ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY.

HL Deb 25 November 1936 vol 103 cc359-401

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH) rose to move to resolve, That this House approves the ratification of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of friendship and alliance signed in London on the 26th August, 1936. The noble Earl said: My Lords, in asking your Lordships to approve the Resolution that stands in my name I will confine myself to a simple description of the sequence of events which have led up to the signature of the present Treaty, and to an explanation of its provisions. I wish to treat my subject entirely objectively, and will make no attempt to draw a comparison between the advantages which His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government respectively may claim to have derived from it. Before the War Egypt was under Turkish suzerainty. When British troops entered it in 1882 they did not do so to conquer the country; they came to suppress a military revolt and to protect the lives and property of foreigners, which were threatened. We achieved our object, but we did not assume sovereignty over the country. Egypt remained under Turkish suzerainty. This state of affairs continued until the beginning of the Great War, when we assumed a Protectorate over Egypt and declared Turkish suzerainty to be at an end. This course was inevitable in view of the fact that we were then at war with Turkey.

In the meantime there had grown up in Egypt a strong Nationalist movement, which had as its object the independence of that country. This movement came to a head in the years immediately after the War. In 1921 His Majesty's Government sent the Milner Mission to Egypt, but it was not found possible to reach any agreement with the Egyptian Government. The United Kingdom Government, however, were not unsympathetic to the Legitimate aspirations of the Egyptian people, and the following year, 1922, they issued the Declaration of February 28, under which they terminated the Protectorate and recognised the independence of Egypt, except in regard to four points which were reserved for subsequent agreement. The four points in question and in respect of which the status quo was maintained were these:—Firstly, the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt; secondly, the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect; thirdly, the protection of foreign interests and the rights of minorities; and, fourthly, the Sudan.

This position could not possibly have been regarded as a final solution of the problem, for on the one hand we had recognised the independence of Egypt and, on the other, we had retained a considerable measure of control, particularly in regard to the four specific points to which I have referred. This state of affairs was in its essence only a temporary one. Many attempts have been made in recent years to reach the agreement which was foreshadowed by the Declaration of 1922, but it was not until now that it was possible to reach it. This agreement has taken the form of the Treaty of which I am now asking your Lordships to approve. It is the outcome of long and complicated negotiations, in the course of which many difficulties have been encountered, but have been resolved owing to the genuine desire of both parties to reach an agreement. There has been good will and a give-and-take spirit on both sides. The fact that the Egyptian negotiators included representatives of almost every Party in Egypt—in fact it was a United Front formed specially for this particular purpose—has been of the greatest assistance in reaching a satisfactory conclusion.

I feel that the House would wish me to pay a tribute, which I do most sincerely, to the High Commissioner, Sir Miles Lampson, for the skill and patience which he displayed throughout the negotiations, together with his advisers; and the House would also wish me, I feel certain, to record our appreciation of the spirit in which Nahas Pasha and his colleagues approached these difficult negotiations. The Treaty is designed primarily, to promote the common good, and this has been achieved by each party protecting its own interests, while at the same time respecting the interests of the other. I honestly believe that if this Treaty is implemented in the same spirit as that in which it was negotiated, it will usher in an era of prosperity in Egypt and fruitful co-operation between ourselves and the Egyptian people.

I will now, if your Lordships will permit me, attempt to describe the provisions of the Treaty, and will deal first of all with the military aspects of the Treaty and the effect of the alliance which will result from it. The strategic role of the British Forces in Egypt is to ensure the security of our communications by the protection of Egypt against external aggression in co-operation with the Egyptian forces. Hitherto our Forces have carried out this role by an unrestricted military occupation of Egypt, but owing to the lack of good communications by road and rail in Egypt, such communications as exist all radiating as they do from two great cities, the security of Egypt could only be ensured if the troops were at the centres of communication, and thus able to move quickly to any threatened point. However, the Treaty has introduced entirely new factors into the situation, which have made it possible for us to accept restrictions on the number of our forces ordinarily maintained in Egypt, and to agree to withdraw them from the cities to the Canal zone. Instead of being a Power in military occupation of the country we are now a Power in alliance with Egypt, and the two countries are bound together by this alliance, the principles underlying which are stated in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Treaty.

The principal provision is an obligation on the High Contracting Parties to assist each other in time of war, and this means that His Majesty's Government must support the Egyptian Government in protecting Egypt from invasion. It is of course for Egypt to defend her own territory, but His Majesty's Government will assist her in that task under the Treaty as her Ally. Egypt does not undertake to send Egyptian troops outside to defend British territory. This is more than we could ask of Egypt at present, and, as Nahas Pasha indicated in his speech the other day, more than Egypt would be willing to undertake. The Treaty therefore lays down that her assistance under this head in the event of war, imminent menace of war, or an apprehended international emergency, will consist in furnishing to His Majesty's Government on Egyptian territory all the facilities in her power in accordance with the Egyptian system of administration and legislation. These facilities include the use of Egyptian ports, aerodromes, means of communication, and all necessary administrative and legislative measures, including the establishment of Martial Law and an effective censorship. They also include provision of facilities for the sending of British forces or reinforcements. Furthermore, the Treaty states that any revision of the Treaty after twenty years will provide for the continuation of the alliance in accordance with the principles of these four Articles. The Treaty therefore ensures that in an emergency the naval, military, and air forces of the British and Egyptian Governments will co-operate to protect the vital and mutual interests of the two countries.

By Article 8 of the Treaty it is expressly recognised that the Suez Canal, whilst being an integral part of Egypt, is an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire, as well as being a universal means of communication. For the defence of the Canal the forces of the British Empire and of Egypt are to act in co-operation. I have said before that the Canal is Egyptian territory, and its defence, as that of other parts of her territory, is an Egyptian responsibility in which, however, as an Ally, this country will, under the Treaty, co-operate. At the end of twenty years the question of whether the presence of British forces is any longer necessary owing to the fact that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of the navigation of the Canal may, if the High Contracting Parties do not agree thereon, be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for decision in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant now in force or to such other persons or body of persons in accordance with such other procedure as the two countries may agree.

It will be observed that the United Kingdom is entitled under the Treaty to be assured that the Suez Canal will be adequately protected by the alliance for all time. The factor which enabled His Majesty's Government to agree to the withdrawal of all the British forces from the city to the Canal was the undertaking by the Egyptian Government to put through forthwith an extensive programme of road and railway improvement in Egypt which they had in mind; and parenthetically I would say that this development will, of course, be for the general benefit of Egypt. In the past indifferent communications in the Delta made such a withdrawal impossible as, in an emergency, freedom of action to British troops located in the Canal zone would have been severely limited. The improvement in communications which is detailed in the Annex to Article 8 of the Treaty, together with the modernisation of the British garrison, have quite altered the complexion of the problem. First-class military roads are to be built from the Canal zone to Cairo and Alexandria and across the Delta; also from Cairo to Suez and to Alexandria, and westward from Alexandria to Mersa Matruh in the western desert area.

The future garrison of Egypt will consist mainly of highly mobile troops. Therefore, when the road programme has been completed, strong British forces can be hastened to any important points in the Delta in a few hours should any emergency arise. Geneifa, which is to be the new cantonment in the Canal zone, will be about eighty miles by road from Cairo and 150 miles from Alexandria after the construction of the new roads. All steps necessary to protect our vital strategical interests can thus be taken very rapidly, not only at the outbreak of war, but in an apprehended emergency as well. Then again, our troops will not move out of Cairo until the new accommodation has been built in the Canal zone and until the strategic roads across the Delta and certain additional railway facilities on the Canal have been completed. Furthermore, our troops will not move out of Alexandria until eight years have elapsed, and the Treaty provides that before the end of this period certain additional strategic roads and other railway facilities will be constructed as well as additional barracks for the Alexandria garrison.

The Egyptian Government have accorded permission to the British Air Force to fly wherever they consider it necessary over Egyptian territory subject to an undertaking on our part that populated areas will only be flown over when necessity so demands. Reciprocal treatment is granted to the Egyptian Air Force over British territory. The Royal Air Force may continue to make use of the existing system of landing grounds and aeroplane anchorages, where needed. The facilities accorded ensure that our own Air Force will possess all that is required for training purposes in peace, and if anything further is needed in time of war Article 7 of the Treaty would cover it. The Treaty imposes certain limitations on the numbers of British military and Air Forces to be ordinarily maintained in Egypt. In peace time the strength of our military garrisons in the Canal zone will be limited to 10,000 military personnel. This has been the strength of the garrison in Egypt in normal times for some years past. So as far as the Air Forces are concerned, we are limited to 400 pilots and the necessary ancillary personnel. This will enable the present strength of the Air Force in Egypt to be maintained.

