Lords Sitting of 21 May 1936

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY (EALING AND SHEPHERD'S BUSH RAILWAY EXTENSION) BILL.
Read 2a.
LONDON AND NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY (LONDON TRANSPORT) BILL.
Read 2a.
SUGAR INDUSTRY (REORGANISATION) BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.
LONDON PASSENGER TRANSPORT BOARD BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (BRISTOL) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (FALMOUTH) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (STOCKTON-ON-TEES) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed.
GRAMPIAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.
ALEXANDER SCOTT'S HOSPITAL ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.

ELECTRICITY SUPPLY (METERS) BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), with the Amendments.
Clause 3 [Transitional provisions as to existing meters]:
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH): My Lords, I have one drafting Amendment on this Bill.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 27, leave out (" section ") and insert (" subsection ").—(The Earl of Plymouth.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD ELTISLEY:: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass. Now that this Bill is about to pass I should like to take this final opportunity of conveying my best thanks and warmest appreciation to the staff of the Electricity Commissioners for their help in dealing with the many complicated Amendments which it has been necessary to introduce in this House during the passage of the Bill. These Amendments were not controversial, but they were nevertheless difficult to introduce in the Bill in their proper form. Although this is but a humble Private Member's Bill, it deals with a question of much importance to the public and also to the electrical industry as a whole. This Bill, when it becomes an Act, will adjust and clarify a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. It will do so with reasonable expedition and in a manner which will obviate unnecessary expenditure. I beg to thank your Lordships for the way in which you have facilitated and expedited the passage of this Bill.
Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Eltisley.)
On Question, Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.

RETAIL MEAT DEALERS' SHOPS (SUNDAY CLOSING) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD ELTISLEY: My Lords, I beg to move the Second Reading of this Bill. It is strictly limited to a single topic and a single trade, a trade of which the circumstances and the position are such, I venture to suggest, as to justify this exceptional and special legislation. It makes no attempt whatever at legislating for shops in general, and it must not be confused with another Bill, the Shops (Sunday Trading Restriction) Bill, which is shortly coming to your Lordships' House, having had a somewhat stormy passage in another place. This Bill, I venture to submit, is one which is needed, and it is also so drafted that it is a Bill which will work. It is administratively simple, and I do not think presents any exceptional difficulties. The purpose of the Bill is to provide for the complete and total closing of retail meat traders' shops on Sunday and also to prohibit the delivery of meat from such shops on Sunday. Three exceptions, however, are made. Meat may be supplied on that day to ships or aeroplanes or airships on arrival at or just before departure from port or aerodrome, as the case may be; and the third exception is in the interests of bona fide members of the Jewish faith.
In view of the considerable amount of other business on the Order Paper to-day, I will endeavour to put the case in justification of the Bill before your Lordships as concisely as possible, but I hope that in so doing I shall not be misunderstood in any way, and that it will not be felt in any quarter that I am dealing too briefly with the principle of the measure. The Bill, which has been passed in another place, is supported and backed by employers in both large and small shops; it is supported by workers employed in all classes of such establishments; and I venture to think it has also the support of a great majority of the public. The Bill has also to be considered from the angle and point of view of public health, and, though I do not desire to stress this particular point, I think it will be generally agreed that it is all to the good if Sunday work can be limited and at least one day in seven is made available which those employed in the trade can utilise for recreation and rest. Amongst the supporters of the Bill are the representative organisations of all engaged in handling butchers' meat by retail. It is also supported by the
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National Federation of Meat Traders' Associations representing the great majority of the small retail meat dealers in England and in Wales, and by the multiple shop firms who own a large number of butchers' shops of a good type distributed over many towns in the country.
General unanimity of opinion exists with regard to the need of this Bill. There has been an undesirable growth recently in the opening of butchers' shops which retail meat on Sunday. It has been a steady and progressive development ever since the War period, and the tendency to open more and more butchers' shops has been especially noticeable in some of the bigger towns, such as our home town of London, Newcastle and Bristol. There is no obligation upon any one to open his shop on a Sunday, but your Lordships will appreciate that, if one or two traders do open their shops on Sunday, it is only human nature that others should do the same who would not otherwise do it, in order to protect their own trade. It is this state of affairs which the overwhelming majority of those engaged in this particular branch of business desire to see stopped, and we feel that it is only through Parliamentary action that any effective remedy can be secured for the unsatisfactory situation that is growing up. The journeymen employed in the industry do not desire to see any extension: in fact they desire to curtail the practice of Sunday opening. They view with alarm this increase in Sunday opening and the possibility of its further development. To them it means increased hours of labour and the deprivation of opportunities to spend a weekly rest day at home with their families.
Meat as a diet, so far as the great majority of the consuming public are concerned, is already purchased for the most part on week-days. I might remind your Lordships that during the War there was no Sunday opening. Meat was then rationed; only certain quantities could be purchased, and then under certain conditions; and there was no advantage to be gained from the trade point of view by one retailer opening his shop on Sundays with a hope of obtaining somebody else's trade. If the objection is urged—and I do not know that it will be urged—that some members of the public, the poorer sections of our community, have

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little or no adequate facilities for keeping meat overnight, I would challenge the objection that there is any hardship which arises in that respect. I do so because for some time past it has been impossible to obtain butchers' meat in some of our big cities, such as Manchester and Sunderland, where the shops by general mutual voluntary agreement are closed on Sundays, and there has been no degree of hardship so far as that class of consumer is concerned.
It may be urged again that if voluntary agreement can be reached in respect of a large town like Manchester to close Sunday retail meat trade shops, the same can be done elsewhere. Attempts have been made to work along voluntary lines and this method, however effective it may be in certain spots in the kingdom, cannot be relied upon to prevent the opening of shops in every case. That is notably the case so far as London is concerned, and London, I need hardly point out, does represent a very large proportion of our population. The practice has been growing in London for some time of opening these retail meat trading shops on Sunday. Those who open their shops do so on the principle that there is always somebody who will probably forget or omit to buy meat on the Saturday, and will therefore run along to a shop on Sunday, and no doubt the shopkeeper sometimes believes he can steal the trade of some other meat shop in his district.
I would urge the importance and value of this Bill also from quite another angle, and that is from the point of view of the local authorities. As the House is aware, butchers' shops are subject to many different forms of inspection. We have meat inspectors appointed by local authorities in order to ensure that the meat offered for sale is fit for human consumption. Again, we have inspectors of weights and measures who are appointed to see that the proper weight of meat which is bought and paid for is given. There is also the question of imported meat exposed for sale which has to be marked and labelled under the Merchandise Marks Act. We have inspectors appointed to deal with questions such as the hours of labour, and the conditions of employment of young persons under eighteen years of age, who also come into the picture. It is obvious that if butchers' shops open on Sundays
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the inspection now required by Statute will have to be made on Sundays, because otherwise, undoubtedly, a certain percentage of unscrupulous traders will take advantage of the situation and avoid their statutory obligations. Therefore local authorities are affected, and if some steps were not taken to regulate the Sunday opening of shops, they would probably have to increase the staff to deal with Sunday trading or else the hours of the existing officials would have to be substantially increased.
There are other officials besides who are concerned under the Road and Rail Traffic Act, because all drivers of commercial goods vehicles are required to keep a record of the time they commence and finish work and the time occupied in driving. Registers have to be kept of all these things. As your Lordships are aware, the total driving time of such employees is limited by Statute and statutory periods of rest are provided for. There again the question of inspection comes in and the officers who make inspections of such records have to be considered. It may be argued on the other hand—I want to anticipate as many objections to the Bill as I can—that inspectors will be wanted to ensure that shops are closed. To that I would retort that the meat trade is a well-organised trade, and the members of the trade have made every reasonable endeavour to bring about the closing of these shops by voluntary agreement under the Shops Act. Being well-organised they will make it their business to see that this measure is enforced, and if it is not being obeyed they will report the matter to the local authority, who will know just when and where and how it is best to take action.
I have pointed out that the Bill has one or two exceptions. Butcher members of the Jewish faith, licensed by appropriate Jewish authorities for the sale of kosher meat, will be permitted under Clause 2 to carry on business on Sundays provided they close their shops on Saturdays. The clauses dealing with the exemption of members of the Jewish faith in the matter of sale of kosher meat have been agreed by the Board of Deputies of British Jews, who are, I am glad to say, completely satisfied. There is exemption also in favour of the supply of meat to ships or aircraft on arrival at or immediately before departure from a port

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or aerodrome. Every endeavour has been made to meet every reasonable situation that may arise. I venture to commend the Bill with all sincerity to the kind consideration and support of the House for the reason that it commands the support—as very few Bills introduced in Parliament do—of the employers, large and small, in the industry, of the employees, of local government authorities and of the great representative bodies of religious opinion of all creeds in the country. Its passage secures the priceless boon of one day's rest in seven, which is not only valuable to the individual, but also, I venture to suggest, in the best interests of our national life. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Eltisley.)
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, my noble friends desire to offer no opposition to this Bill, but in every way to facilitate its passage. On their behalf I should like to be allowed to congratulate the noble Lord on the lucid way in which he has explained the measure.
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, as the noble Lord who moved the Second Reading of this Bill has explained it fully, I need not say anything further by way of description. I only wish to say that we understand that the Bill is supported by practically everyone concerned in this trade, and it appears to the Government therefore that the position of this trade is such as to justify special legislation. The provisions of the Bill is a whole are considered to be workable, and, subject to the possibility of the consideration of certain small points of detail in Committee, it is thought that your Lordships may well give a Second Reading to the measure. Perhaps I might just mention that I understand that the Shops (Sunday Trading Restriction) Bill will come before your Lordships in the course of a few weeks. That Bill, as it stands, covers butchers' shops, and therefore the question of an adjustment between the two Bills may have to be considered at a later stage. In the meantime there is no reason why this Bill should not be given a Second Reading to-day.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

PILOTAGE AUTHORITIES (LIMITATION OF LIABILITY) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD RITCHIE OF DUNDEE: My Lords, this Bill passed through another place unopposed and without amendment. I had hoped that it would have as happy a career in your Lordships' House, but I received yesterday rather an ominous communication from a noble Lord who sits on the Front Bench opposite which leads me to think that perhaps its career here will not be quite so happy. In asking your Lordships to give the Bill a Second Reading I am speaking on behalf of the Docks and Harbour Authorities Association, an association with which the pilotage authorities are connected in the main. The objects of the Bill are to extend to pilotage authorities a limitation of liability for loss and damage caused without their fault or privity, to make clear that the funds of a pilotage authority formed for the benefit of pilots or their widows or children shall not be applicable for the liabilities of the pilotage authority, and to provide that where a harbour, conservancy, dock or canal authority is also a pilotage authority the funds belonging to the authority in one capacity shall not be applicable for the liabilities of the authority in another capacity.
The main object of the Bill is to provide a limitation of liability. At present the liability of pilotage authorities is unlimited, and it is conceivable that they might have to meet claims which would reduce them to a condition of insolvency. It is proposed under the Bill that the limitation should be £100 for each pilot licensed in a particular area. This may seem, perhaps, an arbitrary limitation, but it has been generally agreed that it is a fair one. It does reflect the responsibility of the pilotage authority in this respect, that the larger the port the greater will be the number of licensed pilots in the port and therefore the greater the liability. For instance, there are in the Port of London some 300 pilots, so that the liability there will be about £30,000. In fact it is no more arbitrary than the protection which dock and harbour authorities enjoy—namely, the limitation of £8 per ton on the largest ship that may have made

