Lords Sitting of 28 July 1937

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
James Buchanan, Lord Bishop of Wakefield.—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPERANNUATION BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932 (URBAN DISTRICT OF RUISLIP-NORTHWOOD).
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, I beg to move that this Order be approved.
Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State far the Home Department under the Act, for extending Section 1 of that Act to the urban district of Ruislip-Northwood, and laid before this House on the 8th instant, be approved.—(The Earl of Munster.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932 (BOROUGH OF RAMSGATE).
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, I beg to move that this Order be approved.
Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department under the Act, for extending Section 1 of that Act to the borough of Ramsgate, and laid before this House on the 19th instant, be approved.—(The Earl of Munster.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932 (BOROUGH OF WOOD GREEN).
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, I beg to move that this Order be approved.
Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department under the Act, for extending Section 1 of that Act to the borough of Wood Green, and laid before this House on the 20th instant be approved.—(The Earl of Munster.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
LORD DAVIES LORD DAVIES rose to move to resolve, That this House, recognising the importance both economically and politically of bringing to an end the present system of competitive national armaments but being convinced that the organisation of security is an essential pre-requisite of the limitation of armaments, urges that effect be given to Article 9 of the Covenant of the League of Nations by the constitution of a Commission to advise the Council on matters relating to the enforcement by common action of international obligations.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion that stands in my name. I put the Motion down on the Paper for three reasons. The first is that, as your Lordships are aware, the reform of the Covenant of the League of Nations is now under consideration. The second is that we desire, I think, to know what steps are being taken to try, if possible, to bring to an end the armament race which is now in progress. Thirdly, I should like to refer to the importance of Article 9 of the Covenant, especially in regard to the two-fold problem of disarmament and security, and to appeal to the Government to strengthen that Article and to ensure that the advice of the Military Commission which it establishes shall be taken into consideration in discussing and considering the reform of the League.
May I make a very few observations on this very important question of the reform of the Covenant of the League? As your Lordships are aware, this task has now been entrusted by the Assembly and by the Council of the League to a Committee of Twenty-eight. I believe that in December last this Committee met, and that some time in May the Rapporteurs who were appointed at the meeting in December also met; but, apart from information derived from the Press, we know very little of the progress which has been

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made in the deliberations of this Committee. I feel sure that your Lordships would be very grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, if he could tell us something of the progress which is being made and when we may expect the Report which they will eventually make to the Assembly and to the Council. I venture to suggest that there are two kinds of reform which most of us, I imagine, would like to see in the League and also in the Covenant. First of all there is what may be described as the moral reform of its Members. The expression of that reform is to be found in the willingness of Members of the League to submit themselves to the rule of law. Then there is also what may be described as the institutional or mechanical reform: that is to say, the improvement and the strengthening of the machinery of the League, in order that it may be able to carry out the responsibilities and the obligations which have been placed upon it under the Covenant and by its Members. I suggest that these two aspects of reform are complementary, because, unless there is sufficient motive power, obviously the engine cannot be driven. But the converse is equally true, that you may have the motive power, and it may go to waste unless the engine is also forthcoming. Therefore I think that these two aspects of the reform of the League should be present, and I hope they are present, in the minds of the Committee dealing with this important and vital question.
I also suggest that the reform of the League is really a problem of developing the principle of federalism. After all, the League is a federal institution, and the whole point seems to me to be whether the principle of federalism, upon which it is based, can be developed, in order that it may eventually be able to assert itself as an international authority. A hundred and fifty years ago the same problem presented itself to the thirteen sovereign States of America, and, thanks to the leadership of Hamilton and Madison and others, they decided that they would develop their confederate institutions and would embark upon a complete federal Constitution. I do not suggest for a moment that the Members of the League can emulate the American States, but I suggest that in principle the problem
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which the Members of the League of Nations, at this moment, have to face, is the same problem as the American States had to face in those days. After all, the whole basis of federalism is respect for the rule of law, and if the rule of law is to become effective then surely it follows that at least two institutions have to be established, one of which will promote a peaceful procedure for effecting changes in the public law and also for the revision of treaties, and the other a system of collective security which will provide for the mutual defence of all those nations or sovereign States who combine together for this purpose in a federal constitution.
As to the first problem, a peaceful procedure for effecting changes is embodied in Article 19 of the Covenant. I think most of us will agree that experience during the last eighteen years has proved conclusively that the procedure laid down in that Article is insufficient for the needs and requirements of the Members of the League, and that it does not provide a sufficiently practicable procedure to enable changes to be brought about, and to provide for the revision of treaties, and for dealing with grievances and disputes as they may arise. The principles of collective security, as your Lordships are aware, are defined and explained in Article 16 of the Covenant, and so I hope that, in considering the whole question of the reform of the League, these two specific subjects will be given due and proper consideration.
It is a truism that some process must be elaborated, some procedure must be established, which will provide for what is often described as the dynamic principle of international relationships. In the past, as we all know, war has been the chief instrument for effecting these changes, and therefore if war is to be eliminated we must endeavour to find a substitute for it. Up to now the only substitute, so far as I know, or perhaps not the only one but the substitute which has been operated at Geneva, is the process or method of negotiation and conciliation, exercised through the Council and other bodies of the League. Negotiation and conciliation are all very well—nobody, I am sure, would suggest that they should be scrapped—but although in some instances they have produced notable settlements, as for instance, the settlement of

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the dispute between Hungary and Yugoslavia a few years ago, nevertheless on some occasions they have absolutely failed and broken down. We recollect at least two instances. There was the case of Manchukuo in the crisis between China and Japan and at a later date the crisis between Italy and Abyssinia. Unfortunately, on both occasions, the procedure of negotiation and conciliation failed to bring about a settlement of these disputes.
The second procedure is the method of arbitration, or the submission of all these disputes which cannot be settled by negotiation and conciliation and which are not judicial disputes, to an equity tribunal or Commission for settlement. In the last few years we have had at least two examples of these tribunals. First of all there was the Lytton Commission, which was called upon to try to bring about a peaceful settlement between China and Japan. Your Lordships will remember that the members of this Corn-mission, who were sent out to the Far East, heard evidence from all the parties concerned and eventually their Report was unanimously adopted by the Assembly of the League. Then there has been a more recent example. Only last week your Lordships were considering the Report of the Commission appointed by the Government to recommend a settlement of the troubles which have unfortunately arisen in Palestine. That is another example of an equity tribunal. The members of that body, presided over so ably by the noble Earl, Lord Peel, were all distinguished men, but they were not representatives in any sense of the Government. They were impartial and disinterested, and they were faced with the very difficult problem of the appeasement of two races, Jews and Arabs, both of whom cherished ambitions and ideals which were conflicting and contradictory; and after having heard all the evidence, after a most careful examination and investigation, they presented a Report which has been adopted by the Government and which we hope may bring about appeasement in Palestine.
What I suggest is that the same procedure could be applied by the League of Nations in a very much wider sphere and that they could thus deal effectively with such problems as the status of Colonial territory, access to raw materials and other
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very difficult problems which, unless they are tackled and dealt with by such a procedure in the near future, may bring about or at any rate help to bring about a terrible catastrophe in Europe. I have tried to give your Lordships two specific cases in which the procedure of arbitration or of an equity tribunal has been usefully applied. May I quote in support of this procedure the words of a very distinguished historian, the late Sir John Seeley, who about seventy years ago, wrote as follows:
"There has been found hitherto but one substitute for war. It has succeeded over and over again: it succeeds regularly in the long run, wherever it can be introduced. This is to take the disputed question out of the hands of the disputants, to refer it to a third party whose intelligence, impartiality and diligence have been secured, and to impose his decision upon the parties with overwhelming force."
That statement and that proposition are, I believe, true not only with regard to the problem which confronted our own Government in Palestine, but also in regard to a very much wider class of disputes which are international, and which should be referred to the League of Nations under the Covenant.
Then I would also like to remind the House of the opinion of a very distinguished member of your Lordships' House, the late Lord Bryce. At the conclusion of the War, when many proposals were being put forward in regard to the drafting of the Covenant, Lord Bryce proposed, in conjunction with his group, that what he described as a Council of Elder Statesmen should be constituted as part and parcel of the machinery of the League, and that they should be entrusted with the task of making recommendations in regard to matters and problems which, if left to themselves, might endanger the peace of the world. I think it only right that I should draw the attention of your Lordships to the opinions expressed by those two very eminent statesmen.
Last of all, there is the third method of settling disputes by reference to a legislative body. That of course is the procedure which we adopt in our own domestic politics. Parliament legislates as to how the law is to be changed and what revision has to be taken in hand from time to time. I do not believe that the world has yet advanced sufficiently, or even that Europe has advanced sufficiently, to

