world that whoever comes against us, we are prepared, it may be right—I do not know—to put the figure high. It is for these reasons that I feel unable to follow my noble friend who has just spoken, in his denunciation of rearmament. I agree with every word he said about it being deplorable, about

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the urgent needs we have in this country upon which more money could be spent, but unless you can secure peace none of these things can be done, and as I am unable to agree that you can secure peace by pacifism I am bound to support rearmament. If you are to have international co-operation, we must be ready to do our part. I accept that doctrine and therefore I support it. I say with all earnestness to my noble friend Lord Lothian, that I agree with him that the great evil of Europe is anarchy, and I agree with him that until you get rid of that anarchy you will not succeed in having permanent peace in Europe. He says that this is all because Europe is divided into twenty-six States, but he knows as well as I do that that is a situation you cannot avoid. It may be it was wrong to break up Austria-Hungary, but it was inevitable. Cannot you bind these States together in some way or another so that you will have the embryo of a federal system in Europe which will ultimately develop in that way? That seems to me the only way and, although I should delight in any assistance that we might have from the United States and I agree that the friendship of the United States is valuable, yet I do feel that to aim at the federalisation of Europe, even imperfectly, even if we can only take a very small step in that direction at the present time, is the only hope for the future. I therefore hope we shall persist in supporting the Government policy by every means in our power.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, the subject of this debate has been approached from a number of different angles and in the speeches on both days your Lordships have taken great interest. This afternoon much has been said on the point to which the noble Viscount who has just sat down devoted part of his speech—namely, as to how far it is possible that this country can be isolated in the event of a war. The noble Lord who opened the debate, Lord Arnold, in his very powerful speech desired to point out that it was in no way impracticable. My noble friend Lord Lothian, from a different standpoint, concluded that a particular attitude taken by the United States and ourselves would not only prevent us from being involved in such a war but would be of marked assistance in keeping the peace of the world. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby,
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also believed that it would be possible for us to isolate ourselves by undertaking as rapidly as possible to disarm ourselves, even in an armed world.
The attitude of standing aside is very often a most attractive one. Gallio, the proconsul of Achaia, was a most attractive figure who refused to be troubled even when people came to blows in his presence. As I say, an attractive figure. So far as it is possible for this country to take up a position of indifference to what is happening in Europe, it seems to me that if isolation continued, two conditions would be required, neither of which is applicable to this country. One case, of which, of course, the principal is the United States, is that of a country geographically far removed from the possibility of attack and in the highest degree able to supply itself with all the necessaries of life. Obviously we are in no way in that position. The other instance is at the opposite end of the scale. Take the instance of Holland. Holland possesses a number of Colonies of the greatest value and holds these Colonies by the acquiescence of the Great Powers of the world. There are three great naval Powers in the Pacific, and all the determination and historical courage of the Netherlands would not enable her to hold those Colonies against their appropriation by any one of these three. I shall not discuss the reasons—because they are so obvious—why the Colonies of the Netherlands may be regarded as one of the safest possessions in the world; and as we are one of the three Powers concerned, we should be under no kind of temptation to deprive her of them. But neither the conditions of the United States nor the conditions of the Netherlands are applicable to this country, and for that reason it appears to me almost impossible for us to shake off a great measure of responsibility for what is happening in Europe.
Speaking of responsibility, the Great World War has been mentioned. I do not know how often it has occurred to your Lordships that that was a world war because we made it so. If this country had stood aside in July and August, 1914, the whole course of history would have been different. The United States, Japan and Portugal would never have come into that War at all. It is pretty safe to say that Italy, in the first stages at any rate, would have remained neutral,

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and if she had joined in the War at all would have joined in later on the side of the Central Powers with a view to the determination of matters in the Adriatic not altogether unfavourable to herself. Greece, it may be supposed, would have joined Germany, and I think it would have to be concluded that the Russian breakdown would have occurred certainly as soon as it actually did, if not sooner, and that in spite of all the valour of the French soldiers and the capacity of their Generals it would have been impossible for them to resist in the last resort the overwhelming numbers which would have been brought against them by the Central Powers which, it must be remembered, would have received free supplies certainly from the United States and, I dare say, to a large extent from ourselves. That is, I believe, a sketch of what would have occurred and, quite apart from any moral considerations in the matter, as the noble Viscount on the Cross Benches has pointed out, Lord Grey and his colleagues in the Government foresaw what the ultimate result to Europe would be if events had been allowed to take that course. As I say, apart from all moral considerations, that was the practical justification for our entrance into the War.
