HL Deb 28 July 1937 vol 106 cc1045-53

Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

Moved That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Earl Stanhope.)

LORD LLOYD

My Lords, it is not entirely without significance to observe the fortuitous juxtaposition of the debate we have just listened to with the Committee stage of the London Naval Treaty Bill, because we ought to observe that it is our naval rearmament measures and our evident intention to take to ourselves great strength in the world which have contributed to the securing of a Naval Treaty as this moment, which does tend largely to the reduction of armaments without at the same time reducing in any disproportionate degree British power in the world. The unhappy memories that to many of us still cling round the Naval Treaty of 1930 have made us rather suspicious of naval treaties. Some of us, indeed I think all of us, welcomed the Washington Treaty of 1922, but some of us—not so many of us but some—were very anxious about the more recent Anglo-German Treaty of 1935. But this particular Treaty seems to be on the whole a very satisfactory one. It has only a few anxious features in it to which I may be allowed to call your Lordships' attention for a moment.

It is, of course, regrettable that there should be only three signatories to it, the British Empire, the United States and France, and that there should be the abstentions of Japan, who left the Conference in its early stage, and of Italy. The latter was, perhaps, the rather natural abstention at the time of a country which could not be expected to sign a naval treaty while she was actively at war with Abyssinia, especially when other nations were engaged in applying sanctions against her. We still hope that His Majesty's Government will spare no efforts to get these two countries ultimately to join in this Treaty. But be that as it may, I should like to congratulate His Majesty's Government in the main on this Treaty, for it does achieve considerable protection to the taxpayer against an unlimited race in armaments. It limits the size of capital ships just as Washington did, which is entirely to the good. It provides a zone of non-construction between the 8,000 and 17,000 ton limits. That seems to me an extraordinarily important clause, providing as it does that our present 10,000-ton cruisers shall not be out-matched by building elsewhere of a class of very heavy cruisers or pocket battleships.

Another feature is the holiday which is provided for in the construction of 8-inch-gun cruisers. As regards that there is just one note of anxiety which has to be voiced. Perhaps the noble Earl who replies might tell me if I have any reason for my anxiety or no, but it seems to me that there is an element of danger in this provision, for we have to remember that all our 8-inch-gun cruisers are now very old. They were all built, I think, before 1931—between 1928 and 1931—and are, therefore, much less powerful than any that would normally be built now. That is to say that, under the new German Naval Treaty whereby Germany is entitled to build up to 35 per cent. of our tonnage (with the exception of submarines where she is free or virtually free), Germany, if she were to build modern 8-inch-gun cruisers now, would outmatch us very much. It is therefore very satisfactory to learn that Germany, who is entitled to build five of these cruisers, has agreed, unless any new circumstances arise, to build only three. I think that is satisfactory from every point of view, from the point of view of this country and also from the point of view of the evidence that it gives of Germany's friendly intentions in every respect. That seems to me to be entirely good.

There is a slight note of anxiety about Italy there. Italy, who has abstained from signing this Treaty, is of course perfectly free to build 8-inch-gun cruisers, and, in the circumstances in which we are placed, we might be at a loss in this particular respect. I, personally, have not very much faith in the "escape" clauses for reasons I shall give in a moment, though I suppose if Italy did start building 8-inch-gun cruisers at the present time we certainly should avail ourselves, or ought to avail ourselves, of the "escape" clauses, and I presume we could do so. I should like the noble Earl when he replies to make it perfectly clear that we could so do if it were necessary. Then there is the communication of programmes which, from one point of view, has its value. It is a great help in dispelling mutual suspicions and the particular provisions for this communication of information seem to me to be good.

Whilst, however, the Treaty has achieved a great deal of advantage, and has avoided the very dangerous quantitative limitations which were the great trouble in the 1930 Treaty of London, there is still one point particularly which I regret. I do not think we can get away from it that a treaty of this kind, as indeed does any naval treaty, loses to us our power of initiative, and the loss of initiative to us in naval construction is far more important and more dangerous than to any other country in the world. Even the apparently adequate "escape" clauses do not mitigate that danger for they do not operate in time. They can only operate, in fact, after the danger has arisen and after some other Power has taken the initiative. Indeed, an example has immediately occurred in the case of Japan, which is now going to build 16-inch-gun battleships, while we are confined under the Treaty to 4-inch guns. What are we going to do about that? Japan, apparently, is going to decide that she can and will build 16-inch-gun battleships on a 35,000 ton basis.