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use of their accommodation at any time during the previous five years. The Bill has the approval of shipowners and was blessed by the representative of the Board of Trade in the other House. I am venturing to hope that it may receive that blessing in this House also, and that your Lordships will be good enough to give it a Second Reading. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Ritchie of Dundee.)
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, my noble friends do not desire to offer any opposition to this Bill, and I have been asked to say that on their behalf. It was not opposed by my own Party in another place, and we do not wish to oppose it here. But I am standing at this Box in a dual capacity. I had the honour of being for some years Chairman of the Pilotage Committee, and have always been anxious to help the pilots. They have asked me to put certain points for consideration before this Bill passes its Second Beading. There is no desire to wreck this Bill, and the only reason why my noble friend Lord Apsley, who succeeded me as Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee, and who spoke for the pilots in another place, proposed no Amendment there, is that any Private Bill has to go through all its stages very quickly in order to have any chance of reaching the Statute Book. Your Lordships, who are more efficient in procedure, will no doubt be more likely to deal with this Bill efficiently. Nevertheless I should like the Government to consider certain safeguards which I shall describe.
I do not know why the noble Lord thought that the Bill would have a rough passage in this House. I wrote a letter to the noble Lord, Lord Templemore, and out of courtesy sent the noble Lord, Lord Ritchie, a copy. In it I used these words, speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom Pilots' Association:
" We do not desire to place obstacles in the way of the Bill becoming law, and the pilots did not ask for Amendments in the Commons, so as not to delay its passage."
Then I briefly pointed out the anxieties which the pilots feel. The position is this. The pilots have no wish to wreck this Bill; they welcome it. It is an improvement, because it is in their interests to have the liability of the pilotage
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authorities limited just in the same way as shipowners are able to limit their liability in collision actions and as pilots are able to do under the provisions of the Pilotage Act, 1913. But the pilot naturally asks how a claim for damages is to be met by a pilotage authority if and when this Bill becomes law.
Up to the present these pilotage authorities who act in dual capacities, as described in Clause 6 of the Bill, will be liable to meet the claim out of their own funds, and as this class of pilotage authority, such as the Mersey Docks Board and the Humber Conservancy Board, do not allow pilots to serve on their authority but only on a committee, there is nothing illogical in this. The pilots therefore consider that they are entitled to some protection so as to prevent a pilotage authority from levying an increased contribution from the pilots' earnings in order to meet a claim. Many authorities have a by-law fixing the maximum contribution from pilots' earnings to the Pilot Fund, out of which administration expenses of the authority are paid. The pilots fear that it may be sought by some pilotage authorities to discharge a liability of this kind by the simple expedient of increasing the contribution of the pilots until such time as the claim is satisfied. If it is agreed that this protection should be granted, then it becomes a matter of drafting. If I might address myself for a moment to the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, I hope that the Committee stage of this Bill, if the noble Lord, Lord Ritchie, agrees, can be postponed long enough to enable consultations to take place to see if we can get an agreed Amendment to safeguard this position that I have described.
The Pilot Funds themselves are in this position: that at the end of each year, under the present law, any surplus is paid into the Benefit Fund, and the Benefit Fund in this Bill is very properly exempted from levy. The Pilot Fund may not have any money to meet any claims under this Bill, and what the pilots are considering, and what they would like to discuss, is that in each case an insurance policy should be taken out to the limit of £100 per pilot, as agreed in the Bill. I think the ship-owners and their friends would be prepared to consider that. The other suggestion that I am authorised to make

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is this: that authorities who will come under this Bill might take pilots' representatives to sit with them. That, I think, is a fair proposal which might be considered. I thought it right at this stage to make this claim and say that later on we should like to see, if possible, these agreed Amendments. The matter, as I say, is being discussed now. I hope that this very excellent Bill will be improved in the way I suggest, and we should certainly like to facilitate its passage to the Statute Book.
LORD TEMPLEMORE: My Lords, the noble Lord opposite, as he has truly said, wrote me a letter, which I received this afternoon, suggesting certain Amendments in this Bill of my noble friend which he has described to your Lordships. As a matter of fact, of course, as a point of procedure, this Bill is a Private Member's Bill, and as such the Bill of my noble friend, and I should have thought that the noble Lord opposite would have written to my noble friend and sent me a copy.
LORD STRABOLGI: I sent him a copy.
LORD TEMPLEMORE: I should have thought it would have been the other way about, but that is only a matter of detail. I merely rise to say that His Majesty's Government bless this Bill and are in full approval of the principles embodied in it. I have no doubt that any Amendments which the noble Lord opposite suggests will be most carefully considered both by my noble friend and by the Department which I represent. In the meantime the Government wish to point out that it passed unamended through another place, and they very much hope that without undue delay it will also pass through your Lordships' House.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

ROAD TRAFFIC (DRIVING LICENCES) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Beading read.
LORD JESSEL: My Lords, the two previous movers of Bills have been extremely fortunate in getting a Second
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Reading, and I hope that, as there is luck in odd numbers, I may be equally successful in persuading your Lordships to pass this very small Bill. I should like for a very few moments to detain your Lordships to tell you what it is all about. In the first place, this Bill has passed through another place without any controversy at all. It has been designed to meet certain difficulties which have been experienced in the last year or two by some sections of the road transport industry. The first clause deals with the difficulty experienced by the showman, a class of man with whose activities I think many of your Lordships are acquainted. These are the attendants at travelling shows, who look after the fat lady and the coconut shies and attend to the roundabouts. They are a very useful portion of these travelling shows which give amusement to so many grown-ups and children alike.
This first clause deals only with the question of the steersman. As I said, he is as a rule employed in looking after the matters to which I have referred, but when the fair moves from one ground to another he steers the machine under the direction of the actual driver, who is a skilled engineer, and he is a steersman much in the same way as the helmsman of a ship. Under the Road Traffic Act, 1930, the steersman is regarded as a driver, and is required to obtain an ordinary licence. So long as that licence is a mere
matter of registration and the payment of a 5s. fee the industry have no objection. In 1934 the Road Traffic Act introduced a general requirement that a new driver must pass a driving test. The men with whom we are now dealing never have any occasion to drive in the ordinary sense of the word. Their normal occupation is of a different character, and I submit that it is unreasonable that, before we allow them to turn a wheel under the orders of a qualified driver, we should put them to the expense of learning to drive a lorry or car.
There could be no question of their trying to drive the heavy steam engine itself. That is a trained job. I might remind your Lordships that these machines are very expensive. They cost from £2,000 to £3,000 each, and therefore it is not likely that the owner is going to trust the steering of it to a man who

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is not used to it. I am sorry that Lord Cecil is not here, because he takes such an interest in these matters as Chairman of the Pedestrians' Association, but I would like to remind him and your Lordships that the maximum speed at which these heavy engines are allowed to proceed is five miles per hour. Therefore, even if the man did go wrong, or was taken ill, the driver is standing by his side the whole time, and by means of the heavy brakes can bring the vehicle to a standstill within a matter of a yard or two.
Clause 2 deals with the special driving test which is required to be taken by the man who is going to drive what is called a heavy goods vehicle. Your Lordships will recall that the Act of 1934 required these men, who are practically all whole-time drivers, to hold what the Statute calls the "heavy goods vehicles driver's licence," generally known as the "vocational" licence; and the Chairmen of Traffic Commissioners, who are responsible for these licences, properly exercise the power which Parliament has given them of requiring a man to undergo an appropriate test before he is licensed to drive these large machines up and down the country. But what is wanted is to avoid the curious position that a man cannot obtain a licence until he has passed the test, and he cannot legally drive, for purposes of test or otherwise, one of these types of vehicles until he has got his licence.
The way that is got over at the present moment is for the man to drive a smaller vehicle for his test. That practice has been perforce accepted by the authorities, but it is considered that this is not a satisfactory situation, and it is proposed in this clause to allow a provisional licence, with a three months currency, to be issued for the purpose of enabling the man who wants to drive a heavy goods vehicle to learn to manage such a vehicle efficiently and to pass the proper test. The clause empowers the Minister to lay down certain conditions under which the holder of a provisional licence may drive; that is to say, he must while he is learning be accompanied by a trained driver. This clause, it is hoped, will meet a real difficulty which has been experienced in the last two years by an important part of the road transport industry, and will enable arrangements to be made which
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will be far more satisfactory than those which exist at present.
I have dealt with Clauses 1 and 2 and I would like to conclude by explaining to your Lordships the provisions of Clause 3. That deals with another aspect of the driving test. Under the 1934 Act the Minister of Transport can, and does, require a different test to be passed by the man who comes up for examination on a motor bicycle, and the man who comes up in a car; but the motor cyclist, having passed his test will, if he is of full age, obtain a driving licence authorising him to drive not merely a motor cycle but also any kind of car or lorry. This clause enables the Minister to say that the man who has qualified on a motor cycle only may be granted a licence limited to the driving of motor cycles. The power of limitation is expressed in general terms, but before making any regulation in the matter the Minister, under the Act of 1930, is bound to consult representative organisations. These, my Lords, are the provisions of this Bill. It was gone through very carefully in the Standing Committee, and in the final Division on the Third Heading—which I think was really challenged, not because of any demerits of the Bill, but because it was hoped thereby to keep off another Bill, tactics sometimes pursued on a Friday afternoon in the House of Commons—it was passed by 117 to 3. I hope I shall be fortunate in securing a Second Reading for this Bill, as has happened to two other Bills this afternoon.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Jessel.)
THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH: My Lords, after the noble Lord's full explanation of the Bill I have very little to say on behalf of the Government. In fact I only rise to say that not only do we not wish to put any obstacle in the way of the Bill, but we very much hope that in due course it will find its way to the Statute Book. I know there are some who think that there has already been too much legislation on the subject of the control of road traffic, while, on the other hand, there are some who constantly wish to add to it. I wish to point out that the object of the measure is merely to clear up two or three particular points which experience of the working of existing Acts with