It is surely altogether impossible to foresee, if war should unhappily break out in Europe, how we might become involved or how we might be able to stand aside from it. It is surely impossible to foretell, not merely the method in which such a war may break out, but who would in fact be involved in it. Assuming that it is impossible for us in the long run to maintain an attitude of complete isolation, it seems to me there are only two other courses which it is possible for us to take. One is to revert to the old system of trying to maintain the balance of power between the various formidable elements in Europe. That did not always answer so badly; but one difficulty which would confront the Foreign Office and His Majesty's Government now would be to know how it would be possible, so to speak, to watch the pieces on the chess-board and to say precisely how that balance could be maintained. It is, of course, a simple line of argument to say that you would be largely guided by the character of the Governments of the different countries, and that you would be prepared to support those who hold
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democratic faith as this country does and oppose those, whatever their complexion, which are not popularly governed. That may be so, but, if so, it would be an entirely new departure. Alliances and understandings in the past had very little relation to the character of the Governments of the different countries taking part. Nobody could suppose, for instance, that there were not a large majority of people of Republican faith in France who thoroughly disliked being bound up with the Imperial régime of Russia but who had to make friends with Russia because Germany was on the flank of France. I therefore dismiss the nation that it is possible for this country to try to re-create, and perhaps even to control, the balance of the Great Powers of Europe.
Therefore, it seems to me, we are driven to the solution which I believe is favoured by His Majesty's Government—in fact, we know it is from what they have stated in public—that is, to endeavour to assist in reorganising and strengthening the League of Nations in order to bring the general public opinion, principally of Europe but also of some countries outside Europe, to bear on the problems which have to be faced. On one point I find myself greatly in agreement with my noble friend Lord Cecil. What I think has happened is not so much the failure of the League as the failure of disarmament, and it will have to be, I cannot help feeling, through some approach, which I fear will have to be a very gradual one, to further attempts at a gradual diminution of armaments that safety is most likely to be found. I do not differ greatly from Lord Cecil in feeling that the measures upon which this country is now engaged need not be an objection to that course. The facts of the case, and the feeling which has awakened, rightly or wrongly, in the beginning of the armaments scare, sufficiently explain that without going into any further particulars.
I think most of us feel that too heavy a burden has been placed on the League of Nations. Tasks have been set before it which, not its original constitution but the development of its personnel, has made it impossible for it to fulfil. I think you have to go back to the abstention of the United States from Geneva to find the real reason for this. It was not only the loss of assistance from America, whether material or economic, but the effect of that

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abstention on the minds, I fear, of many of the countries composing the League, which was to diminish what they considered their moral responsibility for enforcing the objects of the League. They may not in those circumstances have thought it necessary or felt it incumbent upon them to enforce the collective provisions of the League. It is not surprising, therefore, that we, to whom their enforcement must, at any rate, be inconvenient, and may be dangerous, should think twice or three times before we combine to take the action which is desired. I cannot help thinking, though without a very great degree of confidence, that the road, it seems to me the only one, on which His Majesty's Government can travel may at last bring them to the goal which we all desire to see reached.
LORD ADDINGTON: My Lords, the debate has covered a wide field, and I only propose for a very few moments to direct your Lordships' minds to the realities of the existing situation which we are called upon to consider by the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Arnold. I do not think any one of us can look round on the conditions of the world to-day without being convinced that there is more fear, more national selfishness and self-sufficiency and less, co-operation than there was a year or two ago. There is fear of war, of aggression, of attack from the air, fear of shortage of essential commodities—whether foodstuffs or raw materials—an increasing tendency for each nation to seek its security in its own territories and to get those essential commodities under its own control. I believe we are very largely responsible for that condition of affairs.
Since the War the world has been looking anxiously to us, for a lead, and I fear it has not got a lead of the kind that it wanted. I believe it was largely for us to take a lead in the revision of those clauses in the Peace Treaties which were made when men's passions were high, and that were even then intended to be modified as conditions changed. I think there is only one instance of a peaceful change of treaty conditions, and I duly appreciate the share which His Majesty's Government had in bringing that into being. But we have waited until those changes have been made unilaterally one by one, and then have contented ourselves with somewhat petulant protests about the sanctity of treaties.