Turning to the provisions of the Annex to Article 8, these ensure that the new cantonment at Geneifa in the Canal zone will be suitably planned and constructed in accordance with modern standards and that it will include the necessary amenities of garrison life on the shore of the Great Bitter Lake. Geneifa itself is in a cultivated area. The greater part of the cost of the new accommodation is to be borne by the Egyptian Government who will be responsible for the constructional work. The Annex contains detailed arrangements to ensure that the work is carried out satisfactorily. Our troops will not move out of their present accommodation until the new accommodation is completed to the satisfaction of both parties. Then again, new training areas for British troops have been provided for under the Treaty and the extensive area available during February and March will enable manœuvres by mobile forces to be satisfactorily carried out.

A very important feature of the Treaty from the point of view of Imperial defence is the note which deals with the future of the Egyptian Army. Hitherto the Egyptian Army has been equipped and trained primarily for an internal security role, and at present it is not capable of undertaking operations against a first-class military Power. Under the terms of the Treaty the Egyptian forces are to be improved in armament and efficiency so as to be capable of taking their full part in the defence of the country in co-operation with the British forces. Our Inspector-General and his staff will be withdrawn from the Egyptian Army, but the Egyptian Government declare their desire to receive a British Mission to assist in the training of their forces. Training facilities in the United Kingdom establishments, both air and military, will be afforded to Egyptian personnel. Besides that it has been agreed that Egyptian armament and equipment shall not differ in type from those of the British forces, and His Majesty's Government will facilitate the supply of such armament and equipment from the United Kingdom. It is to be be hoped that these measures will ensure that cordial co-operation between British and Egyptian forces which will be the surest guarantee of the integrity of Egypt.

As regards the forces in the Sudan, the Treaty provides that in addition to the Sudan Defence Force, which is the force primarily charged with the defence of the country, both British and Egyptian units shall be placed at the disposal of the Governor-General. As far as British forces are concerned, it is anticipated that the Governor-General will wish to retain two battalions of British infantry. The numbers and nature of the Egyptian troops to be sent to the Sudan are at present under discussion between the Governor-General and the Egyptian Government. From the Sudan point of view, it would be advantageous if the Egyptian units could include some of the technical units which the Sudanese are not capable of providing themselves.

I will now turn to the other aspects concerning the Sudan which are incorporated in the Treaty. As far as these are concerned the position is this. While the parties reserve liberty to conclude conventions regarding the Sudan in the future, it is agreed that the administration of the Sudan continues to be that resulting from the Condominium Agreements of 1899. The Governor-General continues to exercise the powers conferred upon him by those Agreements. It is further agreed that the primary aim of the administration must be the welfare of the Sudanese. The question of sovereignty over the Sudan is reserved in the Treaty. Both the British and the Egyptian flags will continue to fly at Khartoum and the status of the Sudan as a territory under the Condominium of the two Powers is illustrated under the Annex to Article 11, which provides that participation of the Sudan in international conventions is effected by the joint action of His Majesty's Government and Egypt.

The appointments and promotions of officials in the Sudan remain vested in the Governor-General. Where no qualified Sudanese are available, the Governor-General will select suitable candidates of British and Egyptian nationalities when making new appointments. According to paragraph 15 of the Agreed Minute the appointment of Egyptian nationals must be governed by the number of suitable vacancies at the time of their occurrence and the qualifications of the candidates. Promotion will be irrespective of nationality up to any rank by selection, in accordance with the individual merits, by the Governor-General. I have already referred to the question of the stationing of troops in the Sudan, and I do not think it is necessary for me to say at this stage anything more than that. So far as Egyptian immigration into the Sudan is concerned, it is agreed that it shall continue unrestricted except for reasons of public order and health. In matters of commerce and immigration or the possession of property there shall be no discrimination in the Sudan between British subjects and Egyptian nationals. As far as financial questions affecting the Sudan are concerned, these have been dealt with in an Agreement which has been published as a White Paper in the last few days and I do not at this stage wish to say anything more about that, but I shall be prepared, or the noble Viscount who leads the House will be prepared, to deal with any questions that might be raised on that point.

I now want to pass on and deal with the question of the security of foreigners and the question of the police, which is bound up with the former question. These are dealt with in Article 12 and in Note No. 2 signed by Nahas Pasha in London on August 26. Under Article 12, while His Majesty's Government on the one hand recognise that the responsibility for the lives of foreigners in Egypt devolves exclusively upon the Egyptian Government, the Egyptian Government on their part undertake that they will ensure the fulfilment of their obligations in this respect. This Article, together with that relating to Capitulations, settles one of the four reserved points of the Declaration of 1922, to settle which is one of the main objects of the Treaty. It is, I venture to say, settled in the only possible way. Responsibility for internal law and order is the most elementary part of independence and the safety of foreigners is bound up with it. It is agreed by Nahas Pasha's Note No. 2 of August 26, to which I have referred, that in pursuance of this Article the European Bureau of the Public Security Department, which has special charge of the security of foreigners, will disappear on the ratification of the Treaty. But for a further five years a European element will be retained in the Egyptian city police, which will for that period remain under the command of British officers. The services of one-fifth of the European police officials will be dispensed with annually. The method of the practical application of this Article in the manner best designed to safeguard the interests of all concerned is now under active discussion.

So far as the important question of the interests of the European police officers and constables is concerned this important matter is the subject of the most energetic and sympathetic activity on the part of His Majesty's Government. There is no reason to doubt that for their part the Egyptian Government will treat these officials with that fairness and generosity which is customary with them and of which Nahas Pasha assured us in the course of his first interview with the Secretary of State in London. The measures being taken by His Majesty's Government in the interests of these officials were dealt with by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in his speech in another place, and also in his reply to a question by the honourable member for Tamworth on November 23, and I would refer your Lordships to those two statements. I will not say anything more with regard to these details at this stage but will be prepared to explain any points that may be raised during the course of the debate if I am able to do so. Then again the Egyptian Government agree that when engaging the services of foreign experts—and this is an important point—they will generally prefer British subjects with the necessary qualifications rather than nationals of any other country.

I still have the question of the Capitulations to deal with. The provisions of the Treaty with regard to this important matter are to be found in Article 13 and its Annex. I do not think I need remind your Lordships that though a quarter of a century ago Capitulations existed in many countries in the world they have now disappeared from most of them, including Turkey, from whom Egypt inherited them. His Majesty's Government have been ready to declare in all the draft treaties which have been proposed with Egypt that the régime of Capitulations in Egypt was no longer in accordance with the spirit of the times nor with the present state of that country. The essence of the Capitulations is that capitulatory foreigners are removed, with certain exceptions, from the operation of Egyptian law and from the jurisdiction of Egyptian tribunals. Jurisdiction for them is exercised by their different Consular Courts.

In Egypt this exemption from local jurisdiction has for the last half century been modified by that most successful institution, the Mixed Courts. These tribunals, on which both Egyptian and foreign Judges sit, but with a foreign majority of Judges, exercise civil jurisdiction in suits between Egyptians and foreigners and between foreigners of different nationalities. They have also been entrusted with certain legislative functions by which with their approval certain types of Egyptian legislation can be made applicable to foreigners. No imagination, my Lords, is required to appreciate how the administration of Egypt is hampered when, speaking generally, Egyptian legislation can only become applicable to foreigners either by virtue of the approval of the Mixed Courts or by the consent of individual Capitulatory Powers. The Treaty sets out a scheme for a reform for this state of affairs. The essence of the scheme is that the Mixed Courts shall continue for a certain number of years, but that on the judicial side their functions shall be increased so as to include the jurisdiction still exercised by the Consular Courts, of which criminal jurisdiction is the most important part.

On the legislative side all restrictions on the application to foreigners of Egyptian legislation are to disappear, but in return Egypt gives a most important undertaking, that all Egyptian legislation applied in future to foreigners shall be in accordance with the principles generally adopted in modern legislation, and that there shall be no discrimination against foreigners, Including foreign corporate bodies. If a question should arise in the future as to whether this undertaking is infringed the matter will be one to be taken up diplomatically, and in case of dispute the dispute will be governed by the General Disputes Article in the Treaty, and the question could be referred if it were necessary to the Council of the League of Nations.

Those, in a few words, are the main lines of the Treaty scheme and Egypt is to make proposals in this sense to the Capitulatory Powers His Majesty's Government have undertaken to use all their influence towards obtaining the agreement of those Powers to these proposals. There are many matters of detail which will have to be settled in this connection by agreement between Egypt and the Capitulatory Powers, including the important matter of the length of the transitional régime during which the Mixed Courts will continue. His Majesty's Government are discussing in a friendly manner with the Egyptian Government the proposals which should be made with regard to all these matters of detail. His Majesty's Government consider that the Egyptian undertaking with regard to the legislation applied to foreigners, to which I have referred already, and the transitional régime during which the Mixed Courts will continue, afford all reasonable guarantees for the future of foreigners in Egypt. It will be a matter of satisfaction to everybody that it is proposed in this matter to follow the proper course of negotiation between them. It is His Majesty's Government's hope and expectation that the other Capitulatory Powers will approach the matter in a reasonable and conciliatory spirit and that Egypt's willingness to proceed to adopt the method of negotiation and agreement will meet with the success which it deserves.

