§ Debate resumed.
§ VISCOUNT BUCKMASTERMy Lords, in speaking to-night for the first time in this House, I cannot but be conscious of the fact that the subject is one which I am ill-qualified to approach. I can only hope, however, that the sincerity of my convictions will not be in doubt, however imperfectly they may be expressed, and that there will be accorded to me the courtesy and kindly consideration which your Lordships so generously extend on such occasions. On one point I find myself in entire agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Davies; that is, that we are not concerned with the details of the French plan but with its principles; and it is these that I seek to destroy by endeavouring to show that they are fundamentally unsound. For this purpose it will only be necessary for me to examine, and that very briefly, a few of the paragraphs in which the plan is contained.
I will first take paragraph 22, which provides that
nothing within the present plan should be considered as contrary to the Covenant of the League, or as providing an obstacle to its application.We see from this that the plan is in fact based on the very principle which has failed so signally at the present time. If, moreover, we examine the reasons why the Covenant has failed, we find that any plan based on it offers but little hope of future success. The Covenant 1179 failed in its purpose because three essential conditions were not complied with. These were: First, that all the major Powers should be Members of the League; secondly, that all Members should be free from private pacts outside the jurisdiction of the League; thirdly, that all Members should in the last resort be prepared to fight on the League's behalf. Now these conditions have never been complied with, and it is apparent that they never can be, because they are mutually destructive, for so long as the obligation to resort to force remains so long will membership of the League be incomplete. In this connection the case of America springs naturally to one's mind. If, on the other hand, Articles 10 and 16, the coercive articles, be deleted, the very heart of the Covenant is gone, the very principles on which the French plan is based have disappeared.Nor can we accept with any confidence the proposal in paragraph 12 that a body which may be loosely termed "an International Police Force "should be established. Far be it from me to brush aside lightly any constructive proposal, but it is difficult to see how such a body could be created in a world armed as ours is to-day. Can one imagine these polyglot legions with their different methods of warfare and their diverse words of command advancing against the massed machine guns of the German Reich? Can one suppose, brave though they may be, that the German contingent would play a very gallant or glorious part on such an occasion? It is extremely doubtful also whether the smaller nations would care to face the cost of forces not within their own control.
I will now quote the material words of paragraphs 11 and 7. Paragraph 11 provides that "if Treaties are broken…sanctions reaching as far as force shall be taken." Paragraph 7 provides that" If mutual assistance is difficult to apply…it should be supplemented by regional agreements." We are still entangled in the meshes of the Locarno Pact: many of us feel that sanctions are both dangerous and futile. Is this the moment to accept proposals such as these—proposals which would not only maintain our existing obligations, but would in fact augment them? These suggestions, to my mind, are not only impracticable, but full of danger. Three of 1180 our Foreign Secretaries have laboured during the last two years to establish a general air pact in the West and in the East of Europe. These labours have been in vain. How then are regional pacts to be created? How many years are to be devoted to the task? If I may be permitted to quote Oscar Wilde, I would remind your Lordships that he once described a second marriage as "the triumph of hope over experience "—a description which may well be applied to proposals such as these. The danger of such a system is abundantly illustrated by the Locarno Pact, a typical regional pact which has shown us the grave risk we ran, and perhaps are still running, of being embroiled in war at a moment's notice for causes which to us may seem inadequate and for advantages which are more or less nebulous.
It is essential that the people of this country should face the position as it really is, that we should realise that agreements are valueless unless all parties to them have the power and the will to carry out their side of the bargain, and that we should remember that the history of the past twenty-five years, starting with the violation of Belgian neutrality and concluding with the use of gas against Abyssinia, is hardly fortunate in this respect. One may be permitted to hope that this country possesses in a greater measure than any other both the power and the will to honour its signature. If that hope be justified, it follows that this country has more to lose than any other from agreements which, though multilateral in conception, prove unilateral in their action. Our interests would surely be better safeguarded if, instead of relying on a multiplicity of pacts, which experience has shown are more likely to be broken than observed, we were to strengthen our own defences, and in times of crisis were to make a bold and resolute declaration of the policy we intended to adopt.
There is, I believe, a grave and growing anxiety lest we commit ourselves further on the Continent of Europe. There are many among us who feel that the interests of peace would be better served if we were to divorce ourselves from all entanglements involving the use of force, remaining alert, powerful, prepared, ready to exercise extreme pressure in whichever direction seemed wisest to us. 1181 Even if we consider the matter from a more selfish angle, and accept the proposition that our frontier is the Rhine, as indeed we may, it is still difficult to see in what way our position is worsened if, in the event of war, we are not committed in advance but are free to exercise our discretion in the light of a policy openly declared. It is not possible to define the limits of our interests in Europe. They are certainly not confined to the preservation of the status quo in the Low Countries. There are many other spheres of our interest; the Mediterranean, for example. Each of these spheres possesses a different political alignment, and we should be careful not to commit ourselves too closely to any particular alignment lest we find ourselves committed in a sphere in which our interests and those of our allies by treaty would ultimately be opposed.