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regard to road traffic has shown us to exist. This is a Bill that was introduced by a private member in another place, and I hope your Lordships will take the opportunity which has been offered in consequence of taking advantage of this form of legislation. Obviously some time would elapse before an opportunity was given to the Government to deal with this particular question.
I only want to add a word on Clause 3. So far as Clause 3 is concerned I, for one, certainly was under the impression that if a learner obtained or qualified for a licence for a motor bicycle he would have to pass a further test before he could obtain a licence to drive a lorry or car, and I dare say a good many of your Lordships were under the same impression. However, this has proved not to be the case. As I understand the motoring industry raise no objection to the proposal in the Bill, I hope that it will be accepted by the House, and that it may make some small contribution to the cause of safety on the roads. So far as the Government know, the Bill as it now stands is satisfactory, and I hope that your Lordships will give it a Second Beading now and in due course pass it through its remaining stages.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.
LORD DAVIES LORD DAVIES rose to move to resolve, That this House, believing that recent international events provide overwhelming evidence of the inability of the League of Nations as at present constituted to fulfil those primary functions for which it was created, urges His Majesty's Government to accord the principles underlying the French plan their earnest consideration and to seize this further opportunity of establishing the peace of Europe on a film and durable basis.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name, and in doing so to fissure your Lordships that I have put it down not so much with the object of eliciting from the Government any considered opinion regarding the French plan, as to provide an opportunity for the expression of your Lordships' views upon this important document. The Government are no doubt
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engaged in studying these proposals simultaneously with those emanating from the German Government, and I trust the noble Earl opposite will acquit me of any intention of endeavouring to raise these matters prematurely, before he and his colleagues have reached their final conclusions. On the other hand, I submit that a document of such vital and far-reaching importance deserves a Second Reading discussion in your Lordships' House. To-day we are concerned not so much with the details as with the principles underlying this plan, and with any points of similarity there may be between it and the proposals put forward by the German Government.
What is the French plan? Broadly, it may be divided under three headings. First, there is the preamble; secondly, there are the proposals for collective security, and, thirdly, there are suggestions for economic development. The preamble, as your Lordships are aware, lays down a number of general principles, most of which will, I imagine, command the assent of your Lordships' House. These principles emphasise the importance of establishing the rule of law. They lay stress upon respect for contracted engagements and the necessity for mutual assistance and co-operation, equality of rights and the independence of all States. For instance, paragraph 3 is as follows:
"There is no real security in international relations if all conflicts which can arise between States are not resolved according to International Law, obligatory on all and interpreted by impartial and sovereign international jurisdiction, and guaranteed by the forces of all the associates of the international community."
Paragraph 4 recognises the necessity for a more drastic pooling of sovereignty. It is as follows:
"Equality of rights does not prevent any State, voluntarily and in the common interest, limiting in certain circumstances the exercise of its sovereignty and rights."
Secondly, there are the proposals for collective security. These insist upon the sanctity of treaties, the organisation of mutual assistance, and the need for a wide measure of disarmament. Paragraph 12, dealing with the problem of mutual assistance, is as follows:
"In order that they may be able to accomplish their duties of mutual assistance, the States associated with the European framework, or in the regional

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framework, shall specially provide and permanently maintain, military, aerial and naval forces at the disposal of the European Commission or the Council of the League of Nations."
Disarmament is referred to in paragraph 14 in the following terms:
"Collective security having been organised in the European or regional frameworks by mutual assistance, all the associates shall proceed to a wide measure of disarmament."
This paragraph supports the contention which many of us have advanced—namely, that disarmament follows security, and not security disarmament, and that to put disarmament first is to put the cart before the horse.
Under the third heading come the proposals for economic development, including the suggestion for a European Customs Union, the international organisation of exchanges, and other propositions as the basis of economic cooperation. Paragraph 20 alludes to
"a revision of certain Colonial Statutes, not in the domain of political sovereignty, but from the point of view of equality of economic rights and the co-operation of credit between European States which, having assured themselves of collective security and mutual assistance, will accordingly have to be considered as associates, not as rivals."
I have tried very briefly to summarise the proposals and suggestions contained in the French plan. I think I have said enough to show that they are far-reaching and that they deserve the most careful consideration. They are based upon two broad principles: first, a collective system of mutual assistance for the prevention and suppression of war; and, secondly, a recognition of economic solidarity and the removal in Europe of those barriers which impede the progress of trade and commerce.
One important principle, however, appears to have been omitted. There is no adequate recognition for the necessity of effecting changes in the relationships of States and the revision of treaties by some peaceful procedure. The dynamic principle is ignored—too great stress is laid upon the importance of maintaining the status quo, and no suggestions are made for implementing the provisions of Article 19. It is true that paragraph 2 says "No treaty should be regarded as unalterable "; but it does not tell us how it is proposed that the alterations shall
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be effected. Then it goes on to say that in the new
"European organisation, wherein all peoples with equal rights shall be freely associated, each State will bind itself to respect the territorial status of the members which cannot be modified without the consent of all. No demand for modification shall be submitted for twenty-five years."
That, I venture to suggest, is the great blemish and the great omission of the French plan.
Now let me turn for a moment to the German proposals. If we contrast them with the French plan, there are at least two points of resemblance. First, there is the proposal for a European air pact. Paragraph 5 is as follows:
"The German Government are prepared, in order to strengthen further these security agreements between the Western Powers, to conclude an air pact calculated to prevent in an automatic and effective manner the danger of sudden air attacks."
This means that if any signatory to the pact is subjected to an attack from the air, the Air Forces of all the other signatories shall automatically go to its assistance. What therefore is the difference between the purpose of this combined force and a force at the disposal of the League? I suggest that this undertaking is very similar to the provisions contained in paragraph 12 of the French plan, whereby:
"the States associated within the European framework…shall specially provide and permanently maintain…aerial…forces at the disposal of the European Commission or the Council of the League of Nations."
Secondly, the German proposals of March 30 allude to
"the setting up of an International Court of Arbitration which shall be responsible for the observance of the various agreements concluded and whose decisions shall be binding on all parties."
We are not told what are the precise duties which are to be entrusted to this Court. But there appears to be a striking resemblance between it and the International European Commission of the French Plan alluded to in paragraph 13, which lays down:
"The permanent control of the carrying-out of treaties within the European framework or the regional framework shall be organised by the European Commission."
Here are at least two points of similarity which point in the direction of the establishment of what is described in the

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French plan as a competent international authority.
I now turn for a moment to the French suggestions regarding regional pacts or ententes for mutual assistance and the German proposals for bilateral pacts of non-aggression. I submit that the only effect of the latter will be to defeat the former and, just like the Pact of Friendship between Italy and Abyssinia, they will only provide the other States-Members of the League with an excuse for doing nothing until the crisis is upon them. The same is true in regard to regional pacts for the purpose of providing mutual assistance because they are apt to degenerate into military alliances. I believe that all such pacts will only undermine the authority and detract from the responsibility of any European collective system which it is proposed to constitute within the framework of the League. Moreover, it is obvious that the value and utility of the collective system is its ability to exert the maximum pressure, both moral and physical, upon the aggressor and to throw its overwhelming weight into the scales on the side of equity and justice.
If it is proposed to split up Europe into a number of watertight compartments each regulated by its own pact, then I submit that we are courting disaster. I believe it is recorded that when Solon was asked which was the best protected city, he replied: "The city where all citizens, whether they have suffered injury or not, equally pursue and punish injustice." If we compare the League of Nations to a city, and regard its States-Members as the citizens, it follows that the best system of collective security is one in which all States, whether they have received injury or not, "equally pursue and punish injustice "—in other words, that they are prepared to join in the collective hue and cry in pursuit of the aggressor.
I think it has been said that the task of the British Government is to construct a bridge linking up the French and German standpoints, in order to effect an amicable agreement between these two great nations. The task of bridge-building will always be a difficult one and it will obviously be still more difficult when the stream over which the bridge is to be erected happens to be in full spate. But however this may be,
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the point I would like to emphasise is this, that the task of co-ordinating the views of France and Germany does not absolve the British Government from the responsibility of putting forward constructive proposals of their own which, in their opinion, will strengthen the organisation and develop the functions of the League and give stability and solidarity to the system of collective security. In the past British Governments have rather shirked this responsibility. In 1924 when the Protocol was discussed at Geneva, and at least on two occasions during the last five years, we have failed to make contributions of our own to the reform of the League and to the revision of the Covenant. It will be remembered that when first of all M. Tardieu, and afterwards M. Herriot, put forward their plans at the Disarmament Conference we certainly failed to support them, or even to suggest how they might be amended and improved.
Now the plan referred to in this Motion may provide the last opportunity of grappling with this vital and difficult problem. I submit, therefore, that this chance should not be allowed to slip away. We are glad to know that an assurance has already
been given by the Government that the present proposals will be considered seriously, and that the reform of the League is no longer to be regarded merely as a pious aspiration. A few weeks ago the Chancellor of the Exchequer, speaking in another place, said:
"When that time comes, we shall have to review the whole conditions, the whole constitution, functions and scope of the League of Nations."
I am sure your Lordships will welcome this assurance that there is to be a revision of the Covenant, and I trust that it will be undertaken in the light of recent experiences, and that the flaws revealed during the last twelve months will be recognised and remedied.
Desperate diseases demand drastic remedies. We all realise the dangers which beset us and the peoples of Europe to-day. I shall not attempt to reiterate the prophetic warnings of so many distinguished statesmen, soldiers and publicists who have warned us of the catastrophic results which may be expected from the next upheaval. I cannot, however, refrain from quoting a striking passage from his rectorial

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address delivered at Edinburgh a few days before his death by a distinguished soldier and member of your Lordships' House—the late Viscount Allen by, whose loss is so deeply deplored to-day throughout the length and breadth of the Empire. This is what he said
"There is danger in delay, for it seems likely that, unless an effort in the right direction—a successful effort—is made soon, the present social system will crumble in ruin; and many now alive may witness the hideous wreck. Then will loom the dreadful menace of the dark ages; returning darker, black, universal in scope, long-lasting."
What is the right direction? Is it a return to pre-War conditions, competing armaments and military alliances? Is it to turn our backs on the concept of justice and the collective system and retire, once more, into isolation, which the experience of a century has proved to be futile and illusory? Is it to emasculate the Covenant by striking out all those provisions which were intended by its framers to assert the rule of law?
If we listen to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who, although he is opposed to the employment of force for any purpose whatsoever, is nevertheless joined in an unholy alliance with anti-sanctionist noble Lords opposite, Article 16 will be consigned to the scrap heap. I am sorry the noble Lord is not in his place to-day. If we accept the advice of my noble friend the Marquess of Lothian, we shall be content with a round table. I am the last person in the world to detract from the merits of a round table. All I venture to submit is that it is not the only article of furniture which is necessary to complete the equipment at Geneva, and that the more austere furnishings of the halls of justice and equity and the constable's office have also to be provided. Surely when the magic of the round table has failed to produce an amicable settlement the last word has not been said. Diplomacy by conference was the motto of Lord Castlereagh a hundred years ago, but to-day, I submit, it will not suffice to save Europe from another catastrophe.
So, my Lords, I reiterate the question: What is the right direction—to go forwards or backwards? The answer, I think, is to be found in Lord Allenby's rectorial and, as it turned out, valedictory address from which I have just quoted. He said:
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"Many former obstacles have been cleared away. Science has overthrown barriers and given egress in all directions. Man is now able to navigate the atmosphere, plumb the deep seas, travel in three dimensions of space, move anywhere at a speed unimaginable to our fathers. Willingly or unwillingly, he has become a world-citizen; and the duties of that citizenship cannot be evaded; duties calling for the wholehearted co-operation of every man and woman alive, joined in mind and purpose to promote the good and the advancement of all.
"And the machinery is ready to hand. The League of Nations is alive and active, while courts exist for determining and adjusting international differences, judicial and financial."
The noble and gallant Viscount also spoke of the civil population being as open as the soldier to attack in any future war, and said:
"The knowledge of this may perhaps bring to the statesman a warning sense of his responsibility The choice lies within Will the hardness of his heart prevail; must the narrowness of his outlook persist until he is schooled by poison-gas and bomb; or will he some day call to mind the pact renouncing war as a solvent of differences; the pact signed by sixty nations, but now forgotten or disregarded? Is it too much to believe that the human intellect is equal to the problem of designing a world state wherein neighbours can live without molestation; in collective security? It does not matter what the state is called; give it any name you please:—League of Nations; Federated Nations, United States of the World. Why should there not be a world police; just as each nation has a national police force?
My Lords, that is the signpost which points in the right direction. It is a courageous challenge to the future from which we dare not run away. No doubt in some quarters we shall be told that the French plan and the German proposals are mere camouflage, and that they do not conform with the recent actions of either country. This may be true, but I submit that that is no reason why we should not take them at their face value in an attempt to reconcile and improve them. Let us recognise the failures of the past in order to prepare for the future. Let us adapt the powers and functions of the League in such a way as will enable it to vindicate the rule of law. At this stage I submit that mutual recrimination will serve no useful purpose. It is idle to apportion the blame for past failures. All the great Powers are involved to a greater or lesser degree—America for having deserted her offspring at the first opportunity; Great

