Lords Sitting of 30 June 1937

Preamble
The House met at half-past three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH.
The Right Honourable Vere Brabazon, Earl of Bessborough in the Peerage of Ireland, G.C.M.G., having been created Earl of Bessborough in the Peerage of the United Kingdom—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
VISCOUNT DAVIDSON.
The Right Honourable Sir John Colin Campbell Davidson, G.C.V.O., C.H., C.B., having been created Viscount Davidson of Little Gaddesden in the County of Hertford—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
LORD ADDISON.
The Right Honourable Christopher Addison, having been created Baron Addison of Stallingborough in the County of Lincoln—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
TEACHERS (SUPERANNUATION) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.
POST OFFICE AND TELEGRAPH (MONEY) BILL.
Brought from the Commons endorsed with the Certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill within the meaning of the Parliament Act, 1911; read 1a; and to be printed.

CINEMATOGRAPH FILMS (ANIMALS) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.
LLANDUDNO GAS ORDER, 1937.
MARLBOROUGH GAS ORDER, 1937.
WINSFORD GAS ORDER, 1937.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Templemore, I beg to move that the Special Orders, as reported from the Special Orders Committee yesterday, be approved.
Moved, That the Special Orders, as reported from the Special Orders Committee yesterday, be approved.—(The Earl of Lucan.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CONWAY GAS COMPANY LIMITED ORDER, 1937.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My Lords, again on behalf of my noble friend Lord Templemore, I beg to move the second Motion standing on the Paper in his name.
Moved, That the Special Order, as reported from the Special Orders Committee on the 22nd instant, be approved.—(The Earl of Lucan.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

PIER AND HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDER (FALMOUTH) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed for Tuesday next.
PIER AND HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDER (CULAG (LOCHINVER)) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed for Tuesday next.
PIER AND HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDER (FOWEY) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed for Tuesday next.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (MAIDENHEAD WATER) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed for Tuesday next.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (SEVENOAKS WATER) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed for Tuesday next.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (TONBRIDGE WATER) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed for Tuesday next.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (BRIDLINGTON) BILL. [H.L.]
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (GUILDFORD) BILL. [H.L.]
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (RHYMNEY VALLEY SEWERAGE DISTRICT AND WESTERN VALLEYS (MONMOUTHSHIRE) SEWERAGE DISTRICT) BILL. [H.L.]
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (SOUTH EAST ESSEX JOINT HOSPITAL DISTRICT) BILL. [H.L.]
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Amendments proposed by the Committee made.

WIDOWS', ORPHANS' AND OLD AGE CONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS (VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTORS) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Viscount Gage.)
On Question, Bill read 3a.
Clause 1:
General provisions as to persons entitled to become special voluntary contributors.
1.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person, not being a person mentioned in the First Schedule to this Act, shall, if he gives notice in that behalf in the prescribed manner and if he fulfils the requirements hereinafter mentioned, thereupon become insured for the purposes of the Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act, 1936 (in this Act referred to as "the principal Act"), as a voluntary contributor thereunder, and pensions shall become payable in respect of his insurance accordingly.
The said requirements are as follows, that is to say:

(a) in the case of a person who gives notice as aforesaid not later than twelve months after the commencement of this Act (in this Act referred to as an "initial entrant"), that he was under the age of fifty-five at the commencement of this Act;

(b) in the case of a person who is not an initial entrant, that he is at the date of his notice under the age of forty; and

(c) in the case of any person, whether an initial entrant or not—

(i) that he is resident in Great Britain at the date of the notice and has been so resident for a period of not less than ten years immediately before that date; and

(ii) that he has a total income not exceeding four hundred pounds a year in the case of a man, or two hundred and fifty pounds a year in the case of a woman, of which not more than two hundred pounds a year in the case of a man, or one hundred and twenty-five pounds a year in the case of a woman, is unearned income.

LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH moved to insert in subsection (1), after paragraph (b):

"(c) in the case of any person being an initial entrant, and in the case of a man who is not an initial entrant, that he has a total income not exceeding four hundred pounds a year of which not more than two hundred pounds a year is unearned income;

(d) in the case of a woman who is not an initial entrant that she has a total income not exceeding two hundred and fifty pounds a year of which not more than one hundred and twenty-five pounds a year is unearned income; and"

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the two Amendments on the Paper in my name both have reference to the same
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matter, and it will not be necessary for me to trouble your Lordships with more than one explanation. You will recollect that the question of the diversity of income limit between men and women has been referred to both on the occasion of the Second Reading and in Committee on the Bill, and that on the Committee stage an Amendment was moved which would have removed the difference, and rendered it possible for women with incomes of over £250, and up to £400 a year, equally with men, to have the advantage of the benefits of this Bill. The circumstances have been referred to on both stages of the Bill and I do not think it is necessary for me to do more than remind your Lordships quite briefly of what it is that we seek to achieve through this Amendment, which is a mere shadow of the Amendment which was moved on the Committee stage.
I need only remind your Lordships in a word that the people whom this Bill will benefit are in the main the small shopkeepers—in the case of women, newsagents, confectioners, boot and shoe shopkeepers, and so on—also a large class of professional and salaried women, including women doctors and people like the women house property managers and many others. In the Committee stage the Government were unable to accept the view that these women should be admitted to the full benefits of the Bill. The main thing which we seek to achieve is, of course, that they should be given the same facilities for making provision for their old age as the men of similar incomes. The Amendment to-day is directed to a much narrower object. It has always been admitted that there would be many hard cases excluded by the present form of the Bill. The Amendment to-day relinquishes of course, as we must after the decision of your Lordships' House, any attempt to secure the recognition of the principle, which has hitherto always been maintained inviolate, of equality of treatment of men and women in the national health insurance scheme. And it is because this Amendment is so much smaller and directed to the rectification of a particular class of hardship, that I venture to hope the Government will no longer harden their hearts, but make this very small concession.
Under this Amendment if it were put in the Bill only those women with incomes

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of over £250 a year and under £400 would be admitted to the benefits of the Bill who were what are called initial entrants. That is to say, entry to the scheme would be granted to women up to the age of fifty-five, as in the case of men, during the first year, but also up to the income limit of £400. There is already, as your Lordships know, the very excellent and very generous provision in the Bill that for the first year of entry the age limit is fifty-five and not forty. This Amendment seeks to make the income limit for women in the first year £400, and not £250. It would have this great advantage, that it would include within the scope of the Bill a large group of the hard cases, to which I have referred on previous stages of the Bill; that is, the women aged to-day, we will say from forty to fifty, who came into employment in the War. They represent a large number of the women who, when their husbands and brothers and fathers went to the front, buckled to and really carried on the economic and agricultural life of the country.
It is unnecessary to emphasise to your Lordships the obligation under which the country lies to the women who, in the familiar phrase, kept the home fires burning during that time, and every one who saw the rally of ex-Servicemen in Hyde Park a few days ago must have felt that we were right to continue to keep alive the memory of what we owe to all those who did their share at that time. I submit to your Lordships that these women have just as great a claim on your Lordships' generosity as the ex-Servicemen who went to the front, and by accepting this Amendment the Government would, I think, do a great deal to meet the plea of hard cases, because, within we will say twenty or twenty-five years, the women concerned will have passed on. Then the younger women coming on will have had a chance to come in under the Bill through being eligible owing to their incomes being under £250. It would undoubtedly do much to relieve the sense of grievance from which women, I think legitimately, suffer to-day.
On the occasion of the Committee stage I asked the Government what inquiry they had made as to the number of hard cases and as to the number of women who had dependants, and I would
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remind your Lordships that the point about dependants is that if a woman has during her twenties or thirties to support dependants, such as aged relatives, it impairs her capacity to provide for her own old age. The Leader of the House, with that charm which beguiles those who have the misfortune to disagree with him, frankly said that no inquiry whatever had been made. He indicated that he did not think any inquiry was of any use. I am bound to say I thought that an astonishing stand to take. We bring forward cases of hardship, we ask what inquiry has been made, and we are told that no inquiry is of any use. I think the boot ought to be on the other foot. We can prove hard cases and, as this is a Bill admittedly to meet hard cases—the Government Actuary says that a very small proportion, perhaps 25 per cent. of the eligibles will go in—we think the Government ought to be ready to concede this small Amendment. I venture to hope that the Government will, even at this late stage, be willing to make a concession to what is a very strong feeling in the country, and be ready to accept this Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 14, at end insert the said paragraphs.—(Lord Balfour of Burleigh.)
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I just want to say on behalf of my noble friends that we think this is a good Amendment in all the circumstances, and we hope the Government will accept it. If necessary, we are prepared to support the noble Lord.
VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, my noble friend has moved a modified edition of the same Amendment as he moved in Committee, and I am afraid I must give a modified edition of the answer that I gave then. I do not want to repeat my arguments, but I might perhaps stress one point. We have heard a great deal in these discussions about hard cases, and, although I do not blame the noble Lord for that, I really believe that if anybody had listened to these debates without having read the Bill, he might have imagined that we were doing something in this measure to inflict certain hardships on women from which they had never suffered before. Of course the exact reverse is the case. The hard cases exist already, and what we are doing in this Bill is something to relieve those hard case. I

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understand from the noble Lord's argument that if a woman has to spend a lot of money in her early age in supporting elderly relatives she may not have sufficient to provide for her own old age. We are, anyhow, providing for the most deserving and the poorest cases, and we are doing this for the first time.
I think it is quits natural when there is a good offer going, as this is, and particularly the provisions for the initial entrants—I thought the noble Lord perhaps rather minimised the amount of the Government contributions in respect of this initial entry scheme—that somebody should want to extend the scope of the Bill and take in a few more people. It is quite natural that somebody should say that we have drawn the line too low. Nevertheless, I do not believe that that is the real explanation of this agitation against this part of the Bill. I cannot help feeling that if this had been a simple scheme to provide old age pensions for both men and women up to the income limit of £250 we should not have heard anything like so much about these hard cases as we have. As we know, the real explanation is that there is this idea that men are getting out of this scheme more than women, and I have devoted considerable time to trying to show that that is really not a true comparison. I do not intend to repeat those arguments to-day.
I realise that I failed to convince my noble friend, and I realise too that he has put forward a counter-proposal. It seems to me that the counter-proposal really amounts to this, that because some women have dependants therefore all women must be admitted to this scheme on exactly the same terms as the men, but at half the contribution price. That is the effect of the Amendments which have been put down. I fail to see why that distinction should be drawn, but I am not entirely surprised because it is not an easy matter to devise an Amendment within the structure of this Bill which combines real equality with the obvious appearance of equality. That does not mean that the Government wish to shut the door finally to any possibility of advance. We think we have covered the vast majority of these women who have a real claim for State assistance. My noble friend does not. I would suggest this to him, that he should try it out, and if after a reasonable time it is found that
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my noble friend is right, well, there is no greater finality about this Bill than about any of its predecessors.
I would remind my noble friend that there has been a considerable advance in insurance in recent years. In fact I am quite prepared to give an undertaking on that point to my noble friend in these words: "As the Minister of Health stated in another place, he regards this measure as filling a further gap in our national social insurance scheme. Whilst emphasising the magnitude of that scheme, he added that he would be one of the first to desire to see a good many gaps filled. This view was also taken by my noble friend the Leader of the House during discussion at the Committee stage of the noble Lord's Amendment. In these circumstances it is clear that from time to time the Government of the day will review the working of the scheme in order to decide whether any further advance could be made and if so what direction it should take. This would obviously involve the weighing up of the claims which have been made by various classes of persons that the benefits conferred by one or other of the existing pensions schemes should be extended to them, and I can assure the noble Lord that in any such review the claims of the women with others will be sympathetically considered."
My noble friend is well aware of the restrained tone of Departmental statements, and I also know well that my noble friend is just as capable of making the most of these statements as any other member of your Lordships' House. I would therefore respectfully suggest to him that his apprehensions—and I am sure we all respect his apprehensions about this Bill—might be more effectively met by doing as I suggest, and waiting to see how the Bill does actually turn out in practice, than by pressing on with his Amendment. After all, it is only a limited edition of the same Amendment as he moved the other day, but it is limited to that part of the Government's proposals which involve the maximum expense to the Government It would extend the Government's liability, and therefore it would be bound to raise opposition in another place. Finally, as I have said, I do not believe it would produce the equality my noble friend desires. It is not for me to dictate the course of action which my noble friend