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enable all these very delicate matters to be discussed and settled by a legislative body, or what Tennyson described many years ago as "the Parliament of man." I believe that the Assembly of the League, even as it is constituted at present, should probably have the power of ratification or rejection of the recommendations of what I have described as an equity tribunal, but I do not believe that we have yet reached a point when all these disputes can be usefully discussed or any decision reached by a properly constituted legislative body.
The next point to which I want to draw your Lordships' attention is the specific bearing which the reform of the League has upon the armament race which is now in progress. I imagine that most of us will agree that this armament race constitutes the most terrible spectacle that confronts the world to-day. I imagine many of your Lordships will remember that at the end of the War most of us felt, after the terrible struggle which we had watched for four years, and which had brought so much devastation and suffering to the world, that we might look forward with equanimity to at least another hundred years of peace. Eighteen years only have elapsed since the conclusion of the War, and we now find ourselves once more being dragged along and pushed into a new armament race, which I cannot help regarding as one of the greatest calamities that could possibly have happened. People may indeed say: "Oh yes, but it means increased trade, it means increased production, and it is really an economic stimulant." For my own part I always distrust stimulants of every sort, and I believe that whatever stimulus this rearmament and this armament race may have provided for trade and industry, in the long run it is bound to spell nothing but disaster.
In support of that opinion I should like to quote from a speech by our ex-Prime Minister, the noble Earl, Lord Baldwin, made a short time ago, in which he said:
"To-day, while we are still finding and burying the bodies of the men who fell in the War, the whole of Europe is arming … an inconceivable folly for those of us who have the responsibility of governing the great countries of Europe."
That is obviously a pronouncement of great importance. I am sure it repesents the view of His Majesty's Government,
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and that they regard this armament race as a grave disaster. Perhaps I may be allowed to quote from another very distinguished former member of this House, the late Viscount Grey of Fallodon, who wrote in his book:
"The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them—it was these that made war inevitable. This is the lesson that the present should be learning from the past in the interests of future peace, the warning to be handed on to those who come after us."
I am sure we all appreciate the truth of that statement. Whilst armaments may not be the primary cause of war, I am sure that they are at least the manifestations and symptoms of its approach. Therefore, I suggest to your Lordships that the vital and urgent problem with which we are confronted at the moment is how to put a stop to this armament race.
Then there is another aspect. All these fiendish preparations mean a financial drain upon the resources of every country in Europe, including our own. We reached a high level of taxation at the conclusion of the War. That high level of taxation is still being maintained. It would have been regarded in pre-War days as a ruinous level, and I should like to ask what margin of wealth, what resources have we in reserve, if unfortunately the avalanche of hate and anarchy should suddenly descend upon us. If we are spending at this rate in times of peace, what resources will be left supposing we are unfortunately hurled into another war? Apparently we are not the only country which is being drained in this way for the exigencies of the next war.
I do not often quote Signor Mussolini in support of any proposition I make to your Lordships, but I find that on May 25 he said:
"Italy would back such an arms limitation move to the utmost, and all the Powers should come in too. They would have to. None of them can—for long—keep up the pace at which they are now going, and they know it. To do so means that the world would wind up in war or in economic collapse, with armies of workless perhaps in revolt. I am not speaking of disarmament, but of arms limitation. Disarmament is impossible at this stage."
I do not know that there is very much difference—I suppose there is a difference —between the limitation of armaments and disarmament. If by disarmament Signor Mussolini means total disarma-

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ment, then I feel inclined to agree with him. The point is that something must be done to prevent this race of armaments from developing, and to bring it to a standstill. I also find that a representative of Germany, the German Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Dieckhoff, declared, on May 19, that he felt that gradual progress should be attempted in disarmament, and maintained that by designating separate weapons for abolition by unanimous agreement, the world would be following the example of the International Red Cross.
We have heard these arguments during the discussions in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. The trouble surely is this, that in these days very little reliance is placed upon international agreements, even though they be unanimous. The most glaring case is the Pact of Paris—the Briand-Kellogg Pact—whereby almost every nation in the world declared that it no longer regarded war as an instrument of national policy. We have seen that these agreements are not always honoured. In fact, they are very often dishonoured. Therefore, I cannot help feeling that what we must have is some sort of guarantee that these pacts, protocols, and treaties will be honourably observed. I suggest to your Lordships that this guarantee can only be found in an effective system of collective security. A great many statesmen at the moment appear to believe that the best way of bringing about the consummation of our desires for peace and justice, and of bringing an end to the armament competition, is through what they describe as economic co-operation. I am sure we all desire to see more economic co-operation, but I do not believe that it is a remedy which will effectively prevent nations from going to war. The other day I noticed that the American Ambassador in Paris made this point. He said:
"It is impossible to expect nations to co-operate economically if they fear that the revival of the economic life of some other nation will result in the iron and steel they furnish to that nation being returned to them the form of bombs and shells."
This means, my Lords, that until this fundamental question of security has been adequately and effectively dealt with we cannot look forward to ally material economic co-operation between the nations of the world.
Therefore we come back, I suggest, to one solution, and that solution, as I ventured to suggest a few moments ago, is the establishment of the rule of law, a peaceful procedure for the settlement of all disputes which defy settlement through negotiation and conciliation, and a system of collective security for mutual defence which is essential if we are to secure practical results. After all, the real reason why the Disarmament Conference ended in failure after sitting for two or three years was the fact that this vital question of security was ignored, and that the plans which the French Government submitted to the Conference to put force behind the Covenant were never properly considered but were really ignored. That I think is the significance of Article 9. Article 9, as your Lordships will remember, is the Article which provides for a permanent Military Commission to be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally.
Your Lordships will also recollect that Article 8 deals with two specific problems. One is the problem of disarmament and the other is the problem of security. Article 8 says:
"The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."
Article 8 in its origin was, I believe, a compromise between the French point of view submitted by M. Bourgeois to the League of Nations Commission and the points of view of the American and the British representatives on that Commission. The functions of the Military Commission constituted under Article 9 were twofold. First of all, it was to advise the Members of the League in regard to points which were bound to arise in carrying out a proper system of disarmament, and secondly, it was to advise the Members upon the enforcement by common action of international obligations. I venture to suggest that in effect this means the establishment of some system of collective security and of mutual defence.
What has this Commission done? I believe that for many years before and during the Disarmament Conference it met fairly regularly, and offered advice on