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Britain for her obstinate refusal, until last October, to clothe Article 16 with flesh and blood and her rejection of every proposal to organise and develop a system of sanctions; France, the erstwhile protagonist of this system, for the abandonment of her traditional policy and the moral support she has given to an aggressor nation; Germany for her defection from the League and her unilateral acts in the repudiation of treaties; Italy for her cynical violation of the Covenant and her wanton and barbarous attack upon a fellow Member of the League, whose claims to membership she had so warmly espoused a few short years ago.
Let us admit that we have all sinned and fallen short of those beneficent intentions embodied in the Covenant which inspired the heroism of our comrades who fell in the World War and animated the peoples and their rulers at its conclusion. Obviously, this should be the season of repentance for all. Those who are not prepared to repent should not be included as Members of a reformed and remodelled League. Better that it should perish than that it should become once more a cloak for the perpetration of injustice and aggression. But repentance cannot be regarded as genuine unless there are guarantees for future good behaviour.
What are the guarantees? The first I suggest is the creation of a peaceful procedure for the settlement of all disputes and the revision of treaties. In default of a more satisfactory solution an Equity Tribunal holds the field. The second guarantee is the pooling of their military resources by the Members of the League in order to assert the rule of law. If air power is the decisive factor, as the campaign in Abyssinia has proved, let Europe be equipped with an Air Police Force under the control and direction of a neutral authority, a reconstituted League. But in order to provide the maximum deterrent effect, this force must possess superiority in numbers and equipment, in comparison with the national Air Force of any European State who refuses to join in the guarantee. If the 22 smaller European Powers, whose present contributions under the Baremo formula towards the maintenance of the League are equivalent to the contributions of the four great Powers, are prepared to contribute their appropriate
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quotas towards the equipment and maintenance of such a force, then its superiority will be assured.
These, my Lords, are the objectives which I trust the Government will keep steadily before them, and which, if they can be achieved, will redound not only to the security of Europe, but to the safety of the British Commonwealth and the welfare of all mankind. I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That this House, believing that recent international events provide overwhelming evidence of the inability of the League of Nations as at present constituted to fulfil those primary functions for which it was created, urges His Majesty's Government to accord the principles underlying the French plan their earnest consideration and to seize this further opportunity of establishing the peace of Europe on a firm and durable basis.—(Lord Davies.)
LORD ARNOLD: My Lords, when I saw this Resolution upon the Paper I wondered if the noble Lord who had put it down intended it to be taken seriously. If so, I should imagine that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is the only man in England who thinks that the French plan furnishes an opportunity—to take the words of the Motion—of "establishing the peace of Europe on a firm and durable basis." This French plan contains all the vices of French foreign policy. Its cardinal feature is that there is to be no territorial readjustment for twenty-five years. That means in short that the French plan seeks to maintain for twenty-five years the status quo. It is indeed an attempt to continue the evils and injustices of Versailles, whereas it should be the duty of statesmen to get away from those evils and injustices and to make a fresh start.
The second main feature of the French plan is this extraordinary proposal for the establishment of a European Commission which it is claimed will be within the framework of the League of Nations—to use that hackneyed and meaningless phrase. As a matter of fact, the framework of the League is the most elastic apparatus that civilisation has yet produced. Anything and everything can be put into the framework of the League. Any proposal apparently fits into that

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framework. This fantastic European Commission is to be a sort of Super-State for the purpose of enabling France to maintain the status quo. France, with all her pacts and alliances and her influence with small nations, knows quite well that she can obtain—and this is the chief operative provision of the European Commission—the two-thirds majority necessary to put into operation so many of the decisions of the European Commission. I say, France knows she can get that two-thirds majority, and she also knows that with that two-thirds majority she can maintain the status quo and can to a very large extent maintain the present position which obtains in Europe as against Germany—because that is really what is the basis of the French plan. All this is really quite incompatible with the League Covenant. The devotion of France to the League is based really on French interests. When the League Covenant does not suit France the League Covenant is broken. That has been very clearly evidenced in the application of Article 16 in the Italo-Abyssinian war.
The third feature of the French plan is this international force. The noble Lord, as, of course, we all knew he would, dwelt at considerable length upon the International Police Force. That is a matter which he brings up from time to time in your Lordships' House. The International Air Police Force has been so battered by criticism in this House, notably from the Government Bench, that I cannot suppose this feature of the French plan will find much support to-day from the noble Earl. That is another reason why I do not think that the noble Earl, when he comes to reply, will have a great deal to say in favour of this French plan.
Next, I will call attention to the first part of the Memorandum on the French plan. This first part seems to make clear that the French Government do not expect their plan to be accepted, because the first part of the Memorandum purports to be a reply to the German case. It might have been designed to exacerbate the situation and to render any settlement between France and Germany virtually impossible. I do not think that is putting it too strongly if that Memorandum is read in its entirety and read carefully. Of course, the truth is that France has now got Great Britain committed to her by Staff talks and that she does not wish
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negotiations on the German plan to succeed. That is the plain truth. She wants them to break down, because what France desires above all is to maintain the status quo. She prefers the status quo to a European settlement, and therefore she will do all that she can to stop what most of the countries want, and what I certainly think Great Britain wants, and that is a real European settlement.
This Memorandum, which purports to be a reply to the German case, puts a very great and almost an intolerable strain upon the patience of Germany, because amongst other phrases this appears: "France insists that fidelity to treaties is the fundamental basis of French policy." Such a claim is completely at variance with what France has done during the last twenty years, particularly in regard to Germany. I will cite only two instances: first, the Disarmament Clause of the Treaty of Versailles, which France has never made the smallest attempt in any way to keep, nor has she attempted to honour the undertaking given there; and secondly, the illegal invasion of the Ruhr. In view of these things, it is really difficult to understand how these words about fidelity to treaties being the fundamental basis of French policy could have got into this Memorandum on the French plan at all.
Lord Rennell, a fortnight ago in a weighty speech in your Lordships' House, emphasised that the great obstacle to European unity was the spirit of mistrust which separates France from Germany. The French plan, so far from doing anything to remove that spirit of mistrust, emphasises it and intensifies it. The French plan is really one for encircling Germany with a network of pacts and alliances. That is what it comes to. That is the real reason why the Memorandum setting forth the plan contains these words. France says in this Memorandum:
"European security forms a whole, and the principle of collective security is not valid for only part of the Continent…France could not conceive of a settlement of Western security for which she would have to disinterest herself in the security of the rest of Europe."
Those are the words which appear in the French plan, and they mean that, if the French plan were adopted by Great Britain, this country, as one of the signatories, would again be committed to all kinds of liabilities in

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Eastern Europe. It is quite true that under the League of Nations Covenant there are similar commitments, but everybody knows now that they will not he carried out.
In particular, Great Britain will not go to war to help France in her Eastern alliances which have been brought into being as part of France's policy of the encirclement of Germany. The fact is that the vast majority of the people of Great Britain are strongly opposed to being taken into war because of trouble in Eastern Europe. Take Austria. France, as everybody knows, is strongly opposed to Austria becoming part of the German Empire, but if Germany annexed Austria it is in the last degree likely that the people of Great Britain would be willing to fight in a war which might result from that action. I say that, despite Stresa and so forth, more, happily, is required than declarations such as that at Stresa to take the nation into war. So far as Great Britain is concerned, the aversion from and apprehension of another war are so deep-seated that the people of this country will not again go to war except on behalf of some clear and unmistakable British interest.
It is in this supreme matter of what their respective peoples might be willing to go to war about that a great cleavage is developing between Great Britain and France. Great Britain has given a guarantee to France and to Belgium to help them if they are invaded by Germany. It may be, if that invasion by Germany should ever take place, that the guarantee will be implemented. Personally, I do not think it should ever have been given, and that, having been given, it should be denounced as soon as possible. But apart from anything else that would be the most honest course, because in view of the French record during and since the War it will be very difficult to get the people of Great Britain to fight again on behalf of France. Your Lordships know that that is true. In the event, however, of the people of Great Britain being willing to go to war in defence of France and what is called the Western Security Pact, it is quite certain that they would not take part in a war concerned with trouble in Eastern Europe. That is the cleavage which is developing or,
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I think I might say, has developed between British foreign policy and French foreign policy.
There have been many debates in your Lordships' House on foreign affairs this year, a great many debates, and I think I have listened to them all. It has again and again been made manifest that hardly a single one of the supporters of the Government on that side of the House is prepared to undertake liability for France's Eastern commitments, and the bare idea of going to war on behalf of Russia arouses noble Lords opposite to fury. So far as I am concerned I entirely agree in refusing to undertake these widespread commitments. I am speaking to-day, as I have done now for some time on foreign affairs, for myself. I do not claim to be speaking for the noble Lords who sit on these Benches, although I know that some of them are in agreement with what I say, but I am actually speaking for myself. In these circumstances which I have been outlining, the Government cannot honestly give support to the French plan, knowing the minds of the people of Great Britain as they do. They will be obliged to tell the Government of France that this country will not undertake vast liabilities like those which are involved in the French plan. I have said that this French plan incorporates all the vices of French foreign policy, and it is French foreign policy which is largely responsible for the condition of Europe to-day. If after the War Great Britain had only had the courage to take the lead and have a foreign policy of her own instead of playing second fiddle to France time after time, things might have been different. But that was not done, and we see the result to-day. Therefore Great Britain should scrutinise very closely any proposal which comes from France, and certainly an important document like the French plan.
If anybody seventeen years ago had prophesied that, within the short space of seventeen years after the War which was to end war, the condition of Europe would be as bad as it is to-day, that man would have been looked upon as a lunatic. And, I repeat, the condition is very largely due to France and to French foreign policy. So there is every reason why we should not continue to follow in the wake of France, and certainly every reason why we should not support this really preposterous French plan. There is