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should take, and I must leave it to him to decide.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, I do not wish to repeat the arguments I briefly addressed to your Lordships on the Committee stage. I would not have risen except for one passage in my noble friend's speech. He said that what we really contended was that it was wrong to make a discrimination between men and women, and that if the limit had been made £250 for both of them the greater part of our argument would have been destroyed. He is perfectly right, at least as far as I am concerned. I look back now for more years than I like to think on the great controversy which has occurred in this country by reason of the demand of women for equality before the law with men. It goes back to more than a generation, a great deal more than a generation. That has been their contention. It so happened that I was attending a meeting of women last night, when we were talking about the old times, and they said: "It is perfectly true it was not a question of whether we were going to gain very much by the franchise. What we resented was the treatment of women on a different footing from men."
That is what they resent, and I think properly resent. Although this is a small matter relatively, they feel that at this stage of our history for a Government with an immense majority behind them and enormous power, and therefore able to do exactly as they like, to put forward a Bill which is still on the principle that women are not to be treated on the same footing as men, is a very unfortunate decision. That is really the whole difficulty and the whole trouble between us. I do not know whether my noble friend is going to divide the House or not, but if he does so I shall feel bound to support him in order to express my deep regret that the Government have taken this line, which I am satisfied has no serious backing behind it in point of policy and which will create a considerable amount of dissatisfaction and uneasiness on the part of a great many women who are among the best citizens of the country.
LORD GAINFORD: My Lords, on the last occasion the noble Marquess, Lord Crewe, who leads this group, supported
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Lord Balfour's proposal. We all support the compromise suggestion which has been made to-day. It indicates a more favourable attitude towards women than the Government have been prepared to adopt hitherto, and I hope the compromise arrangement will be accepted as a reasonable one.
VISCOUNT GAGE: By leave of the House, may I add one point? There seems to be some misconception. The whole structure of the Bill is devised to meet different insurance liabilities. I have made that point several times. It is not a simple old age scheme. It saddles the man with responsibility for family insurance, and, as I said on Second Reading and also in Committee, it is not a question of equality, it is a question of difference of treatment. I do not think I can usefully add to the speeches I have already made on more than one occasion.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: My Lords, I am of course ready to admit that men and women have different responsibilities. This is amply provided for in the general structure of the Bill. The man's contribution is at the rate of 1s. 3d. and the woman's very much less. The woman has only her own age to provide for and, in the case of children, if she is the wife of an uninsured man or a widow with children, she has her children to provide for, but her contributions are very much less. It is a question of allowing women with similar responsibilities similar rights. It is beyond contradiction that a woman in the same position as a man—there may be few of them, but the woman with the same responsibilities as a man does not get the privilege a man has. The noble Viscount has said that in order to create fairness in this matter you have got to put the women on a different basis. That was the argument used in Roman days. The Romans used to say that, in order to create equality, you had to treat women unfairly. I thought we had advanced since the days of the Romans, but apparently the noble Viscount does not think so.
Do not let us be frightened by the bogey of expense. It is estimated by the Government Actuary that 100,000 women out of 500,000 eligible will come into the scheme and that the cost to the Exchequer will be £4,000,000 and the capital sum is equivalent to an equalised annual

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charge of £1,200,000 over a term of thirty years. The Actuary says the number of women eligible to join cannot be assessed with any attempt at precision. If we assume that this will increase the number by 10 per cent. it only means an addition of £20,000 a year for thirty years, and that really is not a reason for refusing what is elementary justice. In view
Bill passed.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
LORD RENNELL LORD RENNELL had the following Notice on the Order Paper:—To ask His Majesty's Government if, when the question of reform of the League of Nations is brought forward at Geneva, discussions will on the first occasion be restricted to the issue of whether revision is necessary or desirable; or whether it is contemplated that definite proposals should be submitted at that meeting and, if so, whether His Majesty's Government intend forthwith to lay a scheme of revision before the Council; and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, in submitting to His Majesty's Government the Question that stands in my name,
of the support that I have received I feel bound to put your Lordships to the trouble of a Division.
On Question, Whether the proposed words shall be there inserted?
Their Lordships divided:—Contents, 33; Not-Contents, 41.

CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Allen of Hurtwood, L.

Hewart, L.

Askwith, L.

Holden, L.

Clarendon, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L. [Teller.]

Ker, L. (M. Lothian.)

Denbigh, E.

Mendip, L. (V. Clifden.)

Rosslyn, E.

Clwyd, L.

Mottistone, L.

Selborne, E.

Daryngton, L.

Noel-Buxton, L.

Strafford, E.

Derwent, L.

O'Hagan, L.

Dickinson, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Astor, V.

Faringdon, L.

Rennell, L.

Cecil of Chelwood, V. [Teller.]

Farrer, L.

Rowallan, L.

Mersey, V.

Gainford, L.

Stanmore, L.

Samuel, V.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Strabolgi, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Hailsham, V. (L. Chancellor.)

Lindsay, E.

Butler of Mount Juliet, L. (E. Carrick.)

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Halifax, V. (L. President.)

Mansfield, E.

Carnock, L.

Mar and Kellie, E.

Cautley, L.

De La Warr, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Munster, E.

Elton, L.

Peel, E.

Fermanagh, L. (E. Erne.)

Plymouth, E.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Argyll, D.

Stanhope, E.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Wicklow, E.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Dufferin and Ava, M.

Illingworth, L.

Salisbury, M.

Bertie of Thame, V.

Kilmarnock, L. (E. Erroll.)

Greenwood, V.

Lamington, L.

Airlie, E.

Lawrence, L.

Beatty, E.

Mancroft, L.

Bessborough, E.

Amulree, L.

Sempill, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Baden-Powell, L.

Strickland, L.

Lichfield, E.

Bayford, L.

Wigan, L. (E. Crawford.)

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

and which has been down for a very considerable time on the Order Paper, I will frankly admit that I had in view as an object the promotion of a pretty thorough discussion of the question of the reform of the League of Nations in good time before it should come up at the meeting of the Assembly at Geneva in the autumn. When, some fifteen months ago, I asked His Majesty's Government whether they contemplated or had under consideration any steps for a revision of the Covenant of the League, I was informed in reply that they had no intention at that time of proceeding with any such scheme. From this answer it seemed permissible to infer that till then their faith in the illusive dream of collective security under the existing League had not been weakened. A few months later, however, your Lordships' House was informed that reform of the League of Nations was receiving the attention of

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the Government. The country was given to understand elsewhere that in due course the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would consider at Geneva, in conjunction with the representatives of those countries which still adhere to the League, by what means their common decisions could be enforced—or "made effective," I think the words were—in the case of an aggressor.
When international deliberations are in prospect definite pronouncements and decisions must naturally be suspended until those deliberations have revealed whether any measure of agreement may be anticipated. I should, therefore, not press His Majesty's Government to make any premature public announcement as to the policy that they intend to adopt. At the same time I put my Question in the particular form in which it stands upon the Order Paper because it seems to me that if Geneva should declare itself, as I think it must, in favour of revision and reform, it would certainly be desirable before proceeding to discuss particular points to ascertain what conditions those countries which have withdrawn from the League would advance for returning to an institution which, after all, must depend for any real influence upon general acceptance of its principles.
The interest taken in this country in the future of the League is intense, though it sometimes seems to me that some, if not many, of its most enthusiastic supporters do not always appear really altogether to appreciate its implications and complexities. There is manifestly a division of opinion whether or not military as well as economic sanctions should be preserved in a revised Covenant; whether even economic sanctions alone should be maintained, or whether the interests of peace might not best be served by eliminating compulsory measures altogether and restricting the functions of the League to securing an authoritative decision on issues submitted to it. Some time ago, on April 14, there appeared in The Times a letter over a number of signatures of public men of very diverse political tendencies. This letter contained a very impressive warning of the dangers of that so-called full League policy which would, in the opinion of the writers, divide the world into two separate political allegiances and make it practically impossible to reconstitute the League as
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an instrument of conciliation and concord. A little later—it was actually on June 21—there was another letter in the Daily Telegraph over an even larger number of signatures advancing precisely the opposite opinion and urging that the coercive powers of the League required strengthening.
As to the first of these letters, having signed it myself I think I need make no comment. As to the second I can only express my conviction that while, no doubt, it represents the views of a great many League idealists in this country it is not likely to secure very much support outside it, and you cannot constitute a League all by yourself. I should not, of course, expect in your Lordships' House any indication which of these two letters approximates most nearly to the official view, but I have noticed with great satisfaction that the members of the Imperial Conference, which fortunately assembled in good time before the meeting of the League of Nations in the autumn, laid down very definitely their view that you must not use force as between nations, and that differences and national needs should be settled rather on the lines of co-operation, joint inquiry and conciliation. They laid it down that nothing could be more damaging to the cause of international peace than to divide the world into two distinct and opposing groups. It seems to me the Government have there at any rate a very distinct line of guidance for the course that they will probably take in view of those decisions of the Imperial Conference.
There are, however, apart from that general principle, a large number of anomalies and questions upon doubtful points in the existing League Covenant on which I think it is legitimate to invite discussion, so that we may not leave the direction of public opinion in this country solely in the hands of an organisation, the members of which—or the majority of them—appear to look upon the existing Covenant as something inviolable and almost sacrosanct. Among these there are several on which I shall be glad, if possible, to have the views of His Majesty's Government, though I dare say it is very difficult for them to give any pronouncement. I should like to know whether they will seek or favour a clearer definition of much of the very ambiguous phraseology used in the League Covenant, such, for instance, as that which restricts member-

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ship to fully self-governing States. What are fully self-governing States? Do those words include any territorial unit entirely independent of any other State? Can they be applied, for instance, to geographical areas occupied by primitive peoples subject to the despotic rule of the strongest? There is good reason to believe that that was not the view which was taken by His Majesty's Government, though perhaps they have acquiesced in their opinions being overriden.
Again, do they contemplate the retention in the Covenant of Articles which have become in practice a dead letter, such as Article 10, by which the obligation is laid upon Members to preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and the political independence of all other Members? And, of course, depending to some extent on that, one might have to consider Article 16, but I do not propose to-day to discuss that, for we first require to know what is going to be done with Article 10. Then, do the Government uphold the principle of unanimity in voting in view of the fact that there must be, in all international affairs, many cases where unanimity is practically impossible? And, not altogether dissociated from that point, do they not consider that there is something abnormal in small nations with a population of, say, three or four hundred thousand having precisely the same voting-power as those which control one-fifth or one-sixth of the population of the world? Then, I should also be glad to know whether they would assent to, or even advocate, the discussion at Geneva of matters which, when the League Covenant was drafted, had not yet come up for public consideration in the world: such, for instance, as the influence—to my mind almost as dangerous as that of the competition in armaments—of agencies and offices of propaganda organised for purposes of influencing opinion in other countries and damaging their position with their neighbours and their friends. It seems to me not inconceivable that a reformed League of Nations might to some extent constitute itself an information bureau which would act in some cases as a deterrent and in any case as a corrective of misrepresentations spread abroad to the world deliberately or even only in ignorance.
There are several other important points to which I have no doubt subsequent speakers will draw attention. In order, however, not to be too long, I will confine myself to one more only which seems to me of very considerable importance. Have His Majesty's Government considered all the implications and the restrictions on League action which may result from the insertion in the Covenant of Article 21, which is practically an international recognition of the Monroe doctrine, there, euphemistically, it appears to me, described as a regional understanding? The Monroe doctrine was, of course, the assertion of a principle or a claim to uphold it, and in no way an agreement, unless the absence of challenge could convert it into one. The essential question for us to consider is, however, its accepted interpretation when Article 21 was included in the Covenant. In the form in which the doctrine was originally propounded by President Monroe, as an inhibition to European States to impose their political systems on the American Continent, it was in entire agreement with the British policy of that time as asserted by Canning. It was welcomed, of course, by all the South American States, to whom its adoption was of advantage, and one may say that there were nothing in it, as originally formulated, with which the prescriptions adopted nearly a century later in the Covenant of the League of Nations would have been in conflict.
But the Monroe doctrine was subsequently expanded by President Cleveland and his successors until it has come to have a far wider significance, and in fact to imply that the United States are not disposed to admit any intervention but their own on the whole of the American Continent. There must be many members of your Lordships' House who vividly remember, as I do, the British Guiana-Venezuela boundary dispute and the terms of the Olney-Cleveland ultimatum to Great Britain—for in fact it was nothing short of an ultimatum—when a very trying situation arose which was only happily resolved by the reasonable action of the old diplomacy. I am not here and now proposing to discuss the Monroe doctrine as it has been expanded in subsequent pronouncements which have not, as far as I know, encountered any direct protests, nor am I concerned with how7 far these: may have been acceptable to the

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Central and South American States who, having also adhered to the League of Nations, seem to me now to be involved in a sort of dual obligation. It is clear to me in practice, however, that any action by the League may be excluded in half the world by the insertion of Article 21 in a Covenant which was intended to be universal in its application.
Is it not, moreover, anomalous that a group of States which constitute such a very important element in the League of Nations, both on account of their numbers and of the ability of their representatives, should be able to take their part in decisions affecting Europe, Asia and Africa but might be precluded from referring to Geneva disputes arising on the Continent in which they are most directly interested? Such a disability, if I am right in so interpreting it, imposed by a non-member State is hardly calculated to increase confidence in the efficacy of a League from which some of the most important Members have withdrawn, while among those who still adhere to it the most influential are uncomfortably conscious of certain divergencies in their own political outlook and not without mistrust of the liabilities in which they may thereby be involved. This was one of the reasons why I have urged on various occasions that in a reformed League there should be three separate Councils, each representing the peoples occupying territories in Europe, in America and in Asia, and that a General Assembly representing all nations at Geneva should, by confirming or dissenting from the views of these separate Councils, record the world's decision. Such a moral sanction would, I believe, be far more likely to be effective than any such unpractical scheme as that of an International Police Force. A League reconstituted on such lines would, moreover, not necessarily exclude the existence of regional pacts designed to secure execution of decisions where there was recalcitrance.
In conclusion, I should like to make it clear that in raising certain matters for consideration and discussion I do so, not as an antagonist of the League, but as an advocate of a League which might unite and would not divide, and of which it appears to me that the principal aim must continue always to be the limitation of armaments. It is true that in some fifteen years of the existing
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League no progress whatever has been made in that direction. Not only that, but we ourselves have been obliged to abandon the very mistaken policy of unilateral disarmament. It is true also, in my opinion, that since Great Britain has shown a firm determination to restore the balance of material strength a better disposition towards pacific settlement of international questions begins to become appreciable. If, then, the logic of morals has shown itself temporarily weaker than the logic of power, we who have constantly and consistently opposed hazarding our own security by giving a lead in premature unilateral disarmament, none the less must deplore a propaganda which would exclude the idea of permanent peace from the faith of nations, and we—at least all those who think as I do—are ready to give our cordial support to any practical scheme for international co-operation and concord. I beg to move.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I venture to think that everybody in this House will agree with the sentiment expressed in the Motion which stands in Lord Rennell's name, that discussion should first of all attempt to determine whether revision is necessary m the Covenant, and that before any proposals of that nature are advocated by the British Government at Geneva they should be discussed in this House. There have been many discussions in your Lordships' House about the League of Nations, and as events have become more difficult in the world I think we become conscious of the essential dilemma which operates in most of our minds. I venture to think that there is hardly a citizen of this country who does not accept the League of Nations as an ideal, as a practical piece of machinery for approaching world unity, for the elimination of international discord, and for the solution of international disputes by peaceful means. But, on the other hand, I think more and more people are asking themselves whether the machinery which was constructed at Paris in 1918 can achieve the objects which its expounders had in view, in terms of the world as it is to-day.
A League of sovereign nations is inherently subject to limitations which its most enthusiastic advocates are sometimes inclined to forget. It is the outline of a noble ideal which some day may be realised, but because it is based on the sovereignty of its Members it is,