It may be argued that such a course means in effect a reversion to the diplomacy of 1914. But need this in fact be so? In 1914 our diplomacy was secret, our policy was uncertain. It is by no means sure that the Great War could have been avoided or postponed, but it is at any rate possible that either of these results might have been achieved if our military strength had been greater, and if, at an even earlier date, we had emphatically staged the action we intended taking. I hope I shall not be accused of exceeding the bounds of moderation if I say that the attitude of those who, on the failure of each successive pact, strive to reinforce it with a further treaty may be likened to the optimism of someone seeking to build a house with a pack of cards. With great difficulty a few cards may be induced to cling together to form the first storey. A second can be erected on the tottering structure of the first. To attempt a third storey is only to precipitate the ruin of the other two; and so the game proceeds with hopes which are raised only to be shattered, until the whole pack is swept away in impatience and disgust.
The rejection of any proposals based on the Covenant of the League should not be considered a counsel of despair. Surely it is possible that this nation, which has always been earnest in the desire for peace, should still be able to pursue her efforts to this end while belonging to a League which no longer imposed on its Members the obligation 1182 to coerce each other. Is it too much to hope that, through a remodelled League, disarmament may be achieved by progressive stages, and ultimately some basis for a permanent peace may be established? Meanwhile we should so repair our defences that we are ready whatever may befall, emphasising to the nations of the world that, though our purpose be pacific, we have the courage, the power and the will to carry out any policy on which we may determine.
§ LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOODMy Lords, I am sure it will be the wish of your Lordships' House that I should begin with a few words of warm congratulation to the noble Viscount who has just sat down on his very brilliant maiden speech. The name of Buckmaster is famous in this House for a distinguished style of oratory. It would seem that we have now the privilege of having that tradition maintained. At this late hour I find it very difficult to know what precise points can be most usefully taken up in this debate. It will obviously be necessary to limit what I have to say to a negligible amount; and I think that I had better explain at the outset to my noble friend Lord Davies, that I should find it very difficult, if he were to go to a Division, to vote for his Resolution.
It seems to me that my noble friend has attached to a most admirable conclusion a most dangerous preamble. Here are the words that my noble friend used. He says:
…this House, believing that recent international events provide overwhelming evidence of the inability of the League of Nations as at present constituted to fulfil those primary functions for which at was created, urges His Majesty's Government "—I cannot but feel misgiving at the use of the phrase "that recent international events provide overwhelming evidence of the inability of the League" to do what it has been created to do. When I listen to the debate in this House three days in succession, and when I read words of that kind describing the present position of the League, I am filled with misgiving. I cannot believe that, at a moment of crisis such as now, all this stocktaking is really as desirable as it appears to be on the surface. Can your Lordships imagine this House being assembled to take stock during the Great War, when Belgium was in the possession of Germany and the King of the Belgians 1183 was an exile from that country? Would we then have assembled at that moment in order that we might consider whether the Allied effort was able to cope with the difficulties of the situation? I venture to submit to my noble friend Lord Davies that he has done some injury to the object that he wishes to serve by joining those who at this critical moment do not desire the League to be able to perform the functions for which it was created.I would go further. Surely this is a moment when it is politically inexpedient that these stocktaking observations should be expressed. We began the debate in your Lordships' House last week before even Mr. Eden had had the opportunity to reach Geneva to discuss the crisis, and we are discussing the League in the terms that my noble friend has used to-night before the new French Government has even been installed in France, when for all we know an opportunity of collaboration between this country and our great neighbour France may come to us, more hopeful than we have known for many years, for the purpose of protecting our own safety, the peace of Europe and the League Covenant. Therefore I am bound to conclude that the introduction to my noble friend's Motion seems to me to be a disservice to the cause of peace at the present moment.