There are still one or two subsidiary points that I should like to mention before bringing to a conclusion my introductory speech. There is first and foremost Article 3, which states that Egypt will apply for membership of the League of Nations and that her application will be supported by His Majesty's Government in the conditions prescribed by Article 1 of the Covenant of the League. Article 2 provides that the two parties will each be represented in the capital of the other by an Ambassador, and since His Majesty the King will be the first Sovereign represented in Egypt by an Ambassador, the British Ambassador will be considered senior to the other foreign diplomatic representatives in that country.

That is all I wish to say at this stage with regard to the provisions of the Treaty. I have attempted to describe them as clearly and succinctly as possible. I would only conclude by saying this: His Majesty's Government have every intention of implementing the obligations which the Treaty contains not only in the letter but in the spirit as well. They hope that as a result of the Treaty causes of friction and irritation which may have existed in the past will be removed and that a spirit of confidence and good will will be generated. We further hope that the Treaty and the alliance which forms a part of it will lead to a period of fruitful and friendly co-operation, which will prove not only of mutual benefit to our two countries but will be also a real factor in the maintenance of peace in the world. I beg to move.

Moved to resolve, That this House approves the ratification of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of friendship and alliance signed in London on the 26th August, 1936.—(The Earl of Plymouth.)

LORD SNELL

My Lords, whenever questions of great Imperial interest come before Parliament it is our habit as far as possible to suspend Party propaganda and to avoid seeking Party advantages from any discussion that may ensue upon them. Such an occasion seems to me to present itself this afternoon in your Lordships' House. This Treaty which is now before us seeks to end an old and trying embarrassment and begins, I venture to hope, a long, happy and increasingly cordial and advantageous relationship. That I think will depend in great part on the spirit in which this Treaty is passed and the impression that our thoughts about it make upon the Egyptian people. I cannot pass on to the few remarks I wish to make without saying, speaking for myself, that on this occasion I think of two outstanding names among others of those who did not live to see this happy result. First of all one naturally thinks of Lord Cromer, that great administrator who laid in Egypt the foundations of order, of financial stability and of administrative efficiency and integrity. On this occasion I think that all of us, without reference to Party, can pay a humble tribute to his great services. I think also that the late Mr. Arthur Henderson, who nearly seven years ago proposed a treaty in much the same sense as that presented to your Lordships to-day, would have been pleased to welcome this Treaty had he been spared to be among us. And, though I unfortunately never or seldom have the privilege of agreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, I should not like to pass away from these remarks without acknowledging his own services in relation to Egypt.

I should just like to say that we on these Benches very specially rejoice in this Treaty because it is an extension of liberty rather than a repetition of the dismal story of repressions of liberty that we so often have to face. I do not think any of us can fail to be thrilled by the fact that this old proud land, one of the motherlands of our civilisation, becomes in real meaning the decider of her own destinies. No one, I venture to say, can measure the stores of administrative statesmanship that may be released in Egypt to the advantage of the Egyptian people and of our own land. This Treaty appears to me to be a proof that we in this country are not forgetting our own traditions. We are not succumbing to the creeping paralysis of dictatorship which seems to be afflicting the world. I should like also to draw the attention of the world, if the world will notice, to the great fact that England chooses just this moment, when democracies seem to be crumbling and dictatorships seem to in the ascendant, to seal this Treaty with Egypt and, as our Order Paper shows, to begin in India the greatest experiment in self-government that the world has ever seen. I, at least, have kith that our principles of democratic freedom will be justified by the results.

Finally, I should like to address a word to His Majesty's Government on this matter. I think it would be very good for their souls not to feel that we should end on that note of admiration, because their stock of self-esteem is already just as much as we can bear. If I could induce them to indulge in a little arehæological research, which is not inappropriate to the theme on which we are engaged, I should like to remind them that when Labour was in office it proposed similar agreements to this Treaty and its efforts broke down on the question of the Sudan. There was the most hearty applause and happiness among the Opposition of that period that Labour had failed to bring peace to Egypt. I cannot, therefore, to-day let His Majesty's Government "get away," as we say, with the idea that all this was born out of their own head; they really inherited it from a previous generation. It is the habit of the Tory Party especially to stone the prophets and then to disguise themselves in their clothes; but on an afternoon when we a re given over to rejoicing I will not pursue that theme any further. I will merely register the fact that, if it be true that there is a time-lag of two years in the mind of democracy, there appears to be a time-lag of at least a decade in the mind of His Majesty's Government. Permit me, in conclusion, to add a word of tribute to the High Commissioner, Sir Miles Lampson, and to the Egyptian statesmen and officials who have helped to negotiate this Treaty, and to express my satisfaction with the way in which it has been accepted by the Egyptian people.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

My Lords, I merely desire in a few sentences and in general terms to join in the expression of satisfaction which I think is universal in the House at the happy conclusion of the settlement of our relations with Egypt. For the last fifty years and more, ever since 1882, those relations have been the subject of anxiety here and sometimes of feelings deeper and more poignant than mere anxiety. It is therefore with a feeling of the profoundest relief that we can look upon the settlement which has been described to-day in such very clear and felicitous terms by the noble Earl on the Front Bench opposite. The noble Lord on the Front Opposition Bench who has just spoken implied, I think, that all this might have been done before. Joining as I do in the deep tribute which he paid to Lord Cromer, I should also like to join him in his expression of regret that Mr. Arthur Henderson is not alive to witness this fortunate result. I am certain that he did everything that a man could do, when he was in charge, to bring it about.

There is, however, this to be said on the other side. It may be—and indeed I think it is—that the atmosphere of to-day differs so largely from the atmosphere then that what was proved to be impossible then has become possible now. That not merely applies to the relations between this country and Egypt, but also to the internal relations of Egypt itself. Nobody, I think, who Lad the privilege of seeing the Egyptian statesmen who were over here recently in connection with the matter could fail to be struck by the sobriety and unanimity with which they approached the settlement of this question. Some years ago such as approach on their part would not, I think, have been possible. It is also the fact that the general outlook of Egyptians, not merely the political figures but of the people themselves, is definitely more friendly towards this country than it was a few years ago, and in those circumstances the action of His Majesty's Government has become—I will not say easy because I do not think it could ever have been easy, but less difficult than it was a few years ago.

I do not want to discuss any of the details further than to express the gratification, which I think we all feel, that the difficult questions of the Capitulations and the Mixed Courts are likely, as I hope, by the argumentative pressure which His Majesty's Government has been able to apply to the Governments of other European countries, to be in a fair way to settlement. Most of all, and I think the greatest source of satisfaction of any, is the prospect of a settlement in the Sudan. After all, the Egyptians must realise that but for the intervention of British forces and the expenditure of not a little British blood, the Sudan would have remained in a welter of savagery. On the other hand, we must entirely appreciate the practical and material interests of Egypt in the prosperity and peace of the Sudan, and for that reason I welcome most heartily the Condominium which is going, as I hope, to achieve a happy condition in that country, where the various races are, I am sure, capable of great advance, both morally and intellectually. I merely say in conclusion that, taking up an atlas and looking at the map, there are not many countries which it is possible to look at in at all a hopeful spirit, either for their present condition or for their future, and it is something to be able to look at the map of Egypt in the firm and confident hope that future years are going to develop, as I hope, the prosperity of that country on a basis of permanent peace.

LORD LLOYD

I should like at the outset of my remarks to acknowledge the generous terms in which the noble Lord who leads the Opposition referred to me. I much appreciate them. My Lords, when we listened to the concise and interesting summary of the Treaty proposals made by the noble Earl who speaks for the Foreign Office in this House, I think we must all have felt that it was difficult to realise, with the great history of our achievements in Egypt, that it is only some brief fifty years, or very little more, since the occupation first took place. The previous occupation under Napoleon brought great names to Egypt, soldiers like Kléber and Dessaix, great administrators like St. Hilaire, Desgenettes and Berthollet, and many another. In the period of our occupation we too brought to Egypt names as great as any brought to that country before, Dufferin and Cromer; Gordon and Milner and Kitchener; Garstin, Wingate, Madrell Wilcox and many another, all of whom deserve to be remembered to-day. As a result of their peculiar efforts in exceptionally difficult circum stances we know that the people of the Nile, whether Copt or Mussulman, Jew, Greek, Turk or Armenian, were able to live side by side in peace and prosperity, and did so, what is more, in the sure hope of its continuance all the years we were there. A not uninteresting reflection for us when we look at the difficulties of two nations living side by side in a neighbouring country to-day.