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as all historical experience goes to show, subject to certain inherent limitations. The more one studies the way it works the more one is driven to the conclusion that its principal difficulties arise from limitations which are inherent in the fact of sovereignty on the part of every single Member. These limitations operate, as I see, in three main fields. In the first place, any peace structure to be efficient must be able to remove grievances before they express themselves in violence or in war. It is a commonplace of domestic politics that unless Parliament can remove the grievances of any section of the community the time will come when that section of the community may be seriously tempted to resort to some kind of direct action, in order to remedy its grievances. It is just the same in international affairs. Unless you can remove the essential grievances in time you begin to get a state of mind, in one country or another, which considers that the denial of justice warrants it in taking the law into its own hands in order to secure justice. The one inherent limitation in the League arises because its Members are sovereign States, and the impediments in the way of bringing about any considerable modification of the status quo is extraordinarily great because those modifications can only be made with the consent of every one of the nations directly concerned. There is no legislative authority in the League instrument by which moral effect might be brought to bear—that is the inherent difficulty in any League consisting of sovereign States.
The second difficulty is that in dealing with what is called aggression the instrument which a League of sovereign States is inevitably driven to use in the last resort is force, and force applied by one or more States to another State, or group of States, means war or the risk of war. That was the fundamental reason which led to the creation of the federal system, because it was realised by experience, over and over again, that you cannot base a peace system upon a form of coercion which in the last resort means the use of war, since war lets loose evils immeasurably greater, probably, than the evils which it is designed to remedy or prevent. So that the coercive action of any League of sovereign States when a great Power is involved immediately brings to the centre of the stage the use of war. I remember very well a speech
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in another place giving as an illustration the greatest example of collective action, under the noblest banner which has ever been used in international affairs, the speeches of Woodrow Wilson in the year 1917 and 1918, when the League of the Allies in the last part of the War was a League of Democracy fighting for what, at any rate at that time, we believed to be the noblest ends; and he asked whether that was not sufficient proof of the view that to invoke or to accept the instrument of war as a means of promoting peace inherently broke down for the reason that once you had to use the remedy of war it was almost impossible to avoid creating conditions in time of peace which in themselves contained the seeds of fresh war.
The third difficulty of a League of sovereign nations is that the League itself has no means of limiting that economic nationalism which has probably, of all the causes of international unrest, of all the causes of the breakdown of democracy, of all the causes of rearmament, been the most potent in the years since 1918. It has therefore no power except the voluntary consent of its Members to reduce the barriers to trade—those barriers which have created vast unemployment, immense devastated areas in country after country, and which, as I say, are the most important single cause of the unrest from which the world suffers to-day. I am, as I believe all your Lordships are, a supporter of the principles for which the League stands, but I cannot help recognising that in the world as it is to-day, with a League of sovereign States, the instrument which has been created at Geneva is only a very slender beginning, and it is an instrument which, to-day at any rate, seems to be inadequate for the accomplishment of the vast ends which it has in view. If the world were to-day, as we hoped it would be in 1918, a world in which all nations in effect were democracies, in which all nations were Members of the League, I think the League structure would work.
After all, from that point of view the League structure does not differ very much from the structure of the British Commonwealth, except that we have arrived at a point in the British Commonwealth when we do not have to rely on written treaties, and we have no instrument in our Constitution which provides for any collective security within itself.

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None of the embarrassments which come from the wielding of the instrument of force occurs inside the British Commonwealth. And the reason why the British Commonwealth works is partly, no doubt, loyalty to similar institutions, loyalty to a common Crown, a certain community of language, community of tradition and so on, but fundamentally it is because, with one or two exceptions, practically all the peoples of the British Commonwealth are in essence contented with the status quo. They do not want to change the status quo in any serious degree. And if any member of the British Commonwealth did reach the point that he was profoundly dissatisfied with the status quo, and if it were impossible to remove its sense of grievance or its unsatisfied aspirations by agreement, I am not sure that the structure of the British Commonwealth would be able to stand the strain. By reason of the spirit which inspires the Commonwealth, by reason of the flexibility of its machinery, by reason of the fact that force is kept in the background, it is easy to gain a consideration of the profoundest difficulties and differences within it before they come to a head. By that means, so far at any rate, we have been able to remove them as a serious cause of conflict within itself.
Now we cannot say that, looking at the world as a whole, there is anything like that state of affairs which was contemplated and hoped for in 1918 or which exists in the British Commonwealth to-day. There are many nations which are profoundly dissatisfied with the status quo, some of them possibly justifiably, some of them not justifiably. My own view is that by far the greatest cause of the breakdown of the League of Nations has been the inability of the League during the years which followed the War to remedy those elements in the Treaty of Versailles which hardly anybody now regards as having been either justified or just. I do not want to enter into immediate controversy—that is not the subject matter of the Motion—but the reason why we have, let me say, a difficult Germany to deal with to-day is fundamentally because neither the Allies nor the League of Nations were able to do what President Wilson regarded as the most important single task of the League—to correct the mistakes which were made, inevitably made, in 1919 by
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peoples who were suffering from four years of war-time propaganda, who had no access to the literature of the origins of the War, and who were in those conditions inevitably bound to do things which were unsound in themselves, and which ought to have been corrected within a very few years. And it has been the failure of the League during that time, the failure of the major countries in it, to do that which is, I think, the fundamental reason why it has become weaker in later years.
There are many causes for that. The most important single cause was the unwillingness of the United States to accept the obligation, carrying with it what was an even greater disaster, which was the breakdown of the Anglo-American Treaty of Guarantee to France, the guarantee on which France accepted the Treaty. When it was withdrawn, France, because of her relative weakness against Germany, was driven to a policy of maintaining as long as she possibly could the whole Versailles structure intact, and of building up with her allies in Eastern Europe a military alliance system for the enforcement of the Treaty which in essence, in my view, was in conflict with the ideals of the League.
It is no use going back on those questions to-day. But I think you cannot help realising that the inherent limitation which I mentioned as being the first of the difficulties which those who hope to see the League gradually restored to a powerful instrument of peace, have got to deal with—the difficulty of altering the status quo—has had a very striking illustration in the difficulties which confronted many people in this country in trying to get an alteration of the economic provisions, political provisions, and armament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, either by disarmament or by alterations in the Treaty, during the years while the German Republic was in existence, because the League at that time was on the whole dominated by the beneficiaries of that Treaty. And I venture to suggest that perhaps the major reason why the League failed to deal with Abyssinia was that it had failed in the earlier years to give Germany justice.
The reason why so many nations in Europe—I will not specify which—were so reluctant to take vigorous action against a case of aggression was that they were mainly concerned with trying to

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maintain a situation in Europe, in which a great nation had been unilaterally disarmed and compelled to keep its frontier undefended and open to a devastating attack from its neighbours. If we had been able to remove the legitimate grievances of Germany in the earlier years after the War I think there would have been no difficulty either in preventing the unjustified attack on Abyssinia or in checking the aggression of Signor Mussolini. It was the German problem which at the bottom prevented the League from functioning in the way in which I believe this country wanted it to function and which I, at any rate, thought it ought to have functioned by taking the resolute action in a field in which we could exercise really decisive power to bring that conflict to an end on reasonably just terms.
I understand that there has been a discussion already at Geneva in the Committee that has been appointed to consider the revision of the Covenant. If my information is correct the real question is the degree to which the League either to-day or in the future can be a really effective instrument for the preservation of the peace of the world. The discussion on the whole turned between two views. There was the view of certain nations who were most anxious that the League should be strengthened by strengthening the sanctions clauses, by adding military sanctions or strengthening the military action of the League because they felt they were menaced. They wanted to collect as many guarantees as possible to defend themselves in the event of aggression. There was another group which felt that tilt most important thing was to disembarrass themselves of automatic obligations to impose sanctions which they did not feel themselves strong enough to impose or which they felt, if they attempted to put them on, would bring upon themselves overwhelming evils because they were too near powerful States they were unable to resist.
The universal sentiment, so I am informed, or the sentiment which seemed to inform the Imperial Conference itself, was that if the League is to be restored the most important single condition—in fact the only condition—on which the original idea of the League can be re-established is that the League itself should be restored to universality. That
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is the view quite clearly expressed in the Imperial Conference Report. It says:
"At the same time, being impressed with the desirability of strengthening the hands of the League by the enlargement of its membership …"
That is really the essence of the case. I do not believe that the League is going to recover much of its strength until two great questions are removed out of the orbit of immediate international dispute. One is the Spanish question and the other is the German question. Until these two problems are solved, I do not think there will be that general acquiescence in the status quo, that major acquiescence in the main outlines of the status quo, which I think is necessary to the successful functioning of a League of sovereign States. I am not going to express any opinion to-day as to how these two problems should be solved; but for a revised League of Nations, or a restored League of Nations, I do not personally believe that, except in minor matters, revision is desirable or necessary. If you have the conditions in which you have general acceptance of the status quo, in which you have universal membership, loyal membership, of the League, the Covenant will work pretty well.
One thing which is important—I To not think it needs an alteration of the Covenant—is that we should create a far more effective instrumentality than now exists for bringing about a revision. Article 19 has never actually been invoked, and there is no machinery, as far as I know, at present in existence by which it can be brought into effect. That is by far the biggest single addition to the machinery of the League which is necessary. For instance, supposing in the years after the War it had been possible under Article 19 to create an impartial Commission on which none of the beneficiaries of the Treaty of Versailles sat, and to which had been referred the question of revision after hearing evidence from Germany and the other defeated Powers on the one side and the Allies on the other as to what alterations in the Treaty were advisable in the interests of justice and peace and prosperity in the world—supposing that had been in existence automatically as part of the machinery of the League, and such a Commission with, let us say, the best representative which the United States could appoint at its head, could have

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defined the truth that peace in Europe depended on a much more vigorous revision of the Treaty of Versailles than had yet been contemplated, you would have had public opinion focused on those provisions before the difficulties involved in the emergence of the totalitarian States had arisen. You would have had a great public opinion behind you. That is, to my mind, far the most important aspect of Covenant revision. I do not believe it will be possible to get any effective measure of collective security until the nations are satisfied that there is an instrument for removing grievances and altering the status quo before they are asked to commit themselves to the responsibilities of collective action in order to maintain a status quo which is to-day practically unalterable.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, I rise to take part in this debate with considerable diffidence, and one of the causes of my diffidence is that I find it is often thought when I address your Lordships on these questions that I am speaking in the name of a great organisation to which I have the honour to belong, the League of Nations Union. I hope your Lordships will allow me to say that when I speak to your Lordships I speak as a member of this House, and nothing that I say binds anybody at all except myself. I am anxious to make that clear, not that I anticipate anything I am about to say is likely to be disagreed with by others, but I think it is very important that that principle should be recognised and admitted. We have heard two very interesting speeches, apparently completely divergent in what they recommended. Indeed, as far as I listened to them, the most important point on which they agreed was that, though they both warmly approved of the League of Nations, both of them desired to destroy it.
My noble friend Lord Rennell made a most interesting series of suggestions. He wanted to change the qualifications of membership of the League. He wanted to do something—he did not exactly say what—to Articles 10 and 16. He wanted to abolish the rule of unanimity. He wanted to create new machinery by which—he did not exactly say how—you would prevent unfair propaganda. He wanted—what, I did not quite make out—to do something to Article 21; at any
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rate he thoroughly disapproved of it, if I followed him rightly; and he was of opinion that there should be created three separate Councils which would deal with the proceedings of the League. I have no means of knowing what took place in the discussions of the Committee appointed to consider revision of the League, but I am quite certain that nobody made any proposals in the least resembling these put forward by my noble friend Lord Rennell, and he will probably agree with me that if anybody had proposed them there would not have been the slightest chance of their adoption.
My noble friend Lord Lothian took quite a different view. His view was that no change should be made in the Covenant except in minor details; but he advocated the creation of some machinery, or some understanding as to machinery, for dealing with Article 19. I warmly agree with that. Indeed, if I may be permitted a slight piece of autobiography, which is always a great mistake, I tried hard to convince the Commission which sat on the League of Nations to have a very extensive system for dealing with existing treaties. I think I went too far. I admit the idea was certainly in accord with what my noble friend Lord Lothian has said. I am quite sure there ought to be such machinery. I am quite sure there is no difficulty, without any addition to the Covenant, in creating such machinery. If any difficulty arose because an obviously right proposal was put forward and, though adopted by the great majority of the League, was rejected by a minority, so that it could not be carried out, then I do think there is a very strong ground for stating that those who voted for the change should not be required to oppose by arms or by coercion any change in the direction which they desire to see carried out. At any rate that is a kind of proposal which I think might well be considered.
Having said that, I am afraid the limits of my agreement with my noble friend are reached. I was not able to take the view he took about the fundamental difficulties that were in the way of the League. Of course I agree that the continued existence of grievances is a deplorable fact, but not being, if I may be allowed to say so, so young and so sanguine as he is, I do not think it is at all probable that you will ever be able by any machinery to remove