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every reason why we should have nothing to do with it; should not resurrect it but leave it where it is. As a matter of fact, the French plan was really put forward for two purposes: in the first place as propaganda for the French Elections; and in the second place to confuse the issue and to divert attention from the proper consideration of the German plan; and I say it is wrong for Great Britain to have any part in wrecking tactics of this kind. The French plan cannot possibly have been put forward with any hope of effecting a European settlement. The French Government must have known perfectly well that that could not follow from the French plan. Here again there is a great cleavage between Great Britain and France. Great Britain wants a European settlement; all Parties want a European settlement. We want a fresh start, we want to get away, as I say, from the Versailles spirit, and so on. France, on the other hand, wants the status quo; she wants that more than she wants a European settlement. France has done and is doing nothing whatever to bring about reconciliation with Germany. On the other hand, an Anglo-German understanding is desired by the great mass of the people of Great Britain, and only France stops it from being brought about. An Anglo-German understanding or settlement could be arrived at to-morrow if it were not for France. There is no real difficulty as between this country and Germany.
Before I conclude I would like to say a few words about the first part of the Motion. The Motion begins by emphasising the inability of the League of Nations, as constituted, to work, or, to quote the words of the Motion, "to fulfil those primary functions for which it was created." I was very much surprised when I saw those words on the Paper, under the name of the noble Lord, because when some two months ago I said very much the same thing, and suggested that a new League was needed, not based on force, I incurred the strong displeasure of the noble Lord. He contended, as Lord Cecil and others constantly contend, that the alternative lay between a situation like that of 1914, which preceded the War, and the League of Nations. We were told that again and again, and I should think that if the noble Viscount on the Cross Benches
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(Viscount Cecil) has said it once he has said it two dozen times. I cannot discuss that to-day, and so far as I am concerned I entirely deny the contention. It is quite wrong to say that there are no other courses open. There are in fact plenty of other courses open, and all of them better, I consider, either than the League of Nations as at present constituted or the Balance of Power which led to the Great War.
Here may I say that those of us who criticise the League of Nations do not do so lightly, particularly having regard to the place which it fills in the minds and thoughts of some of our best friends. To them the League of Nations is an almost divine institution. To attack it is like attacking a man's religion. It is really tantamount to blasphemy. Nevertheless there is a striking change in the attitude of Lord Davies since the middle of March. I then incurred his displeasure because I pointed to some of the obvious weaknesses of the League of Nations. Now, however, in his Motion and speech he says the same thing as I have said, but more strongly. He said that it would be better the League should perish than that it should become once more a cloak for the perpetration of injustice and aggression. Even I have not gone so far, and I should have to think it over before I did so. I wish to pay a tribute to the noble Lord's honesty in facing the logic of facts. His admission about the failure of the League of Nations deserves a certificate for intellectual integrity, and it is much to be regretted that a similar certificate cannot be given to many of the supporters of the League of Nations. They will not recognise the force of events, but still go on talking just as if nothing had happened, as if the League of Nations was still an all-inclusive League, and as if it had functioned well and had fulfilled all, or nearly all, of the hopes of its founders. That is so far removed from the facts that I think the attitude is to be regretted, to use no stronger language.
Some of us who have never been enthusiastic about a League of Nations founded on force nevertheless did hope, particularly in early days, the condition of Europe being what it is, and in view of the conditions contained in the Treaty of Versailles, that the League of Nations might do something to help disarmament;

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but unhappily after the complete breakdown of the Disarmament Conference, and other disappointments and failures, culminating in the almost unbelievable calamity of the League's action and inaction in regard to Abyssinia, we have been compelled to take the view that the League of Nations as at present constituted—a League of Nations based on force—so far from being an instrument likely to preserve peace is more likely to lead to grave international complications and disappointments, and possibly even to war. Therefore we feel the time has come when all these matters should be taken most seriously into consideration, and although the Government have intimated that that is going to be done, I have not seen any great indication, from what they have said up to the present, that they have any very drastic change in view. However, I may be wrong. With regard to this French plan, which is the main object of the noble Lord's Motion, I cannot help thinking your Lordships will not do other than condemn it.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT HALIFAX): My Lords, as your Lordships are aware, there is to be a Royal Commission this evening at which the Royal Assent will be signified to certain Bills. I understand that it will be generally convenient that the Commission should take place now, and if your Lordships will agree to suspend the debate it can be resumed after the Commission.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION.
The following Bills received the Royal Assent:

Civil List,

Sugar Industry (Reorganisation),

Coinage Offences,

Voluntary Hospitals (Paying Patients),

Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Luton),

Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Matlock),

Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Bridport Joint Hospital District),

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East Lothian County Council Order Confirmation,

Glasgow Corporation Order Confirmation,

Grampian Electricity Supply Order Confirmation,

Royal National Pension Fund for Nurses,

Rhymney Valley Sewerage Board,

Yorkshire Electric Power,

Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Traction,

South East Cornwall Water Board,

Mersey Docks and Harbour Board.

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.
Debate resumed.
VISCOUNT BUCKMASTER: My Lords, in speaking to-night for the first time in this House, I cannot but be conscious of the fact that the subject is one which I am ill-qualified to approach. I can only hope, however, that the sincerity of my convictions will not be in doubt, however imperfectly they may be expressed, and that there will be accorded to me the courtesy and kindly consideration which your Lordships so generously extend on such occasions. On one point I find myself in entire agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Davies; that is, that we are not concerned with the details of the French plan but with its principles; and it is these that I seek to destroy by endeavouring to show that they are fundamentally unsound. For this purpose it will only be necessary for me to examine, and that very briefly, a few of the paragraphs in which the plan is contained.
I will first take paragraph 22, which provides that
" nothing within the present plan should be considered as contrary to the Covenant of the League, or as providing an obstacle to its application."
We see from this that the plan is in fact based on the very principle which has failed so signally at the present time. If, moreover, we examine the reasons why the Covenant has failed, we find that any plan based on it offers but little hope of future success. The Covenant

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failed in its purpose because three essential conditions were not complied with. These were: First, that all the major Powers should be Members of the League; secondly, that all Members should be free from private pacts outside the jurisdiction of the League; thirdly, that all Members should in the last resort be prepared to fight on the League's behalf. Now these conditions have never been complied with, and it is apparent that they never can be, because they are mutually destructive, for so long as the obligation to resort to force remains so long will membership of the League be incomplete. In this connection the case of America springs naturally to one's mind. If, on the other hand, Articles 10 and 16, the coercive articles, be deleted, the very heart of the Covenant is gone, the very principles on which the French plan is based have disappeared.
Nor can we accept with any confidence the proposal in paragraph 12 that a body which may be loosely termed
"an International Police Force "should be established. Far be it from me to brush aside lightly any constructive proposal, but it is difficult to see how such a body could be created in a world armed as ours is to-day. Can one imagine these polyglot legions with their different methods of warfare and their diverse words of command advancing against the massed machine guns of the German Reich? Can one suppose, brave though they may be, that the German contingent would play a very gallant or glorious part on such an occasion? It is extremely doubtful also whether the smaller nations would care to face the cost of forces not within their own control.
I will now quote the material words of paragraphs 11 and 7. Paragraph 11 provides that "if Treaties are broken…sanctions reaching as far as force shall be taken." Paragraph 7 provides that" If mutual assistance is difficult to apply…it should be supplemented by regional agreements." We are still entangled in the meshes of the Locarno Pact: many of us feel that sanctions are both dangerous and futile. Is this the moment to accept proposals such as these—proposals which would not only maintain our existing obligations, but would in fact augment them? These suggestions, to my mind, are not only impracticable, but full of danger. Three of
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our Foreign Secretaries have laboured during the last two years to establish a general air pact in the West and in the East of Europe. These labours have been in vain. How then are regional pacts to be created? How many years are to be devoted to the task? If I may be permitted to quote Oscar Wilde, I would remind your Lordships that he once described a second marriage as "the triumph of hope over experience "—a description which may well be applied to proposals such as these. The danger of such a system is abundantly illustrated by the Locarno Pact, a typical regional pact which has shown us the grave risk we ran, and perhaps are still running, of being embroiled in war at a moment's notice for causes which to us may seem inadequate and for advantages which are more or less nebulous.
It is essential that the people of this country should face the position as it really is, that we should realise that agreements are valueless unless all parties to them have the power and the will to carry out their side of the bargain, and that we should remember that the history of the past twenty-five years, starting with the violation of Belgian neutrality and concluding with the use of gas against Abyssinia, is hardly fortunate in this respect. One may be permitted to hope that this country possesses in a greater measure than any other both the power and the will to honour its signature. If that hope be justified, it follows that this country has more to lose than any other from agreements which, though multilateral in conception, prove unilateral in their action. Our interests would surely be better safeguarded if, instead of relying on a multiplicity of pacts, which experience has shown are more likely to be broken than observed, we were to strengthen our own defences, and in times of crisis were to make a bold and resolute declaration of the policy we intended to adopt.
There is, I believe, a grave and growing anxiety lest we commit ourselves further on the Continent of Europe. There are many among us who feel that the interests of peace would be better served if we were to divorce ourselves from all entanglements involving the use of force, remaining alert, powerful, prepared, ready to exercise extreme pressure in whichever direction seemed wisest to us.