No one denies that the League Covenant could be improved: it has been known to all of us for years. No one who has studied its articles with care has ever had any doubts upon that question at all. Do let us remember that this machinery of international government, which has been created for the first time in the history of the world, is new, was created in abnormal times, was the child of war, and has had to live out its first fifteen years of life during a period of post-War crisis. Was it to be expected that it would work with the efficiency of an instrument that was old and experienced and was built in normal times? If I may venture to say so to those who speak critically of the League Covenant at the present moment, the defect in the last few years has not been in the Covenant of the League but in the will-power of the statesmen who have operated it; who have failed to use wisely a Covenant which, with all its weaknesses, provided an instrument of achievement. If those statesmen had acted at the right moment and, above all things, if those statesmen 1184 had been willing to act with the same precision and certainty on behalf of international justice and law as individual nations have been accustomed to do when national dangers and national interests are involved, the result would have been very different. That, my Lords, as I see it, is the history of the last few years, and now an opportunity has come, greater perhaps than we could have expected, to use that instrument, even in its present form, to restore the peace of Europe. It is for that reason that I welcome the second part of my noble friend's Motion.
May I just take the two points which he himself has raised and which have been stated in frequent debates in your Lordships' House? The first is the one which argues that sovereignty, as a quality of the States which compose the League, is a fatal impediment to the success of the operations of that League. That view is held by Lord Davies himself, and was underlined by my noble friend Lord Lothian when he took part in the last debate. Everyone knows that sovereignty limits the full opportunities of the League, but sovereignty is not a fundamental impediment. Twenty sovereign States in 1914–1918 used force collectively for the protection of law, and succeeded notwithstanding their sovereignty. If twenty sovereign States could do that in 1914, fifty sovereign States can do it in 1936. Similarly, with regard to the revision of treaties, the Covenant provides an instrument of restraint on war in order to provide a period during which it is possible for nations, sovereign though they are, to sit round the conference table under Article 19, in order to consider how to revise existing treaties. I therefore put it to your Lordships that sovereignty is not a fundamental defect, though indeed it may limit the amount of useful work the League can speedily perform.
I come to the second point, which is used by Lord Ponsonby—namely, that the inclusion in the League Covenant of force is in itself an impediment—exactly the opposite view from that of my friend Lord Davies. I wish Lord Ponsonby were here, because I should like to address directly to him, in his presence, this question: Is he being correctly interpreted when he allows it to be stated that he is opposed to the use of force under international auspices? 1185 When my noble friend Lord Cecil put that construction of his views to him in the debate, he nodded his head in vigorous accord. Lord Ponsonby is not opposed to force as an instrument for international purposes. He is only opposed to the use of force so long as the League membership is incomplete. He has always been clearly prepared for force to be employed as a method of international action from the start if that condition is satisfied. How it is he keeps company with his fellow pacifists, I have never quite been able to understand!
But if I might deal with the point whether force should be sanctioned, I would say you cannot have collective policy through the League for the purposes only of discussion and conciliation whilst, armaments remain in the world. If you have an instrument of discussion and conciliation only, and each of the nations possesses armaments for which you have no collective policy, the inevitable consequence must be that you will have an armaments race taking place simultaneously with your effort to carry on collective discussion. If you leave armaments in the world without a collective policy as to their use, it means that the armaments race will overtop your discussions, and the whole of your efforts will be destroyed. Some of my noble friends take the view, mad as it seems to some people, which I take myself: that there should be no armaments! We do not seek their protection, and we are willing to give them up. That is at least a logical view. But do not say that you will retain arms and that you will have no collective policy for their use.
Before I sit down, may I bring these arguments into the region of the immediate situation? As I see it at the moment, this nation needs the collective force of the League more than any country in the world. We need it for Imperial reasons. I can understand those who say: "Disarm; do not seek to protect your trade routes to India; do not seek to maintain an Empire or to defend it by force." That I understand. But to say we will maintain our arms, we insist upon protecting our routes to India, we insist upon sustaining our Empire, because we believe it is for the benefit of the world that we should do so, and 1186 will sustain it by force, and then, having made those three propositions, to declare, as the Government are on the verge of doing to-day, that the only part of the world where we will state emphatically and clearly what our policy towards collective force is to be is on the Rhine, is disastrous. You cannot have a widespread Empire and protect your trade routes and then say that the only part of the world where you will act forcibly in an armed world is a particular geographical area where there is no danger at all. The least dangerous part of Europe to-day is the West. If any explosion comes it is coming from Central Europe, or Eastern Europe, or, as I venture to think, in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore to surrender the principle of collective security and replace it by regional security only in a region where danger does not exist, is not realism, it is lunacy.
The second point I would make is this: we need at this political moment to show a renewal of faith in the collective force of the League because of the European negotiations with Germany and France. His Majesty's Government, and Mr. Eden in particular, I believe, merit the good will of all schools of thought, and every section of public opinion, for the gallant effort they have made and are still making to bring into harmony two great nations who have long misunderstood each other—Germany and France. I think the Government have displayed in this matter skill, courage and patience; and if all goes well there is every prospect that at last an agreement can be come to in Europe which will bring these two nations together and give us an opportunity of considering the revisions of the status quo and of the Covenant which we so urgently desire.