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technical questions which were referred to it—questions that had to do with disarmament. But since the Disarmament Conference closed down I understand the Commission has not met at all. The question I would ask the noble Earl opposite is this: Why was the second provision of Article 8, the obligation to take common action, never submitted for the consideration of this Commission? Why was the possibility of evolving a plan or scheme to co-ordinate the pressure which it was intended should be exercised upon any Member of the League who became an aggressor never referred to this body? Why was nothing done during the Manchukuo crisis and especially during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis? We remember that on the latter occasion this country despatched a fleet to the Mediterranean without, apparently, consulting other Members of the League. Surely that involved a far greater risk of war than had we summoned or asked the League to summon the Commission of experts under Article 9, and endeavoured to discover how far the Members of the League were prepared to take joint action against the aggressor. The noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, will also remember that a questionnaire was despatched to the Mediterranean Powers asking them what assistance would be forthcoming in the event of the aggressor launching naval reprisals against any Member of the League as a result of the imposition of financial and economic sanctions.
I cannot help feeling that the services of this Commission have not been taken advantage of in order that Members of the League might be able to carry cut their commitments under the Covenant, and the responsibilities and obligations which they have assumed under that document. I am sure most of us will agree that economic and financial sanctions are closely connected with military sanctions. Both are inter-dependent, and in support of that opinion I would like to refer to the view expressed by the ex-Prime Minister a short time ago, when he pointed out quite clearly that all these sanctions were inter-dependent, and that you could not expect the economic and financial sanctions to be wholly successful unless the States Members of the League were prepared to supplement them if necessary by military sanctions as well.
I apologise to your Lordships for taking up so much of your time but this is my last point. Unless these institutions, agreed upon at the conclusion of the most terrible war in history and embodied in the Covenant of the League, including the Commission of military experts provided for in Article 9, are utilised, then obviously the whole work of the League is discredited, the League is brought into disrepute, and the process of disintegration is accelerated. It seems to me that a number of Governments spend their time in trying to dodge their obligations and commitments under the Covenant and the Pact of Paris. Until they realise that all these omissions have a direct bearing upon the success and the development of the League as an international institution, as an institution which they w ill have to fall back upon in times of trouble, there is not very much hope of any progress. Therefore I appeal to the Government very earnestly this afternoon to urge upon the Committee of Twenty-eight, the Committee who are inquiring into the reform of the League, to utilise more fully and to strengthen the provisions contained in Article 9 of the Covenant, so that not only may this Commission be used for questions that have to do with disarmament, but also that their advice and their technical guidance should be sought in endeavouring to formulate a practical system of collective security. In that way, I believe, and in that way alone, we shall help to put the brake upon and bring to an end the rearmament programmes which all countries are feverishly carrying out at the moment and we may do something towards restoring confidence in the League and in the future. I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That this House, recognising the importance both economically and politically of bringing to an end the present system of competitive national armaments but being convinced that the organisation of security is an essential pre-requisite of the limitation of armaments, urges that effect be given to Article 9 of the Covenant of the League of Nations by the constitution of a Commission to advise the Council on matters relating to the enforcement by common action of international obligations.—(Lord Davies.)
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, I do not wish to occupy your

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Lordships' attention for more than a very few moments, but I should like to express on my own behalf, and I imagine on behalf of the great majority of your Lordships, gratitude to my noble friend for the persistence and courage with which he takes care that we shall not overlook these very important questions to which he has alluded to-day. He has dealt with two subjects, the limitation of armaments and the proposed improvement of the machinery for peaceful change. As to his observations about limitation of armaments, his general argument is one with which I am in entire agreement. I am quite sure that it is essential that we should press that forward whenever we get the chance. I understand that is the policy of His Majesty's Government, and I only hope that they will not be discouraged too easily by the rather cold atmosphere which apparently prevails on this subject in certain international quarters. I also agree most heartily with my noble friend that we must be prepared for a measure for improving and insisting on the obligations which he has shortly described in the well-known phrase "collective security," because I am perfectly certain—there is no point which seems to me less open to doubt—that there is not the least prospect of inducing Continental nations to agree to any effective limitation of armaments, much less any reduction of armaments, unless they are quite satisfied that they can do so safely; that is to say, that if in consequence of reduction of armaments they are attacked, they can rely upon other Members of the League to support them against that attack. So I agree entirely in thinking that the two topics of the reduction of armaments and collective security are very closely connected.
When my noble friend went on to talk about Article 9 I was a little more doubtful, because I had some experience of that at the beginning and it was not very encouraging. The Committee appointed under that Article consisted entirely of Service members. If I remember rightly, there were three Service members at least, if not more, appointed by each Member of the Council. I may have got the details wrong, but that is the substance of it. It was a very large body. It never, during the time I knew it, decided anything of the slightest importance though it held repeated meetings. The nearest approach the Committee ever got
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to doing anything was a declaration by the Service members that they would consult their Governments. I do not think that was a very fortunate device. My noble friend was perfectly right in saying that it was the result of a compromise between the French delegations and some of the other delegations represented on the Commission at Paris. But I do agree with him in substance, though I am not sure as to method, that the re-creation of some Committee—but it should not be a Committee composed in that way—such as was contemplated in the Disarmament Conference, to consider this question and to make plans for disarmament in the first place, and possibly (though I feel more doubtful about this) for other subjects, is a most desirable thing. Personally I regretted, and I still regret, that when the French Government recently brought about the revival for a day or two of some of the machinery of the Disarmament Conference the opportunity was not taken for setting up such a Committee, which would, I think, have been most usefully employed in considering the practical possibilities of a genuine disarmament scheme. To that extent I am in entire agreement with my noble friend.
As to his other proposals, they are very familiar to me and I imagine to the rest of your Lordships. His proposal for an equity tribunal in the form in which he put it before your Lordships has not, I think, any very serious objection to it. He does not suggest that the equity tribunal could decide these questions. He does not suggest that you should create a tribunal of that kind which could make an order that such and such territory should be conferred from country "A" to country "B" and that that order would be complied with. I am sure we have not got within seeing distance of such a reform as that in international affairs. But that there should be in any question that arises, or in any question that is likely to arise, an inquiry by some Committee appointed for that purpose, I personally do not doubt. I share my noble friend's admiration for the work done by the Lytton Commission although it did not in fact produce any particular result at the time. It was a very striking example of how representatives of five different countries can come to a perfectly unanimous decision as to