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Even if we consider the matter from a more selfish angle, and accept the proposition that our frontier is the Rhine, as indeed we may, it is still difficult to see in what way our position is worsened if, in the event of war, we are not committed in advance but are free to exercise our discretion in the light of a policy openly declared. It is not possible to define the limits of our interests in Europe. They are certainly not confined to the preservation of the status quo in the Low Countries. There are many other spheres of our interest; the Mediterranean, for example. Each of these spheres possesses a different political alignment, and we should be careful not to commit ourselves too closely to any particular alignment lest we find ourselves committed in a sphere in which our interests and those of our allies by treaty would ultimately be opposed.
It may be argued that such a course means in effect a reversion to the diplomacy of 1914. But need this in fact be so? In 1914 our diplomacy was secret, our policy was uncertain. It is by no means sure that the Great War could have been avoided or postponed, but it is at any rate possible that either of these results might have been achieved if our military strength had been greater, and if, at an even earlier date, we had emphatically staged the action we intended taking. I hope I shall not be accused of exceeding the bounds of moderation if I say that the attitude of those who, on the failure of each successive pact, strive to reinforce it with a further treaty may be likened to the optimism of someone seeking to build a house with a pack of cards. With great difficulty a few cards may be induced to cling together to form the first storey. A second can be erected on the tottering structure of the first. To attempt a third storey is only to precipitate the ruin of the other two; and so the game proceeds with hopes which are raised only to be shattered, until the whole pack is swept away in impatience and disgust.
The rejection of any proposals based on the Covenant of the League should not be considered a counsel of despair. Surely it is possible that this nation, which has always been earnest in the desire for peace, should still be able to pursue her efforts to this end while belonging to a League which no longer imposed on its Members the obligation
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to coerce each other. Is it too much to hope that, through a remodelled League, disarmament may be achieved by progressive stages, and ultimately some basis for a permanent peace may be established? Meanwhile we should so repair our defences that we are ready whatever may befall, emphasising to the nations of the world that, though our purpose be pacific, we have the courage, the power and the will to carry out any policy on which we may determine.
LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD: My Lords, I am sure it will be the wish of your Lordships' House that I should begin with a few words of warm congratulation to the noble Viscount who has just sat down on his very brilliant maiden speech. The name of Buckmaster is famous in this House for a distinguished style of oratory. It would seem that we have now the privilege of having that tradition maintained. At this late hour I find it very difficult to know what precise points can be most usefully taken up in this debate. It will obviously be necessary to limit what I have to say to a negligible amount; and I think that I had better explain at the outset to my noble friend Lord Davies, that I should find it very difficult, if he were to go to a Division, to vote for his Resolution.
It seems to me that my noble friend has attached to a most admirable conclusion a most dangerous preamble. Here are the words that my noble friend used. He says:
"…this House, believing that recent international events provide overwhelming evidence of the inability of the League of Nations as at present constituted to fulfil those primary functions for which at was created, urges His Majesty's Government "—
I cannot but feel misgiving at the use of the phrase "that recent international events provide overwhelming evidence of the inability of the League" to do what it has been created to do. When I listen to the debate in this House three days in succession, and when I read words of that kind describing the present position of the League, I am filled with misgiving. I cannot believe that, at a moment of crisis such as now, all this stocktaking is really as desirable as it appears to be on the surface. Can your Lordships imagine this House being assembled to take stock during the Great War, when Belgium was in the possession of Germany and the King of the Belgians

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was an exile from that country? Would we then have assembled at that moment in order that we might consider whether the Allied effort was able to cope with the difficulties of the situation? I venture to submit to my noble friend Lord Davies that he has done some injury to the object that he wishes to serve by joining those who at this critical moment do not desire the League to be able to perform the functions for which it was created.
I would go further. Surely this is a moment when it is politically inexpedient that these stocktaking observations should be expressed. We began the debate in your Lordships' House last week before even Mr. Eden had had the opportunity to reach Geneva to discuss the crisis, and we are discussing the League in the terms that my noble friend has used to-night before the new French Government has even been installed in France, when for all we know an opportunity of collaboration between this country and our great neighbour France may come to us, more hopeful than we have known for many years, for the purpose of protecting our own safety, the peace of Europe and the League Covenant. Therefore I am bound to conclude that the introduction to my noble friend's Motion seems to me to be a disservice to the cause of peace at the present moment.
No one denies that the League Covenant could be improved: it has been known to all of us for years. No one who has studied its articles with care has ever had any doubts upon that question at all. Do let us remember that this machinery of international government, which has been created for the first time in the history of the world, is new, was created in abnormal times, was the child of war, and has had to live out its first fifteen years of life during a period of post-War crisis. Was it to be expected that it would work with the efficiency of an instrument that was old and experienced and was built in normal times? If I may venture to say so to those who speak critically of the League Covenant at the present moment, the defect in the last few years has not been in the Covenant of the League but in the will-power of the statesmen who have operated it; who have failed to use wisely a Covenant which, with all its weaknesses, provided an instrument of achievement. If those statesmen had acted at the right moment and, above all things, if those statesmen
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had been willing to act with the same precision and certainty on behalf of international justice and law as individual nations have been accustomed to do when national dangers and national interests are involved, the result would have been very different. That, my Lords, as I see it, is the history of the last few years, and now an opportunity has come, greater perhaps than we could have expected, to use that instrument, even in its present form, to restore the peace of Europe. It is for that reason that I welcome the second part of my noble friend's Motion.
May I just take the two points which he himself has raised and which have been stated in frequent debates in your Lordships' House? The first is the one which argues that sovereignty, as a quality of the States which compose the League, is a fatal impediment to the success of the operations of that League. That view is held by Lord Davies himself, and was underlined by my noble friend Lord Lothian when he took part in the last debate. Everyone knows that sovereignty limits the full opportunities of the League, but sovereignty is not a fundamental impediment. Twenty sovereign States in 1914–1918 used force collectively for the protection of law, and succeeded notwithstanding their sovereignty. If twenty sovereign States could
do that in 1914, fifty sovereign States can do it in 1936. Similarly, with regard to the revision of treaties, the Covenant provides an instrument of restraint on war in order to provide a period during which it is possible for nations, sovereign though they are, to sit round the conference table under Article 19, in order to consider how to revise existing treaties. I therefore put it to your Lordships that sovereignty is not a fundamental defect, though indeed it may limit the amount of useful work the League can speedily perform.
I come to the second point, which is used by Lord Ponsonby—namely, that the inclusion in the League Covenant of force is in itself an impediment—exactly the opposite view from that of my friend Lord Davies. I wish Lord Ponsonby were here, because I should like to address directly to him, in his presence, this question: Is he being correctly interpreted when he allows it to be stated that he is opposed to the use of force under international auspices?

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When my noble friend Lord Cecil put that construction of his views to him in the debate, he nodded his head in vigorous accord. Lord Ponsonby is not opposed to force as an instrument for international purposes. He is only opposed to the use of force so long as the League membership is incomplete. He has always been clearly prepared for force to be employed as a method of international action from the start if that condition is satisfied. How it is he keeps company with his fellow pacifists, I have never quite been able to understand!
But if I might deal with the point whether force should be sanctioned, I would say you cannot have collective policy through the League for the purposes only of discussion and conciliation whilst, armaments remain in the world. If you have an instrument of discussion and conciliation only, and each of the nations possesses armaments for which you have no collective policy, the inevitable consequence must be that you will have an armaments race taking place simultaneously with your effort to carry on collective discussion. If you leave armaments in the world without a collective policy as to their use, it means that the armaments race will overtop your discussions, and the whole of your efforts will be destroyed. Some of my noble friends take the view, mad as it seems to some people, which I take myself: that there should be no armaments! We do not seek their protection, and we are willing to give them up. That is at least a logical view. But do not say that you will retain arms and that you will have no collective policy for their use.
Before I sit down, may I bring these arguments into the region of the immediate situation? As I see it at the moment, this nation needs the collective force of the League more than any country in the world. We need it for Imperial reasons. I can understand those who say: "Disarm; do not seek to protect your trade routes to India; do not seek to maintain an Empire or to defend it by force." That I understand. But to say we will maintain our arms, we insist upon protecting our routes to India, we insist upon sustaining our Empire, because we believe it is for the benefit of the world that we should do so, and
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will sustain it by force, and then, having made those three propositions, to declare, as the Government are on the verge of doing to-day, that the only part of the world where we will state emphatically and clearly what our policy towards collective force is to be is on the Rhine, is disastrous. You cannot have a widespread Empire and protect your trade routes and then say that the only part of the world where you will act forcibly in an armed world is a particular geographical area where there is no danger at all. The least dangerous part of Europe to-day is the West. If any explosion comes it is coming from Central Europe, or Eastern Europe, or, as I venture to think, in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore to surrender the principle of collective security and replace it by regional security only in a region where danger does not exist, is not realism, it is lunacy.
The second point I would make is this: we need at this political moment to show a renewal of faith in the collective force of the League because of the European negotiations with Germany and France. His Majesty's Government, and Mr. Eden in particular, I believe, merit the good will of all schools of thought, and every section of public opinion, for the gallant effort they have made and are still making to bring into harmony two great nations who have long misunderstood each other—Germany and France. I think the Government have displayed in this matter skill, courage and patience; and if all goes well there is every prospect that at last an agreement can be come to in Europe which will bring these two nations together and give us an opportunity of considering the revisions of the status quo and of the Covenant which we so urgently desire.
But that agreement can never be brought to the point of signature except upon one condition, that collective force shall guarantee it when it is signed. You will never get France to concede the equality which Germany ought to have, and ought to have had long ago, unless she knows that the new agreement will not only be signed but protected. You will never get Germany herself to reveal her bona fides as a contracting State unless we, the British, show as a nation that we are prepared to join collectively in guaranteeing the agreement. Even those of us who understood the injustices

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to which the great German nation has been subjected, are still troubled as to the extent to which we can rely upon Germany to honour an agreement when entered into. We must provide an opportunity whereby Germany, having received her equality, can then be called upon to reveal her integrity as a European Member by our asking her to protect what she has signed, and unless we for our part are prepared through the collective force of the League Covenant to guarantee this agreement, you will never persuade Germany to show her hand.
For those two reasons I do beg that we should not at this critical moment, when critical events are being decided in Abyssinia and European peace is waiting to be achieved, continue to say to other nations publicly in speech after speech, as many of us are doing in this Chamber, that this great Covenant is unavailing, unsuitable for the purpose for which it was created. I beg rather we should say we know it will need to be revised, but we will use it to the full, even as it is, and employ its provisions for the purpose of change as well as to protect the status quo, but we will not at this moment surrender the principle of putting organised collective force behind law while armaments remain in the world. If we do that, we betray the whole structure of the League, which was created out of the agony of the Great War, imperil our own national safety, and ruin any prospect of bringing peace to Europe.
LORD NOEL-BUXTON: My Lords, I desire with great sincerity to join in the congratulations to the noble Viscount, Lord Buckmaster. We all welcome the eloquence which he has shown he has at his command, and I hope we shall very often hear him speaking in this House. My noble friend Lord Davies bases his support of the French plan on the alleged failure of the League, and I agree with my noble friend Lord Allen of Hurtwood that it is most regrettable he should couple the two together. I want to suggest to Lord Davies that whatever good points there may be in the French plan the ground for it is not to be found in the failure of the League. If the French plan requires a repeal of the coercive clauses in the Covenant it seems to me highly dangerous that the question should be opened. Lord Davies urges that alteration follows from failure. There he raises a question of supreme
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importance, because there is no bigger question than the question of peace and war.
I want to say that whatever impression might be given in this House by some speeches made on the Labour Benches, the Labour Party have never wavered in their support of the Covenant as it is, and in its opposition to any repeal weakening the Covenant. To propose an alteration of any kind would be very dangerous at the moment, because it might open the door to the abrogation of vital clauses. It would be a revolution. It would be changing horses while crossing a stream, and especially unfitting at this moment of great international danger. We submit that the case for failure is absolutely unproved. To prove it would necessitate showing that things in the last fifteen years would have been better without the Covenant. The case for the League in regard to the prevention of war in these past years is a very strong one. No fewer than twenty-four disputes have been settled by reference to the Council, and many of them were of a nature which historically leads to war. Some of them referred to questions of frontiers, and if we had not had in existence the coercive powers under Articles 10 and 16, humanly speaking many of them must have led to war.
The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, in the last debate on the League of Nations, gave cases in which the League intervened and stopped wars. Perhaps he might have added the high probability of war in the difference, two years ago, between Hungary and Yugoslavia. It is true that in the case of Manchuria we registered a failure, but was there any demand for the repeal of clauses of the Covenant because of that failure? No cry was then raised that the result of the existence of the Covenant was to deceive States which hoped for its protection. The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, said it makes our position now equivocal, but if so, that surely ought to have been raised with greater strength in the Manchurian crisis. It seems to me very plain that in the past we should have been worse off without the coercive clauses.
But what about the present? Whether sanctions against Italy are to be continued or not—we are not debating that