Nevertheless, the curtain now rings clown upon the stage of British endeavour in Egypt, and whatever protection we may be privileged to give to Egypt in future under the terms of this Treaty, we shall be able to do nothing more for the people in Egypt whom we have served so long, and henceforth shall be compelled to watch their future with folded hands. When the noble Lord referred to the rejoicing with regard to this Treaty I must confess that my own was much modified by this consideration. If, in 1882, any one had inquired what we had come to Egypt to do, it would certainly have been replied that we had come there to restore the financial difficulties in which Egypt found herself, to establish a humane, just and modern administration, and then leave the country as soon as we had made the Government stable and progressive enough to shield us and Egypt from danger of any foreign interference with them, or with our Imperial communications. I rather doubt if any Englishman, knowing the country well, or many Egyptians themselves, would venture to assert that these conditions are fulfilled to-day. After all, Parliamentary institutions are alien to the soil of Egypt, and at any rate are of only recent growth there; but even so their short record is one of considerable disturbance and upheaval in the country. Moreover, the skilful and powerful King who so recently controlled the interactions of democratic forces in his country has just died, leaving a young and untried, though promising, monarch in the hands of a Regency, to carry on the Government in that difficult country. Furthermore, the neighbouring States of Iraq, Palestine, Syria and the area on the north coast of Africa, exist to-day in varying degrees of turmoil and unrest, due in no small measure to the premature introduction of the very systems which we have introduced into Egypt.

These are, in fact, the actual circumstances in which we close the chapter of our administrative history in Egypt to-day. If I refer to them it is only because I wish to remind your Lordships that the main motive which brought us to Egypt, which kept us there since 1882, and which inspired the work of Milner, Cromer, Kitchener and their successors, was the safeguarding of our Imperial communications. It was always held that the safety of those communications could not be assured by military dispositions alone, but must depend to a large degree upon the internal conditions prevailing in the country itself. That is obviously so, for a discontented, ill-governed and turbulent hinterland at our back could be at any time a grave menace to even the best military dispositions that we might take. It was in this conviction, and not for financial reform alone, that Lord Cromer applied himself to his task, knowing as he did that success in the one field would bring him equal success in the other.

Of course, it is true that as years elapsed experience showed us how unnecessarily pitiful had been the conditions of the fellaheen in that country, a ad as it dawned on us how we had it in our power to give the fellah a square deal, to free him from forced labour, and to make him for the first time acquainted with justice—not only that, but how it was in our power to make the blind to see in Egypt, to free the Egyptian from his divers plagues, hookworm, bilharzia, leprosy and the like, and indeed from starvation itself—so the work of restoration did admittedly become an object in itself, and one that it seemed during all those years both ignoble and impossible to abandon. I am therefore venturing to remind your Lordships that this Treaty departs definitely from the previously accepted axiom that the internal conditions of Egypt are a matter of primary concern to any one who guarantees the integrity of Egypt. I should like here to add that it is a common fallacy to suppose that the axiom was abandoned in 1922; that is not the case, though it is often so stated; for if your Lordships will refer to the White Paper explanatory of that Declaration which was sent to the Dominions you will see it there clearly laid down that the welfare of the people of Egypt was held to be an essential British interest, and one to which we could not be indifferent; and it was only on that understanding and in the light of those explanations that the Dominions at that time accepted the 1922 Declaration.

But, subject to that very important hinterland consideration, if I may so put it, it is only fair to say that I think the military clauses in this Treaty infinitely better than any previously agreed to in the several preceding negotiations from the time of the Curzon-Adly negotiations up to the present time. There are of course grave disadvantages from the Egyptian point of view as well as from our own in the vacation by British troops of the capital. But I think the disadvantages are undoubtedly much less under this Treaty than under any previous draft. There are disadvantages, of course, in having a garrison confined in a restricted area in the Canal zone; and let no one imagine that there it is going to be very easy to make the soldier's life agreeable. Even the moderate amenities of Ismailia have only been developed after heavy cost in money and lapse of long years. I hope that the noble Earl will forgive me if I here venture to make a slight correction of his accent, for I hope, for the sake of the morale of our troops who are going to occupy it in the future, he will not refer to the place as Geneva, but as Geneifa, which I think is the correct pronunciation of the place to which they are destined.

There are two important differences between these proposals and their predecessors. The one that reconciles me most to the military clauses of this Treaty—which I have naturally, as your Lordships might suppose, examined with as critical An eye as I could—is that, in contradistinction to any previous proposals, it is on our apprehension of any international danger that we may emerge from the Canal zone for the protection of Egypt for any purpose whatever. That is an enormous difference. Every previous draft had conditions which made for grave delay in a crisis of that kind, which I considered at the time when I was responsible for some of the negotiations to be a very grave defect. That is eliminated in this Treaty, and I think it makes an enormous difference.

The second difference is that to which the noble Earl referred, and which makes much difference in my mind— namely, the construction of strategic roads for use by British troops and Egyptian forces, for dealing with any emergencies that may arise. The old objections were very real. You could move no mechanical transport on the top of an Egyptian canal bank, and that bank only had to be watered to make it impossible for transport. Even cavalry could with difficulty get about the Delta in some circumstances. These new strategic roads, coupled with modern transport, make the whole difference, and do, I think, largely make it possible for our troops to leave the capital and go to Geneifa in due course. I also think that, subject to one small proviso on which I am scarcely competent to make a criticism, I cannot imagine anything fairer than the air clauses. I would perhaps have asked a question as to whether the number of pilots provided for is really enough, but one must presume that competent authorities have decided that correctly.

May I ask the noble Earl two questions in regard to the military clauses before I leave them? I should like to ask what are the actual estimated sums payable by Egypt in respect of roads and barracks, and what is the amount of the sum referred to, I think in line 5 of paragraph 4 of the Annex to Article 8? I read a speech the other day in the Press, I think by Sidky Pasha—I am not sure—in which he mentioned the sum of about £4,000,000 for the barracks and £4,000,000 for the roads, making £8,000,000 in all. If that were the case that would make our share of it £1,000,000. I would also like to ask what is the sum payable by us—it is really in the nature of a debt, I agree—for the Abbasia barracks—a debt contracted some years ago on our agreeing to evacuate the Kasr-el-Nil barracks. I have in mind a figure of something like £400,000 payable by us in respect of the Abbassia barracks.

There is one other technical matter, the question of the water supply. I am not entirely satisfied with the wording of paragraph 3 of the Annex to Article 8, for I doubt if it is adequate to ensure that the supply of water in the Canal zone—a vitally important matter—will be adequately pure and free from risks of bilharzia. The Egyptian Government, I think, might easily contend that the present sweet water supply is suitable, simply on the ground that it is the water which is now used in the Canal zone, and that we have already accepted it as such for those troops "for whom accommodation already exists"—I am quoting the terms of the paragraph. But this is a very different thing. It may be suitable for the civilian needs of a European population, when filtered and chlorinated for immediate use in the Canal zone, but for large bodies of troops, who in hot weather will bathe and use the water with very modified carefulness, it seems essential that something should be done to filter the water at the Nile intake, so as to remove what I believe are called bilharzia hosts, that is, the watersnails, without which the bilharzia germ cannot live, and take it in pipelines to the Canal. Unless that is done it may give our troops very grave trouble. I have not been able to ascertain whether any such precautions are going to be taken, but I think that any one acquainted with bilharzia conditions in Egypt will realise that greater provisions than those apparently in this Treaty need certainly to be made.

May I before leaving the military clauses make a brief reference to the Egyptian Note on page 19 in regard to the new Egyptian Army? I should like to say that I personally welcome the proposals made therein very cordially indeed. For a long time past I have believed that the time had come when the Egyptian Army, both in the interests of Great Britain and Egypt, should be brought up to date and made into the admirable body which I am sure will be possible once adequate training and modern facilities are provided. The magnificent physique of the Egyptian fellah as well as his peculiar proclivity for drill and military service give one the highest hopes that the Egyptian Army may become a really valuable military ally in the Near East. Indeed, so far as the parade ground is concerned, any one who has seen the Egyptian nafr at drill will realise that the Brigade of Guards itself will have to look to its laurels after a little intensified training has taken place.

Whilst I can join to a large degree in the congratulations to the Foreign Secretary on this aspect of the Treaty, I am afraid there are other aspects of the Treaty which give me much greater cause for anxiety. So far as the internal situation of Egypt is concerned, a study of the various proposals made from the time of the Milner Mission's Report, from 1919 onwards, reveals a story of gradual but regular retreat from every position which the Milner Mission and every subsequent British Government and statesman concerned have laid down as absolutely essential both for Egypt and ourselves in Egypt. Quite clearly the Treaty we are now considering is little less than a stampede from every guarantee laid down as essential in the past—that is to say, if the progress of Egyptian independence was to proceed in due relation to the actual internal situation in Egypt. It is quite evident to me, and I think it will be to everybody, that His Majesty's Government made up their minds, rightly or wrongly—I do not say which—that an immediate alliance with Egypt was necessary on strategic grounds and, having so decided, neither the security of foreigners nor the protection of minorities, nor even the commercial interests of our own people, still less the interests of the people of Egypt, have been allowed to stand in the way of their aim.