But that agreement can never be brought to the point of signature except upon one condition, that collective force shall guarantee it when it is signed. You will never get France to concede the equality which Germany ought to have, and ought to have had long ago, unless she knows that the new agreement will not only be signed but protected. You will never get Germany herself to reveal her bona fides as a contracting State unless we, the British, show as a nation that we are prepared to join collectively in guaranteeing the agreement. Even those of us who understood the injustices 1187 to which the great German nation has been subjected, are still troubled as to the extent to which we can rely upon Germany to honour an agreement when entered into. We must provide an opportunity whereby Germany, having received her equality, can then be called upon to reveal her integrity as a European Member by our asking her to protect what she has signed, and unless we for our part are prepared through the collective force of the League Covenant to guarantee this agreement, you will never persuade Germany to show her hand.
For those two reasons I do beg that we should not at this critical moment, when critical events are being decided in Abyssinia and European peace is waiting to be achieved, continue to say to other nations publicly in speech after speech, as many of us are doing in this Chamber, that this great Covenant is unavailing, unsuitable for the purpose for which it was created. I beg rather we should say we know it will need to be revised, but we will use it to the full, even as it is, and employ its provisions for the purpose of change as well as to protect the status quo, but we will not at this moment surrender the principle of putting organised collective force behind law while armaments remain in the world. If we do that, we betray the whole structure of the League, which was created out of the agony of the Great War, imperil our own national safety, and ruin any prospect of bringing peace to Europe.
§ LORD NOEL-BUXTONMy Lords, I desire with great sincerity to join in the congratulations to the noble Viscount, Lord Buckmaster. We all welcome the eloquence which he has shown he has at his command, and I hope we shall very often hear him speaking in this House. My noble friend Lord Davies bases his support of the French plan on the alleged failure of the League, and I agree with my noble friend Lord Allen of Hurtwood that it is most regrettable he should couple the two together. I want to suggest to Lord Davies that whatever good points there may be in the French plan the ground for it is not to be found in the failure of the League. If the French plan requires a repeal of the coercive clauses in the Covenant it seems to me highly dangerous that the question should be opened. Lord Davies urges that alteration follows from failure. There he raises a question of supreme 1188 importance, because there is no bigger question than the question of peace and war.
I want to say that whatever impression might be given in this House by some speeches made on the Labour Benches, the Labour Party have never wavered in their support of the Covenant as it is, and in its opposition to any repeal weakening the Covenant. To propose an alteration of any kind would be very dangerous at the moment, because it might open the door to the abrogation of vital clauses. It would be a revolution. It would be changing horses while crossing a stream, and especially unfitting at this moment of great international danger. We submit that the case for failure is absolutely unproved. To prove it would necessitate showing that things in the last fifteen years would have been better without the Covenant. The case for the League in regard to the prevention of war in these past years is a very strong one. No fewer than twenty-four disputes have been settled by reference to the Council, and many of them were of a nature which historically leads to war. Some of them referred to questions of frontiers, and if we had not had in existence the coercive powers under Articles 10 and 16, humanly speaking many of them must have led to war.
The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, in the last debate on the League of Nations, gave cases in which the League intervened and stopped wars. Perhaps he might have added the high probability of war in the difference, two years ago, between Hungary and Yugoslavia. It is true that in the case of Manchuria we registered a failure, but was there any demand for the repeal of clauses of the Covenant because of that failure? No cry was then raised that the result of the existence of the Covenant was to deceive States which hoped for its protection. The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, said it makes our position now equivocal, but if so, that surely ought to have been raised with greater strength in the Manchurian crisis. It seems to me very plain that in the past we should have been worse off without the coercive clauses.
But what about the present? Whether sanctions against Italy are to be continued or not—we are not debating that 1189 at the moment—the League has a function in, the settlement of the Abyssinian question. Italy, for instance, signed the Slavery Convention; Italy has a representative on the Slavery Commission. At the very least let us hope that conditions will be imposed which will result in some of the conditions inherent in the mandates—the prohibition of the raising of black armies, and the open door to trade, for example. We ought not to despair at least of some League supervision, some League Commissioner, I should hope—that is the very least of our aims. But what possibility will there be of arriving at such conditions if the coercive clauses of the Covenant are previously removed? I should like to ask my noble friend Lord Davies how we should be better off now in regard to the Abyssinian question if we substitute the French plan for the Covenant or if we modify the Covenant in any way.