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the way in which a very difficult international question may be solved, and, though I do not wish to go back on it, I regret that owing to the want of effective support given to the advice of that Committee nothing eventually resulted which would have stopped the aggression of one Asiatic Power upon another in the Manchurian question.
I doubt very much whether any change in the Covenant is necessary at all in this matter. I think there is ample power in the Covenant to appoint such a Committee at any time that is desirable. Your Lordships will perhaps remember that in one of the early Articles—I think Article 5—there is, I will not say an assertion, but an implication that a Commission on any subject may be appointed by the Council or the Assembly, not by a unanimous vote, but by the vote of a majority. There ought therefore to be no difficulty in appointing such a Commission, and in fact many Commissions have been appointed to discuss many questions which have arisen. That can be done not only on the questions which are directly aimed at in Article 15 and so on, but any question which involves danger to the peace of the world can be inquired into by such a Commission at any time. For instance—and it is really to make this observation that I principally trouble your Lordships—it would be quite possible for the Council of the League to appoint a Commission to examine into the present position in Spain and to make any recommendation that they thought would contribute to the stoppage of the war, and observations on the conditions which they thought were likely to prolong it.
I have long wished that such a Commission could be appointed, and I still hope that His Majesty's Government will see their way to make such a proposal at a very early date to the Council of the League. I believe it could do nothing but good. I say that without the slightest disrespect to the Non-Intervention Committee, which we all recognise that His Majesty's Government have done their very utmost to make a success. They have pursued their way with great tenacity and great skill, and we are all grateful to the Government as a whole, and especially to my noble friend the Earl of Plymouth opposite for the great patience and ability with which he has conducted
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that very difficult negotiation. But I confess, as the time goes on, that I feel a doubt—I do not know whether it is shared by any of your Lordships—whether the policy of non-intervention is really practicable, and, if practicable, whether it is sufficient. I say "practicable" because I do not wish to say anything which might possibly be mischievous. It is, however, evident, without referring to anything in the future, that the difficulty of drawing up any convention or agreement which can really preclude intervention by those who desire to intervene is very great. I cannot help feeling that it would be better to admit that the only satisfactory way of stopping intervention by other Powers is to stop the war itself, and that our policy ought to be directed, not so much to "keeping the ring," if I may phrase it in that way, as to putting an end to the fighting.
It is a great reproach, not only to the League of Nations, which is even perhaps a relatively small matter, but to the whole of our civilisation and to the whole nominal allegiance which we give to the principles of religion and morality, that this senseless fighting should go on week after week, month after month, with great fury and with all the horrible accompaniments of modern war. I speak quite ignorantly, I admit; I can only judge by what I see in the newspapers; but it does not appear as though we were much nearer the end of the war than we were a year ago. I cannot think that this is a situation which ought to be allowed to endure. We ought to make some effort to bring this fighting to an end. We have this international machinery. If it is not sufficient, by all means improve it, but we have it, and I believe it is amply sufficient for the purpose if the States which compose it are really desirous of utilising it for that purpose. The time has now come when a serious and an open effort should be made to bring the fighting to an end, so that the world at large may know whether it is this party or that party, whether it is this Power or that Power, which is standing in the way of pacification in Spain. An open, public, definite inquiry of that kind could do nothing but good. I cannot believe that it would make the situation any worse than it is at present, and if by any chance it were to succeed, that alone, in my judgment, would put an effective and complete stop to the danger of this evil

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spreading to other countries, and even to the danger of a European war. It is for the purpose of making that observation—which I hope my noble friends opposite will not in any way interpret as an attack upon them, for it is not so intended in the least—that I venture to trouble your Lordships with these few remarks.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH): My Lords, briefly, I think, the noble Lord's Motion amounts to this. He says that disarmament is highly desirable but that the essence of the situation, the organisation of security, must come before disarmament takes place. Let us therefore, he says, set up a Commission under Article 9 of the Covenant of the League to advise on matters regarding the enforcement by common action of international obligations. In making that proposal I cannot help feeling that he has misunderstood the intentions of Article 9 of the Covenant. Article 9 lays down that a Permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Article 1 and Article 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally. As your Lordships know, the Commission was in fact set up under this Article as long ago as 1920, and, if I may, I should like to say a word or two about it. The noble Viscount is perfectly correct when he said that it was composed of three Service representatives, one military, one naval and one air representative, from each State Member of the Council of the League. Other Members of the League could claim the right to send representatives on a similar basis when matters with which they were directly concerned were being discussed.
This Commission met on the demand either of the Council or of one of its Sub-Commissions, or indeed also of one of the delegations. Its principal duties were questions which generally affected disarmament, but it functioned in other circumstances as well. On the occasion of the admission of a new Member to the League, the Commission was asked its advice on the regulations which were to be prescribed for the armed forces and armaments of the country which was then a candidate for Membership of the League. Since the opening of the Disarmament Conference this Commission has only met once, and that was the
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occasion when Iraq was admitted to membership of the League. Before the Disarmament Conference it had met much more frequently, and indeed it assisted very considerably the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference in its technical work in preparation for that Conference. When the Conference actually began naturally the meetings of this Commission were no longer necessary, in view of the fact that the work they had been doing was taken over by Sub-Committees of the Conference itself.
This is the point that I wish to make. I want to suggest that the limitations which have been given to the functions of this Advisory Commission are really justified by the terms of Article 9 itself. The noble Lord who introduced this debate contended that part of the functions of this Commission was to advise the Council on matters relating to the "enforcement by common action of international obligations." I am now quoting from the words he used himself. I feel I must draw your Lordships' attention to this Article, and the other Articles to which he refers, because I think it is paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Covenant which the noble Lord brings to support the contention to which I have just referred, and I would like, if your Lordships will forgive me, to read paragraph 1 of Article 8, which is as follows:
"The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."
If I may be allowed to say so, I think the noble Lord has misread this paragraph. He understands it to mean this: that the Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of armaments, and also requires the enforcement by common action of international obligations. I do not think you can really read it in this way. I think this reference here to enforcement by common action of international obligations conditions the "lowest point" to which armaments may be permitted to various countries. I do not think it forms a substantive part of the whole of this paragraph. This point is really raised only incidentally, but it really means, surely, that Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point

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consistent with national safety, and consistent with the enforcement by common action of international obligations. I myself have read it in this way and I have never heard it suggested that it could be read in any other way.
As I have said, this reference to the enforcement of international obligations is really only incidental, and is alluded to as one of the criteria to be taken into consideration in arriving at the level of armaments which should be permitted to each State. I venture to go a bit further, and to suggest that if Article 9 had the intention for which the noble Lord argues it would surely have been more appropriate to include in it reference to Article 16. Article 16 refers directly to the principles of action which is to be taken in the event of an international dispute, and definitely lays down what those principles are. In practice we know that so far as the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia was concerned the application of those principles was a matter for the decision of the Members of the League themselves, and, as I have said, I have never heard it suggested, except to-day, that the Permanent Advisory Commission which has been set up under Article 9 should exercise functions in connection with Article 16. I would merely point out that even if this suggestion had been made before, and it had been accepted, it must always be remembered that under Article 16 there is no automatic obligation on Members to take military action on behalf of a country which may have been the victim of unprovoked aggression.
I could go into this question in greater detail, no doubt, but I think that perhaps it is hardly necessary for me to do so now, since I really think that the view I have put forward is the one which, up to this time, has been generally accepted. I therefore venture to say that, whatever may be the intrinsic merits of the noble Lord's propositions, they do go far beyond the Covenant as it stands at the present moment. But I do not wish to argue on a question of the interpretation of the Covenant, and I would therefore like to apply myself to the actual proposals which the noble Lord has put forward during the course of his remarks. It seems to me that the real point at issue is this: It is not so much a question of the interpretation of the Covenant, but
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rather a question of the very nature of the League itself. I venture to say that acceptance of the views which the noble Lord has put forward implies that the authors of the Covenant of the League thought that, in creating the League of Nations, they were setting up not so much an association of free States, but rather some form of Super-State, which would possess, as it were, a sort of general staff, one of whose main duties would be to draw up plans for war against any offending State. The noble Lord has stated that one of his objects is to secure that some scheme of this kind should be included among those proposals for the reform of the League which are at present being considered by the League. In those circumstances I agree that the intentions of the authors of the League are perhaps not very relevant, but I think it is impossible not to make some observation in passing upon the fact that their intention cannot have been that which my noble friend suggested this afternoon.
As I said, the noble Lord contemplates, as I see it, not so much the restoration of the League to a position of greater authority and power on its present basis, but rather the creation of a new League based on entirely different principles. He asked me if I would explain what the position was so far as the question of the reform of the Covenant was concerned. We did have a debate in your Lordships' House some three or four weeks ago, when that particular question was discussed at considerable length and in considerable detail, and when, I hope, I was able to give a clear account of how this question at present stood. I do not suppose that the noble Lord would wish me to repeat fully what I said on that occasion, but I would merely remind your Lordships that the Assembly of the League has referred this matter of the reform of the Covenant to a Committee, which is known as the Committee for the Application of the Principles of the Covenant of the League. This Committee now actually has under consideration the observations of various Governments on this question. Among them are the observations which were made by the Government of the United Kingdom, and they were made at the last meeting of the Assembly by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
I am afraid that in the circumstances I cannot add to the statement which he