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at the moment—the League has a function in, the settlement of the Abyssinian question. Italy, for instance, signed the Slavery Convention; Italy has a representative on the Slavery Commission. At the very least let us hope that conditions will be imposed which will result in some of the conditions inherent in the mandates—the prohibition of the raising of black armies, and the open door to trade, for example. We ought not to despair at least of some League supervision, some League Commissioner, I should hope—that is the very least of our aims. But what possibility will there be of arriving at such conditions if the coercive clauses of the Covenant are previously removed? I should like to ask my noble friend Lord Davies how we should be better off now in regard to the Abyssinian question if we substitute the French plan for the Covenant or if we modify the Covenant in any way.
When the Covenant is attacked the assumption is that Articles 10 and 16 are to go. But what is likely to happen then in future cases? Is it not easy to imagine many possible wars which might follow from abrogation? Let us grant that the coercion of great Powers is an ambitious thing, which in the opinion of experts hardly comes within possibility at the moment. But is there no danger from the action of smaller Powers? All the defeated States in the Great War have claims on strong grounds. Hungary might very well quarrel about the Slovaks, or she might quarrel with Serbia. Turkey might very well quarrel with Greece or with Bulgaria. Bulgaria has no less than a quarter of her population under alien rule. And now those States are practically free to raise armies if they want to. It is very possible that those States might seek to use force in insisting on their just claims. And small wars are very likely to set alight the powder magazine. That was the fear in 1921 and 1926, which led to the peremptory stopping of the two wars of those years. Surely it would be madness to abandon authority; it might paralyse the League in taking action to prevent wars, even on a small scale. It would be no solution if the League were reduced to a debating society, and we might very bitterly repent what had been done if the amendment of the Covenant were put through by the Assembly this year.
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But then critics point to the new situation which has arisen, as an answer to any claim which may be made for the success of the League in the past. I would like to ask those critics what new fact there is which is really to the bad in regard to the coercive powers. The new fact this year is that great hopes were raised last autumn by Sir Samuel Hoare's statement at Geneva in September—quite thrilling hopes that even a great Power like Italy could be headed off, and that now there is naturally a sense of great disappointment. Thousands of people were converted to enthusistic support by the prospect of successful coercion for the first time on a great scale. But surely, on logical grounds, to cool-headed people that disappointment ought to have been far greater in the case of Manchuria. The new thing was that Italy was near, that people were far more interested, that the public was keenly concerned, as it was not in the case of Manchuria. The new fact is in public feeling, public emotion, in a mood which now exists and leads to a feeling that we should throw up the sponge. But to be governed by emotion at such a moment would hardly be level-headed.
The real new fact that critics of the League neglect is the new attitude of France. Nothing could be more explicit than the statement of M. Blum, and if to be governed by new facts is the rule of the day, there are facts which cut the other way. There is the fact that the League has been in action on a great scale. Sceptics had never expected that sanctions could really be organised. Even German opinion was gravely impressed up to the time of the Laval incident by the fact that sanctions were in operation. It was the defection of France which destroyed the influence of sanctions on Germany. It is hardly a moment to drop machinery, which only requires good will to make it work, at the moment when good will is furnished in the country most vital to its success. At this late hour let me cut my remarks short, but I should like to say that if there has been any impression that in the Labour Party there is any stampede against the League, nothing could be more mistaken. My noble friend Lord Snell, who so often shows a philosophic insight in his speeches, was I think very just when he said last week that to

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exaggerate the faults of the League is an indulgence on our part. It is a natural mood in these days, but it would be unworthy of our statesmanship to yield to a mood. He is also right in the view that if we revise the Covenant all the enemies of the League—and there are many—will seize the opportunity to rob it of authority. To open the door to revision would, it seems to me, be dangerous in the last degree.
The official Labour Party's statement on this question—namely, the speech made by Mr. Arthur Henderson at a Labour Party Conference in 1933—dealt with the particular matter of the morals to be drawn from apparent failure. He said:
"Can it be said that what has happened has proved the errors of the law, the institutions, and the practices of which the League of Nations is composed; or has it simply proved that the Governments have not observed the law?"
And he went on:
" So long as it was rightly used, the machinery of the League gave results (in many different spheres of activity) which far exceeded the expectations of those who set it up…the remedy for recent failure lies, not in scrapping the Covenant, but in resolving that it shall be properly applied."
The Labour Party is as convinced now as then of the value of the coercive clauses of the Covenant. I think it is true that the alternative is to return to the conditions which led up to 1914.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EARL STANHOPE): My Lords, the noble Lord who has just sat down has given us what I understand is the official version of the Labour Party's policy in regard to the League. I do not think any of us on this side of the House feel any doubts whatever as to their support of the League as a whole. Where we have had doubt—and I confess my doubts have been rather increased by his speech than otherwise—is that they do not seem to realise that the League Covenant entails very heavy obligations in any part of the world, and they do not seem to realise that you cannot faithfully hope to undertake these obligations unless you have adequate forces of your own. It is quite hopeless for the Labour Party to put forward as a practical policy that of supporting the Covenant of the League and at the same time saying they are
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prepared to vote against any increase in our own arms.
LORD STRABOLGI: We have not done anything of the kind.
EARL STANHOPE: The Labour Party has never voted against an increase in our arms?
LORD STRABOLGI: We have just published a full, thought-out policy on this matter, and we declare quite definitely—I make a present of this to the noble Earl—we are in favour of the necessary force for a system of collective security.
EARL STANHOPE: As I understand, in another place there has been considerable criticism of the amounts put forward in the Budget and in the Estimates of the three Defence Services by the present Government as being too great. I do not know how the noble Lord reconciles that with the statement he has just made.
LORD STRABOLGI: As this is very important, I hope the noble Earl will allow me. I have tried to deal with this matter myself, probably inadequately, but because we criticise the inefficient extravagance of the Government in the present uncoordinated state of our defences, that is not to say we would not vote for the efficient forces necessary for a system of collective security.
EARL STANHOPE: I only hope that the critics of the proposals of the Government are a great deal more definite and more accurately informed than they appear to be from the debates I have read, because as I understand it from a good many speeches—I happen to be interested in these matters, as the noble Lord knows—I have found much more general criticism of the amount of money involved than of the method that is being pursued. If I am wrong, I hope that situation will be made very clear not only in another place but in the country at large, because then we shall get complete agreement that the first essential, if we are going to exert our proper influence as a Member of the League or as the centre of the Commonwealth of Nations which we are, is that our forces shall be kept up to date and shall be modernised and adequate. I think I have had to say on a previous occasion in this House that if only our forces had been

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not only stronger, but recognised throughout the world as being stronger—which is rather a different matter—it is quite possible that some of the crises through which we have passed in the last few years might never have occurred. That holds completely true to-day, and that is why His Majesty's Government are taking every step with the utmost rapidity they can to see that that fault in our present arrangements is rectified at the earliest possible moment.
The noble Lord opposite referred to the attitude of France. May I point out to him that the new Government of France has not yet taken office, and it remains to be seen whether the statements which have been made by various Leaders in France are actually put into operation when they are faced with responsibility. I am afraid most of us who have been some time in political life have heard of speeches being made on the hustings and elsewhere which sometimes do not coincide with action when the Party in question take office. I am afraid that is not only true of this country, and although I dislike the phrase, and always have disliked it, I am afraid in regard to France it is a question of "wait and see." I really have very little to say in regard to the general question to which your Lordships have devoted most of your speeches because, as I understand, they have been a continuation of the debate which was recently spread over three days. Therefore, I have very little—in fact nothing—new to say to your Lordships on that matter.
I may say that, although I have been just over thirty years a member of your Lordships' House, one of the best maiden speeches which I have ever heard was the one that delighted us all this evening. We were all glad that the noble Viscount, Lord Buckmaster, has made so brilliant a beginning in this House. Many of us have rejoiced over speeches made by his most distinguished father, whom I have heard described as being not only the best speaker in your Lordships' House but the best speaker in Parliament. I cannot speak of the other House, but that was certainly true as regards this House. With the promise we have heard to-day we have hopes that once again the hereditary principle has justified itself. I see that noble Lords
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opposite are inclined to scoff, but I have known many cases of the same kind, and we all hope, as has been said from many quarters, that Lord Buckmaster will attend our debates regularly and will take a really great part in our discussions. May I say, as perhaps a very old member of the House, one of the things I rejoiced most of all to observe was that the noble Viscount was clearly audible in every part of this House—a matter I am afraid that is not very frequent in some of our speeches.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, to whom I apologise for not having heard the first few minutes of his speech—I confess I was trying to overhaul arrears of work at the Foreign Office—took in particular the paragraph which I suspected would interest him—namely, that referring to what he has often described as an International Police Force and what in fact is described as forces of mutual assistance composed of land, sea and air forces. I rejoiced to find that the noble Lord, for the greater part of his speech, gave up that phrase which I have always regarded as so misleading—the International Police Force—and used the much more accurate one—the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Some of the principles in the French scheme are, as your Lordships know, principles which we support most warmly. It begins with the principle which I think your Lordships will remember we brought out in our questions which we addressed to the Government of the German Reich—namely, that
" the first basis of international relations must be the recognition of equality of rights and of the independence of all States together with respect for engagements undertaken,"
and that there is no durable peace between nations if this peace is subject to the fluctuating ambitions and needs of each people. That seemed to be somewhat forgotten in the debate to which we have just listened. Unless agreements, whatever they may be, are not only accepted but followed faithfully by the nations who sign their names to them, then all hope of international peace and international security must come to an end. I for one feel that it is on the security of the signature rather than on the security based on international forces that we must rely if we are going to maintain the peace of Europe.