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all grievances. I do not think that is a kind of object which is worth considering as capable of attainment. Nor do I believe that that is the real difficulty. The real difficulty, as it seems to me, is a fundamental disagreement at the present time as to what ought to be the conditions of international life. I agree with my noble friend that the overwhelming majority of the people of this country are in favour of the general conception of the League of Nations—namely, that there should be some international authority to which you could appeal in cases of differences or disputes arising, in cases of grievance and the rest of it. That is one view. As I think, it is the only view which promises any kind of progress in international affairs, but it is profoundly rejected by the dictatorship countries. That is the real issue, and it is the vital thing we have to consider.
There is no doubt they reject it. I will take the German case, where the rejection has been most complete. Because they could not get their way with the disarmament question, though in fact it was in a more favourable position than it had been for some time, they resigned from the League. They had already resigned once and come back. They resigned at the same time from the International Labour Office for no reason at all except a general dislike of internationalism. They even, I believe, declined to sit on the Committee of Intellectual Co-operation, and they have quite recently forbidden their ministers of religion to attend an international conference which is to take place—I know my noble friend knows about that as well as I do—merely on the ground that they do not think it is right to encourage even in that matter international action. When these recent events in Spain took place their conception was that there was something dishonouring to them to allow such a question as the deplorable attack on the "Deutschland" to be considered by an international authority, and they would not even consider it until they had slaughtered a certain number of the inhabitants of Almeria. When the next incident occurred and the Non-Intervention Committee, as I understand it, expressed the desire to have the facts investigated before they took any action upon the incident that had then occurred, both Germany and Italy withdrew.
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And it is not only what they have done, but if you read their explanations their whole point is that it is wrong, it is impossible for the Germans and the Italians to consider the idea of international control over their proceedings. It is perfectly true that that creates enormous difficulty in the way of any progress, and I can only say that I hope that position will not be long maintained. But if it is, and so long as it is maintained, you must consider the problem on the theory that it is not a question of having this provision or that provision in the Covenant of the League, but that these two States object to the whole conception of international control. That really is the situation. There may be others. I take those two because those two have definitely stated it. So long as that is the case it really is quite futile to talk about making this or that relatively minor change in order to attract these two countries back to the League. If they did come back, holding that view, they would be no strength to the League. They would only withdraw again the moment the League did anything of which they disapproved. I do not rejoice in that; very far from it. I think it is a most deplorable state of things, but it does exist; and if we are to approach these questions, as I think, with any degree of reality we must recognise that that is so. And it is very important that we should approach them with reality.
My noble friend threw out a kind of general aspiration for a Federation of Europe, if I understood him. I am not sure whether it came to that, but he said at any rate that it would be a very good thing if it existed. I do not know if he went further than that. It would be an admirable thing. I would exclude nothing which really met the danger and difficulty we are in, because what I am personally impressed by is this. This is not a question of academic discussion—my noble friend Lord Rennell will forgive me—as to whether it is or is not desirable to make this or that particular change. We are faced with a positive and grave danger. That is the position we are in. There is not the least doubt that war is drawing nearer. I do not say it is drawing nearer very rapidly, but it is drawing nearer. I do not believe any one can doubt that. The thing is to take long periods of time, not a period from week to week, and if you look at the position in

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Europe as it was in 1931 and as it is to-day no one can doubt that war has come much nearer than it was at that date.
Now the question is, what are we going to do? I believe my noble friend Lord Ponsonby is to take part in this debate; I hope he will. He will no doubt advocate his remedy, which is pacifism. I am not going to argue it. He knows very well my view on the subject and it would not be respectful of me to repeat it. I would, however, venture respectfully to say to him that nothing would give me greater pleasure than to be able to co-operate with him in this matter. From many points of view we start with the same object and the same purpose, but I cannot bring myself to believe, quite apart from whether his plan is right or wrong, that it has a practical application at all. I do not see any chance of its being adopted in this country, or in any other country in Europe, and I am very much fortified in that opinion by observing the recent run of by-elections. So far as I know there was not a candidate in any of those elections who advocated the pacifist solution. I may be wrong about that, but so far as I was able to observe there was not one. I am afraid that in those circumstances I must regard it as quite outside practical politics altogether, and the idea of a pacifism which we alone should indulge in seems to me, I confess, quite unsustainable in argument.
The other point of view, which was not particularly argued by either of the preceding speakers but no doubt ran through much at any rate of what my noble friend Lord Rennell said, is that of taking force out of the Covenant. Everybody thinks that force is a very poor remedy. Everybody desires that conciliation, amendment of grievances, negotiation, everything of that kind should be tried first. If a dispute arises the great thing is to try to settle it by discussion and negotiation. Every means of conciliation should be tried. In a recent controversy which raged in The Times it was sometimes said that the difference between the parties was conciliation or sanctions. It is not so. The most violent sanctionist is equally strong in favour of conciliation. The point really is what are you going to do if conciliation fails? That is the issue we must face. I confess that I cannot believe that if
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you told the great military Governments of Europe that in no circumstaces, however they behaved, would they be opposed by the force of international authority, they would pay the slightest attention to what international authority said. I regret it very much, but that is what I feel. That being so I could not support the view that you ought to take force out of the Covenant.
I feel sure that is wrong, and I want those who advocate it to consider one or two subsidiary but very important questions. It is perfectly true that the League failed to stop aggression in China and failed to stop the destruction of Abyssinia, but it has in fact stopped several minor disputes. I wonder whether my noble friend and those that think with him believe that if there had been no force at the back of the remonstrances made—I do not like to mention names because the disputes were happily settled—there would have been a settlement. Anyone who was familiar with what actually occurred must know that it was the knowledge that some countries were considering whether it would be necessary to take coercive action which led to settlement. I should regard it as a most retrograde step if we were to say that in the future we are going to make it extremely difficult for the League to keep the peace even in the minor matters, which are still often of immense importance.
Then there is the question of disarmament. My noble friend Lord Rennell in an eloquent passage of his speech strongly advocated disarmament. I wonder whether my noble friend has followed, as unfortunately I was obliged to do, this whole question for years past. We want a general reduction of armaments. Suppose we reduce armaments and some other country fraudulently does not reduce armaments and attacks us when we have disarmed: what is to happen? That is the difficulty. It is not a theoretical matter and I am sure my noble friends on the Government Bench know that that has always been the difficulty. What are you to do? The only answer is: "If that happens all the rest of us will come to your assistance." You have got to do it. Unless you can say to the countries which disarm, "We are going to see you through" the Governments will not be allowed by their peoples to think of disarmament.

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My noble friend Lord Rennell says, I have no doubt with absolute sincerity, that he is anxious to see international disarmament. I can only suggest that if he will look at the records of the many discussions that have taken place at Geneva he will see that there is no possibility of getting agreement for general disarmament unless there is also some kind of guarantee for the safety of the countries that disarm. I do not want to go back on past controversies, but I still believe that in the years 1932 and 1933 there was a very good chance of getting general agreement on the question. The chance was destroyed just because some Governments—I do not want to make a Party discussion of this—felt unable to consider what would happen if disarmament took place and if in consequence of disarmament one or more of the disarmed countries was put into a difficult or dangerous position. It seems to me only too clear that in any of the controversies where it became obvious that we were not prepared to use force we have never succeeded. Where we have succeeded it has been because of the comparative weakness of the parties and their knowledge that we intended to use force. The idea that you can appeal to the sweet reasonableness of a country that is an aggressor and say to that country, "This is what we beg you to do, but in no circumstances shall we try to enforce our view," is only to invite disaster.
I must not keep your Lordships too long, but there is one other topic I want to say something about. We have had from the present Foreign Secretary pronouncements on the policy of the Government for which should be basely ungrateful if I did not express my warm gratitude. He has gone a very long way undoubtedly. Perhaps I should not use the word "gone," because it has been always his view. He has expressed opinions approximating in most points to the views which I and others humbly hold in these matters. He declared again last Friday in the House of Commons that he quite agreed that in no circumstances must British forces be used against the Covenant. He has said that they should be used in self defence and in the defence of countries which we have specially undertaken to defend, like France and Belgium. He has said, as I understood him—and this is a statement I have never felt happy about—that we should leave it
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doubtful whether we should use our forces in defence of any victim of aggression. In his last speech he added a statement which seemed to me of great importance. Dealing with the question of whether we had any interest in the preservation of peace in Central Europe, he used an expression which I was delighted to read—"Our interest in peace is universal." Some of us have contended for that for a long time. He made what is perhaps an even more important statement—these are his actual words—that
"… Europe, the world, will always be at the mercy of an international incident until there is a general acceptance of the rule of law."
I believe that is true.
Let us consider what an important statement that is. If you want to keep peace you have got to have a rule of law; it is part of our interest to keep peace everywhere; and in certain cases where we think it is particularly important we have engaged to defend the countries attacked. It does seem to me very strange that after that you should boggle at what seems to me the logical conclusion, that in that case, subject to technical and practical considerations which must of course be considered, we are prepared to use our whole strength in order to keep peace in all parts of the world. I really cannot see that, if it is right to use force to defend France or Belgium because that is our interest, it is wrong to use force to defend other countries, when we admit that our interest in peace is universal and when, according to a maxim which I thought was generally accepted, the greatest of British interests is peace. In those circumstances I should have thought that the true condition was not whether we should or should not consider how we felt about it when it arose, but that we should say quite clearly and boldly: "Our obligation under the Covenant is not to intervene unilaterally. It is perfectly true that it is an individual obligation, in the way that Article 16 is actually drafted, but it is an individual obligation"—at least, so I read the Article—"to take part in a joint undertaking." You must read the whole Covenant together; you must not confine yourself to the literal wording of any particular Article. You must take the conception of the Covenant.
The idea of the Covenant set out in the Preamble and in almost every other

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Article was that you should use the whole strength of the League in order to keep the peace, that it should be a joint operation, an operation which was individually incumbent upon each Member but only incumbent upon any Member if there was a sufficient support from other Members. I cannot see anything in the Covenant in reason which says that you must have an absolutely universal support. There is certainly nothing in the wording of the Covenant which embodies that view, and it seems fantastic, because that would mean that you could do nothing if some small country in South America refused to take action. That cannot be the meaning. The meaning must and ought to be that, before you enter on really serious coercive action in order to keep the peace, you must be satisfied that you are going to be supported by a sufficient number of States to make it probable, almost to certainty, that that action will be successful. That seems to me to be the essential view, and I am quite in favour of making such changes, if any are required, not in the Covenant, where I am quite clear that no change is required for that purpose, but in the administration of the Covenant, as should make quite certain that before this or any other country took strong action on behalf of peace it would be supported by an adequate number of other Powers.
That is the only criticism I have to make, as far as it is a criticism, and I am not at all clear that I really differ in anything that I have tried to say from anything that the Government have in their minds. That, however, is the only criticism that I suggest of the Government's statement of their policy. I must say, however, that there is one thing which I very much regret. I very much regret the constant assertion that the only thing that this country cares about is to be kept out of war. That is constantly being asserted by Ministers and others. I think it is a most dangerous thing to say. In the first place, I think it is a direct encouragement to disorderly Powers, if I may put it so, to become more and more aggresive and to treat our remonstrances and the remonstrances of others with very scant respect. It is bound to have that effect, and also an even more important effect: that of increasing the danger of war. I am quite sure it is not true; I am perfectly certain,
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and anybody who has ever taken any part in these controversies must be perfectly certain, that there is a tremendous feeling in favour of peace—that is to say, peace as against war. But I am perfectly certain also that for adequate reasons, or for reasons which appear at the moment to be adequate, and particularly at the call of the Government of the day, this country would be found as ready as it has always been found to exert its full strength in the defence of our interests and of the principles of justice upon which our interests depend.
I am sure that this is so, and I think it a frightfully dangerous thing to encourage countries, particularly of an aggressive type, to doubt about that point. That is the way wars occur. That is precisely the way in which they have occurred in the past. I am not sure that it is not the way in which the War of 1914 was produced. A very interesting letter by Mr. Richard Pares appeared yesterday in The Times: I do not know whether he was right or wrong, but he took a different view from that of history as expounded in the other House and declared that exactly what I am fearing had happened before the war which is commonly called "The War over Jenkins' ear"; that we led Spain to believe that in no circumstances should we fight, and she went on to aggression after aggression until the point came. It happened to come over a relatively small matter, but one which just filled up the cup and finally excited the anger of the people of this country, and we were plunged into war. I am sure that is a most unfortunate attitude to take.
Perhaps your Lordships will think that in this matter I belong too much to a past generation. Certainly when I was young and what is called a loyal member of the Conservative Party, there was nothing upon which the then Conservative leaders more often insisted than that an abdication of our rights, a policy of "scuttle," as I remember it used to be called, was not only deplorable in itself but also of the greatest danger to peace. The circumstances of the history of that time show that they were right. I am not a Jingo, Heaven knows. I loathe war with every fibre of my being. I believe that the noblest and the most fruitful effort for British statesmanship