When the Covenant is attacked the assumption is that Articles 10 and 16 are to go. But what is likely to happen then in future cases? Is it not easy to imagine many possible wars which might follow from abrogation? Let us grant that the coercion of great Powers is an ambitious thing, which in the opinion of experts hardly comes within possibility at the moment. But is there no danger from the action of smaller Powers? All the defeated States in the Great War have claims on strong grounds. Hungary might very well quarrel about the Slovaks, or she might quarrel with Serbia. Turkey might very well quarrel with Greece or with Bulgaria. Bulgaria has no less than a quarter of her population under alien rule. And now those States are practically free to raise armies if they want to. It is very possible that those States might seek to use force in insisting on their just claims. And small wars are very likely to set alight the powder magazine. That was the fear in 1921 and 1926, which led to the peremptory stopping of the two wars of those years. Surely it would be madness to abandon authority; it might paralyse the League in taking action to prevent wars, even on a small scale. It would be no solution if the League were reduced to a debating society, and we might very bitterly repent what had been done if the amendment of the Covenant were put through by the Assembly this year.
1190 But then critics point to the new situation which has arisen, as an answer to any claim which may be made for the success of the League in the past. I would like to ask those critics what new fact there is which is really to the bad in regard to the coercive powers. The new fact this year is that great hopes were raised last autumn by Sir Samuel Hoare's statement at Geneva in September—quite thrilling hopes that even a great Power like Italy could be headed off, and that now there is naturally a sense of great disappointment. Thousands of people were converted to enthusistic support by the prospect of successful coercion for the first time on a great scale. But surely, on logical grounds, to cool-headed people that disappointment ought to have been far greater in the case of Manchuria. The new thing was that Italy was near, that people were far more interested, that the public was keenly concerned, as it was not in the case of Manchuria. The new fact is in public feeling, public emotion, in a mood which now exists and leads to a feeling that we should throw up the sponge. But to be governed by emotion at such a moment would hardly be level-headed.
The real new fact that critics of the League neglect is the new attitude of France. Nothing could be more explicit than the statement of M. Blum, and if to be governed by new facts is the rule of the day, there are facts which cut the other way. There is the fact that the League has been in action on a great scale. Sceptics had never expected that sanctions could really be organised. Even German opinion was gravely impressed up to the time of the Laval incident by the fact that sanctions were in operation. It was the defection of France which destroyed the influence of sanctions on Germany. It is hardly a moment to drop machinery, which only requires good will to make it work, at the moment when good will is furnished in the country most vital to its success. At this late hour let me cut my remarks short, but I should like to say that if there has been any impression that in the Labour Party there is any stampede against the League, nothing could be more mistaken. My noble friend Lord Snell, who so often shows a philosophic insight in his speeches, was I think very just when he said last week that to 1191 exaggerate the faults of the League is an indulgence on our part. It is a natural mood in these days, but it would be unworthy of our statesmanship to yield to a mood. He is also right in the view that if we revise the Covenant all the enemies of the League—and there are many—will seize the opportunity to rob it of authority. To open the door to revision would, it seems to me, be dangerous in the last degree.
The official Labour Party's statement on this question—namely, the speech made by Mr. Arthur Henderson at a Labour Party Conference in 1933—dealt with the particular matter of the morals to be drawn from apparent failure. He said:
Can it be said that what has happened has proved the errors of the law, the institutions, and the practices of which the League of Nations is composed; or has it simply proved that the Governments have not observed the law?And he went on:So long as it was rightly used, the machinery of the League gave results (in many different spheres of activity) which far exceeded the expectations of those who set it up…the remedy for recent failure lies, not in scrapping the Covenant, but in resolving that it shall be properly applied.The Labour Party is as convinced now as then of the value of the coercive clauses of the Covenant. I think it is true that the alternative is to return to the conditions which led up to 1914.
§ THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EARL STANHOPE)My Lords, the noble Lord who has just sat down has given us what I understand is the official version of the Labour Party's policy in regard to the League. I do not think any of us on this side of the House feel any doubts whatever as to their support of the League as a whole. Where we have had doubt—and I confess my doubts have been rather increased by his speech than otherwise—is that they do not seem to realise that the League Covenant entails very heavy obligations in any part of the world, and they do not seem to realise that you cannot faithfully hope to undertake these obligations unless you have adequate forces of your own. It is quite hopeless for the Labour Party to put forward as a practical policy that of supporting the Covenant of the League and at the same time saying they are 1192 prepared to vote against any increase in our own arms.