Even our right to guard the Canal is limited to the very brief period of twenty years, and I think your Lordships should in this connection take note of a rather disquieting feature in the penultimate sentence of Article 16. I should like to ask the noble Earl for an explanation of that point. It is that part which states that the continuance of the alliance is to be based on the principles contained in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7. There is a very significant omission of Article 8, from which it is clear that in spite of our liability to defend Egypt from any and every aggression, it is not contemplated here that in any circumstances we shall be allowed to garrison any troops in Egypt for that purpose. At least that seems to mo the only way possible to explain this, as I have said, very significant omission of Article 8 in that connection.

Only those who are in His Majesty's Cabinet to-day and who have access to full information on the situation can be in a position to judge whether the price that His Majesty's Government have thought it right to pay, or the sacrifices they have deemed it proper to make for the object in view, are justified by the circumstances. The Government, after all, that neglects its defences can only pursue a foreign policy commensurate with those defences, and I am merely concerned to-day that we should be under no delusions as to what has been done and what we are in fact going to set our hands to. I am not sure that the Foreign Secretary is quite wise in adducing Lord Cromer's great name in support of these particular proposals. Lord Cromer's whole work was devoted, as was Lord Kitchener's, to the betterment of the condition of the people of Egypt, and whatever may be the strategic merits—and I have acknowledged them to be important—of Mr. Eden's Treaty, no one in your Lordships' House or outside can possibly doubt that the masses of the people of Egypt will be the worst sufferers by virtue of our withdrawal and of the provisions of the Treaty. Nor—I only refer to this in passing—was the Foreign Secretary more accurate in imputing to Lord Cromer, as an objective, an unshakable belief in Egyptian autonomy. Very different indeed was Lord Cromer's faith, based as it was on incomparable personal knowledge of Egyptian conditions over a long time. He did not conclude in favour of autonomy for Egypt—far from it. His final conclusion was given to the world in these words: After hanging in the balance for thirty-three years the political destiny of Egypt has at last been settled. The country has been incorporated in the British Empire. No other solution was possible. As to the rest of the clauses, I shall not refer to them so roughly as to call them, as a friend of mine did, the "bag and baggage clauses," but I am afraid they must be called the abandonment clauses. I have already referred to the abandonment of the reserved points of the 1922 Declaration in respect of the protection of minorities and foreigners. The Foreign Secretary suggests, as think my noble friend also did, that this Treaty settles the four reserved points. It settles them—yes; but it does not solve them. In 1922 the rule of the road was solvitur ambulando; in 1936 it is solvitur deserendo. The noble Earl justifies this settlement by saying that the right to look after minorities and foreigners is the first privilege of an independent Government, but if that were true when we gave Egypt independence, as we declared we did in 1922, why was it that we reserved those points then? Nothing in the Government or people of Egypt has changed since that time. I only mention that to say that I doubt very much whether His Majesty's Government could not have got as effective and as useful a Treaty without making a complete surrender of foreign and commercial interests in Egypt.

We have abandoned our power to protect not only foreigners, not only minorities, but our own nationals in Egypt as well. We announce in the Treaty our readiness to abandon the whole capitulatory position and the Mixed Courts also, thus handing over to the Egyptian Government, after a very short period of transition, the complete jurisdiction, legislative, fiscal, judicial, and criminal, over all persons in Egypt. The ratification of this Treaty to-day, I am glad to think, is not going finally to settle this aspect of the question. I am certain that foreign Governments will fight hard for the maintenance of some kind of veto in regard to legislation affecting foreigners in Egypt, and that is the main ground of my objection to this Treaty. I am doubtful if His Majesty's Government realise how grave and how justified are the anxieties felt, not only by foreigners, not only by British subjects, but by Egyptians themselves, by all those in any case who have staked all their business fortunes on our protection in Egypt. After all, it is well known that up to quite recent years practically the whole wealth of the Nile valley has been created not by the people of the Nile valley, but by foreign capital, foreign energy, and foreign enterprise. In the last fifteen years there have been signs of activity and ability on the part of Egyptian national institutions. Flourishing concerns are showing great enterprise, but till quite recently the whole wealth of the Nile valley, roughly speaking, has been the work of foreigners, and that is what makes the conditions quite different in this country from those in any other country in the world.

Those who know the difficulties best are most apprehensive of the new changes ahead. New taxation is inevitable, new legislation certain, decline of the administration, expected by everybody, realised already. There must also be new and heavy increases in the Budget, the attack on the Mixed and Consular Courts and the certainty of their disappearance in the near future, the removal of British troops from the towns, the weakening and rapid elimination of the European element in the police, the growing competition of Egyptian capital and the certainty of its securing, very naturally, preference from the Egyptian Government—the possibility of economic xenophobia, which has happened in every country immediately after the abolition of Capitulations. All these are the very reverse of the conditions under which foreign capital flourished and made Egypt prosperous and powerful.

Take the question of taxation alone. There is a kind of idea believed and propagated sedulously abroad that British and foreign subjects live in Egypt in luxury and without contributing any of the taxes of the country. Numbers of people have believed this and have told me that it is so. It is of course absolutely untrue. The foreigner pays in Egypt exactly the same taxes as any Egyptian national, and indeed in many cases derives less advantage, as for instance, in matters of education, than the Egyptian himself. The bulk of the revenue is raised by indirect taxation from which nobody can escape. Therefore if people ask: "What are the foreigners afraid of; why do they want a legislative veto?" the noble Lord replies: "It is all right, because the Egyptian Government have given us a guarantee that no legislation which they pass in relation to foreigners will be inconsistent"—I think the words are—"with the principles of modern legislation." Naturally every foreigner in Egypt is well aware that this guarantee will be given and there are very few who doubt that it will be kept, but that does not meet the question at all. It is not in the terms of legislation that the danger lies; it is in the application of the law once it is passed. Times out of number there have been cases where attempts have been made to apply a law, in itself equal to all, foreign and Egyptian, in terms of the greatest injustice to foreigners, in the actual perception, as the French call it, of the tax, and this is what the legislative veto provides against.

It is an unhappy proposal for the Egyptians themselves and may lead to what has taken place in Turkey, where all foreign capital and enterprise practically have been eliminated under the Capitulations. It will be an unhappy day for the peoples of Egypt and still more for the foreigners if the veto of the Mixed Courts is taken away. The foreign community in Egypt regret, therefore, as I regret, that His Majesty's Government have found it necessary to go so far as to pledge themselves in advance to such a wholesale and sudden abolition of all these safeguards—safeguards, I repeat, which have been considered necessary by every Government that has had to do with the question. I have every sympathy with the natural desire of the Egyptians to rid themselves of the curse, as they call it, of internationalism. But there is not a foreigner and very few Egyptians who believe that so sudden a transfer from internationalism to complete Egyptian sovereignty in these particular matters is not fraught with grave dangers. Indeed, I myself am confident that Egyptian opinion, if it dared to express itself, would be saying very much the same thing as I am saying to your Lordships to-day.

In point of fact you will give under this Treaty greater powers to the Egyptian Government than are given in America or France to their Governments. The kind of thing I would venture to suggest to your Lordships is that a veto should be given, for instance, to the Egyptian Cour d'Appel, the Court of Appeal, which is in itself an Egyptian institution. It is not a thing that could hurt in any degree the amour propre of the Egyptian people. It should have exactly the same sort of powers in the Cour d'Appel as the High Court in America has, in control of all federal legislation, to which the President himself must bow. But if the American analogy is not enough, you have a more complete and suitable one in the Courts of France, where both Conseil d'Etat and Conseil Economique have super-Parliamentary powers. The Egyptian Cour d'Appel should be given the right to exercise in this manner its veto on behalf of foreigners, but without the obligation to refer laboriously in each case to all foreign Governments concerned, which has been a matter naturally of grievance and delay to the Egyptian Government.

As it is, I say that this Treaty actually confers greater powers on the Egyptian Government than are enjoyed by the Government of either France or America. Without saying a word in disparagement of the Egyptian Government, it is, after all, compared with those Governments, new, inexperienced, untutored and immature in the ways of Parliamentary control, and it is indeed a remarkable thing that the Socialists, in the draft treaty of 1930, actually insisted on retaining this veto on legislation and the Egyptian Government cordially accepted it. I have the terms here in which they accepted it, and I say emphatically that there is no change whatever in the situation as between 1930 and 1936 which can justify these far-reaching concessions. It is, I think, well known that the discussions by the High Commissioner and the Foreign Office on the position of foreigners were rushed through at the end, and it seems to me that great concessions were made in a hurry in the elation which resulted from the agreement on the military and the Sudan clauses. Unless some compromise is found on this question of the veto on foreign legislation, I fear that very grave evils are likely to ensue, of which our new Ally, Egypt herself, is likely to be one of the chief sufferers. I would not venture to weary your Lordships with any suggestions now, but I believe that some compromise on this matter is possible and would be acceptable to the Egyptian Government. That is perfectly possible, and I think that Great Britain can be of valuable service to Egypt in finding that compromise. I hope His Majesty's Government will not be deaf to my appeal on this question.