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made on that occasion, but I would like to say this, that a number of different points which were raised in the observations made by the various States have been referred to Sub-Committees, at the head of each of which is a Rapporteur, who are in the process of examining these questions and who will make Reports. I made it clear on the last occasion that the duties of the Rapporteur are not so much to make suggestions as to what action should be taken, but rather to prepare the way and make it as easy as possible for the Committee, when they come to examine these various questions, to formulate their view and to give what advice they consider best to the League itself. The Committee will meet again before the Assembly, and will no doubt inform the Assembly at its next meeting as to the position with regard to the task which was placed upon their shoulders.
They are proceeding, I think quite lightly, with deliberation in an admittedly difficult and confused international situation. They are, I believe, taking full account of the realities of the present position, and they have naturally taken into careful consideration the state of public opinion in the various countries which are Members of the League; but this much I think I am in a position to say, that a study of these observations which have been submitted by various Governments does make it seem exceedingly doubtful whether any agreement could be reached in favour of proposals on the lines of those which the noble Lord has suggested. I cannot help feeling that any attempt to impose a line of that kind on the Assembly might have the effect of straining the loyalty of its Members, and might possibly also lead to further defections from the League. His Majesty's Government, in common I imagine with all your Lordships here to-day, and other countries as well, feel that nothing would make more difficult the restoration of the League's authority than either a further reduction in the membership of the League or, on the other hand, the creation of a state of affairs in which, as I said when speaking last on this matter in your Lordships' House, the world would become divided into two separate groups of Powers one inside the League and the other outside. On the other hand, we think that everybody should do all in his power to check any such tendencies, and my fear is that the noble Lord's proposals, if insisted upon in anything like
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their complete form, might possibly have the very opposite effect of that which he, and I think all of us, desire. They might, I am afraid, create an atmosphere which would make it very difficult, perhaps almost impossible, to bring about international disarmament, which we all think of such very great importance.
The noble Lord further dealt with the question of the setting up of an equity tribunal. He suggested that the creation of such a tribunal, to which international disputes could be referred, and whose verdict was to be accepted, should be an essential part of any scheme for the reform of the League. I want to make it clear that His Majesty's Government fully support the principle of international adjudication of disputes, but the noble Lord justified his suggestion on the ground that the existing international machinery for the ventilation of grievances is really inadequate at the present moment. Here I am inclined to agree with the noble Viscount. For their part, His Majesty's Government feel that the machinery actually is there, but what has been lacking is a will to operate and to make use of that machinery.
I feel that I must, before I end my speech, make just a short reference to the general question of armaments. I want to repeat what has been said on numerous occasions before by many members of the Government—namely, that no one would welcome more sincerely than His Majesty's Government a situation in which it would be possible for them to relieve the country of the present enormous burden of armaments expenditure, and they will continue to do everything in their power to create a situation in which that would be possible. But they are convinced that these conditions have not yet been realised, and therefore it is their intention to persist in their present policy of re-equipping the de-fences of this country. Furthermore, they believe that this policy is recognised in present circumstances to be an important contribution to the peace and security of the world at large. They have made it plain that these arms will never be used for anything inconsistent with the principles of the Covenant of the League. They have made it plain, again, that their policy will continue to be based upon their membership of the League, and they have

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further promised their whole-hearted cooperation for the purpose of strengthening the League for the work it has to do, both by the enlargement of its membership and by the more confident loyalty of its members. I hope the House will be satisfied with the attempt I have made to deal with the points which have been raised during the course of this debate, and I hope in these circumstances that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his Motion.
LORD DAVIES: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for his reply on behalf of the Government. I quite understand that it is very difficult to make any pronouncement at this particular time, but I desire to make it clear I did not intend to suggest that in the Committee of Twenty-eight we should endeavour to impose our particular views or impose any particular reforms upon that Committee. What I suggested was that we should use our influence as one of the nations represented on that Committee to urge the strengthening of the organisation of the League in order that it may be able to carry out its obligations and responsibilities to a far higher degree than it has been able to do during the last eighteen years. I do not intend to comment upon the reply of the noble Earl in regard to the observations which I made earlier in the debate, and I do not intend to traverse his arguments regarding the interpretation which may be placed on Article 8—"the enforcement by common action of international obligations." There may be two interpretations of what that Article means, but, if I may be allowed to say so, I think he is quite wrong in regard to what he described as the intentions of the framers of the Covenant.
Article 16, Article 8, and other Articles clearly imply that the framers of the Covenant intended that the League should become not merely a Conference, not merely an endeavour to settle disputes, and so on, by what is known as diplomacy by conference, but that it should become, in fact, an international authority and should be able to deter not only its own Members but countries which did not belong to the League from going to war and resorting to violence in order to secure w hat they wanted. President Wilson, in introducing the Covenant into the
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Assembly at Paris, made this clear when he said "force is in the background of this programme, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall." If that meant anything it was that Article 8—"the enforcement by common action of international obligations"—meant that the League was a combination of nations for mutual defence and the protection of the Covenant. If that is so, I suggest that it was also intended that the Commission under Article 9—I admit it is vague—should be entrusted to deal with all these technical questions; to give expert and technical advice to the Members of the League in dealing not only with disarmament but also with the whole problem of the organisation of sanctions.
With regard to rearmament I ask the noble Earl to believe me when I say that I have never criticised the Government's policy in this respect. I have always felt—and many of your Lordships have felt—that the policy of unilateral disarmament was entirely wrong, and we are now reaping the fruits of that disastrous policy. But in saying that, it does not mean that we should not be ready to join with those nations who are prepared to submit themselves to the rule of law, and that we are not willing to collaborate with them for mutual protection. The medium of collaboration is surely, I suggest, co-ordination by the Military Commission described in Article 9. Its members should collaborate in endeavouring to devise and recommend a practical plan for collective security before, not after, the crisis is reached. I cannot help thinking that the noble Earl's patient diplomacy and activity on the Non-Intervention Committee would have been materially assisted and facilitated had a Commission of this kind been in existence. In conclusion, I would again thank the noble Earl for his reply and beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

AMENDMENT OF THE MILK MARKETING SCHEME, 1933.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (THE EARL OF FEVERSHAM): My Lords, I beg to

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move that the Special Order be approved.
Moved, That the Special Order, as reported from the Special Orders Committee on Thursday last, be approved.—(The Earl of Feversham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