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is to establish peace and to establish it on a permanent and firm foundation. But I am quite sure it will not be established on that firm foundation if we think we can get it without making any exertion and even without running any risk. You cannot get things that are really worth having by any procedure of that kind. You must make up your mind what you want, you must make up your mind how that need is to be obtained, and you must not go and say to the people of this country that the only thing that matters is that we should be kept out of war. For those reasons I certainly hope that the Government will think a long lime before they embark on extensive changes in the Covenant. There are one or two minor matters in which change might well be made, but I suspect that I am in agreement with my noble friend Lord Lothian in thinking that extensive changes would do nothing but harm.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My Lords, perhaps I might explain that the bareness of the Bench in front of me is not due to the fact that my noble friends knew I was going to speak, but being very busy men they have engagements which have prevented them from attending at this debate. I am very glad on this occasion to follow the noble Viscount who has just resumed his seat. He has, if I may say so, a rather unfortunate habit, when he follows me, of crushing with great effect arguments which I have never made, and I am rather dismayed this afternoon because he began by crushing arguments that I was not going to make. I am going to confine myself to the purpose which I think my noble friend Lord Rennell had in view in bringing this matter before your Lordships' House. I agree with what he said in his speech, that we do not expect the Government to divulge to us exactly what they intend to do. I should not be in the least disappointed if the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, were at the conclusion of the debate to say, "Thank you very much; it is most interesting," and then the House were to adjourn. We do not want a microphone to be hung over the Foreign Secretary's desk in the Foreign Office through which he should divulge to the world all the thought that pass through his mind. But I would add that I hope, when the time comes in September for these matters to
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be gone into, that the Government will not go to Geneva with what is called an "open mind," but will have made up their minds before then precisely as to what they think should be done in this very important matter. They should not wait to hear what other people think and then make one of those equivocal replies which mean nothing very much. The matter is too important to be allowed to solve itself in that way.
Now I think that the most important point that has got to be dealt with in this connection is the question of force being behind the League. I was really rather shocked at some of the periods in my noble friend Lord Cecil's very eloquent speech. He displayed what I might call rather an Early Victorian bellicosity in his final passages, which I thought was very much out of date. He seemed to regard it as incumbent on us, in his own phrase, to keep the peace everywhere. That is what I complain of in my own Party. If there is a war they want to be in it, and that, apparently, is what the noble Viscount thinks—that we have got to police the world. I expect your Lordships have noticed that when that sort of phrase is used there is always a criminal, and we are always the policeman. Does it not occur to the noble Viscount that that sort of language, used so frequently, especially by League of Nations speakers, is rather offensive to foreign countries? We may think them criminals. We may think them a nuisance, and madmen. We may think whatever we like about them, but do not let us in our international relations always point the finger at them, and put on an air of righteousness when we step on to the platform, as if we were the one righteous nation going to keep the peace. I think that that tone, too often used, is one of those small matters which produce discord more than anything else.
This question of whether there should be retained in the Covenant of the League an obligation in certain circumstances to use force is to my mind paramount. I think Lord Cecil, like the Dominions, who expressed their view the other day, wishes to see the League made all-inclusive. Really, with the League as it exists at present all our plans must be frustrated, because to use the League against the Powers that are not in the League is really dividing the world into two camps. Therefore we want to draw

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in the other Powers. Difficult as it may be, opposed as at the moment they seem to be to co-operative action or control of any sort, we want to draw in the other Powers, and it is my firm conviction that so long as there is an obligation to use force to aid collective security, you will never get them in. They will not come in on those terms at all. That is my first strong reason for believing that the dropping of Article 16, at any rate, is an absolutely essential reform in the Covenant.
But I want to carry the matter rather further. We have experienced only recently an attempt to use Article 16. It failed, because in human affairs, whatever the quarrel is, sides are going to be taken, and you are not going to get unanimity except for a pious resolution. You are not going to get unanimity for action, whether it be economic sanctions or military sanctions, and economic sanctions always lead to military sanctions. Economic sanctions I particularly object to, because they press down upon the innocent population with whom we have no quarrel. The practical working of Article 16 has been found to fail. Whatever may be said about the desirability—and I have very strong views on that—the practicability of administering sanctions, military and economic, of checking an aggressor and preventing a war by this method, has been proved by the most signal illustration which we have had since 1918 to be utterly beyond the bounds of possibility.
Therefore—and this is I think the strongest point I want to make, and I really ask the noble Viscount's attention to it—those who go on saying that you must have collective security, and must use force against an aggressor, and get collective action on the part of the Powers of the League to frustrate aggression, are raising the hopes of the small nations that they will receive protection. The tragedy of Abyssinia showed us the way in which the Abyssinians were misled into really supposing that we were going to help them, when we ought to have known from the outset that it was quite impracticable. I do not think we ought to mislead other nations by saying that we pin our faith on collective action. I think that it is unfair, and that it gives them the impression that the British Fleet and the British Army can be called to
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their protection at any moment when what is declared to be aggressive action is brought against them. The British Army and Navy cannot be used all over the world to help those who fear that an aggressor is going to pounce upon them. So long as you depend on force in any attempt to establish peace so long will you utterly fail.
The noble Lord who introduced this Motion mentioned several other reforms that ought to be made. I join with all three noble Lords who have spoken up till now in very strongly hoping that machinery will be set up for the peaceful revision of treaties. I have wearied your Lordships on previous occasions by the emphasis I have given to this proposal, and it seems to me that the only way it can be done is by making revision automatic. There is no other way. If revision is automatic every few years, if the Treaty of Versailles, for instance, had come up for revision after five years we might not have had many of the troubles that we have now. I wish treaties were not drawn up by eminent personages. I cannot bear the "Big Five." I should like to see treaties drawn up by second division clerks, humble people who really know better how peace can be preserved after a war than those who are hot and impassioned from their victory or from their defeat. They are the worst people on earth to draw up treaties. We should have had a very much better treaty if the President Wilsons and the Lloyd Georges and various other people had not been in Paris; and we are travelling through a time now produced in all its difficulties by the Treaty of Versailles. TI ere is no question about that now in anybody's mind.
But I do not like the tone of my noble friend Lord Cecil when he talks of war drawing nearer and nearer. We must not have talk of that sort. It produces a sort of feeling, coming from a very experienced and notable statesman, as he is, that really people must go and buy their gas masks at once. I hate all this preparation which makes people apprehensive and which, as Lord Grey of Fallodon said, largely produced the outbreak of war; that is to say, the accumulation of armaments. I think, if I may say so, that the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister are following a middle course in very difficult times, and their recent speeches give me great hope that they

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are more inclined to agree with me than with the noble Viscount on the Cross Benches (Lord Cecil of Chelwood). I have not had the honour of addressing the newly reconstructed Government. I forgot to put it on my notes—I ought to congratulate them. To my mind they look very much the same. But I do hope that they will pursue a course which eliminates from all their language—and I do not accuse the Foreign Secretary of using it at all; I do not think he does—that pointing to Governments—well the noble Viscount called them the "disorderly Powers." Why on earth should we point at people and call them the disorderly Powers? Any one may have very strong feelings about these Governments—I have myself—but I think it is very wrong in public language and in international intercourse to use expressions of that sort. I think that is what those Powers resent. I am sure they resent it in Germany, where they are extremely sensitive. However wrong and appalling we may think their deeds, we have to live in the world with other nations. We have to subordinate to some extent our own overwhelming self-satisfaction, and we have to try to feel that we must come to peaceful terms with our neighbours.
I agree with what the noble Viscount said—I think it is the only thing I did agree with—when he said we cannot have conferences to get rid of all grievances. Nations will have grievances. We ourselves have grievances, and we should be very sorry to be deprived of them. Nations have their grievances, and that is part of humanity. What we have to do is to find some method of preventing those grievances culminating in war. We know that the people themselves have no quarrel whatever with one another, and that is why—and this is the point on which I differ from His Majesty's Government, just as I differ from my noble friends in my Party—I do not believe that preparations for war will stop war. I believe that the dragooning of this nation into hectic preparation for war may bring war. I have very strong feelings on that subject because I have no confidence in force. Ultimately force defeats its own ends, and in the world that we have to-day, with these new policies and new ideas with regard to the constitution and government of nations, it is not force that is going to win its way—I wish the keen advocates of these particular policies
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would realise that—but in the gradual evolution of the government of nations it is good will that is going to prevail and bring things to a better issue. I hope the Government, if they are going to say anything, will not disappoint me, because I think there is confidence in the line they are taking, and I am sure that it is not with a view of criticising them that my noble friend has introduced this debate.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: My Lords, as several previous speakers have said, your Lordships' House has discussed this question of the future of the League—whether it should be reformed and if so how it should be reformed—on more than one occasion. The fact that it has been discussed here and in another place and on the platform up and down the country, and in the homes is, I think, of the greatest value, because, as I see it, gradually a public opinion is being created which is tending more and more to bring people belonging to different Parties to have the same idea as to what should be the proper function of the League in the future. The issue is not whether we are for the League or against the League; the real issue, as I see it, is how best we can have international co-operation for the achievement of justice and peace. I deeply regret that on this particular issue I find myself in disagreement with the noble Viscount who sits on the Cross Benches in front of me (Lord Cecil) for there is no-one whom I would rather follow on almost any question, and particularly on the question of peace. But I am sure he will realise that, though we differ, we are still, whatever our individual opinions may be, as anxious as he is to maintain the principle of international co-operation for the preservation of peace and the establishment of justice.
When the League was first set up my recollection is that there was a three-fold object—first of all, to preserve peace by international action; secondly—and a very important point and one which has been lost sight of—to revise the Peace Treaties.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: No. They were expressly excluded.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: Well I will come to that in a minute. Thirdly, there were certain clauses dealing with the humanitarian aspects of the League. After 1919 there was a period, a rather lengthy period of ten or twelve years, when peace was

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more or less guaranteed in Europe. Subsequently to that, in recent years, there has been, as the noble Viscount said, a greater sense of insecurity. During the early years after the War ended there was peace in Europe, not a peace by consent but because one set of Powers represented overwhelming force. It was not the existence of the League, it was not the existence of the Covenant that gave Europe a sense of peace for some time to come. Any one who chose to look below the surface realised there was a seething mass of discontent which, sooner of later, would make itself felt. I do not blame France and her Allies. I do not blame her for making these alliances, but because Clause 19, which was expressly put into the Covenant, I understand, in order to help to revise Treaties and injustice, was not utilised, after a period of ten or twelve years a sense of insecurity began to grow in Europe. You had certain Powers which had been disarmed beginning to rearm, and to-day we find Europe threatened with the possibility of rival military alliances. The peace of Europe is threatened to-day because certain peoples are ready to face the horrors of war because—I do not know that everybody is necessarily expected to agree with them—they have a sense of injustice, of grievance. It is because they feel that their country has not been properly treated that at the present moment the peace of Europe is so insecure.
I took the trouble to consult contemporary newspapers and discussions in Parliament to see what was said after the Versailles Treaty was made, and I find there was a very large amount of criticism of the terms of the Treaty imposed on the defeated Powers. I am not going to bother your Lordships' House with numerous quotations. Anybody who cares to look through the files of the Manchester Guardian, The Times, the Daily News, the Morning Post, and most of the leading papers will find letters of protest, letters by prominent writers, indicating that the peace which had just been imposed would, in the words of one writer, "lead to recurrent European chaos or war." A leading article in the Manchester Guardian said that the Peace Treaty had "set up in Central Europe a permanent centre of vehement and well-founded discontent." A leading article in The Times stated that
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"where it may be found necessary to detach numbers of Germans from Germany … these clauses should be subject to general revision."
And so it goes on. I find a most emphatic protest made by leaders of the Labour Party, Robert Smillie, Robert Williams, Mr. Cramp and others
"repudiating the action by which Germany has been forced to put her signature to what all sane men know is to be a scrap of paper."
Ample warning was thus being given, in 1919 and 1920, as to the insecurity of the peace which was created, or the absence of fighting created by the terms of the Peace Treaty. The Manchester Guardian also published a protest by various peace organisations including the Society of Friends, the National Peace Council, the Free Religious Movement, and others in which it was stated:
"We wish to place on record our conviction that nothing but disaster can eventuate from such a peace."
The noble Viscount himself, Lord Cecil, taking part in a debate in another place, indicated that in his opinion there were clauses in the Peace Treaty which ought not to be there. He said that treaties in general needed periodic revision, and that this particular Peace Treaty, the Versailles Treaty, should be revised for—a significant word—"pacification"—that is to say, in his opinion firm peace could not be established in Europe unless certain clauses in the Versailles Treaty were revised
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: A great deal has been done.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: To go back to the point I was making just now, I have consulted contemporary records and also accounts of the Peace Treaty, and have found that President Woodrow Wilson, when introducing the Covenant or speaking in support of it, admitted that in the war atmosphere there had been mistakes; that the atmosphere was not right for creating a durable, fair, or just peace. He indicated that it was his desire, and the desire of many other prominent statesmen who had taken part in establishing the Versailles Treaty, to use Clause 19 of the Covenant in order to revise it. He indicated in one of his speeches that a clause had been inserted in the Covenant which would enable the League to revise some of these injustices and grievances. A great deal of the present trouble is due to the fact that when