§ EARL STANHOPEThe Labour Party has never voted against an increase in our arms?
LORD STRABOLGIWe have just published a full, thought-out policy on this matter, and we declare quite definitely—I make a present of this to the noble Earl—we are in favour of the necessary force for a system of collective security.
§ EARL STANHOPEAs I understand, in another place there has been considerable criticism of the amounts put forward in the Budget and in the Estimates of the three Defence Services by the present Government as being too great. I do not know how the noble Lord reconciles that with the statement he has just made.
LORD STRABOLGIAs this is very important, I hope the noble Earl will allow me. I have tried to deal with this matter myself, probably inadequately, but because we criticise the inefficient extravagance of the Government in the present uncoordinated state of our defences, that is not to say we would not vote for the efficient forces necessary for a system of collective security.
§ EARL STANHOPEI only hope that the critics of the proposals of the Government are a great deal more definite and more accurately informed than they appear to be from the debates I have read, because as I understand it from a good many speeches—I happen to be interested in these matters, as the noble Lord knows—I have found much more general criticism of the amount of money involved than of the method that is being pursued. If I am wrong, I hope that situation will be made very clear not only in another place but in the country at large, because then we shall get complete agreement that the first essential, if we are going to exert our proper influence as a Member of the League or as the centre of the Commonwealth of Nations which we are, is that our forces shall be kept up to date and shall be modernised and adequate. I think I have had to say on a previous occasion in this House that if only our forces had been 1193 not only stronger, but recognised throughout the world as being stronger—which is rather a different matter—it is quite possible that some of the crises through which we have passed in the last few years might never have occurred. That holds completely true to-day, and that is why His Majesty's Government are taking every step with the utmost rapidity they can to see that that fault in our present arrangements is rectified at the earliest possible moment.
The noble Lord opposite referred to the attitude of France. May I point out to him that the new Government of France has not yet taken office, and it remains to be seen whether the statements which have been made by various Leaders in France are actually put into operation when they are faced with responsibility. I am afraid most of us who have been some time in political life have heard of speeches being made on the hustings and elsewhere which sometimes do not coincide with action when the Party in question take office. I am afraid that is not only true of this country, and although I dislike the phrase, and always have disliked it, I am afraid in regard to France it is a question of "wait and see." I really have very little to say in regard to the general question to which your Lordships have devoted most of your speeches because, as I understand, they have been a continuation of the debate which was recently spread over three days. Therefore, I have very little—in fact nothing—new to say to your Lordships on that matter.
I may say that, although I have been just over thirty years a member of your Lordships' House, one of the best maiden speeches which I have ever heard was the one that delighted us all this evening. We were all glad that the noble Viscount, Lord Buckmaster, has made so brilliant a beginning in this House. Many of us have rejoiced over speeches made by his most distinguished father, whom I have heard described as being not only the best speaker in your Lordships' House but the best speaker in Parliament. I cannot speak of the other House, but that was certainly true as regards this House. With the promise we have heard to-day we have hopes that once again the hereditary principle has justified itself. I see that noble Lords 1194 opposite are inclined to scoff, but I have known many cases of the same kind, and we all hope, as has been said from many quarters, that Lord Buckmaster will attend our debates regularly and will take a really great part in our discussions. May I say, as perhaps a very old member of the House, one of the things I rejoiced most of all to observe was that the noble Viscount was clearly audible in every part of this House—a matter I am afraid that is not very frequent in some of our speeches.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, to whom I apologise for not having heard the first few minutes of his speech—I confess I was trying to overhaul arrears of work at the Foreign Office—took in particular the paragraph which I suspected would interest him—namely, that referring to what he has often described as an International Police Force and what in fact is described as forces of mutual assistance composed of land, sea and air forces. I rejoiced to find that the noble Lord, for the greater part of his speech, gave up that phrase which I have always regarded as so misleading—the International Police Force—and used the much more accurate one—the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Some of the principles in the French scheme are, as your Lordships know, principles which we support most warmly. It begins with the principle which I think your Lordships will remember we brought out in our questions which we addressed to the Government of the German Reich—namely, that
the first basis of international relations must be the recognition of equality of rights and of the independence of all States together with respect for engagements undertaken,and that there is no durable peace between nations if this peace is subject to the fluctuating ambitions and needs of each people. That seemed to be somewhat forgotten in the debate to which we have just listened. Unless agreements, whatever they may be, are not only accepted but followed faithfully by the nations who sign their names to them, then all hope of international peace and international security must come to an end. I for one feel that it is on the security of the signature rather than on the security based on international forces that we must rely if we are going to maintain the peace of Europe.1195 The noble Lord, Lord Davies, seemed to think that every nation had sinned, and that we ought, every one of us, to sit in sackcloth and ashes. I gathered he alone was right. He has in season and out of season put forward his scheme of this International Police Force, and as he proceeded to say that that was the only thing that could save us hereafter, I suppose that he alone is absolved from having to kneel in the confessional. Frankly I had rather hoped he might have read some of the debate of last week, and have taken to heart the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. The noble Viscount remarked that we had been trying to get a national police force for a good many years and had failed to do so even in this small country, and therefore the proposed International Police Force for the world, while it might be an ideal, at any rate was one that was hopelessly impracticable and not likely to be put into effect during the lifetime of any one of us.