I should like to ask the noble Earl what we propose to do about that, and—this is a purely technical point, and I am only asking for information because I should not have the presumption to venture a criticism—when you put 16-inch guns on a 35,000 ton ship where do you lose? Do you lose in armament, or in speed, or in the number of guns? It may be a very ignorant question to ask, but I should like to know what the answer to it is. Certainly here we are at a loss as regards initiative of design. It is not for me to argue the different values of 14-inch guns and 16-inch guns. That the Admiralty alone can decide. But I should have thought that in capital ships the weight in gun power was enormously important. I hope, as there have been a good many expressions of anxiety in newspapers and from the public about the question of the 16-inch versus 14-inch guns, that the noble Earl, when he replies, will give us a little enlightenment as to our security under that head.

The only other criticism I should like to make, which I have not yet seen made, though I have had a good many letters about it, refers to Article 9 affecting merchant tonnage. Article 9 says: No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.) in calibre. Perhaps the noble Earl could give us a little further information on this point. It seems to me a very vague provision that no preparation should be made for the installation of warlike armaments. It is a question of enormous importance to us. Any war directed against us is certainly going to be directed, first of all, against our commerce. We are already, by common consent, very short of merchant tonnage. It is estimated variously that we are something between 800 and 1,500 cargo ships short of our essential and actual needs. Therefore, it is all the more vitally important that every merchant ship we have got should be prepared at the earliest possible moment, wherever she be found at the moment war is declared, to defend herself and that she should need as little as possible the protection of the Navy.

We have to remember that our ships will not all be in home ports. Therefore, I want to know whether the Admiralty have made arrangements for the distribution of the necessary guns for their protection to the various ports in the Empire. Could ships at Singapore, at Aden, at Bombay or down the coast of Africa find at the outbreak of war—they would be already equipped with gun mountings according to the Treaty, that is all right—an already prepared supply of guns of the necessary calibre for their instant mounting and protection? I am not quite sure whether the provision includes—I presume it includes—anti-aircraft guns. Could a multiple pompom, for instance, be mounted if such were necessary? I hope the noble Earl can give some information on these particular points. But apart from this expression of anxiety it does seem to me that on the whole the Treaty is satisfactory and that it has definitely achieved something to the good. So long as Italy and Japan remain outside there must be some cause for anxiety, but as I have been a very persistent critic of the London Treaty of 1930—a type of treaty which I hope will never in our naval story be reintroduced—and to some extent, a lesser extent, of the Anglo-German Treaty, it is with all the more pleasure that I congratulate His Majesty's Government on this Treaty.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION (EARL STANHOPE)

My Lords, I rejoice that my noble friend on the Cross Benches approves of this new Treaty. He and I were very stern critics of the 1930 Treaty on more than one occasion in your Lordships' House, largely, I think, because we both felt that the limitation of the numbers of British cruisers was unwise and unsound. In this Treaty, as he knows, we have escaped at any rate that danger and we have confined ourselves to qualitative limitation. There I think we have been wise, as my noble friend pointed out. What we really require in this country are numbers of ships rather than large ships; and, provided our ships are adequate to take on the ships of any other nation they may have to meet, that is all we require. In fact the more we can reduce the size of battleships probably the better it is for us, because we require a greater number. As my noble friend knows we tried hard to cut the size of battleships below the figure in the Treaty, but we were unable to get agreement in that respect with other countries.

I am not quite sure that I entirely agree with him in his support of the Washington Treaty. I am one of those who feel that the 10,000-ton cruiser is not perhaps the ship we very much require in this country. At any rate it was for some time the view of the Admiralty that such a ship was too big for a cruiser and too small for a capital ship, and that therefore it rather fell between two stools. As is well known we have a holiday in this Treaty, and we hope that eventually we may persuade other countries, at present not willing, to give up the 8-inch-gun cruiser, to build the smaller type which we think would be adequate for them and for us.

My noble friend said that we lose the initiative in construction, and I did not quite follow him in his remarks in that respect. Of course it is quite true that we are limited to building ships within the various categories laid down in the Treaty. We cannot build battleships above 35,000 tons or cruisers above 8,000 tons—I think that is the figure, at any rate it was a 6-inch-gun cruiser. But of course we can build any type of ship within that tonnage and within that armament. Therefore, subject to the limitation of tonnage and armaments, we have as much initiative as anybody else, and we believe that with our experience in building probably we shall make a better job of building ships within that limitation than anybody else.

LORD LLOYD

I am afraid I did not make my point clear. If we are compelled, by the unexpected action of some Power, to use an "escape" clause we are then at any rate to the extent of four months, and probably much longer, handicapped in designing new ships. There is not only the four months delay but we are handicapped by all the work that has been clone by the other Power in planning their action.

EARL STANHOPE

Of course my noble friend is quite correct in that. If some-one does suddenly build a new type of ship, unless we hear of that in good time—probably we should, because we do hear a good deal even from those outside the Treaty of what they are doing—we do start with that amount of delay. We should be entitled to build whatever ship we considered necessary to meet the threat, but, as he says, it does take considerable time to produce plans for a new type of ship and armament, and to that extent we may lose initiative.