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Clause 19 was inserted it was assumed that the beneficiaries would be willing to make concessions, to give up something voluntarily, in order to remedy grievances. Unfortunately, the satisfied Powers, the beneficiaries, decided to make no substantial concession on the major points. They united their armed forces in military alliances to resist change, and unfortunately, as the result of that, collective security has come to mean collective action by satisfied League Members to maintain the status quo. That has too often been the case.
We are told sometimes that it is unreasonable to expect democracies to make concessions to totalitarian States. We have got to realise that we were very slow in recognising the claims of Germany when she was a Republic, and it is because we did not recognise the just claims of Germany when she was a Republic that we are faced to-day with a restless, discontented, and rearming Europe. As I see it, the right objective is first of all to get justice, to get fair play, to get a sound status quo. That is the first essential, and after that you should get machinery for dealing with new grievances as they arise. If we get that, we may have a reasonable hope that peace will follow. The wrong way of looking at this question is to say that the first essential is to have an absence of fighting, and, secondly, to hope that justice will follow. An absence of fighting is not the greatest desideratum. An absence of fighting is not a secure peace. It is not a healthy state of things if there is sullen discontent, a feeling of grievance and injustice, under the surface.
Let us just compare what happens in industrial relations in this country and in totalitarian States. In totalitarian States, apparently, there is no discontent, there is no industrial strife; there is, apparently, peace. Here, on the other hand, we have strikes, we have disturbances, we have strife. Yet, I venture to say, our apparent strife here, is far healthier than the absence of strife in those totalitarian States, because absence of strife there is due to coercion and oppression and not to the agreement and consent of the different parties in industry.
The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, said a word about Government policy. As I understood it, he indicated a hope that the Government policy was to intervene
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in any part of Europe—I do not know whether he would go so far as to say the world—if peace, if the status quo were broken. Now I am perfectly convinced that the sense of the country is increasingly moving away from that line of policy, if we were to attempt to commit ourselves to automatic military action if the peace of Europe is broken anywhere in Europe, particularly in regard to some of the grievances that arise out of the Versailles Treaty, I am convinced we should have a divided country, and it would be absolutely impossible for a democracy such as we are to attempt to embark upon a war unless the nation were substantially and overwhelmingly in favour of military action.
The real question which we have to decide, as I understand it, when we are talking of the reform and the future of the League, is how best we can obtain peaceful change, what is the best way in which we can bring about peaceful change. I believe we can learn a great deal from what happens in this country. Your Lordships know that periodically we have to deal with Bills for altering borough boundaries. I think that invariably the proposal of a borough to extend its boundary so as to include the territory of an adjacent authority is resisted by that authority; in a large number of cases at any rate that is so. But the question is settled by London. It is settled because the local authorities are not independent authorities, because the supreme decision rests with us. I cannot conceive of Northumberland going to war to defend Plympton in Devonshire from the desire of Plymouth to extend its boundaries and include Plympton, should that ever arise. I think the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, indicated the difficulty of dealing with revision and dealing with this question while the Members of the League maintain full and independent Sovereign rights. It would not be possible to get these boundary adjustments in this country if each local authority was entirely independent. It is because London has a superior authority, has the right to decide whether or not a boundary shall be altered, that the change takes place without friction and without bloodshed.
Similarly, on the question of conciliation and consultation, I believe we can

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learn a great deal here. Your Lordships are aware of the joint bodies, such as Whitley Councils, which are set up to deal with very bitter issues on which feeling runs very high between different partners in industry. I believe that a certain school of thought underestimates the possibilities of what can be done by consultation and conciliation. I do not believe that it is essential to have teeth in the League in order to get change I believe that putting in too many teeth is far more likely to prevent change from coming about. On the question of the future of the League and what reforms should be proposed, it seems to me that in the world as it is to-day, with so many big Powers outside the League and with the status quo which needs revision having still far too much in it of the War Treaties that were imposed upon the defeated Powers and never accepted by them at the time, we should not strengthen the coercive clauses of the Covenant. I am afraid that if we want to "put teeth into the Covenant" as it is called, we should prevent that essential revision which would lead to a more satisfactory status quo. I think that if we were to put teeth into the Covenant we should prevent the great Powers which are now standing outside the League from co-operating more extensively or even entering the League. I believe that if we were to put teeth into the Covenant we should inevitably divide Europe into two rival military alliances.
Therefore, for a time, I hope that we shall attempt to use the League as a piece of consultative machinery, and try to settle some of these great political questions by consultation. We should utilise to a greater extent than we have done those very valuable humanitarian clauses for dealing with economic problems which are contained in the Covenant, and we should make every effort to improve the present status quo. I believe that if we do this we shall save—and it is very important that we should save—the principle of international co-operation. If we succeed in doing that, then, at some future time, we shall be able to adapt the League so that it may include those Powers which are now outside it, and the League will be called upon to defend a more defensible status quo in Europe than is now the case.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rennell,
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started his speech by saying that he had no desire to destroy the League of Nations. Neither have I. I speak as a supporter of it up to a point, although when the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, made his observation a somewhat cynical smile passed across the face of the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil. I want to point out to your Lordships to-night certain weaknesses of the League which render it at the present time in the view of many people rather a source of danger than a source of strength. One cannot deny that in certain of its aspects the League has done and is doing very good work, as for instance in connection with the suppression of slavery, the drug traffic, the white slave traffic and in the international regulation of hours and conditions of labour. It has also in certain minor disputes done excellent work in conciliation. But I submit to your Lordships that it suffers from a certain accretion of inherited defects which must be removed if any progress in international co-operation is to be resumed.
The first of its defects is that it is not universal. The United States of America dealt a blow to the Teague which has festered ever since when that great country refused to enter it. The defection of Germany and Japan increased its weakness, while Italy, though nominally a Member of the League, has not for some time shown a great enthusiasm for the League spirit. That leaves three great countries, Russia, France and ourselves. I have never been one of those who were enthusiastic for the inclusion of Soviet Russia in the League, and at the present time the way in which the Soviet Government are "liquidating"—to use their own polite phrase—all their principal military commanders makes one doubt whether Russia will be in a position for some time to take an active part in European affairs, even if such participation would be benevolent, which I doubt. Our near neighbours across the Channel are going from crisis to crisis, which renders them also a great deal more impotent than we would like them to be. The result is that at the present time the maintenance of collective security is left to this country alone. Collective security has been shown to be a myth, and a very dangerous myth. The noble Lord, Load Rennell, took as one of his texts that one cannot constitute a League all by oneself. That, however, seems to be

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what other Members of the League would like to see this country do, that we should act as policemen for the rest of them, and carry out practically singlehanded the decisions and, if necessary, the military measures which all of them have agreed to in principle, but not one of them is willing to put into execution.
There is one point which I do not think has been mentioned to-day, and that is that open discussion at the Assembly and Council of the League does not lead to good feeling throughout the world. There has been a great deal of abuse hurled at the old system of what is called secret diplomacy, but it is increasingly evident that that system had a great deal to commend it, although few people are willing to realise the fact. We have to-day a situation when thanks to improved methods of communication everything that takes place in the Council Chamber is known within a few minutes in the furthermost part of the globe. If any statesman on behalf of his country says he is willing to make some compromise then, of course, the opponents in his own country of his Government at once raise their voices and cry out that the country is being betrayed. That makes it very difficult for conciliation or discussion to continue. Open discussion, I suggest, is by no means an unmixed blessing.
There is also the fact, already alluded to, that it was very largely the existence of the League of Nations in its present form which led to the destruction of Abyssinia, because Abyssinia was led to believe—largely by the clamour of some of the members of the organisation to which the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, proudly claims to belong, and of other bodies—that it was only a matter of a short time before they would receive military assistance from this and other countries. If we had had recourse to the older system of diplomacy it would have been possible in the early stages of the dispute, when it became quite obvious that Italian aggression was a great deal more than a mere punitive expedition, to send our Ambassador in Rome quietly to tell Signor Mussolini that any further aggression in Abyssinia would be regarded by us as an unfriendly act. Signor Mussolini naturally would not have liked that, but I do not think that he could have done other than submit to it. But once the question got into the open, once it was discussed at the League, obviously a Dictator could
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not retreat without a loss of face which would have imperilled his whole administration and possibly his own existence.
Then we come to the very important point that the Covenant of the League has been inextricably mixed up with the Treaty of Versailles. Although a great many of the Treaty provisions have been broken with impunity, and although it is largely a dead letter, yet until the Treaty and the Covenant are separated we shall never get a satisfactory state of affairs. If I understood him rightly, the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian—I am sorry he is not in his place at the moment—said that he believed that with very slight modification of the League structure we should be able to achieve universality more or less on the basis of the status quo. Can anyone imagine that Hungary will ever be satisfied with the present position? It is not likely, either, that the economic position of Austria can become at all reasonable as long as you have a small country overweighted with a very large urban population. Unless and until we can get some sort of Danubian federation re-established I do not think we can ever hope that Central Europe will be other than a powder magazine.
If the League is to be any good at all we have got to achieve universality of membership, at least so far as the important countries of the world are concerned, and we have got to get the Dictator countries into the League. I think probably almost everyone in this House disapproves of some of the ideals of the Dictator countries and of a great many of their methods, but there they are and we have to live in the same Continent with them. Either we must be on friendly terms or sooner or later we shall have to fight them. We cannot indefinitely remain in a state of armed hostile neutrality. If we are to achieve universality these totalitarian States have to be brought in, and they will never come into the League under its present constitution.
Then there is the question of how our membership of the League as at present constituted is regarded by the people of this country. The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil was right up to a point. He deplored the idea that we should never be prepared to fight, and he denied that that was the view of the great majority of

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our fellow countrymen. I believe that the great majority of our fellow countrymen will be very loth to take part in any war that is not directly in defence of our own country or of Imperial interests. It may well be that they may become excited over some flagrant act of aggression, like the invasion of Belgium in 1914, and it may well be that in a case like that They would be willing to enter a European war although our own interests might not be directly involved, but the fact does remain that at present the people of this country are more than anxious to keep the peace. It is quite certain that the extraordinary success of the Government at recent by-elections has been due to their foreign policy during the last few months. The Government are deservedly popular not only because of what they have done at home, but because they have kept this country out of war and have done a very great deal to prevent war in Europe. For that people are grateful, and they have shown it in the by-election results. I believe that the lamentable showing from their point of view of Opposition candidates is due to the fact that the official Socialist policy—which I do not think is shared by the two noble Lords now on the opposite Benches—stands for interference in other countries which would inevitably lead to a European war.
The people of this country, I am certain, desire that it should be the Government of this country that should decide whether we should enter a war. They are not going to submit to the idea that we can be dragged into war in defence of the principle of collective security, long since discredited, or in defence of some small European country which may be quite unjustifiably attacked, unless it has been shown quite clearly and unmistakably that the people of this country themselves desire to have part in such a contest. They desire to have freedom of action and, above all, to have peace, but not on conditions determined by a Council of other nations sitting at Geneva. For these reasons I am convinced that the League of Nations as at present constituted is a menace rather than an aid to international peace, and I hope very much that we shall have some statement from the Government—not necessarily a detailed one, for I quite see that that might be inadvisable, but some statement that they are willing and anxious to bring
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forth at the next meeting of the League definite proposals that in some form or other the League's present constitution should be radically amended. I do not wish at this late hour to take up mere of your Lordships' time by describing what would be my own solution. I do not feel, for one thing, that my experience is sufficient to justify my doing so; but perhaps I may be permitted to say that it would be somewhat along the lines suggested by the noble Viscount, Lord Astor.
If we are going ever to fight a war, it is quite certain that we must have the great bulk of the population behind us, as Lord Astor said, and as the noble Lord, Lord Arnold, stressed in your Lordships' House a few months ago. If we ever had a war again—which God forbid!—and we did not have an overwhelming majority of the country behind us, then our position would be one of extreme danger. The chances of being drawn into such a war are infinitely greater under the present constitution of the League of Nations than they would be if that constitution were purified of the coercive clauses. Therefore I hope very much that the Government will set the coping-stone upon their admirable efforts for peace of the last few months by bringing forward at Geneva proposals for altering the constitution of the League, even though in the meantime it might be more discreet to leave those proposals in an inchoate rather than a concrete form.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH): My Lords, those of your Lordships who have had the privilege of listening to this debate must have been deeply interested by the brilliant analysis made by various noble Lords of the difficulties which clearly confront Members of the League of Nations in their attempt to find the right method of applying the principles of the Covenant of the League. Inevitably, I suppose, this debate has covered a wider field than the terms of the Motion actually cover, and I hope that in the circumstances your Lordships will not expect me to follow noble Lords into the various aspects of the international and European situation with which they dealt at some length. I would, if I might be allowed to do so, confine myself as much as I can to the terms of the Motion and the various points which are