The noble Lord, Lord Arnold, as has happened before, showed his hostility to and doubts of France and of her policy. Well, let us realise this, that warmly as we support ideas of peace, I do not think even we can claim to have any superiority over the French in that respect. I doubt if there is any part of this country, or any class in this country, which is more firmly convinced of the vital necessity of peace than the French people as a whole. Let us at any rate realise that we have that great interest in common, and that we, the two great democracies of Western Europe, have not only ideas of peace in common, but many others too. Do not let us try to find every opportunity for criticising a nation which has so much in common with us as France. Let us see, not only in regard to France but to other nations, whether we cannot find the highest common factor in which we can work together instead of the greatest number of cases where we disagree. The noble Lord criticised the idea of the European Commission. May I point out that the references to the European Commission in the French plan are extremely indefinite? That is one of the reasons why I can say very little about the plan because so much of it is really in very general terms and, of course, it will depend how it is worked out when it comes down to details. But to say that the European Commission will have a two-thirds 1196 majority of France and her Allies is something at any rate that I cannot find in the French scheme. It might work that way; on the other hand it might equally well work the other way.
May I in passing refer to another point which several of your Lordships appear to have disregarded? There seems to be a general idea that there is no alternative between the League of Nations and the situation prior to 1914. That idea was criticised, I think by Lord Arnold, as being not true, and he said that there were various other alternatives. May I point out that in point of fact you may get the League of Nations coming to be the same thing as the situation in 1914, and for this reason, that if you get great nations staying outside the League of Nations you will once again get a balance of power of the people inside the League and the people outside the League. That, I venture to say, is perhaps the most dangerous situation into which we can drift, and it is one we have very carefully to consider and see how it can be avoided. But to continue as we are, with a number of small nations unlikely to fulfil their proper quota of defensive forces and unwilling to shoulder the responsibility of taking collective action against some stronger nation which may be near them, may end in the League and those who support the League being left in a very much weaker position than those who are opposed to it or those who are outside it. That will mean the destruction not only of the League but of the ideals which are behind the League, which is a very much greater thing. Therefore do not Jet us nail our colours to the mast now, until we have had a great deal more opportunity of considering the whole situation of the League as it is.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Buxton, that the efforts which the League have made have been very remarkable in that they have gone as far as they have, but he also will recognise, which I really feel he did not quite recognise, the failures which, I am bound to say, I think we now must agree have occurred in regard to the Abyssinian question. It is no good our disguising the fact that we did hope that Abyssinia would remain on her feet long enough for the effect of economic sanctions to be so severely felt by Italy, the aggressor, that she might have to stop the war. That has 1197 not happened for a variety of reasons, one being, that Abyssinia collapsed much sooner than most of us expected, as I think owing to the use of gas. Therefore it is no good our pretending that the action of the League has had the effect that we all hoped; nor has it prevented Italy from getting possession of a very large part of Abyssinia or the collapse of the Abyssinian forces. As I have said on move than one occasion, this question is not yet at an end, and therefore it is too early to come to hasty decisions on the matter. As your Lordships know, the Council of the League will meet again in the middle of next month when the whole of these matters will come under careful consideration.
§ LORD NOEL-BUXTONMay I interrupt the noble Earl? I would like to be clear on this. Does the noble Earl mean that the failure in regard to Abyssinia was due to the clauses of the Covenant?
§ EARL STANHOPEAs the noble Lord knows, the clauses of the Covenant are not so definite that one can say it is owing to the clauses of the Covenant being defective or to the way in which they have been worked; but I would say this, that if the clauses are so indefinite, or if nations are not prepared to go further than they have done and to carry out their obligations more fully than has been the case on this occasion, then the Covenant is an insecure foundation on which to build the peace and security of nations. It is not merely a question of the terms of the Covenant, but how far all nations are prepared to carry them out, and to take the risk which that entails. The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, in letters to the Press, has stated that it really comes down to the question: What is a nation prepared to fight for? That, in the end, is I think a true statement, and one that must be asked in regard to the action of this or any other nation, and how far we may expect support for the obligations of the League.