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The noble Lord, Lord Davies, seemed to think that every nation had sinned, and that we ought, every one of us, to sit in sackcloth and ashes. I gathered he alone was right. He has in season and out of season put forward his scheme of this International Police Force, and as he proceeded to say that that was the only thing that could save us hereafter, I suppose that he alone is absolved from having to kneel in the confessional. Frankly I had rather hoped he might have read some of the debate of last week, and have taken to heart the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. The noble Viscount remarked that we had been trying to get a national police force for a good many years and had failed to do so even in this small country, and therefore the proposed International Police Force for the world, while it might be an ideal, at any rate was one that was hopelessly impracticable and not likely to be put into effect during the lifetime of any one of us.
The noble Lord, Lord Arnold, as has happened before, showed his hostility to and doubts of France and of her policy. Well, let us realise this, that warmly as we support ideas of peace, I do not think even we can claim to have any superiority over the French in that respect. I doubt if there is any part of this country, or any class in this country, which is more firmly convinced of the vital necessity of peace than the French people as a whole. Let us at any rate realise that we have that great interest in common, and that we, the two great democracies of Western Europe, have not only ideas of peace in common, but many others too. Do not let us try to find every opportunity for criticising a nation which has so much in common with us as France. Let us see, not only in regard to France but to other nations, whether we cannot find the highest common factor in which we can work together instead of the greatest number of cases where we disagree. The noble Lord criticised the idea of the European Commission. May I point out that the references to the European Commission in the French plan are extremely indefinite? That is one of the reasons why I can say very little about the plan because so much of it is really in very general terms and, of course, it will depend how it is worked out when it comes down to details. But to say that the European Commission will have a two-thirds
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majority of France and her Allies is something at any rate that I cannot find in the French scheme. It might work that way; on the other hand it might equally well work the other way.
May I in passing refer to another point which several of your Lordships appear to have disregarded? There seems to be a general idea that there is no alternative between the League of Nations and the situation prior to 1914. That idea was criticised, I think by Lord Arnold, as being not true, and he said that there were various other alternatives. May I point out that in point of fact you may get the League of Nations coming to be the same thing as the situation in 1914, and for this reason, that if you get great nations staying outside the League of Nations you will once again get a balance of power of the people inside the League and the people outside the League. That, I venture to say, is perhaps the most dangerous situation into which we can drift, and it is one we have very carefully to consider and see how it can be avoided. But to continue as we are, with a number of small nations unlikely to fulfil their proper quota of defensive forces and unwilling to shoulder the responsibility of taking collective action against some stronger nation which may be near them, may end in the League and those who support the League being left in a very much weaker position than those who are opposed to it or those who are outside it. That will mean the destruction not only of the League but of the ideals which are behind the League, which is a very much greater thing. Therefore do not Jet us nail our colours to the mast now, until we have had a great deal more opportunity of considering the whole situation of the League as it is.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Buxton, that the efforts which the League have made have been very remarkable in that they have gone as far as they have, but he also will recognise, which I really feel he did not quite recognise, the failures which, I am bound to say, I think we now must agree have occurred in regard to the Abyssinian question. It is no good our disguising the fact that we did hope that Abyssinia would remain on her feet long enough for the effect of economic sanctions to be so severely felt by Italy, the aggressor, that she might have to stop the war. That has

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not happened for a variety of reasons, one being, that Abyssinia collapsed much sooner than most of us expected, as I think owing to the use of gas. Therefore it is no good our pretending that the action of the League has had the effect that we all hoped; nor has it prevented Italy from getting possession of a very large part of Abyssinia or the collapse of the Abyssinian forces. As I have said on move than one occasion, this question is not yet at an end, and therefore it is too early to come to hasty decisions on the matter. As your Lordships know, the Council of the League will meet again in the middle of next month when the whole of these matters will come under careful consideration.
LORD NOEL-BUXTON: May I interrupt the noble Earl? I would like to be clear on this. Does the noble Earl mean that the failure in regard to Abyssinia was due to the clauses of the Covenant?
EARL STANHOPE: As the noble Lord knows, the clauses of the Covenant are not so definite that one can say it is owing to the clauses of the Covenant being defective or to the way in which they have been worked; but I would say this, that if the clauses are so indefinite, or if nations are not prepared to go further than they have done and to carry out their obligations more fully than has been the case on this occasion, then the Covenant is an insecure foundation on which to build the peace and security of nations. It is not merely a question of the terms of the Covenant, but how far all nations are prepared to carry them out, and to take the risk which that entails. The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, in letters to the Press, has stated that it really comes down to the question: What is a nation prepared to fight for? That, in the end, is I think a true statement, and one that must be asked in regard to the action of this or any other nation, and how far we may expect support for the obligations of the League.
The noble Lord, Lord Allen of Hurtwood, thought that it was absurd that there should be any idea of regional agreements for Western Europe where, he said, there was no danger. I hope he is right, but I think it is a statement that he would find would receive very little support in France or other parts of Western Europe. Once again I must say that to ask people in this country
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to undertake obligations, not only to impose economic sanctions but to undertake risks which may involve war, and perhaps will involve war, is a responsibility which the Government would face with considerable doubt and misgiving unless the interest of the security of this nation were involved sufficiently.
LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD: How then does the noble Earl intend to bring about the circumstances which will enable an agreement to be signed between Germany, France, Britain, and the other European countries?
EARL STANHOPE: Because I think the interests of those three countries have sufficient in common to make an agreement possible. At least that is my hope. But as the noble Lord knows, it will require an enormous amount of investigation, and we have asked a great many questions of Germany. If we can clarify the situation and improve the feeling between France and Germany we may be able to get an agreement which will not only be in the interests of those two countries but very much in our own interests. That was the reason why we originally signed the Locarno Treaty. Our interests are so bound up with Western Europe that we felt justified in undertaking that obligation additional to the obligations under the Covenant. That was our reason when the Rhine question arose and France asked us to give her a guarantee as we had given a guarantee to France, Germany and Belgium when we signed the Locarno Treaty.
I agree with several noble Lords in regard to the dislike expressed of the terms of the Motion of the noble Lord opposite. I venture to think that, in the first part, it goes a great deal too far in criticising the League, and I should be unwilling to agree to the second part in its entirety, because it not only asks us to give the French plan our earnest consideration, which of course we shall do, but it suggests that it is by far the best method we can adopt at the present moment. What has happened, as your Lordships know, is that the Locarno Powers have referred the French plan to the League of Nations for careful examination, and it is proposed that that and the German plan shall be considered there together. The Government are not going to neglect their obligations in

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that respect, nor will they hesitate to put forward another plan if they think that plan a better one. We are not going to hide behind other nations and not fulfil our obligations. As I have said, we are particularly anxious to try and get an agreement between these two great nations in Europe, and we believe that if we can succeed in that we shall lay the foundation not only of peace in Western Europe, but in a great part of the rest of Europe as well. I am afraid I have nothing more to say to your Lordships—I said a great deal only last week—and I can only add that I cannot accept the noble Lord's Motion for the reasons I have given.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, before the noble Lord exercises his right of reply, may I be allowed, as these debates attract considerable notice outside your Lordships' House and even outside this country, to put before the noble Earl and the great Department in which he serves, the attitude of British Labour towards armaments? A very important decision has to be taken by the Government, and I do not want them to be under any misapprehension as to where we stand. I hold in my hand a declaration made by the National Council of Labour on May 5. The National Council of Labour consists, as the noble Earl knows full well, of the Trade Union Congress Executive, the National Executive and the Parliamentary Executive of the Party. It therefore can be taken as fully representative, all those three bodies being elected and not nominated. On this question the National Council of Labour said:
"The collective organisation of security means that there must be forces available to carry out the decisions of the League. British Labour believes that the test way to ensure this is by the ultimate creation of an international force and the reduction of all national armed forces to the lowest possible level."
"Ultimate" is the one word to which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will object. The declaration goes on:
"Meanwhile, it is prepared for this country to make its proper contribution to the collective forces which are necessary for the preservation and defence of peace. The forces to be brought against an established aggressor must have such strength, organisation and direction as to make them an effective deterrent."
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That sets out our position as lately as May 5 of this year, and I hope it will be taken notice of by the noble Earl and his advisers.
EARL STANHOPE: I take note of it, but I must say straight away that it seems far from being clear or definite.
LORD DAVIES: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Earl opposite for his reply on behalf of the Government and for the assurance he has given us that the Government are considering both the French and the German proposals, and that they intend, if necessary, to introduce a plan of their own. I do not propose to impose upon the indulgence of your Lordships by endeavouring to answer all the points which have been raised during this discussion. All I would venture to say in reply to my noble friend Lord Allen is that my Motion was not intended to criticise the League. All I wanted to say was that the League, like every human institution, must either recede or go forward. It must either shrink or develop. It appears to many of us that the moment has now arrived, in view of the experiences of the last few months, when the whole question of remodelling and reforming the League must be considered and undertaken. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

SOCIAL SERVICES IN POLICE COURTS.
VISCOUNT MERSEY: My Lords, I beg to ask the starred Question standing on the Paper in my name.
[The Question was as follows:—To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will bring to the notice of the clerks of petty sessional divisions the recommendations of the Departmental Committee on Social Services.]
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I am obliged to the noble Viscount for giving me an opportunity of making a statement as to the means to be taken to bring the recommendations of the Summary Courts (Social Services) Committee to the notice of those responsible for the administration of the law. It may be expected that many magistrates and their clerks will read the Report itself. I understand that

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about 1,300 copies have already been sold, which suggests that many of those interested are taking steps to acquaint, themselves with the nature of the recommendations. The practice usually followed by the Home Office in matters of this kind is to issue a circular to the justices and their clerks, summarising the main points of a report and making suggestions as to any changes of practice which may be desirable. My noble friend will of course recognise that some of the recommendations of the Committee cannot be carried into effect without legislation. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State is giving the Report his careful consideration, and he authorises me to say that he will bear in mind the desirability of issuing a circular or circulars on the subject to courts of summary jurisdiction as soon as circumstances permit.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I should like to ask a question arising out of the reply given to the noble Viscount. I think it is evident that his intention was that magistrates should be acquainted with the contents of this Report Clearly the Government cannot provide every magistrate with a copy—that would be too expensive—but would it not be possible for the Government to send a copy of the Report to the clerk of every magistrates' court, rather than a mere circular? In a circular it would not be possible to give the reasons for the main recommendations, but I think the point of the noble Viscount would be met more adequately if the Home Office were able to send a copy of this Report to every clerk with the natural suggestion that the attention of the magistrates who sit in his court should be drawn to this document.
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, in reply to that question, I will certainly communicate that suggestion to my right honourable friend; but, as I mentioned in the course of the statement which I read, he is now considering whether it is advisable to send all circulars on the matter to courts of summary jurisdiction. But, as it has not been the custom hitherto to send these Reports, the noble
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Lord is proposing something which I think is new, but I will certainly bring it to the attention of my right honourable friend.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (PLYMPTON SAINT MARY) BILL. [H.L.]
VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to confirm a Provisional Order of the Minister of Health relating to the rural district of Plympton Saint Mary; and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Viscount Gage.)
On Question, Bill read 1a: to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (WEST HARTLEPOOL) BILL. [H.L.]
VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to confirm a Provisional Order of the Minister of Health relating to the Borough of West Hartlepool; and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Viscount Gage.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (RIPON) BILL. [H.L.]
VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to confirm a Provisional Order of the Minister of Health relating to the City of Ripon; and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Viscount Gage.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.
House adjourned at twenty minutes before eight o'clock.