My noble friend asked me a question about Japan and 16-inch guns. That is an extremely technical question, and being no longer at the Admiralty I am not prepared to commit myself. Obviously if you do put in a larger gun, it requires much bigger tonnage. All apparatus (such as turrets and munition hoists) has to be larger and that increases enormously the weight of the ship. You have to give up something if you are going to keep within the limit of 35,000 tons. You may reduce your horse power, and so lose speed, or you may reduce armour, or you may reduce the number of guns. Those are matters which the experts must go into. But I believe that the opinion of the Admiralty is that it is not likely that you will be able to get a really well balanced ship of 35,000 tons if you put 16-inch guns into her. If you have a much smaller number of guns, then if a lucky shot knocked out one turret you would not have enough guns to fight the ship adequately. I believe that the view is that it is better to have a larger number of 14-inch guns than a smaller number of 16-inch guns, in case one turret was knocked out.

LORD LLOYD

Is it clear that Japan is not going to accept this limitation?

EARL STANHOPE

At present we do not know that Japan is going to put in 16-inch guns. All she has said is that she will not be limited to 14-inch guns. We hope that she will accept the limitation of 35,000 tons. If she builds above 35,000 tons, it may be necessary for us and other nations who have signed the Treaty to reconsider the limitation on capital ships. As I think I said at the Second Reading stage, it is as much to the advantage of Japan as of anybody else that she should not go in for large ships, which are extremely expensive, and which she is probably even less able to afford than the United States or ourselves. As regards Japan and Italy not being in the Treaty, I can assure my noble friend that as far as we are concerned we are using every endeavour to get them to adhere to it. And, as I think I said on Second Reading, as the Italian representatives gave such help in drawing up the Treaty we hope that now that the feeling engendered by the application of sanctions is over, the better feeling existing between us and Italy may enable Italy to join as a signatory to this Treaty once we and other nations have ratified it.

As regards being able to go outside, using the escalator clauses, under Article 6 (2), if any nation built 8-inch-gun cruisers, we could follow it in our next annual programme. Our building rate is faster than that of other countries, and therefore it does not put us a whole year behind. In fact, possibly, by the time the foreign ship was launched, we might have ours also ready to launch; or at any rate the completion of the vessel and her coming into commission might be at very much the same time although we had started a long way behind. I think I mentioned last time that the range of the 14-inch gun and that of the 16-inch gun are, I understand, very much the same. Therefore, although the weight of the projectile goes up very considerably with the calibre of the gun, that does not mean that if you have a 14-inch gun you are outranged by a ship carrying a 16-inch gun. My noble friend will see, therefore, to take an example, that if you had ten 14-inch guns and the other ship had six 16-inch guns, while I am not sure but I think the six 16-inch guns would actually fire a heavier weight of metal than the ten 14-inch guns, you would have a greater probability of hitting and getting your volume of fire on to the ship, and therefore possibly giving a knock-out blow, with your ten rounds than the other ship would have with its six.

My noble friend asked about Article 9 and stated that it was rather indefinite. I do not think it really is. If he will reexamine it, he will see that all that is allowed in merchant ships is that they may be stiffened in order to enable guns to be mounted. That would enable anything to be done on shore, because this Treaty is entirely limited to what happens in ships, and it is therefore quite permissible under the Treaty for us to provide the 6-inch guns. I do not know that they are complete for all the merchant ships that might desire to mount them, but even when I was at the Admiralty ten years ago there was a very large number of 6-inch guns in store for arming merchant ships should they be required, and I understand that that number has been very materially increased since then. I believe I am correct in saying that arrangements have been made for seeing that those guns are distributed to various points throughout the world where they might be required, although, as my noble friend will understand, they could only be in naval stations. They could not be in every port and, of course, could certainly not be in a foreign port. Antiaircraft guns, provided they are under the calibre of 6 inches, as is every antiaircraft gun of which I have ever heard, of course may legitimately be mounted in merchant ships as much as may be desired. I do not think much strengthening of decks would be necessary for them, because as a rule they are much smaller guns and therefore the recoil is very much less.

LORD LLOYD

There is no limit to the number that can be mounted?

EARL STANHOPE

No, there is no limit. You can have as many as you like; but they must not be above 6.1 inches, which, of course, the soldier looks on as an enormous gun, as my noble friend knows. I once saw one in France on a railway truck and wondered what on earth it was. Then I discovered that it was what the Navy considers a comparatively small gun. I have now, I think, covered most of the points my noble friend has raised. I did not know that he proposed to raise them until I came down to the House. I am not as closely in touch with these matters as I used to be, but I hope I have answered his questions correctly, and I also hope that he will realise what a good Treaty this is.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly:

Bill reported without amendment.

Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended, Bill read 3a, and passed.