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Cannot we now admit that we have made mistakes in this direction in the past, that we have done (under different conditions it is true) many of the things that we are blaming other countries for doing in the last few years? Cannot we admit our mistake in having a policy that followed on events instead of foreseeing them and seeking the solution to problems before they become burning national issues? I readily admit many of the difficulties of His Majesty's Government. In framing their policy they have not had that whole-hearted support from the country as a whole which they might have been led to expect. There has been in the country a moral dry rot and a decay of standards both in youth and age, as I and some of my friends have been seeing as we travel about England, and of which many of our leaders seem to be singularly unaware. This has led, and must lead, to a moral revolt.
On the other hand, I have also been seeing in this country, and many other countries, the beginning of a moral and spiritual awakening which is leading to a new confidence among many people, a new freedom from fear and inferiority, the creation of a new atmosphere in which alone conferences can be successful and problems can be solved. Particularly in this year the nations of the world are looking to us in this country to give a lead. That lead can only be given by statesmen who are wholly committed to the will of God and whose backing is a public opinion alive to the real spiritual and moral issues. At a time when the statesmen of the Empire are coming together the supreme issue may well be to re-examine the true foundations on which our Empire rests. When those foundations have begun to rot great empires of the past have crashed. These are some of the realities of the situation. I believe it is in the light of these realities, and only in the light of these realities, that our statesmen can face the practical issues which are before the world to-day.
We must set ourselves to remove the causes that lead to war. A policy which I think would be more effective than armaments is to try to understand and to meet the needs of other nations, to see whether we cannot share with them the resources in raw materials and in markets and in spaces for development which have been

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entrusted to us, to see if by sharing we can build the world prosperity for which there has been a call by many of the influential leaders of the world. A smaller share of such prosperity may well be greater than the whole of the chaos which is the alternative with which we are faced. I am convinced that men of good will in many countries of the world will give a firm and loyal support to such a policy. What is needed to bring British foreign policy into accord with the realities of the existing situation is not the steering of a middle course between the opposing forces of revolutionary activities existing in the world to-day, but what may well prove even more revolutionary, a policy founded upon the will and purpose of God, which has never been fully tried, seeking to apply His answer to the problems which have not been solved by the wisdom of man.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, one of the most striking and attractive features of debates in your Lordships' House is the way in which opinions on great issues such as this cut across all ordinary Party boundaries. During these two days I have found myself somewhat in agreement with most of the speakers but I fear completely in agreement with hardly any of them. To a very great extent I sympathise with the attitude of the noble Lord, Lord Arnold, but I was not able to follow him in what, to him, was the logical conclusion of the policy of isolation. He went further than I could go in suggesting that that should be accompanied at the same time by apparently the more or less complete abandonment of all our forces. To my way of thinking, and I believe that it is a view shared by the great majority of people in this country, His Majesty's Government are absolutely right in pushing on with rearmament as fast as is possible, because I believe that a strong and well armed Britain is the greatest factor for peace that could exist in the world to-day.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, appealed even more fervently for complete disarmament, but I submit that he gave away his case completely when he admitted that had he been in Russia he would not be alive and that had he been in Germany he would have been in a concentration camp. I think he was a
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little optimistic as regards his position in Germany. Unfortunately totalitarian, dictatorial nations are not subject to arguments based upon good will and pacifism. I have not had the privilege of meeting either Herr Hitler or Stalin, but I have met Signor Mussolini and he made it perfectly clear that he had neither liking nor respect for pacifists. So far as the British Empire was concerned he would respect it and be its friend just as long as it was prepared to keep, and if necessary to fight to keep, its possessions. That attitude I think is one which is shared by Germany, except that I am not quite so certain of the friendly intentions of Germany.
The noble Lord, Lord Mount Temple, made an impassioned appeal for us to be more sympathetic towards Germany. I am not myself in any way inclined to hostility towards that country, but at the same time I do not think I am speaking for myself alone when I say that it is impossible to regard Germany as the equal of other civilised nations as long as she continues her present policy of the persecution of racial minorities and all forms of religion which do not happen to coincide with the extreme form of almost Slate Theism which the German Government is apparently trying to establish. The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, turned, I thought, somewhat pointedly in my direction when he commented acidly on the temporary alliance between those whom he was pleased to call diehards—a description I repudiate—and the noble Lord, Lord Arnold, and warned those whom he designated diehards that Lord Arnold and his friends were what he termed hot customers. We fully appreciate that, and in supping with them we will take not only a long spoon but one well insulated against heat.