LONDON NAVAL TREATY BILL.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Earl Stanhope.)
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, it is not entirely without significance to observe the fortuitous juxtaposition of the debate we have just listened to with the Committee stage of the London Naval Treaty Bill, because we ought to observe that it is our naval rearmament measures and our evident intention to take to ourselves great strength in the world which have contributed to the securing of a Naval Treaty as this moment, which does tend largely to the reduction of armaments without at the same time reducing in any disproportionate degree British power in the world. The unhappy memories that to many of us still cling round the Naval Treaty of 1930 have made us rather suspicious of naval treaties. Some of us, indeed I think all of us, welcomed the Washington Treaty of 1922, but some of us—not so many of us but some—were very anxious about the more recent Anglo-German Treaty of 1935. But this particular Treaty seems to be on the whole a very satisfactory one. It has only a few anxious features in it to which I may be allowed to call your Lordships' attention for a moment.
It is, of course, regrettable that there should be only three signatories to it, the British Empire, the United States and France, and that there should be the abstentions of Japan, who left the Conference in its early stage, and of Italy. The latter was, perhaps, the rather natural abstention at the time of a country which could not be expected to sign a naval treaty while she was actively at war with Abyssinia, especially when other nations were engaged in applying sanctions against her. We still hope that His Majesty's Government will
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spare no efforts to get these two countries ultimately to join in this Treaty. But be that as it may, I should like to congratulate His Majesty's Government in the main on this Treaty, for it does achieve considerable protection to the taxpayer against an unlimited race in armaments. It limits the size of capital ships just as Washington did, which is entirely to the good. It provides a zone of non-construction between the 8,000 and 17,000 ton limits. That seems to me an extraordinarily important clause, providing as it does that our present 10,000-ton cruisers shall not be out-matched by building elsewhere of a class of very heavy cruisers or pocket battleships.
Another feature is the holiday which is provided for in the construction of 8-inch-gun cruisers. As regards that there is just one note of anxiety which has to be voiced. Perhaps the noble Earl who replies might tell me if I have any reason for my anxiety or no, but it seems to me that there is an element of danger in this provision, for we have to remember that all our 8-inch-gun cruisers are now very old. They were all built, I think, before 1931—between 1928 and 1931—and are, therefore, much less powerful than any that would normally be built now. That is to say that, under the new German Naval Treaty whereby Germany is entitled to build up to 35 per cent. of our tonnage (with the exception of submarines where she is free or virtually free), Germany, if she were to build modern 8-inch-gun cruisers now, would outmatch us very much. It is therefore very satisfactory to learn that Germany, who is entitled to build five of these cruisers, has agreed, unless any new circumstances arise, to build only three. I think that is satisfactory from every point of view, from the point of view of this country and also from the point of view of the evidence that it gives of Germany's friendly intentions in every respect. That seems to me to be entirely good.
There is a slight note of anxiety about Italy there. Italy, who has abstained from signing this Treaty, is of course perfectly free to build 8-inch-gun cruisers, and, in the circumstances in which we are placed, we might be at a loss in this particular respect. I, personally, have not very much faith in the "escape" clauses for reasons I shall give in a moment, though I suppose if Italy did start building 8-inch-gun cruisers at the present

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time we certainly should avail ourselves, or ought to avail ourselves, of the "escape" clauses, and I presume we could do so. I should like the noble Earl when he replies to make it perfectly clear that we could so do if it were necessary. Then there is the communication of programmes which, from one point of view, has its value. It is a great help in dispelling mutual suspicions and the particular provisions for this communication of information seem to me to be good.
Whilst, however, the Treaty has achieved a great deal of advantage, and has avoided the very dangerous quantitative limitations which were the great trouble in the 1930 Treaty of London, there is still one point particularly which I regret. I do not think we can get away from it that a treaty of this kind, as indeed does any naval treaty, loses to us our power of initiative, and the loss of initiative to us in naval construction is far more important and more dangerous than to any other country in the world. Even the apparently adequate "escape" clauses do not mitigate that danger for they do not operate in time. They can only operate, in fact, after the danger has arisen and after some other Power has taken the initiative. Indeed, an example has immediately occurred in the case of Japan, which is now going to build 16-inch-gun battleships, while we are confined under the Treaty to 4-inch guns. What are we going to do about that? Japan, apparently, is going to decide that she can and will build 16-inch-gun battleships on a 35,000 ton basis.
I should like to ask the noble Earl what we propose to do about that, and—this is a purely technical point, and I am only asking for information because I should not have the presumption to venture a criticism—when you put 16-inch guns on a 35,000 ton ship where do you lose? Do you lose in armament, or in speed, or in the number of guns? It may be a very ignorant question to ask, but I should like to know what the answer to it is. Certainly here we are at a loss as regards initiative of design. It is not for me to argue the different values of 14-inch guns and 16-inch guns. That the Admiralty alone can decide. But I should have thought that in capital
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ships the weight in gun power was enormously important. I hope, as there have been a good many expressions of anxiety in newspapers and from the public about the question of the 16-inch versus 14-inch guns, that the noble Earl, when he replies, will give us a little enlightenment as to our security under that head.
The only other criticism I should like to make, which I have not yet seen made, though I have had a good many letters about it, refers to Article 9 affecting merchant tonnage. Article 9 says:
"No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.) in calibre."
Perhaps the noble Earl could give us a little further information on this point. It seems to me a very vague provision that no preparation should be made for the installation of warlike armaments. It is a question of enormous importance to us. Any war directed against us is certainly going to be directed, first of all, against our commerce. We are already, by common consent, very short of merchant tonnage. It is estimated variously that we are something between 800 and 1,500 cargo ships short of our essential and actual needs. Therefore, it is all the more vitally important that every merchant ship we have got should be prepared at the earliest possible moment, wherever she be found at the moment war is declared, to defend herself and that she should need as little as possible the protection of the Navy.
We have to remember that our ships will not all be in home ports. Therefore, I want to know whether the Admiralty have made arrangements for the distribution of the necessary guns for their protection to the various ports in the Empire. Could ships at Singapore, at Aden, at Bombay or down the coast of Africa find at the outbreak of war—they would be already equipped with gun mountings according to the Treaty, that is all right—an already prepared supply of guns of the necessary calibre for their instant mounting and protection? I am not quite sure whether the provision includes—I presume it includes—anti-aircraft guns. Could a multiple pompom, for instance, be mounted if such were necessary? I hope the noble Earl

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can give some information on these particular points. But apart from this expression of anxiety it does seem to me that on the whole the Treaty is satisfactory and that it has definitely achieved something to the good. So long as Italy and Japan remain outside there must be some cause for anxiety, but as I have been a very persistent critic of the London Treaty of 1930—a type of treaty which I hope will never in our naval story be reintroduced—and to some extent, a lesser extent, of the Anglo-German Treaty, it is with all the more pleasure that I congratulate His Majesty's Government on this Treaty.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION (EARL STANHOPE): My Lords, I rejoice that my noble friend on the Cross Benches approves of this new Treaty. He and I were very stern critics of the 1930 Treaty on more than one occasion in your Lordships' House, largely, I think, because we both felt that the limitation of the numbers of British cruisers was unwise and unsound. In this Treaty, as he knows, we have escaped at any rate that danger and we have confined ourselves to qualitative limitation. There I think we have been wise, as my noble friend pointed out. What we really require in this country are numbers of ships rather than large ships; and, provided our ships are adequate to take on the ships of any other nation they may have to meet, that is all we require. In fact the more we can reduce the size of battleships probably the better it is for us, because we require a greater number. As my noble friend knows we tried hard to cut the size of battleships below the figure in the Treaty, but we were unable to get agreement in that respect with other countries.
I am not quite sure that I entirely agree with him in his support of the Washington Treaty. I am one of those who feel that the 10,000-ton cruiser is not perhaps the ship we very much require in this country. At any rate it was for some time the view of the Admiralty that such a ship was too big for a cruiser and too small for a capital ship, and that therefore it rather fell between two stools. As is well known we have a holiday in this Treaty, and we hope that eventually we may persuade other countries, at present not willing, to give up the 8-inch-gun cruiser, to build the
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smaller type which we think would be adequate for them and for us.
My noble friend said that we lose the initiative in construction, and I did not quite follow him in his remarks in that respect. Of course it is quite true that we are limited to building ships within the various categories laid down in the Treaty. We cannot build battleships above 35,000 tons or cruisers above 8,000 tons—I think that is the figure, at any rate it was a 6-inch-gun cruiser. But of course we can build any type of ship within that tonnage and within that armament. Therefore, subject to the limitation of tonnage and armaments, we have as much initiative as anybody else, and we believe that with our experience in building probably we shall make a better job of building ships within that limitation than anybody else.
LORD LLOYD: I am afraid I did not make my point clear. If we are compelled, by the unexpected action of some Power, to use an "escape" clause we are then at any rate to the extent of four months, and probably much longer, handicapped in designing new ships. There is not only the four months delay but we are handicapped by all the work that has been clone by the other Power in planning their action.
EARL STANHOPE: Of course my noble friend is quite correct in that. If some-one does suddenly build a new type of ship, unless we hear of that in good time—probably we should, because we do hear a good deal even from those outside the Treaty of what they are doing—we do start with that amount of delay. We should be entitled to build whatever ship we considered necessary to meet the threat, but, as he says, it does take considerable time to produce plans for a new type of ship and armament, and to that extent we may lose initiative.
My noble friend asked me a question about Japan and 16-inch guns. That is an extremely technical question, and being no longer at the Admiralty I am not prepared to commit myself. Obviously if you do put in a larger gun, it requires much bigger tonnage. All apparatus (such as turrets and munition hoists) has to be larger and that increases enormously the weight of the ship. You have to give up something if you are going to keep within the limit of 35,000 tons. You may reduce your horse