The noble Lord, Lord Allen of Hurtwood, thought that it was absurd that there should be any idea of regional agreements for Western Europe where, he said, there was no danger. I hope he is right, but I think it is a statement that he would find would receive very little support in France or other parts of Western Europe. Once again I must say that to ask people in this country 1198 to undertake obligations, not only to impose economic sanctions but to undertake risks which may involve war, and perhaps will involve war, is a responsibility which the Government would face with considerable doubt and misgiving unless the interest of the security of this nation were involved sufficiently.
§ LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOODHow then does the noble Earl intend to bring about the circumstances which will enable an agreement to be signed between Germany, France, Britain, and the other European countries?
§ EARL STANHOPEBecause I think the interests of those three countries have sufficient in common to make an agreement possible. At least that is my hope. But as the noble Lord knows, it will require an enormous amount of investigation, and we have asked a great many questions of Germany. If we can clarify the situation and improve the feeling between France and Germany we may be able to get an agreement which will not only be in the interests of those two countries but very much in our own interests. That was the reason why we originally signed the Locarno Treaty. Our interests are so bound up with Western Europe that we felt justified in undertaking that obligation additional to the obligations under the Covenant. That was our reason when the Rhine question arose and France asked us to give her a guarantee as we had given a guarantee to France, Germany and Belgium when we signed the Locarno Treaty.
I agree with several noble Lords in regard to the dislike expressed of the terms of the Motion of the noble Lord opposite. I venture to think that, in the first part, it goes a great deal too far in criticising the League, and I should be unwilling to agree to the second part in its entirety, because it not only asks us to give the French plan our earnest consideration, which of course we shall do, but it suggests that it is by far the best method we can adopt at the present moment. What has happened, as your Lordships know, is that the Locarno Powers have referred the French plan to the League of Nations for careful examination, and it is proposed that that and the German plan shall be considered there together. The Government are not going to neglect their obligations in 1199 that respect, nor will they hesitate to put forward another plan if they think that plan a better one. We are not going to hide behind other nations and not fulfil our obligations. As I have said, we are particularly anxious to try and get an agreement between these two great nations in Europe, and we believe that if we can succeed in that we shall lay the foundation not only of peace in Western Europe, but in a great part of the rest of Europe as well. I am afraid I have nothing more to say to your Lordships—I said a great deal only last week—and I can only add that I cannot accept the noble Lord's Motion for the reasons I have given.
LORD STRABOLGIMy Lords, before the noble Lord exercises his right of reply, may I be allowed, as these debates attract considerable notice outside your Lordships' House and even outside this country, to put before the noble Earl and the great Department in which he serves, the attitude of British Labour towards armaments? A very important decision has to be taken by the Government, and I do not want them to be under any misapprehension as to where we stand. I hold in my hand a declaration made by the National Council of Labour on May 5. The National Council of Labour consists, as the noble Earl knows full well, of the Trade Union Congress Executive, the National Executive and the Parliamentary Executive of the Party. It therefore can be taken as fully representative, all those three bodies being elected and not nominated. On this question the National Council of Labour said:
The collective organisation of security means that there must be forces available to carry out the decisions of the League. British Labour believes that the test way to ensure this is by the ultimate creation of an international force and the reduction of all national armed forces to the lowest possible level."Ultimate" is the one word to which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will object. The declaration goes on:Meanwhile, it is prepared for this country to make its proper contribution to the collective forces which are necessary for the preservation and defence of peace. The forces to be brought against an established aggressor must have such strength, organisation and direction as to make them an effective deterrent.1200 That sets out our position as lately as May 5 of this year, and I hope it will be taken notice of by the noble Earl and his advisers.
§ EARL STANHOPEI take note of it, but I must say straight away that it seems far from being clear or definite.
§ LORD DAVIESMy Lords, I should like to thank the noble Earl opposite for his reply on behalf of the Government and for the assurance he has given us that the Government are considering both the French and the German proposals, and that they intend, if necessary, to introduce a plan of their own. I do not propose to impose upon the indulgence of your Lordships by endeavouring to answer all the points which have been raised during this discussion. All I would venture to say in reply to my noble friend Lord Allen is that my Motion was not intended to criticise the League. All I wanted to say was that the League, like every human institution, must either recede or go forward. It must either shrink or develop. It appears to many of us that the moment has now arrived, in view of the experiences of the last few months, when the whole question of remodelling and reforming the League must be considered and undertaken. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.