Now I would come to the position in which the Government find themselves to-day. The noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, rather gave away the Government's case when he said, quite rightly, in speaking of the League of Nations, that from the very beginning it had suffered from lack of universality and that unfortunately its situation had been aggravated in the last few years. I feel that that is a point which cannot be overstressed. To put it colloquially the League never had a chance from the start and unfortunately the League has an even less fair chance

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than it had then. At the beginning of its career it suffered from the defection of the United States of America. It still suffers from that, and also from the disappearance of Germany and Japan and the virtual abstention of Italy. I suggest that it is poor compensation for the loss of those great countries that the League should have acquired the doubtful benefit of having Soviet Russia as a Member. Collective security, which I understand it is the intention of the Government to try to rebuild—or rather to build, because up to now it has never existed—can surely never work until such time as all the Great Powers are again Members of the League of Nations. Until that time surely we must depend upon our armed forces, which as I have said the Government are very rightly increasing, although, equally rightly, with the greatest reluctance.
We should also have a foreign policy which will as far as humanly possible keep us out of foreign entanglements. We have at the present time far too many commitments. We are bound by various articles of the Treaties immediately following the War and the position to-day may easily become one of extreme danger. We might be called upon to go to the help, for example, of a country often mentioned in this debate, Czechoslovakia, and at the same time find that once we were engaged there we should have to devote our attention to some other infinitely more vital place and no longer have the wherewithal to do it. It is not possible for us in any circumstances, as far as I can see, to build up our forces to such an extent that we can undertake at one time the responsibility of maintaining the peace of Europe and the much more vital responsibility of ensuring the safety of our own country and our own Empire.
So far as that country of Czechoslovakia is concerned, it is possibly the greatest danger spot in Europe to-day, where unfortunately there are a great many other danger spots. If we were to be called upon to assist Czechoslovakia, we should not be assisting a homogeneous unit, but one of the worst geographical jokes perpetrated by Messrs. Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson. It is a country of an impossible shape and of about fifteen million inhabitants, of whom rather less than half belong to the ruling Czech race. The remainder are minorities of several different kinds—Hungarians,
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Poles, Slovaks, none of whom enjoy the benefits of being ruled by the Czechs, but those who enjoy it least are the so-called Slovak-Deutsch Germans, some three million in number, of whom some two-thirds are very strongly Nazi in their sympathies. Were an attempt to be made by the Germans to invade Czechoslovakia, there is little doubt that they would find the country immediately torn by dissension and not capable of putting up a very good resistance, good though her Army might be. In those circumstances we might well find ourselves in the position of having to support an already lost cause, and to support it with such force, as I have said, that at home we might be put in a position of very great danger. I submit that we ought to have a foreign policy which will keep us much freer of entanglements than the one with which we are faced, or may be threatened, at the present time.
In conclusion I would draw the attention of your Lordships, and especially that of the Government, to one of the most cogent arguments used by Lord Arnold: that in order to prosecute any war successfully you must have at least 90 per cent. of the population behind you. At the present time, for any war except a war fought in defence of our own Empire and our own interests, we should not find 50 per cent. of the people of this country behind any Government that proposed to enter such a war. Our position would be made more dangerous by twenty, fifty or a hundred times. How far we could be judges of when it would be necessary to intervene, of when our interests were involved, would be a matter for the Government to decide. I would not go so far as Lord Arnold in saying that we should never be drawn in except when directly attacked. Should Spain, for example, decide that she was willing to sell or otherwise hand over the Canaries to Germany, I think we should be absolutely entitled to say that we refused to allow anything of the sort to happen, as it would be a very grave threat to our own national security.
But I am convinced that until we get some foreign policy of that sort, not only will our position in Europe be a dangerous one but also, should that position lead us into war, we should not have a united country behind the Government. To enter into any war at the present time would be terrible, but to enter into one

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unless we were 99 per cent. unanimous would be an absolute disaster. Finally, I do not believe that war is inevitable. I think that with decent statesmanship in every country we ought to be able to avoid it altogether, and I suggest that our best way of doing so is an approximation of our foreign policy in the future to the lines I have indicated rather than those which we seem to be following at the present day.
LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD: My Lords, I beg to move that the debate be adjourned until to-morrow.
Moved, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Lord Allen of Hurtwood.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly till tomorrow.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: My Lords, before we adjourn may I say that I understand that it is proposed that we should meet at three o'clock to-morrow and that we should resume this debate after the conclusion of the business that at present stands on the Paper.
House adjourned at a quarter before seven o'clock.