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power, and so lose speed, or you may reduce armour, or you may reduce the number of guns. Those are matters which the experts must go into. But I believe that the opinion of the Admiralty is that it is not likely that you will be able to get a really well balanced ship of 35,000 tons if you put 16-inch guns into her. If you have a much smaller number of guns, then if a lucky shot knocked out one turret you would not have enough guns to fight the ship adequately. I believe that the view is that it is better to have a larger number of 14-inch guns than a smaller number of 16-inch guns, in case one turret was knocked out.
LORD LLOYD: Is it clear that Japan is not going to accept this limitation?
EARL STANHOPE: At present we do not know that Japan is going to put in 16-inch guns. All she has said is that she will not be limited to 14-inch guns. We hope that she will accept the limitation of 35,000 tons. If she builds above 35,000 tons, it may be necessary for us and other nations who have signed the Treaty to reconsider the limitation on capital ships. As I think I said at the Second Reading stage, it is as much to the advantage of Japan as of anybody else that she should not go in for large ships, which are extremely expensive, and which she is probably even less able to afford than the United States or ourselves. As regards Japan and Italy not being in the Treaty, I can assure my noble friend that as far as we are concerned we are using every endeavour to get them to adhere to it. And, as I think I said on Second Reading, as the Italian representatives gave such help in drawing up the Treaty we hope that now that the feeling engendered by the application of sanctions is over, the better feeling existing between us and Italy may enable Italy to join as a signatory to this Treaty once we and other nations have ratified it.
As regards being able to go outside, using the escalator clauses, under Article 6 (2), if any nation built 8-inch-gun cruisers, we could follow it in our next annual programme. Our building rate is faster than that of other countries, and therefore it does not put us a whole year behind. In fact, possibly, by the time the foreign ship was launched, we might have ours also ready to launch; or at any
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rate the completion of the vessel and her coming into commission might be at very much the same time although we had started a long way behind. I think I mentioned last time that the range of the 14-inch gun and that of the 16-inch gun are, I understand, very much the same. Therefore, although the weight of the projectile goes up very considerably with the calibre of the gun, that does not mean that if you have a 14-inch gun you are outranged by a ship carrying a 16-inch gun. My noble friend will see, therefore, to take an example, that if you had ten 14-inch guns and the other ship had six 16-inch guns, while I am not sure but I think the six 16-inch guns would actually fire a heavier weight of metal than the ten 14-inch guns, you would have a greater probability of hitting and getting your volume of fire on to the ship, and therefore possibly giving a knock-out blow, with your ten rounds than the other ship would have with its six.
My noble friend asked about Article 9 and stated that it was rather indefinite. I do not think it really is. If he will reexamine it, he will see that all that is allowed in merchant ships is that they may be stiffened in order to enable guns to be mounted. That would enable anything to be done on shore, because this Treaty is entirely limited to what happens in ships, and it is therefore quite permissible under the Treaty for us to provide the 6-inch guns. I do not know that they are complete for all the merchant ships that might desire to mount them, but even when I was at the Admiralty ten years ago there was a very large number of 6-inch guns in store for arming merchant ships should they be required, and I understand that that number has been very materially increased since then. I believe I am correct in saying that arrangements have been made for seeing that those guns are distributed to various points throughout the world where they might be required, although, as my noble friend will understand, they could only be in naval stations. They could not be in every port and, of course, could certainly not be in a foreign port. Antiaircraft guns, provided they are under the calibre of 6 inches, as is every antiaircraft gun of which I have ever heard, of course may legitimately be mounted in merchant ships as much as may be desired. I do not think much strengthening

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of decks would be necessary for them, because as a rule they are much smaller guns and therefore the recoil is very much less.
LORD LLOYD: There is no limit to the number that can be mounted?
EARL STANHOPE: No, there is no limit. You can have as many as you like; but they must not be above 6.1 inches, which, of course, the soldier looks on as an enormous gun, as my noble friend knows. I once saw one in France on a railway truck and wondered what on earth it was. Then I discovered that it was what the Navy considers a comparatively small gun. I have now, I think, covered most of the points my noble friend has raised. I did not know that he proposed to raise them until I came down to the House. I am not as closely in touch with these matters as I used to be, but I hope I have answered his questions correctly, and I also hope that he will realise what a good Treaty this is.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
Bill reported without amendment.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended, Bill read 3a, and passed.

AGRICULTURE BILL.
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
THE EARL OF FEVERSHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(The Earl of Feversham.)
On Question, Bill read 3a, with the Amendments.
Clause II:
Persons to and by whom payments, elections and applications may be made.
(2) Where—

(a) in any year there occurs, at any time before the fourth day of June, a change in the occupation of a farm which, at the time of the change, comprises land under oats or land under barley, and

(b) the outgoing occupier is, by virtue of any custom or agreement, entitled to harvest the oats or barley,

the preceding provisions of this Part of this Act shall, in relation to the said land, have
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effect as if for any reference in those provisions to the person who, at the beginning of the fourth day of June in that year, was the occupier of the farm, there were substituted a reference to the outgoing occupier.
THE EARL OF FEVERSHAM THE EARL OF FEVERSHAM moved to leave out subsection (2) and insert:
"(2) Where in any year there has occurred or occurs, at any time before the fourth day of June, a change in the occupation of a farm which, at the time of the change, comprised or comprises land under wheat, land under oats or land under barley, and the outgoing occupier is, by virtue of any custom or agreement, entitled to harvest any of the wheat, oats or barley, the appropriate Minister, upon application made to him by or on behalf of the outgoing occupier, may give directions for all or any of the following purposes, that is to say:—

(a) for determining the person or persons by whom any election for that year which may be made in respect of the farm under Section seven of this Act, or any application under Section nine of this Act for any subsidy payment which may be made for that year in respect of the farm, must be made in order to be effective;

(b) for requiring any such election to be approved by the appropriate Minister in order that it may be effective;