There is the other main cause to which I will refer if your Lordships will permit me to delay you for two more minutes. This is such a vast subject and it matters so much to so many of our nationals in Egypt who desire that I should put some of their case, at any rate, as well as my own. The other main causes of anxiety, as I am sure the noble Earl who opened this discussion knows, refer to the question of statut personnel, personal status, which is a matter of absolutely prime importance to our own nationals. I can see no reason other than exaggerated nationalist sentiment why the matters of statut personnel—marriage, divorce, and all the rest of the things generally known as statut personnel—cannot be settled between people of our own nationality and decided by British Judges.

I know that in the Annex to Article 13 there is, in paragraph 7, a saving clause recognising the justice of this plea. It is very clear: In view of the fact that it is the practice in most countries to apply to foreigners the law of their nationality in matters of statut personnel consideration will be given to the desirability of excepting from the transfer of jurisdiction, at any rate in the first place, matters relating to statut personnel.… So, even in this Treaty it is contemplated that this relief might be given, but I am a little anxious lest we have not ruled ourselves out of this benefit. I should like to ask the noble Earl whether I am right or wrong—I hope I may be wrong—in thinking that we have done that by virtue of our acceptance of paragraph 3. I hope the noble Earl will let me know the right interpretation of that paragraph.

Then there is the question of the Consular Courts. I know that that is more or less a chose jugée, and there are many valid arguments in favour of the change, but I would point out that we are affected by the transfer more than any other nationality. After all, most other countries will have their cases decided when transferred to the Mixed Courts by Judges who are entirely familiar with the Latin Code and the Code Napoleon, whereas cases transferred from our Consular Courts in which we have case law will be tried by Judges who have not the foggiest notion of case law. Our nationals are likely to be sufferers thereby.

May I add that I was very glad to hear from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his speech yesterday, the tribute that he paid to the work of the European police, both officers and men, in Egypt, and his statement that measures would be taken to see that they were not sufferers by the Treaty provisions. I would only say—I do not know whether the noble Earl recognises it—that in many cases constables in Egypt have married foreign wives who would be reluctant to come here and they have lived in non-English cosmopolitan surroundings. Both in the interests of their work, in which they are specialists, and because of these personal matters, I hope that consideration will be given to finding them employment in localities which, because of their experience and their conditions, would be particularly suitable.

In a few moments this Treaty will be ratified and will belong to the past. It is with the future alone that we ought to be concerned. In the absence of safeguards in Egypt the whole of our future in Egypt is going to depend, in my judgment, on the degree of encouragement, active support and protection which His Majesty's Government are going to give to British enterprise there. Originally British capital was strongly represented in Egypt. To-day there is nothing left except the remains of the Cassel group of financial houses, and many of them have been much weakened in the last few years. The National Bank of Egypt, the Agricultural Bank, the Mortgage Company and the Wadi Komanbo Company are the main houses of the old Cassel group of finance. It is sad to think that to-day, when we are going to ratify this Treaty, two of them are actually in liquidation.

It seems to me that it is vital for the future that we should put all our energy into the Egyptian field in trade and commerce. You may ask, if the lack of safeguards is as I have described, how it is possible to encourage British enterprise to enter that field. I think the answer is simple. I believe there is going to be a strong pro-English feeling in Egypt. I believe feeling there is genuine, and I believe that the atmosphere is such that if we choose to profit by it we may find great opportunities for our capital. But it will depend on the protection of the British Government, and not on local safeguards, whether capital is willing to go there, and whether it will be able to function when it gets there. There are many factors which make it imperative to go in at once. While the Cassel group has broken down and is not as strong as it was, Belgian and French finance on the other hand is active. We are Egypt's best customers, her currency is tied to sterling, we have friendly and intimate relations with great institutions like the Bank Misr, which can be largely developed, but it is incumbent that we should make greater efforts than we have ever made in the past, in the field of finance and, what is perhaps more important, in the cultural field.

I have thought it my duty to make these criticisms about the lack of safeguards, which I believe to be dangerous, but I believe on the other hand that Egypt is likely to be a good and faithful Ally. I believe that Egyptians mean to play their part just as we mean to play our part, and I believe that our future relations are capable of great things. It depends entirely on the British Government Whether we sink back into a position of impotence, weakness and discouragement, or whether we take the opportunity which I believe this Treaty will provide to render great service not only to ourselves but also to the people of Egypt.

LORD MOTTISTONE

My Lords, I have just returned from Egypt, and in the Egyptian Chamber I listened less than a fortnight ago to a speech which, although it was in Arabic, was almost identical with the speech made by the noble Earl. The only difference was that in Egypt the House was full whereas here we have a House that is half empty. I do not think that that implies that the House of Lords does not take as deep an interest in the settlement of the Egyptian question as is taken in Egypt. Having gone to Egypt with a perfectly open mind, I spent a month there in constant consultation with the different Ministers and with Sir Miles Lampson. I think that His Majesty's Government have done a great act of State in making this Treaty and in trusting the people of Egypt to the utmost. I differ profoundly from my noble friend Lord Lloyd, in his criticism of the absence of safeguards which he said His Majesty's Government did not insist upon having in the Treaty. Had they done so, there would have been no Treaty. As it is, you have a Treaty.

Now, I can tell your Lordships what may be of interest to you: how the Treaty was received in Egypt at the moment when it was propounded in their Parliament. Lord Crewe and I were concerned in giving self-government to the Transvaal and ultimately to South Africa, and it was interesting to me to hear him accept the principle of this Treaty and the principle that if you are going to trust people at all and if you have people to deal with whom you understand, you should trust them to the utmost. The difference between Egypt and South Africa was, of course, all the width or depth of the African continent, but the principle remains the same. From what I have observed during the last month in Egypt, I am sure that the policy of trust in Egypt, for the time being at any rate, is going to be just as successful as it was in the first case. As I listened to my noble friend Lord Lloyd, I was reminded of all these other occasions on which people have tried to insist upon safeguards when they have decided to trust people with the job of governing their country. I am sure that is all wrong.

I was in the Chamber, as I have said, when Nahas Pasha introduced the Treaty. There was only one criticism from a packed House representing all Parties in Egypt, and that was that they ought to wait until we had decided it here, as we are deciding it to-night. Beyond that there was none. With the help of those who can understand the Arabic language better than I do, though I have learnt a bit of it, I traced in the Press, English, French and Arabic, the comments of all those concerned. There was no criticism except in some case that the military clauses ought to have been carried out sooner, that the Kasr-el-Nil and the Citadel ought to be evacuated in four years instead of at the end of the period when the barracks are built on the Canal. On the main issue of whether it was a good Treaty which we had made with Egypt, there was no dispute at all. I am sure that this will interest your Lordships who know Egypt, as many of those whom I am addressing know it. The thing that has been the trouble in Egypt all through these post-War years, and indeed before, has been the riots fomented by the students in Cairo. It may seem a little thing, but Lord Lloyd will agree with me, and so will all previous High Commissioners, that it has been a real trouble.

Now, would your Lordships believe it? the same students who have been the fomenters of disturbance and the cause of riots which have ended in bloodshed on a great scale over and over again in these last eighteen years, were addressed while I was there by the Finance Minister, Makram Pasha, himself a student of renown—seeing that he took a double-first at New College, Oxford— a most brilliant scholar and no doubt a very able financier. He addressed the students, as few Ministers of any complexion have dared to address them, for two hours. At the end of that time the students unanimously resolved, bound themselves and their successors in so far as they could bind them, to support the Treaty of friendship and alliance with England for all time. Makram Pasha himself told me that he was surprised and delighted when this happened. So did the Prime Minister and so did all concerned, including the leaders of other Parties whom I saw and to whom I spoke.

I cannot tell your Lordships how wonderful is the change of sentiment and feeling in Egypt. I know Egypt well. I was there forty-six years ago and for a long time forty-one years ago. I have been watching it ever since and care deeply for its fortunes—naturally enough, as any Englishman must do who has so many relatives who have been concerned in the fights there, civil or military. I wondered whether my view, which was only my own personal view, was right, and whether it was really true that the hearts of the whole people had been changed by one document, the Treaty. So I consulted Sir Miles Lampson, our High Commissioner there. I said: "During the weeks I have been here seeing the people, the ex-Ministers and the other people whom I have been privileged to see, high and low, rich and poor, I believe that this one act of statesmanship, this Treaty, has changed the heart of the whole people. Can that be true?" The High Commissioner answered me: "I am sure you are right; a miracle has happened." I do not quote his exact words, but this is the substance of them. "The bitterness of fifty-two years has been swept away in fifty-two days." That from a man who perhaps knows more of Egypt now than any other Englishman!