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raised in connection with it and which are germane to it.
In order to explain the position, how that position has developed, and in what way it is likely to develop in the future, and in order to answer the specific question which my noble friend Lord Rennell, who initiated this debate, put to me, I feel that I must give your Lordships a short history of the discussion of the reform of the League of Nations by the League itself. The question was first raised at a Council meeting on June 26 last year, and it was considered by a special Assembly of the League on July 4. Your Lordships will remember that it was at this meeting that the Assembly took the decision to raise sanctions, and, as a result of the failure of the machinery of the League, the Assembly adopted a resolution taking note that "the full application of the Covenant had been prevented by various circumstances" and inviting Governments to submit proposals for the improvement of the application of its principles. When the Assembly met in September, already eighteen nations had submitted their observations to the League. A number of other Governments, including His Majesty's Government, expressed their views verbally in the Assembly.
At the conclusion of that Assembly a General Commission was set up, and as a result of the deliberations and report of this Commission, the Assembly constituted in October a Committee of 28 Members of the League to study all the proposals which had been made or which might be submitted by Governments regarding this problem. The Committee was further instructed to prepare a report with the object of giving practical effect to the resolution adopted by the Assembly. It was also directed that the report of the Committee should be submitted to the Governments of the States Members of the League to serve as a basis for any future decisions that might be taken. The Committee held its first meeting in December. It decided then not to discuss questions of substance, but to settle its procedure and its method of work. It selected from the questions which had been raised by Governments in communicating with the League on this subject a certain number of subjects which it considered should be first dealt with—they were, I think, actually eleven
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in number—and rapporteurs were appointed for each subject.
I want to make clear, because it is important, of what the task of the rapporteurs in this connection actually consists. It is their business not to arrive at solutions or even to suggest solutions to the Committee, but rather to explore the whole situation and to pave the way for discussion of these various possibilities at a full meeting of the Committee. When the rapporteurs have done that, when they have concluded their work, then they will report and their actual task will be completed. It will be for the Committee to reach any subsequent decisions as to the examination of the different problems. I do not think it is necessary for me to enumerate the various subjects which were selected by the Committee, but I would remind the House that the United Kingdom representative on the Committee was entrusted with the preparation of reports on the "Participation of all States in the League" and on "Co-operation between the League and non-Member States." The Rapporteurs' Committee held a meeting in May, last month, and I am glad to be able to say that it was evident that good progress had been made in the preparation of the various reports. I want to repeat, because it is germane to the question which the noble Lord asked, that these reports will be issued on the sole responsibility of the rapporteur, and will not be regarded as an expression of the Committee's views until the Committee has examined them and pronounced upon them.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Could my noble friend say whether these reports are going to be published before the Committee has considered them?
THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH: I am afraid I am not in a position to say whether they will be or not, but I will make inquiries and let the noble Viscount know. As for the future procedure, it has been agreed that a meeting of the Committee will be held before the opening of the next Assembly. We do not expect, as a matter of fact, that the Committee will then discuss questions of substance, but they will inform the Assembly of the subjects with which it is proposed to deal in the first instance, one of which I understand is likely to be the separation of the Covenant from the Treaty of Peace.

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The Committee will probably then meet again towards the end of the year. That shows, I think, that a great deal of preparatory work has already been done. It may well be argued, and I know that it has been objected by some, that progress in this matter has been slow. I am sure, however, that your Lordships will realise that the task before this Committee is an extremely difficult and complicated one. It has, as a matter of fact, to deal with all the problems which have at one time or another given rise to controversy since the very foundation of the League, and it would be absurd to think that these problems can be solved in a short space of time, particularly when one reflects on the present international position, which I fear can only be looked upon as unsettled and confused.
Your Lordships will therefore see, from what I have said, that the question of League reform has not been raised merely on the issue of whether or not revision is desirable. The discussion of this subject has proceeded from the premise that circumstances in the past have prevented, on occasion, the full application of the Covenant, and that the Members of the League were desirous of strengthening the authority of the League by adapting the application of its principles and modifying the method used up to now, as a result of the lessons learned from actual experience. The question, as I see it, which has to be decided is whether it is possible to find in the different suggestions and proposals which have been put forward for improvement, a number of proposals to which Members of the League can agree. If no agreement can be found it goes without saying that the provisions and obligations of the Covenant will remain as they are at present.
I think it is further clear that it is first necessary to ascertain whether a common basis of agreement can be found on measures to improve the application of the principles of the Covenant, before you go on to consider the method by which these measures can be effectively put into operation. I should like to say that I feel it is doubtful, to say the least, whether a revision of the Covenant would be necessary for this purpose. There is provision, of course, for amending the Covenant. It will be found in Article 26. But quite indubitably the difficulties of obtaining the consents which
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are necessary to put any amendment of that kind into effect are very great in-deed, and I think, furthermore, it will be agreed by everyone that any attempt to remodel the Covenant fundamentally would constitute a vast undertaking. I think in practice it would be possible to record any agreed modification of the application of the Covenant by way of interpretive resolutions. This method would have a certain authority, for at the Assembly in 1921 a resolution of this character was adopted which concerned the application of Article 16 of the Covenant.
After these preliminary remarks I would like to turn to the views which have been expressed by His Majesty's Government on the question of the application of the principles of the Covenant. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expounded those views at the Assembly in September last, and I would, if I may, summarise them shortly, because they are important, as they represent the views of His Majesty's Government to-day. He pointed out that the world had a need of an international order which should finally supersede the arbitrament of war as between one nation and another. He said that in his view the best method that could be devised was the League of Nations, which had as its chief aim the establishment of permanent peace throughout the world. He said that so far as His Majesty's Government were concerned their policy would continue to be based upon their membership of the League, and he assured his hearers that their wholehearted co-operation would be forthcoming in order to strengthen the League and enlarge its membership. He then went on to say that the principal causes of failure were twofold: first, the lack of universality of the League; and secondly, its failure, or indeed its in-ability, to play an effective part in the earlier stages of a crisis.
He proposed that the Council should be given sufficient latitude to enable it to make recommendations under paragraph 1 of Article 11 without the consent of the two States in the controversy. He then went on to say that he saw every advantage in regional pacts which were devised to strengthen general security, and expressed himself in

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favour of them provided they were consistent with the principles of the Covenant of the League. He then went on and referred to criticisms that the League existed to maintain the status quo, a subject which has been very fully discussed to-day, and about which different views have been expressed by your Lordships. He pointed out that Article 19 of the Covenant existed and that it recognised the impracticability of a rigid maintenance of the status quo, but he also pointed out that the powers of the Assembly did not extend to decisions of real substance on these matters. He added that His Majesty's Government considered that a clear expression of opinion on the part of a great majority of the Assembly would undoubtedly exert moral pressure on the side of remedying injustices. Finally, he said that His Majesty's Government were in favour of the separation of the Covenant from the Treaties of Peace.
In addition to that, the House will also be aware that the Imperial Conference has recorded various opinions in a Resolution, and the Resolution was broadly to this effect. It said that for each member of the Commonwealth the first objective was the preservation of peace. It added that the settlement of differences should be sought by methods of co-operation, joint inquiry, and conciliation. At the same time, the Conference was impressed with the desirability of strengthening the influence of the League by enlargement of its membership, and they welcomed regional agreements between members of the British Commonwealth and other nations in so far as they contributed to the cause of peace and did not conflict with the Covenant of the League. Those are broadly the views expressed in that Resolution, to which I shall have to refer shortly.
That is really the position which has been reached in the consideration of this matter by the League of Nations and His Majesty's Government. But there are some general considerations that I should like to place before your Lordships. In the first place, His Majesty's Government are convinced that the principles of the Covenant are right, and they do not think that it is necessary, even if it were possible, to devise some other system based on other and radically different principles. But there is no doubt that from
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the moment that the question of the application of the principles of the Covenant was raised in the League and elsewhere wide differences of opinion became evident. Speaking generally, as has been pointed out to-day, there are two schools of thought in this matter, and here I should like to make it clear that in saying what I am going to say I have no intention of indicating that His Majesty's Government favour one alternative or the other. I am merely desirous of putting the position before the House as I see it as clearly as possible.
As I was saying, there are broadly two schools of thought on this question. One school favours the introduction into the Covenant of more precise and binding obligations. It favours particularly the idea that the obligation to render military assistance to a Power which has been the victim of unprovoked aggression should be automatic. On the other side there are those who favour the reduction, and even the complete deletion, of the coercive clauses of the Covenant. Both these opinions have been represented in the proposals which have been made to the League for reform, and they also have been represented in letters to the Press in this country, signed by leading politicians and other people of eminence.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: Could the noble Earl give us a hint as to which side preponderates at Geneva?
THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH: I must allow the noble Lord to interpret my remarks as he prefers. In the circumstances that I have indicated I think it is clearly necessary that we should proceed cautiously. We cannot deny that the authority of the League has been weakened of late, and it is therefore very important that we should not precipitate or force a division among those States which remain loyal to the League and its principles. But it is quite clear that the whole controversy is closely connected with the important question of the universality of the League. I think that has been made evident by this discussion this afternoon. After all, the Covenant was drafted on the assumption that it would be universally accepted and applied, and consequently the League would have had irresistible authority and force. If that universality had been obtained there might have been little criticism of the Covenant as it stands,

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but the failure to obtain it has undoubtedly altered the conditions, more especially in respect of the coercive clauses. The view has been put forward that a League based on coercion cannot fulfil its functions so long as it is not universal. People say that it is better to attain universality, even at the cost of weakening the automatic obligations which might have existed before. They argue that the sacrifice involved is apparent rather than real, in that a League which was a truly representative League would have an overwhelming moral force behind it. There is this further consideration, that it would still be open to Members of such a League to agree to impose measures of coercion, if they thought it possible or desirable or appropriate.
On the other side the view is held that any modification should be in the direction of strengthening and making more definite the obligations which already exist. It is suggested that this could best be achieved by bringing about a closer relation between economic and financial sanctions on the one hand and military measures on the other, and also by means of reinforcing the Covenant by a number of regional pacts. In regard to that point His Majesty's Government have already expressed the view that they are in principle in favour of regional pacts in so far as they can be made to contribute to the cause of peace, and in so far as they do not conflict with the Covenant. At the same time, it really would be stupid to ignore the objections to proposals for making more rigid the obligations of Members of the League. It is clear that in present circumstances to do this might narrow, rather than enlarge, the membership of the League. It might have the tendency to divide nations into two or more different groups, possibly one group inside the League and one outside the League. Nor is it certain either, more especially if the membership of the League were further narrowed down, that the preponderance of force on the side of the League would be sufficient to secure the pacific settlement of international disputes. The question of universality therefore is really fundamental to the work of the Committee.
Apart from the general observations made by the Secretary of State at the
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League Assembly last year, and apart from the Resolution passed the other day, to which I have shortly referred, His Majesty's Government have not as yet eh pressed any views on the matter. As rapporteur to the Committee for certain questions connected with universality, the representative of His Majesty's Government has the task of preparing a report on which the deliberations of the Committee can be based. But I want to repeat that he is not required to make proposals, and indeed it would be wrong for him to do so. It will be for the Committee, after having examined his report, to make up their minds what recommendations to make. I think it is quite clear that the course of the discussion in the Committee will largely depend upon the importance which members attach to this question of universality in relation to the other questions which the Committee will be studying.
There is, of course, a further important consideration which I must say something about, and to which reference has already been made this evening, and that is that if a really representative League is desirable, it is obvious that at some stage the opinions of countries not at present members of the League must be ascertained. This question has already been raised at Geneva, and I should like to remind your Lordships that the Assembly has already decided that it was for Members of the League, in the first place, to study the problems themselves affecting the reform of the League. They left it to the Committee to consider this specific question of ascertaining the views of Powers outside the League, and perhaps to examine the best methods of eliciting their views. I wish to assure the House that His Majesty's Government ale fully alive to this aspect of the question and to its importance.
The noble Lord, Lord Rennell, has raised a number of questions to which I feel I must shortly refer. He raised the question of Article 21. As a matter of fact, this is not one of the problems which the Committee have decided to consider at first. Although I agree it is of theoretical interest, I wonder whether it is really of much practical importance for the working of the League. In so far as it is important, it seems to me that it is a matter which can be left to the countries in South America themselves, countries whose collaboration in the work

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of the League has, in the past, been a very valuable element; but I should like to point out that no actual difficulties did arise or did affect the action taken by the League in the dispute, for instance, which took place between Bolivia and Paraguay, or in the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru. The noble Lord went on to point out that as a result of these difficulties, he favoured a suggestion for the establishment of three Councils of the League—one for Europe, one for America, and one for Asia. I am sure your Lordships will realise that the adoption of such a proposal would, in fact, alter the whole basis upon which the League is established. His Majesty's Government are not satisfied that such an alteration is either desirable or necessary; but in any event I want to tell the noble Lord that this question of regional or continental organisation of the League is one which has been selected by the Committee for study in connection with the question of universality, and consequently any relevant considerations will be open for discussion when the Committee meets.
The noble Lord also made reference to the question of self-governing States and asked whether it might not be desirable more clearly to define a self-governing State, and indeed, to sweep away a number of phrases which it was difficult to interpret throughout the Covenant of the League. So far as this is concerned, clearly the present Members of the League are presumed, by virtue of their very membership, to be self-governing. What happens, when any new application is made for entry into the League, is that the Assembly has to examine the position and satisfy itself that the conditions laid down in Article to are actually fulfilled. In the circumstances His Majesty's Government do not feel that there is really any necessity for defining the words which actually stand in this Article any further.
With regard to Article 10, to which the noble Lord referred, I can only say that this is one of the subjects which are being examined and studied by the Committee, and it is impossible for me in the circumstances to say anything at this stage. Obviously His Majesty's Government will have to wait for the report of the Committee.
The noble Lord lastly raised another matter, and that was the equality of status of the various Powers who are Members
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of the League. This is a matter which has often been discussed before. This principle of equality of status is one which is upheld by a great many Members of the League, and all I can say is that any attempt to alter that principle would, without the slightest doubt, meet with the strongest opposition.
Apart from the general statement I made earlier, I have attempted to deal with a number of points which the noble Lord has raised, and I hope, in the circumstances in which the Government are at present placed, the noble Lord will be satisfied with my reply.
LORD RENNELL: My Lords, I wish to thank the noble Earl very much for his lucid exposition and for the answers he has given to the points I raised. Perhaps he might have replied more fully on one or two points, but in view of the late hour I shall confine myself to thanking him most cordially and asking your Lordships' permission to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

PUBLIC HEALTH (DRAINAGE OF TRADE PREMISES) BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the consideration of Commons Amendments read.
VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Amendments be now considered.
Moved, That the Commons Amendments be now considered.—(Viscount Gage.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

PUBLIC HEALTH (DRAINAGE OF TRADE PREMISES) BILL. [H.L.]