(c) for securing, in a case where the outgoing occupier has the right to harvest the oats or barley or any part thereof, that the outgoing occupier will receive the whole or part of any such subsidy payment according as the appropriate Minister may determine;

and if and so far as, by virtue of any such directions as aforesaid, anything which under Section six, Section seven or Section nine of this Act would otherwise fall to be done to or by the person who at the beginning of the fourth day of June was the occupier of a farm falls to be done to or by some other person, that section shall have effect as if any reference therein to the person who at the beginning of the said day was the occupier of the farm were, or as the case may be, included, a reference to that other person, and subsection (1) of this section shall be construed accordingly."
The noble Earl said: My Lords, on the Report stage, which was taken on Monday last, I said that we were not entirely satisfied, owing to the very limited time that was available, that the Amendment which I moved to insert a new subsection (2) in Clause II covered completely all the points raised by my noble friend Lord Saltoun and other noble Lords from Scotland. We now propose to provide for Scotland by inserting the Amendment that appears last on the Paper in the Scottish Application Clause, and to insert a new subsection in Clause II to cover England and Wales and Northern Ireland. In the North of

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England it is frequently the custom for the outgoing occupier at Lady Day to remain entitled only to the wheat that he has sown and not to any barley or oats, whether they be sown before or after the change of occupation. This means that some provision must be made to decide, in default of agreement, which of these two persons should make the election as to wheat deficiency payments or ***oats and barley subsidy under Clause 7, and we have come to the conclusion that the best course is to enable the Minister to make the necessary determination. It is not a matter which can very well be settled in connection with the incoming valuation of the farm.
I should add that there is a further class of case which the Amendment also covers, but it is one of probably more limited application. That is where, first, there is no wheat on the farm but the outgoing occupier at Lady Day is entitled to harvest winter-sown oats or barley; and secondly, the incoming occupier may also plant spring oats or barley and would, as the Bill stands at present, be the person who should make application for the subsidy and to whom payment would eventually be made. The Amendment enables the Minister to determine whether the subsidy shall be apportioned or whether, if there is no spring-sown oats or barley, the subsidy in respect of any oats or barley grown on that farm should be paid entirely to the outgoing occupier.
Both this Amendment and the third Amendment on the Order Paper have been designed in the first place to meet the point of the noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, and secondly to meet the point that has arisen out of the Amendment in relation to its application to Northern England. I am glad to know from the noble Marquess, Lord Aberdeen, that the Scottish representatives in your Lordships' House are well satisfied with the wording of these Amendments. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 9, line 34, leave out subsection (2) and insert the said new subsection.—(The Earl of Feversham.)
LORD STONEHAVEN: My Lords, my noble friends who spoke for Scotland are, for various reasons, unable to be present
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to-day. Lord Saltoun in particular is sitting in Scotland as representative of your Lordships' House on a Scottish Provisional Order. They one and all, however, asked me to express their extreme gratitude for the generous and complete way in which the noble Earl has met their representations.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 20 [Special payments in connection with the eradication of bovine tuberculosis]:
THE EARL OF FEVERSHAM: This Amendment is a drafting Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 14, line 20, leave out from ("been") to ("a") in line 21 and insert ("sanctioned by").—(The Earl of Feversham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 33:
Application to Scotland.
33. In the application of this Act to Scotland—
THE EARL of FEVERSHAM THE EARL of FEVERSHAM moved to add to the clause:
"(d) subsection (2) of Section eleven of this Act shall not apply, and in lieu thereof the following provision shall have effect:—
(2) Where in any year there has occurred or occurs, at any time before the fourth day of June, a change in the occupation of a farm which, at the time of the change, comprised or comprises land under oats or land under barley, and the outgoing occupier is, by virtue of any custom or agreement, entitled to harvest the oats or barley, or to receive payment therefor, the provisions of Part II of this Act shall, in relation to the said farm, have effect as if for any reference to the person who at the beginning of the fourth day of June in the said year was the occupier of the farm, there were substituted a reference to the outgoing occupier."
The noble Earl said: My Lords, this is the Amendment to which I have referred, and I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 23, line 30, at end, insert the said words.—(The Earl of Feversham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to
Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.

MILK (AMENDMENT) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.
Then, Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended, Bill read 3a, and passed.

HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICES.
Order of the Day for the consideration of the Fourth Report from the Select Committee read.
The Committee reported as follows:
1.—PRINCIPAL CLERK OF PRIVATE BILLS AND PRIVATE COMMITTEES.
The Committee sanctioned an increase in the salary of Mr. E. C. Vigors, head of the Committee Office; the existing salary of £1,161 in respect of that post to be reassessed at £1,250 per annum as from the 1st of July, 1937.
2.—CLERK TO THE LORD GREAT CHAMBERLAIN.
The Committee sanctioned the appointment of Mr. R. Herbert as Clerk in the Lord Great Chamberlain's Department in the place of Captain G. J. W. Townsend, M.B.E., who retires on 21st January, 1938. The appointment to date from 15th October, 1937; the amount of the salary to be determined by the Clerk of the Parliaments in consultation with the Lord Great Chamberlain and the Chairman of Committees.
3 —MESSENGER TO EXAMINERS OF STANDING ORDERS.
The Clerk of the Parliaments informed the Committee of the retirement of Mr. Vincent Medynski, Messenger to the Examiners, on the 27th September, 1937.
Mr. Medynski's salary is shared between the House of Lords and House of Commons and the total pension due to him on 38 years' completed service under the Superannuation Act, 1909, amounts to £131 19S. 2d. and the additional allowance to £369 9s. 6d.
The Committee sanctioned the proportions due from the House of Lords as follows:—

£

s.

d.

Pension

57

7

6

Additional Allowance

160

12

10

The Committee also approved the appointment of Mr. E. C. Botting, Messenger in the Clerk of the Parliaments Department, as Examiners' Messenger on Mr. Medynski's retirement; the scale of salary, as agreed with the House of Commons, to be £215 rising by
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£12 per annum to £250, of which two-thirds will be paid by the House of Lords and one-third by the House of Commons. Mr. Botting's entry point to the new scale will be his existing emoluments as at 27th September and he will receive an increment of £12 on 1st April, 1938.
4.—ACCOUNTING AND COPYING DEPARTMENTS.
1. The Committee sanctioned an increase from £337 to £350 in the salary of Mr. P. Johnson, Assistant Accountant, from 1st December, 1936, as authorised by Treasury Circulars 11/36 and 1/37.
2. The Committee confirmed the scale and salary of Miss W. M. J. Phipps as Examiner of Acts from 1st May, 1936, as laid down in their Second Report, 1936. The scale to be £337-£18-£515 and Miss Phipps' entry point to be her existing emoluments of £367 4s. with an increment at £18 on the new scale on promotion.
5.—MANUSCRIPT PRAYER BOOK.
The Committee authorized the Librarian to take the MS. Prayer Book attached to the Act of Uniformity of 1662 to the Record Office in order to effect repairs to the binding: such repairs only to be undertaken under the personal supervision of Mr. Jenkinson, head of the binding and repair department of the Public Record Office.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now considered and agreed to. I do not think there is any point to which I need call your Lordships' attention except the last one, which may be of interest. The Manuscript Prayer Book which was attached to the Act of Uniformity of 1662 is preserved in your Lordships' Library. The binding has got into rather bad repair, and the Committee ask your Lordships to authorise the removal, under very strict supervision, of the Prayer Book to the Public Record Office for repairing.
Moved, That this Report be now considered and agreed to.—(The Earl of Onslow.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at twelve minutes past five o'clock.