I suppose the reason is that the solution is in itself natural and right. I do not think that my noble friend Lord Crewe will differ from me when I say that there is no half-way house, in the case of Egypt, between annexation and independence. To endeavour to maintain that half-way house, to go niggling away with little safeguards, to say, "No, no, not quite that; no, no, you shall be independent, but not quite"; that spoils the whole picture to the hearts and minds of millions of people, and ruins your last chance of real settlement. Let no one think the Egyptians are an illiterate folk who do not understand what is going on. They do understand, and they have responded in an astonishing fashion to this gesture of trust made, under no compulsion whatever, by the British Government, who have said: "We will give you what we planned to give in the days of Sir Eldon Gorst and of Lord Cromer: independence, while recognising our special interests and making you our perpetual Ally and friend."

I am quite sure that the results of this Treaty will be to make it much easier for us in the world to carry through our great Imperial task. Everybody who has had to do with the General Staff in this country or elsewhere knows that Egypt, for all kinds of mysterious reasons, is one of the most vital points—not only links, but points—in our Imperial policy. How are you to cope with these ten million or more people of this ancient race? That has been the problem. I believe His Majesty's Government have solved it, and though I have differed from them often in the past and shall often differ again, I now say at once that as far as I am concerned—and I know I speak for the noble Lords on this Bench—this policy of trust is amply justified on this occasion.

I would end by saying this: You cannot tell what the future will be just from the particular things which have happened and which I myself chanced to be privileged to observe in the first month or two of the new plan, but you can say this with certainty: that all history proves that there is everything in getting a good start. And, my word, we have a good start! The crowds in Egypt acclaiming the High Commissioner as he drives through the streets instead of an angry mob looking on, and the other factors in Egypt which prove that the people of Egypt have accepted the Treaty, all show that we have made a good start. I am sure that, having made a good start, we shall be wise—and I may say this to my noble friend Lord Plymouth, who represents the Government here—if we are generous in all matters, generous in money and other things, and in all matters where the High Commissioner and others appeal to us for help. If we do this I am quite sure that, with the good start we have made, we shall end in a happy solution of the age-long difficulties between England and Egypt.

LORD RENNELL

My Lords, I shall not detain you very long. I should like to say in the first place that I have had a pleasant surprise this afternoon, because I came down to the House feeling that my noble friend Lord Lloyd would make a very severe attack upon the Treaty, and I was pleasantly surprised that he sees, as the French say in their graphic language, "both to eat and to drink" in the Treaty as it has been signed. There was a great deal in what he said to which I attach much importance, but I shall not go into it critically as I see the noble Lord is not now in his place.

There are, however, two points on which I think he did not state the thing quite accurately. I entirely agree with him that we did not go to Egypt in 1882 for the sake of the fellaheen, but I am of quite so sure that we went there for the sake of our Imperial communications either, because we had, before we went there, invited the French to go in with us, and they declined. We then turned to the Italians and proposed to them a joint occupation, and they also declined, and it was then, when things were becoming very aggravated, that we went in alone. I have always thought that it was our vested interests and the great amount of British capital involved in Egypt at the time which constituted, perhaps, the compelling motive which carried the country with it. After all, we did not hesitate to say that our occupation was a very temporary one, and in 1887 we even went so far as to draft, and I am not sure did not initial, a treaty with the sultan of Turkey for the immediate evacuation of Egypt. Therefore our Imperial communications must in those lays have weighed more lightly with us than Lord Lloyd seemed to suggest.

The reason why I felt the obligation of rising for a short moment was that I wanted to express a great welcome to this Treaty which has been just signed. I felt that obligation because I am one of the surviving members of the Mission which went out in December, 1919, to investigate the causes of unrest at the end of the Great War, and to see whether we could make any suggestions for the solution of a problem which, in spite of fifty years of military occupation, had never been squarely faced before. The reason why I was selected was, I suppose, that I had been for eight years second in command to Lord Cromer, from 1892 till 1901, and during a great part of the time I was very glad to have my noble friend Lord Stonehaven, whom I see present, as my colleague. We are probably the only two members of the House who served under Lord Cromer. Those were in the days when the reconstruction to which he had devoted twenty-five years of his life was still in progress. A good deal has been said about him, and a certain amount also in another place, and I should like to add a word myself, because I suppose during those eight years of daily intercourse I got to know his mind as well as most people. When ill-health compelled the great Pro-Consul to retire from Egypt in 1907, and he returned to England, he told me, to my surprise, and I think it will probably be to your Lordships' surprise also, that in spite of the twenty-five years which he had passed there, when his authority was never questioned, he was never again asked his advice on any question connected with Egypt. It would seem almost incredible to most people, but I have his authority for saying so, and I suppose his case is not an isolated one.

I think it is possible, knowing his mind as I did, that Lord Cromer had not anticipated how rapidly the course of events would combine to give effect to what I may call the inevitable consequences of his own great achievement, but during all those years we were together I never had the least doubt in my mind that he felt also that we could not in the end fail to implement that undertaking, which we had so repeatedly given, that our occupation was only a provisional one. It is quite true that afterwards, with the termination of the Turkish sovereignty and the establishment of a Protectorate at the end of the Great War, his outlook may have changed—I should not like to pledge, myself one way or another—but up to the time I left him I had very little doubt about what was really in his mind.

When I returned to Egypt in 1919 it was to a very different Egypt. Up to 1900, beyond the official advisers that had been appointed to the Egyptian Government, there were a limited number of British inspectors in the interior and irrigation officers, who lived in constant contact with the Egyptian people and knew them thoroughly, and were regarded by them as their protectors and friends. By 1919 I do not say that the quality of the high officials had in any way deteriorated, but the number of British officials employed in Egypt had increased by leaps and bounds, and, as it happens, when a number of our people collect together and form a community in a foreign country they tend to segregate themselves and bring their own home life, interests and games, from all of which the Egyptian was rigidly excluded. The Executive also for some time past had had a tendency to encroach unduly, and to act very independently. The cleavage continued. I should say probably also that a succession of no fewer than five different British representatives, who followed Cromer's retirement, did not contribute to stability. Then, with the Great War, the inevitable imposition of Martial Law tended to widen the division. Meanwhile, with the spread of even a limited amount of education among the masses of people in Egypt there had grown up a very marked increase of national consciousness, and an instinct for co-operation, which I think also was stimulated very largely by the termination of the Turkish suzerainty.

The crisis, as your Lordships all remember, after the loyalty and patience displayed by the Egyptian people, and particularly by the Government throughout the Great War, came when some of their Ministers who desired to lay their case before His Majesty's Government proposed to come to London to do so, and unfortunately were informed that everybody was so occupied in making preparations for the negotiation of the Peace Treaty that their visit would be inopportune. The result was a very serious outbreak in 1919. It had to be repressed by very severe measures, and the Mission was despatched to consider the situation. Well, obviously, the resources of the British Empire, even if it had meant the permanent detention, as then seemed inevitable, of two divisions in Egypt at the end of the War, would have been perfectly capable of controlling even discontented and disappointed Egypt. We spent many months, both in Egypt and afterwards in discussions over here with Egyptian representatives, in going into the situation very profoundly. I can only say that the Mission was unanimously in favour of a better way—a way which, while it seemed to us consistent with securing our incontestable interests in Egypt, should also implement those undertakings which we had so constantly given since 1882 or 1883, and at the same time win the permanent friendship and the sympathy of the Egyptian people as our Ally.

While I am very much interested to hear from one who was present how this was received in Egypt at the time, I believe myself perhaps not wholly in Parliamentary government as being the best form of government for people in less advanced stages of civilisation; but what one can apply to Egypt one can apply to a great many other countries also. I believe myself in conciliation and friendship, and I am glad to live to see the basis of permanent friendship established by this Treaty of alliance between ourselves and Egypt, where I spent so many years, and in which I take so deep an interest.

LORD SEMPILL

My Lords, you will in these matters have had well in mind the position in the Sudan. The history of our relations with the Sudanese shows very clearly how keen our desire has been always to see that they were not exploited or oppressed. We have, when required, sacrificed our own interests to those of the Sudanese, and have also on a number of occasions curtailed the interests of foreigners in their developments in the Sudan. In the Treaty a very great deal of power is vested in the Governor-General. The manner in which the Treaty will affect the Sudan will depend on the way in which the Governor-General exercises the powers vested in him. Considerable pressure will undoubtedly be brought to bear in regard to the allocation of Government posts.