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  [The references are to Bill No. 62.]
  Clause 1, page 1, line 9, after ("by") insert ("paragraph (a) of the proviso to").
  Clause 1, page 1, line 18, after ("in") insert ("paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of").
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, all the Amendments, which look rather formidable, have been agreed between the Government and the various authorities interested in this Bill. I will, therefore, refer to them shortly unless any noble Lord requires a further explanation in which case I will endeavour to give it. Both the Amendments on Clause 1 merely clarify the existing law. I beg to move that this House doth agree with both Amendments.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Clause 2, page 2, line 13, leave out ("specifying") and insert ("stating").
  Clause 2, page 2, line 14, leave out ("and") and insert ("or").
  Page 3, line 2, leave out ("for determining") and insert ("with respect to").
  Page 3, line 2, line11, leave out ("and").
  Page 3, line 2, line 15, at end insert:
  ("and
  (e) any other matter with respect to which byelaws may be made under this Act;
  but any such condition as aforesaid shall be of no effect if and so far as it is inconsistent with any byelaws so made which are for the time being in force.")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, of the Amendments to Clause 2 the first is purely drafting, and the next is nearly drafting. I think the subsequent Amendments on the clause might be taken together. The Amendments on page 3, lines 2 and 11, lead up to the Amendment on line 15. Under the Bill the local authorities can only obtain full control by adopting by-laws. They can obtain partial control by attaching conditions to the consent which they give, and this Amendment enables them to obtain full control by the latter method where there are only one or two industries which it is desired to control. That is a saving of expense. I beg to move that we agree with the Commons Amendments.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Clause 3, page 4, line 12, leave out from ("any") to the end of line 14 and insert ("such condition as the Minister thinks fit to impose for determining any of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (3) of the last preceding section")
  Clause 3, page 4, line 27, at end insert:
  ("(2) For the avoidance of doubt is is hereby declared that a person aggrieved by the failure of a local authority to give such a consent as aforesaid within the initial period has a right of appeal under this section, notwithstanding that the failure may be occasioned only by the fact that an interested body have not approved the giving of the consent.")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, the first of these Amendments is drafting, and the
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  second merely makes clear the provisions of the existing law. I beg to move that we agree with the Commons Amendments.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage).
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Clause 4, page 4, line 38, after ("if") insert ("any").
  Page 5, line 12, after ("period") insert: ("and
  (c) (where the trade effluent was at any time within the said period discharged into the sewer under an agreement between the local authority and the owner or occupier of the trade premises, being an agreement which was in force at the end of the said period but has thereafter ceased to be in force) the owner or occupier of those premises makes to the local authority, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, such payments (if any) in respect of the reception of the trade effluent into the sewer as he would have been obliged to make under that agreement if it were still in force.
  (2) Where, in relation to any premises having a drain or sewer communicating with a public sewer or a cesspool, the local authority, acting in pursuance of Section forty-two of the principal Act have, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, closed that drain or sewer (hereinafter referred to as 'the old drain or sewer') and provided in lieu thereof another drain or sewer (hereinafter referred to as 'the new drain or sewer') communicating with a public sewer, the consent of the local authority to the discharge of any trade effluent through the new drain or sewer into the public sewer with which it communicates shall not be necessary for the purposes of this Act—

  (a) if, at some time during the period of one year immediately before the date on which the old drain or sewer was so closed, any trade effluent of the same nature or composition as that of the trade effluent in question was lawfully discharged through the old drain or sewer into the public sewer or the cesspool, as the case may be, with which it communicated; and

  (b) if and so long as—

  (i) the quantity of the trade effluent which, on any one day, is discharged through the new drain or sewer into the public sewer with which it communicates does not exceed the maximum quantity of the trade effluent which, on any one day during the said period, was discharged through the old drain or sewer into the public sewer or the cesspool, as the case may be, with which it communicated, or (where, immediately before it was so closed, the old drain or sewer communicated with a cesspool) does not exceed such greater quantity, if any, as may be substituted for the said maximum quantity by agreement between the local authority

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  and the owner or occupier of the trade premises or, in default of such agreement, by order of the Minister, and

  (ii) the rate at which the trade effluent is discharged through the new drain or sewer into the public sewer with which it communicates is not higher than the highest rate at which the trade effluent was, during the said period, discharged through the old drain or sewer into the public sewer or the cesspool, as the case may be, with which it communicated.")

  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, the first Amendment is purely drafting, and, although that upon line 12 is a very long one, its effect can be shortly stated. The first part safeguards the financial arrangements of existing agreements which might be unfairly prejudiced by the original wording of the clause, and the second part removes any financial liability from a trader by reason of action taken by an authority under the Bill. I beg to move that we agree with the Commons Amendments.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage).
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Page 5, line 13, leave out ("and") and insert ("(3)").
  Page 5, line 13, line 15, after the second ("of") insert ("subsection (1) or subsection (2) of").
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, these two Amendments are consequential. I beg to move that we agree with them.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage).
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENT.
  Page 5, line 16, at end insert:
  ("(4) The consent of a local authority to the discharge, from any premises into a sewer of the local authority, of any liquid produced solely in the course of laundering articles on those premises shall not be necessary for the purposes of this Act")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, this is self-explanatory and was put in to meet legitimate complaints of launderers. I beg to move that we agree with the Commons Amendment.
  Moved, That this House cloth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Viscount Gage).
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Page 5, line 20, leave out ("the period aforesaid") and insert ("such a period as is mentioned in subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section")
  Page 5, line 20, line 21, leave out ("that") and insert ("such a")
  Page 5, line 20, line 23, leave out ("that") and insert ("such a")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, these Amendments are consequential. I move that we agree with them.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Clause 5, page 6, line 14, leave out ("passing through the sewers of the local authority") and insert ("with which it is likely to come into contact while passing through any sewers")
  Clause 5, page 6, line 16, at the beginning insert ("injure or obstruct those sewers or")
  Clause 5, page 6, line 36, after ("as") insert ("reasonably")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, these Amendments are, I think, self-explanatory. They deal with a small point to meet questions arising out of joint sewerage schemes. The Amendment on line 16 merely clarifies a small point, while that on line 36 is purely drafting. I beg to move that we agree with the Commons Amendments.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Page 7, line 10, leave out ("the local") and insert ("a sewerage")
  Page 7, line 10, line 13, leave out ("on the premises")
  Page 7, line 10, line 18, leave out ("on the premises")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, these Amendments also deal with quite a small point in connection with the joint sewerage schemes. I move that we agree with the Commons Amendments.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Page 7, line 26, at end insert ("and in relation to different parts of the district of the local authority")
  Page 7, line 10, line 32, at end insert ("and nothing in any trade effluents byelaws shall enable a local authority to make any charge for the reception into a sewer of any quantity of any trade effluent discharged from any particular trade premises, being a quantity which, by virtue of the last preceding section, could lawfully be discharged from those premises into the sewer without the consent of the local authority.")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, the first Amendment is merely to meet possible needs for variation in the different conditions in the same sanitary authority's area. The next Amendment, at line 32, merely clarifies a small point, and I do not think I need explain it further. I move that we agree with the Commons Amendments.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENT.
  Page 8, line 6, leave out ("in such manner, and to such") and insert ("to any interested bodies, to any persons whose names for the time being appear in the register to be kept by the local authority under paragraph 2 of the Schedule to this Act, and to such other")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, this is another small point concerning the issue of a notice. I think it is quite self-explanatory and I beg to move that we agree with it.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Clause 6, page 8, line 22, leave out ("three") and insert ("six")
  Clause 6, page 8, line 34, leave out ("three") and insert ("six")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, the first of these two Amendments is necessary because the procedure is longer than that provided for in the Public Health Act on which the original time limit is based, and the other Amendment is consequential. I beg to move that we agree with them.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENT.
  Clause 7, page 9, line 12, after ("whole") insert ("or part")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, this is a Privilege Amendment. I beg to move that we agree with it.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENT.
  Clause 9, page 10, line 35, after ("possesses") insert ("or is able without expense to obtain")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, this is an Amendment to protect the local authorities while obtaining the information they require. I move that we agree with it.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Clause 10, page 11, line 26, leave out ("he has reason to believe is, or is likely to be discharged") and insert ("is passing")
  Clause 10, page 11, line 39, leave out ("if required so to do")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, both these Amendments are drafting. I move that we agree with them.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENT.
  Clause 12, page 12, line 14, at end insert:
  ("(2) The Minister may by order provide that, in relation to any such area as may be specified in the order, being an area in which a sewerage system or sewage disposal system is provided by a joint sewerage authority, the functions of a local authority under such provisions of this Act as may be so specified shall be discharged by that joint sewerage authority, either as well as, or instead of, by the local authority, according as the order in my direct; and any such order may contain such incidental and supplementary provisions as may be necessary or expedient for the purposes of the order.")
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, this is a special clause that has been agreed to. It deals with the special position of the County of Middlesex. I beg to move that we agree with it.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Clause 12, page 12, line 15, leave out subsection (2) and insert:
  ("(3) The following provisions shall have effect in relation to any order under this section:—

  (a) the Minister shall, as soon as may be after the making of the order, cause to be published in the London Gazette and in such other manner as he thinks best adapted for informing persons affected, a notice of the making of the order, specifying the place where copies of the order may be obtained and stating that the order will become final and come into operation unless, within such period not being less than thirty days as may be specified in the said notice, notice of objection to the order is given to the Minister by some person affected by the order;

  (b) if no such notice of objection has been given within the period aforesaid, or if every objection of which notice has been so given has been withdrawn, the order shall come into operation at the end of the said period or on such date thereafter as may be specified in the order, but if such notice of objection has been so given and the objection has not been withdrawn, the order shall have no effect until confirmed by Parliament;

  (c) where, by virtue of the preceding provisions of this subsection, the order can have no effect until confirmed by Parliament, the order shall be deemed to be a provisional order for the purposes of paragraphs (c), (d) and (g) of subsection (1) of Section two hundred and eighty-five of the Local Government Act, 1933.

  (4) Any power under this section to make an order shall be construed as including a power, exerciseable in the like manner and subject to the like conditions, to vary or revoke the order.")
  Clause 12, page 12, line 24, at end insert: ("(5) This section shall have effect as from the passing of this Act")
  Clause 12, page 12, line 26, leave out ("the volume of")
  Clause 12, page 12, line 29, leave out lines 29 to 32.
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, the first of these Amendments is to give Parliament greater supervision over procedure, which no doubt will be welcome to your Lordships. The next Amendment is consequential; the Amendment in line 26 simply clarifies a small point; and the Amendment at line 29 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move that these Amendments be agreed to en bloc.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Clause 15, page 14, line 6, leave out the second ("or") and insert ("and shall not extend").
  Clause 12, page 12, line 10, at end insert ("so long as that area continues to drain as aforesaid into any sewer or sewage disposal works so vested").
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, these are clarifying Amendments. Under the provisions of the Bill an area outside London which now drains into the London sewers would continue to be exempt from the provisions of the Bill even if it ceased to drain to those sewers. The object of the Amendments is to bring such an area in that event within the scope of the Bill. The Amendment to line 10 is consequential upon the first. I beg to move that these Amendments be agreed to.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS.
  Schedule, page 15, line 10, leave out ("two") and insert ("one").
  Page 16, line 18, leave out ("two") and insert ("one").
  VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, the Bill as now drafted requires a local authority before making by-laws to publish their intention by advertisement in the London Gazette as well as in two or more newspapers. With the requirement as to advertisement in the London Gazette it would seem that sufficient publicity would be obtained by advertisement in one instead of two newspapers. I beg to move that these two Amendments be agreed to.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Viscount Gage.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

NATIONAL TRUST FOR PLACES OF HISTORIC INTEREST OR NATURAL BEAUTY BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with Amendments: The said Amendments considered, and agreed to.
House adjourned at eighteen minutes before eight o'clock.