I venture to suggest to your Lordships that it is most desirable that His Majesty's Government should suitably instruct the Governor-General to admit only British and Sudanese subjects to the political branch of the administration or to the posts of District Commissioners or Governors of Provinces. Every endeavour has for the last ten years been made to govern the Sudan indirectly through the native Chiefs. The whole policy of indirect administration might prove a failure unless the Chiefs have the best and most disinterested guidance, which they can only get through first-class British political officers. In some other directions the appointment of only British or Sudanese subjects might be modified; for example, the Egyptian Irrigation Department, now under the control of a British Inspector-General aided by British engineers, might, when these retire, be replaced by Egyptians. Then the Egyptian Inspector-General could be given a seat on the Governor-General's Council.

Your Lordships will know of the effective steps that have been taken to train Sudanese to play a part in the development and administration in all departments of their own country. The policy has been steady, if slow, and it is influencing to an increasing extent all aspects of Sudanese affairs. The policy has produced admirable results and tribute should certainly be paid to those organisations, such as the Gordon College and the Kitchener Memorial Medical School, to mention only two. As a result of the work of those organisations and the development generally, a strong national consciousness is growing. Your Lordships will agree that our responsibilities towards the Sudanese are very large indeed, and will want to be assured that His Majesty's Government have taken all proper steps to safeguard their interests. I submit therefore, in conclusion, that we must see to it, in implementing this Treaty, that nothing is done which is contrary to the interests and the welfare of the Sudanese, and set our faces very rigidly against any action which would favour the interests of Egypt at the expense of those of the Sudan.

THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH

My Lords, I should like to thank the House for the generous and sympathetic reception which it has accorded to my Resolution. Criticisms were very few, and perhaps it, would be best for me to confine myself to dealing with the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, and to attempting to answer the questions which he asked. It is very gratifying to His Majesty's Government to know that the noble Lord was not unsympathetic to the Treaty, although he had a number of criticisms to level at it. Dealing first of all with the military clauses of the Treaty, the noble Lord said that they were the best that had so far appeared in any draft, and he confined himself to making some general criticisms of the disposition of the forces, as they would be when the Treaty had come fully into operation. But, generally speaking, he expressed himself as satisfied that, as the result of the work on roads and railways that would follow from the implementing of the Treaty, the position could be looked upon as satisfactory.

LORD LLOYD

Might I interrupt? I did not make any criticisms of the disposition of the forces. I asked questions about what would occur in the place assigned to them.

THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH

I am afraid I must have misunderstood the noble Lord. But, at any rate, I think I am justified in saying that, as the result of the work that will be carried out, he felt that the position would not be an unsatisfactory one. Then he asked me certain specific questions. He asked me what would be the sums payable by the Egyptian Government in respect of barracks and roads. I do not know what it will cost the Egyptians to build barracks and provide the amenities for the troops, but I do not think the noble Lord is quite correct in thinking that we have to pay one quarter of the total bill which will result. To begin with we contribute nothing towards the Air Force barracks; we contribute nothing towards the cost of amenities—lands and water supply, which are a heavy item. Furthermore, we contribute nothing to the cost of accommodation for civilian personnel. What we do is merely to contribute a quarter of the cost of the Army barracks—that is, a quarter of the cost of accommodation for about 8,000 men. I am afraid I cannot mention any specific sum, but that is actually what the position will be.

The noble Lord then asked me a question in connection with the Abbasia barracks. Under paragraph 4 of the Annex to Article 8 His Majesty's Government will contribute the actual sum spent by the Egyptian Government before 1914 on the construction of new barracks as alternative barracks to the Kasr-el-Nil barracks in Cairo. He asked what this sum was, and I am in a position to tell him the sum is £390,000. Then the noble Lord raised the question of water supply. The only answer I am in a position to give him—and I hope it will satisfy him—is that all these plans have to be approved by both sides. I feel confident myself that the military authorities will be certain to satisfy themselves as to whether the water supply which is provided is completely satisfactory, before they will be prepared to agree generally to the plans which are submitted to them. I therefore hope that there need be no fear that the necessary work will not be done satisfactorily.

The noble Lord passed on to a number of other points connected with other portions of the Treaty. He first of all referred to Article 8. That is the Article which, amongst other things, deals with the right to defend the Canal. He pointed out that Article 8 was omitted from Article 16 when the latter Article gave a list of Articles to be continued in a new Treaty of Alliance. The Articles mentioned are Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7. I think the answer to that is in Article 8 itself. In the second paragraph of that Article it is stated that British troops may remain there if Egyptian troops are not able to protect the Canal. Further than that, British vital interests in the safety of the Canal are admitted in that very Article, and our right to be sure for all time that the Canal is safe.

LORD LLOYD

It is clear, then, that the concluding lines of Article 16 in no sense govern or modify Article 8? That is what I am trying to arrive at. It is important, because they might be read in the sense I have suggested.

THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH

Under Article 8 it is a, matter for agreement between the two parties as to whether the Egyptian Army will be in a position to take over the protection of the Canal. If no agreement is reached between the two parties, provision is made in this Article for the matter to be referred to a certain body.

LORD LLOYD

It seems to me important that this matter should be clarified. Article 16, which obviously follows Article 8, says: It is agreed that any revision of this treaty will provide for the continuation of the Alliance between the High Contracting Parties in accordance with the principles contained in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7. That might be held, and was held to me by somebody competent to read drafting terms, as governing in some respects—possibly completely—Article 8. If the noble Earl assures me it does not, I am perfectly satisfied.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT HALIFAX)

My Lords, perhaps I may answer the noble Lord to the best of my ability. I am advised that the fact that Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 are mentioned in Article 16, and Article 8 is not there mentioned, does not in any way have the effect which I understand the noble Lord to fear of derogating from the value of Article 8. The importance of the direct reference to Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 in Article 16, as the noble Lord will appreciate, is that if, and when, the matters contemplated by Article 16 come for decision, the guidance given by Article 16 is that the decision will be taken on the lines of Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 without, of course, any prejudice to what is contained in Article 8.

LORD LLOYD

I thank the noble Viscount.

THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH

In dealing with other matters in the Treaty, the noble Lord raised the point of the desirability of a veto on Egyptian legislation.

LORD LLOYD

As affecting foreigners, not all Egyptian legislation.

THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH

On legislation concerning foreigners. What he suggested would be desirable was that the Mixed Courts should have the power of vetoing such legislation. In effect that would be to impose on those Courts quasi-legislative functions which in our view they are not really best fitted to discharge, and it would bring them into conflict with the Egyptian authorities. His Majesty's Government do not feel that that is a very sound idea. They feel it is better to have a clear Treaty obligation, as they have got in the Treaty, which can, if necessary, be taken up by diplomatic action, with the Council of the League of Nations to decide in the case of a dispute. We feel that a general safeguard of that kind is more satisfactory than the method proposed by the noble Lord.

Then he asked a question in regard to statut personnel. He asked whether His Majesty s Government had not ruled themselves out as the result of the obligations they had undertaken in paragraph 3 of the Annex to which he was referring. The answer to that is that His Majesty's Government have not ruled themselves out from claiming the benefit of paragraph 7 by either that paragraph or any other part of the Treaty. The noble Lord also referred to the question of taxation in Egypt. He pointed out that foreigners in Egypt pay the same taxes Egyptians do at present, but the point is this: because at present Egypt cannot impose on foreigners direct taxation she has to refrain from imposing direct taxation upon any one, because no Egyptian Government can, for obvious political reasons, tax Egyptians more heavily than the rich foreign concerns who have so great a part of the wealth of the country.

The noble Lord also spoke about the position of the police and asked me whether the Government were doing anything, or if anything was being done, in order to ensure so far as possible that the police who were retired as the result of the implementing of the Treaty would be found suitable employment. I can give him this information in respect of that. In Cairo a committee of the High Commissioner and his advisers is working out proposals which will be put before the Egyptian Government. A body which is known as the European Constables' Advisory Committee has been set up by the British community in Cairo with the support of the High Commissioner to investigate the possibility of finding employment for the retiring constables in Egypt. In addition, the Secretary of State has approached Government Departments in this country and he has also written on the subject to the High Commissioners for the Dominions. I think the noble Lord may be assured that everything is being done that is possible to find employment for these particular constables when their time for retirement comes.

There was one question which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, in connection with education in Egypt. Valuable suggestions were made by him and the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, as to the developments which might be encouraged in the educational and cultural sphere in Egypt. I can assure the noble Lords that His Majesty's Government are fully alive to the position in this respect and have these suggestions or similar ones under sympathetic consideration at the moment. Those are, I think, the various points which have been raised, and I have attempted to deal with them. I hope that now the House will be prepared to come to a decision on this Resolution. Before sitting down I should once again like to take the opportunity of thanking your Lordships for the sympathetic reception you have given to this Resolution.

On Question, Motion agreed to.